Marinha Americana-US Navy
Enviado: Qua Jan 09, 2008 12:19 am
Posted 12/17/07 19:15
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Visions of U.S. Navy Called Unrealistic
Service Chief Says Proposed Numbers of Ships Are ‘Way, Way Off’
By VAGO MURADIAN
A pre-Thanksgiving Day briefing by the U.S. Navy’s top strategist may not change the size and shape of the fleet, but it shows how service leaders are looking to get creative as they work to expand the fleet on a flat budget.
The 26-page briefing prepared by Vice Adm. John Morgan, “Three Futures, One Navy: A Portfolio Analysis,” and e-mailed to Adm. Gary Roughead, the chief of naval operations, includes three alternatives to the service’s shipbuilding plans: a 263-ship fleet optimized for major combat operations against a peer competitor; a 534-ship shaping force tailored for coalition and maritime security operations; and a 474-ship balanced force, able to perform high- and low-end missions.
Roughead was quick to shoot down all three ideas.
“I just find the numbers to be way, way off. They are just way out there,” he said after a Dec. 13 hearing on maritime strategy before the House Armed Services Committee.
But the CNO added that the Navy needs to find thoughtful new approaches to the expensive task of expanding the fleet to face future threats.
“I have been encouraging my staff to do that, and that’s why you are seeing some of this stuff going around,” he said.
Today’s fleet numbers 280 ships, and the working 30-year plan — which has been roundly denounced as unrealistic by analysts and Congress — is calling for 313 ships by 2013.
As the 2009 budget request approaches its final form and the 2010 budget process begins, Roughead said he is asking his staff: “How do we make those decisions? Where do we make tradeoffs? Where do we accept risk? Where do we reduce risk?”
Despite a series of looming worries, Navy and Air Force leaders have so far been unable to persuade DoD leaders for more modernization funds.
The Marine Corps worries the Navy’s plan for 30 amphibious ships is four too few to move two brigades anywhere in the world, Gen. James Conway, the Marine Corps commandant, told lawmakers at the Armed Services Committee hearing.
Another risk is the rise of Chinese naval power, which has improved more quickly than Navy leaders expected, Roughead said.
One suggestion pushed by Congress to stretch available funding is to find ways to combine the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship with the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter. Roughead said he will meet in January with Adm. Thad Allen, the Coast Guard commandant, to discuss the idea.
The CNO also conceded, as long maintained by industry and observers, the Navy would save money if it could squelch its appetite for late requirements changes. The Navy needs appetite suppressants when it comes to requirements and will have to determine and acquire what it needs, vice what it wants, Roughead said.
Three Options
The three fleets proposed by Morgan include:
å Major combat operations. A force of 263 ships, smaller than the 313-ship fleet that Roughead has said he wants, tailored for battle against a peer competitor. This fleet would be composed of 12 aircraft carriers, 13 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 26 amphibious ships, 81 cruisers and destroyers, 54 corvettes, 21 auxiliaries and 56 submarines including attack, ballistic and cruise missile boats.
This fleet would be optimized for high-end combat but would lack the numbers needed to address lower-intensity global needs.
å Shaping force. A fleet of 534 ships, mostly corvettes and patrol boats better suited to littoral, maritime security and partnership operations. This force would comprise six aircraft carriers, 24 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 48 amphibious ships, 48 cruisers and destroyers, 161 corvettes, 200 patrol craft, 30 riverine squadrons, 15 auxiliaries and 32 submarines of all classes.
This option seeks quantity instead of the combat power that might be needed to fight a peer competitor.
å Balanced force. A fleet of 474 ships that is able to conduct operations from high-end battle to low-end counterterrorism and maritime security. This force would be composed of nine aircraft carriers, 23 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 46 amphibious ships, 57 cruisers and destroyers, 132 corvettes, 160 patrol craft, 20 riverine squadrons, 15 auxiliaries and 32 submarines of all classes.
The briefing wasbased in part on the findings of a 2005 “tabletop exercise” involving Lockheed Martin, which makes the Aegis combat system and is one of the two builders of the new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
All three scenarios enlarge the amphibious fleets and boost the number of surface combatants somewhat. Both major surface combatant programs, the DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer and LCS, have seen cost increases. The Zumwalt-class destroyer, by the Navy’s own admission, is up to $3.3 billion a copy — and outside analysts project even higher costs.
The big loser appears to be the submarine force, whose fleet has shrunk to 54 boats, and whose Virginia-class attack submarine program is approaching its latest cost target of $2 billion apiece.
Roughead is regarded as an advocate for submarines and anti-submarine warfare.
Ron O’Rourke, a naval analyst at the Congressional Research Service, called the 474- and 534-ship options “the most substantially different ship force-structure plans from [the Pentagon] to come to light since the alternative fleet architecture proposed by the Office of Force Transformation (OFT) in a report submitted to Congress in 2005.”
O’Rourke said a change in the Navy’s shipbuilding plan would reverse nearly two years of declarations that a new era of stability had arrived.
“Adopting the second or third plans in particular could have significant implications for the Navy’s shipbuilding plan, and consequently for various parts of the shipbuilding industrial base. These numbers could cause anxiety in certain quarters,” he said.
Lowballing Assumptions
But O’Rourke and others said the options were built on unrealistic assumptions.
Morgan’s brief assumes the Navy’s ship construction budgets in the next three decades will remain about $12.5 billion, not including inflation adjustments — quite a bit less than the $15 billion needed for the current 313-ship plan.
The brief also assumes that nuclear-powered aircraft carriers will cost $5 billion; big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, $2.5 billion; smaller amphibious ships, $1 billion; cruisers and destroyers, $1 billion; corvettes of the Littoral Combat Ship class, $500 million; patrol craft, $100 million; riverine squadrons, $100 million; submarines, $2.5 billion; and auxiliaries, $500 million.
O’Rourke called these assumptions “a bit strange.”
“Submarines, LHAs and LCSs are represented at something like full cost, while there seems to have been an after-Christmas door-buster blow-out sale on nuclear-powered carriers, cruisers and destroyers, and LPDs,” the analyst said. “If we could get nuclear-powered carriers for $5 billion, and cruisers, destroyers and LPDs for $1 billion, the Navy’s challenge in shipbuilding affordability would be significantly reduced.”
O’Rourke said more realistic assumptions would have been “carriers at $8 billion or more, follow-on cruisers and destroyers being $2 billion or more, and LPDs being $1.5 billion or more.”
One congressional staffer, who called the submarine cuts alarming, said the brief was not particularly useful.
“One reason people are likely to embrace the Morgan brief as a serious effort is because anyone that can add knows the current plan doesn’t work,” the staffer said. “Consequently, they are motivated to find the ‘real plan’ the Navy must be hiding.” å
E-mail: vmuradian@defensenews.com.
Print this story
Visions of U.S. Navy Called Unrealistic
Service Chief Says Proposed Numbers of Ships Are ‘Way, Way Off’
By VAGO MURADIAN
A pre-Thanksgiving Day briefing by the U.S. Navy’s top strategist may not change the size and shape of the fleet, but it shows how service leaders are looking to get creative as they work to expand the fleet on a flat budget.
The 26-page briefing prepared by Vice Adm. John Morgan, “Three Futures, One Navy: A Portfolio Analysis,” and e-mailed to Adm. Gary Roughead, the chief of naval operations, includes three alternatives to the service’s shipbuilding plans: a 263-ship fleet optimized for major combat operations against a peer competitor; a 534-ship shaping force tailored for coalition and maritime security operations; and a 474-ship balanced force, able to perform high- and low-end missions.
Roughead was quick to shoot down all three ideas.
“I just find the numbers to be way, way off. They are just way out there,” he said after a Dec. 13 hearing on maritime strategy before the House Armed Services Committee.
But the CNO added that the Navy needs to find thoughtful new approaches to the expensive task of expanding the fleet to face future threats.
“I have been encouraging my staff to do that, and that’s why you are seeing some of this stuff going around,” he said.
Today’s fleet numbers 280 ships, and the working 30-year plan — which has been roundly denounced as unrealistic by analysts and Congress — is calling for 313 ships by 2013.
As the 2009 budget request approaches its final form and the 2010 budget process begins, Roughead said he is asking his staff: “How do we make those decisions? Where do we make tradeoffs? Where do we accept risk? Where do we reduce risk?”
Despite a series of looming worries, Navy and Air Force leaders have so far been unable to persuade DoD leaders for more modernization funds.
The Marine Corps worries the Navy’s plan for 30 amphibious ships is four too few to move two brigades anywhere in the world, Gen. James Conway, the Marine Corps commandant, told lawmakers at the Armed Services Committee hearing.
Another risk is the rise of Chinese naval power, which has improved more quickly than Navy leaders expected, Roughead said.
One suggestion pushed by Congress to stretch available funding is to find ways to combine the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship with the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter. Roughead said he will meet in January with Adm. Thad Allen, the Coast Guard commandant, to discuss the idea.
The CNO also conceded, as long maintained by industry and observers, the Navy would save money if it could squelch its appetite for late requirements changes. The Navy needs appetite suppressants when it comes to requirements and will have to determine and acquire what it needs, vice what it wants, Roughead said.
Three Options
The three fleets proposed by Morgan include:
å Major combat operations. A force of 263 ships, smaller than the 313-ship fleet that Roughead has said he wants, tailored for battle against a peer competitor. This fleet would be composed of 12 aircraft carriers, 13 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 26 amphibious ships, 81 cruisers and destroyers, 54 corvettes, 21 auxiliaries and 56 submarines including attack, ballistic and cruise missile boats.
This fleet would be optimized for high-end combat but would lack the numbers needed to address lower-intensity global needs.
å Shaping force. A fleet of 534 ships, mostly corvettes and patrol boats better suited to littoral, maritime security and partnership operations. This force would comprise six aircraft carriers, 24 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 48 amphibious ships, 48 cruisers and destroyers, 161 corvettes, 200 patrol craft, 30 riverine squadrons, 15 auxiliaries and 32 submarines of all classes.
This option seeks quantity instead of the combat power that might be needed to fight a peer competitor.
å Balanced force. A fleet of 474 ships that is able to conduct operations from high-end battle to low-end counterterrorism and maritime security. This force would be composed of nine aircraft carriers, 23 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 46 amphibious ships, 57 cruisers and destroyers, 132 corvettes, 160 patrol craft, 20 riverine squadrons, 15 auxiliaries and 32 submarines of all classes.
The briefing wasbased in part on the findings of a 2005 “tabletop exercise” involving Lockheed Martin, which makes the Aegis combat system and is one of the two builders of the new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
All three scenarios enlarge the amphibious fleets and boost the number of surface combatants somewhat. Both major surface combatant programs, the DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer and LCS, have seen cost increases. The Zumwalt-class destroyer, by the Navy’s own admission, is up to $3.3 billion a copy — and outside analysts project even higher costs.
The big loser appears to be the submarine force, whose fleet has shrunk to 54 boats, and whose Virginia-class attack submarine program is approaching its latest cost target of $2 billion apiece.
Roughead is regarded as an advocate for submarines and anti-submarine warfare.
Ron O’Rourke, a naval analyst at the Congressional Research Service, called the 474- and 534-ship options “the most substantially different ship force-structure plans from [the Pentagon] to come to light since the alternative fleet architecture proposed by the Office of Force Transformation (OFT) in a report submitted to Congress in 2005.”
O’Rourke said a change in the Navy’s shipbuilding plan would reverse nearly two years of declarations that a new era of stability had arrived.
“Adopting the second or third plans in particular could have significant implications for the Navy’s shipbuilding plan, and consequently for various parts of the shipbuilding industrial base. These numbers could cause anxiety in certain quarters,” he said.
Lowballing Assumptions
But O’Rourke and others said the options were built on unrealistic assumptions.
Morgan’s brief assumes the Navy’s ship construction budgets in the next three decades will remain about $12.5 billion, not including inflation adjustments — quite a bit less than the $15 billion needed for the current 313-ship plan.
The brief also assumes that nuclear-powered aircraft carriers will cost $5 billion; big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, $2.5 billion; smaller amphibious ships, $1 billion; cruisers and destroyers, $1 billion; corvettes of the Littoral Combat Ship class, $500 million; patrol craft, $100 million; riverine squadrons, $100 million; submarines, $2.5 billion; and auxiliaries, $500 million.
O’Rourke called these assumptions “a bit strange.”
“Submarines, LHAs and LCSs are represented at something like full cost, while there seems to have been an after-Christmas door-buster blow-out sale on nuclear-powered carriers, cruisers and destroyers, and LPDs,” the analyst said. “If we could get nuclear-powered carriers for $5 billion, and cruisers, destroyers and LPDs for $1 billion, the Navy’s challenge in shipbuilding affordability would be significantly reduced.”
O’Rourke said more realistic assumptions would have been “carriers at $8 billion or more, follow-on cruisers and destroyers being $2 billion or more, and LPDs being $1.5 billion or more.”
One congressional staffer, who called the submarine cuts alarming, said the brief was not particularly useful.
“One reason people are likely to embrace the Morgan brief as a serious effort is because anyone that can add knows the current plan doesn’t work,” the staffer said. “Consequently, they are motivated to find the ‘real plan’ the Navy must be hiding.” å
E-mail: vmuradian@defensenews.com.
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