Fórum Defesa Brasil

Carlos Mathias escreveu:Plínio meu camarada, eu entendo o seu ponto de vista, mas ao entrarmos no F-16MLU etc,etc, estaremos perpetuando uma estado de coisas as quais o programa FX está justamente tentando quebrar, se é que se pode dizer assim. O problema não é o F-16 e suas versões, que já provaram serem ótimos aviões em diversas ocasiões, mas o entrave a que eu e os outros colegas estamos tentando nos referir é quanto aos possíveis embargos na operação do mesmo, que a meu ver são uma certeza. Se quisermos realmente almejar ter uma força digna do nome, com armas de última geração e SEM restrições de uso e pelo menos alguma transferência de tecnologia, que pode sim ser pedida, o F-16 na minha opinião e me parece da FAB é a última opção, até mesmo nosso colega português(?), cujo país entrou nessa, desaconselha tal opção. É muito válida para países mais "engajados" nas políticas americanas e mais, digamos assim submissos, aos interesses dos EUA. Os bloqueios virão, tenho certeza, pois uma vez as mãos atadas será uma moleza fazer pressões mil.

Carlos Mathias escreveu:Pois é, como eu já disse antes, seria um desfecho de ouro, um golpe de mestre para os americanos, tirando todo mundo de jogada e mantendo nossa dependência do material deles e por consequência sujeitos as mais diversas pressões. Tiro o chapéu prá eles neste aspecto.

Su-30MK / MKI

The Su-30MKI version was designed for India. The Su-30MK is equipped by the latest radars designed by Indian specialists and with the Akash air-to-air missile. India signed a $1.5-$1.8 billion dollar deal for 40 SU-30s (2 squadrons) in November 1996. Under the contract, the Irkutsk aircraft production association will deliver 40 Su-30s in different versions to the Indian air force. In June 1997 the first batch of eight Sukhoi Su-30 MK fighters were inducted into the Indian Air Force's 24 Squadron at the Lohagaon air base near Pune. India was expected to import a total of 40 Russian fighters by March 1999. Deliveries were initially to start in the spring of 1998, but Indian Defense Ministry experts delayed their decision on the avionics equipment for the planes.

As of mid-2000 India had received only eight SU-30K air defence aircraft and none of the upgraded SU-30MK multi-role aircraft in the Rs 6310-crore deal signed with Russia in 1996. There had been no deliveries after May 1997. India's Defence Research Development Organisation had failed to develop and supply key avionics sub-systems and failed to procure Western avionics to equip the SU-30MK aircraft for its designated multi-role.

At the end of 1999 the Irkutsk aviation industrial association 'Irkut' was finishing the assembly of ten Su-30MK multifunctional long-range for India's Air Forces, equipped with aerial refuelling capabilities. This second series of 10 MKs was completed in early 2000. Twelve similar aircraft followed in 2001, and two final batches of 10 (for a total of 20) Su-30MKIs were scheduled to come after 2003. The aircraft will be progressively converted to the MKI configuration. After the deliveries are complete, HAL plans to launch production of new modifications of Su-30s under a Russian license in cooperation with Sukhoi.

Negotiations to license the production of the Su-30MKI to the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) works of India continued in 1997. The Indians received feasibility plans, and it was thought that a final decision would be reached quickly. Production in India would begin after 2001. In all, India might produce 100 warplanes in a contract worth more than $1 billion. However, as of mid-1999 negotiations on the contract for the licensed production of Su-30MKI fighter by HAL remained delayed due to the government crisis in India, which could not be resolved until after the Fall 1999 elections. The two sides had agreed on all the basic issues, including the value of the licensing contract.

In late December 2000, India and Russia agreed to the licensed production of the Su-30MKI, following the visit of President Vladimir Putin to India in October 2000. The deal signed in Irkutsk, where the factory manufacturing the Su-30s is located, was worth more than $3 billion, and provided for the production of 140 Su-30 fighters at Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) over a period of 20 years.

A General Contract was signed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) with Russian Agency – Rosoboronexport on December 28, 2000 for license manufacture of 140 SU 30 MK 1 aircraft. Collaboration is for the licensed production of 140 SU 30 MK 1 aircraft along with additional engines and sets of aggregates to cater for the lifetime exploitation of the aircraft. The Russian side will provide for supply of license technical documents, specific non-standardised equipment and toolings based on the request for Indian side, technical assistance for preparation of Detailed Project Report (DPR), deputation of Russian Specialists to the project site, training of Indian engineers in Russia etc., and supply of technical kits in different stages of production. The DPR has been received and is being studied. Once the DPR has been approved, the production of SU 30 MK 1 aircraft in India is planned to commence during 2004-2005.

Como assim "A surpresa já era"? Mísseis Guiados por Calor não alertam seus alvos como os Guiados por radar fazem(que podem ser detectados por um RWR).

AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS)

The CMWS consists of six (6) electro-optical sensors and an internally mounted Electronics Control Unit (ECU), which detects incoming missiles, provides warning to the crew, and dispenses countermeasures. CMWS is a totally passive detection system, requiring only the electro-optic (EO) signature of the missile plume. The ECU determines the threat status of detection’s using flight parameter data received from the aircraft Central Computer (CC). The ECU provides missile threat declaration, Direction-Of-Arrival (DOA) and elevation information to the CC which generates the crewstation display and warning tone. The CMWS allows for automatic or manual AN/ALE-45 Countermeasures Dispenser (CMD) operation.

All Infrared [IR] direct threat weapons require line of sight [LOS] to be established prior to launch and the in-flight missile must maintain LOS with the target heat source until impact (or detonation of the proximity fuse). IR missiles require the operator to visually detect the target and energize the seeker before the sensor acquires the target. The operator must track the target with the seeker caged to the LOS until it is determined that the IR sensor is tracking the target and not any background objects (natural or man made objects to include vehicles, the sun, or reflected energy from the sun off clouds, etc.). The IR sensor is also susceptible to atmospheric conditions (haze, humidity), the signature of the aircraft and its background, flares, decoys, and jamming.

When an aircraft has been detected, targeted, locked-on, and the missile fired, the emphasis has to shift to defeating the in-flight missile. Of course, except in the case of autonomously guided missiles, countermeasures against the ground (or hostile aircraft) tracking and command guidance system could still be effective (as in the case of conventional RF countermeasures). There are already a number of countermeasures against RF seekers.

The real challenge is posed by the shoulder-launched "fire and forget" type of IR guided missiles. In most cases, such missiles require lock-on prior to launch; they do not have autonomous reacquisition capability. Given an adequate hemispheric missile warning system (such as that in development), it is quite conceivable that the missile can be defeated in flight. One approach is to use an RF weapon (directed from the aircraft under attack, or counter-launched) to defeat the guidance electronics. For optical or IR seekers that are obviously not "in-band" to the RF weapons, a "back-door" means of coupling the RF energy into the attacking missile must be used. Such back-door mechanisms exist; however, they are notoriously unpredictable and statistically diverse, differing by orders of magnitude from missile to missile, even those of the same class, depending on the missile's maintenance history.

VICTOR escreveu:Outra coisa:

Como assim "A surpresa já era"? Mísseis Guiados por Calor não alertam seus alvos como os Guiados por radar fazem(que podem ser detectados por um RWR).

MAWS = Missile Approach Warning System

AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS)

The CMWS consists of six (6) electro-optical sensors and an internally mounted Electronics Control Unit (ECU), which detects incoming missiles, provides warning to the crew, and dispenses countermeasures. CMWS is a totally passive detection system, requiring only the electro-optic (EO) signature of the missile plume. The ECU determines the threat status of detection’s using flight parameter data received from the aircraft Central Computer (CC). The ECU provides missile threat declaration, Direction-Of-Arrival (DOA) and elevation information to the CC which generates the crewstation display and warning tone. The CMWS allows for automatic or manual AN/ALE-45 Countermeasures Dispenser (CMD) operation.

All Infrared [IR] direct threat weapons require line of sight [LOS] to be established prior to launch and the in-flight missile must maintain LOS with the target heat source until impact (or detonation of the proximity fuse). IR missiles require the operator to visually detect the target and energize the seeker before the sensor acquires the target. The operator must track the target with the seeker caged to the LOS until it is determined that the IR sensor is tracking the target and not any background objects (natural or man made objects to include vehicles, the sun, or reflected energy from the sun off clouds, etc.). The IR sensor is also susceptible to atmospheric conditions (haze, humidity), the signature of the aircraft and its background, flares, decoys, and jamming.

When an aircraft has been detected, targeted, locked-on, and the missile fired, the emphasis has to shift to defeating the in-flight missile. Of course, except in the case of autonomously guided missiles, countermeasures against the ground (or hostile aircraft) tracking and command guidance system could still be effective (as in the case of conventional RF countermeasures). There are already a number of countermeasures against RF seekers.

The real challenge is posed by the shoulder-launched "fire and forget" type of IR guided missiles. In most cases, such missiles require lock-on prior to launch; they do not have autonomous reacquisition capability. Given an adequate hemispheric missile warning system (such as that in development), it is quite conceivable that the missile can be defeated in flight. One approach is to use an RF weapon (directed from the aircraft under attack, or counter-launched) to defeat the guidance electronics. For optical or IR seekers that are obviously not "in-band" to the RF weapons, a "back-door" means of coupling the RF energy into the attacking missile must be used. Such back-door mechanisms exist; however, they are notoriously unpredictable and statistically diverse, differing by orders of magnitude from missile to missile, even those of the same class, depending on the missile's maintenance history.

Esse tipo de sistema é usado para alertar e proteger aeronaves de mísseis IR.

César escreveu:lembrando que mísseis guiados por calor não alertam seus alvos quando disparados. Tem um sistema que faz isso, parece que se chama MAWS, tenho que pesquisar melhor sobre ele.