UCRÂNIA

[Suetham]

MDS
Com este já é o 4ª registro do uso do 9M119M1 ? Pelas minhas contas sim.

[Suetham]

[gabriel219]

MDS
Com este já é o 4ª registro do uso do 9M119M1 ? Pelas minhas contas sim.

Sim, todos os vídeos que vi eram diferentes. Esse seria o recorde de abatimento de um blindado por um carro de combate já registrado, superando o do Challenger.

A AFU começa a acumular tropas em Zaporizhzhia, próxima as linhas V-T-P:

Kamyshevakha, Zaporozhye region

A mass accumulation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, ammunition, personnel, equipment are constantly brought up. They do not go further yet, they are waiting for further instructions.

Local store clerks are told they are under orders to minimize contact with locals.

In addition, local authorities report that there will be no mobile communication in two days.

-Two Majors

Aparentemente a AFU irá optar por atacar as linhas com menor quantidade de tropas dos Russos, porém a que possui maior densidade de áreas edificadas e fortificações.

A RIA está pintando um cenário semelhante ao que descrevi neste post: https://www.defesabrasil.com/forum/view ... 1#p5629721




Interessante. Parece que os Russos vão receber Shaheds dos Iranianos E dos Chineses:

[gabriel219]

Russos andam realizando bombardeios em toda a linha de Zaporizhzhia para destruir alvos e dificultar a concentração de tropas da AFU para a ofensiva.

[gabriel219]

TV Polonesa:

[prp]

[P44]

Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin has criticised the Russian government harshly in a recent interview. Reportedly, he flatly discounted the official propaganda narrative and said it was "untrue" that Russia was fighting fascists or NATO in Ukraine. Instead, Prigozhin said, his mercenaries were only ever fighting against Ukrainian soldiers and a few "Russophobe" foreigners. His statements, along with his presentation to state news agency RIA Novosti (which appeared to either imitate or mock mannerisms of president Vladimir Putin), have led to speculations that Prigozhin may intend to challenge Putin's leadership and run for president in 2024. Lately, he has often criticised the Kremlin's conduct of the war effort.

https://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/uk ... 69762.html

[gabriel219]

Enquanto isso, os Russos aumentaram a intensidade dos bombardeios em posições da AFU em Zaporizhzhia, afim de causar atrito nas forças da ofensiva:

[Goldfinger]

Honey, I'm home!

[knigh7]

One evening in late December, as Muscovites strolled along their city’s brightly lit streets in anticipation of the end-of-year celebrations, a group of old friends gathered for dinner at the flat of a senior state official.

Some of the guests present, which included members of Russia’s cultural and political elite, toasted a new year in which they expressed hope for peace and a return to normality.

As the night went on, a man who needed little introduction stood up for a toast, holding his glass.

“I am guessing you are expecting me to say something,” said Dmitry Peskov, Vladimir Putin’s longtime spokesperson, according to one of the two people who separately recounted the evening to the Guardian under conditions of anonymity.

“Things will get much harder. This will take a very, very long time,” Peskov continued.

His toast darkened the mood of the evening among the guests, many of whom have said in private that they oppose the war in Ukraine. “It was uncomfortable to hear his speech. It was clear that he was warning that the war will stay with us and we should prepare for the long haul,” one guest said

More than a year into an invasion that, according to Russian planning, was supposed to take weeks, Vladimir Putin’s government is putting society on a war footing with the west and digging in for a multi-year conflict.

Speaking at length to workers at an aviation factory in the Buryatia region recently, Putin once again cast the war as an existential battle for Russia’s survival.

“For us, this is not a geopolitical task, but a task of the survival of Russian statehood, creating conditions for the future development of the country and our children,” the president said.

It followed a pattern of recent speeches, said the political analyst Maxim Trudolyubov, in which the Russian leader has increasingly shifted towards discussing what observers have called a “forever war” with the west.

“Putin has practically stopped talking about any concrete aims of the war. He proposes no vision of what a future victory might look like either. The war has no clearcut beginning nor a foreseeable end,” Trudolyubov said.

During Putin’s closely watched “state of the nation” speech last month, the Russian leader repeated some of the many grievances he holds against the west, stressing that Moscow was fighting for national survival and would ultimately win.

The thinly veiled message to the people, Trudolyubov said, was that the war in Ukraine would not be ending anytime soon and that Russians must learn to live with it.

Western officials have described listening to Putin’s combative speech in February with dismay, seeing it as the Russian leader doubling down on his war and leaving little room for retreat.

One western diplomat in Moscow described Putin’s message in the speech as preparing the Russian public for “war that never ends”.

The diplomat also said it was not clear that Putin could accept a defeat in the conflict because it did not seem that Putin “understands how to lose”.

The person said Putin did not appear to be reconsidering the conflict despite the heavy losses and setbacks of the last year. The diplomat noted that the Russian president was a former KGB operative and said they are trained to always continue to pursue their objectives, rather than reassessing the goals in the first place.

Others have noted that the Russian leader, who, according to western intelligence, is personally making operational and tactical decisions in Ukraine, has stopped discussing the situation on the front in Ukraine in his public comments.

According to a study of the president’s speeches by the Russian news outlet Verstka, Putin last mentioned the fighting in Ukraine on 15 January, saying that the dynamics of his army were “positive”.

These omissions reflect the Kremlin’s uneasy acceptance that it is unable to change the course of the war on the battlefield, argued Vladimir Gelman, a Russian politics professor at the University of Helsinki.

“It is easier not to talk about the war efforts when your army is making no progress,” Gelman added. “But scaling back is not an option for Putin; that would mean admitting defeat.”

Russia’s leadership initially expected the conflict would last just a matter of weeks before they declared victory, according to plans captured by western intelligence at the beginning of the war.

Over the winter, western military analysts and Ukrainian officials repeatedly warned that Russia, after drafting 300,000 men last autumn, would mount a major new attack.

But Moscow’s offensive across a 160-mile arc in eastern Ukraine, which started in February, has brought the country minimal gains at staggering costs. Western officials have estimated that there have been up to 200,000 killed or injured on the Russian side.

“Russia simply does not have the offensive capabilities for a major offensive,” said US military expert Rob Lee.

According to Lee, less than 10% of the Russian army in Ukraine is capable of offensive operations, with the majority of its troops now conscripts with limited training.

“Their forces can slowly achieve a few grinding attritional victories but do not have the capacity to punch through Ukrainian defensive lines in a way that would change the course of the war.”

To boost the military’s long-term prospects, Russia’s defence minister Sergei Shoigu has proposed increasing the armed forces from 1.15 million combat personnel to 1.5 million.

“We see that Russia’s military is preparing for a long war. Putin is banking that his country’s resources will trump Ukraine’s as the west gets tired of helping Kyiv,” Lee said.

Despite the setbacks on the battlefield in Ukraine, the Kremlin has weathered any potential backlash against the war at home, crushing the remnants of Russia’s civil society and remaking the face of the country in the process.

“Many in the country have now fully accepted that this war will not go away and believe that they need to learn to live under the reality,” said Andrei Kolesnikov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment who has studied public attitudes towards the war since its beginning.

Kolesnikov said that the population’s ability and willingness to adapt to the new reality has turned out to be much stronger than many observers expected.

When Putin ordered a draft of 300,000 reservists in September, sociologists noticed a record uptick in fear and anxiety, with men concerned about going to fight and mothers and wives worried about their husbands, fathers and sons.

Yet within several months, the dread decreased, according to Kolesnikov.

“The propaganda campaign has been successful despite the initial hesitance of the people,” said a source close to the Kremlin’s media managers, referring to the early anti-war protests, which led to more than 15,000 arrests across the country in the first weeks after the invasion.

“The government has managed to rally people around the flag. The way the conflict was framed helped people to accept it,” the source added.

The full power of the state has been deployed to spread and enforce the message that the war is necessary for Russia’s very identity and survival.

National television has turned from airing light entertainment to broadcasting aggressive political talkshows.

Meanwhile, schools have been instructed to add basic military training and “patriotic” lessons that aim to justify the war in Ukraine. State rhetoric, including calls by Putin to get rid of “scum and traitors”, have led to a wave of denunciations by ordinary Russians of their colleagues and even friends.

“The country has gone mad,” said Aleksei, a former history teacher at an elite boarding school outside Moscow who recently quit after a disagreement with management over the new “patriotic” curriculum. “I had to stop talking to colleagues and friends. We are living in different realities,” he said.

But while hundreds of thousands of Russians have been silenced or fled the country, a vocal group of war supporters have embraced the country’s new direction.

They too have noted the growing costs of the conflict, but are calling for greater public buy-in while increasingly portraying the war as a global battle with Europe and the US.

At a Moscow launch event in mid-March for the “International Movement of Russophiles,” a group backed by Russia’s foreign ministry and heavily populated with fringe European activists and conspiracy theorists, the message was dire.

“We are not just seeing neo-Nazism, we are seeing direct nazism, which is covering more and more European countries,” said Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, during a speech.

Konstantin Malofeev, a conservative oligarch who was sanctioned by the US in 2014 for “threatening Ukraine and providing financial support to the Donetsk separatist region,” said: “We have not seen such hatred since after Russian soldiers ended the war with the victory in Berlin. We stopped that war and now we, the victors, are once again facing the fact that it has risen up from hell against us.”

Yet there were few direct allusions to the situation on the front in Ukraine, and on the sidelines of the conference, some spoke about Russia’s difficult progress and the costs of the war.

“Not everyone in this country yet understands what we’re going to have to pay to win this war,” said Alexander Dugin, a radical Russian philosopher and prominent supporter of the war. “People in our country have to pay for their love for Russia with their lives. It’s serious and we weren’t ready for this.”

Dugin’s daughter, Darya Dugina, was killed last year in a car bombing that may have targeted him. Putin has spoken several times about the attack on Dugina and her name was written on a briefing paper held by Putin during a recent security council meeting, video uploaded by the Kremlin showed.

“I don’t think people in this country fully understand what is happening after a year,” Dugin added.

“Of course there’s full support from the president but it hasn’t fully come into the hearts and souls of all our people … some people have woken up, some people have not. Despite the year of war, it is going very slowly.”

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/ ... ion-stalls

[Suetham]

A AFU começa a acumular tropas em Zaporizhzhia, próxima as linhas V-T-P:
Aparentemente a AFU irá optar por atacar as linhas com menor quantidade de tropas dos Russos, porém a que possui maior densidade de áreas edificadas e fortificações.

A RIA está pintando um cenário semelhante ao que descrevi neste post: https://www.defesabrasil.com/forum/view ... 1#p5629721

A travessia do rio em Kherson pode ser apenas diversionário. É quase garantido de que o real objetivo é Zaporizhzhia, mas na minha opinião, temos aqui quatro linhas defensivas russas possíveis de um ataque diversionário da AFU:
Tentativa de travessia do rio Dnipro em Kherson
Linha Kupiansk-Svatove-Kreminna
Bakhmut
Transnistria

Em Kherson e Transnistria, a situação é mais regular, pois não há combates em andamento, exceto talvez ataques aéreos pontuais em Kherson, como em Berylav recentemente pelas forças russas e vice-versa, mas os outros dois sim, em Bakhmut e no eixo Kupiansk-Svatove-Kreminna e com a Rússia realizando operações ofensivas.

Se ocorrer um ataque diversionária na linha Kupiansk-Svatove-Kreminna, os russos podem habilitar as reservas concentradas nas linhas atrás e também em Belgorod e nas áreas fronteiriças de Kursk, podendo até impedir que as forças ucranianas se desloquem para outras partes da linha de frente, como por exemplo, poderia serem realocadas para Bakhmut e Avdiivka. A situação parece estar sob controle sob uma perspectiva estratégica, mesmo se o C Ex em Poltava for ativado, o que eu duvido muito. Ainda aqui, caso desloquem para outros TO, a capacidade de reposição e ativação de reservas da AFU em Poltava podem estar comprometidas se a Rússia apertar o cinto e partir pra cima.

Interessante. Parece que os Russos vão receber Shaheds dos Iranianos E dos Chineses:

Então, como eu já havia especulado, os chineses podem enviar aos russos o Shahed-136 sob a designação ZT-180. Existe a notícia de que a China encomendou 15.000 unidades, será que algumas unidades serão enviados a Rússia ou talvez todas as unidades, ou todos são para o PLA? A ver. Enquanto isso, o Spiegel alega que serão enviados alguns lotes para a Rússia: https://archive.ph/xYGLh China Reportedly Negotiating with Russia To Supply Kamikaze Drones

O link do site que o Cyberspec News publicou:
https://www.militarydrones.org.cn/zt-18 ... 703p1.html

ZT-180 Loitering Munition Drone （Suicide Drone）
Overview:
The ZT-180 drone adopts delta wing layout to effectively improve the cruising speed and reduce the size of UAV. The wing-body fusion design reduces the resistance of the whole aircraft, and realizes the compact structure for carrying easily; The design scheme of wing + fuselage with 3 fuel tanks is adopted to effectively increase the tank volume of UAV, reduce the cross-sectional area of fuselage, thus reduce the flight resistance of UAV and increase the flight duration. Adopt tail-push power arrangement to improve propeller efficiency.

ZT-180 Drone Features:
Low cost
Small volume, rapid deployment
Quick retrofit and replacement load
Compact structure design, easy to transport.

ZT-180 Drone Specification:
Length: 2.8 meters
Wing length: 2.6 m
Flying speed: 43 m/s
Endurance: 10h
Effective range: 1800 km
Payload: 34kg
Maximum take-off weight: 170kg
Take-off mode: catapult-assisted take-off

Aliás, não são apenas os chineses fazendo cópias não, os Shaheds turcos - Azab - também estão a caminho
https://gazetememur.com/home/PartialPag ... cc94&page=
https://defence-industry.eu/turkish-com ... -munition/

[Suetham]

https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/put ... di-guerra/
Putin warns: "We don't use hypersonic weapons in Ukraine but we have them"

O mais estranho é que tanto os EUA e a própria Ucrânia já afirmaram o contrário e, se eu não me engano, o próprio MoD russo tbm nos briefings.

O Lost-Armour publicou um gráfico sobre o emprego do Lancet na Ucrânia. Foram registradas 175 ataques, sendo a maioria dos alvos a artilharia.
O gráfico inferior registra a quantidade de ataques registrados lançados por mês.
https://lostarmour.info/tags/lancet



Zelensky não está errado nessa


Local de origem do T-55

As Forças Armadas Russas estão usando cada vez mais vários projéteis de alta precisão.

Essas fotos mostram a derrota de um tanque ucraniano por um projétil guiado Kitolov-2M de 122 mm. O carro está escondido em posições em uma floresta densa, mas um projétil com uma cabeça de laser semiativa voa direto no alvo.

Além da versão de 122 mm do projétil Kitolov-2M, existe uma versão do calibre de 120 mm. Esta munição é usada ao disparar de canhões autopropulsados ​​"Khosta" e "Nona-S/SVK" e permite que equipes de tiro móveis atinjam alvos com precisão de até 1 m a uma distância de 2 a 12 km.

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/36 ... tugal.html
Ukraine receives three Leopard 2 tanks from Portugal
https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-735665
UK Challenger 2 tanks arrive in Ukraine, to see combat soon
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-6 ... 794efcfa7d
Ukraine war: Germany sends much-awaited Leopard tanks
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62002218
Ukraine weapons: What tanks and other equipment are the world giving?


Os veículos blindados prometidos estão finalmente começando a chegar na Ucrânia. Entre Portugal e a Alemanha, foram entregues 21 CCs Leopard 2A6. Marders também apareceram. Falta ainda a entrega de Bradleys, mas os Strykers e os Cougars estão pelo menos parcialmente entregues e alguns ainda em estágio de entrega, visto alguns dias atrás na Polônia. Pelo menos alguns dos Challengers foram entregues do Reino Unido. Eu só quero saber o quão complicada será a logística da AFU com esse novo arsenal, os CCs Leopard usam munição de 120 mm, complicando ainda mais a cadeia de suprimentos da Ucrânia, ao mesmo tempo em que fornecem estoques diferentes dos 105mm e 155mm enviados. Os CCs Challenger também usam munição não padrão da OTAN, também fornecendo mais problemas na cadeia de suprimentos. Pode ser atenuado pelo fato de que as tripulações foram treinadas para cada novo sistema pelos países doadores. Pode haver falta de transferibilidade, mas cada tipo de arma provavelmente estará concentrado em unidades totalmente desse tipo. Senão, seria um pesadelo logístico em uma escala inimaginável, mas ainda é um pesadelo. Mesmo supondo que eles tenham resolvido isso, a falta de um grande número de CCs ocidentais ainda é preocupante. Você tem cerca de 2 Btl na estrutura de força em torno de Leopard 2 (alguns são os A4) e um Esqd em torno do Challenger 2. Mesmo que o Abrams apareça, agora você tem outro Btl de CCs.

https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-recruit ... 34123.html
As Fighting Rages On At The Front, Thousands Join Ukraine's Offensive Guard

Enquanto isso, a Ucrânia está criando uma "guarda ofensiva", uma variedade de brigadas de assalto compostas por tropas recém-mobilizadas, misturadas com tropas experientes. A Guarda ficará subordinada ao Ministério do Interior. Existe a suposição de que eles deveriam ser unidades combativas principais na próxima contraofensiva ucraniana, no entanto, parece que a maioria deles já foi enviada para Bakhmut e Avdiivka.

O HistoryLegends fala especificamente sobre eles por volta dos 16 minutos. Embora eu não concorde necessariamente com tudo o que é dito por este canal, ele está sugerindo fortemente que a contraofensiva ucraniana será em Bakhmut ou possivelmente na linha de Bakhmut e Zaporizhzhia simultaneamente (uma sendo diversionária), com a qual eu concordaria.

De acordo com esta entrevista, os ucranianos poderiam se colocar em posição de ameaçar a Crimeia. Se for esse o caso, será a maior ameaça a Putin que ele enfrenta


Um piloto ucraniano afirma que a Ucrânia precisa modernizar seu exército


Relatórios ucranianos sobre os combates





Campanha de desinformação:

Os russos deveriam aumentar dobrar sua aposta na campanha de desinformação




Do lado ucraniano, a campanha de desinformação sobre o envio de IS-3 para a Ucrânia
--------

O ministro da defesa da Ucrânia, Reznikov, alega que a contraofensiva começara em abril ou maio.





A Ucrânia está aumentando muito as operações de ataque com artilharia contra posições/áreas russas de concentração no sul, aqui a AFU conduziu um ataque HIMARS contra uma subestação elétrica(perto da aldeia de Fedorivka) e também em um entroncamento ferroviário em Melitopol. Um ponto relevante é que embora as linhas ferroviárias a leste (Tokmak) ou oeste (Kakhovka) não sejam eletrificadas, as demais estações de tração da linha ferroviária para Dzhankoi(Crimeia) são, pelo menos até Novobohdanivka, onde também uma subestação local foi atacada. Os atuais entroncamentos ferroviários que eu acho passíveis de serem atacados pela AFU é:
Dzhankoi - 45.701950, 34.383898
Novooleksiivka - 46.228261, 34.648429

Além disso, a AFU conduziu um ataque em Simferopol com UAVs na Crimeia.


Ainda ao sul, em Kherson, as forças ucranianas atacaram posições russas perto de Oleshky


Os russos estão aumentando até mesmo as fortificações em Skadovsk, onde existe uma restinga a frente do ponto de fortificação. Além disso, os russos estão construindo trincheiras e fortificações nas regiões Armiansk e Dzhankoi da Crimeia e as forças russas estão usando civis para construir algumas das defesas, de acordo com o ISW citando o MoD da AFU.

[Suetham]

https://tass.com/politics/1596657?utm_s ... eforum.com

"Air defense capabilities shot down a Ukrainian Air Force Mi-8 helicopter near the settlement of Temirovka in the Zaporozhye Region. In addition, during the last 24-hour period, they intercepted a Grom-2 operational/tactical missile, three rockets of the HIMARS multiple launch rocket system, and also destroyed two Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles near the communities of Novoandreyevka and Zelyony Gai in the Donetsk People’s Republic," the spokesman said.

The new missile will have a range from 50 to 280 km.

Com esse alcance máximo, toda a península da Crimeia estaria ao alcance do SRBM Grom-2:


Se realmente for verdadeiro o emprego do Grom-2, resta saber se o míssil está em produção e onde. Isso colocaria toda a Península da Crimeia sob o alcance.

Edição:

https://istoe.com.br/foguetes-de-longo- ... -russia-2/

[gabriel219]

Os Russos estão expandindo seus campos minados em Zaporizhzhia e criando pontos fortes bem atrás das linhas:



Isso mostra que aprenderam com os erros que cometeram ao deixar as regiões ocupadas de Kharkiv com quase nenhuma proteção.

Até agora, foram quase 4 meses de preparação para a ofensiva em Zaporizhzhia e em Kherson. Recentemente o Exército Russo assumiu o controle das operações no entorno de Bakhmut, para a Wagner focar na cidade em si.

Imagino que em Bakhmut as mesmas preparações vem sendo feitas.

[knigh7]