EUA

[cabeça de martelo]

[Francoorp]

Esse cara ai ja deu essa entrevista a anos atras... para o Movimento Zeitgest:

[marcelo l.]

Os americanos não se entendem, assim é difícil cortar gastos...

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 ... trike-icb/

The military's joint chiefs closely watched U.S.-Russian arms talks and rejected Moscow's call for banning new conventionally-armed long-range missiles in the START arms accord, but accepted some curbs, according to a letter from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman, outlined the opposition in a letter made public on Monday endorsing Senate ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty now being debated in the Senate.

Adm. Mullen stated that "U.S. senior military leaders monitored very closely all provisions related to conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) throughout the negotiation process."

"During that process, the Russian Federation publicly declared in several occasions that there should be a ban on the placement of conventional warhead on strategic delivery systems," he said.

Adm. Mullen said in the end the chiefs agreed that any warhead — nuclear, high-explosive or high-speed kinetic — on an intercontinental or submarine missile would be counted under START's central limits.

However, he said the treaty allows deployment and further development of the conventional strike weapons, which are designed to hit targets any place around the world in 60 minutes or less.

"It is true that intercontinental ballistic missiles with a traditional trajectory would be accountable under the treaty, but the treaty's limits accommodate any plans the United States might pursue during the life of the treaty to deploy conventional warheads on ballistic missiles," Adm. Mullen said.

Adm. Mullen said the United States "made clear" during negotiations that the Pentagon will not consider non-nuclear long-range strike weapons not defined by the treaty, including "boost glide" warheads that skirt the upper atmosphere "to be accountable under the treaty."

According to defense officials, the Pentagon is not considering the use of ballistic missiles for non-nuclear attack weapons under prompt global strike.

Its main concepts being developed include a high-speed glide vehicle and other super high speed weapons that would have to be launched from a new missile not covered by the treaty.

The letter echoes earlier concerns expressed by Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who told The Washington Times last month that the treaty "will enable us to move forward with our modernization effort and will not put any noteworthy constraints on development of our prompt global strike capability."

A recent Congressional Research Service report stated, "Congress is likely to question how the New START Treaty would affect U.S. plans" for the conventional global-strike mission.

"Warheads deployed on boost-glide systems would not be affected by the treaty because these are new types of strategic offensive arms," the report said. "But those deployed in existing types of reentry vehicles on existing types of ballistic missiles, like the Navy's [conventional-warhead Trident] program, would count against the treaty limits."

The Mullen letter was written the same day it was requested by Sen. John Kerry, Massachusetts Democrat and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and states that the treaty "has the full support of your uniformed military, and we all support ratification."

Adm. Mullen said he and the chiefs support the treaty because it allows a strong and flexible nuclear force and will help Russia to be open about its nuclear programs. It also will help reduce nuclear arms proliferation around the world, he said.

Failure to ratify the treaty will leave Russian nuclear facilities unmonitored by ground teams of inspectors and could result in a shift of defense sources "to maintain adequate awareness of Russian nuclear forces."

Defense officials have said the United States would have to divert intelligence and surveillance assets currently focused on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to arms control monitoring.

Adm. Mullen said the chiefs also are confident the treaty will not "constrain in any way our ability to pursue robust missile defenses."

[FoxTroop]

Estes americanos estão completamente cegos. Colocar cargas convencionais em misseis balisticos?!!!! Vão lançar um ICBM com carga convencional contra quem?!!!! E os sistemas de detecção e aviso, russos ou chineses, sabem lá se vai com uma hóstia das potentes ou se é só peidinho?!!! Quer dizer, já por mais de que uma vez se entrou em contagem por causa de lançamentos civis indevidamente identificados e uma das últimas vezes foi mesmo à conta que isto não dava o berro e estes sacanas ainda se metem a inventar. Se se querem matar, não lixem quem nada tem a ver com maluqueira.

[cabeça de martelo]

Simplesmente não faz sentido...deve haver alguma jogada no meio.

[marcelo l.]

A razõa parece que os planejadores militares americanos consideram que em caso de alerta do programa de Ataque Global* este seria componente essencial para atingir o "grupo terrorista", por que seria uma arma que pode rapidamente atingir qualquer alvo e ponto do globo.

* ainda em fase embrionária comparando o que se quer chegar.

[marcelo l.]

Mais gastos inuteis...

WASHINGTON — The missile defense system that President Barack Obama plans to deploy in Europe starting next year may not function properly and could face significant cost overruns, a nonpartisan congressional watchdog agency warned Tuesday.

The report raises questions about legislation that would strengthen the U.S. commitment to the deployment plan that the White House was negotiating in return for Republican votes it needed for Senate approval of a new U.S.-Russia nuclear arms reduction treaty.

According to the Government Accountability Office, Obama has committed the Defense Department "to a schedule that could be challenging to meet, based on the technical progress of missile defense element development and testing programs."

Moreover, the administration committed the Pentagon "to this schedule before the scope of the development efforts was fully understood, GAO said in its report to a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. The GAO is an investigative arm of Congress.

The GAO report was released five days after an interceptor designed to destroy ballistic missiles in flight missed its target over the Pacific Ocean in the U.S. missile defense program's second failed test this year. It was the seventh failure in 15 tests since 1999.

Some experts question the integrity of the tests, saying they are staged under unrealistic conditions, according to the Pentagon's own data. Among other objections, critics say no decoys are used in the tests, and current sensor systems cannot differentiate between decoys and actual targets.

As in previous reports, the GAO raised concerns with the Pentagon's approach to producing, purchasing and deploying missile defense system components before they have undergone sufficient development and testing.

"The highly concurrent development, production and deployment effort DOD (the Department of Defense) is undertaking . . . increases risks that the capability eventually provided will not meet the war-fighter's needs, with significant potential cost and schedule growth consequences," the report said.

The Obama administration in September 2009 scrapped the former Bush administration's plan to deploy a sophisticated tracking radar in the Czech Republic and 10 interceptors in Poland to defend the U.S. and Europe against ballistic missile attack by Iran.

The administration unveiled its own plan, known as the European Phased Adaptive Approach, in February.

The EPAA involves phased deployments of what the Pentagon portrayed as proven technology, including sea- and land-based versions of the Navy's Standard Missile 3, or SM-3, and sea- and land-based radars linked to early warning satellites.

The U.S. next year would begin stationing warships off of Europe equipped with the current version of the SM-3 and Aegis radars as well as position a transportable tracking radar in southern Europe.

An improved version of the SM-3 would be deployed beginning in 2015 on ships and in Romania. The missiles would be positioned in Poland and at sea in 2018, and they'd be replaced by a third, more advanced model by 2020.

The GAO, however, found that the Pentagon had failed to implement a management system for the EPAA that synchronizes acquisitions of different elements of the system "and ensures transparency and accountability."

"The limited visibility into the costs and schedule for EPAA and the lack of some key acquisition management processes" could result in the production of system elements before they are adequately proven, "leading to rework, cost increases, delays, and uncertainties about delivered capabilities," the report said.

In comments included in the report, the Pentagon disputed the approach used by the GAO to assess the EPAA, saying that the report "inaccurately portrays the department's acquisition plans."





Read more: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/12/21/1 ... z18rOHwvRf

[tflash]

Estes americanos estão completamente cegos. Colocar cargas convencionais em misseis balisticos?!!!! Vão lançar um ICBM com carga convencional contra quem?!!!! E os sistemas de detecção e aviso, russos ou chineses, sabem lá se vai com uma hóstia das potentes ou se é só peidinho?!!! Quer dizer, já por mais de que uma vez se entrou em contagem por causa de lançamentos civis indevidamente identificados e uma das últimas vezes foi mesmo à conta que isto não dava o berro e estes sacanas ainda se metem a inventar. Se se querem matar, não lixem quem nada tem a ver com maluqueira.

Se os russos e os chineses forem préviamente avisados, não há problema. A minha pergunta é se justifica o gasto, já que um ICBM não deve ser barato. Serve exactamente para o quê?

[marcelo l.]

Estes americanos estão completamente cegos. Colocar cargas convencionais em misseis balisticos?!!!! Vão lançar um ICBM com carga convencional contra quem?!!!! E os sistemas de detecção e aviso, russos ou chineses, sabem lá se vai com uma hóstia das potentes ou se é só peidinho?!!! Quer dizer, já por mais de que uma vez se entrou em contagem por causa de lançamentos civis indevidamente identificados e uma das últimas vezes foi mesmo à conta que isto não dava o berro e estes sacanas ainda se metem a inventar. Se se querem matar, não lixem quem nada tem a ver com maluqueira.

Se os russos e os chineses forem préviamente avisados, não há problema. A minha pergunta é se justifica o gasto, já que um ICBM não deve ser barato. Serve exactamente para o quê?

Então, serve para acertar qualquer base de grupo terrorista rapidamente, apenas com algumas botões eles têm o mundo ao alcance com arma convencional... acho que faz parte do programa de Ataque Global que consiste em neutralizar rapidamente qualquer ameaça aos EUA, só não sei se vale para atacar pontos estratégicos de países considerados inimigos.

[FoxTroop]

Se eu fosse russo ou chinês, por mais avisado que estivesse, nunca por nunca deixaria um ICBM ser disparado por cima de mim. Uma explosão nuclear sobre a ionosfera e lá ía a minha capacidade de comando e controlo, além da rede electrica nacional e comunicações. Alguém arriscaria isso? Alguém confiaria assim num "amigo" que está a lutar a todo o custo para manter o status quo? É uma loucura, mas parece que o novo START já foi ratificado pelos americanos e essa sombra, por enquanto vai estar afastada.

[LeandroGCard]

Estes americanos estão completamente cegos. Colocar cargas convencionais em misseis balisticos?!!!! Vão lançar um ICBM com carga convencional contra quem?!!!! E os sistemas de detecção e aviso, russos ou chineses, sabem lá se vai com uma hóstia das potentes ou se é só peidinho?!!! Quer dizer, já por mais de que uma vez se entrou em contagem por causa de lançamentos civis indevidamente identificados e uma das últimas vezes foi mesmo à conta que isto não dava o berro e estes sacanas ainda se metem a inventar. Se se querem matar, não lixem quem nada tem a ver com maluqueira.

Se os russos e os chineses forem préviamente avisados, não há problema. A minha pergunta é se justifica o gasto, já que um ICBM não deve ser barato. Serve exactamente para o quê?

Um ICBM básico, modelo Mille com motor Flex, fica lá pelos 10 milhões de dólares o lançamento. Um americano deve ficar pelo menos o triplo disso, se for pequeno.

Com ogivas convencionais serve para pegar uns talibãs que estejam jantando em algum casebre da fronteira do Afeganistão com o Paquistão antes que eles possam comer a sobremesa, sem que nenhum soldado, piloto ou marinheiro dos EUA tenham que se mexer. O casebre deve valer uns 5.000 dólares (sendo generoso), e os talibãs só vão ter uns mil outros para tomar o lugar dos que forem mortos pelo ICBM. Isto é que é relação custo benefício, a menos que os Talibãs não gostem da comida e saiam do jantar antes do fim, pois não dá para abortar um ataque de ICBM e trazer o míssil de volta para a base.

Agora falando sério, existem muito poucos alvos que valeriam à pena atacar com ICBM's equipados com ogivas convencionais, só consigo imaginar usinas nucleares, que se atingidas e rompidas causam um tremendo estrago SEM que armamento nuclear seja utilizado. Fora isso, tudo que um míssil assim pode destruir poderia ser consertado ou substituído por um valor menor que o do próprio míssil.


Leandro G. Card

[marcelo l.]

Bom, o start foi assinado, mas o Obama teve que prometer comprometer mais de US $ 80 bilhões para a modernização do arsenal nuclear, ou seja, da perspectiva do tesouro americano a coisa só piorou.

[marcelo l.]

Não consegui postar o artigo, mas só pelo começo já dá para ver....

http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washi ... _generals/

WASHINGTON — An hour after the official ceremony marking the end of his 35-year career in the Air Force, General Gregory “Speedy’’ Martin returned to his quarters to swap his dress uniform for golf attire. He was ready for his first tee time as a retired four-star general.

But almost as soon as he closed the door that day in 2005 his phone rang. It was an executive at Northrop Grumman, asking if he was interested in working for the manufacturer of the B-2 stealth bomber as a paid consultant. A few weeks later, Martin received another call. This time it was the Pentagon, asking him to join a top-secret Air Force panel studying the future of stealth aircraft technology.

Martin was understandably in demand, having been the general in charge of all Air Force weapons programs, including the B-2, for the previous four years.

He said yes to both offers.

In almost any other realm it would seem a clear conflict of interest — pitting his duty to the US military against the interests of his employer — not to mention a revolving-door sprint from uniformed responsibilities to private paid advocacy.

But this is the Pentagon where, a Globe review has found, such apparent conflicts are a routine fact of life at the lucrative nexus between the defense procurement system, which spends hundreds of billions of dollars a year, and the industry that feasts on those riches. And almost nothing is ever done about it.

The Globe analyzed the career paths of 750 of the highest ranking generals and admirals who retired during the last two decades and found that, for most, moving into what many in Washington call the “rent-a-general’’ business is all but irresistible.

From 2004 through 2008, 80 percent of retiring three- and four-star officers went to work as consultants or defense executives, according to the Globe analysis. That compares with less than 50 percent who followed that path a decade earlier, from 1994 to 1998.

In some years, the move from general staff to industry is a virtual clean sweep. Thirty-four out of 39 three- and four-star generals and admirals who retired in 2007 are now working in defense roles — nearly 90 percent.

And in many cases there is nothing subtle about what the generals have to sell — Martin’s firm is called The Four Star Group, for example. The revolving-door culture of Capitol Hill — where former lawmakers and staffers commonly market their insider knowledge to lobbying firms — is now pervasive at the senior rungs of the military leadership.

[marcelo l.]

[RobertoRS]

Não sabe de nada.

Mas esse cara aqui manja muito.