F-35 News

[P44]

no pasa nada...

Joint Strike Fighter: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not Meeting Warfighter Requirements on Time


(Source: Government Accountability Office; issued March 19, 2010)



The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is critical for recapitalizing tactical air forces and will require a long-term commitment to very large annual funding outlays.

The current estimated investment is $323 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft. (GAO’s previous annual report on JSF, released in March 2009, estimated development and procurement cost at $300 billion for 2,456 DoD aircraft. GAO’s latest estimate means the program’s cost increased by almost 8% in one year—Ed.)

As required by law, this report discusses (1) program cost, schedule, and performance; (2) manufacturing results; and (3) test plans and progress. GAO's work includes interviews, cost data, test plans, production measures, and analyses by defense and contractor officials.

The JSF program continues to struggle with increased costs and slowed progress--negative outcomes that were foreseeable as events have unfolded over several years. Total estimated acquisition costs have increased $46 billion and development extended 2 more years, compared to the program baseline approved in 2007.

DOD leadership is now taking some positive steps which, if effectively implemented, should improve outcomes and provide more realistic cost and schedule estimates. Officials increased time and funding for system development, added 4 aircraft to the flight test program, and reduced near-term procurement quantities.

Restructuring is not finished and further cost growth and schedule extensions are likely.

The program is at risk for not delivering aircraft quantities and capabilities on time.

Dates for achieving initial operational capabilities may have to be extended or some requirements deferred to future upgrades.

Aircraft unit costs will likely exceed the thresholds established by the statutory provision commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy and may require DOD to certify the need for the JSF to Congress.

Program setbacks in costs, deliveries, and performance directly affect modernization plans and retirement schedules of the legacy aircraft the JSF is slated to replace.

Manufacturing JSF test aircraft continues to take more time, money, and effort than budgeted. By December 2009, only 4 of 13 test aircraft had been delivered and labor hours to build the aircraft had increased more than 50 percent above earlier estimates. Late deliveries hamper the development flight test program and affect work on production aircraft, even as plans proceed to significantly ramp-up annual procurement rates.

Some improvement is noted, but continuing manufacturing inefficiencies, parts problems, and engineering technical changes indicate that design and production processes may lack the maturity needed to efficiently produce aircraft at planned rates. The independent manufacturing review team determined that the planned production ramp rate was unachievable absent significant improvements.

Although restructuring actions should help, there is still substantial overlap of development, test, and production activities while DOD continues to invest in large quantities of production aircraft before variant designs are proven and performance verified.

Slowed by late aircraft deliveries, technical problems, and low productivity, the flight test program only completed 10 percent of the sorties planned during 2009.

Other technical challenges include (1) relying on an extensive but largely unproven and unaccredited network of ground test laboratories and simulation models to evaluate system performance; (2) developing and integrating very large and complex software requirements; and (3) maturing several critical technologies essential to meet operational performance and logistical support requirements.

Collectively, testing and technical challenges will likely add more costs and time to development, affecting delivery of warfighter requirements and hampering start up of pilot and maintainer training and initial operational testing.


Selected Excerpts

-- Steadily lengthening schedules to complete key system developefforts further exacerbates the already extreme overlap among development, test, and production activities.

-- The program office currently estimates total life-cycle costs for operating, sustaining, and maintaining JSF fleets at $764 billion, substantially higher than earlier estimates. The cost per flying hour of the CTOL variant is projected to be higher than the F-16, one of the Air Force aircraft it is slated to replace. NAVAIR officials recently projected total life-cycle costs even higher, at more than $1 trillion.

-- In addition to ongoing software challenges, the program continues to address several technical issues:

* The carrier variant requires significant design modifications to the keel web, a key structural joint to enable catapult takeoffs. Proposed design changes are still being reviewed and cost and schedule impacts are unknown at this time.

* The program continues to address significant technical and design challenges with the F135 engine. The STOVL engine’s lift fan has required design changes in response to damages incurred during testing which will limit flight test efficiency and will likely require additional modifications, time, and resources.

* Logistic support: NAVAIR reported that the software to support the system’s communication with legacy information systems is currently not planned and may affect interoperability. In addition, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) reported that the current integrated support system for the JSF prohibits operating two detachments from one squadron simultaneously. This limitation will severely affect current operating practices.

* Helmet Mounted Display. Critical to information integration and situational awareness, issues with the helmet mounted display continue to impact system effectiveness and air system integration.

* Damage to flight deck and runways. The F-35 engine and integrated power package exhaust may cause excessive damage to the flight deck environment and runway surfaces that may result in operating limits or drive costly upgrades and repairs of JSF basing options.

* Thermal management. Heat build-up and exhaust impedes the aircraft’s ability to conduct missions in hot environments. The program has made design changes to address this issue, but those changes are not expected to go into effect until the third low-rate procurement lot and are likely to affect operational testing. The development of a fuel pump to mitigate excessive heat is not expected to fully achieve requirements. As a result, the program has instituted restrictions on how the aircraft can be used [which] will limit flight test efficiency and may not be feasible for operational deployment.


Click here for the full report (53 pages in PDF format) on the GAO website.
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10382.pdf

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http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articl ... A-gao.html

[Penguin]

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/de ... d=blogDest

DARPA defines complexity as parts count plus lines of software code, which it admits is an imperfect metric. But if you look at the F-35, it works. Once seen as the low end of a hi-lo fighter mix with the F-22, the F-35 is actually a far more complex vehicle: three versions and 6 million lines of avionics software (19 million in the complete system) compared with one model and 1.7 million lines for the F-22.

[Penguin]

Press Release


(Source: Romanian Ministry of Defence; issued March 24, 2010)
(Issued in Romanian only; unofficial translation by defense-aerospace.com)


Romania has finally opted for a mix of used and new F-16s to replace its MiG-21 Lancer fighters, and hopes to eventually move up to the F-35 JSF. (Romanian MoD photo) National Defense Minister Gabriel Oprea presented, during the meeting of the Supreme Council of National Defense (CSAT) held on March 23, 2010, a statement on the Multirole Aircraft Program of the Romanian Air Force.

Given that Romania does not have the financial resources necessary for the acquisition of new multirole aircraft, CSAT has approved the Defence Ministry’s proposal to acquire 24 used F-16 aircraft. The proposal will be submitted for discussion and approval by the Romanian Parliament. The proposal to purchase F-16 aircraft was made by the Romanian Air Force’s General Staff, and is based on an in-depth analysis of the missions which the aircraft is required to carry out, and on the long-term strategy to integrate the fighter aircraft into this category of forces.

Minister Gabriel Oprea also presented CSAT members with information regarding the implications of the retirement, in coming years, of the MiG-21 LanceR fighter aircraft which currently equip the Romanian Air Force.

The implementation of the Multirole Aircraft Program is part of the strategic partnership between Romania and the United States of America, and the option to purchase F-16 aircraft is part of the Air Force Staff’s strategy of gradually developing operational capabilities, with the ultimate goal of acquiring the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

In this respect, the strategy set out the following steps:
- An initial stage involving the acquisition of 24 used F-16 Block 25 aircraft;
- An intermediate stage involving the acquisition of an additional 24, new-build F-16 aircraft of the Block 50-52 version;
--A final phase involving the service introduction of 24 F-35 JSF aircraft, which will replace the first batch of F-16 aircraft originally purchased.

The F-16 is a multirole aircraft capable of performing missions for the defense of airspace, strike missions against land and sea targets in all weather conditions, by day and night, and reconnaissance missions.

Its equipment configuration meets Romania's defense needs and allows the commitments undertaken within NATO. The F-16 is a tactical aircraft whose performance has been tested in combat, and has successfully carried out missions during operations in Iraq, the Western Balkans and Afghanistan. All these technical features and performance at the highest level meet the initial operational requirements of the Romanian Air Force.

The purchase of used F-16 aircraft will be subject to an agreement between the governments of Romania and the United States. Project value is approximately US $ 1.3 billion, broken down as follows: 24 refurbished, updated and fully equipped aircraft; technical assistance for a period of 3-5 years; and a logistic support package including flight simulators, training, transport, adaptation of ground infrastructure, ammunition, weapons and administrative costs.

Personnel training will be carried out in the United States to U.S. Air Force standards, to achieve the required operational level and the full implementation of this system’s capabilities.

The aircraft to be purchased by Romania are in service with the US Air Force, and have a remaining lifetime estimated at 10 to 15 years since (2500 to 3500 flight hours per aircraft.)

The first aircraft will arrive in Romania in 2013.

-ends-

[tflash]

Esses não são os mesmos que mandaram ajuda humanitária para o Taiti? Eles compram tudo o que o tio Sam lhes disser para comprar. A Inglaterra já está a pensar duas vezes e eles a quererem comprar despreocupadamente.

[Carlos Mathias]

Para países sem importância, colônias e esparros submissos, esses equipamentos caem como uma luva, pois que não tem absolutamente nenhuma importância estratégica e global.

Como creio que nenhum de nós aceitaria esse papel de país cachorro para o Brasil, a notícia serve como alerta e modelo de onde devemos manter distância segura.

[tflash]

Para países sem importância, colônias e esparros submissos, esses equipamentos caem como uma luva, pois que não tem absolutamente nenhuma importância estratégica e global.

Como creio que nenhum de nós aceitaria esse papel de país cachorro para o Brasil, a notícia serve como alerta e modelo de onde devemos manter distância segura.

A coisa cai no ridículo porque mesmo os estados unidos estão renitentes. O f16 até é uma escolha boa pelo custo/beneficio mas dizer que vão comprar o f35 sem avaliarem o eurofighter + os caças do fx2 mostra o calibre dos lideres de lá. Estamos a falar de um país com graves carências económicas. (por uma questão histórica, eles não devem nem querer ouvir falar em material russo.)

[Mental Ray]

[Bourne]

É um forte candidato para o FX III. Vai estar pau a pau com o Pakão ou similar.

[tflash]

Faz umas acrobacias bonitas mas não substitui o Harrier pelo simples facto de se arriscar a custar tanto como o HMS Ilustrious.

[P44]

F-35 Unit Cost Seen Exceeding $200M

How Much Will Each F-35 Cost? (excerpt)


(Source: Center for Defense Information; issued March 30, 2010)



In two hearings in the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Ashton Carter and his Director for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Christine Fox presented new unit cost estimates for the F-35. Those estimates are extremely optimistic (and very incomplete).

Incomplete because the $114 million to $135 million “Average Procurement Unit Cost” (APUC) Carter and Fox announced, in “then-year” dollars, to buy 2,443 aircraft does not include the research, development, test and evaluation for the F-35. Their current estimate of the additional development costs is about $60 billion (to add to the current estimate of $278 to $329 billion to produce 2,443 F -35s). Including development would add about $25 million to the cost of each aircraft, making the Carter-Fox total program unit cost vary from $139 million to $160 million.

It may be that Carter and Fox are unwilling to testify to a total program unit cost because they are unwilling to inflict further “sticker shock.” Presumably, the official, more complete numbers will be made available later in April when the Defense Department releases its new Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), now about 18 months overdue. What Carter and Fox thought they had to gain by delaying the more complete revelation does not merit speculation; their existing (and truncated) production unit cost estimates have little to do with unfolding realities.

The 2011 budget request for the F-35 plans to buy 43 aircraft for $8.654 billion in procurement funding. That makes for a production unit cost for the 2011 buy of $201 million per F-35. In his March 24 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Carter stated that the unit cost “will decrease significantly” from this level as purchases increase and production processes “optimize.” This is consistent with conventional wisdom that there exists a “learning curve” for aircraft production that progressively shrinks unit cost steadily as production proceeds. Thus, Carter and Fox argue, F-35 unit production costs will come down from the currently unsettlingly high number of $201 million each down to the $114 to $135 million band.

The last 50 years of actual DOD aircraft cost history, especially of “stealth” aircraft, do not treat the Carter-Fox estimates, and the prevailing conventional wisdom, very politely, however. The absence of any such progressive “learning curve” in unit cost has been thoroughly demonstrated by the analysis of Chuck Spinney, using actual procurement data. In the case of the F-35, we can test the likelihood and amount of “learning curve” reduction in the unit cost by comparing the F-35 at this point in its program history to its closest aircraft relative, the F-22.

…/…

F-35 unit cost, just for the procurement side of the ledger, is far more likely to stay around $200 million per copy, or go up, than it is to reduce to the not particularly affordable costs Carter and Fox now predict.

It also worth remembering that the $200-plus million unit cost anticipated here is incomplete. An accurate sticker price includes the total cost of development, testing, facilities and other factors amortized across the ultimate size of the fleet. With the fleet size shrinking by some currently unknown, but very substantial, factor, the unit cost for the total program is sure to grow to even more horrifying levels.

Whatever that final unit cost may ultimately be, to predict it now will surely be met with gales of derisive laughter from the advocates of this ongoing disaster -- gales that will last only until the actual bill arrives on their doorstep. (end of excerpt)


Click here for the full article (HTML format) on the CDI website.
http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm ... /index.cfm

[Enlil]

Para países sem importância, colônias e esparros submissos, esses equipamentos caem como uma luva, pois que não tem absolutamente nenhuma importância estratégica e global.

Como creio que nenhum de nós aceitaria esse papel de país cachorro para o Brasil, a notícia serve como alerta e modelo de onde devemos manter distância segura.

Engraçado é q por aqui "alguns" não comentaram o fato de q lá os EUA pedalaram a concorrência...

[suntsé]

Então na pratica os EUA não possuem um caça de 5 geração?

porque como o F22 foi cancelado e o F35 esta na fase de projeto....

[soultrain]

suntsé,

O F-22 já teve o IOC, ou seja está operacional, não estará totalmente, mas opera. O que foi cancelado foi a fabricação de mais.

O F-35 está bem mais além da fase de projecto, está na fase de industrialização.

[[]]'s

[U-27]

alias

isso me da uma duvida
em combate 1x1, entre um f-35 e um f-22

quem ganha?

[Sterrius]

F22 que é superior em quase todas as caracteristicas U27. Ao menos nas caracteristicas que dizem respeito no combate ar-ar.

Exceto avionicos. Que obviamente podem ser passados pro f22 se os EUA tive-se motivos pra isso.