Fórum Defesa Brasil

E eu tenho sérias dúvidas de que 'eles' terão fôlego financeiro para botar n'água todos aqueles Arleigh Burkes de que tanto se fala...

O ano que vem ou, no máximo, o seguinte, é de cortes MUITO maiores no 'budget' ianque de Defesa, podem me cobrar depois se eu estiver errado...

Navy: No Need to Add DDG 1000s After All
By philip ewing
Published: 1 Aug 08:18 EDT (12:18 GMT)


Top Navy acquisition officials dramatically reversed course during a congressional hearing July 31, saying the service needed to purchase more Arleigh Burke-class DDG 51 destroyers, and no longer needs the next-generation destroyer it has been pushing for over the past 13 years.

This, after years of vigorously claiming the service needed to move beyond the 1980s technology in the Burkes and leap ahead with the new ship, the DDG 1000 Zumwalt class. Now, they're saying the Zumwalts just won't cut it, citing the planned ship's inability to fire advanced versions of the Standard Missile, contradicting previous industry claims.
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They also said there was a new "classified threat" for which the Burkes are better suited but would not go into specifics. Speaking for the Navy were Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, deputy chief of naval operations for integration of resources and capabilities; and Allison Stiller, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for ship programs.

"Now, we're turning on a dime," mused Rep. Joe Sestak, D-Pa., a former Navy vice admiral, after hearing their testimony.

In earlier congressional and public discussions, the sticking point for the DDG 1000 had been its cost, which is now estimated to be $3.2 billion per copy. Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., chairman of the House Armed Service's Seapower subcommittee earlier this year struck the third Zumwalt from the Navy's budget request because he said ballooning costs for the advanced warships would bankrupt the Navy's acquisitions budget.

Navy leaders confirmed last week that they would end the ship class at two hulls, nixing earlier plans to build seven ships. Before that, the Navy had called for 32 hulls.

At the hearing, Taylor maintained his stance that cost was the biggest problem with the program. But the Navy's stated position July 31 wasn't that officials couldn't control the costs for its future ships but that the world threat picture had changed in such a way that it now makes more sense to build at least eight more Burkes. Precise details were still unclear for when the ships would be built and how they'd be outfitted.

"Why not go with the Zumwalt if you don't care about affordability?" Sestak asked.

Taylor, interjecting, said affordability may not have been a consideration for Navy planners, but it remained important to the subcommittee.

But McCullough maintained that more Burkes are needed to counter: a bigger threat from ballistic missiles; sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles; and quiet diesel-electric submarines.

They also told subcommittee members that the Marine Corps no longer needs the long-range fire support from the Zumwalts' 155mm Advanced Gun System, because such fire support could be provided by Tactical Tomahawk cruise missiles and precision airstrikes. McCullough said the Marine Corps agreed, although a spokesman for Headquarters Marine Corps, Capt. Carl Redding, said he could not immediately confirm there had been a new accord with the Navy.

A second panel of congressional Navy experts, including Ron O'Rourke of the Congressional Research Service and Eric Labs of the Congressional Budget Office, told lawmakers they hadn't heard before McCullough mentioned it July 31 that the Marine Corps had withdrawn its requirement for long-range fire support from offshore naval guns.

Reporters weren't able to ask McCullough or Stiller for details about the acquisition plan for the new Burkes or the Marine Corps fire support issue. Surrounded by a phalanx of aides, McCullough and Stiller jogged from the hearing room and out the door of the Rayburn House Office Building into a waiting motorcade, ignoring shouted questions from journalists. It was a departure from previous hearings, where it's not out of the ordinary for witnesses to stop and answer reporters' questions after giving testimony.

Earlier in the hearing, many subcommittee members appeared incredulous that the Navy could have conducted such a sweeping re-evaluation of the world threat picture in just a few weeks, after spending some 13 years and $10 billion on the surface ship program known as DD 21, then DD(X) and finally, DDG 1000. That figure does not include the money spent for the two hulls.

Rep. Niki Tsongas, D-Mass., noted that in March, McCullough told Congress that DDG 1000 was critical the Navy's future missions. Did he still stand by his testimony?

McCullough and Stiller said they still thought the ship would be highly capable, but more Burkes would be better for today's asymmetrical threats. McCullough cited the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah's anti-ship missile attack on an Israeli patrol boat in 2006.

Rep. Jim Langevin, D-R.I., asked why the Navy had made such an about-face after it had already asked for a third DDG 1000 in this year's budget request. Had the Navy done an analysis of alternatives, or consulted with other military commanders, before deciding to stop building DDG 1000 after two ships?

No, McCullough said, adding that when Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead started his job last October, the new Navy leader pointed out an "asymmetric mismatch" in what the Navy would need and the types of ships it was building. The service had "excess capacity in fire support," so it didn't need more of the new ships it has been planning, in various stages, since 1995. McCullough and Stiller added that Roughead still has not given his final approval on eliminating the five ships beyond the two the Navy has already ordered.

In the second panel, Paul Francis, an acquisitions expert with the Government Accountability Office, said the fire support issue came as a "surprise" to him.

Sestak said he was worried about what he called the recent "sea change" the Navy had apparently undergone in the threats it perceived over the next few years.

"My issue today is one of credibility. Not of an individual but of a process. I don't know what the strategic sense of the Navy is today," he said. "Whither the Navy of the future?"

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i= ... =AME&s=TOP

Seguindo uma visão mais geopolítica da supremacia naval. A necessidade dos EUA, expressa nos projetos megalomaniacos da U. S. Navy, servem para preservar o domínio dos oceanos norte-americano.

Hoje, os norte-americanos seguem uma lógica semelhante a britânica da primeira metade do século XIX. Em que dizia que a Royal Navy deveria ter uma frota com o dobro ou mais poder de combate, que a soma de todas as outras marinhas do mundo, inclusive as aliadas. Isso, tinha o objetivo de garantir que os britânicos poderiam eliminar qualquer marinha e garantir que as rotas navais continuassem sobre o seu dominio e, assim, poderiam chegar a qualquer lugar do mundo e bombardear qualquer país.

Entretanto, essa política britânica não foi mais possível a partir da metade do século XIX, quando a França começou a voltar a ter uma marinha descente e tão ou mais avançados tecnologicamente que os britânicos. Depois surgiram outras potências navais como o Japão, os Estados Unidos e, principalmente, a Alemanha. Ao mesmo tempo, que os britânicos começaram a não ter "la prata" para montar uma marinha poderosa o suficiente para se sobrepor solitariamente sobre as potências navais crescentes.

Hoje em dia, (acho que Túlio vai concordar comigo e dizer que isso é parte da derrocada norte americana ), os EUA podem estar começando a viver o problema britânico da segunda metade do século XIX. Ou seja, as marinhas pelo mundo, aliadas ou não, estão se fortalecendo e, de algum modo, ameaçar o dominio da U. S. Navy regionalmente. Mas, o governo norte-americano e os congressistas, começam a dizer que não tenham "la prata" disponível para tocar todos os projetos megalomaniacos e até questionar se há a necessidade de tais projetos.

Missile Threat Helped Drive DDG Cut
Zumwalt Class Could Not Down Chinese Weapons
By christopher p. cavas
Published: 4 August 2008


The threat posed by a super-secret new Chinese ballistic missile is among the factors driving the U.S. Navy's decision to "truncate" the planned seven-ship DDG 1000 Zumwalt class of advanced destroyers and build more DDG 51-class ships.
After years of planning, U.S. Navy leaders have announced plans to end the Zumwalt class at two ships.

Navy officials say the primary advantage of DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class ships equipped with the Lockheed Martin Aegis combat system is that they can shoot down ballistic missiles - a capability the Navy never asked for in its high-technology and high-priced Zumwalts and its new Raytheon-developed combat system.

A program to upgrade 15 existing DDG 51 destroyers, along with three Aegis cruisers, will be complete by year's end. But the new missile threat is causing combatant commanders - the "cocoms" who lead regional commands such as U.S. Pacific Command and European Command - to demand more ships that can handle ballistic missile defense (BMD). The Navy's solution is to drastically reduce the number of Zumwalts to two ships that critics say will be simply technology demonstrators.

"The DDG 1000 … is incapable of conducting ballistic missile defense," Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, deputy chief of naval operations for Integration of Resources and Capabilities, told Congress July 31 during a hearing called to address the destroyer issue.

McCullough, in his written testimony, also revealed that the DDG 1000 cannot perform area air defense - the ability to shoot down enemy planes and missiles over a wide region. The Zumwalts, McCullough said, "cannot successfully employ the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2), SM-3 or SM-6."

The SM-2 is the Navy's primary air defense missile, and Raytheon is developing the SM-6 replacement. The SM-3 is a BMD missile.

A Navy source said the ships could carry and launch Standard missiles, but the DDG 1000 combat system can't guide those missiles onward to a target.

The new information contrasts with a DDG 1000 briefing provided this spring by the Naval Sea Systems Command, which listed Standard missiles as among the Zumwalt's weapons, and with well-known sources such as Jane's Fighting Ships, which lists the new ships as carrying the SM-2 missile.

BMD Issue Grew

The BMD issue gained prominence with Navy planners over the winter as intelligence assessments described the new threat. McCullough, in response to a question at the hearing by the House Seapower subcommittee, said work to rejigger the destroyer program began "four and a half to five months" ago, making it late February or early March.

Although a "secret, classified" threat was discussed during the hearing, neither Navy officials nor lawmakers would reveal any details.

One source familiar with the classified briefing said that while anti-ship cruise missiles and other threats were known to exist, "those aren't the worst." The new threat, which "didn't exist a couple years ago," is a "land-launched ballistic missile that converts to a cruise missile."

Other sources confirmed that a new, classified missile threat is being briefed at very high levels. One admiral, said another source, was told his ships should simply "stay away. There are no options."

Information on the new threat remains closely held.

"There's really little unclassified information about this stuff," said Paul Giarra, a defense consultant in McLean, Va., "except for the considerable amount of information that's appeared in unclassified Chinese sources."

Several experts on Chinese missiles contacted for this story said they weren't sure which specific threat drove the Navy to change its destroyer plans. One source speculated it might be "Threat D, a cruise missile that separates to a supersonic missile." A Chinese ballistic missile with terminal radar-homing capabilities - "a carrier killer" - is another possibility.

Retired Rear Adm. Eric Vadon, a consultant on East Asian defense affairs, thought the weapon sounded like a Dong Feng 21 (DF-21) missile, also known by its western designation CSS-5. Although the basic missile has been in service since the 1970s, the Chinese are known to be working to turn it into a homing ballistic missile.

"There's a possibility that what we're seeing is that somebody is calling this thing a cruise missile because it has some of those characteristics," Vadon said. "It maneuvers and it homes in. But a cruise missile breathes air."

The Chinese targetable ballistic missile threat has long worried U.S. Navy planners and military professionals.

"We're pretty certain the Chinese have been working on this for some time," said Bernard Cole, a professor at National Defense University in Washington and an expert on the Chinese military. "It would pose a threat. I don't know how you would counter that missile."

But Cole said the description of a ballistic missile turning into a cruise missile is new: "I've never heard this described this way."

Sources in the Pentagon said the U.S. Navy has not yet moved to add the BMD upgrade to any more existing Aegis ships. But a senior defense official confirmed the Navy is embracing BMD as a mission for Aegis surface combatants - and that all the new DDG 51s the Navy is asking for will be BMD-capable.

McCullough also said that the destroyer modernization program, which will start in 2011 with the oldest ships, will include signal processors "with inherent ballistic missile defense capability." Those electronics will make the ships more easily upgradeable should the service choose to add the BMD upgrade.

Even if the Pentagon and Congress approve the request to build more DDG 51s, the new ships won't start to come on line until at last 2015, estimated Eric Labs of the Congressional Budget Office, who also testified at the July 31 hearing.

A Controversial Move

Navy leaders received permission July 22 to ask the Pentagon to build only two DDG 1000s and instead ask for at least nine more DDG 51s. While observers have known for months that support for the DDG 1000 program inside the Navy was weak, the move nevertheless surprised Raytheon, which is developing the combat system and numerous subsystems for the Zumwalts, and a number of lawmakers who support the DDG 1000 program.

"Wow. We're turning on a dime," Rep. Joe Sestak, D-Pa., a former Navy vice admiral, said July 31 about the Navy's decision to halt DDG 1000 construction. "Where's the analysis, the strategic thought, the studies, and the cost studies that will show: is this really the way to go, or is there a different change or a better approach? I don't think we've seen those."

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md., ranking member of the Seapower subcommittee and a former chairman, noted that he supported the Zumwalt program when the understanding was that the design's new tumblehome hull would be used in the follow-on CG(X) cruiser. Now, although the Navy has not revealed any details of an analysis of alternatives being conducted for the CG(X), Bartlett said the new ship will likely not have the new hull.

"I feel a little bit 'had' now when I'm told that the hull will probably not be used in CG(X)," Bartlett said.

Navy officials have been reluctant to explain the program shift publicly. Although senior Navy leaders began briefing Congress July 22, no press conferences have been held and no official statements released. And while McCullough and Allison Stiller, the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for ship programs, appeared at the July 31 hearing, they declined to speak with the media afterward, instead hurrying to a waiting van which sped off before the doors closed.

E-mail: ccavas@defensenews.com.

Tenho de me render à capacidade do Born véio de interpretar corretamente um post meu ANTES MESMO DE EU POSTAR.

A crise lá está mais do que feia, breve nem estarei mais falando que 'não vão conseguir botar muito mais navios no mar' mas sim questionando a capacidade de manterem os que já têm...

E não duvido nem um pouco que já nos tenham oferecido algumas de suas belonaves operacionais, em prol da contenção de custos. Vão-se os anéis...

Agora, interessante a comparação geopolítica com os Britânicos: eu chutaria que teremos novidades a partir do fim da Olimpíada da China...

Tenham cuidado com previsões catastrofistas. A Inglaterra está em decadência há mais de um século é ainda é um dos grandes poderes do mundo. E se as descobertas de petróleo no Atlântico e nas Malvinas se confirmarem, irão entrar firme e fortes século adentro. O poder de fogo da US Navy corresponde segundo o Military Balance a dois terços de todo o poder de fogo naval do mundo. O terço restante corresponde a todas as outras marinhas do mundo juntas. A combinação de uma dúzia dos maiores porta-aviões do mundo, com uma centena de cruzadores e detróires modernos e uns sessenta e poucos submarinos nucleares e 900 aeronaves de combate será imbatível pelo menos até meados deste século. Só a título de curiosidade, existem no máximo uma dúzia de forças aéreas no mundo com poder de fogo suficiente para ameaçar um único grupo de batalha centrado em um porta-aviões da classe Nimitz. Tente imaginar um único Nimitz com 50 a 60 Super Hornet, mais aviões de apoio e navios com mísseis anti-aérios de longo alcançe e mísseis de cruzeiro contra a nossa querida FAB...

Tente imaginar um único Nimitz com 50 a 60 Super Hornet, mais aviões de apoio e navios com mísseis anti-aérios de longo alcançe e mísseis de cruzeiro contra a nossa querida FAB...

eu prefiro imaginar um SSK a fazer a folha ao Nimitz

Túlio,

Faz semanas que você anda meio apocalípitico quanto ao futuro dos EUA, ou mesmo quanto ao presente de sua economia.

Os EUA já quase quebraram duas vezes nos últimos trinta anos, e continuam aí como motor econômico do mundo. Não duvido que eles tenham cortes orçamentários, o que deve ser encarado como absolutamente natural para quem aumentou assustadoramente seus gastos com defesa no último governo. Afinal, além de terem bases militares por todo mundo, estao a travar duas guerras simultâneas quase do outro lado do mundo.

Mas daí a dizer que eles estão à beira do colapso vai um baita caminho. Quer um exemplo? Suponhamos que eles resolvam reduzir sua frota de navios à metade. Assim, de um dia para o outro. Alguém no mundo ainda poderia contra meia dúzia de porta aviões nucleares e duas dezenas de subs de ataque?

Esse é o ponto. quem apostar contra os EUA vai perder, pelo menos nas próximas décadas. Até porque se os EUA quebrarem, o resto do mundo vai junto.

Bem, talvez não o mundo todo. Talvez o Butão se salve

Não se trata de desejo meu. O que penso e las fuentes pode ser encontrado neste tópico:

viewtopic.php?f=4&t=14036

PS.: a josta mal começou...

born escreveu:Seguindo uma visão mais geopolítica da supremacia naval. A necessidade dos EUA, expressa nos projetos megalomaniacos da U. S. Navy, servem para preservar o domínio dos oceanos norte-americano.

Hoje, os norte-americanos seguem uma lógica semelhante a britânica da primeira metade do século XIX. Em que dizia que a Royal Navy deveria ter uma frota com o dobro ou mais poder de combate, que a soma de todas as outras marinhas do mundo, inclusive as aliadas. Isso, tinha o objetivo de garantir que os britânicos poderiam eliminar qualquer marinha e garantir que as rotas navais continuassem sobre o seu dominio e, assim, poderiam chegar a qualquer lugar do mundo e bombardear qualquer país.

Entretanto, essa política britânica não foi mais possível a partir da metade do século XIX, quando a França começou a voltar a ter uma marinha descente e tão ou mais avançados tecnologicamente que os britânicos. Depois surgiram outras potências navais como o Japão, os Estados Unidos e, principalmente, a Alemanha. Ao mesmo tempo, que os britânicos começaram a não ter "la prata" para montar uma marinha poderosa o suficiente para se sobrepor solitariamente sobre as potências navais crescentes.

Hoje em dia, (acho que Túlio vai concordar comigo e dizer que isso é parte da derrocada norte americana ), os EUA podem estar começando a viver o problema britânico da segunda metade do século XIX. Ou seja, as marinhas pelo mundo, aliadas ou não, estão se fortalecendo e, de algum modo, ameaçar o dominio da U. S. Navy regionalmente. Mas, o governo norte-americano e os congressistas, começam a dizer que não tenham "la prata" disponível para tocar todos os projetos megalomaniacos e até questionar se há a necessidade de tais projetos.

Born

A US Navy, por si só tem um orçamento maior que o das Forças Armadas Chinesas, Russas e Indianas EM CONJUNTO...

Troubled DDG 1000 faces shipyard
problems

One month after the Defense Department announced that it was changing the Navy’s position on whether to build a
third Zumwalt-class destroyer, confusion remains as to why the Navy backed off the program in the first place — and
now whether the Navy will be able to build the first two ships.
Sources familiar with the issue say that problems have arisen in guaranteeing the seals between the composite
construction panels of the ship’s huge deckhouse. The structure — one of 10 key engineering development models —
is to be built by Northrop Grumman’s dedicated composite facility at Gulfport, Miss.
The deckhouse is one of the major changes in the DDG 1000 over previous warships. All of the ship’s major sensors —
radars, missile guidance systems, electronic warfare and other sensors — are embedded in the structure, and all of the
ship above the first superstructure level is contained in the composite structure. A partial test section of the structure
has been built, and Northrop and Navy officials have maintained that there are no significant problems with the
composite deckhouse.
Navy officials hadn’t responded to questions by Sept. 12, but Northrop issued a statement that day.
“Our testing program of the composite deck house is very mature and continues to meet the technical requirements of
the design,” Northrop said.

But one source familiar with the situation said the Navy is so worried about the problem that it has been canvassing
other manufacturers of composite structures to see whether an alternate production source could be found.
The technical problems add another wrinkle to an already controversial program which, after years of staunch support,
the Navy essentially rejected July 31, when top shipbuilding officials told lawmakers that the program was incapable of
defeating certain enemy missiles and should be cut short at just two hulls. The officials said the service should instead
continue building Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, which they said are already designed to counter the threat.
Top Defense Department officials then sent letters to lawmakers in mid-August saying the Navy had been “directed” to
go back and press for the third ship in the fiscal 2009 budget.
Standard missile controversy
One of the key questions provoked by the July 31 testimony was the assertion by Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, the
Navy’s requirements chief, that DDG 1000s “cannot successfully employ the Standard Missile-2, SM-3 or SM-6 missile.”
The SM-2 is the Navy’s primary area air defense weapon, intended to reach out 40 to 90 nautical miles to destroy
enemy aircraft, missiles or ships; SM-3 is a ballistic missile defense weapon; and SM-6 is the SM-2 replacement under
development by Raytheon. The missile is what provides the “G” in “DDG.”
A DDG, or guided-missile destroyer, is able to provide air defense for other ships such as aircraft carriers, amphibious
ships or merchant convoys. A “DD,” or destroyer, might be armed with surface-to-surface missiles such as Harpoons or
Tomahawks, or carry point-defense missiles such as Sea Sparrows to defend itself.
The DDG 1000 designation, a mix of the DDG classification and the DD hull number series, is viewed with ambiguity by
many naval professionals, but the Navy firmly and consistently described the ship as capable of operating the Standard
Missile — until July 31.
Congress, industry and naval analysts remain confused as to why the Navy now says the DDG 1000 cannot use the
Standard Missile.
“Our [combat system] design has the SM-2 using the same link as used in all the other ships,” said Dan Smith,
president of Raytheon’s Integrated Defense Systems division. “The Volume Search radar is essentially the same as the
SPY-1D” Aegis radar used in all current DDGs and cruisers.
“I can’t answer the question as to why the Navy is now asserting that after years of funding and years of
documentation that Zumwalt is not equipped with an SM-2 capability,” Smith said.
Navy officials have declined to explain the issue, tying it to responses about a ballistic missile defense capability the
service did not require the DDG 1000s to have.
‘This whole thing is very strange’
Congress continues to consider the 2009 defense budget, which officially requests the third DDG 1000. The Navy, for
now, isn’t advocating whether the ship be a 1000 or 51.
“Making certain that we have — I’ll just say, a destroyer — in the ’09 budget is more important than whether that’s a
DDG 1000 or a DDG 51,” Navy Secretary Donald Winter told Navy Times on Sept. 4.
The Navy’s changing rationales and positions have baffled even its staunchest supporters.
Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, in whose state the first DDG 1000 would be built at the General Dynamics Bath Iron
Works shipyard, is widely viewed as the strongest champion for the ship on Capitol Hill. Yet she says she is still in the
dark.
“I’ve yet to get an answer to what changed,” Collins told Navy Times on Sept. 9.

“If there is a serious new threat from China,” Collins added, “it seems to us the Navy should have come to us and
given us a classified briefing. That still hasn’t occurred. There are these vague references to this new Chinese missile,
but the Navy’s never given us a briefing. You would think that if this threat was emerging and potent, the Navy would
have come and given us a classified briefing.
“This whole thing is very strange,” Collins declared. “I’m baffled by the way this has been handled.”
The Navy’s industrial partners aren’t entirely sure what’s going on either. Spokesmen for shipbuilders Northrop
Grumman and General Dynamics would not comment on the situation, but sources inside the companies said no Navy
DDG 1000 briefings have been forthcoming. Raytheon, however, was more forceful.
“There’s been zero communication between the Navy and us about this,” Smith said. Source : navytimes.com


fonte:
DAILY COLLECTION OF MARITIME PRESS CLIPPINGS 2008 – 244, 17-09-2008

Hoje, os norte-americanos seguem uma lógica semelhante a britânica da primeira metade do século XIX. Em que dizia que a Royal Navy deveria ter uma frota com o dobro ou mais poder de combate, que a soma de todas as outras marinhas do mundo

A doutrina britânica determinava que a Royal Navy deveria ter uma capacidade naval, superior à soma da segunda e da terceira mais poderosas marinhas do mundo.

Isso quer dizer, que a marinha da Grã Bretanha teria que ser mais poderosa que a marinha da França e da Alemanha, quando se iniciou a I Guerra Mundial.

Os Estados Unidos têm neste momento um poder muito maior que o que a Royal Navy tinha no seu auge. Quer durante o plano naval do final do século XIX (em que só uma classe de couraçados britânicos tinha 9 navios) quer com as construções que antecederam a I guerra e até ao fim da I guerra.

É dificil fazer contas, mas a marinha norte-americana é provavelmente mais poderosa que a marinha da França, Grã Bretanha, Alemanha Rússia e China juntas.

Bastaria ver o numero de Arleigh Burkes e Ticonderogas que eles têm, mas acima de tudo, as tecnologias que já estão ao serviço.

Bastaria contar o numero de navios contra-torpedeiros/cruzadores AEGIS dos Estados Unidos e comparar com todos os sistemas de defesa do mesmo tipo que existam em todas as marinhas de todos os países do mundo juntas.

Quando ocorreu a crise de 1929, todos vaticinavam a decadência americana e o fim do capitalismo.
Foi com base nessas previsões quase inevitáveis de decadência, que a Alemanha declarou guerra aos Estados Unidos em 1941...

No entanto, a História é sempre referência. Nenhum país dominou para sempre.
O problema, é que todos os que se apresentam como candidatos, também já tiveram os seus periodos de dominio e decadência.

Sem duvida, concordo consigo neste assunto em absoluto. Mas os sinais de decadência estão ai, é só ver os relatórios operacionais dos Arleigh Burkes e Ticonderogas em serviço.

Mesmo assim são de muito longe a mais poderosa Marinha do mundo. Se combina-se-mos todas as marinhas da UE, tambem ficaria uma coisinha jeitosa.

[[]]'s

soultrain escreveu: Se combina-se-mos todas as marinhas da UE, tambem ficaria uma coisinha jeitosa.

[[]]'s

E um pesadelo logistico...

Já era altura de alguém se lembrar que não é possivel continuar a desenvolver e a produzir cinco a seis classes de destroyers diferentes para a mesma missão, dois submarinos nucleares diferentes com a mesma missão, quatro ou cinco SSK´s com a mesma missão, três caças diferentes com a mesma missão, quatro MBT´s diferentes com a mesma missão, qualquer coisa como vinte familias de veiculos de rodas, todas elas desenhadas para cumprirem o mesmissimo conjunto de missões, etc, etc, etc...
Se o Pentagono é prolifico em "Pork Barrel Budgets", os MOD´s Europeus chegam a lembrar alguns livros do Kafka.

Presentemente as marinhas da Europa têm quatro navios espanhóis, quatro holandeses e três alemães, em termos de navios de defesa aérea.

Franceses, italianos, britânicos ainda não receberam os seus.

Fora da Europa, em termos de navios de defesa aérea modernos, há os quatro Kongo japoneses, um sul coreano e os dois chineses (embora neste caso com reservas quanto à sua verdadeira modernidade). Os russos têm navios grandes e bem armados, mas os seus sensores não estão à altura e a sua «assinatura» de radar transforma-os em alvos a grande distância.

Ou seja: De memória, todos os países do mundo juntos não conseguem somar vinte navios. Os Estados Unidos, têm mais de setenta.

Lembro-me da frase de Napoleão...
As noticias da minha morte, foram muito exageradas.

O poder dos países do mundo acaba sendo determinado pelos seus sistemas de mísseis nucleares. E nesse balanço de terror, muitas vezes esquecemos que até um país que pode ser facilmente erradicado do mapa, como a Grã Bretanha tem sozinha, capacidade para destruir praticamente toda capacidade industrial russa e matar 80% da população. A França tem ainda mais.