O Wikleaks e o FX

[Marino]

Como prometi, crio este tópico com os cablegates referentes ao FX, quotando no fórum irmão para dar crédito aos que tiveram o trabalho de pesquisar.
Depois da leitura, não restará dúvida de que a FAB queria o SH.

No tópico do JF-17 eu recortei tudo, aqui vou deixar os cables inteiros, especificamente sobre o F-X2:
Antecipação da SL porque a END iria desclassificar o F-16 e o F-18, e as supostas razões para desclassificar os russos (além de já terem dito de pronto que o F-18 "era justamente o que eles procuravam", que tipo de comprador faz isso?):

2008, Aug 5
Brazil's Next Generation Fighter Competition Takes Off — Embassy Brasilia (Brazil)
Reference id: 08BRASILIA1061
Cable time: Tue, 5 Aug 2008 14:57 UTC
Origin: Embassy Brasilia
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Published on: 11 Jul 2011 (original), 1 Sep 2011 (diff) (now)
Highlight:
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001061 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA, PM/RSAT, USDOC FOR MAC/ADRISCOLL/LFUSSELL/MCAMERON, FCS/PWILLIAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2018 TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], BR [Brazil], ETTC [Trade and Technology Controls] SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S NEXT GENERATION FIGHTER COMPETITION TAKES OFF REF: BRASILIA 847 Classified By: DCM Lisa Kubiske. Reason: 1.5(d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Meeting the July 31, deadline for responses to Brazil's request for information (RFI) on a next generation fighter aircraft (FX2), Boeing and Lockheed Martin submitted their proposals on July 30 and 31 respectively. The Brazilian Air Force (BRAF) is expected to review the proposals of the six competing aircraft and announce a short list by the end of August. As noted in reftel, benefits to the Brazilian economy, particularly its aerospace industry will be decisive in the fighter competition. Both U.S. companies have included substantial packages for industrial cooperation but are taking widely different approaches. Both expect strong competition from the French, Russian and Swedish competitors and will seek appropriate USG advocacy. Post strongly supports providing advocacy for US competitors once approved by Washington agencies. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) BOEING. Boeing provided information on its F18 Super Hornet, highlighting the aircraft's performance record and potential for upgrades to keep it among the world's leading combat aircraft for the next several decades. Boeing's proposal included an extensive section on the technology transfer potential and on possibilities for industrial cooperation. While Boeing could not be specific on the cooperative activities it would pursue, it did provide a list of potential Brazilian partners and of possible projects in which they could participate. It also provided examples of how other F18 users contribute to the production of their aircraft. Most importantly, Boeing offers opening for broad cooperation with Embraer, not only on military, but on civilian aircraft as well. As Embraer specializes in regional jets that Boeing does not produce, such a partnership would allow both companies to utilize their respective strengths. As BRAF officials have indicated in the past that benefits to Embraer will be key, Boeing's offer should be attractive. (Note: Embraer is a private sector company, but the only Brazilian aircraft manufacturer and considered a national asset.) After an initial review of the Boeing submission, the BRAF team overseeing the process told the Boeing rep that the submission was "just what we were looking for."
¶3. (C) LOCKHEED. Lockheed Martin faces a more difficult road with its F16. In Brazil's aborted FX1 competition, the F16 was deemed not to meet Brazil's requirements, and many Brazilian Air Force officers believe it is too old an aircraft to compete with the other candidates. Lockheed is offering a newer, more capable F16, but the real appeal of the plane will be that it would establish a relationship with Lockheed that would carry over to eventual purchase of the F35 Joint Strike Fighter. Many Brazilian pilots have said openly that the F35 would be their preferred long term aircraft, but its availability would be after Brazil must replace its aging fleet. The F16 would provide a capable option until the F35 could be available. Lockheed's offer will also be attractive to Brazil because it would lead to construction of a manufacturing and/or assembly facility for the F16 in Brazil, delivering a direct economic benefit over the life of the aircraft in Brazilian service. The BRAF team called the Lockheed proposal "impressive," but noted that because it was a late addition to the competition, they are least familiar with the F16. This could prove a disadvantage among the top level staff who will make final decisions. On the other hand, Lockheed's offers of co-production were well-received as was the potential for Brazil to become a regional service hub for other South American countries operating smaller numbers of F16s.
¶4. (C) OTHER COMPETITORS. Post does not have the details of the proposals of the other competitors, the Russian SU35, the Swedish Gripen and the French Rafale. Brazilian contacts have indicated that the French and Russians have both been active in lobbying for their planes in advance of their formal submissions. BRAF sources have told embassy officers that they would not prefer the Russian plane as they believe it has reliability problems and because the Russians are perceived as suppliers of last resort. Lockheed reps have said that they expect a strong proposal from Saab, to include a substantial offset package, based on the Swedish company's past activity.
¶5. (C) COMMENT. The two U.S. proposals could both provide Brazil with capable aircraft and strong economic benefits. In effect, they offer Brazil a choice between the shorter term
advantages of indigenous production of an aircraft with a limited shelflife and a potential long term relationship that would go well beyond the FX2 program. As noted in reftel, how Brazil views the economic advantages will be key in its decision making. U.S. competitors will also have to overcome a presumption that U.S. technology transfer policies are too restrictive and have indicated that they will request USG assistance in this regard. Providing Defense Minister Jobim with familiarization flights on both aircraft during his recent visit to the U.S. and with briefings on tech transfers has been a step in the right direction. With a relatively short period in which to make submission, competitors have put together impressive proposals. It is likely that the BRAF has compressed the normal process for RFIs in order to have its "short list" of aircraft together before the Minister for Planning unrolls the new national defense strategy on September 7 out of concern that the planning document will limit its options in selecting new fighters.
SOBEL

"Yes, but...", FMS e financiamento que já deram dor de cabeça, AIM-9X não disponível... É um plantação de mandioca completa na "horta" do "Brazil":

2008, Dec 12
The Fx2 Competition: Overcoming Key Challenges — Embassy Brasilia (Brazil)
Reference id: 08BRASILIA1589
Cable time: Fri, 12 Dec 2008 15:52 UTC
Origin: Embassy Brasilia
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Published on: 11 Jul 2011 (original), 1 Sep 2011 (diff) (now)
Highlight:
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001589 SIPDIS STATE FOR PM/RSAT AND WHA/BSC E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018 TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations], ETTC [Trade and Technology Controls], MASC, BR [Brazil] SUBJECT: THE FX2 COMPETITION: OVERCOMING KEY CHALLENGES REF: A. BRASILIA 1373 B. SECDEF REPORT ON JOBIM MEETING 12/10/08 C. IIR 6 809 0043 09 Classified By: DCM Lisa Kubiske. Reason: 1.5(d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. A December 9 meeting with Boeing representatives highlighted several key issues for the success of Boeing,s bid for Brazil,s next generation fighter aircraft, the FX2. As noted in ref a, technology transfer continues to be Brazil,s most important criterion for selecting a fighter. While there is some scope for interpretation of transfer of technology, several factors, namely weapons integration and source codes, will be seen as key to a successful bid, as will the potential for Brazilian manufacture of components. In a December 10 meeting, Brazilian Air Force finance officials informed Embassy reps about financing requirements and expressed concern that in the past USG inflexibility has got in the way of FMS financing. With French President Sarkozy visiting later in the month a major effort to establish the French aircraft as a presumptive choice is likely. While all these factors provide challenges for the success of Boeing,s bid, there are immediate steps that the USG can take to keep the Super Hornet in the lead. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) As Boeing completes its submission for the Brazilian Request for Proposal (RFP) for a next generation fighter, its representatives highlight several issues that will be critical to winning the competition. Ref a noted the importance of technology transfer for the Brazilians, and Embassy contacts continue to place a priority on this as a deciding factor. The Brazilians have generally avoided specific demands for technology but have made clear that they expect that technology transferred under the FX2 program should benefit their industry and that they expect technology equal to that of other major air forces. Defense Minister Jobim was recently quoted as saying that &national (industrial) capacity is fundamental to this sort of deal.8 He told Secretary Gates that Brazil had declined to choose the Lockheed Martin F16 as a FX2 finalist because it is seen as older technology (ref b). Boeing is expected to present a strong industrial cooperation package to include significant incentives for Brazilian industries, but when evaluating the candidates, the Brazilian Air Force will likely also consider the specific technologies on offer. For example, excluding the AIM 9x missile, which has been approved for export to such countries as South Korea, Switzerland and Saudi Arabia, would be seen as evidence of an unwillingness to transfer technology that we have offered to others and confirm Brazilian suspicions about U.S. trustworthiness as a supplier.
¶3. (C) Based on what Brazilian Air Force leaders have told the Embassy and Boeing, there are two aspects of tech transfer in particular that should be seen as redlines for Brazil: source codes and weapons integration. While the Brazilian Air Force understands that there are some source codes that no manufacturer will provide, its Commander, Brigadeiro Saito, has stated publicly that he expects source code to be provided. The key for Brazil will be to have such codes as are necessary to operate the aircraft and make use of technology derived for its domestic industries, but Saito will use openness to provide codes as a litmus test for the larger question of technology transfer. Brazil also will need to be able to say that it can use domestically-produced weapons on its new aircraft. Given the high importance the government places on supporting Brazilian defense industries, it would be unthinkable for a major purchase not to make use of local products.
¶4. (C) In a December 10 meeting with Embassy reps, Brazilian Air Force planning chief Brig.Alvaro Knupp dos Santos (3 star) discussed Brazilian concerns about financing its fighter
purchase. The original plan was to make an outright cash purchase to be financed by selling bonds. Current market rates, however, make this prohibitively expensive. Brazil will need seller financing and is asking all three candidates about possible arrangements. The Brazilian Air Force is particularly concerned that it will have to "defend" its deal to the Ministry of Finance and answer detailed questions about why proposed finance arrangements would be in Brazil,s best interests. Knupp further commented that financing as part of U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procurements has been a problem in the past because of "lack of flexibility" on the U.S. side and "demanding lawyers" on the Brazilian. He requested a copy of the standard provisions for FMS cases as soon as possible so as to identify and address any possible obstacles. Knupp was clear that he does not want finance arrangements to get in the way of a possible sale and indicated a strong willingness to engage with the USG and Boeing so as to avoid potential pitfalls.
¶5. (SBU) French President Sarkozy is expected to visit Brazil during the week of December 22. While in country, he is expected to sign an agreement on the purchase of diesel electric submarines and a defense cooperation agreement. With Brazil,s new defense strategy paper due out at about the same time, there should be considerable public momentum given to the &Strategic Partnership8 between the two countries. While Brazilian Air Force leaders have told Embassy reps that there will be no movement on the fighter purchase, the French will seek to reinforce perceptions that the Rafale is the leader in the competition and its selection is a virtual fait accompli. Boeing is conscious of the public relations impetus that the French will gain from the visit and is looking for an opportunity to generate some press coverage for the Super Hornet by sponsoring a visit by Brazilian journalists to Boeing,s U.S. facilities and providing them access to pilots who have flown the plane in combat.
¶6. (C) COMMENT: During the December 10 meeting, it became clear that among Air Force personnel, the Super Hornet is the current competition leader. The F18,s superior capabilities, technology and overall cost give it an advantage. However, these factors will not, in the final consideration, outweigh possible perceptions that other planes could offer better technology transfer and financing. Decisions on technology release should set appropriate limits on what technology will be made available, but the key to a successful outcome will be to ensure that such decisions are briefed to the Brazilians in terms of what they will be receiving rather than in terms of what we are withholding. It will be important to be able to reassure the Brazilians that they are being treated consistently with other friendly countries in terms of technology release and that the technologies on offer will benefit Brazilian industry. For the two key issues of weapons integration and source codes, the answer to the Brazilians should be "yes, but...," Brazil will get the necessary codes for the industrial cooperation envisioned in the offset package even if some source code will not be transferred. Similarly, Brazil needs to hear that it would be able to use its weaponry, even if it may not immediately choose to undertake the expense of proceeding with integration. We should also engage with the Brazilians as early as possible on the issue of FMS sales and how to avoid potential legal roadblocks in a financing package. It will also be important to complete information sharing arrangements for the FX2 program as early as possible and continue to press the Brazilians for a more comprehensive agreement.
¶7. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Following upcoming Washington discussions on technology transfer and financing, which should provide a clearer picture of the possible technology transfer package, post will seek to review with Washington agencies the potential transfers against our understanding of Brazilian requirements and the precedents set by technology release decisions to other non-NATO countries. Given the SecDef,s assurance to MOD Jobim in ref b that the U.S. tech transfer package would be strong, the final interagency recommendation should reflect this view. We should then expedite contact with Boeing to ensure that the RFP submission takes into account the USG position. As there will have to be restrictions on the technology to be released, it will remain critically important for post to be engaged in the process to craft an approach that explains why the technology package is attractive for Brazil and gives supporters of the F18 in the Air Force the arguments they need to make the Super Hornet Brazil's choice.
SOBEL

Não vão disponibilizar o AIM-9X porque não somos confiáveis como Arábia Saudita e Coréia do Sul e também não vão nos passar os códigos de integração do nosso armamento, a razão da rusga da COPAC com a indústria e a malígna transferência de tecnologia:

2009, Feb 20
Brazil Fx2 Competition: The Bids Are In; Next Steps — Embassy Brasilia (Brazil)
Reference id: 09BRASILIA216
Cable time: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 18:27 UTC
Origin: Embassy Brasilia
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Published on: 11 Jul 2011 (original), 1 Sep 2011 (diff) (now)
Highlight:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000216 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/BSC, PM/RSAT E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2019 TAGS: BR [Brazil], PREL [External Political Relations], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], ETTC [Trade and Technology Controls] SUBJECT: BRAZIL FX2 COMPETITION: THE BIDS ARE IN; NEXT
STEPS REF: A. BRASILIA 41 B. 08 BRASILIA 1373 Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reason 1.5 (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Following the February 2 submission of bids for Brazil's FX2 fighter competition, the Brazilian Air Force (BRAF) will begin the process of technical evaluation. The U.S. competitor, Boeing's F18 Super Hornet, submitted a proposal that complied with Brazilian technical requirements and offered an extensive package of offsets that evoked an positive initial reaction from the BRAF. Despite this, the Super Hornet is still perceived as trailing the French competitor as Brazilian affinity for its "strategic partnership" with France has led to Dassault's Rafale being perceived as the default choice. To overcome such perceptions, Boeing hosted a group of prominent Brazilian journalists on a tour of U.S. Navy and Boeing facilities that should result in more balanced reporting in the Brazilian press. For a successful outcome to the FX2 process, the USG will need to be prepared to answer Brazilian questions about technology release, particularly regarding source codes and integration of third party weapons outside the U.S., in a way that does not give an outright "no" to the Brazilians while remaining consistent with USG policy. See paragraphs 4-8 for specific suggestions on next steps. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) On February 2, responses to the Request for Proposal (RFP) for Brazil's next generation fighter aircraft (FX2) were submitted to the BRAF in Sao Jose dos Campos by Boeing, Dassault and Saab. With the RFP issued as recently as November, the rapid response from the USG, particularly with regard to technology release, was a significant achievement. Thus far in the FX2 process, most BRAF reps have told embassy officials that they might prefer the F18 as the superior aircraft but were not confident about the releasability of U.S. technology. USMLO Brasilia reports many congratulations from the BRAF on the completeness of Boeing's bid, although there has already been one follow up request for confirmation that all technologies included in the package have been approved for export. Despite the success of the RFP response, there remains a perception among Brazilian leaders that the French candidate, the Rafale, remains the plane to beat in the competition. President Sarkozy's highly-publicized visit to Rio in December and his strong personal friendship with President Lula are seen as giving the Frencha strong political preference.
¶3. (U) As a step toward building the public case for the F18, Boeing sponsored a February 2-5 tour for Brazilian journalists to Washington, NAS Oceana and St. Louis. Participants heard from WHA A/S Shannon and PM AA/S Ruggeiro that the USG strongly supports the sale, including through the transfer of technology and understands Brazil's importance for the stability of the Western Hemisphere. The journalists' questions seemed to accept that the USG was prepared to approve the transfer of relevant technologies and focused on wheather this represented a change in policy to now provide Brazil with the best equipment available. There was also considerable interest in the overall cost of the aircraft and the possibility of financing. By visiting Navy units operating the Super Hornet, the journalists heard first hand accounts of the plane's superior performance from those who have flown it in combat and observed flight operations. The Navy presentations drove home the point that with the F18 Brazil will get a plane with proven performance and reliability, something neither of the other competitors can
offer. In St. Louis, the group was briefed on Boeing's manufacturing operations and the potential advantages to Brazilian industry of partnership with Boeing.
NEXT STEPS ----------
¶4. (C) While the presentation of a strong RFP was an important step, there are still several potential pitfalls in the evaluation process and opportunities to build support for the U.S. candidate. As noted in ref B and previous reporting, Brazilian concerns that the U.S. could withhold key technologies remain a significant factor against success in the FX2 competition. The RFP response, along with BRASILIA 00000216 002 OF 002 positive press coverage, has alleviated much of this concern, but there are several points remaining which, if incorrectly presented, could revive accusations that the U.S. will not transfer technology. The RFP response to the BRAF requirement for a within visual range (WVR) weapon proposed either the U.S.-made AIM9M or integration of a third party weapon, presumably Brazilian-made. While either option will meet the RFP conditions, the Brazilians may notice that a more advanced U.S.-made missile, the AIM 9X, has been approved for export to such Air Forces as those of Saudi Arabia and South Korea and assume that Brazil is less trusted. Post understands that approval of the AIM9X for Brazil remains unlikely, but it will be important not to respond to Brazilian inquiries about this weapon with an outright "no." We should be prepared to explain that we understand that Brazil's policy is to favor indigenous weapons, as articulated in the recent defense strategy, and we are prepared to work with Brazil to integrate such missiles as they become available. We are also offering a lower cost, high performance alternative in the AIM9M. If Brazilian industry is interested, we could suggest partnership with U.S. firms on an improved WVR weapon.
¶5. (C) Similarly, we may see some Brazilian pushback on the location for weapons integration. Ideally, the Brazilians will want this done in Brazil with Brazilian engineers, an arrangment we understand that the USG will not approve. Again, rather than simply denying such a request, it would be better that the USG response focus on the downsides of doing the work in Brazil: huge increases in cost and the disadvantage of exempting Brazilian Super Hornets from ongoing technological improvements occurring in the worldwide Hornet/Super Hornet communities. In order to take full advantage of the mature technologies Boeing is offering (as opposed to its competitors, many of whose key systems are still on the drawing board), Brazil will have to participate in the Super Hornet program as a regular partner, and that means with key weapons integration done in the U.S.
¶6. (C) Before any aircraft could be transferred to Brazil, we will need to complete an information sharing agreement that will ensure protection of classified data. While this is in process, the process of approving technology release for the RFP response revealed that the BRAF will also need to complete an arrangement for protection of the GPS signals used for
weapons guidance. Prompt progress on these arrangements will be instrumental to completing a sale.
¶7. (SBU) The journalists participating in the tour gave strongly positive feedback to Boeing and Embassy reps. We have heard from several that stories will soon be appearing in major Brazilian publications (to be reported septel). As a follow on, embassy is discussing with Boeing the possibility of organizing a similar tour for Brazilian political/opinion leaders that would focus on the importance of the U.S.-Brazil relationship and the benefits, both political and economic to enhancing our partnership. Participation could be open to members of the Brazilian Congress that will have to approve funding for the FX2 and former Ministers who now can influence Brazilian opinion.
¶8. (SBU) President Lula's March visit to Washington will provide an opportunity to signal USG support for the sale of the Super Hornet and highlight the advantages to Brazil of buying the planes. Ideally, President Lula would be offered the same sort of familiarization flight in a Super Hornet that was conducted for Defense Minister Jobim in July 2008. Given the high degree of Brazilian interest in the new U.S. administration, we expect plentiful opportunities for high level contacts in the coming months. These should be used to remind Brazilian leaders of strong USG support for Boeing and the superiority of the F18 offer.
SOBEL

Problemas de financiamento com dicas da SEFA pro SH não ser desclassificado:

2009, May 22
Financing For Brazil's Fighter Purchase — Embassy Brasilia (Brazil)
Reference id: 09BRASILIA659
Cable time: Fri, 22 May 2009 20:57 UTC
Origin: Embassy Brasilia
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Published on: 11 Jul 2011 (original), 1 Sep 2011 (diff) (now)
Highlight:
UNCLAS BRASILIA 000659 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MASS [Military Assistance and Sales], PREL [External Political Relations], BR [Brazil] SUBJECT: FINANCING FOR BRAZIL'S FIGHTER PURCHASE REF: Brasilia 634
¶1. (SBU) The Brazilian Air Force (BRAF) Finance Secretariat (SEFA) has been tasked to submit a report on financing arrangements being presented by the Governments of each of the three competitors (US, France, and Sweden) to support proposals for Brazil's next generation fighter (FX2). The finance report will be submitted together with the BRAF technical recommendation to the National Defense Committee (NDC), consisting of the President of the Republic, the Presidents of the Legislative Houses and the Ministers of Justice, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Treasury, Planning and the Military High Commanders, to assist in their final decision. According to BRAF sources, if two competitors are close in the technical ranking, a decision to seek international financing could lead to SEFA's report being a decisive factor. During a Brazilian Air Force Finance Secretariat Visit to Washington DC on 29 and 30 Apr 2009 SEFA requested Governments communicate in writing detailed financing support of the F-X2 project by 29 May 2009. SEFA Director Maj. Brig. Knupp told Commerce and DSCA reps "SEFA expects 100% financing for F-X2 under Export Credit Agency (ECA) conditions." SEFA delivered the same message to the other competitors during visits to France and Sweden.
¶2. (SBU) The USG is at a competitive disadvantage as Ex-Im Bank, the US ECA, is prohibited by law from financing defense articles. ECAs in France and Sweden have no similar restrictions and will provide ECA guarantees to support their offers as requested by SEFA. Exceptions to EXIM regulations can only be made via legislative action.
¶3. (SBU) Crafting the USG response to SEFA's request is challenging given that we have no possibility of ECA support available. Post therefore recommends the USG communicate a willingness to approach Congress for legislation supporting the Super Hornet. Precedents for exceptions to EXIM rules include legislation to support the sale of F-16s to Poland, and to approve EXIM financing of military helicopters for Greece and, in a separate case, Turkey. Maj Brig Knupp (3-star) told MLO and FCS reps that he understands our legal challenges, and said that even if non-committal, the expression of willingness to approach Congress would be a significant demonstration of interest by the USG in support of Brazil and the Super Hornet offer. In order to remain viable in the FX2 competition, it is essential that a USG response to SEFA's request is submitted by the May 29 deadline. While the finance arrangements by themselves may not be decisive, lack of viable financing could well erode what post believes will be a significant advantage for Boeing from the Super Hornet's overall affordability.
KUBISKE

[Marino]

Infelizmente tem mais:
O cable de logo depois do fatídico 7 de setembro de 2009, choro, ranger de dentes e tudo mais:

2009, Sep 9
Lula Favors French Fighters -- Situation Serious But Not Hopeless — Embassy Brasilia (Brazil)
Reference id: 09BRASILIA1124
Cable time: Wed, 9 Sep 2009 10:20 UTC
Origin: Embassy Brasilia
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Published on: 11 Jul 2011 (original), 1 Sep 2011 (diff) (now)
Highlight:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001124 SIPDIS STATE FOR T, WHA AND PM. OSD FOR USD/ATL. E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019 TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations], MASC, ETTC [Trade and Technology Controls], BR [Brazil] SUBJECT: LULA FAVORS FRENCH FIGHTERS -- SITUATION SERIOUS BUT NOT HOPELESS REF: A. BRASILIA 1100 B. BRASILIA 1094 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske. Reason: 1.4(d) SUBJECT: Lula Favors French Fighters ) Situation Serious But Not Hopeless
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In a surprise announcement during the September 7 visit of French President Sarkozy, President Lula said Brazil would begin negotiations to purchase French-made Rafale fighter aircraft. The President,s step short circuited the Brazilian Air Force,s technical evaluation process which was supposed to deliver a recommendation in the next week. Since Lula,s announcement, GOB officials have been engaged in spin control to convey the message that the purchase from France is not completely certain; the intention is simply to begin purchase negotiations. Nevertheless, the September 7 message indicates that the Rafale is now the strong favorite and underlines the importance of the Lula-Sarkozy personal relationship. Because Lula cited the French willingness to transfer technology as the basis for his preference, and the USG has recently concluded the Congressional notification process for Boeing,s F18 Super Hornet, we may be able to use the final tech transfer approval to seek a level playing field in the negotiation phase. As this was a political decision, we will need
political-level support for the USG candidate to supplement the Super Hornet,s superior package of technology and offsets. END SUMMARY.
WHAT WE KNOW -------------
¶2. (U) In a joint news conference with Sarkozy, September 7, Lula said that Brazil would begin negotiations with France for the purchase of thirty-six fighter aircraft. Lula cited France,s willingness to transfer technology and the importance of &consolidating8 the strategic partnership with France as the reasons for his decision. To bolster the French case, Sarkozy reportedly promised to buy a dozen C390 cargo planes, to be developed by Brazil and to support Rio de Janeiro,s bid to host the 2016 Olympic Games. The French reportedly also promised to assist Brazil in exporting future French-Brazilian aircraft to unspecified countries in Latin America and Africa. Almost immediately after the news conference, other Brazilian officials began giving their own version of the announcement. Foreign Minister Celso Amorim said that "there was a decision to negotiate with one supplier. There was no decision in relation to the other two (competitors)." Later press reports indicated that Lula "did not rule out" the USG or Swedish planes.
¶3. (C) It is likely that Lula,s announcement came as a surprise to the rest of the Brazilian government. Over the past several weeks, Mission Brazil has heard the consistent message that any decision would be made after Sarkozy,s visit. Air Force contacts informed MLO Brasilia that they would be submitting their technical evaluation to the MOD in the week following the visit for review and preparation of a recommendation to the President. The evaluation was never completed or delivered, meaning Lula,s decision to favor the French was taken without the benefit of over a year of work by Air Force experts.
¶4. (U) September 8 press commentary shows the beginnings of a debate on the issue. Several commentators, notably in Folha Sao Paulo, have criticized the expense of the purchase and the lack of transparency of the decision process. Coming on the heels of criticism of the government for the non-competitive purchase of French submarines (ref a), Folha notes there seems to be a "strategy of silence for defense purchases. Another op ed in the same paper, however, trumpeted the deal as a means of avoiding an undesirable post cold war unipolar world. All commentators, however, still seem to believe that the USG is not reliable as a partner for technology transfer and that a future administration could decide to cancel any arrangements made by the current one.
¶5. (C) On September 8, USMLO Air Force Section Chief met with the BRAF team responsible for the evaluation process and BRASILIA 00001124 002 OF 003 reported that
they have received direction to continue work as usual and not to react to what is being aired in the press. During another meeting with two 3-star General Officers, Brig. Salmone (Deputy Commander of Aerospace Technology Command) and Brig. Knupp (BRAF Finance Secretariat), they indicated the BRAF are proceeding "as if nothing happened yesterday," i.e. the Air Force will prepare its recommendation as previously planned and deliver it to the Minister; the USG should remain engaged as it was before Lula,s statement. (They stressed the importance of this moment for moving forward with the United States-Brazil relationship.)
WHAT IT MEANS -------------
¶6. (C) Above all, the September 7 press conference showed that the fighter purchase has become a political decision in which the Super Hornet,s superior capabilities and Boeing,s offer of industrial partnership mean little. Lula,s announcement of an intention to negotiate a fighter purchase with France appears to have cut both Defense Minister Jobim and the Brazilian Air Force out of the loop and ignored the GOB,s official process for arriving at a decision. Despite Jobim,s statement to Under Secretary Tauscher (ref b) that he would give the U.S. a chance to match others, offers, the process has passed Jobim by. Jobim,s intention was to play a major role in the process, both to strengthen his authority as Minister and to add an achievement to his resume should he run for President in 2010. When the skipping of the technical evaluation becomes known, it is likely that more questions will be raised about the lack of a process. Given the spate of scandals touching members of the Brazilian government, it is also possible that there will be allegations of corruption arising from the deviation from the previously-announced procedure. The explanatory statement by Amorim was clearly intended to leave an opening for the other competitors, but Lula, through his announcement, has taken charge of the process and set the terms.
¶7. (C) As the government did with the submarine purchase, announced in December 2008 (ref a), Lula,s emphasis on tech transfer, without any specifics on what technologies are involved, provides an excuse to focus on a single preferred supplier. The submarine decision was also announced during a Sarkozy visit to Brazil, showing the power of the personal relationship over such considerations as capability, cost and benefit to the Brazilian economy. It is worth noting that Brazil faces Presidential elections in 2010, and Lula will not want to hand the opposition an issue with which to criticize his government for wasting money or employing questionable procurement processes. Should opposition in the press and the Brazilian Congress grow, it is possible Lula could turn to another option or put off the fighter competition to be decided by the next President.
WHAT TO DO ----------
¶8. (C) The clear designation of the French as the front runners means that the USG/Boeing bid faces a major challenge in order to level the playing field. It will be critical to counter the perception that USG willingness to transfer technology is ephemeral and to get this message to Lula, who has established himself as the only decision maker on this issue. In doing so, we need to take advantage of Lula,s definition of tech transfer as the key issue and the fact that while negotiations are to open with France, they are not yet closed to the other competitors. We can use the completion of the thirty day Congressional notification period for the sale on September 5 as a new fact in support of the USG bid. By meeting Lula,s requirement for assured tech transfer, we can argue that we should begin the negotiation process for the same reason the French have been invited to do so.
¶9. (C) Given that Lula,s decision to begin negotiations with the French was made following a late dinner with Sarkozy, the importance of personal relationships cannot be overstated. Should President Obama speak with Lula in the next few weeks, it would be important for him to mention the fighter sale. Post recommends that any such conversation BRASILIA 00001124 003 OF 003 could include such points as: -- We understand you are negotiating with the French for the purchase of fighter aircraft because they are offering technology transfer. We are prepared to offer full transfer of all necessary technology as well. -- This decision has been made and passed through Congress. I guarantee it will not change. -- Since we are offering the same technology transfer as the French, I ask that we also be included in the purchase negotiations. I am confident that we will be able to offer a better deal.
¶10. (SBU) Post also recommends that senior USG officials make similar points to the Brazilian press. Additionally, we should add that the USG is offering technologies the others cannot (e.g. low observables, materials testing and proven AESA radar). We should also note that both the French and Swedish entrants contain USML-controlled technology and require export licenses both for sale to Brazil and should Brazil wish to transfer to third parties.
¶11. (SBU) On September 14, Boeing plans to host a suppliers conference with Brazilian industry, which generally favors partnership with Boeing. Post will engage with Boeing on a positive message. If Lula,s tech transfer issues can be addressed, hearing from business leaders that the Brazilian economy would benefit most from partnership with Boeing could be influential. Boeing expects substantial press coverage at this event, and we should ensure that the USG is represented to underline that we have completed our tech transfer approval.
KUBISKE

Representantes da FAB asseguram que a escolha é política, mas vão tratar o anuncio de 7 de setembro como se nada tivesse acontecido, e recomendando o F-18:

2009, Sep 11
Brazil's Fighter Purchase: "everything's Confused" — Embassy Brasilia (Brazil)
Reference id: 09BRASILIA1130
Cable time: Fri, 11 Sep 2009 10:32 UTC
Origin: Embassy Brasilia
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Published on: 11 Jul 2011 (original), 1 Sep 2011 (diff) (now)
Highlight:
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001130 SIPDIS STATE FOR T, WHA AND PM. OSD FOR USDP AND USD/AT&L E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019 TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations], MASC, ETTC [Trade and Technology Controls], BR [Brazil] SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S FIGHTER PURCHASE: "EVERYTHING'S CONFUSED" REF: A. BRASILIA 1124 B. BRASILIA 1100 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske. Reason: 1.4 (d)
¶1. (C) The period following President Lula's surprise September 7 announcement that he wanted to negotiate with France for the purchase of Rafale aircraft has seen a dizzying series of turnabouts, a remarkable variety of rumors and little in the way of solid information. It is clear that the GOB still considers the competition to be in progress and will proceed with its technical evaluation process. MOD Jobim has stated definitively that all three competitors will be considered. Lula's announcement is widely viewed as premature and something of a gaffe, and it has led to widespread questioning in the press and Congress as to why Brazil would choose the most expensive option. Further muddying the waters was the fortuitously-timed USG announcement that the Congressional notification period for the U.S. competitor, the Boeing Super Hornet, had expired and that Brazil could now consider the USG/Boeing offer approved. Brazilian Air Force contacts have reassured Embassy military reps that they will complete their evaluation and that it would be favorable for the USG. They caution, however, that Monday's events show clearly that the final decision will be a political one and high-level political engagement will be necessary for success.
¶2. (C) Most daily papers carried the news that we are still in the competition and that we consider the USG offer to be superior. We heard from a member of the Senate staff that the news of the expiration of the Congressional notification was more important than Secretary Clinton's letter because the GOB had been most concerned about the U.S. Congress blocking the sale. Presidential Advisor Marco Aurelio Gercia, a known proponent of a French alliance, tried to downplay USG credibility by saying the "precedents" of dealing with the USG "are not good" without specifying any such precedent. With the French offer to buy ten of the to-be-developed Brazilian cargo aircraft seen as decisive in getting Lula to support buying French fighters, the news has broken that Embraer has already bid on, and stands a good chance of winning, a tender to supply the U.S. Air Force with 100 light attack aircraft, a far more tangible and immediate benefit to Brazilian industry.
¶3. (C) COMMENT. While it remains difficult to divine what chance there may be to overcome President Lula's premature declaration in favor of the French, the opportunity is there. The French bid is now widely seen as too expensive and possibly linked to corruption. As noted in ref a, Lula's statement that the French enjoyed an advantage in technology transfer has now been called into question, creating an opening to make a case for Boeing's advantages of price, offsets and performance. Boeing will meet with Brazilian suppliers September 15-16 to build support in the Brazilian business community for partnership. The fact remains, however, that President Lula has established himself as the decision maker, and chances for USG success depend on engaging with Lula.
KUBISKE

[Marino]

Continuando os Wikileaks.

Sobre FX-2 em 26/06/2009, o Jobim esperava o relatório final do FX-2 entregue pela FAB em Julho, o que na verdade não aconteceu até Setembro :
Cable reference id: #09BRASILIA825

Subject Brazil's Fighter Competition: Ambassador's Conversation With Mod Jobim
Origin Embassy Brasilia (Brazil)
Cable time Fri, 26 Jun 2009 20:45 UTC
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Source http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09BRASILIA825.html
References 09BRASILIA795

¶1. (C) In a private June 26 meeting with Ambassador Sobel on the margins of a lunch including Presidential Advisors Marco Aurelio Garcia and Gilberto Carvalho, MOD Jobim said he believes he has the information he needs to discuss Brazil's fighter purchase with President Lula once the Air Force makes a recommendation. Jobim told the Ambassador that he expects to receive the Air Force's position in July, after which he will be able "to speak politically." Jobim emphasized that tech transfer would be the key factor in Brazil's decision, although he declined to be drawn into discussing whether he thought Boeing's tech transfer offer the best. He did say that he was convinced Boeing was "sincere" in its offer. Ambassador Sobel asked whether, in the event that the Air Force recommended the Super Hornet, Jobim would endorse the recommendation. The Minister said he had the information he needed to support the Super Hornet. He cautioned that he does not currently know "where Lula is" on the matter.

¶2. (C) Turning to the question of industrial cooperation, Jobim believed that there was increasing interest in Boeing's offset package. He reported that he had recently discussed the issue with Embraer President Frederico Curado who had said Embraer's priority was job creation and that Curado was interested in what he described as building partnership with Boeing. Jobim was also impressed by the breadth of Boeing's prospective industrial cooperation, encompassing major firms such as Embraer and Avibras, companies with strong political connections such as Santo Labs, and even a business in Porto Allegre, in Jobim's home state of Rio Grande do Sul. Jobim said he planned to meet with Boeing officials in early July to learn more about the offset package.

¶3. (C) Embassy Comment. Embassy believes Jobim's remarks were intended to convey the sense that Boeing is in a strong position to come out of the Air Force phase of the selection process as a front runner. Should it do so, Jobim will likely be willing to offer his support. The key decision, however, will be with the National Defense Council, in particular President Lula. Should Lula prefer one of the competitors, it is likely Jobim would go along. For this reason, USG enagement with Brazil at the highest levels assumes even greater importance as we have a narrowing window to influence the fianl decision. SOBEL

[Marino]

Outro wikileaks, sobre o FX-2 em 30/07/2009, é o mesmo que o Carlos Mathias citou em :
http://defesa.forums-free.com/programa- ... s4780.html
em português.
Meus comentários :
- a 1a parte em letras grandes é a parte de mais baixo nível nessa podridão de FAB conversando com o Embaixador dos EUA, totalmente inaceitável e ilegal esse tipo de conversa por parte de qualquer funcionário civil ou militar brasileiro, ainda mais quando faltavam poucas semanas para entrega do relatório final do FX-2 pela FAB ao governo federal;
-vide acima que era para até essa data a FAB ter entregue o relatório final do FX-2, segundo previsão do Ministério da Defesa, mas não entregou. Vejam na 2a parte sublinhada que uma razão do atraso da FAB é a insistência dela em receber por escrito a carta de garantia de ToT's dos EUA/Boeing. É o comprador se preocupando com a saúde do vendedor, é o cachorro abanando o rabo, é o mais alto oficial da FAB se preocupando primeiro com os EUA do que com o Brasil.
Cable reference id: #09BRASILIA952

Reference id aka Wikileaks id #219060 ?
Subject Brazil,s Air Force Commander Asks For State Assurances On Tech Transfer By August 6
Origin Embassy Brasilia (Brazil)
Cable time Fri, 31 Jul 2009 20:42 UTC
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Source http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09BRASILIA952.html
S E C R E T BRASILIA 000952 NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR D, P, T, AND WHA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2019 TAGS: MASS [Military Assistance and Sales], PREL [External Political Relations], BR [Brazil] SUBJECT: BRAZIL,S AIR FORCE COMMANDER ASKS FOR STATE ASSURANCES ON TECH TRANSFER BY AUGUST 6 REF: BRASILIA 888 Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION LISA KUBISKE, REASON 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) At a July 30 dinner for visiting SouthCom Commander General Doug Fraser, Brazil,s Air Force (BRAF) commander, Brigadier Juniti Saito (protect), pulled Ambassador Sobel and Political Counselor aside to discuss the FX-2 Fighter purchase. He said that there was no question from a technical point of view that the F18 was the superior aircraft. &We have been flying U.S. equipment for decades,8 he said, &and we know that it is dependable and that maintenance is simple and cost-effective through FMS.8 That has to be factored into the cost of the new fighter, he said, as the BRAF will likely be using the plane for thirty or forty years. It is the best decision, he said, and the French can,t complain as they just signed a USD 14 billion deal with Brazil (for submarines and helicopters).
¶2. (S/NF) Saito stressed, however, that the question regarding USG commitment to technology transfer remains &a significant political barrier8 that is extremely important to overcome. Saito asked whether the letter he had requested that assured technology transfer (reftel) would be forthcoming. The Ambassador assured him that we understood how important it was to overcome this issue, and said he believed it was in the final stage of approval. Relieved, Saito said he needed the letter in hand by August 6. He said, however, that the decision would not be announced until &after September 7.8 (Note: French President Sarkozy will visit Brazil next month and attend national day festivities on September 7 as part of the &Year of France in Brazil8 activities. End note.)
¶3. (S/NF) Saito reiterated how important President Obama,s discussion on the FX-2 sale with President Lula at Aquila had been, saying, &It opened the door for me to approach the Ambassador as I have.8 He said that President Lula had instructed Defense Minister Jobim and Brigadeiro Saito to meet with General Jones during his upcoming visit and requested an office call by General Jones.
¶4. (S/NF) Comment: This was Saito,s clearest expression that he plans to recommend the F18. Post is working to set up a meeting between General Jones and Brigadier Saito on August 4. Post further understands that Under Secretary Tauscher is prepared to deliver the letter Saito requested to Defense Minister Jobim and Foreign Minister Amorim during the visit, and believes this will be seen as a significant sign of USG support for Boeing,s offer. SOBEL

[Marino]

Agora um Wikileaks mais recente com cable da Embaixada dos EUA sobre o FX-2, de 05/01/2010.
Minha leitura e destaques :
- o então presidente Lula em 2009 não queria escolher F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, e sim Rafale. Tal preferência era vista como um óbice por parte dos EUA, e eles tentavam manipular todos os elementos em volta do presidente para mudar tal opinião : Ministro da Defesa, congressistas, etc;
- a Embaixada dos EUA afirma que sabia do resultado (supostamente) sigiloso do relatório oficial da FAB entregue ao governo, em que o Super Hornet era o preferido no relatório e pela FAB.
Cable reference id: #10BRASILIA3

Reference id aka Wikileaks id #242528 ?
Subject Fx2 At The End Of 2009
Origin Embassy Brasilia (Brazil)
Cable time Tue, 5 Jan 2010 19:40 UTC
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Source http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10BRASILIA3.html
References 09BRASILIA1124
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000003 SIPDIS STATE FOR T, PM AND WHA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/05 TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations], ETTC [Trade and Technology Controls], MASS [Military Assistance and Sales], BR [Brazil] SUBJECT: FX2 at the End of 2009 REF: BRASILIA 1124; IIR 6 809 0156 10 CLASSIFIED BY: Lisa Kubiske, Charge d'Affaires a.i.; REASON: 1.4(D)
¶1. (C) As 2009 comes to end, Brazil's FX2 competition remains undecided. It had been expected that President Lula would make a decision before the end of the year, so as to be able to complete the sale during his tenure. Practically speaking, however, even if a Presidential decision were to be made immediately, the time needed for contract negotiation and appropriation of funds means that the final decision to buy the planes will fall to the next
President in 2011. Embassy contacts in the Ministry of External Relations and Ministry of Defense believe that Defense Minister Jobim will meet with Lula later in January to try to make a decision.
SEPTEMBER: RAFALE PREFERRED
¶2. (C) Lula has made no secret of his preference for the Dassault Rafale, announcing during President Sarkozy's September 7 visit (ref a) that he planned to negotiate the purchase with France, before even reading the Brazilian Air Force's (BRAF) technical evaluation. During the following three months, it was clear that Lula had instructed his government, including Jobim, to focus on making the deal with France work. In September, Lula told the Brazilian press that negotiations with France would focus on attaining a price for the aircraft similar to what Boeing and Saab were asking. (Reportedly, Dassault's best offer was 40% higher.) Despite another Sarkozy visit to Brazil in November and Jobim's later stop in Paris, the French were not able to meet Brazilian requests for a lower price, but their lack of responsiveness (ref b) did not seem to affect the Brazilian preference. Initial statements in September from Lula and FM Amorim attempted to portray the French as somehow offering a superior level of technology transfer as justification for the higher price, but as details emerged from the technical evaluation process, it became clear that all three competitors were generally meeting BRAF tech transfer requirements.
DECEMBER: NEW MOD INTEREST IN BOEING, SAAB STILL A CONTENDER
¶3. (C) During October and November, contacts by Embassy officials and Boeing representatives were received politely, but with little real interest as the focus remained on the French. In recent weeks, however, there has been a notable change from the Minister of Defense. Beginning with A/S Valenzuela's December 14 meeting with Jobim (reported septel), there has been renewed interest in the USG/Boeing proposal. While Jobim repeated concerns about "bad precedents" for policies regarding transfer of U.S.-origin technology (in reality complaints about export licensing procedures), he said he understood that the USG had a new approach and was interested in Boeing's industrial cooperation offer. Boeing has strengthened its case by promoting its new "Global Super Hornet" initiative, which would transfer important elements of production of all F/A 18 aircraft (including those for the U.S. military) to Brazil. By globalizing Super Hornet production and including Brazil in the process, Boeing not only is in position to create and maintain more jobs in Brazil, but can assuage Brazilian paranoia about theoretical USG cutoffs of fighter supply by pointing out that any such cutoff would affect the U.S. Navy as well. In a recent interview with the newspaper Folha de Sao Paulo, Jobim was careful not to commit, mentioning the "strategic alliance" with France but also noting that cost, technology transfer and overall aircraft capability were important.
¶4. (C) Along with the revival of Boeing's hopes, the Swedish Gripen remains a strong competitor. As noted in ref b, many Brazilians perceive it to be an attractive alternative to the Rafale because it has the lowest sticker price. Saab's plan to co-develop the new generation Gripen with Brazil has also garnered support in Brazil's aviation industry among those who believe that such development will increase local aircraft design capabilities. Jobim, however, has been openly dismissive of the Swedes on the basis of the Gripen's lesser capability and because the "New Generation" variant offered to Brazil does not yet exist. A recent story in Isto C) magazine with sourcing to the BRAF pointed out that military aircraft development programs normally run over deadlines and budgets, negating the Gripen's purported price advantage.
¶5. (C) COMMENT. While the Rafale's high price and doubts about the Gripen's development would seem to make the Super Hornet the obvious choice, the fact remains that Lula is reluctant to buy an American aircraft. It is possible that the renewed interest in the USG offer is merely a ploy to gain leverage on the French or that the delay in the decision is intended to allow Dassault to find a way to lower its price. In Mission's view, the chance to win the FX2 competition is real. We know that the Super Hornet received the most favorable technical evaluation from the BRAF and is the choice of the operators. We have also been successful in answering most of the doubts raised about USG technology transfer policies, particularly with the technical evaluation team. There remains, however, the formidable obstacle of convincing Lula. Our goal now should be to make sure that Jobim has as strong a case as possible to take to Lula in January. Mission recommends the following steps:
B7 Continue to underline full USG support in all high-level contacts with Brazil. As Mission has pointed out previously, repeated assurances from President Obama to Lula in the course of their normal contacts are the single most effective means of making our case.
B7 Use Ambassador-Designate Shannon's initial contacts with the Brazilian leadership to make the point that we have worked hard to ensure we have the best offer.
B7 Maintain our public affairs campaign to highlight that not only has the USG completed its approval of tech transfer, but Boeing is confident enough in the offer to be prepared to shift part of production (including hundreds of jobs) to Brazil.
B7 Coordinate with Boeing to ensure the advantages of the Global Super Hornet program are made known to the Brazilian Congress and media. KUBISKE

[Marino]

Copio para cá partes do excelente texto postado pelo Bender no tópico FX-2, pois cita o WikiLeaks :
http://defesa.forums-free.com/viewtopic ... 421#p47421

O link da matéria no site "A Publica" :
http://www.apublica.org/2011/08/amorim- ... o-caminho/

Nesse texto, fica claro o comportamento do Ministro da Defesa e Comandante da Aeronáutica :

- "então ministro da Defesa, Nelson Jobim, que virou interlocutor contumaz do embaixador, a ponto de confidenciar sua irritação com o MRE – compartilhada pelos EUA – em especial com o embaixador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães.";

- "Jobim, por sua vez, se comportava de maneira dúbia e confundia a diplomacia estrangeira. Em um telegrama intitulado “Brasil e França: amor verdadeiro ou casamento de conveniência”, o embaixador relata a visita da comitiva presidencial à França e à Rússia cujos objetivos “cada vez com mais detalhes” haviam sido confidenciados por Jobim antes da viagem."

- já em 01/2009 se sabia o que foi revelado no cablegate 09BRASILIA952 sobre 30/07/2009.
"Sobel também se reuniu diversas vezes com os comandantes das Forças Armadas para pedir “conselhos” e ouvir sua opinião sobre as chances dos caças da Boeing vencerem a concorrência de quase 10 bilhões de reais. “Os apoiadores mais fortes do Super Hornet (o F-18 americano) são as lideranças militares, em particular o comandante da Aeronáutica, brigadeiro Juniti Saito, que considera a oferta da Boeing o melhor negócio e vê as Forças Armadas americanas como a melhor escolha para uma parceria com o seu país”, escreve em telegrama de janeiro de 2009."

- citação do cablegate 09BRASILIA952 sobre 30/07/2009 :
"Durante um jantar oferecido ao comandante americano Doug Fraser, em julho do mesmo ano, o brigadeiro Saito teria puxado Sobel e seu conselheiro político de lado para discutir a aquisição dos caças. “Ele disse que não havia dúvida do ponto de vista técnico sobre a superioridade do F-18: ‘Há décadas voamos em equipamentos americanos e sabemos o quanto eles são bons e fáceis de manter’”."
"Saito então pediu que o governo americano enviasse uma carta ao governo brasileiro se comprometendo a transferir tecnologia além de reiterar a importância da aproximação de Lula e Obama para o negócio."

- esse documento da Aeronáutica obtido não-oficialmente é novidade para mim, isso se configura espionagem e repasse de documentos confidencial a um outro país, algo muito grave :
"Em outro telegrama, o embaixador conta ter obtido “uma cópia não oficial” de uma Requisição de Informações da Aeronáutica (passada eletronicamente para Washington) que “permite planejar os próximos passos para os EUA vencerem a negociação”."
"Além de classificar o F-18 como uma aeronave testada em combate “com incomparável segurança e durabilidade”, e de garantir que o preço não seria o principal critério da escolha da Aeronáutica, a informação mais importante obtida pelo documento é de que a Embraer, “principal beneficiária de qualquer transferência de tecnologia”, consideraria “desejável a oportunidade de estabelecer uma parceria com a Boeing”, principalmente se a companhia americana “tivesse a intenção de oferecer uma cooperação adicional na área da aviação comercial”."
Essa última parte a Boeing tem feito nos últimos 2 anos... parece seguir a receita vazada nesse documento que deveria ser confidencial e foi obtido indevidamente pela Embaixada dos EUA.

[Marino]

Não postei os comentários dos foristas.
O tópico inteiro pode ser lido aqui:
http://defesa.forums-free.com/wikileaks ... -t401.html

[Luís Henrique]

Ainda bem que o Snowden surgiu.

Senão estaríamos com o excelente Super Hornet e com a HORRÍVEL tot americana.

Em vez de avançar voltaríamos para a idade da pedra.;

[Quiron]

Rapaz, vou precisar reler tudo, mas tem coisas assustadoras nisso ai.

Primeiro, segurar o relatório para esperar a carta de TOTs da boeing/EUA? Que absurdo é esse? De onde veio a ordem para segurar?

Segundo, autoridades militares conversando o tempo todo com a embaixada americana e soltando informações/comentando preferências? Isso é coisa de república de bananas. Deve ser averiguado.

Outro ponto: se não perceberam a enrolação americana em relação à transferência dos códigos e em relação à integração de nossos armamentos, o "yes, but...", então são incompetentes, o que já seria o suficiente para remover tais elementos de qualquer cargo com poder de decisão. Não se entrega o poder de decidir sobre a defesa do país a elementos sem capacidade. Já o pior caso seria se perceberam a enrolação das TOTs e mesmo assim insistiram em manter o avião americano na lista. Escolher esse avião teria comprometido qualquer programa nacional de mísseis, radares etc.. É crime.

Por último, onde estava a Abin durante esse processo todo? Não é sempre que teremos um Snowden.

[wagnerm25]

A Abin é tão discreta que até suspeito que não exista.

[mmatuso]

Se o Brasil fosse um país sério cabeças literalmente rolariam.

[Marino]

Que bom que não sou o único indignado.
O silêncio neste tópico estava ensurdecedor.
É uma vergonha existirem brasileiros deste naipe.
Acho que não vou ser mais contestado quando disser que o escolhido havia sido o SH.

[Juliano Lisboa]

Eu ainda to pasmo, coisa de filme. Brincadeira esse Brasil. Eita povinho bunda viu. Do mais pobre ao mais rico, se não for na maracutaia não tem jeito. Se salvam poucos nesse país.

[Marino]

E não preciso violar a lei e publicar um relatório confidencial para provar, com fontes abertas, que a Copac sugeriu o Gripen, isto todos sabem, mas que o Alto-Comando da FAB optou pelo SH e foi esta opção que chegou no MD.
Tudo o que falei está na cara para os que tem olhos de ver.

[Marino]

E nós somos uns principiantes mesmos.
O "yes but" simplesmente vem do estudo da idiossincrasia brasileira de "não dizer não".
Nós falamos: tá bem, mas tem um probleminha aqui...
Somos inocentes e não sabemos de nada.
Se uma empresa de advocacia com experiência em negociação internacional não for contratada para a negociação do Gripen, vamos ser comidos vivos.