Wikileaks põe à prova relação dos EUA com os seus aliados

[P44]

Mais de 250 mil documentos sobre três anos de diplomacia
Wikileaks põe à prova relação dos EUA com os seus aliados

29.11.2010 - 09:20 Por João Manuel Rocha

EUA alargaram espionagem de líderes estrangeiros. Revelações confirmam preocupações com Teerão e incluem pedido do rei saudita para "cortarem a cabeça da serpente" iraniana.

O Irão obteve da Coreia do Norte mísseis capazes de atingir a Europa Ocidental e o secretário norte-americano da Defesa acredita que qualquer ataque militar a Teerão só atrasaria o programa nuclear iraniano por um a três anos.

As revelações, adiantadas pelo New York Times, constam de documentos de um lote de 250 mil entregues pelo site Wikileaks a um conjunto de jornais, os quais revelam, entre muitos outros aspectos, que os principais financiadores da rede terrorista Al-Qaeda continuam a ser doadores sauditas e que a China desenvolveu uma acção de sabotagem de computadores tendo por alvo os Estados Unidos e os seus aliados.

Informação extraída dos documentos de três anos de diplomacia norte-americana - que incidem principalmente sobre o período final da Presidência de George W. Bush e o inicial de Barack Obama, e vão até Fevereiro deste ano - indicam também que norte-americanos e sul-coreanos discutiram a perspectiva de uma Coreia unificada em caso de implosão do regime de Pyongyang, devido à transição de liderança, ou a problemas económicos.

Outra revelação indica que os EUA pediram aos seus diplomatas para intensificarem a recolha de informações sobre dirigentes estrangeiros. O secretário-geral das Nações Unidas, Ban Ki-moon, e os representantes dos outros membros permanentes no Conselho de Segurança - França, Reino Unido, China e Rússia - foram também vigiados mais de perto.

O Departamento de Estado, revelam os relatórios e telegramas entregues também aos diários Le Monde, The Guardian, El País e à revista Der Spiegel, deu no ano passado aos funcionários de 38 embaixadas e missões diplomáticas uma detalhada relação das informações pessoais e de outra natureza que deviam obter sobre funcionários e representantes das Nações Unidas que se relacionam com o Sudão, Afeganistão, Somália, Irão e Coreia do Norte.

Despachos assinados pela secretária de Estado, Hillary Clinton, dão conta do tipo de elementos que devem ser recolhidos, os quais vão de dados pessoais sobre líderes estrangeiros às opiniões que têm sobre os Estados Unidos, referem os jornais.

Os documentos incluem revelações sobre assuntos como o terrorismo e a ameaça nuclear, mas também retratos cândidos de líderes estrangeiros.

As posições expressas são em muitos casos opiniões de diplomatas, que não vinculam necessariamente as posições oficiais de Washington. Mostram, em todo o caso, uma visão interna sobre o modo como a diplomacia de Washington vê outros Estados e acções que envolvem países como a Coreia do Norte, o Irão ou o Paquistão. "Oferecem um panorama inédito das negociações de bastidores tal como são feitas pelas embaixadas através do mundo", notou o diário norte-americano.

Entre as revelações de ontem à noite - e que em condições normais deveriam permanecer reservadas durante décadas - estão também a de que os EUA vigiam de perto a agenda islamista do primeiro-ministro turco, Recip Erdogan, e que os países árabes pediram a Washington para travar o programa nuclear iraniano por qualquer meio. Parte dos documentos são muito recentes e datam de Fevereiro. Só o tempo vai permitir perceber até que ponto as revelações afectarão as relações dos Estados Unidos com os seus aliados.

O Guardian refere que o rei Abdullah, da Arábia Saudita, "apelou frequentemente" aos EUA para atacarem o Irão, a fim de travar o seu programa nuclear, segundo o embaixador saudita em Washington. O rei aconselhou os norte-americanos a "cortarem a cabeça da serpente" e assumiu que combater a influência iraniana no Iraque era uma prioridade sua e do seu governo, segundo documentos que citam afirmações feitas em Abril de 2008 pelo embaixador saudita em Washington, Adel al-Jubeir.

O embaixador norte-americano em Riade refere num relatório enviado à secretária de Estado Clinton, preparatório da sua visita de Fevereiro deste ano, que Abdullah afirmou que "se o Irão conseguir desenvolver armas nucleares, todos na região farão o mesmo, incluindo a Arábia Saudita". Também Israel pediu a Washington firmeza para com o regime de Teerão.Informações incompletas

Além de considerandos e comentários feitos sobre líderes estrangeiros - será pouco o apreço de representantes dos EUA pelo Presidente francês, Nicolas Sarkozy, e Vladimir Putin é considerado autoritário, por exemplo - os documentos revelados confirmam, segundo El País, a intensa actividade diplomática norte-americana para bloquear o Irão, que o predomínio da China na Ásia é visto como um dado adquiridos, bem como os esforços desenvolvidos junto dos países da América Latina para isolar o líder venezuelano, Hugo Chávez.

A Casa Branca condenou a divulgação de documentos diplomáticos, que referiu como "revelação imprudente de informações classificadas obtidas ilegalmente". As revelações podem pôr em risco vidas de pessoas que "em muitos casos vivem e trabalham em países opressores", diz o comunicado de Robert Gibbs, porta-voz do Presidente Obama. "Trazem riscos para os nossos diplomatas, para os membros da comunidade das informações e para pessoas do mundo inteiro que pedem aos EUA para os ajudar."

As revelações podem, além disso, segundo a administração americana, "comprometer discussões privadas com os dirigentes e chefes de partidos da oposição estrangeiros". "Quando a substância de conversações privadas é impressa na primeira página de jornais de todo o mundo, isso pode afectar profundamente os interesses dos EUA em política estrangeira, mas também a dos nossos amigos e aliados no mundo inteiro."

A preocupação com o impacto da fuga de informações levou nos últimos dias a diplomacia americana a entrar em contacto com diversos governos estrangeiros por causa do dossier Wikileaks. Clinton estabeleceu ela própria contactos com os executivos do Reino Unido, Israel, Austrália, Noruega, China, Dinamarca e Canadá.

A apreensão de Washington terá razão de ser. "Por vezes, as expressões usadas em documentos são de tal natureza que podem dinamitar as relações dos EUA com alguns dos seus principais aliados, noutras podem pôr em risco alguns projectos importantes da sua política externa, como a aproximação à Rússia ou o apoio a certos governos árabes", escreveu o El País.

11 de Setembro da diplomacia

O diário espanhol considera que depois das revelações de ontem "seguramente se poderá falar de um antes e de um depois no que respeita aos hábitos diplomáticos". O ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros de Itália, Franco Frattini, disse ainda antes da divulgação dos documentos, que afirmou desconhecer, que o dia de ontem era o "11 de Setembro da diplomacia mundial". "A essência da nossa política externa é a nossa capacidade para falar frontal e honestamente com os nossos parceiros estrangeiros e manter essas conversações fora do domínio público", comentou à Reuters Roger Cressey, antigo responsável pela cibersegurança dos EUA.

http://www.publico.pt/Mundo/wikileaks-p ... 468605?p=2

http://www.publico.pt/Mundo/eua-alargar ... os_1468526

[soultrain]

Informação revelada pela Wikileaks entala os EUA
02h20m
Augusto Correia *

O site Wikileaks, que já divulgara documentos classificados pelo Governo dos EUA sobre as operações militares no Afeganistão e no Iraque, libertou cerca de 250 mil novos documentos que "constituem a maior fuga de informação secreta de toda a história".

foto FABRICE COFFRINI/AFP
Informação revelada pela Wikileaks entala os EUA
Julian Assange, fundador da Wikileaks


Ignorando os avisos de Washington, mas, precavendo-se contra a reacção da Casa Branca e do Pentágono, que poderiam neutralizar o acesso ao site - que ontem, domingo, esteve incessível -, a Wikileaks libertou a informação a alguns jornais de referência e línguas várias: El País (espanhol), Le Monde (francês), The Guardian e New York Times (língua inglesa) e Der Spiegel (alemã).

A Casa Branca condenou "veementemente" a divulgação "irresponsável e perigosa", alegando que "tais revelações colocam em risco diplomatas, os serviços secretos e as pessoas que apelam aos EUA para que promova a democracia e um Governo transparente".

Segundo o El País, "o alcance destas revelações é de tal calibre que, seguramente, se poderá falar de um antes e um depois, no que diz respeito aos hábitos diplomáticos".

Na lista dos 15 mil documentos a que o El País teve acesso, de um total de 250 mil, há "comentários e relatórios elaborados por funcionários norte-americanos, com uma linguagem muito franca, sobre personalidades de todo o mundo".

Destaca-se, por exemplo, a suspeita norte-americana de que a política russa está nas mãos de Vladimir Putin, "que é considerado um político de perfil autoritário, cujo estilo pessoal machista lhe permite relacionar-se perfeitamente com Silvio Berlusconi".

Do primeiro-ministro italiano, revelam-se pormenores das suas "festas selvagens" e manifesta-se "a desconfiança profunda que desperta em Washington".

A diplomacia norte-americana demonstra também "pouco apreço" pelo Presidente francês, Nicolas Sarkozy, cujos movimentos para criar obstáculos à política externa dos Estados Unidos são "meticulosamente seguidos".

Os documentos "oferecem uma perspectiva inédita das negociações de bastidores tais como as praticam as embaixadas em todo o mundo", observa o New York Times.

O diário britânico The Guardian indica, por exemplo, que o rei Abdallah da Arábia Saudita instou os Estados Unidos a atacarem o Irão para pôr fim ao programa nuclear iraniano.

No conjunto dos mais de 250 mil telegramas do departamento de Estado dos Estados Unidos que abrangem um período até Fevereiro de 2010 e que incidem, na maioria, sobre os últimos dois anos, há ainda referências à Chanceler alemã, Angela Merkel, considerada "pouco criativa".

O secretário-geral da ONU, Ban ki-Moon, os seus assistentes e equipas, as agências da ONU, suas embaixadas e as organizações não governamentais ficaram, assim, sob a permanente espionagem dos diplomatas norte-americanos.

O correio diplomático divulgado pela Wikileaks reproduz os rumores sobre a suposta corrupção do primeiro-ministro turco, Tayyip Erdogan.

Num despacho datado de Maio de 2009, a embaixadora norte-americana Anne W. Patterson afirma que as autoridades paquistanesas recusaram uma visita de especialistas dos EUA às instalações nucleares no Paquistão.

Os documentos revelam, ainda, a forma curiosa como os diplomatas norte-americanos vêem alguns dos líderes mundiais. Da "pele fina" de Sarkozy aos "aspecto flácido" de Kim Jong-II.

[P44]

Wikileaks: 722 telegramas tiveram origem na embaixada dos EUA em Lisboa
Por Redacção

Na lista dos 250 mil documentos classificados que foram divulgados domingo à noite no site Wikileaks, 722 são telegramas com origem na embaixada norte-americana em Lisboa, considerados confidenciais e enviados durante os últimos quatro anos.

Segundo avança a edição online do Público, o conteúdo destes telegramas ainda não é conhecido, mas deverá começar a ser divulgado nos próximos dias no site fundado por Julian Assange.

Sobre os telegramas com origem na capital portuguesa, 415 são de informação não classificada, 292 são documentos confidenciais e 15 são classificados como «secretos». O primeiro documento data de 24 de Maio de 2006, tendo como temas genéricos “Fronteiras entre Estados, Territórios e Soberania”, “Relações Políticas Externas”, “Questões de Política Interna”, “Portugal” e “OSCE”. Já o último é de 25 de Fevereiro deste ano, com referência a “Terroristas e Terrorismo”, “Comunicações e Sistemas de Correios”, “Condições Económicas” e “Relações Políticas Externas”.

A referência ao Iraque aparece por 12 vezes na correspondência que partiu de Lisboa. Já o Afeganistão aparece em 33 telegramas.
11:22 - 29-11-2010

http://www.abola.pt/mundos/ver.aspx?id=234593

[soultrain]

Isto para mim tem mão da China.


Tudo isto não deveria vir a publico, alguma coisa precisa ser feita rapidamente, ou pode haver consequências graves e profundas.

[[]]'s

[prp]

Isto para mim tem mão da China.


Tudo isto não deveria vir a publico, alguma coisa precisa ser feita rapidamente, ou pode haver consequências graves e profundas.

[[]]'s

Eu quero mais é ver o circo pegar fogo. Bando de babacas. Já reparou que eles detonaram todos os seu aliados, e os trantam como capachos, antes era paranóia nossa agora está ai a prova.

E os documentos brasileiros, alguma informação?

[soultrain]

Mas isso é normal, ou acha que a diplomacia Brasileira não é assim? Isto é como conversas dentro de quatro paredes entre marido e mulher, ninguem pode ouvir.

[[]]'s

[Bourne]

Acho que todos os países falam e pensam coisas no particular que deveriam vazar ao público. Ninguém é santo.

Quem fez os documentos virem a público pode ser qualquer um. Seja país ou organização.

[prp]

Mas isso é normal, ou acha que a diplomacia Brasileira não é assim? Isto é como conversas dentro de quatro paredes entre marido e mulher, ninguem pode ouvir.

[[]]'s

Sim, eu sei que é normal, mas os defensores do grande irmão do norte sempre falam que não é verdade, que isso não existe, é paranóia e tudo mais.

[Francoorp]

Dono do Wikileaks diz que o governo Obama parece um "Regime"...



AMMAN (GIORDANIA) - L'amministrazione Obama "si sta trasformando in modo estremamente preoccupante in un regime che non crede nella libertà di stampa" e che ha perseguitato i media più di quanto non abbiano fatto i predecessori: è quanto ha affermato Julian Assange, fondatore del sito Wikileaks, nel video-intervento di ieri ad Amman in Giordania durante la terza conferenza annuale sul giornalismo investigativo arabo.

http://www.tg1.rai.it/dl/tg1/2010/artic ... 79.html#p1

[Francoorp]

Brazil - Em segredo, Brasil monitora e prende suspeitos de terrorismo

Natalia Viana, especial para WikiLeaks

São Paulo, Brasil - A polícia federal e a ABIN seguem dicas da inteligência americana para realizar operações de contraterrorismo no país. É isso que mostram alguns telegramas enviados pela embaixada dos EUA em Brasília para Washington obtidos pelo Wikileaks.

Segundo os documentos - os primeiros de milhares enviados pela missão americana no Brasil obtidos pela organização - a polícia federal e a ABIN (Agência Brasileira de Inteligência) monitoram a presença de suspeitos de terrorismo em solo nacional desde pelo menos 2005.

“A Polícia Federal frequentemente prende indivíduos ligados ao terrorismo, mas os acusa de uma variedade de crimes não relacionados a terrorismo para não chamar a atenção da imprensa e dos altos escalões do governo“, relatou o embaixador Clifford Sobel em janeiro de 2008.

O governo sempre negou a existência de atividades terroristas no Brasil.

Almoço

No dia 4 de maio de 2005, o general Armando Félix esteve em um almoço na casa do então embaixador americano John Danilovich, que ficou no cargo até 2006.

Segundo o relatório enviado a Washington (See cable 05BRASILIA1207), Felix teria dito que é importante que as operações de contraterrorismo sejam ‘maquiadas’ da maneira apropriada para não afetar negativamente a “orgulhosa” e “bem-sucedida” comunidade árabe no Brasil.

Pouco antes, o ministro do Gabinete de Segurança Institucional havia agradecido entusiasmadamente o apoio dos americanos através do RMAS - Regional Movement Alert System, um sistema que detecta passaportes inválidos, perdidos ou falsificados. A partir de informações do RMAS, a ABIN e a PF estariam monitorando "indivíduos de interesse" no país.

"Além das operações conjuntas conosco, o governo brasileiro também está pedindo que filhos de árabes, muitos deles empresários de sucesso, vigiem árabes que possam ser influenciados por extremistas ou grupos terroristas", diz o relato. Para Félix, é de total interesse da comunidade "manter potenciais extremistas na linha", evitando assim chamar a atenção mundial para os árabes brasileiros.

A preocupação em manter segredo sobre as operações anti-terrorismo foi uma constante durante o goveno Lula. Desde 2006, a administração tem protestado contra menções de atividades ligadas ao terrorimo na tríplice fronteira com o Paraguai e a Argentina, incluídas no relatório anual do governo dos EUA.

Em parte, isso se deve a uma discrepância formal: o governo americano considera o partido libanês Hezbollah e o palestino Hamas como terroristas, enquanto o Itamaraty os considera partidos legítimos. Os dois têm grande apoio dentre a comunidade árabe na tríplice fronteira.

Prisões "disfarçadas"

Mas para além das diferenças no discurso, os documentos vazados pelo Wikileaks mostram que na prática a polícia brasileira age frequentemente a partir de informações da inteligência americana.

"A sensibilidade ao assunto resulta em parte do medo da estigmatização da grande comunidade islâmica no Brasil ou de que haja prejuízo para a imagem da região (da tríplice fronteira) como destino turístico. Também é uma postura pública que visa evitar associação à guerra ao terror dos EUA, vista como demasiado agressiva", analisa outro embaixador americano, Clifford Sobel, que esteve no cargo de 2006 a 2010.

Segundo o telegrama enviado por ele em 8 de janeiro de 2008 (LINK - 136564), a preocupação em não admitir atividades suspeitas de terrorismo seria maior ainda dentro do Ministério de Relações Exteriores. Por isso, diz Sobel, o Brasil participa "relutantemente" das reuniões anuais sobre segurança que reúne diplomatas, oficiais de segurança e inteligência da Argentina, Paraguai e Brasil com os EUA para discutir segurança na tríplice fronteira.

Na verdade, a região não é prioridade quando se trata de terrorismo. "A principal preocupação em contraterrorismo tanto para oficiais brasileiros quanto para a missão americana é a atividade de indivíduos ligados ao terrorismo - em particular diversos suspeitos extrermistas sunitas e alguns indivíduos ligados ao Hezbollah - em São Paulo e em outras áreas do sul do Brasil", relata Sobel.

O telegrama revela que, apesar da retórica em contrário, a Polícia Federal, a Receita Federal e a Abin "monitoram" atividades suspeitas de terrorismo e "seguem todos as pistas passadas a elas".

"A Polícia Federal frequentemente prende indivíduos ligados ao terrorismo, mas os acusa de uma variedade de crimes não relacionados a terrorismo para não chamar a atenção da imprensa e dos altos escalões do governo”, diz um trecho do telegrama secreto. “No ano passado a Polícia Federal prendeu vários indivíduos envolvidos em atividades suspeitas de financiamento de terrorismo mas baseou essas prisões em acusações de tráfico de drogas ou evasão fical". A PF e a Abin sempre compartilham essas informações com as agências americanas, diz o relato.

O mesmo telegrama de Sobel cita dois exemplos. Em 2007, a PF teria preso um potencial faclitador terrorista sunita que operava primordialmente em Santa Catarina sob acusação de entrar no país sem declarar fundos - e estaria trabalhano pela sua deportação. A operação Byblos, que desmantelou uma quadrilha de falsifcação de documentos brasileiros no Rio de Janeiro para libaneses também é citada como exemplo de operação de contra-terrorismo.

Será que o governo sabe?

O Brasil não tem legislação específica sobre terrorismo, em parte por causa do legado da ditadura militar, que taxa oposicionistas de terroristas. A demora do Executivo em enviar um projeto de lei sobre tema ao Congresso desagrada aos americanos, como mostra outro relatório, enviado por Sobel em 11 de abril de 2008 (See Cable 08BRASILIA504).

Nele, o embaixador comenta com surpresa o comentário de José Antonio de Macedo Soares, secretário-adjunto do Gabinete de Segurança Institucional, de que o Brasil compartilha todas as informações referentes a contraterrorismo. Ele questiona se o alto escalão do governo recebe as mesmas informações da inteligência brasileira que os EUA recebem. "Embora não possamos responder definitivamente, os comentários de Soares sugerem que esse pode ser o caso e que, apesar das negativas, eles reconhecem os problemas potenciais que o Brasil enfrenta".

Outra possibilidade seria que o governo tem acesso às informações, mas não as consideram evidência de ação terrorista. "Isso significa que ou estão jogando conosco ou consideram terrorismo apenas fora do Brasil".

Duplo discurso

Outro documento publicado pelo WikiLeaks traz a mais recente avaliação da política brasileira de combate ao terrorismo, de 31 de dezembro de 2009 (See Cable 09BRASILIA1540). Nele, a Ministra Conselheira da Embaixada Lisa Kubiske reitera a existência de "dois discursos separados" no Brasil: enquanto o governo nega, a polícia monitora e colabora em operações de contraterrorismo. Ela cita como exemplo a prisão, em maio daquele ano, de um integrante da Al Qaeda.

A prisão foi feita pela PF em São Paulo durante uma pretensa investogação sobre células nazistas. O libanês, conhecido como "senhor K", foi preso sob acusação de racismo. Para a PF, ele coordenava uma célula de comunicação e recrutamento da Al Qaeda em São Paulo.

Na época, o presidente Lula se negou a comentar o assunto.

No seu telegrama Lisa Kubiske avalia como positivo o fato a notícia ter vindo a público. Ela também elogia o Ministério das Relações Exteriores por ter admitido que terroristas podem se interessar no Brasil por causa das Olimpíadas de 2016.

Entre outras coisas, o relatório de dezembro de 2009 elogia atuação do Conselho de Controle de Atividades Financeiras (Coaf) ligado ao Ministério da Fazenda, chamando-o de "eficiente".

De fato, diversos documentos obtidos pelo Wikileaks mostram que o COAF tem colaborado bastante com o governo americano, investigando bens de diversos suspeitos de terrorismo. Entretanto, como aponta Lisa Kubiske, até o final de 2009 nenhum bem ou propriedade havia sido encontrado. O telegrama serviu de base para a avaliação oficial dos EUA sobre o Brasil em 2010.

Os documentos fazem parte de 251 mil telegramas enviados pelas embaixadas americanas de todo o mundo ao Departamento de Estado entre 1966 e 2010 que serão publicados pelo WikiLeaks nas próximas semanas.

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/articles ... ora-e.html


------------------------------------------------------

Telegramas Diplomáticos da Embaixada Yankee de Brasilia para Washington:

(See cable 05BRASILIA1207):

Viewing cable 05BRASILIA1207, BRAZIL: Ambassador's Lunch with General Jorge Armando Felix, Minister for Institutional Security

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Reference ID Date Classification Origin
05BRASILIA1207 2005-05-06 15:03 SECRET Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T BRASILIA 001207

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2015
TAGS: PINR PREL BR Bilateral Relations with the US
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: Ambassador's Lunch with General Jorge Armando Felix, Minister for Institutional Security

Classified by Ambassador John J. Danilovich for reasons 1.4 (B),(C) and(D).

1.(S) Ambassador hosted General Jorge Armando Felix, Minister for Institutional Security, for lunch at the residence on 4 May 2005. While General Felix has much less influence than his predecessor from the previous government, he is still the country's most senior intelligence official and the rough equivalent of national security advisor to the president. In addition to his own staff at the Ministry for Institutional Security (GSI), which contains representatives from the various Brazilian Government security and foreign relations agencies, General Felix is also responsible for overseeing the Brazilian National Intelligence Agency (ABIN).

2.(S) The Tri-Border Region: The Ambassador asked General Felix for an assessment of the transnational crime situation in the tri-border region of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. General Felix admitted that there were serious problems in the region and that the illegal movement of arms, money, drugs and the like through the region was of concern to the Brazilian Government. Felix said that both ABIN and the Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) were devoting additional personnel and resources to the problem and noted that ABIN even had some joint programs with RMAS that were focused on these issues.

3.(S) Counterterrorism: This led to a discussion on terrorism issues/operations in the tri-border region and throughout Brazil. General Felix said that ABIN worked closely with RMAS in jointly targeting individuals of interest, and the Ambassador expressed his appreciation for this assistance. General Felix said that in addition to the joint operations that we were working together, the Brazilian government was also appealing to moderate, second generation Arabs, many of whom were successful businessmen in Brazil, to keep a close eye on fellow Arabs who may be influenced by Arab extremists and/or terrorist groups. General Felix said that it was in the interest of these moderate, Arabs to keep potential firebrands in line and keep the microscope off of the Arab community in Brazil. General Felix said that the recently murdered former prime minister of Lebanon sent that same message to the Arab community in Brazil during a visit a few years back. General Felix said that it was important that counterterrorism operations were packaged properly so as not to negatively reflect on the proud and successful Arab community in Brazil.

4.(S) Venezuela: Following the CT discussion, the Ambassador raised Venezuela and its president Hugo Chavez and noted that Chavez was disrupting Brazil's efforts to play a leading role politically and economically in South America. General Felix nodded his head and appeared to be very carefully measuring his response. He then said that he had his own personal opinions about Chavez (which he did not share) that were different from the Brazilian Government?s position. That being said, General Felix said that he preferred keeping in line with the official position (though he did not elaborate on it either). Felix noted that whether one was pro- or anti-Chavez, he had become very much a part of the "Latin American" reality.

5.(S) Additional Assistance: The Ambassador asked General Felix if there were any areas where the USG could better assist the GSI and/or ABIN. Felix said that he was very happy with the assistance currently being provided by the USG. One area where he claimed that the Brazilian Government was falling behind was in protecting its own classified and unclassified computer systems. Felix said that he would welcome any assistance (courses, visitors, etc.) in this area. Felix also said that he was trying to beef up the GSI and ABIN's SIGINT capabilities and could always use some assistance along those lines. 6.(S) Embassy Comment: General Felix is an amiable, low- key individual. He does not appear overly ambitious and admitted that he preferred traveling for the sake of pleasure as opposed to business. He is not someone who will make waves, and this likely contributed to his walking carefully through the Venezuela discussion. The above being said, General Felix has always been a straightforward interlocutor, and his term at GSI has been highlighted by very cooperative, joint CT operations between RMAS and ABIN. All in all, his continued presence at GSI bodes well for U.S. interests. DANILOVICH 2005-05-06


(See Cable 08BRASILIA504):

Viewing cable 08BRASILIA504,

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Help us extend and defend this work
Reference ID Date Classification Origin
08BRASILIA504 2008-04-11 19:07 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO0361
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0504/01 1021934
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RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5428
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 6101
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 000504

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR WHA, WHA/BSC, AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018

TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KCRM ETTC EFIN ASEC AR BR

REF: A. BRASILIA 000440 B. BRASILIA 000579 C. SAO PAULO 000991 D. SAO PAULO 000532

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Phil Chicola.
Reasons 1.4 B and D

¶1. (C) Summary: In November of last year the Government of Brazil announced that it was backtracking on its effort to introduce counterterrorism (CT) legislation after a years-long effort by a working group within the Presidency's Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) to coordinate the drafting of the initiative within the government. Although they now seek to downplay the importance of having such legislation, prior to the reversal GOB officials claimed that new anti-terrorism legislation was necessary to improve its legal regime--which currently does not treat terrorist activities, terrorism financing, or support of terrorism as crimes. Some news reports have suggested that President Lula's powerful chief of staff quashed the proposed legislation, which had been attacked by some social activists and advocacy groups who feared it could be used against them and compared it to military era repression. The media and political silence that greeted the government's reversal has exposed a vacuum on matters pertaining to terrorism among the elites whose support would be required to overcome GOB resistance. As a result, our efforts to put this legislation back on Brazil's agenda will be an uphill climb. End Summary.

¶2. (U) This cable is the second of two that looks at the Brazilian government's latest actions to counter terrorist activities. The first touched on Brazil's reform of its intelligence and counterterrorism structure.

No Crime Without a Law to Define It

¶3. (U) In 2004, the GOB formed a working group within GSI, the Presidency's office in charge of coordinating intelligence, counternarcotics and national security, charged with examining Brazilian laws related to terrorism, as well as the way the government was structured to deal with the challenges posed by international terrorists (ref A). Prior to this effort, Brazilian government officials and outside observers had concluded that Brazilian laws dealing with terrorism were ambiguous and needed updating to account for modern realities (refs B and C). Under Brazilian law, terrorist acts, their financing, and activities supporting terrorist acts are not considered crimes. Both the Brazilian constitution and the National Security Act (Public Law 7.170 of 1983), which defines crimes against national security, criminalize acts of terrorism in general. However, because the National Security Act harkens back to the military regime, Embassy contacts have indicated that it is highly unlikely the government would ever use it to charge someone with a crime related to a terrorist activity (Ref B). In addition, because terrorism under that law is proscribed without being typified, even in the unlikely case someone attempted to test the prevailing wisdom on the applicability of a military-era national security law to charge someone with the crime of attempting to commit an act of terrorism, they probably would be unable to do so. The Act specifically proscribes criminal acts that could be considered acts of terrorism, such as sabotage and bombings, but only as distinct crimes from terrorism. Because of this, terrorist activities consisting of defined crimes under the law could not be charged explicitly as terrorism.

Domestic Politics to Blame

¶4. (U) As soon as news reports started surfacing in early 2007 that GSI was about to wrap up its work, the government started coming under fire from opponents of the bill. The BRASILIA 00000504 002 OF 004 influential Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (OAB, the Brazilian bar association) criticized the government for pushing legislation that was, according to OAB's president Cezar Britto, in reality a thinly veiled move to criminalize the actions of social movements and those fighting for equality. Forced on the defensive, several high-ranking GSI officials publicly suggested that any anti-terrorism legislation would be rarely used and that judges would have discretion in applying it. Then in late November 2007, the government unceremoniously announced that it would not introduce the legislation to Congress.

¶5. (C) In a meeting with Poloff, Assistant Secretary Jose Antonio de Macedo Soares of the Secretariat for Monitoring and Institutional Studies, at GSI (and Ministry of External Relations representative to GSI, where he holds the rank of minister) and GSI advisor Janer Tesch Hosken Alvarenga explained that it was impossible to reach consensus within the government on how to define terrorism. Asked to confirm a news item in the daily newspaper Correio Braziliense noting that Minister Dilma Rousseff (chief of staff to President Lula in the Casa Civil) had quashed the proposal, Alvarenga equivocated, suggested that several "clients" had weighed in, including the Ministry of Justice. In the end, he did not deny the news report, stating that the decision had been a "political" one.

¶6. (SBU) A Brazilian War College analyst on strategic intelligence and author of numerous articles on counterterrorism topics, Andre Luis Soloszyn, went farther, asserting to poloff that the Correio story sounded very credible to him, and that the GSI working group was a smokescreen for the government to demonstrate to the US and the international community that it was taking the issue of counterterrorism seriously. Soloszyn noted that there was little chance that this particular government, stacked with leftist militants who had been the object of military dictatorship-era laws designed to repress politically-motivated violence, was going to put forth a bill that would criminalize the actions of groups it sympathizes with, such as the Landless Movement (MST), for "there is no a way to write an anti-terrorism legislation that excludes the actions of the MST".

An Idea Whose Time Has Come(and Gone

¶7. (C) Asked if there was a possibility the legislation could come back some time in the future, both Soares and Alvarenga were pessimistic. Commenting on the enormously complex nature of the issue, Alvarenga noted that discussions of terrorism within Brazilian society remain at an immature stage, with few experts on the topic and very few people interested. Soares added that people within and outside the government find the possibility of a terrorist attack taking place on Brazilian soil so improbable that they are incapable of giving the issue much attention.

¶8. (SBU) Soloszyn echoed these comments, indicating that he is one of the few individuals to focus on the issue of terrorism outside the government. Within the government, the story is not much different, he added, and virtually no one in Congress was focused on the issue. Most legislators and general public are so in the grip of the "it can't happen here" mentality that they lack any idea of terrorist tactics, the concept of support networks, the threat of homegrown terrorism, and exploitation of soft targets. According to Soloszyn, the issue of potential pockets of Islamic extremism among segments of Brazil's large Muslim community is likewise an unstudied subject among specialists, and unthinkable as a proposition among the public at large. The Brazilian mind even among the highest echelons of the government, he added, can't get past its own cliches about the multicultural paradise that is Brazil.

¶9. (SBU) According to him, the only factor that could change this indifference is another wave of violence like that unleashed by the First Capital Command (PCC) in Sao Paulo in 2006 (ref D). Terrorism perpetrated by Islamic extremists is too remote for Brazilians to worry about. The only way they are going to move on this, he added, is when it affects them on a daily basis. (Comment: In the immediate aftermath of the PCC's violence in 2006, President Lula called their actions terrorism, and made noises about finally getting some anti-terrorism legislation on the books. End comment.)

"We have to Stop this Farce"

¶10. (C) In his conversation with poloff, Soares dismissed the importance of the government's reversal, arguing that the success of any potential terrorist attack against the Israeli Embassy in Brasilia is not going to be determined by whether there is a law on the books outlawing terrorism. Brazil, according to him, has excellent working relationships with other countries, he noted, including with the US and Israel. Soares added that he hoped to continue cooperating with the US, despite what he described as the "farcical" elements within the bilateral CT dialogue: Soares did not miss the opportunity to repeat the oft-heard complaint by GOB officials about comments on the part of USG officials suggesting the Triborder Area (TBA) remains a top concern with regard to potential terrorist activity, which then prompt the obligatory Brazilian demands for evidence of such activity. He called the exercise pointless, since, in his words, "we all know that your officials based their statements on information we provide the US". Soares also criticized Argentine officials for their comments linking the TBA to the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, calling their accusations "silly" and "baseless".

------------- Comment: -------------

¶11. (C) After various Brazilian government officials had warned of the flawed nature of the Brazilian legal system, it is unfortunate, though not surprising, to hear GSI officials now argue that there is no need for the GOB to improve Brazil's legal regime to make it illegal to commit, finance, plan, or support terrorist acts. Although we cannot confirm definitively that the Casa Civil quashed the initiative for political or ideological reasons, it is certainly plausible. Outside of some agencies focused on security issues, this government evinces very little interest in terrorism issues, much less on legislation its base has no interest in seeing enacted and that would require significant political capital to push through Congress. Likewise, with little knowledge or enthusiasm within Congress, there is no one to take up the mantle there either. As a result, the initiative has become an orphan of Brazil's current political realities. For the moment, any effort to suppress terrorism, its financing, or activities supporting terrorist activities will have to continue for the foreseeable future to follow the "Al Capone" approach of taking down terrorists based on customs violations, tax fraud, and other crimes that unfortunately also carry less jail time. While this approach can work, it is not a substitute for giving police and judges the additional legal tools that the international community has agreed are necessary in the fight against terrorism and nor is it a substitute for institutionalizing counterterrorism within the Brazilian legal system. Taking Brazil's reform of its CT structure (ref A) together with its backtracking CT legislation once again shows a mixed picture of Brazil's overall CT effort at the policy level. Furthermore, the low standing CT holds as an issue among Brazil's elite casts some doubt as to whether the potentially useful reform of ABIN will actually materialize. Over the next months, Mission will consult with Washington agencies as we review our strategy for increasing Brazilian attention to counter-terrorism.

¶12. (C) Comment, cont: On a separate note, we found Soares' admission that Brazil provides the bulk of the intelligence on matters related to CT to be highly atypical, although it sheds some light on a question that has long-puzzled the Mission. That is, whether policy-level officials, particularly at Itamaraty, where they tend to be most disinclined to accept the suggestion that there may be terrorist elements active in their territory, receive the same information from Brazil's intelligence elements as the U.S. receives. Although we cannot answer definitively, Soares comments would suggest that to be the case and that, despite their denials, they recognize the potential problems Brazil faces. Another possibility is that they have access to the same information but, either because the information would be inadmissible in a Brazilian court or because it does not meet a presumed higher threshold of what constitutes terrorist-related activity, they technically do not consider it evidence of such activity. This means they are either playing games or they are defining terrorism out of Brazil. Neither interpretation presents a flattering picture of the seriousness with which the senior levels of the Brazilian government treat the issue of terrorism, but both are consistent with what we have seen over the last several years from a government that considers CT a low priority. End comment. SOBEL

(See Cable 09BRASILIA1540):

Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1540, BRAZIL: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

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Reference ID Date Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1540 2009-12-31 13:01 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Brasilia
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DE RUEHBR #1540/01 3651333
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0233
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHC/USAID WASHDC 0001
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RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
UNCLAS BRASILIA 001540

SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

¶1. (U) The Brazilian government continues to cooperate in countering terrorism and related activities that could contribute to the facilitation of attacks in the region or elsewhere-to include investigating potential terrorism financing, document forgery networks, and other illicit activity. Operationally, elements of the Brazilian government responsible for combating terrorism, such as the Federal Police, Customs, and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency, work effectively with their U.S. counterparts most of the time and pursue investigative leads provided by U.S. and other intelligence services, law enforcement, and financial agencies regarding terrorist suspects.

¶2. (SBU)There are two separate discourses in the government of Brazil on counterterrorism; politically, Brazil continues to deny the presence and potential threat of terrorists and terrorism in Brazil, while law enforcement and intelligence monitor and cooperate to counter the threat. The head of the Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) intelligence division in July went on record during a Brazilian Chamber of Deputies hearing on terrorism and admitted that an individual arrested in April was in fact linked to al Qaeda (AQ). Despite the statement, most GOB officials continue to toe the party line and deny any evidence that terrorists have, or would be, interested in establishing a presence in Brazil.

¶3. (SBU) Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement services are concerned that terrorists could exploit Brazilian territory to support and facilitate terrorist attacks, whether domestically or abroad, and have focused their efforts in the areas of Sao Paulo, the tri-borders areas of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay; Brazil, Peru, and Colombia; and the Colombian and Venezuelan borders. Other branches of the Brazilian government, particularly the Ministry of External Relations, do not believe Brazil is vulnerable to terrorism-related activities and instead focus more heavily on threats from transnational crimes. In October 2009, the MRE did admit, for the first time, that terrorists could become interested in Brazil because of the award of the 2016 Olympics to Rio de Janeiro. Brazilian law enforcement's recognition of the potential threat from terrorism prompted a reform of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) that could raise the profile of the issue by upgrading the counterterrorism division to the department level.

¶4. (SBU) Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement forces work with regional and international partners. Brazil participates in regional counterterrorism fora, but is less committed to regional groups in which the Unites States is involved. Brazil is actively involved Mercosul's working group on terrorism and the sub-working group on financial issues, the latter of which discusses terrorism financing and money laundering among the Mercosul countries, but has proven difficult to engage in 3+1 mechanism on security in the Tri-Border Area (TBA), where Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay share a border.

¶5. (U) Bilaterally, the USG provided a variety of training courses throughout Brazil in counterterrorism, combating money laundering, detection of travel document fraud, container security, and international organized crime. In 2009 the USG again hosted a Major Crimes Conference that successfully brought together Brazil and neighboring countries' federal and state law enforcement communities and judges and prosecutors to share best practices and receive practical training.

¶6. (U) Although Brazil has no official list of terrorist groups and does not recognize the FARC as one, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has been critical of the FARC's use of violence and has publicly called on the group to desist in the armed struggle against the Colombian government.

¶7. (U) Brazil is capable of monitoring domestic financial operations and effectively utilizes its financial intelligence unit, the Financial Activities Oversight Council (COAF), to identify possible funding sources for terrorist groups. Through COAF, Brazil has carried out name checks for persons and entities on the UNSCR 1267 and 1373 terror finance lists, but has so far not found any assets, accounts or property in the names of persons or entities on the UN terror-finance lists.

¶8. (U) Brazil also continues to undertake steps to enhance its capabilities to combat money laundering. Since 2003, fifteen specialized money laundering courts have been established, including two in Sao Paulo, with each court headed by a judge who receives specialized training in national money laundering legislation. In addition, in 2008, the United States and Brazil established a working group with money laundering judges to share best practices and training needs.

¶9. (U) A 2006 national anti-money laundering strategy goal was formed aimed to build on the success of the specialized courts by creating complementary specialized federal police financial crimes units in the same jurisdictions. In 2008, the federal police established such units in the Federal District (Brasilia) and the states of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In addition, the Ministry of Justice funded the creation of technology center to combat money laundering in the federal district and Rio de Janeiro, the latter of which received two such centers, one embedded with the Public Ministry and one with the State Civil Police. In 2008, the Ministry signed accords to establish additional centers in Bahia, Goiais, and Rio Grande do Sul.

¶10. (SBU) The government of Brazil's counterterrorism strategy consists of deterring terrorists from using Brazilian territory to facilitate attacks or raise funds, along with monitoring and suppressing transnational criminal activities that could support terrorist actions. It accomplishes this through actions between its law enforcement entities and through cooperation with the United States and other partners in the region. For example, in 2009 Brazilian authorities began in earnest to work with other concerned nations (particularly the U.S.) in combating the significant and largely unchecked document fraud problem in the country. During the year, multiple regional and international joint operations with U.S. authorities successfully disrupted a number of document vendors and facilitators, as well as related human-trafficking infrastructures. This included one of the largest visa fraud cases of its type in U.S. law enforcement history.

¶11. (SBU) In 2009, the work on the U.S.-Brazil container security initiative in Santos, Brazil was stalled after U.S. officials traveling to Brazil for the program had difficulties getting Brazilian visas. The container security initiative was created to promote secure containerized cargo to the United States through the establishment of a trade transparency unit to detect money laundering through trade transactions. The Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (MRE) was uncomfortable with the counter-terrorism focus of the program, but has recently agreed to issuing visas in support of the initiative.

¶12. (U) The Brazilian government is achieving visible results from recent investment in border and law enforcement infrastructure that were executed with a view to gradually control the flow of goods-legal and illegal-through the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, the proceeds of which could be diverted to support terror groups. The inspection station at the Friendship Bridge in the TBA that was completed by the Brazilian customs agency (Receita Federal) in 2007 continued to take effective action to reduce the smuggling of drugs, weapons, and contraband goods along the border with Paraguay. According to Receita Federal, from January to July 2009 the agency seized more than USD 400 million in contraband goods, including drugs, weapons, and munitions, an increase of eight percent from 2007. As a result of the effective crackdown on the Friendship Bridge, most smuggling operations now take place through the Parana River and Lago Itaipu and some have migrated to other sections of the border, such as the towns of Guiara and Ponta Pora. The Federal Police has special maritime police units in both Foz de Iguacu and Guaira that patrol the maritime border areas, but because of the scale and complexity of the endeavor to curtail smuggling and trafficking activities through the waterways, Brazil is considering using an unmanned aerial vehicle to assist law enforcement in monitoring the border, a development that could further improve border security.

¶13. (SBU) Brazil's overall commitment to combating terrorism and illicit activities that could be exploited to facilitate terrorism is undermined by the GOB's failure to strengthen its legal counterterrorism framework significantly. Although terrorist financing is an established predicate offense for money laundering, Brazil lacks legislation criminalizing terrorism or its financing as autonomous offenses. The 2005 National Strategy against Money Laundering (ENCLA) created a working group (composed of representatives of ministries involved in CFT, the judiciary, and the federal prosecutor's office) charged with drafting legislation to criminalize terrorism and its financing. The draft legislation was never forwarded from the executive branch to the Brazilian Congress. A long-delayed anti-money laundering bill is still pending before the Brazilian Congress. The bill would facilitate greater law enforcement access to financial and banking records during investigations, criminalize illicit enrichment, allow administrative freezing of assets, and facilitate prosecutions of money laundering cases by amending the legal definition of money laundering and making it an autonomous offense. KUBISKE 2009-12-31

[marcelo l.]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/dailybeast/1118 ... 9zdHNob2M-

NEW YORK – The whistleblower’s latest document dump exposes Saudi Arabia’s plot against Iran, a corrupt Afghan’s $52 million payday, Putin and Berlusconi’s “bromance,” and more. See nine of the most startling details.
1. Yemen Takes the Fall for U.S. Drones
Leaked documents reveal that Yemen has been covering up for the U.S in the fight against al Qaeda by saying publicly that attacks initiated by the State Department were directed by Yemen. “We’ll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours,” Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh told General David Petraeus in January 2010. The coverup, made necessary by severe distrust of the U.S. in the Middle East, prompted Yemen’s prime minister to joke about how the president had “lied” to his parliament about the strikes.
2. China Hacked Google—and the Dalai Lama
The Chinese government was behind the much-publicized cyberattack on Google’s computer network this year, according to “a Chinese contact” who told the U.S. Embassy in Beijing about “a coordinated campaign of computer sabotage carried out by government operatives.” U.S. officials have previously declined to finger the Chinese government publicly for the attacks, but the WikiLeaks cable makes clear that Beijing directed hacks into not only Google, but also U.S. and Western allies’ computers, the Gmail accounts of Chinese dissidents, and even the Dalai Lama’s computer.
3. Hillary Commissioned U.N. Spies
Clinton wanted diplomats to snoop out credit-card numbers, frequent-flier details, schedules, email addresses, cellphone numbers, and even DNA of the members of the U.N. Security Council, according to the documents. That includes U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, about whom the secretary of state requested information on “management and decision-making style and his influence on the secretariat.” The requests, which were made in July 2009 and follow similar orders from Clinton’s predecessor, Condoleezza Rice, will no doubt cause embarrassment and could even be illegal: A 1946 U.N. treaty bans “search, requisition... and any other form of interference” of United Nations property.
4. “Feckless” Berlusconi Has “Shadowy” Ties to Putin
The cables are not very kind to Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who is deemed “feckless, vain, and ineffective as a modern European leader” by Elizabeth Dibble, the U.S. envoy to Rome. Another leaked document details Berlusconi’s already known “frequent late nights and penchant for partying hard.” The reports also question the intimate relationship between Berlusconi and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who reportedly use a “shadowy” bilingual go-between and lavish each other with expensive gifts. Secretary Clinton asked her envoys in the two nations to report on any business dealings between the two, in addition to their chummy bromance.
5. Saudi King Wants a U.S. Military Strike on Iran
Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah repeatedly pushed the U.S. to attack Iran, according to the U.S. ambassador there. “Cut off the head of the snake,” the king said in 2008, requesting a military strike against Iran’s burgeoning nuclear program. The Saudi government also called for “severe U.S. and international sanctions on Iran.” Israel also urged action, labeling 2010 a critical year. A June 2009 message describes Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak outlining a “window between 6 and 18 months from now in which stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons might still be viable.” After that, said Barak, “any military solution would result in unacceptable collateral damage” Other cables show that the U.S. believes Iran has received advanced missiles from North Korea capable of striking Moscow and Europe.
6. Corrupt Afghan V.P. Caught With $52 Million in Cash
This must have weighed down his luggage: Officials working with the Drug Enforcement Agency in the United Arab Emirates last year discovered that Afghanistan’s visiting vice president, Ahmed Zia Massoud, had $52 million on him—in cash. Calling the bonanza a “significant amount,” the U.S. Embassy let him keep it “without revealing the money’s origin or destination.” Massoud denies funneling any cash out of Afghanistan.
7. U.S. Offers Payouts in Exchange for Guantanamo Detainees
U.S. authorities were so anxious to resettle Guantanamo prisoners abroad that they were ready to strike any deal with a foreign country willing to take them. Officials offered Kiribati, a tiny island nation in the Pacific—population 98,000—millions of dollars in incentives to shelter Chinese Muslim detainees. They also bribed Slovenian officials to take an inmate in exchange for the chance to meet President Obama. Belgium, meanwhile, was told that taking Guantanamo prisoners would be a “low-cost way…to attain prominence in Europe.”
• Peter Beinart: The WikiLeaks Drama Is Overblown• Tunku Varadarajan: The Fallout from WikiLeaks8. U.S., S. Korea Are Planning to Reunite the Two Koreas
As tensions on the peninsula escalate, American and South Korean officials have already discussed plans to unite the two Koreas should the North ultimately collapse. They’ve also considered inducing China to go along with reunification, with the South Korean ambassador telling the State Department in February 2010 that economic incentives would “help salve” China should a united Korea end up in a “benign alliance” with the United States.
9. State Department Gives Low Marks to Germany’s Merkel
The German magazine Der Spiegel, which was among the publications allowed to preview the leaks, immediately zeroed in on the State Department’s cool perception of Chancellor Angela Merkel. The German leader “has not taken bold steps yet to improve the substantive content of the relationship,” wrote former U.S. Ambassador William Timken in 2006. Merkel was also called “risk averse and rarely creative” in a 2008 message. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, meanwhile, was deemed “short on substance.”

[tflash]

Eu estava à espera de revelações bombásticas e afinal quase tudo são coisas de senso comum. Nada do que li até agora me surpreendeu. Simplesmente são coisas que se distanciam do politicamente correcto mas nada que fuja à opinião de uma pessoa minimamente culta.

[Sterrius]

tem que ver que não saiu tudo ainda, eles vão sair liberando aos poucos.

[soultrain]

Isto é mais grave do que parece. O que estão a fazer não é liberdade, é crime, é irresponsável!!!!!

[FoxTroop]

Isto é mais grave do que parece. O que estão a fazer não é liberdade, é crime, é irresponsável!!!!!

Crime Irresponsabilidade

Confirmar, porque é disso que se trata pois já todos nós estavamos carecas de saber, ali, preto no branco, que se provocam revoltas noutros países apenas porque o resultado de eleições democráticas não lhes interessa, ao mesmo tempo que se auto-intitula o "guardião da democracia e liberdade" e isto é apenas um exemplo dos milhares de crimes que ali estão.

Irresponsabilidade, a única que vejo é a nossa, por vermos países a ser destruidos com base em falsidades, por assistirmos ao vivo a chacinas de povos à base de argumentos que envergonhariam até o mais fanático nazi ou mais empedrenido guarda de um Gulag, por sermos anjinhos e fingirmos não perceber que amanhã, se interessar ao "arautos da liberdade", passamos a ser uma "terrivel ameaça à paz e liberdade mundial" e levamos com umas bombocas para não sermos parvos.

Se é verdade que ali existe muita palha, também é certo que existe ali matéria para levar muita gente a tribunal por crimes contra a humanidade, haja um bom par de bolas, daquelas bem negras para que tal se faça.