Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Qua Dez 01, 2010 8:12 pm
Página 49 de 100
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Dez 17, 2010 11:08 pm
AVIATIONWEEK.COM
Tech Transfer Issues Could Hold Up Indian Fighter Buy
Dec 16, 2010
By Neelam Mathews mathews.neelam@gmail.com
NEW DELHI
Evidence is growing that the downselect decision for India’s Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) may not be announced until the fourth quarter of 2011, with the holdup centered on terms for technology transfer.
India requires that any aircraft or weapons system introduced into service successfully clear all tests, trials and evaluations. All the MMRCA candidates have completed user trials, including weapons validations, technical and maintenance evaluations. They are currently being evaluated on their proposals for industrial offsets, with technology transfer next up. Only when this process produces a short list will their commercial offers be evaluated.
Technology transfer terms must be completed with the main contract, a defense official explained. India requires that licensed production of the aircraft, including engines, accessories, radars, systems and tooling, be covered by the tech transfer proposal. The ministry holds refusal rights on any specific item and suppliers must provide full life-cycle product support.
The MMRCA contract will provide for 126 aircraft and is the largest military procurement pending in India. It has drawn bids based on the MiG-35, Dassault’s Rafale, Eurofighter, the Saab Gripen, Boeing’s F/A-18E/F and Lockheed Martin’s F-16.
Vendors, who were supposed to have their evaluations completed last April, have already been required to extend or revise their bids through next April because the selection process became bogged down. If the defense ministry is not able to complete its downselect process by then, vendors will have to resubmit their bids and another year’s delay will ensue.
That raises the prospect that swings in currency rates could significantly change the value of the bids, given that rates are determined not when bids are received but when the commercial evaluation begins.
Tech Transfer Issues Could Hold Up Indian Fighter Buy
Dec 16, 2010
By Neelam Mathews mathews.neelam@gmail.com
NEW DELHI
Evidence is growing that the downselect decision for India’s Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) may not be announced until the fourth quarter of 2011, with the holdup centered on terms for technology transfer.
India requires that any aircraft or weapons system introduced into service successfully clear all tests, trials and evaluations. All the MMRCA candidates have completed user trials, including weapons validations, technical and maintenance evaluations. They are currently being evaluated on their proposals for industrial offsets, with technology transfer next up. Only when this process produces a short list will their commercial offers be evaluated.
Technology transfer terms must be completed with the main contract, a defense official explained. India requires that licensed production of the aircraft, including engines, accessories, radars, systems and tooling, be covered by the tech transfer proposal. The ministry holds refusal rights on any specific item and suppliers must provide full life-cycle product support.
The MMRCA contract will provide for 126 aircraft and is the largest military procurement pending in India. It has drawn bids based on the MiG-35, Dassault’s Rafale, Eurofighter, the Saab Gripen, Boeing’s F/A-18E/F and Lockheed Martin’s F-16.
Vendors, who were supposed to have their evaluations completed last April, have already been required to extend or revise their bids through next April because the selection process became bogged down. If the defense ministry is not able to complete its downselect process by then, vendors will have to resubmit their bids and another year’s delay will ensue.
That raises the prospect that swings in currency rates could significantly change the value of the bids, given that rates are determined not when bids are received but when the commercial evaluation begins.
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Qua Dez 22, 2010 1:58 pm
India continua a avançar em termos de tecnologia.
http://www.sify.com/news/india-twice-su ... gjggb.html
Get best Tour Packages to India. Ask for expert Tour Suggestions now www.DestinationIndia.com/Packages
Bhubaneswar, Dec 22 (IANS) India Wednesday successfully conducted two tests of its indigenously developed nuclear-capable Prithvi-II ballistic missile from a military base in Orissa, an official said.
The surface-to-surface missile, which has been inducted into the Indian armed forces, first blasted off from the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur, about 230 km from here, at 8.15 a.m. and then at 9.15 a.m. This is the second time two Prithvi missiles were successfully tested within a gap of one hour, the official said.
'The tests were done by the armed forces. Both were perfect launches,' Integrated Test Range director S.P. Dash told IANS.
The tests were conducted as part of a user trial in the presence of senior scientists of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The two missiles were taken from a production lot and were test fired by the Army's Strategic Forces Command (SFC), Dash said.
All radars, electro-optical tracking systems and telemetry stations along the coast monitored the trajectory parameters of the missiles throughout the mission, he added.
Prominent among those who witnessed the test were Defence Research and Development Laboratory (Hyderabad) director P. Venugopalan, programme director V.L.N. Rao, project directors D.S. Reddy and Adalat Ali.
V.K. Saraswat, scientific advisor to the defence minister, congratulated the scientists and armed forces for the successful flight tests.
Prithvi-II has a maximum range of 350 km and can carry a 500 kg payload. The previous test of the missile Sep 24 was unsuccessful. It had, however, been successfully tested June 18.
DRDO has developed the Prithvi range under India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme.
'The Prithvi missiles, equipped with state-of-the-art guidance systems have reached the specified targets with very high degree of accuracy,' Dash said.
http://www.sify.com/news/india-twice-su ... gjggb.html
Get best Tour Packages to India. Ask for expert Tour Suggestions now www.DestinationIndia.com/Packages
Bhubaneswar, Dec 22 (IANS) India Wednesday successfully conducted two tests of its indigenously developed nuclear-capable Prithvi-II ballistic missile from a military base in Orissa, an official said.
The surface-to-surface missile, which has been inducted into the Indian armed forces, first blasted off from the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur, about 230 km from here, at 8.15 a.m. and then at 9.15 a.m. This is the second time two Prithvi missiles were successfully tested within a gap of one hour, the official said.
'The tests were done by the armed forces. Both were perfect launches,' Integrated Test Range director S.P. Dash told IANS.
The tests were conducted as part of a user trial in the presence of senior scientists of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The two missiles were taken from a production lot and were test fired by the Army's Strategic Forces Command (SFC), Dash said.
All radars, electro-optical tracking systems and telemetry stations along the coast monitored the trajectory parameters of the missiles throughout the mission, he added.
Prominent among those who witnessed the test were Defence Research and Development Laboratory (Hyderabad) director P. Venugopalan, programme director V.L.N. Rao, project directors D.S. Reddy and Adalat Ali.
V.K. Saraswat, scientific advisor to the defence minister, congratulated the scientists and armed forces for the successful flight tests.
Prithvi-II has a maximum range of 350 km and can carry a 500 kg payload. The previous test of the missile Sep 24 was unsuccessful. It had, however, been successfully tested June 18.
DRDO has developed the Prithvi range under India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme.
'The Prithvi missiles, equipped with state-of-the-art guidance systems have reached the specified targets with very high degree of accuracy,' Dash said.
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Dom Jan 02, 2011 4:43 pm
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Qui Jan 13, 2011 6:35 pm
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20110111/main1.htm
A TRIBUNE EXCLUSIVE
New Delhi, January 10
The buzz has started about which new ‘fighter bird’ will rule the Indian skies as well as those of enemy. The Eurofighter aircraft, it seems, has emerged the winner after a long ‘dogfight’ among six foreign 4.5th generation jet planes to clinch over $10-billion Indian Air Force deal for 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). The second runner-up is said to be the French fighter Rafale.
Despite the aggressive business-oriented visit of US President Barack Obama recently, two major competing American military aircraft makers, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, have lost their pitch.
Growing Indo-US strategic relations have not helped the American diplomatic and arms lobbies to get either of the two planes touch the winning mark. India had shortlisted six aircraft: American Lockheed Martin’s F-16IN ‘Super Viper’, US Boeing’s ‘Super Hornet’ F/A-18IN, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company NV (EADS)’ Eurofighter Typhoon - EADS is a consortium of British, German, Spanish and Italy firms - French D'assault's Rafale, Swedish Saab’s Gripen, and Russian MiG-35. The MMRCAs induction is likely to start by 2015.
When the file related to the final evaluation of rival aircraft was shown to Defence Minister AK Antony, highly reliable sources told The Tribune that he said that if this was the case, let it be. The Prime Minister’s Office has been made aware about this. Now, a ‘political decision’ is awaited on this mega deal.
Interestingly, on the New Year eve, an important file relating to the deal was found on the roadside in the Khel Gaon area. The file was supposed to be in the custody of an IAS officer of the rank of director in the defence production wing of the Ministry of Defence. An inquiry has been ordered.
The IAF intends to purchase the MMRCA combat jets to replace its aging Russian-made MiG-21 fleet in phases and help in curbing the recent trend of the depleting squadron strength.
India had floated tenders for this deal in August 2007. The exhaustive technical evaluation of the six global manufacturers’ bids was completed last year. Starting from Bangalore, the trials took the competing fighters and their weapons to the hot desert region of Jaisalmer as well as high-altitude Leh.
Incidentally, the IAF ‘top guns’ - after trials at home and abroad - were said to be in favour of Swedish Saab’s Gripen fighters. Boeing’s ‘Super Hornet’ also reportedly gave a tough fight to be among the top four. The Eurofighter is said to be the costliest jet among the competitors.
Lockheed Martin’s F-16 lost mainly as the Air Force pilots’ community raised a critical question: why should India go for the same fighter aircraft that is with our main regional adversary - Pakistan?
The arrival of Lockheed Martin’s F-16 fighter plane for trials had made many in the IAF apprehensive, and they feared that its ‘selection’ - because of over-pitched American lobbying - might become a ‘combat disadvantage’ for India. Pakistan has been operating F-16 aircraft since the mid-eighties and is currently flying the F-16 Block 50.
The Russian MiG-35 was ‘not touched’ by the evaluators as New Delhi and Moscow were busy signing a deal for a fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA).
A TRIBUNE EXCLUSIVE
New Delhi, January 10
The buzz has started about which new ‘fighter bird’ will rule the Indian skies as well as those of enemy. The Eurofighter aircraft, it seems, has emerged the winner after a long ‘dogfight’ among six foreign 4.5th generation jet planes to clinch over $10-billion Indian Air Force deal for 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). The second runner-up is said to be the French fighter Rafale.
Despite the aggressive business-oriented visit of US President Barack Obama recently, two major competing American military aircraft makers, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, have lost their pitch.
Growing Indo-US strategic relations have not helped the American diplomatic and arms lobbies to get either of the two planes touch the winning mark. India had shortlisted six aircraft: American Lockheed Martin’s F-16IN ‘Super Viper’, US Boeing’s ‘Super Hornet’ F/A-18IN, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company NV (EADS)’ Eurofighter Typhoon - EADS is a consortium of British, German, Spanish and Italy firms - French D'assault's Rafale, Swedish Saab’s Gripen, and Russian MiG-35. The MMRCAs induction is likely to start by 2015.
When the file related to the final evaluation of rival aircraft was shown to Defence Minister AK Antony, highly reliable sources told The Tribune that he said that if this was the case, let it be. The Prime Minister’s Office has been made aware about this. Now, a ‘political decision’ is awaited on this mega deal.
Interestingly, on the New Year eve, an important file relating to the deal was found on the roadside in the Khel Gaon area. The file was supposed to be in the custody of an IAS officer of the rank of director in the defence production wing of the Ministry of Defence. An inquiry has been ordered.
The IAF intends to purchase the MMRCA combat jets to replace its aging Russian-made MiG-21 fleet in phases and help in curbing the recent trend of the depleting squadron strength.
India had floated tenders for this deal in August 2007. The exhaustive technical evaluation of the six global manufacturers’ bids was completed last year. Starting from Bangalore, the trials took the competing fighters and their weapons to the hot desert region of Jaisalmer as well as high-altitude Leh.
Incidentally, the IAF ‘top guns’ - after trials at home and abroad - were said to be in favour of Swedish Saab’s Gripen fighters. Boeing’s ‘Super Hornet’ also reportedly gave a tough fight to be among the top four. The Eurofighter is said to be the costliest jet among the competitors.
Lockheed Martin’s F-16 lost mainly as the Air Force pilots’ community raised a critical question: why should India go for the same fighter aircraft that is with our main regional adversary - Pakistan?
The arrival of Lockheed Martin’s F-16 fighter plane for trials had made many in the IAF apprehensive, and they feared that its ‘selection’ - because of over-pitched American lobbying - might become a ‘combat disadvantage’ for India. Pakistan has been operating F-16 aircraft since the mid-eighties and is currently flying the F-16 Block 50.
The Russian MiG-35 was ‘not touched’ by the evaluators as New Delhi and Moscow were busy signing a deal for a fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA).
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Jan 14, 2011 9:42 am
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/ ... t%20Policy
India Confirms MMRCA Ineligible For New Offset Policy
Jan 13, 2011
By Neelam Mathews mathews.neelam@gmail.com
NEW DELHI
Indian Defense Minister A.K Antony says the defense ministry’s new, more liberal offset policy will not be applicable to the country’s largest defense procurement, the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), quashing the hopes of many vendors.
Program offsets require foreign vendors to provide work for Indian industry up to a certain percentage of the program’s value. The $11 billion MMRCA project was viewed as a potential major boost to India’s still-maturing defense industry.
“The new policy will be applicable to requests for proposals issued from January 2011 onwards,” Antony says.
“This is a big disappointment,” says Puneet Kaura, executive director of Samtel Display Systems. “We see it as an opportunity lost. We would have been pleasantly surprised if the MMRCA and other projects had been incorporated under the new policy.”
The new Defense Production Policy — a 6-page document with 16 points — places an emphasis on indigenous design, development and manufacturing of defense equipment.
“The Ministry of Defense is encouraging [the] participation of the Indian industry and supporting them to become self-reliant,” says Nidhi Goyal, director of Deloitte’s Indian aerospace and defense team. “We need to wait and see how effectively the government works with the private sector to develop indigenous platforms and systems, given the limitations of time and technology that may be available in the country.”
“Self-reliance is our motto, but it is still a distant dream,” Antony says. Nonetheless, he stresses the need to “substantially reduce dependence on foreign suppliers,” adding that the main thrust of the revised policy is “speedy indigenization.”
But industry is skeptical, given the government’s continued reliance on public sector companies such as Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., which still perform the bulk of the work on Indian defense projects. “We will protect the public sector units and strengthen them,” Antony says. “Our thrust is to have a strong defense industrial base. The level playing field [will be brought about] in a phased manner. Rome wasn’t built in a day.”
India Confirms MMRCA Ineligible For New Offset Policy
Jan 13, 2011
By Neelam Mathews mathews.neelam@gmail.com
NEW DELHI
Indian Defense Minister A.K Antony says the defense ministry’s new, more liberal offset policy will not be applicable to the country’s largest defense procurement, the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), quashing the hopes of many vendors.
Program offsets require foreign vendors to provide work for Indian industry up to a certain percentage of the program’s value. The $11 billion MMRCA project was viewed as a potential major boost to India’s still-maturing defense industry.
“The new policy will be applicable to requests for proposals issued from January 2011 onwards,” Antony says.
“This is a big disappointment,” says Puneet Kaura, executive director of Samtel Display Systems. “We see it as an opportunity lost. We would have been pleasantly surprised if the MMRCA and other projects had been incorporated under the new policy.”
The new Defense Production Policy — a 6-page document with 16 points — places an emphasis on indigenous design, development and manufacturing of defense equipment.
“The Ministry of Defense is encouraging [the] participation of the Indian industry and supporting them to become self-reliant,” says Nidhi Goyal, director of Deloitte’s Indian aerospace and defense team. “We need to wait and see how effectively the government works with the private sector to develop indigenous platforms and systems, given the limitations of time and technology that may be available in the country.”
“Self-reliance is our motto, but it is still a distant dream,” Antony says. Nonetheless, he stresses the need to “substantially reduce dependence on foreign suppliers,” adding that the main thrust of the revised policy is “speedy indigenization.”
But industry is skeptical, given the government’s continued reliance on public sector companies such as Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., which still perform the bulk of the work on Indian defense projects. “We will protect the public sector units and strengthen them,” Antony says. “Our thrust is to have a strong defense industrial base. The level playing field [will be brought about] in a phased manner. Rome wasn’t built in a day.”
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Jan 14, 2011 11:29 am
Fiquei sem saber onde por o artigo, mas apesar do nacionalismo alguns pontos são importantes, apesar deu ser um fã do tejas.
http://www.pakistanideology.com/pakista ... arassment/
A lot can be achieved in two and a half decades. For an individual, its roughly one-third of the average lifespan. For a nation, its enough time for an entire generation to come through. A nation can be transformed from a marshy swamp into one of the largest economies of the world – as in the case of Singapore.
What did Indian Air Force (IAF) achieve in twenty six years while consuming over $2 billion? the answer to that is Zilch; Zero; Nada; Nothing – except a failed project and a continued embarrassment in the shape ‘Tejas’. Tejas LCA (Light Combat Aircraft, also known as Last Chance Aircraft) has gone many trials and tests and there’s no sign of induction as yet. It has now been announced to enter IAF in 2010.
Pakistan’s own ambitious JF-17 project was launched in partnership with China in 1995. In just eleven years and with just $500 million spent, the JF-17 was flying in Pakistani Airspace on March 23rd 2007 – with the maiden flight having taken place much earlier in 2003.
The Indian Air Force on the other hand has with significant assistance from France, Israel, and the United States worked on the Tejas (meaning Radiant) LCA project for over two decades and the aircraft is no closer to induction. Infact it gets worse; the unit cost of one JF-17 is $15 million dollars, while a Tejas will cost up to $31 million – which is closer to the far advanced Russian Su-30’s starting cost ($33 million). India would be well advised to buy more of the Russian aircraft instead of wasting billions of dollars in trying to produce its own ‘indigenous’ fighter plane.
In 1983, IAF launched a Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program to replace its flying coffins, the MiG-21’s. Earlier in 1981, a study was conducted by IAF, the ‘Long Term Re-Equipment Plan’, to make plans for a future aircraft that would not only replace MiG-21’s but also be cheaper option to foreign imported planes. The Indian government created an entire agency to manage the LCA Tejas program. Tejas was to be developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), but Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) was the managing agency of the program.
To develop Tejas, India sought help from Israel and France. The IAF’s Air Staff Requirement for the LCA would not be finalized until October 1985. So, for the first four years, Indian authorities failed to even come up with personnel list who would work on the project. Initially Indian authorities believed they would be able to do a test flight in 1990, and have Tejas induction ceremony in 1995. You would think that 12 years would be enough to produce a fighter plane – however thanks to India’s utter incompetence, Tejas is still waiting to be inducted into IAF as of October 2009.
In 1990 HAL started work on the technology demonstrators but because of the financial crunch in India, full-scale funding was not authorized until April 1993. First technology demonstrator, TD-1, was rolled out in Nov 1995 and was followed by demonstrator 2 in 1998, but they were kept grounded for several years due to structural concerns and trouble with the development of the flight control system. (http://www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/fighter/lca/).
The Indian engineers wanted to develop a fly-by-wire system of its own. This is no easy task and requires extensive knowledge of flight control laws and the expensive writing of a considerable amount of software code for the flight control computers, as well as its integration with the avionics and other electronic systems. India tried but failed. With no other option left, India sought help from British Aerospace and Lock Heed Martin for its ‘indigenous’ project, who in turn obliged in 1993.
Until 1998 when India, in an attempt to flex its muscles conducted meaningless nuclear tests which have recently been revealed to have been complete failures, Lockheed Martin was helping India’s failing Tejas project by providing a series of in-flight simulation tests of the integrated flight control software which were conducted on F-16 VISTA until July 1998.
For the Multi-Mode Radar (MMR) of Tejas, India turned to Ericsson, and Ferranti Defense Systems, who make such radars. The Indian engineers disgracefully decided to copy those radars and call it indigenous production. As of 2002, the development of MMR was experiencing major delays and costs escalation. It took India four years just to figure out the problem with the radar. Test results in May 2006 proved that the there was a compatibility issue between radar and the advanced signal processor module. The Indians would be well advised to learn from China – the undisputed champions of reverse engineering – before its own botched and expensive attempts.
India also signed a deal with Rafael of Israel to supply Laser pods, and Sextant of France and Elbit of Israel to supply multi-function displays. Despite all these failures, the Indian authorities still believed they produce the engine on their own. Initially it was decided to equip Tejas with the General Electric F404-GE-F2J3 engine. In 1986, a parallel program was developed to produce an indigenous engine. It was named, Kaveri, but India overconfidence while trying to reverse engineer only managed to ensure the production was slowed because of technical difficulties – followed by the 2004 test of the engine that was a complete failure.
In the end India had to turn to French aircraft company Snecma for technical assistance. The height of India’s false ego and attempts at saving face is evident from them naming the French engine that will be used in Tejas, as Kaveri. On the other hand, the GE engine is still being procured for use in Tejas planes that are going to be produced for induction into IAF. The engine trouble didn’t end there, in 2008 it was announced that Kaveri, is not ready for Tejas, and India announced, in May 2009, a tender for $750 million for more powerful GE engine or Eurojet EJ200 engine. (http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1802/18020420.htm)
As a result of all this rambling the unit cost of Tejas has jumped from $21 million to $30 million. The first batch of Tejas is scheduled to be inducted in IAF in 2010, and will be combat ready in 2012 – or so they say. By 2012, PAF will have at least 60 JF-17’s combat ready fully equipped and prepped up.
The JF-17 Thunder – a joint project between Pakistan and China – was riginally designed to be a small and capable lightweight fighter powered by a single engine to reduce costs – the JF-17 was supposed to be a simple and inexpensive solution for replacing large fleets of obsolete types in the air forces of developing countries. The JF-17 evolved into a more advanced fighter during the later stages of development with revised terms of reference by the Pakistan Air Force and the incorporation of more modern features and technologies.
Being simultaneously manufactured in Pakistan and China, ten JF-17’s have already been inducted in PAF. The Pakistan Air Force plans to make the first JF-17 squadron officially operational by the end of 2009.
Apart from smaller Air Forces, Egyptian and Iranian Air forces have confirmed interest in purchasing these aircraft from Pakistan.
The JF-17 Thunder project has been completed in a record period of four years. China National Aviation Corp officially signed the development contract for the FC-1 airplane in 1999. The project initially suffered a setback due to imposition of sanctions in 1999, which hindered acquisition of avionics and weaponry for the aircraft. The avionics had to be delinked from airframe development in 2001. China National Aviation Corp completes the detailed preliminary design in 2001 and in 2002 the company completed the detailed design structure and the system charts.
On 25 August 2003 the “owlet dragon” FC-1 airplane carried on the initial flight. It flew 17 minutes before it returned to the airport.
The aircraft was intended to be a match for the Indian Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), which is (despite all setbacks) still expected to form the backbone of the Indian Air Force in future. There are, however, some features like advanced and futuristic avionics and cost effectiveness that give the JF-17 an edge over the LC – apart from the fact that it is actually ready and being inducted in the Pakistan Air Force, compared to its Indian counterpart which may take many years, if it is ever finished. There are rumors within official circles in India that a proposal to purchase the 60 JF-17 aircrafts from Pakistan was actually drafted before being vetoed by Air Chief Marshal Pradeep Vasant Naik after the attacks in Mumbai.
http://www.pakistanideology.com/pakista ... arassment/
A lot can be achieved in two and a half decades. For an individual, its roughly one-third of the average lifespan. For a nation, its enough time for an entire generation to come through. A nation can be transformed from a marshy swamp into one of the largest economies of the world – as in the case of Singapore.
What did Indian Air Force (IAF) achieve in twenty six years while consuming over $2 billion? the answer to that is Zilch; Zero; Nada; Nothing – except a failed project and a continued embarrassment in the shape ‘Tejas’. Tejas LCA (Light Combat Aircraft, also known as Last Chance Aircraft) has gone many trials and tests and there’s no sign of induction as yet. It has now been announced to enter IAF in 2010.
Pakistan’s own ambitious JF-17 project was launched in partnership with China in 1995. In just eleven years and with just $500 million spent, the JF-17 was flying in Pakistani Airspace on March 23rd 2007 – with the maiden flight having taken place much earlier in 2003.
The Indian Air Force on the other hand has with significant assistance from France, Israel, and the United States worked on the Tejas (meaning Radiant) LCA project for over two decades and the aircraft is no closer to induction. Infact it gets worse; the unit cost of one JF-17 is $15 million dollars, while a Tejas will cost up to $31 million – which is closer to the far advanced Russian Su-30’s starting cost ($33 million). India would be well advised to buy more of the Russian aircraft instead of wasting billions of dollars in trying to produce its own ‘indigenous’ fighter plane.
In 1983, IAF launched a Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program to replace its flying coffins, the MiG-21’s. Earlier in 1981, a study was conducted by IAF, the ‘Long Term Re-Equipment Plan’, to make plans for a future aircraft that would not only replace MiG-21’s but also be cheaper option to foreign imported planes. The Indian government created an entire agency to manage the LCA Tejas program. Tejas was to be developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), but Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) was the managing agency of the program.
To develop Tejas, India sought help from Israel and France. The IAF’s Air Staff Requirement for the LCA would not be finalized until October 1985. So, for the first four years, Indian authorities failed to even come up with personnel list who would work on the project. Initially Indian authorities believed they would be able to do a test flight in 1990, and have Tejas induction ceremony in 1995. You would think that 12 years would be enough to produce a fighter plane – however thanks to India’s utter incompetence, Tejas is still waiting to be inducted into IAF as of October 2009.
In 1990 HAL started work on the technology demonstrators but because of the financial crunch in India, full-scale funding was not authorized until April 1993. First technology demonstrator, TD-1, was rolled out in Nov 1995 and was followed by demonstrator 2 in 1998, but they were kept grounded for several years due to structural concerns and trouble with the development of the flight control system. (http://www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/fighter/lca/).
The Indian engineers wanted to develop a fly-by-wire system of its own. This is no easy task and requires extensive knowledge of flight control laws and the expensive writing of a considerable amount of software code for the flight control computers, as well as its integration with the avionics and other electronic systems. India tried but failed. With no other option left, India sought help from British Aerospace and Lock Heed Martin for its ‘indigenous’ project, who in turn obliged in 1993.
Until 1998 when India, in an attempt to flex its muscles conducted meaningless nuclear tests which have recently been revealed to have been complete failures, Lockheed Martin was helping India’s failing Tejas project by providing a series of in-flight simulation tests of the integrated flight control software which were conducted on F-16 VISTA until July 1998.
For the Multi-Mode Radar (MMR) of Tejas, India turned to Ericsson, and Ferranti Defense Systems, who make such radars. The Indian engineers disgracefully decided to copy those radars and call it indigenous production. As of 2002, the development of MMR was experiencing major delays and costs escalation. It took India four years just to figure out the problem with the radar. Test results in May 2006 proved that the there was a compatibility issue between radar and the advanced signal processor module. The Indians would be well advised to learn from China – the undisputed champions of reverse engineering – before its own botched and expensive attempts.
India also signed a deal with Rafael of Israel to supply Laser pods, and Sextant of France and Elbit of Israel to supply multi-function displays. Despite all these failures, the Indian authorities still believed they produce the engine on their own. Initially it was decided to equip Tejas with the General Electric F404-GE-F2J3 engine. In 1986, a parallel program was developed to produce an indigenous engine. It was named, Kaveri, but India overconfidence while trying to reverse engineer only managed to ensure the production was slowed because of technical difficulties – followed by the 2004 test of the engine that was a complete failure.
In the end India had to turn to French aircraft company Snecma for technical assistance. The height of India’s false ego and attempts at saving face is evident from them naming the French engine that will be used in Tejas, as Kaveri. On the other hand, the GE engine is still being procured for use in Tejas planes that are going to be produced for induction into IAF. The engine trouble didn’t end there, in 2008 it was announced that Kaveri, is not ready for Tejas, and India announced, in May 2009, a tender for $750 million for more powerful GE engine or Eurojet EJ200 engine. (http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1802/18020420.htm)
As a result of all this rambling the unit cost of Tejas has jumped from $21 million to $30 million. The first batch of Tejas is scheduled to be inducted in IAF in 2010, and will be combat ready in 2012 – or so they say. By 2012, PAF will have at least 60 JF-17’s combat ready fully equipped and prepped up.
The JF-17 Thunder – a joint project between Pakistan and China – was riginally designed to be a small and capable lightweight fighter powered by a single engine to reduce costs – the JF-17 was supposed to be a simple and inexpensive solution for replacing large fleets of obsolete types in the air forces of developing countries. The JF-17 evolved into a more advanced fighter during the later stages of development with revised terms of reference by the Pakistan Air Force and the incorporation of more modern features and technologies.
Being simultaneously manufactured in Pakistan and China, ten JF-17’s have already been inducted in PAF. The Pakistan Air Force plans to make the first JF-17 squadron officially operational by the end of 2009.
Apart from smaller Air Forces, Egyptian and Iranian Air forces have confirmed interest in purchasing these aircraft from Pakistan.
The JF-17 Thunder project has been completed in a record period of four years. China National Aviation Corp officially signed the development contract for the FC-1 airplane in 1999. The project initially suffered a setback due to imposition of sanctions in 1999, which hindered acquisition of avionics and weaponry for the aircraft. The avionics had to be delinked from airframe development in 2001. China National Aviation Corp completes the detailed preliminary design in 2001 and in 2002 the company completed the detailed design structure and the system charts.
On 25 August 2003 the “owlet dragon” FC-1 airplane carried on the initial flight. It flew 17 minutes before it returned to the airport.
The aircraft was intended to be a match for the Indian Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), which is (despite all setbacks) still expected to form the backbone of the Indian Air Force in future. There are, however, some features like advanced and futuristic avionics and cost effectiveness that give the JF-17 an edge over the LC – apart from the fact that it is actually ready and being inducted in the Pakistan Air Force, compared to its Indian counterpart which may take many years, if it is ever finished. There are rumors within official circles in India that a proposal to purchase the 60 JF-17 aircrafts from Pakistan was actually drafted before being vetoed by Air Chief Marshal Pradeep Vasant Naik after the attacks in Mumbai.
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Seg Jan 17, 2011 11:16 am
Fiquei sem saber, mas a memória dos Mirages em guerra é um ponto sempre colocado, e pelo menos os Paquistanes parecem elogiar...
http://www.defence.pk/forums/military-a ... s-war.html
Mirages at War
Mirages at War
Air Commodore M Kaiser Tufail (Retired)
“Enemy pilots should see it, but never catch up with it.” [MARCEL DASSAULT]
At the outbreak of the 1971 Indo-Pak War, Mirage IIIEs were the newest and most advanced combat aircraft in the PAF inventory. Besides performing a wider variety of missions, they could generate a higher daily sortie rate compared to the aging F-86s, F-104s and B-57s. They could navigate accurately to relatively deeper targets and, after the attack, egress at high speed. They could carry out straight line, hit-and-run intercepts against raiders as adeptly as the F-104s, though the radar performance of both fighters was suspect against low-flying targets in ground clutter. Coupled with marginal performance of the five-odd low level AR-1 air defence radars which were interspersed with yawning gaps, PAF’s intercept capability was of consequence during day only; at night-time, it was a chance in a million, as it were.
Surface attack weaponry of the Mirage was not yet commensurate with the more capable platform that it was. PAF relied on the old vintage Mk-117 (750-lbs) high explosive bombs delivered from critical dive angles. Specialist anti-runway weapons had not been not been marketed by the French as yet. Air-to-air weapons included first generation AIM-9B Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles, whose two-degree wide field of view allowed only dead line astern attacks against backgrounds free of extraneous heat sources. Employment of the semi-active radar-guided Matra R-530 missile was found to be impractical in combat situations due to its stringent launch parameters and very short range, particularly at low level, where most of the interceptions were expected. It never saw operational use other than, what amounted to virtual jettisoning in one combat situation.
High expectations from these modern Mirages were also tempered by the stark reality of having just one squadron to fulfil the myriad tasks. 23 Mirages – one aircraft had been lost earlier in a flying accident – were a meagre 8% of the 276 combat aircraft available at the outbreak of war. How the PAF would dovetail its much vaunted front-line element into the military’s overall strategic reckoning had to be carefully articulated in its concept of air operations.
The Strategic Compulsion
Cognizant of the improbability of successfully holding its eastern wing against a determined Indian onslaught and a vigorous insurgency, Pakistani military planners came to be grounded in the conviction that ‘defence of the East lies in the West’. In practical terms, this aphorism meant that Pakistan would launch a major offensive into India from the western wing at the outset of any conflict. By threatening vital Indian assets in Kashmir and the Punjab, the Pakistan Army planners hoped to draw Indian forces away from the east and, gain enough time for outside powers to restrain an unmistakably rampant India. Additionally, any territory seized in the west could be offered as a sop to the countrymen for losses in East Pakistan.
L-R: F/L Shafique Haider, S/L Farooq Umar, W/C Hakimullah (Officer Commanding), S/L Farooq Feroze, F/L Khalid Iqbal
L-R: F/L Safdar Mahmood, F/L Najib Akhtar, F/L Salimuddin, F/L Farooq Habib, F/L Sarfaraz, F/L Saeed Anwar, F/O Hasnat Ahmad
PAF’s concept of operations gave over-riding priority to supporting the Army’s proposed offensive. Air cover was sought to be established over the Army’s deep thrust till such time that it had dug in and established its own defences. It was also felt necessary to attack 4-5 Indian airfields that directly threatened the offensive once it was underway. To prevent timely arrival of logistic reinforcements, PAF was to interdict supplies directly serving the Indian forces; this meant attacking rail yards and other supply nodes soon after start of the offensive. Until the army’s offensive was launched, limited close air support during holding operations was to be provided. Tactical recce was to be conducted regularly to determine the changing disposition of enemy formations. Finally, PAF was to maintain pressure on the IAF with sustained disruptive strikes against some of its forward and rear bases, to accrue a measure of psychological ascendancy in the conduct of air operations.
From PAF’s standpoint, it was easy to see that the modern Mirages were the weapon of choice for operations during the critical land battle planned for the western theatre. Yet, far from singling out these vital assets for the critical stage of the war only, it was boldly decided to employ them to the hilt in all phases.
The bulk of No 5 Squadron was deployed at its parent Base, Sargodha, under command of Wing Commander (Wg Cdr) Hakimullah, formerly an old hand on the F-104s. A detachment of six aircraft, led by Squadron Leader (Sqn Ldr) Farooq F Khan, was moved to the deeper-located satellite Base of Mianwali to provide redundancy in the night intercept role and, also as a back-up strike element for the all-important land offensive. Mirages were thus poised to be at the forefront of PAF’s ‘coup de main’.
Softening Up
Contrary to the general perception, PAF’s dusk strikes of 3 December against some of the forward Indian airfields were not pre-emptory at all, as the Indian invasion of East Pakistan had already taken place in earnest, on 21 November. While these strikes were, of course, aimed at cratering runways and destroying radars, they also had an intrinsic ‘provocative’ element which the PAF planned to cleverly exploit through its well-prepared air defences, when IAF retaliated the following morning.
Mirages got a small share of 8 airfield strike sorties in the opening round of the counter-air operations campaign that also included 24 airfield strikes by F-86s and 4 radar strikes by F-104s. Wg Cdr Hakimullah led a flight of 4 Mirages to Amritsar, while his flight commander, Sqn Ldr Aftab Alam, led another flight of 4 Mirages to Pathankot.
Heading east into fast-fading light, Wg Cdr Hakimullah was able to take a cue from Amritsar runway lights, which were inexplicably glimmering when it should have been a complete black-out. His formation pulled up for a dive attack to deliver two 750-lb bombs each. Except for No 4, whose bombs did not release due to some malfunction, the rest were able to put in the attacks in the beginning of the runway.
Sqn Ldr Aftab Alam’s formation did not have the good fortune of catching Pathankot with its lights on and could not execute a proper attack in the evening haze and low light. The bombs fell in the general vicinity of the airfield.
Given the very short distance from the border, IAF was unable to scramble interceptors from the ground, so standing patrols should have been a sensible option. With no interceptors, all raiding aircraft came back unscathed. The disruptive raids were continued into the night by the B-57s.
The missed strike at Pathankot was repeated by Sqn Ldr Aftab Alam’s formation the next afternoon. This time, all the bombs found their mark on the runway and taxi track. As they were exiting after delivering the attack, Nos 3 and 4 found a Gnat closing in behind them, with guns blazing. Thanks to their swift Mirages, they were easily able to get out of harm’s way.
Mirages continued with the airfield strikes, flying for five more days. A mission each was flown on 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 December. Awantipura airfield was added to the usual list of Amritsar and Pathankot. Wg Cdr Hakimullah, alongwith attached senior squadron pilots, Sqn Ldr Rao Akhtar and Sqn Ldr Arif Manzoor alternated as mission leaders for these subsequent strikes. With the threat of enemy interceptors increasing, it was decided to add a pair of escorts during the airfield strikes.
Altogether, 38 strike sorties (including 8 escorts) were flown by Mirages against three forward airfields. This was almost one-fourth of the total daytime counter-air effort of 158 sorties flown by the PAF. As stated earlier, these airfield strikes were largely disruptive in nature and served the purpose of softening up, before the actual neutralisation that was to come later with the army’s offensive. Seen in that context, they do not seem measly in quantum, though where they fell short was in the ‘punch’. There is no reason to doubt the IAF assessment of the effects as “negligible/slight damage.” The runways were never out of operation for more than a few hours. The damage could have been longer lasting if special runway penetrating ordnance had been used, as the Israeli Air Force had done in 1967. Non-availability of such weapons led the PAF to resort to conventional iron bombs which would bounce off the runway and explode above the surface, causing more blast and less breach. Also, delivery from shallow dive angles to avoid exposure to Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA) made the bombs skip off the surface even farther.
The disruptive raids seem well worth the effort, however, considering that operational and maintenance activity on IAF forward bases was hampered, and no PAF aircraft was lost while conducting these very dangerous missions. On a few occasions when enemy interceptors managed to get behind an odd Mirage, the latter was able to outpace them, much like Dassault had imagined in his desert vision of a mirage whereby, “enemy pilots should see it but never catch up with it!”
Defending the Skies
Despite a biggish nose which housed a sizeable antenna promising long range pick-up at higher altitudes, the Cyrano II radar of the Mirage lacked the ability to distinguish low flying targets against ground clutter. This drawback rendered the Mirage completely dependent on ground-controlled interception at low level, much like its spares-stricken counterpart, the F-104. PAF’s five low level ground radars could cover just 7% of the eastern border of West Pakistan and were, therefore, deployed at the main bases and a few vulnerable approaches only. Air defence was, thus, largely a function of Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) being able to respond to chance pick-up of low flying targets by ground radars. Once vectored on to its target by ground control, the Mirage could accelerate fast enough to chase an intruder for whom there was little hope of escape.
Naeem Atta, seen here as a Group Captain
The test of the Mirage’s capabilities as an interceptor came on the night of 4 December, when Flight Lieutenant (Flt Lt) Naeem Atta was scrambled from Mianwali. The ground controller, Flt Lt Khalid Kashmiri, vectored Atta on to an intruder heading west, towards Mianwali. The controller was able to position the Mirage three miles astern of the low flying target, but in a pitch dark night, there was no prospect of visual contact. As the Salt Range loomed ahead, the target started climbing to avoid the hilly terrain. Fortuitously for Atta, this meant that the target was also easing out of ground clutter and there was a good probability that it would be ‘painted’ by the Cyrano radar. Unknown to Atta, his radar had been in standby mode, as he had not been careful in selecting his switches in a hurry; this was just as well, since the target’s tail warning receiver had not been triggered and there was no evasive manoeuvring. Soon after selecting the transmit mode, Atta was able to report a blip on his radar scope at an optimum IR-missile shooting distance of one-and-a-half mile, dead tail-on. Following radar lock-on, the missile’s seeker head swung to the heat source and, a growl in Atta’s earphones confirmed a launch-ready condition; the intruder’s fate was sealed. Moments after launching the AIM-9B Sidewinder, Atta saw a huge fireball silhouetting an aircraft in the night sky. Next morning, the wreckage of a Canberra (IF 916) was confirmed at the village of Nara located at the western edge of the Salt Range, not too far from Khushab town. The aircrew, including the pilot Flt Lt Lloyd Sasoon and navigator Flt Lt Ram Metharam Advani, belonging to the Agra-based Jet Bomber Conversion Unit, were killed on impact. The Canberra’s ‘Orange Putter’ tail warning system had been unwittingly outfoxed, in what turned out to be a stealthy interception.
Not far from Mianwali is Sakesar, a small PAF Base perched on the picturesque Salt Range at an elevation of 4,000 feet. The Base housed a high-powered FPS-20 radar as well as the vital Sector Operations Centre – North. At mid-day on 5 December, the IAF had made an attempt at attacking the radar, which cost it dearly, as two Hunters were shot down by a patrolling pair of F-6s. Later that afternoon, a lone intrepid Hunter was able to sneak in for a successful rocketing attack. After the attack a clean getaway for a singleton, right under the noses of patrolling interceptors, was an improbable prospect. As expected, the Hunter was intercepted by two Mirages scrambled from Mianwali. The pair was led by Flt Lt Safdar Mahmood, with Flg Off Sohail Hameed as his wingman. Diving down from the hills, the Hunter had built up speed, but not enough to elude the far swifter Mirages. With the help of instructions from the ground controller, Flt Lt Shaukat Jamil, Safdar was able to catch up and settle behind the Hunter, to start his shooting drill. A couple of well-placed bursts of the 30-mm cannon got the Hunter smoking. As Safdar held off while watching his quarry in its last throes, Sohail picked up the smouldering aircraft and let off a Sidewinder missile to finish it off. Just before the aircraft impacted the ground, the pilot ejected but it was too late. Sqn Ldr Jal Maneksha Mistry of No 20 Squadron was found fatally injured. The wreckage of the Hunter (A 1014) was strewn near the small town of Kattha Saghral.
Chamb was one of the few sectors where Pak Army had made significant advances and the Indian XV Corps desperately sought destruction of heavy guns that had been reported in the area. On 6 December, a pair of Su-7s from Adampur-based No 101 Sqn was tasked to locate and destroy the guns. The Su-7s sought out what appeared like hutments concealing the artillery pieces and were rocketing the place. Flt Lt Salimuddin Awan and his wingman Flt Lt Riazuddin Shaikh, who were patrolling in their Mirages over Gujranwala-Sheikhupura area, were vectored by ground radar onto the two Su-7s. Salimuddin, who was carrying a R-530 radar-guided missile alongwith two Sidewinders, decided to get rid of the bulky weapon by just blindly firing it off, so as to lighten up for the chase. Spotting the Mirages, the Su-7s jettisoned their drop tanks and rocket pods and started exiting east. With the Su-7s doing full speed, a long chase ensued till Riazuddin found himself close enough to fire a missile, but it went straight into the ground. Salimuddin then moved in and, on hearing the lock-on growl, pressed the missile launch button, not once but twice, to be sure. Two Sidewinder missiles shot off from the rails and, moments later, Riazuddin called out that one of the Su-7s had been hit. Salimuddin instantly switched to the other Su-7 and fired his 30-mm cannon. Just then, Salimuddin noted the outlines of Madhopur Headworks near Pathankot, which was not surprising, as they had been chasing the Su-7s for several minutes inside enemy territory, along the Jammu-Kathua Road. Recollecting themselves, the Mirages turned back and recovered at Sargodha with precariously low fuel. Monitoring of VHF radio confirmed a message transmitted to Adampur that an Su-7 had been “fired at … the pilot ejected”. It was later learnt that the wingman, Flt Lt Vijay Kumar Wahi had succumbed to his ejection injuries. The leader, Sqn Ldr Ashok Shinde, was lucky to bring back his Su-7 which had been damaged by bullet hits. High-speed pursuit was a forte of the Mirage, a lesson learnt by the IAF the hard way and, one time too late.
Mirages flew a total of 315 air defence sorties (219 during day, 96 at night) which was 18% of the overall air defence effort. With three IAF aircraft shot down, the Mirage kill rate, based on the total air defence sorties flown, came to be .95%. This compares quite favourably with kill rates of other PAF fighters which performed air defence missions:
F-86F -1.2%, F-86E -1.1% and F-6 - 0.74%.
Scouting the Troops
PAF had three Mirage IIIRs, which were equipped with five OMERA Type 31 optical cameras mounted in the nose. With a Doppler navigation radar available, getting to a destination was fairly easy. Magnesium flares provided enough illumination at night to confer a round-the-clock tactical reconnaissance capability. The number of aircraft was, however, on the low side and did not sufficiently cater for unserviceabilities.
A month prior to the outbreak of all-out war, the PAF had started to fly cross-border photo recce sorties, some of which were in the vital Chamb Sector, where the Pak Army’s 23 Division had planned a secondary ‘diversionary’ offensive. With the disposition of forces well-known, the attack resulted in significant advances that threatened India’s overland links to Kashmir, besides depriving Indian forces from establishing a launch pad for offensive operations towards the vital lines of communication passing through nearby Gujrat.
Early in the war, another important breakthrough came in the Suleimanki-Fazilka Sector, where 105 Independent Infantry Brigade (IV Corps) was able to surprise the Indian ‘Foxtrot’ Force and, made a firm foothold in the area of Pak II Corps’ planned main offensive. While the Indian forces desperately carried out repeated counter attacks, PAF Mirages conducted regular photo recce missions in Ferozepur area to update the ground commanders about Indian reinforcement efforts aimed at vacating the incursion. In the event, a badly demoralised and confused Foxtrot Force could not make any headway and the Pakistani brigade was able to safeguard the vital Suleimanki Headworks, which was only a mile from the border.
Mirage IIIRP 67-202, one of the first three recce version Mirages ready for its ferry flight from France
In preparation for the main offensive, PAF Mirages fervently conducted photo recce missions along Ferozepur-Kot Kapura, Ferozepur-Fazilka and Fazilka-Muktasar railway networks, as well as in general areas of Ferozepur and Sri Ganganagar, for the latest disposition of forces. An important mission involved recce of crossing points over Gang Canal for a careful scrutiny of obstacles across the waterway that could possibly impede the movement of II Corps. The main offensive could, however, not materialise as explained later, and most of the photo recce effort was rendered worthless.
Two pilots who played a sterling role in the photo recce operations were the squadron’s ‘slide rule wizards’, Sqn Ldr Farooq Umar and Flt Lt Najib Akhtar. Of the 30 photo recce sorties (besides 15 escorts) flown by No 5 Squadron before and during the war, 22 were considered successful. Although most of the singleton recce Mirages were escorted by another Mirage, yet some of the missions had to be aborted due to intense enemy air activity. In Shakargarh Sector, a few night recce missions were attempted with partial success. In one such mission on the night of 11 December, an IAF MiG-21 scrambled to intercept a Mirage flown by Sqn Ldr Farooq Umar, ended up shooting down one of its own MiG-21s flown by Flt Lt A B Dhavle, which was patrolling in the vicinity.
Four-odd Bomb Damage Assessment missions were also flown following the initial strikes on runways. These helped in better planning of subsequent airfield strike missions.
Interdiction of Supplies
One of the hugely successful missions of the war was an attack on Mukerian Railway Station. On 15 December, Wg Cdr Hakimullah was tasked to lead a four-ship mission to attack Bhangala Railway Station on Jalandhar-Pathankot railway line. After pulling up for the attack, he was dismayed to discover that there was no rolling stock in sight, but he decided to try his luck further south along the railway line. Having flown a mere 30 seconds, he overflew Mukerian Railway Station which was bustling with trains. Peeling off into the attack pattern, the four Mirages set themselves for single-pass dive attacks with two 750-lb bombs each. According to Hakimullah’s estimate, there were at least 100 freight bogies latched to different trains berthed adjacent to each other. The Mirages released their bombs one by one though No 4, who had hung ordnance, pulled off dry. The impact of the bombs on fuel and ammunition laden trains was so furious that the blasts shook the aircraft; No 2’s drop tanks sheared off with the shock wave but he was able to fly back without any further damage.
The Mirages had so far been striking at shallow targets, but with the time for the main offensive running out, it was decided to use them more audaciously. It was ironic that one of the most significant interdiction missions was also the one and only flown by Mirages, before the curtain fell two days later.
Drop Scene
Pakistan Army’s plan in the west called for the beginning of offensive operations five or six days after an Indian attack in the east. These, however, were meant to be secondary operations, essentially distractions, designed to fix the enemy and to divert his attention away from the intended site of the main attack by II Corps. With one armoured and two infantry divisions, II Corps was to strike into India from the Bahawalnagar area approximately three days after the secondary attacks. II Corps was to drive east to cross the international border, before turning to the northeast to push for Bhatinda and wishfully, beyond. It was expected that most of India’s armoured reserves would have become embroiled in Pakistan’s defences in the Shakargarh salient during this three-day interval between the secondary attacks and the main effort.
After much prodding by the Army’s field formation commanders as well as the PAF C-in-C, the vacillating GHQ reluctantly issued orders for II Corps to shift to its forward assembly areas on 14 December; elements of 1 Armoured Division began to move the following day. By this time, however, the other major component of II Corps ie, 33 Division, had already been detached to reinforce the beleaguered I Corps in the north and 18 Division in the south, where things were not going well for the Pakistan Army. As a consequence, II Corps was deprived of almost one third of its striking power before the offensive had even begun. On the evening of 16 December, however, new instructions arrived from GHQ, “freezing all movements” until further notice. Following capitulation of forces in the Eastern Wing, Pakistan accepted a cease fire on 17 December.
Mirages – which were expected to reduce the IAF’s weight of attack by neutralising 4-5 IAF airfields once the main offensive was underway – could, thus, not be utilised for the critical task that had been meticulously planned for months.
Report Card
During the 14-day war, Mirages flew a total of 393 sorties which was 13% of PAF’s overall war effort of 2,921 sorties. For a relatively new and modern weapon system, the the Mirage could have achieved an aircraft Utilisation Rate better than the 1.6 sorties per aircraft per day during the war. While it fell short of the planned 2.2 daily sorties, it reflected a cautious conduct of the war whereby the PAF was held back, so that everything could be thrown in during the army’s main offensive which, in the event, never came through.
Wg Cdr Hakimullah, who very ably commanded the Mirage squadron during the war and, also led several dangerous missions in enemy territory, was awarded the Sitara-i-Jur’at (Star of Valour). That coveted award also went to Sqn Ldr Farooq Umar, the senior flight commander of the squadron, who had flown many useful photo recce missions in enemy areas infested with patrolling fighters. The three pilots who shot down IAF aircraft were content with having joined the elite club of fighter pilots with aerial kills.
A month after the war, the PAF was able to line up 22 Mirages for all to see on the tarmac at Sargodha, while the 23rd Mirage was under maintenance in a hangar. The impressive sight belied claims of any losses that had been incurred by the Mirage fleet during the war.
Official PAF Records.
Utilisation Rate is based on an average aircraft serviceability of 75%. The Mirage-III wartime UR is calculated thus: UR = 393 sorties ÷ 17 aircraft ÷ 14 days = 1.6.
The picture of the lined-up Mirages appeared in Air Enthusiast, May1972 issue.
Acknowledements are due to Air Vice Mshl Farooq Umar (Retd), Air Vice Mshl Saleem-uddin Awan (Retd), Air Cdre Safdar Mahmood (Retd) and Gp Capt Naeem Atta (Retd) who helped with the narrative of their respective missions.
There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know.
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Mirages at War
Mirages at War
Air Commodore M Kaiser Tufail (Retired)
“Enemy pilots should see it, but never catch up with it.” [MARCEL DASSAULT]
At the outbreak of the 1971 Indo-Pak War, Mirage IIIEs were the newest and most advanced combat aircraft in the PAF inventory. Besides performing a wider variety of missions, they could generate a higher daily sortie rate compared to the aging F-86s, F-104s and B-57s. They could navigate accurately to relatively deeper targets and, after the attack, egress at high speed. They could carry out straight line, hit-and-run intercepts against raiders as adeptly as the F-104s, though the radar performance of both fighters was suspect against low-flying targets in ground clutter. Coupled with marginal performance of the five-odd low level AR-1 air defence radars which were interspersed with yawning gaps, PAF’s intercept capability was of consequence during day only; at night-time, it was a chance in a million, as it were.
Surface attack weaponry of the Mirage was not yet commensurate with the more capable platform that it was. PAF relied on the old vintage Mk-117 (750-lbs) high explosive bombs delivered from critical dive angles. Specialist anti-runway weapons had not been not been marketed by the French as yet. Air-to-air weapons included first generation AIM-9B Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles, whose two-degree wide field of view allowed only dead line astern attacks against backgrounds free of extraneous heat sources. Employment of the semi-active radar-guided Matra R-530 missile was found to be impractical in combat situations due to its stringent launch parameters and very short range, particularly at low level, where most of the interceptions were expected. It never saw operational use other than, what amounted to virtual jettisoning in one combat situation.
High expectations from these modern Mirages were also tempered by the stark reality of having just one squadron to fulfil the myriad tasks. 23 Mirages – one aircraft had been lost earlier in a flying accident – were a meagre 8% of the 276 combat aircraft available at the outbreak of war. How the PAF would dovetail its much vaunted front-line element into the military’s overall strategic reckoning had to be carefully articulated in its concept of air operations.
The Strategic Compulsion
Cognizant of the improbability of successfully holding its eastern wing against a determined Indian onslaught and a vigorous insurgency, Pakistani military planners came to be grounded in the conviction that ‘defence of the East lies in the West’. In practical terms, this aphorism meant that Pakistan would launch a major offensive into India from the western wing at the outset of any conflict. By threatening vital Indian assets in Kashmir and the Punjab, the Pakistan Army planners hoped to draw Indian forces away from the east and, gain enough time for outside powers to restrain an unmistakably rampant India. Additionally, any territory seized in the west could be offered as a sop to the countrymen for losses in East Pakistan.
L-R: F/L Shafique Haider, S/L Farooq Umar, W/C Hakimullah (Officer Commanding), S/L Farooq Feroze, F/L Khalid Iqbal
L-R: F/L Safdar Mahmood, F/L Najib Akhtar, F/L Salimuddin, F/L Farooq Habib, F/L Sarfaraz, F/L Saeed Anwar, F/O Hasnat Ahmad
PAF’s concept of operations gave over-riding priority to supporting the Army’s proposed offensive. Air cover was sought to be established over the Army’s deep thrust till such time that it had dug in and established its own defences. It was also felt necessary to attack 4-5 Indian airfields that directly threatened the offensive once it was underway. To prevent timely arrival of logistic reinforcements, PAF was to interdict supplies directly serving the Indian forces; this meant attacking rail yards and other supply nodes soon after start of the offensive. Until the army’s offensive was launched, limited close air support during holding operations was to be provided. Tactical recce was to be conducted regularly to determine the changing disposition of enemy formations. Finally, PAF was to maintain pressure on the IAF with sustained disruptive strikes against some of its forward and rear bases, to accrue a measure of psychological ascendancy in the conduct of air operations.
From PAF’s standpoint, it was easy to see that the modern Mirages were the weapon of choice for operations during the critical land battle planned for the western theatre. Yet, far from singling out these vital assets for the critical stage of the war only, it was boldly decided to employ them to the hilt in all phases.
The bulk of No 5 Squadron was deployed at its parent Base, Sargodha, under command of Wing Commander (Wg Cdr) Hakimullah, formerly an old hand on the F-104s. A detachment of six aircraft, led by Squadron Leader (Sqn Ldr) Farooq F Khan, was moved to the deeper-located satellite Base of Mianwali to provide redundancy in the night intercept role and, also as a back-up strike element for the all-important land offensive. Mirages were thus poised to be at the forefront of PAF’s ‘coup de main’.
Softening Up
Contrary to the general perception, PAF’s dusk strikes of 3 December against some of the forward Indian airfields were not pre-emptory at all, as the Indian invasion of East Pakistan had already taken place in earnest, on 21 November. While these strikes were, of course, aimed at cratering runways and destroying radars, they also had an intrinsic ‘provocative’ element which the PAF planned to cleverly exploit through its well-prepared air defences, when IAF retaliated the following morning.
Mirages got a small share of 8 airfield strike sorties in the opening round of the counter-air operations campaign that also included 24 airfield strikes by F-86s and 4 radar strikes by F-104s. Wg Cdr Hakimullah led a flight of 4 Mirages to Amritsar, while his flight commander, Sqn Ldr Aftab Alam, led another flight of 4 Mirages to Pathankot.
Heading east into fast-fading light, Wg Cdr Hakimullah was able to take a cue from Amritsar runway lights, which were inexplicably glimmering when it should have been a complete black-out. His formation pulled up for a dive attack to deliver two 750-lb bombs each. Except for No 4, whose bombs did not release due to some malfunction, the rest were able to put in the attacks in the beginning of the runway.
Sqn Ldr Aftab Alam’s formation did not have the good fortune of catching Pathankot with its lights on and could not execute a proper attack in the evening haze and low light. The bombs fell in the general vicinity of the airfield.
Given the very short distance from the border, IAF was unable to scramble interceptors from the ground, so standing patrols should have been a sensible option. With no interceptors, all raiding aircraft came back unscathed. The disruptive raids were continued into the night by the B-57s.
The missed strike at Pathankot was repeated by Sqn Ldr Aftab Alam’s formation the next afternoon. This time, all the bombs found their mark on the runway and taxi track. As they were exiting after delivering the attack, Nos 3 and 4 found a Gnat closing in behind them, with guns blazing. Thanks to their swift Mirages, they were easily able to get out of harm’s way.
Mirages continued with the airfield strikes, flying for five more days. A mission each was flown on 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 December. Awantipura airfield was added to the usual list of Amritsar and Pathankot. Wg Cdr Hakimullah, alongwith attached senior squadron pilots, Sqn Ldr Rao Akhtar and Sqn Ldr Arif Manzoor alternated as mission leaders for these subsequent strikes. With the threat of enemy interceptors increasing, it was decided to add a pair of escorts during the airfield strikes.
Altogether, 38 strike sorties (including 8 escorts) were flown by Mirages against three forward airfields. This was almost one-fourth of the total daytime counter-air effort of 158 sorties flown by the PAF. As stated earlier, these airfield strikes were largely disruptive in nature and served the purpose of softening up, before the actual neutralisation that was to come later with the army’s offensive. Seen in that context, they do not seem measly in quantum, though where they fell short was in the ‘punch’. There is no reason to doubt the IAF assessment of the effects as “negligible/slight damage.” The runways were never out of operation for more than a few hours. The damage could have been longer lasting if special runway penetrating ordnance had been used, as the Israeli Air Force had done in 1967. Non-availability of such weapons led the PAF to resort to conventional iron bombs which would bounce off the runway and explode above the surface, causing more blast and less breach. Also, delivery from shallow dive angles to avoid exposure to Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA) made the bombs skip off the surface even farther.
The disruptive raids seem well worth the effort, however, considering that operational and maintenance activity on IAF forward bases was hampered, and no PAF aircraft was lost while conducting these very dangerous missions. On a few occasions when enemy interceptors managed to get behind an odd Mirage, the latter was able to outpace them, much like Dassault had imagined in his desert vision of a mirage whereby, “enemy pilots should see it but never catch up with it!”
Defending the Skies
Despite a biggish nose which housed a sizeable antenna promising long range pick-up at higher altitudes, the Cyrano II radar of the Mirage lacked the ability to distinguish low flying targets against ground clutter. This drawback rendered the Mirage completely dependent on ground-controlled interception at low level, much like its spares-stricken counterpart, the F-104. PAF’s five low level ground radars could cover just 7% of the eastern border of West Pakistan and were, therefore, deployed at the main bases and a few vulnerable approaches only. Air defence was, thus, largely a function of Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) being able to respond to chance pick-up of low flying targets by ground radars. Once vectored on to its target by ground control, the Mirage could accelerate fast enough to chase an intruder for whom there was little hope of escape.
Naeem Atta, seen here as a Group Captain
The test of the Mirage’s capabilities as an interceptor came on the night of 4 December, when Flight Lieutenant (Flt Lt) Naeem Atta was scrambled from Mianwali. The ground controller, Flt Lt Khalid Kashmiri, vectored Atta on to an intruder heading west, towards Mianwali. The controller was able to position the Mirage three miles astern of the low flying target, but in a pitch dark night, there was no prospect of visual contact. As the Salt Range loomed ahead, the target started climbing to avoid the hilly terrain. Fortuitously for Atta, this meant that the target was also easing out of ground clutter and there was a good probability that it would be ‘painted’ by the Cyrano radar. Unknown to Atta, his radar had been in standby mode, as he had not been careful in selecting his switches in a hurry; this was just as well, since the target’s tail warning receiver had not been triggered and there was no evasive manoeuvring. Soon after selecting the transmit mode, Atta was able to report a blip on his radar scope at an optimum IR-missile shooting distance of one-and-a-half mile, dead tail-on. Following radar lock-on, the missile’s seeker head swung to the heat source and, a growl in Atta’s earphones confirmed a launch-ready condition; the intruder’s fate was sealed. Moments after launching the AIM-9B Sidewinder, Atta saw a huge fireball silhouetting an aircraft in the night sky. Next morning, the wreckage of a Canberra (IF 916) was confirmed at the village of Nara located at the western edge of the Salt Range, not too far from Khushab town. The aircrew, including the pilot Flt Lt Lloyd Sasoon and navigator Flt Lt Ram Metharam Advani, belonging to the Agra-based Jet Bomber Conversion Unit, were killed on impact. The Canberra’s ‘Orange Putter’ tail warning system had been unwittingly outfoxed, in what turned out to be a stealthy interception.
Not far from Mianwali is Sakesar, a small PAF Base perched on the picturesque Salt Range at an elevation of 4,000 feet. The Base housed a high-powered FPS-20 radar as well as the vital Sector Operations Centre – North. At mid-day on 5 December, the IAF had made an attempt at attacking the radar, which cost it dearly, as two Hunters were shot down by a patrolling pair of F-6s. Later that afternoon, a lone intrepid Hunter was able to sneak in for a successful rocketing attack. After the attack a clean getaway for a singleton, right under the noses of patrolling interceptors, was an improbable prospect. As expected, the Hunter was intercepted by two Mirages scrambled from Mianwali. The pair was led by Flt Lt Safdar Mahmood, with Flg Off Sohail Hameed as his wingman. Diving down from the hills, the Hunter had built up speed, but not enough to elude the far swifter Mirages. With the help of instructions from the ground controller, Flt Lt Shaukat Jamil, Safdar was able to catch up and settle behind the Hunter, to start his shooting drill. A couple of well-placed bursts of the 30-mm cannon got the Hunter smoking. As Safdar held off while watching his quarry in its last throes, Sohail picked up the smouldering aircraft and let off a Sidewinder missile to finish it off. Just before the aircraft impacted the ground, the pilot ejected but it was too late. Sqn Ldr Jal Maneksha Mistry of No 20 Squadron was found fatally injured. The wreckage of the Hunter (A 1014) was strewn near the small town of Kattha Saghral.
Chamb was one of the few sectors where Pak Army had made significant advances and the Indian XV Corps desperately sought destruction of heavy guns that had been reported in the area. On 6 December, a pair of Su-7s from Adampur-based No 101 Sqn was tasked to locate and destroy the guns. The Su-7s sought out what appeared like hutments concealing the artillery pieces and were rocketing the place. Flt Lt Salimuddin Awan and his wingman Flt Lt Riazuddin Shaikh, who were patrolling in their Mirages over Gujranwala-Sheikhupura area, were vectored by ground radar onto the two Su-7s. Salimuddin, who was carrying a R-530 radar-guided missile alongwith two Sidewinders, decided to get rid of the bulky weapon by just blindly firing it off, so as to lighten up for the chase. Spotting the Mirages, the Su-7s jettisoned their drop tanks and rocket pods and started exiting east. With the Su-7s doing full speed, a long chase ensued till Riazuddin found himself close enough to fire a missile, but it went straight into the ground. Salimuddin then moved in and, on hearing the lock-on growl, pressed the missile launch button, not once but twice, to be sure. Two Sidewinder missiles shot off from the rails and, moments later, Riazuddin called out that one of the Su-7s had been hit. Salimuddin instantly switched to the other Su-7 and fired his 30-mm cannon. Just then, Salimuddin noted the outlines of Madhopur Headworks near Pathankot, which was not surprising, as they had been chasing the Su-7s for several minutes inside enemy territory, along the Jammu-Kathua Road. Recollecting themselves, the Mirages turned back and recovered at Sargodha with precariously low fuel. Monitoring of VHF radio confirmed a message transmitted to Adampur that an Su-7 had been “fired at … the pilot ejected”. It was later learnt that the wingman, Flt Lt Vijay Kumar Wahi had succumbed to his ejection injuries. The leader, Sqn Ldr Ashok Shinde, was lucky to bring back his Su-7 which had been damaged by bullet hits. High-speed pursuit was a forte of the Mirage, a lesson learnt by the IAF the hard way and, one time too late.
Mirages flew a total of 315 air defence sorties (219 during day, 96 at night) which was 18% of the overall air defence effort. With three IAF aircraft shot down, the Mirage kill rate, based on the total air defence sorties flown, came to be .95%. This compares quite favourably with kill rates of other PAF fighters which performed air defence missions:
F-86F -1.2%, F-86E -1.1% and F-6 - 0.74%.
Scouting the Troops
PAF had three Mirage IIIRs, which were equipped with five OMERA Type 31 optical cameras mounted in the nose. With a Doppler navigation radar available, getting to a destination was fairly easy. Magnesium flares provided enough illumination at night to confer a round-the-clock tactical reconnaissance capability. The number of aircraft was, however, on the low side and did not sufficiently cater for unserviceabilities.
A month prior to the outbreak of all-out war, the PAF had started to fly cross-border photo recce sorties, some of which were in the vital Chamb Sector, where the Pak Army’s 23 Division had planned a secondary ‘diversionary’ offensive. With the disposition of forces well-known, the attack resulted in significant advances that threatened India’s overland links to Kashmir, besides depriving Indian forces from establishing a launch pad for offensive operations towards the vital lines of communication passing through nearby Gujrat.
Early in the war, another important breakthrough came in the Suleimanki-Fazilka Sector, where 105 Independent Infantry Brigade (IV Corps) was able to surprise the Indian ‘Foxtrot’ Force and, made a firm foothold in the area of Pak II Corps’ planned main offensive. While the Indian forces desperately carried out repeated counter attacks, PAF Mirages conducted regular photo recce missions in Ferozepur area to update the ground commanders about Indian reinforcement efforts aimed at vacating the incursion. In the event, a badly demoralised and confused Foxtrot Force could not make any headway and the Pakistani brigade was able to safeguard the vital Suleimanki Headworks, which was only a mile from the border.
Mirage IIIRP 67-202, one of the first three recce version Mirages ready for its ferry flight from France
In preparation for the main offensive, PAF Mirages fervently conducted photo recce missions along Ferozepur-Kot Kapura, Ferozepur-Fazilka and Fazilka-Muktasar railway networks, as well as in general areas of Ferozepur and Sri Ganganagar, for the latest disposition of forces. An important mission involved recce of crossing points over Gang Canal for a careful scrutiny of obstacles across the waterway that could possibly impede the movement of II Corps. The main offensive could, however, not materialise as explained later, and most of the photo recce effort was rendered worthless.
Two pilots who played a sterling role in the photo recce operations were the squadron’s ‘slide rule wizards’, Sqn Ldr Farooq Umar and Flt Lt Najib Akhtar. Of the 30 photo recce sorties (besides 15 escorts) flown by No 5 Squadron before and during the war, 22 were considered successful. Although most of the singleton recce Mirages were escorted by another Mirage, yet some of the missions had to be aborted due to intense enemy air activity. In Shakargarh Sector, a few night recce missions were attempted with partial success. In one such mission on the night of 11 December, an IAF MiG-21 scrambled to intercept a Mirage flown by Sqn Ldr Farooq Umar, ended up shooting down one of its own MiG-21s flown by Flt Lt A B Dhavle, which was patrolling in the vicinity.
Four-odd Bomb Damage Assessment missions were also flown following the initial strikes on runways. These helped in better planning of subsequent airfield strike missions.
Interdiction of Supplies
One of the hugely successful missions of the war was an attack on Mukerian Railway Station. On 15 December, Wg Cdr Hakimullah was tasked to lead a four-ship mission to attack Bhangala Railway Station on Jalandhar-Pathankot railway line. After pulling up for the attack, he was dismayed to discover that there was no rolling stock in sight, but he decided to try his luck further south along the railway line. Having flown a mere 30 seconds, he overflew Mukerian Railway Station which was bustling with trains. Peeling off into the attack pattern, the four Mirages set themselves for single-pass dive attacks with two 750-lb bombs each. According to Hakimullah’s estimate, there were at least 100 freight bogies latched to different trains berthed adjacent to each other. The Mirages released their bombs one by one though No 4, who had hung ordnance, pulled off dry. The impact of the bombs on fuel and ammunition laden trains was so furious that the blasts shook the aircraft; No 2’s drop tanks sheared off with the shock wave but he was able to fly back without any further damage.
The Mirages had so far been striking at shallow targets, but with the time for the main offensive running out, it was decided to use them more audaciously. It was ironic that one of the most significant interdiction missions was also the one and only flown by Mirages, before the curtain fell two days later.
Drop Scene
Pakistan Army’s plan in the west called for the beginning of offensive operations five or six days after an Indian attack in the east. These, however, were meant to be secondary operations, essentially distractions, designed to fix the enemy and to divert his attention away from the intended site of the main attack by II Corps. With one armoured and two infantry divisions, II Corps was to strike into India from the Bahawalnagar area approximately three days after the secondary attacks. II Corps was to drive east to cross the international border, before turning to the northeast to push for Bhatinda and wishfully, beyond. It was expected that most of India’s armoured reserves would have become embroiled in Pakistan’s defences in the Shakargarh salient during this three-day interval between the secondary attacks and the main effort.
After much prodding by the Army’s field formation commanders as well as the PAF C-in-C, the vacillating GHQ reluctantly issued orders for II Corps to shift to its forward assembly areas on 14 December; elements of 1 Armoured Division began to move the following day. By this time, however, the other major component of II Corps ie, 33 Division, had already been detached to reinforce the beleaguered I Corps in the north and 18 Division in the south, where things were not going well for the Pakistan Army. As a consequence, II Corps was deprived of almost one third of its striking power before the offensive had even begun. On the evening of 16 December, however, new instructions arrived from GHQ, “freezing all movements” until further notice. Following capitulation of forces in the Eastern Wing, Pakistan accepted a cease fire on 17 December.
Mirages – which were expected to reduce the IAF’s weight of attack by neutralising 4-5 IAF airfields once the main offensive was underway – could, thus, not be utilised for the critical task that had been meticulously planned for months.
Report Card
During the 14-day war, Mirages flew a total of 393 sorties which was 13% of PAF’s overall war effort of 2,921 sorties. For a relatively new and modern weapon system, the the Mirage could have achieved an aircraft Utilisation Rate better than the 1.6 sorties per aircraft per day during the war. While it fell short of the planned 2.2 daily sorties, it reflected a cautious conduct of the war whereby the PAF was held back, so that everything could be thrown in during the army’s main offensive which, in the event, never came through.
Wg Cdr Hakimullah, who very ably commanded the Mirage squadron during the war and, also led several dangerous missions in enemy territory, was awarded the Sitara-i-Jur’at (Star of Valour). That coveted award also went to Sqn Ldr Farooq Umar, the senior flight commander of the squadron, who had flown many useful photo recce missions in enemy areas infested with patrolling fighters. The three pilots who shot down IAF aircraft were content with having joined the elite club of fighter pilots with aerial kills.
A month after the war, the PAF was able to line up 22 Mirages for all to see on the tarmac at Sargodha, while the 23rd Mirage was under maintenance in a hangar. The impressive sight belied claims of any losses that had been incurred by the Mirage fleet during the war.
Official PAF Records.
Utilisation Rate is based on an average aircraft serviceability of 75%. The Mirage-III wartime UR is calculated thus: UR = 393 sorties ÷ 17 aircraft ÷ 14 days = 1.6.
The picture of the lined-up Mirages appeared in Air Enthusiast, May1972 issue.
Acknowledements are due to Air Vice Mshl Farooq Umar (Retd), Air Vice Mshl Saleem-uddin Awan (Retd), Air Cdre Safdar Mahmood (Retd) and Gp Capt Naeem Atta (Retd) who helped with the narrative of their respective missions.
There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know.
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Jan 28, 2011 5:16 pm
dogfight!
India’s Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft Decision
Ashley J. Tellis
© 2011 Carnegie Endowment
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dogfight.pdf
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments v
Acronyms and Abbreviations vi
Summary 1
Introduction 3
Conclude The MMRCA Competition Expeditiously 9
Do Not Split the MMRCA Purchase 19
Buy the “Best” Aircraft for the Mission 25
Conclusion 131
Notes 135
About the Author 141
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 142
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Jan 28, 2011 10:12 pm
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Jan 28, 2011 10:20 pm
Kaveri engine to power fifth generation fighter aircraft
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=14266
The Hindu The Il-70 aircraft at Moscow powered by the Kaveri engine developed by India. A file Photo: DRDO.
Under development for over two decades, the indigenous fighter jet engine ‘Kaveri’ will be used for powering the home-grown fifth generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).
Being developed by DRDO’s Gas Turbine research Establishment (GTRE), the Kaveri was initially being developed for the LCA Tejas programme but now it will be used on the AMCA, which is expected to be ready by 2016-17, senior officials told PTI here.
The AMCA is a twin-engine indigenous fighter aircraft programme for which initial sanctions have already been accorded by the Defence Ministry, they added.
The indigenous fighter aircraft engine programme was first started in 1986 and has suffered delays and cost over-runs. It was also marred by the technology denial regimes in the 90s.
After not being able to get the desired thrust for powering fighter aircraft, the DRDO entered into a Joint Venture with the French engine manufacturers Snecma to further enhance its capabilities.
“In recent times, the engine has been able to produce thrust of 70-75 Kilo Newton but what the IAF and other stake-holders desire is power between 90—95 KN.
“I think with the JV with Snecma in place now, we would be able to achieve these parameters in near future,” they said.
On using the Kaveri for the LCA, they said the engine would be fitted on the first 40 LCAs to be supplied to the IAF when they come for upgrades to the DRDO in the latter half of the decade.
Due to the absence of an indigenous engine, GE engines from the United States were procured to power the LCAs and recently, another tender was awarded to the American company for supplying 99 engines for the advanced version of the Tejas.
On the present status of the programme, officials said the maiden flight test of the Kaveri was completed successfully during the Flying Test Bed (FTB) trials at the Gromov Flight Research Institute in Moscow November last year.
During the coming months, 50-60 test flights will be carried out to mature the engine in terms of reliability, safety and airworthiness.
These trials would pave the way for further flight trials of Kaveri engine with a fighter aircraft, they added.
Keywords: DRDO, Kaveri engine, Fighter aircraft
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Qua Fev 02, 2011 4:34 pm
O documento tem 150 págs. de análise!
Documento do Think Tank americano Carnegie Endowment faz Raio-X do programa MMRCA da Força Aérea da Índia
Escrito por Felipe Salles
Ter, 01 de Fevereiro de 2011 22:16
O maior programa de aquisição de caças em curso atualmente no mundo é o chamado Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) da Força Aérea Indiana. Aqui, cinco caças modernos estão sendo comparados e avaliados em condições extremas pelos técnicos e pilotos indianos visando encontrar um substituto único para o MiG-23, MiG-27, MiG-29, SAPECAT Jaguar e Mirage 2000H. O vencedor leva pra casa uma encomenda inicial de 126 caças, ainda com real potencial de ser expandido este número no futuro. O caça escolhido para o MMRCA ficará posicionado abaixo dos poderosos Su-30MKI e do futuro "FGDA" (o caça stealth indiano) e acima do caça leve Tejas desenvolvido localmente pela HAL.
Na Índia essa é uma concorrência que consegue ser ainda mais complexa e cheia de pressões políticas e lobbies, internos e externos, do que a nossa. O MMRCA coloca na mesma arena, para uma luta até a morte, os caças americanos Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet e Lockheed Martin F-16IN Super Viper (uma nova versão criada especialmente para esta concorrência), o caça francês Dassault Aviation Rafale, o russo RSK MiG MiG-35, o europeu Typhoon além do sueco Saab Gripen NG (Next Generation).
O autor Ashley J. Trellis preparou para o Carnegie Endowment for International Peace um documento de 150 páginas que disseca todos os aspectos desta imensa concorrência. Para nós brasileiros, o texto joga luz sobre uma série de aspectos que podem, ou não, ser importantes dentro do nosso próprio programa F-X2 de reequipamento da força de caças da FAB.
A derrota do Rafale ou do Gripen NG na concorrência indiana, caso ela ocorra antes do anúncio do resultado do F-X2, pode, ao menos em tese, ser um golpe fatal para as perspectivas de vitória de cada um destes modelos aqui no Brasil e em outras concorrências internacionais posteriores.
Clique aqui para baixar o documento integral. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dogfight.pdf
Fonte: Alide
http://www.alide.com.br/joomla/index.ph ... a-da-india
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dogfight.pdf
Documento do Think Tank americano Carnegie Endowment faz Raio-X do programa MMRCA da Força Aérea da Índia
Escrito por Felipe Salles
Ter, 01 de Fevereiro de 2011 22:16
O maior programa de aquisição de caças em curso atualmente no mundo é o chamado Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) da Força Aérea Indiana. Aqui, cinco caças modernos estão sendo comparados e avaliados em condições extremas pelos técnicos e pilotos indianos visando encontrar um substituto único para o MiG-23, MiG-27, MiG-29, SAPECAT Jaguar e Mirage 2000H. O vencedor leva pra casa uma encomenda inicial de 126 caças, ainda com real potencial de ser expandido este número no futuro. O caça escolhido para o MMRCA ficará posicionado abaixo dos poderosos Su-30MKI e do futuro "FGDA" (o caça stealth indiano) e acima do caça leve Tejas desenvolvido localmente pela HAL.
Na Índia essa é uma concorrência que consegue ser ainda mais complexa e cheia de pressões políticas e lobbies, internos e externos, do que a nossa. O MMRCA coloca na mesma arena, para uma luta até a morte, os caças americanos Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet e Lockheed Martin F-16IN Super Viper (uma nova versão criada especialmente para esta concorrência), o caça francês Dassault Aviation Rafale, o russo RSK MiG MiG-35, o europeu Typhoon além do sueco Saab Gripen NG (Next Generation).
O autor Ashley J. Trellis preparou para o Carnegie Endowment for International Peace um documento de 150 páginas que disseca todos os aspectos desta imensa concorrência. Para nós brasileiros, o texto joga luz sobre uma série de aspectos que podem, ou não, ser importantes dentro do nosso próprio programa F-X2 de reequipamento da força de caças da FAB.
A derrota do Rafale ou do Gripen NG na concorrência indiana, caso ela ocorra antes do anúncio do resultado do F-X2, pode, ao menos em tese, ser um golpe fatal para as perspectivas de vitória de cada um destes modelos aqui no Brasil e em outras concorrências internacionais posteriores.
Clique aqui para baixar o documento integral. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dogfight.pdf
Fonte: Alide
http://www.alide.com.br/joomla/index.ph ... a-da-india
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dogfight.pdf
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Qua Fev 02, 2011 4:40 pm
e, é o mesmo que o Santiago já havia postado! 
foi malssss
foi malssss
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Qua Fev 02, 2011 10:26 pm
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Qui Fev 03, 2011 10:08 pm
‘Silent Hornet’ no Aero India
3 de fevereiro de 2011, em Noticiário Internacional, por Guilherme Poggio .
Um modelo tamanho natural da versão furtiva do Boeing F/A-18+ Super Hornet será uma das atrações do Aero India 2011, que começa no próximo dia 9 de fevereiro na Base Aérea de Yelahanka.
O vice-presidente da Boeing para o mercado de espaço, defesa e segurança, Vivek Lall, disse que um dos dois F/A-18 que serão apresentados estará configurado com tanques de combustível conformais, motores de elevada performance, SM/LW (spherical missile laser warning), compartimento de armas interno, novo cockpit e IRST integrado.
O ‘mock up’ a ser apresentado no Aero India será o primeiro F/A-18 a ser desenvolvido como parte do programa ‘International Super Hornet Roadmap’ que foi anunciado pela Boeing no último Farnborough Air Show.
Designado como a próxima evolução do Super Hornet, a aeronave terá características que aumentarão a sobrevivência, a consciência situacional e a performance.
Lall disse que se a Índia assinar o contrato do MRCA com a Boeing, ela também terá a possibilidade de moldar essa tecnologia no futuro. “Estamos trabalhando em uma plataforma que combaterá nos próximos 30 ou 40 anos” disse Lall.
Leia mais (Read More): Poder Aéreo
3 de fevereiro de 2011, em Noticiário Internacional, por Guilherme Poggio .
Um modelo tamanho natural da versão furtiva do Boeing F/A-18+ Super Hornet será uma das atrações do Aero India 2011, que começa no próximo dia 9 de fevereiro na Base Aérea de Yelahanka.
O vice-presidente da Boeing para o mercado de espaço, defesa e segurança, Vivek Lall, disse que um dos dois F/A-18 que serão apresentados estará configurado com tanques de combustível conformais, motores de elevada performance, SM/LW (spherical missile laser warning), compartimento de armas interno, novo cockpit e IRST integrado.
O ‘mock up’ a ser apresentado no Aero India será o primeiro F/A-18 a ser desenvolvido como parte do programa ‘International Super Hornet Roadmap’ que foi anunciado pela Boeing no último Farnborough Air Show.
Designado como a próxima evolução do Super Hornet, a aeronave terá características que aumentarão a sobrevivência, a consciência situacional e a performance.
Lall disse que se a Índia assinar o contrato do MRCA com a Boeing, ela também terá a possibilidade de moldar essa tecnologia no futuro. “Estamos trabalhando em uma plataforma que combaterá nos próximos 30 ou 40 anos” disse Lall.
Leia mais (Read More): Poder Aéreo