EU CONHEÇO A LEI que vc citou. Vale para VENDAS, não para repasse de tecnologias. Tem mais, a cada dois anos, tempo das legislaturas da Casa dos Representantes, os atos de transferência de tecnologia precisam ser revalidados. Isso, inclusive, é destacado como elemento complicador pelos diplomatas norte-americanos no Wikileaks.Penguin escreveu:Sugiro que vc leia com muita atenção o texto abaixo:
Congress' Role
http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/handboo ... srole.htmlARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT (AECA)(...) the Arms Export Control Act require the President to notify Capitol Hill of proposed weapons sales and leases (negotiated by the Pentagon, as well as those negotiated directly by industry) valued at $14 million or more. In most cases, lawmakers have 30 days to consider the deals before the contract can be offered or the export license granted. For arms transfers to close allies like Japan, Australia and members of the NATO alliance, Congress has only a 15-day review period. These sales announcements are referred to as "36(b) notifications" for government-negotiated foreign military sales, or "36(c) notifications" for commercially-negotiated deals.
The Foreign Assistance Act (section 516) directs the President to tell Congress about any planned shipments of excess defense articles-surplus weapons stocks that the US armed forces intend to give or sell at a deep discount to foreign militaries. Congress has 30 days to review these deals. Similarly, the President must pre-notify Capitol Hill of any emergency drawdowns of weapons and materials from US stocks destined for foreign militaries. These drawdowns are grant transfers of US surplus weapons stocks that are justified usually on the basis of aiding the fight against drug trafficking or in response to some other perceived crisis.
In order to block or amend a proposed arms transfer, members of both the House and Senate must introduce a Joint Resolution of Disapproval. The resolutions are then referred to the House and Senate foreign affairs committees, which must report them out of committee (that is, pass them). The full House and Senate must then pass the resolution with enough votes (two-thirds of each chamber) to override a Presidential veto.
Congress must do all of this within the 15 or 30 day time period prescribed, which poses a very high hurdle. In fact, it is so high that Congress has never made it over; the legislature has never blocked an arms sale in this manner. The last serious attempt by Congress to do so occurred in 1986, when President Reagan proposed to sell Saudi Arabia 1,700 "Sidewinder" air-to-air missiles, 100 "Harpoon" anti-ship missiles, and 200 "Stinger" shoulder- launched anti-aircraft missile launchers with 600 missiles. Congress mustered veto-proof majorities in both chambers and stalled the sale, but eventually House and Senate leaders cut a deal with President Reagan which allowed some of the missiles to be sold. This episode demonstrates that even when the political will exists in Congress to block a sale, the administration and arms industry maintain a great deal of leverage with which to twist arms and turn votes.
Since 1986, the executive branch has sold over $145 billion of weapons to governments around the world without a single vote by Congress on a proposed deal. On top of this, thousands of commercial sales-valued in the tens of billions of dollars-have taken place in the past decade without objection or even discussion in Congress.
The congressional review procedure has been underutilized for several reasons. First, the systemic difficulty of assembling the large number of votes necessary in the short time period allotted poses a daunting challenge. The near impossibility of successfully blocking a sale has no doubt dissuaded some members of Congress from even trying. Compounding this difficulty is the fact that only a very small percentage of lawmakers (and their staff) are aware of pending arms sales. The notifications are referred to the House International Relations Committee (with 48 members) and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (with 18 members). The other 469 Representatives and Senators are generally completely in the dark. And even the relevant members and their over-burdened staff are lax in reviewing the sales proposals. According to a former director of the House International Relations Committee staff, only a few personnel routinely bother to read the classified background information provided to the committee on these sales.
Second, notice to Congress of proposed arms sales comes very late in the process. The deal will have been in the works with the customer government for months or years by the time Congress is let in on it. A refusal at this point, the administration often argues, would damage bilateral relations, national security and/or the prestige of the office of the President.
Third, the days of the activist and reform-minded Congress which established the Arms Export Control Act are in the past. Enacted in 1976, the AECA was inspired by the Vietnam war and several scandals in the conduct of overseas business, including the widespread use of bribery by US companies to win arms deals. Lawmakers today involve themselves in many foreign policy issues, but Congress is not highly focused on reforming US conventional arms export policy. (Rather, Capitol Hill tries to reform Russian and Chinese export practices.) This lack of critical concern about our own policies is fostered by the fact that many congressional districts derive at least some jobs from arms exports, and many members of Congress derive campaign contributions from arms exporters (see chapter 5).
Finally, it is important to note that thousands of weapons transfer deals occur each year without any public or congressional scrutiny. Sales of small arms, non-lethal equipment and spare parts are routine and generally fall below the $14 million threshold for congressional notification. In addition, although most transfers which require congressional notification are made public, some sales are classified, either because the weapon system itself is classified, or to protect US foreign policy interests. Certain aspects of other sales are kept secret to protect confidential business information. Finally, US intelligence agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, may transfer arms secretly, under section 40(h) of the Arms Export Control Act. Only members of the intelligence oversight committees are informed of covert arms supply operations.
All of this is not to say that congressional review is without value. Because Congress and the press are told of large pending sales, a national debate in the media or a backroom dialogue between the administration and Congress can and does occur. Moreover, the possibility that Capitol Hill will block a sale-or even attempt to do so-probably does moderate administration sales activity.
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms_Export_Control_Act
ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT (AECA)
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/ ... -000-.html
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