Fórum Defesa Brasil

soultrain escreveu:Já agora Sintra,

Mais informações sobre o uso do AIM-54, tens alguma coisa?

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Since 1977 the IIAF F-14s were engaged in a series of tests, which put the plane and its weapons system to the extremes, and eventually ended by several spectacular test-firings of AIM-54s, two of which might have scored unofficial world-records for the range, speed, and the height reached by the missiles in flight.

Within the first six months of the war Iranian F-14s scored over 50 air-to-air victories, mainly against Iraqi MiG-21s and MiG-23s, but some also against Su-20/22s. In exchange, only a single F-14A was damaged - by debris from a MiG-21 that exploded in front of it.

Because of this, as well as because of the murderous precision and effectiveness of the Tomcat's AWG-9 weapons system and AIM-54A Phoenix long-range air-to-air missiles, it can be concluded that there was never before an air defence system that proved as effective in a war - especially not over such a lengthy period of time.

By 1987 the Iraqis have suffered such heavy losses to Iranian Tomcats that they were forced to find a solution with which they could engage them under more equal circumstances. Eventually, in early 1988 France managed to deliver a series of Mirage F.1EQ-6 fighters, equipped with Super 530D and Magic Mk.2 missiles, to Iraq: after a series of air battles through February, March, and May 1988, in which the Iraqis suffered additional heavy losses to IRIAF Tomcats, in July 1988 the new IrAF Mirages finally managed to shot two Iranian F-14s down in a single engagement.

At around 10:40hrs, at 12.200m (40,000ft) and only eight kilometres from the Iranian border, two IRIAF F-4Es underway to attack targets in Iraq, were approaching a Boeing 707-3J9C-tanker escorted by two F-14As, led by Capt. M. Khosrodad. The Tomcats were flying a race-track pattern around the tanker, with one of them continuously scanning the airspace over the front by its AWG-9 radar. Around 10:45hrs, just as the first Phantom started receiving fuel from the tanker, the radar onboard Capt. Khosrodad’s F-14A acquired several Iraqi fighters apparently closing from the west and well within the range of the AIM-54 missiles of his Tomcat.

Despite the standing order not to fly into the Iraqi airspace or leave the tanker unprotected, Capt. Khosrodad decided to attack: he ordered his wingman, whose aircraft was only armed with Sparrows and Sidewinders, to remain with the Boeing and the two Phantoms; then Capt. Khosrodad headed off west.

Working swiftly, he and his RIO fired two AIM-54As and two AIM-7E-4s in rapid succession, and both were most pleased when they noticed that at least two of their radar contacts disappeared within seconds of each other: apparently, so they thought, they had just spoiled ‘another Iraqi air raid’….or so they thought.

The access to Iranian veterans both in and outside of Iran and careful research of contemporary reporting ensures that the subject is covered comprehensively. In many cases the authors were able to get first hand accounts of major actions involving the Tomcat, including daring missions escorting strikes into Mosul via Turkish airspace and encounters over Kharq Island when the AIM-54 Phoenix missile was suspected of having destroyed three or four MiG-23s flying in close formation with a single missile.

soultrain escreveu:

statement made by Philip Coyle, the former director of operational test and evaluation at the Pentagon, when giving evidence before a subcommittee of the US Senate Armed Services Committee on March 22, 2000.
The report is damning of the Super Hornet in areas critical to Australia's operational requirements, while praising it for its improved aircraft carrier capabilities when compared to the original Hornet - something not high on our list of essential criteria.

Three sentences on page eight of the report say it all: "The consequences of low specific excess power in comparison to the threat are poor climb rates, poor sustained turn capability, and a low maximum speed. Of greatest tactical significance is the lower maximum speed of the F/A-18E/F since this precludes the ability to avoid or disengage from aerial combat. In this regard, the F/A-18E/F is only marginally inferior to the F/A-18C/D, whose specific excess power is also considerably inferior to that of the primary threat, the MiG-29."
Forget about the new Sukhoi Su-30 Flanker family of Russian fighters proliferating across the region: all Hornet variants are acknowledged in the report as being no match for even the older MiG-29s. Space precludes quoting the report's comments on the multitude of other areas where the Super Hornet is inferior to the 1970s-designed and 1980s-built original F/A-18 aircraft. Admittedly the Block II Super Hornet has a new radar and some electronic components not in the version Coyle gave evidence on, but the fundamental airframe and performance remain unaltered: it is heavier, slower, larger and uglier (its radar signature did not measure up to expectations) than the normal Hornet.

Acha alguma coisa de anormal em relação a isto?

[[]]'s

The Low, Low Price of $49.9 Million . . .

Aviation Week is reporting the following:

"Boeing is offering the Navy what one Pentagon source calls a 'tempting' deal for an all-time-low flyaway price of $49.9 million for new F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. The cost is guaranteed for a third multi-year buy of 170 aircraft, but this is nearly double the Navy's stated commitment for 92 more. Still, the deal 'is going to be pretty tough for the Navy to turn down,' says a Pentagon official.

"The proposal comes as Defense Dept. leaders worry that the cost of Lockheed Martin's Joint Strike Fighter will continue to grow. The Navy has told Congress it has a shortfall of 50 fighters, due in part to two factors--an accelerated burn rate of fighter hours combined with decreased projections of the design life of existing aircraft. Boeing could begin delivering the first aircraft from this deal two years after the award date. The offer would carry the production line to 2013; current work ends in 2009."

Damn, what a steal. How is Boeing going to make ends meet? (I'll bet they're scrimping on food at the Paris Air Show chalets.) Although I swore I'd never be caught dead in a Hornet (wouldn't fly an airplane that didn't have a front seat), at that price I might just have to get a couple for me and the missus.

(Gouge: NC)

-- Ward

June 18, 2007 10:55 AM

soultrain escreveu:jacques,

Desculpe mas acho que está a desviar o foco do que estamos a discutir. Alguma vez disse que o SH é uma má aeronave? Ela só é caracterizada como Super Bug porque está a desempenhar um papel para o qual não se adequa. Problemas todos têm.

Até agora viu-me a postar os tais problemas que os marines referem, que por acaso até são verdade?

Se ler bem a declaracao da US Navy, os problemas não são negados, pelo contrário são dado como conhecidos e resolvidos ou em resolução.

Por acaso é a LockMart que quer vender mais à US Navy, pelo atraso do F-35, não o contrário.

Leia novamente:

Peter Criss is a retired RAAF air vice-marshal, former air commander of Australia and one of Australia's most experienced fighter/strike pilots.

Sidney Morning Herald
http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/ther ... e=fullpage

Já agora onde está a parte que desmente isto:

The consequences of low specific excess power in comparison to the threat are poor climb rates, poor sustained turn capability, and a low maximum speed. Of greatest tactical significance is the lower maximum speed of the F/A-18E/F since this precludes the ability to avoid or disengage from aerial combat. In this regard, the F/A-18E/F is only marginally inferior to the F/A-18C/D, whose specific excess power is also considerably inferior to that of the primary threat, the MiG-29."
____________________________________________________________
Rafale
Performance
Maximum speed: >Mach 1.8 (2,130 km/h, 1,320 mph)
Range: 1,800 km (970 nm, 1,100 mi)
Service ceiling: 18,000 m (60,000 ft)
Rate of climb: >305 m/s [7] (60,000 ft/min)
Wing loading: 326 kg/m² (83 1/3 lb/ft²) Thrust/weight: 1.13

Super Hornet
Maximum speed: >Mach 1.8 (1,188 mph, 1,911 km/h) at high altitude
Range: 681 mi (592 nm, 1,095 km) on hi-hi-hi interdiction mission with 4× 1,000 lb (450 kg) bombs, 2× AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles, and 2× drop tanks
Combat radius: 150 nm (173 mi, 278 km) 135 min maritime air superiority mission with 6 AAMs and 3 drop tanks
Service ceiling: >50,000 ft (15,000 m)
Wing loading: 92.8 lb/ft² (453 kg/m²)
Rate of climb: Não é publicado

Hornet F/A-18C Hornet
Maximum speed: Mach 1.8 (1,127 mph, 1,814 km/h) at 36,100 ft (11,000 m)
Combat radius: 330 mi (290 nm, 537 km) on hi-lo-lo-hi mission
Ferry range: 2,070 mi (1,800 nm, 3,330 km)
Service ceiling: 50,000 ft (15,000 m)
Rate of climb: 50,000 ft/min (254 m/s)
Wing loading: 93 lb/ft² (450 kg/m²)
Thrust/weight: >0.95


Em relação ao Rafale, estes numeros já lhe dizem alguma coisa?

Nós começamos esta discussão a falar do IRST e até agora não me respondeu!?

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http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/06/marine_superhornet_070617/

Problems spark ‘déjà vu’

Several unofficial briefings and papers listing alleged defects in Super Hornets have circulated for at least a year inside the Pentagon. Some have been leaked to the media, including Military Times.

The Marines officially disavow the materials.

“Unofficial, unendorsed and old briefs are nothing more than opinions which may have been used to make decisions on which direction Marine aviation was headed long ago. They do not represent the one position that matters: the Marine Corps’ official position, which is: The F-35B represents the centerpiece of Marine Corps’ aviation, and this is supported by the program of record,” said Maj. Eric Dent, a Marine spokesman.

Still, the allegations continue to make the rounds. A recent story in the Boston Globe about one of the alleged problems sent program officials hurrying to Capitol Hill to reassure Congress there were no serious issues with the aircraft.

“This is déjà vu,” Gaddis* said from NavAir. “Some of those things they’re digging up are literally 12 to 15 years old.”

* Hornet program manager Navy Capt. Don Gaddis

Gaddis and his team actually have a game plan for each time the issues reappear.

“Every so often, about every two or three years, these questions come up. We can answer pretty much anything you want answered,” he said.

Widespread enthusiasm for the Super Hornet throughout the naval aviation community belies the alleged problems with the aircraft. The Boeing-built twin-engine jet, a development of the original McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, deployed in 2002. Originally intended as a stopgap measure between the demise of the old A-6 Intruder and failed A-12 replacement and the JSF, the Super Hornet has legions of admirers despite some shortcomings. With the APG-79 Active Electronically Scanned Array radar installed in new aircraft, the Navy is even more enthusiastic.

“By any measure — reliability, availability, flexibility, bombs dropped, accuracy — we exceeded the F/A-18Cs in expectations across the board,” said Capt. Jeffrey Penfield, head of air-to-air missile systems for NAVAIR.

Penfield, who commanded Strike Fighter Squadron 115 during the 2003 invasion of Iraq and wrote the operational evaluation for the Super Hornet, is adamant in his support for the aircraft.

“It went beyond expectation,” he declared. “It knocked the ball out of the park.”

The F/A-18 E/F acquisition program was an unparalleled success. The aircraft emerged from Engineering and Manufacturing Development meeting all of its performance requirements on cost, on schedule and 400 pounds under weight. All of this was verified in Operational Verification testing, the final exam, passing with flying colors receiving the highest possible endorsement.

The F/A-18E/F is powered by two upgraded F414-GE-400 engines (developed originally for the A-12), producing 36% more thrust than the C/D's F404 engines. Using 480-gal tanks increases the E/F's external fuel capacity to 9,800 lb. (vs. the C/D's 6,700 lb. with 330-gal tanks). The use of low-observable materials and shaping makes the E/F less detectable by radar than the C/D.

In 1992, the F/A-18's operational requirements specified a combat radius of 410 nautical miles (nm, 1.15 statute miles) for fighter missions and 430 nm for attack missions. Such ranges were not achieved by the F/A-18C/D, whose range/payload capabilities have been reduced by weight growth due to equipment added in successive upgrades since 1982, when its combat radius was 366 nm in fighter missions and 415 nm in attack missions. In 1992 the Navy projected the F/A-18E/F's fighter combat radius to be about 420 nm, with an attack radius of about 490 nm -- exceeding requirements of 410 nm and 430 nm for these missions.3 In carrier landings, the F/A-18E/F is estimated to be able to bring back 9,000 lb of fuel/ordnance payload vs. the C/D's recovery payload of less than 6,000 lb.

jacquessantiago escreveu:OBS.: Citei o Koop, não pq ache ele equilibrado, mas justamente pelo oposto. Ele é um ferrenho militante do F-22 e ataca qq outra opção distinta. Não é que ele elogiou o SH! Porém aposto que depois da escolha da RAAF ele deve estar arrependido e deve ter mudado de idea. Vou checar o site dele.

soultrain escreveu:O que postou foi o Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared ATFLIR.
O que vai ser colocado é um IRST.

De resto, nada desmente a falta de capacidade do vector na função Superioridade Aérea, que será ainda mais comprometida com este IRST.

Quanto ao resto há quem discorde, mas o Tomcat tambem tinha problemas crónicos, assim como todas as máquinas com a complexidade de um caça, digamos que não é defeito é feitio.

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With the Lot 30 aircraft as a starting point, the Flightplan lays out a roadmap for expanding the F/A-18E/F's precision-engagement and battle-management capabilities. Much of the focus is on air-to-ground operations, but the Super Hornet is to get an infrared search and track (IRST) sensor to increase air-to-air capability.

Development of the IRST is funded beginning in FY2008, leading to fielding in 2012-13, says Mathews. A targeting, not imaging sensor, the IRST will be integrated with the radar to provide spectral diversity and the ability to engage passively air-to-air. Although it could be mounted internally, a podded sensor is more likely, he says.

Presenter: Rear Admiral John Nathman, Director, Naval Air Warfare Division February 16, 2000 12:30 PM EST

DoD Special Briefing on "SUPER HORNET" Operation Evaluation Results


(...) I think Captain Rutherford may want to talk about some of the dog-fighting piece of it because I think that might be a larger question here.

So maybe I'll let the captain talk about what he sees in terms of the near-in and the dog-fighting.

Captain Rutherford: Thank you, Admiral.

Well, I think it's fair to take a look at where air combat aviation is going in the 21st century here. And you will take a look at some legacy fighter tactics that largely include and, in fact, I dare say, require that you convert the nose of your aircraft to the tail of your opponent aircraft.

Life in the 21st century is going to be a little bit different. Now you only have to have strong neck muscles and the tactic -- and the development, the technology development that will support these tactics are a Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System and a widely capable off-boresite missile employment capability as well. We see that as where this F-18 is ultimately going.

In those scenarios where the aircraft would be in a "knife fight," as we've come to call it, without benefit of the joint helmet- mounted cuing system in either aircraft, the fighter or the opponent, this aircraft will hold its own very nicely. It has extremely capable slow-speed fighting capabilities, much more pronounced than the F-18C. The directional stability of this aircraft and the high angle of attack region puts it in a league all of its own. It features a flight control system -- flight control law that's called beta-dot- feedback, which imparts directional stability to this aircraft, that its predecessor does not have.

So we think that any sort of pot shots that are taken at the aircraft in the 1 v. 1 visual arena are in fact perhaps not as -- don't hold as much water as some would suggest.

Q: This is a basic question. When you say "operationally effective and suitable," what does that mean? Compared to what?

Admiral Besal: The operational effectiveness, we looked in this particular airplane at 21 different COIs, we call it -- Critical Operational Issues. We needed to see, can the airplane perform these traditional roles and missions that would be assigned to a strike fighter airplane.

Operational suitability is different in that we want to know, can the airplane perform those missions in the environment in which it will operate. We look at 10 particular COIs in operational suitability for F-18E/F. These are what we refer to as the "ilities" -- reliability, maintainability, availability, documentation, safety, human factors, engineering, topics like that.

So those are the two different criteria that we judge the airplane by, or two different standards or segments of the evaluation.

Q: Does it have to meet all 21 and all 10 or just a majority of them?

Captain Rutherford: No, sir, it doesn't require -- we look at those under the 21 different criteria and the 10 suitability criteria, but no -- again, there is a qualitative judgment call that's made in there; it doesn't need to meet all of those criteria. The airplane does, in good numbers.

And as always, there's room for growth and improvement in any airplane that we've got.

I think that's pretty much it.

Q: In the time between when the aircraft goes aboard the Lincoln and you get the AIM-9X, are you comfortable with this airplane as a first-day-of-the-war kind of airplane, or -- and what do you have to say about the Air Force's contention that we need the F-22 as a first-day-of-war weapon to clear the battlefield, so that the Super Hornet and other strike aircraft can proceed unimpeded to the target? (Soft laughter.)

Admiral Nathman: Well, I'll try and answer that one. Then we'll let maybe Captain Rutherford.

I don't think we're going to compete this airplane against the F- 22. I think the F-22 is a superb fighter.

You remember when we -- in the introduction, when we talked about the Navy's conops, concept of operations? This airplane is not -- although it's a superb aircraft by itself, it's an airplane that we do not operate by itself. When we launch strikes, typically our strike groups are well -- very well shaped, and that's what we train to. Remember, we start training on the unit level 18 months prior to the deployment in our air wings. Then about eight months prior to deployment, we bring in integrated training. And that culminates in a four-week air wing training detachment at Fallon, Nevada, where we get into the latest tactical developments against the projected threat for that deployment. Then we follow it by many at-sea periods, primarily what we call Fleetex, and joint exercise at the end, which basically polishes not only the team but battle group staff and the commander, the air wing, the ship, and the battle group team to operate. And that's the way the airplane's going to be flown. It's going to be flown inside of Navy con ops, which provides what I think is the right level of shaping. Remember, this airplane is a striker primarily, but it's a great fighter.

And so what we see in our airplane is particularly the fact that we have the road map to protect its signature, to provide the reach, particularly with the AESA [Advanced Electronic Sensor Aperture], to find the reach to detect those kinds of targets, while we shape the signature of the aircraft, to support the radar missiles to endgame -- that's a very critical piece to us -- and then, like we talked about in the dogfighting, they have the capability, if we get in the endgame, in the day visual environment -- if we get there, the airplane has the rating capability and the weapons system and cueing to provide for that capability.

Now, we don't see that kind of threat on the near horizon. Why? Because we're flying typically where we see that we understand the threat in Korea, we certainly understand the threat in Iraq, we certainly understand the threat over the Balkans. And I don't think the bar is that high, nor do I think it will ever get high, that we can't grow this airplane to continue to be what we see the first-day- of-a-war-kind of strike fighter -- period.(...)

Super Hornet OPEVAL
Wings of Gold, Spring 2000 by Nathman, John

F/A-18E/F Wins Collier Trophy

In February 15th, the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force released the Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL) of the FIA-18E/F Super Hornet, declaring it to be "operationally effective and operationally suitable." To those unfamiliar with the process this statement may seem rather bland, but, in fact, it represents the highest endorsement a program can receive. Designed as a first-class warfighter with the growth potential to sustain it on the cutting edge, the Super Hornet's OPEVAL performance fulfilled our every expectation for the aircraft.

The Super Hornet program has been called the most successful acquisition program in recent history, remaining within every fiscal requirement directed by Congress and delivering aircraft on time. This is a credit to the hard work and dedication of the team of Naval Aviators, engineers and managers who have been a part of the requirements and acquisition process, particularly the Naval Air Systems Command and PMA-265. By successfully completing OPEVAL, the Super Hornet has checked a sipnificant waypoint en route to delivering 21st century warfighting capability to the fleet.

Able to excel both in air-to-air and air-to-ground regimes, the F/A-18FJF will perform a spectrum of vital warfare missions, including air superiority, day/night strike with precision weapons, fighter escort, close air support, suppression of enemy air defenses, reconnaissance, forward air control and tanking. The Super Hornet's exceptional ability to penetrate, deliver and survive will be critical to battlespace shaping and dominance. Its stealthiness and survivability give Naval Aviation a superior firstday-of-the-war capability, while its balanced warfighting characteristics and proportionality within the air wing will make it the backbone of carrier aviation's every-day-of-the-war strike capability as well: The E/F's presence on our flight decks will enhance the capability and effectiveness of existing platforms, and truly complements Navy tactical air concepts of operation (CONOPs) while delivering decisive combat power.

From an operator's perspective, the true importance of the OPEVAL report isn't that it marks a significant milestone in a successful acquisition program-which it does-but what's really exciting is that it marks the beginning of the Super Hornet story for the fleet. Today, VFA-122, the F/A18E/F Fleet Replacement Squadron, is hard at work "training the trainers" as the squadron's instructor pilots prepare for the first two CAT I (first-tour) students slated to start training on May 29t". In just over two years, the first operational cruise of the Super Hornet will take place when VFA-115 embarks with CVW-14 in USS Abraham Lincoln. When the men and women of the VFA-115 Eagles man their jets, they will bring to the Lincoln Battlegroup a decisive warfighting capability in the form of the world's finest strike-fighter.

The core warfighting capabilities required of the Super Hornet include range, endurance, payload flexibility, bring-back, survivability and growth, particularly in the strike mission area and as a mission tanker. Each of these capabilities is critical to the execution of maritime dominance and power projection missions, and the FIA-18ElF delivers them all into the hands of the fleet aviators who will sit at the controls. For example, the F/A18EIF enjoys superb airto-air maneuverability It demonstrated superior high angle-of-attack and nose pointing capability during OPEVAL, which combined with its advanced sensors, air-to-air weapons like AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9X, and the Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System (described in detail below), will make it a most deadly foe in both beyond visual range and close-in engagements.

Range and Endurance. The FIA18E/F will be able to destroy targets up to 40 percent further from the aircraft carrier (compared to the Hornet) and deliver weapons to these targets with far greater accuracy. In addition, in the combat air patrol scenario at 200 nautical miles from the flattop, the Super Hornet can remain on station 80 percent longer. During normal cyclic operations, the E/ F can serve in the tanking role for the air wing and still be able to perform a combat mission.

The F/A18E/F will be able to deliver the same types of ordnance as current strike fighters. But with two additional weapons stations, a more versatile mix of weapons will permit greater flexibility (air-to-air and/or air-toground). Due to its increased internal fuel capacity, the E/F is expected to normally operate with only a single centerline fuel tank for most cyclic operations, providing up to three additional weapons stations. The proven reliability of new-generation weaponry exhibited in Desert Fox, Southern Watch and Kosovo, coupled with the Super Hornet's ability to carry more air-to-ground precision ordnance, creates a new metric for measuring combat powerno longer will we calculate the number of sorties per target or weapons per aim point, but rather the number of targets destroyed per Super Hornet sortie.

Bring-back. Because it has gained weight over the years through incorporation of new technology and modifications to increase structural life, the F/A-18C cannot recover with a significant amount of unexpended ordnance. In contrast, the Super Hornet can recover with four 1,000-pound class weapons and a full fuel reserve, an increase of nearly three times the weapon recovery capability.

Survivability. The F/A-18E/F benefits from an integrated, balanced approach to survivability that makes it more survivable against the threat projected for the next 15 years. First, the Super Hornet incorporates low observable (stealth) technology where it provides the best payoff (stealth has not been applied where there would be only a marginal return on the investment). Second, the F/A-18E/F has the capability to operate passively, integrating and fusing targeting information from multiple sources while avoiding detection. Finally, the engine, hydraulic, and fire suppression systems have been specifically engineered to reduce vulnerability. Bottom line, the Super Hornet's survivability improvements over its predecessors make it harder to find; if found, harder to hit; if hit, harder to disable. This survivability, coupled with greater mission payload, translates to a lesser probability of counter-detection with fewer aircraft required in threat envelopes to achieve the same level of target destruction, for an estimated fivefold increase in overall survivability as compared to our current strike-fighter force.

Growth. The Super Hornet's 17 cubic feet of extra volume is the key to keeping it on the cutting a d g a throughout the aircraft's service life. Along with this extra volume, there is a surplus of electrical power and cooling which will readily allow the incorporation of new technologies to keep ahead of future threats. Several of these technologies are already funded for development and early inclusion. For example:

Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA). Stated for introduction in 2006, this radar will be able to simultaneously operate in the airto-air mode (providing a tremendous increase in range and selection of multiple targets) and in the air-to-ground mode (providing Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) for precision weapons target identification). AESA will be able to covertly use third party targeting data received via the Multi-source Information Distribution System (MIDS) from various off-board networked systems. Furthermore, AESA's design will reduce detection by enemy radar and offer self-protect and standoff jamming operations. Finally, with fewer moving parts, the AESA radar is projected to be five times more reliable than current radar systems.

Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking InfraRed,(ATFLIR). This state-ofthe-art infrared camera system offers significant improvements in targeting and will be a baseline installation on all initial production aircraft-VFA-115 will bring this capability with them on the first Super Hornet deployment. The ATFLIR will combine the navigation, laser spot tracker and FLIR systems into one system. In addition, it will offer superb spot stability, increased ranges and increased reliability.

Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM). The IDECM will include a towed decoy that has the most capable airborne radio frequency countermeasure ever designed. It will be capable of transmitting confusing waveforms from some distance behind the aircraft, providing twin advantages of deceiving enemy radars and drawing missile guidance off the aircraft as well. This system is a key component of the Super Hornet's integrated approach to survivability.

Shared Advanced Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP). SHARP is a digital version of the current F-14 TARPS camera designed for use by the Super Hornet. Capable of digitally filming targets and conducting hit assessments, it will transmit images for realtime assessment and analysis, greatly enhancing the timeliness and fidelity of imagery available to strike planners and operational commanders.

Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS). An in-the-helmet Head-Up Display (HUD) will cue aircrew to targets and threats while displaying critical flight information. Not only will "virtual" sensor and data link information be blended visually with what the aircrew see in the physical world, but on-board sensors and weapons systems are automatically refocused as the pilot's head turns toward a target. This means aircrew will no longer be required to point the nose of the aircraft to the target for cueing, but instead, simply point their helmet, lock-on a target and release the weapon.

Announced in mid-February was the receipt by the Boeing Company, Hornet Industry Team, and U.S. Navy of the prestigious Robert J. Collier Trophy for 1999. Presented annually by the National Aeronautics Association, this trophy, established in 1911, is awarded each year in recognition of the greatest achievement in aeronautics and astronautics in America, with respect to improving the performance, efficiency, and safety of air or space vehicles, the value of which has been thoroughly demonstrated by actual use during the preceding year. The trophy, on permanent display at the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum in Washington, DC, is considered the greatest and most prized of aeronautical honors in America. This award, which only occasionally recognizes achievement in militaryrelated aircraft development programs, provides an independent view of the significance of the Super Hor net program.

The U.S. Navy and Naval Aviation are in the midst of redefining our ability to project power from the sea. Revolutionary advances in precision strike capability and our capacity to "net" forces to enable timely decisionmaking by operational commanders to significantly enhance combat effects are the drivers for this change. The capabilities the Super Hornet brings to the fight are at the very heart of both the revolution in strike warfare and network-centric operations. These capabilities will be entrusted to the Navy's fleet aviators who will ultimately be the ones to write the real story of the Super Hornet's operational success.)

RADM John Nathman, Director Air Warfare

Copyright Association of Naval Aviation Spring 2000
Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights Reserved

jacquessantiago escreveu:

soultrain escreveu:jacques,

O F-14 e A6 não foi substituido directamente pelo SH, primeiro tivemos o Hornet do qual o SH foi um paliativo.

Quando é a própria US Navy a admitir que o SH não é supersónico com carga, quando sabemos que as suas caracteristicas são mais para um Bomb truck do que um caça de superioridade aérea.

A USNavy perdeu capacidades com a substituição do F-14 e A6 como plataformas, o SH não foi a evolução natural.

[[]]'s

Soultrain,

Agora fiquei curioso. Para que um caca tem capacidade supersonica superior a Mach 1,8 se nao pode ultrapassar Mach 1 com carga? A pergunta seguinte seria, com que carga?

Pelo que me consta, o F-18 foi desenhado levando em conta uma performance otima entre Mach 0,7 e Mach 1,2, velocidades reais de combate. E ninguem vai a combate sem armas ou cargas externas.

A propria US Navy vem a publico desmentir certas coisas que tem circulado sobre o Suoer Hornet e aponta a origem dos boatos:

Protecting JSF, Marines Fire at F/A-18E/F U.S. Navy Calls Shots Off-Target

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS, NAVAL AIR STATION PATUXENT RIVER, Md.


Inside Naval Air Systems Command headquarters at this southern Maryland base, U.S. Navy program officials for the F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighter program have heard the stories circulating at the Pentagon. Their aircraft, the stories go, can’t carry certain weapons, can’t fly high enough, can’t go fast enough. Design problems such as wing flutter plague the plane and — perhaps worst of all — parts will wear out so fast that the plane’s lifespan will be severely shortened.

There’s just one problem with the stories, Navy officials say: None of them are true. “We’re really scratching our head thinking what’s going on,” said Capt. Don Gaddis, Super Hornet program manager.

So who is spreading these stories about the plane? The answer, which surprised some program officials, is the Marines.

The Marine Corps isn’t even part of the Super Hornet program. They’re planning on replacing their aging Hornets and AV-8B Harrier jump jets with the F-35B short-takeoff-or-vertical-landing (STOVL) version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

Nao me parece que a US Navy perdeu. Me parece que ela ganhou: uma plataforma muito mais flexivel, que pode gerar um numero muito superior de surtidas, com sistemas muito superiores e desempenho geral superior.

OBS.: Li que seria mais facil e muito menos arriscado projetar um novo caca que navalizar o F-22. Navalizar o F-22 iria requerer uma nova asa, com geometria distinta. Isso implicaria em modificacoes profundas em todo o caca para manter integra a capacidade stealth e de desempenho dinamico.

E se analisarmos a situacao da US Navy como um sistema, do qual o SH faz parte, ela tem incorporado muitas novas capacidades: AEGIS, generalizacao do uso de misseis de cruzeiro, SLAM, AIM-120D, AESA, AIM-9X, HMD, etc.

[]´s

Jacques

jacquessantiago escreveu:

jacquessantiago escreveu:

soultrain escreveu:jacques,

O F-14 e A6 não foi substituido directamente pelo SH, primeiro tivemos o Hornet do qual o SH foi um paliativo.

Quando é a própria US Navy a admitir que o SH não é supersónico com carga, quando sabemos que as suas caracteristicas são mais para um Bomb truck do que um caça de superioridade aérea.

A USNavy perdeu capacidades com a substituição do F-14 e A6 como plataformas, o SH não foi a evolução natural.

[[]]'s

Soultrain,

Agora fiquei curioso. Para que um caca tem capacidade supersonica superior a Mach 1,8 se nao pode ultrapassar Mach 1 com carga? A pergunta seguinte seria, com que carga?

Pelo que me consta, o F-18 foi desenhado levando em conta uma performance otima entre Mach 0,7 e Mach 1,2, velocidades reais de combate. E ninguem vai a combate sem armas ou cargas externas.

A propria US Navy vem a publico desmentir certas coisas que tem circulado sobre o Suoer Hornet e aponta a origem dos boatos:

Protecting JSF, Marines Fire at F/A-18E/F U.S. Navy Calls Shots Off-Target

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS, NAVAL AIR STATION PATUXENT RIVER, Md.


Inside Naval Air Systems Command headquarters at this southern Maryland base, U.S. Navy program officials for the F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighter program have heard the stories circulating at the Pentagon. Their aircraft, the stories go, can’t carry certain weapons, can’t fly high enough, can’t go fast enough. Design problems such as wing flutter plague the plane and — perhaps worst of all — parts will wear out so fast that the plane’s lifespan will be severely shortened.

There’s just one problem with the stories, Navy officials say: None of them are true. “We’re really scratching our head thinking what’s going on,” said Capt. Don Gaddis, Super Hornet program manager.

So who is spreading these stories about the plane? The answer, which surprised some program officials, is the Marines.

The Marine Corps isn’t even part of the Super Hornet program. They’re planning on replacing their aging Hornets and AV-8B Harrier jump jets with the F-35B short-takeoff-or-vertical-landing (STOVL) version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

Nao me parece que a US Navy perdeu. Me parece que ela ganhou: uma plataforma muito mais flexivel, que pode gerar um numero muito superior de surtidas, com sistemas muito superiores e desempenho geral superior.

OBS.: Li que seria mais facil e muito menos arriscado projetar um novo caca que navalizar o F-22. Navalizar o F-22 iria requerer uma nova asa, com geometria distinta. Isso implicaria em modificacoes profundas em todo o caca para manter integra a capacidade stealth e de desempenho dinamico.

E se analisarmos a situacao da US Navy como um sistema, do qual o SH faz parte, ela tem incorporado muitas novas capacidades: AEGIS, generalizacao do uso de misseis de cruzeiro, SLAM, AIM-120D, AESA, AIM-9X, HMD, etc.

[]´s

Jacques

Super Hornet rompendo a barreira do som com cargas externas:

PRick escreveu:

jacquessantiago escreveu:

jacquessantiago escreveu:

soultrain escreveu:jacques,

O F-14 e A6 não foi substituido directamente pelo SH, primeiro tivemos o Hornet do qual o SH foi um paliativo.

Quando é a própria US Navy a admitir que o SH não é supersónico com carga, quando sabemos que as suas caracteristicas são mais para um Bomb truck do que um caça de superioridade aérea.

A USNavy perdeu capacidades com a substituição do F-14 e A6 como plataformas, o SH não foi a evolução natural.

[[]]'s

Soultrain,

Agora fiquei curioso. Para que um caca tem capacidade supersonica superior a Mach 1,8 se nao pode ultrapassar Mach 1 com carga? A pergunta seguinte seria, com que carga?

Pelo que me consta, o F-18 foi desenhado levando em conta uma performance otima entre Mach 0,7 e Mach 1,2, velocidades reais de combate. E ninguem vai a combate sem armas ou cargas externas.

A propria US Navy vem a publico desmentir certas coisas que tem circulado sobre o Suoer Hornet e aponta a origem dos boatos:

Protecting JSF, Marines Fire at F/A-18E/F U.S. Navy Calls Shots Off-Target

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS, NAVAL AIR STATION PATUXENT RIVER, Md.


Inside Naval Air Systems Command headquarters at this southern Maryland base, U.S. Navy program officials for the F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighter program have heard the stories circulating at the Pentagon. Their aircraft, the stories go, can’t carry certain weapons, can’t fly high enough, can’t go fast enough. Design problems such as wing flutter plague the plane and — perhaps worst of all — parts will wear out so fast that the plane’s lifespan will be severely shortened.

There’s just one problem with the stories, Navy officials say: None of them are true. “We’re really scratching our head thinking what’s going on,” said Capt. Don Gaddis, Super Hornet program manager.

So who is spreading these stories about the plane? The answer, which surprised some program officials, is the Marines.

The Marine Corps isn’t even part of the Super Hornet program. They’re planning on replacing their aging Hornets and AV-8B Harrier jump jets with the F-35B short-takeoff-or-vertical-landing (STOVL) version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

Nao me parece que a US Navy perdeu. Me parece que ela ganhou: uma plataforma muito mais flexivel, que pode gerar um numero muito superior de surtidas, com sistemas muito superiores e desempenho geral superior.

OBS.: Li que seria mais facil e muito menos arriscado projetar um novo caca que navalizar o F-22. Navalizar o F-22 iria requerer uma nova asa, com geometria distinta. Isso implicaria em modificacoes profundas em todo o caca para manter integra a capacidade stealth e de desempenho dinamico.

E se analisarmos a situacao da US Navy como um sistema, do qual o SH faz parte, ela tem incorporado muitas novas capacidades: AEGIS, generalizacao do uso de misseis de cruzeiro, SLAM, AIM-120D, AESA, AIM-9X, HMD, etc.

[]´s

Jacques

Super Hornet rompendo a barreira do som com cargas externas:

Pelo que me lembro da crítica do Comandante Aviador dos Fuzileiros, não que não possa ser quebrada a barreira do som com cargas externas, mas que a atitude de vôo dos F-18E com cargas externas, é muito ruim. Isto se deve ao alto arrastro aerodinâmico e níveis tb altos na instabilidade artificial do caça. Ele diz que o avião fica de tal modo instável, que torna o vôo em altas velocidades impossível para o piloto suportar a turbulência gerada, ou controlar o avião a contento para atacar o alvo com suas cargas bélicas. Eu tinha este texto em algum lugar, vou ver se encontro.

[ ]´s

* Claim: There is still “manageable wing flutter” with the aircraft and the “wing drop” problem persists.

Rebuttal: “We do not have a flutter problem with this airplane and have never had a flutter problem,” declared Gaddis. “The only thing we can think of is they are getting it confused with the old wing drop problem. That was solved.”

NAVAIR engineers noted that wing drop and wing flutter are different phenomena. Flutter, explained engineer Mike Masse, “is a self-excited oscillation” — basically, vibrations that cause aircraft instability. “There are no stability problems or restrictions on F/A-18 E/F,” he said.

The well-publicized wing drop problem discovered during flight tests in 1997 was entirely different, Super Hornet chief engineer Ed Hovanesian said.

“It’s a momentary loss [of lift] on one wing,” he said, causing a quick roll-off in a specific portion of the flight envelope.

Although a slight vibration — dubbed “residual lateral activity” — remains, a series of fixes essentially solved the problem by 1999, he said.

Now, “as you pull the airplane, you get a little bit of lateral oscillation that is only there from 7.8 to 8.1 degrees [angle of attack],” he said. “You can pull a little bit harder and it’s gone. You can pull a little bit less and it’s gone.”

Many pilots notice no effect at all, he said.

“The most important thing about it,” Hovanesian added, “is it did not cause any task abandonment at all.”