Fórum Defesa Brasil

Irans Strategic Penetration in Latin America

Dr. Ely Karmon


Iran and its Proxy Hezbollah: Strategic Penetration in Latin
America.First published as Working Paper by the Real Instituto Elcano
(RIE), Madrid.Dr. Ely Karmon*.‘Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
must love the tropics', commented ironically The Miami Herald.[1] He
has spent more time in Latin America than President Bush. Since his
inauguration in 2005, Iran's foreign policy focus has shifted from
Africa to Latin America in order to, as Ahmadinejad puts it, ‘counter
lasso' the US.[2].


Iran's Goals in Latin America
Farideh Farhi argues that while Iran's increased attention to Latin
America as a region is a relatively new development, its bilateral
ties with some individual Latin American nations are of long standing
and relatively robust. Iran has shared an ideological relationship
with Cuba since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and a political
relationship with Venezuela since their co-founding of OPEC in the
1960s. The impetus behind these long-standing bilateral relationships
is three-fold:[3]


1. Iran's non-aligned position in foreign policy has compelled it to
seek out countries with similar ideological outlooks.


2. US efforts to keep Iran in diplomatic and economic isolation have
forced it to pursue an active foreign policy.


3. The election of a reformist President in 1997 made it possible for
countries like Brazil to engage Iran with enough confidence to
withstand pressures from the US.


The shift to the left in many important Latin American countries in
the first decade of the new millennium has allowed Iran to be more
successful in its attempt to improve relations with particular
countries. From Ahmadinejad's point of view, ‘rather than responding
passively to the US attempt to isolate Iran politically and
economically and become the dominant player in the Middle East region,
Iran's backyard, Iran should move aggressively in the US's own
backyard as a means to rattle it or at least make a point'.[4]


What is Ahmadinejad Looking for in Latin America?


First, he is seeking Latin American support to counter US and European
pressures to stop Iran from developing nuclear capabilities. Venezuela
and Cuba were, alongside Syria, the only three countries that
supported Iran's nuclear programme in a February 2006 vote at the
United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency.[5]


Secondly, Ahmadinejad wants to strike back at the US in its own
hemisphere and possibly destabilise US-friendly governments in order
to negotiate with Washington from a position of greater strength.


Third, Ahmadinejad's popularity at home is falling, and he may want to
show his people that he is being welcomed as a hero abroad.


Since Ahmadinejad's ascendancy to power, he has made three diplomatic
tours to Latin America in search of an alliance of ‘revolutionary
countries'. He visited Venezuela in July 2006, Venezuela, Nicaragua
and Ecuador in January 2007, and Venezuela and Bolivia in September
2007. Ahmadinejad had also hosted President Chávez of Venezuela,
President Ortega of Nicaragua, President Morales of Bolivia and
President Correa of Ecuador and is expecting the visit of Brazil's
President Lula da Silva in 2009.


The cornerstone of Ahmadinejad's Latin America policy is the formation
of an anti-American axis with Venezuela. During a July 2006 visit to
Tehran, Chávez told a Tehran University crowd, ‘We have to save
humankind and put an end to the US empire'. When Chávez again visited
Tehran a year later Ahmadinejad and Chávez used the visit to declare
an ‘Axis of Unity' against the US.[6] Ahmadinejad's efforts to further
destabilise the neighbourhood suggest that he is seeking a permanent
Iranian presence on the US doorstep.


Both leaders are using their mutual embrace to overcome international
isolation and sanctions. Both Tehran and Caracas have used their
petrodollar windfall to encourage states in Latin America to embark on
confrontational policies towards the US.[7]


Using billions of Iranian dollars in aid and assistance, and a US$2
billion Iran/Venezuela programme to fund social projects in Latin
America, Ahmadinejad has worked to create an anti-American bloc with
Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua.


Iran's Growing Presence in Latin America


During the International Conference on Latin America held in Tehran in
February 2007, Iran's Foreign Minister, Mehdi Mostafavi, announced the
opening of embassies in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and
Uruguay and a representative office in Bolivia, and that a number of
Latin American countries would open embassies in Iran.[8]


Iran's political and economic penetration of the continent in a short
period of two-three years is indeed impressive.


Venezuela


According to Elodie Brun, both Venezuela and Iran are using oil as a
political instrument to insert themselves internationally in a way
that both characterise as revolutionary. The Venezuelan President,
Hugo Chávez, and President Ahmadinejad embrace a rhetoric emphasising
autonomy and independence from the great powers, primarily the US but
also Europe, citing unity in the struggle against imperialism and
capitalism. Hostility to the US, and particularly to the Bush
Administration, is what most binds the foreign policies of the two
countries.[9]


‘Here are two brother countries, united like a single fist', Hugo
Chávez, the Venezuelan leader, was quoted as saying in Tehran. ‘Iran
is an example of struggle, resistance, dignity, revolution, strong
faith', Chávez told al-Jazeera. ‘We are two powerful countries. Iran
is a power and Venezuela is becoming one. We want to create a bipolar
world. We don't want a single power [that is, the US]...Despite the
will of the world arrogance [of the US], we [Iran and Venezuela] will
stand by the oppressed and deprived nations of the world', Ahmadinejad
said.[10] Thérèse Delpech, a French analyst, has noted that
Ahmadinejad's ‘flamboyant style' is similar to that of his Venezuelan
colleague.[11]


Some observers consider that Latin America's willingness to embrace
Iran indicates how far US prestige has fallen in the region. Chávez
has emerged as ‘the godfather and relationship manager', striving to
draw in this embrace other allies such as Bolivia, Ecuador and
Nicaragua. He is providing Iran with an entry into Latin America,
vowing to ‘unite the Persian Gulf and the Caribbean' and recently gave
Iran observer status in his leftist trade-pact group known as the
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas.[12]


Iran has become the second-largest investor in Venezuela, after the
US. The first ‘anti-imperialist cars' from a joint venture (Venirauto)
have now reached Venezuela's roads, with the first batch earmarked for
army officers. The 4,000 tractors produced annually in Ciudad Bolivar
have a symbolic value as agents of revolutionary change. Most are
given or leased at a discount in Venezuela to socialist cooperatives
that have land, with the government's blessing. Universities are
teaching Farsi.[13]


Iran is to help build platforms in a US$4 billion development of
Orinoco delta oil deposits in exchange for Venezuelan investments. An
Iranian company is building thousands of apartments for Venezuela's
poor. The most visible impact so far has been the arrival of Iranian
businesses. The public housing project alone has brought more than 400
Iranian engineers and specialists to Venezuela, where many have
learned basic Spanish.[14]


Venezuela could also provide Iran with some breathing space as it
tries to weather the financial pressure of UN and US sanctions on its
nuclear programme. Venezuela could end up being an outlet for Iran to
move money, obtain high-tech equipment and access the world financial
system.[15]


Venezuela has already become Iran's gateway for travel to the region.
There is now a weekly flight between Caracas and Tehran, with a
stopover in Damascus, operated by the Venezuelan state-controlled
airline Conviasa and Iran's national carrier, Iran Air. Flights are
packed with government officials and government-friendly business
people.[16] Venezuela's state airline bought an Airbus jet especially
for the route.


Bolivia


Bolivia might be a poor country, but it is strategically located and
represents an important ally for Iran that can act as a catalyst in
enhancing Iran's growing cooperation with other leftist or populist
governments in Latin America.


On 27 September 2007 Ahmadinejad visited La Paz for the first time to
meet President Morales. They took the opportunity to sign a programme
of cooperation worth US$1.1 billion in Bolivia's underdeveloped oil
and gas sector.[17]


In August 2008 the government of Bolivia, with the support of Iran and
Venezuela, created the Public National Strategic Company ‘Cement of
Bolivia' with an investment of US$230 million for the establishment of
two plants in Potosí and Oruro departments. In the same month, the
Vice-president of Iran, Mojtama Samare Hashemi, came to the country to
express his support for Evo Morales and to promote economic
agreements.


Iran decided to open two health clinics in Bolivia, as a base for
future Red Crescent projects in South America. The agreement includes
sending Iranian medical teams to Bolivia, and offering specialised
education and training for Bolivian physicians. The Bolivian Health
Minister said that the Iranian clinics would expand the medical aid
already being provided by Cuba and Venezuela.[18]


The Iranian state television agreed to provide Bolivian state
television with Spanish-language programming, making it that much
easier for every Bolivian to receive Iranian-produced news and
documentary shows -ie, propaganda.


In September 2008 Morales went to Teheran and agreed with Ahmadinejad
to accelerate the execution of joint projects to increase economic
development and welfare for both nations. The two Presidents issued a
statement to the effect that the interference of the United Nations
Security Council in Iran's nuclear programme had no legal or technical
justification. Morales' decision to set aside any hesitation and fully
support Iran's position in the current nuclear stand-off has gone a
long way to cementing Iranian-Bolivian friendship. According to the
statement, the two sides have also pledged to continue their political
struggle against imperialism. ‘Nothing and no country can harm our
relations with the revolutionary country of Iran', Morales told
reporters.


Following his return from Iran, President Evo Morales announced he was
moving the country's sole Middle Eastern Embassy from Egypt to Iran, a
clear sign of what his strategic priorities in the Middle East are.


Nicaragua


According to Maradiaga and Meléndez, Nicaragua's foreign policy
strongly correlates with Venezuela's, and any Latin American
relationship with Iran is conducted through Caracas. President Ortega
sees himself as a ‘revolutionary' who supports Chávez's political-
ideological anti-imperialist ‘Socialism of the 21st century'.
Francisco Aguirre Sacasa, a former Nicaraguan Foreign Minister,
described Ortega's relations with Iran as a ‘policy of the heart'.[19]


Iran promised Nicaragua US$1 billion in aid and investment to develop
its energy and agricultural sectors, infrastructure and water
purification facilities. The largest project was the construction of a
deep water port on Nicaragua's eastern shore, requiring an investment
of US$350 million. Nicaragua received a US$231 million loan from Iran
in 2007 to build a hydroelectric dam. In August 2008, Nicaraguan-
Iranian relations were further consolidated when President Ahmadinejad
donated US$2 million for the construction of a hospital. Iran will
also expand media cooperation with Nicaragua.[20] Iran has stationed
about 20 Iranian officials at its Embassy there, which has by now
become one of the largest in the country.


However, Maradiaga and Meléndez claimed as late as mid-2008 that the
proposed projects created the appearance of strong economic ties
between the two nations but that there was little evidence that the
aid and investment would materialise. They doubted that the
relationship -held together by the anti-Americanism espoused by the
leaders of both countries- would deepen beyond the ideological and
political level.[21] On the political level, Nicaragua is actually
playing down US concerns about Iran's nuclear-weapon ambitions and
President Ortega publicly supported Iran's right to ‘nuclear energy
for peaceful ends'.[22]


Ecuador


Prior to 2007 ties were minimal and neither country had diplomatic or
commercial offices in the other's capital. In 2000, 2006 and 2007, no
Ecuadorean exports reached Iran, and in 2003, the year with the
highest volume of trade, Ecuador's total exports to Iran were worth US
$2.5 million.


Ahmadinejad's short and surprising visit to Rafael Correa's
presidential inauguration in January 2007 spawned a new bilateral
relationship between the two countries. Correa maintained that the
relationship was not political but based solely on commercial
interests. The visiting President said that ‘deep cooperation between
Iran and Ecuador in the international arena will help establish
balance in the world equation'.[23]


According to César Montúfar there is little evidence of a growing
commercial relationship between Quito and Tehran. The ties between
Ecuador and Iran were established because of Ecuador's relationship
with Venezuela. Montúfar argues that as Venezuela's influence in
Ecuador is declining a similar decline in Iran's relations with
Ecuador has ensued.[24]


However, this evaluation was quickly contradicted by the facts. In the
summer of 2008 the two countries opened commercial bureaus in their
respective capitals. The Ecuadorean commercial bureau in Tehran was
the only one to be opened by the government of Correa since he was
elected. Iran and Ecuador signed an energy cooperation deal in
September 2008, including a plan to build a refinery and a
petrochemical unit in southern Ecuador.[25]


President Correa visited Iran in November 2008 and signed 25 bilateral
agreements in various fields, including the oil industry. Correa, who
is the first Ecuadorean head of State to visit Iran, travelled
accompanied by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Oil and Mining,
Agriculture and Defence, among other officials and business people. In
December 2008 Ecuador and Iran signed an agreement of cooperation in
the field of energy with the participation of Iran in hydro-electrical
projects and in the tender for the construction of the important of
Coca-Codo-Sinclair dam project.


In December 2008, Iran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary
Saeed Jalili visited Ecuador. During the meeting with Jalili, Correa
said his country's relations with Iran were strategic and that he
favoured the expansion of the military ties and customs cooperation
between the two nations. ‘Links between Quito and Teheran are beyond
trade relations', Correa said.[26] Finally, on 13 February 2009 Iran
opened a brand new Embassy in Quito, an act coinciding with the 30th
anniversary of the Islamic revolution in Iran.[27]


Paraguay


Fernando Armindo Lugo Méndez, a former Catholic bishop, was
inaugurated as President of Paraguay on 15 August 2008 and headed the
country's first left-leaning presidency.


Ahmadinejad was one of the first to congratulate Lugo on his victory.
Iran's media praised Lugo by calling him ‘a man of God and an enemy of
the Great Satan'. The large Muslim population in Paraguay's tri-border
region aided Lugo's campaign for the presidency through fund-raising
drives that were supported by Iran and Venezuela.[28]


Lugo designated Alejandro Hamed Franco, Paraguay's ambassador to
Lebanon, as Foreign Minister. Hamed has publicly announced that he
plans to strengthen ties with the Middle East. His appointment was
sure to create tensions with the State Department due to his
sympathies with anti-US developments in the Middle East and his
acknowledged connections with US-banned groups. He was accused of
providing Paraguayan passports to Lebanese citizens, although he
claims they were only for those who were trying to escape Israeli
attacks in 2006.[29]


In February 2009 an Iranian government delegation visited Paraguay to
seek import and investment opportunities. The Iranian delegation hoped
to import soya and meat from Paraguay and showed an interest in
bilateral cooperation in technology and agriculture and in investing
in Paraguayan real estate.[30]


Brazil


During President Mohammad Khatami's February 2004 visit to Caracas to
attend the summit of the non-aligned G-15 he met the newly elected
President Lula da Silva of Brazil and talked about bilateral trade.
Since then, Brazil's exports to Iran have doubled and it has been the
latter's largest Latin American trade partner for several years, with
a volume of exports to Iran as large as those of neighbouring Turkey
and India.[31]


However, when in September 2007 Ahmadinejad expressed his intention of
going to Brasilia on an official visit -after speaking at the UN
General Assembly and visiting Venezuela and Bolivia-, Brazilian
diplomacy came out with the classic excuse: the impossibility of
reconciling Lula and the Iranian President's schedules.[32]


Still, Lula's reluctance to meet Ahmadinejad did not prevent him from
publicly supporting Iran's nuclear energy programme and suggesting
that Iran ‘should not be punished just because of Western suspicions
it wants to make an atomic bomb'.[33]


During the visit in November 2008 of the Brazilian Foreign Minister
Celso Amorim to Iran, his Iranian colleague Manouchehr Mottaki said
that ‘Iran affords South America major priority in its foreign policy
and Brazil enjoys a special position in this respect' and that Tehran
and Brasilia generally share the same interests in numerous global
matters which can be used as a potential for bilateral consultations.
Amorim, for his part, described the expansion of ties with Iran as a
priority for Brazil's foreign policy. He also referred to his meeting
with Mottaki as a ‘turning point' in Brazil-Iran relations and
expected that the visits by the two nations' Presidents would bring
ties to a new level.[34]


On this occasion, President Ahmadinejad said there are no barriers to
the expansion of ties with Brazil. ‘The (political) systems in the
world are on the decline, and we should help each other and work for
establishing a new (political) order'. Ahmadinejad expressed his hope
that the visit to Iran of President Lula in the near future would
further help build up the friendship between the two nations.[35]


Uruguay


In June 2008, the Uruguayan Vice-president Rodolfo Nin Novoa called
for the further expansion of all-out ties with the Islamic Republic of
Iran. He announced his readiness to pay a visit to Tehran to discuss
the furthering of bilateral cooperation with the Iranian authorities
and said that President Ahmadinejad had invited his Uruguayan
counterpart to visit Tehran in the near future. He also announced
Uruguay's nomination of a new ambassador to Tehran and the formation
of the Iran-Uruguay Parliamentary Friendship Group.[36] Then, in
October 2008, Fernando Alberto Arroyo became Uruguay's ambassador to
Tehran.


Argentina


Argentina has an Embassy in Tehran and Iran has an Embassy in Buenos
Aires. Since 1994 relations between the two countries have been marred
by Iran's involvement in the AMIA bombing. Efforts to resolve the case
were being made when much of the region was expanding its relations
with Iran, and several of Argentina's regional allies were pledging
support for Ahmadinejad's government.


According to Iranian sources, during the 2004 G-15 summit meeting,
despite Argentine President Nestor Kirchner's interest in discussing
bilateral economic ties, Khatami refused to meet him until ‘Buenos
Aires formally apologised to Tehran for falsely charging Iranian
diplomats with involvement in the bombing of the AMIA Jewish community
centre in 1994'.[37]


Although Argentina maintains friendly relations with Iran's allies,
like Chávez, Ortega and Correa, Kirchner's domestic agenda is driving
him in a different direction. For example, he cancelled plans to
attend President Correa's inauguration ceremony after Ahmadinejad
announced that he would attend. The continuing US conflict with Iran
complicates matters further.[38]


At the 2007 UN General Assembly, the Argentine President urged Iran to
help with the probe on the terrorist attack. This was not well
received by the Tehran government, which responded angrily. The case
has also caused tension with Chávez, an ally of the then President
Kirchner. The Venezuelan ambassador to Buenos Aires, Roger Capella,
was replaced after he criticised the Argentine justice system for
seeking the capture of Iranian officials, upsetting the Argentine
government. But this was not enough to weaken the ties between
Argentina and Venezuela.[39]


In February 2007, the Iranian government organized the first
International Conference on Latin America at the Institute of
International Political Studies at the Foreign Ministry. The title of
the conference was ‘Development in Latin America: Its Role and Status
in the Future International System'. According to press releases, the
participants also included Argentine members of parliament.[40]


The Subtle Ideological/Religious Penetration


Iran's religious and intellectual penetration of Latin America, its
attempts to convert Christians and Sunni Muslims to Shia Islam and
thus export the ideology and revolutionary beliefs of Ayatollah
Khomeini is similar to the trend seen today in the Middle East,
although it clearly does not reach the same proportions.


For instance, Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi, head of the Sunni
International Union for Muslim Scholars and the Muslim Brotherhood's
main religious authority, has made harsh anti-Shia and anti-Iran
statements in the Egyptian and Saudi press. He warned against the
danger posed by the spread of Shia Islam in Sunni countries,
characterising it as part of Iran's campaign for regional hegemony.
[41]


In another typical example, an article on a Sudanese website accuses
Iran of having ‘turned its Embassy in Khartoum into a centre for
spreading... Shia [Islam], aimed at prompting the Sudanese to forsake
Sunni [Islam] and embrace Imami Shiism [instead]'. To ensure the
success of this plan, various Iranian-funded facilities have been
established around the capital, including cultural centres, libraries,
institutions and schools. These establishments are actually missionary
centres for spreading Shia Islam. ‘[Moreover], some of the recent
converts to the Shia have begun to spread Shiite philosophy in the
capital and around the country, among students and in the large
universities'.[42]


A superficial surf of the Internet shows that Latin America is not
immune from this phenomenon. Professor Ángel Horacio Molina (Hussain
Ali), a researcher at the Centre of Oriental Studies of the National
University at Rosario (Argentina), writes frequently for the Revista
Biblioteca Islámica in El Salvador and moderates the Islamic blog
oidislam.blogspot.com. The blog's home page presents itself as ‘Islam
Indoamericano, a space to develop a revolutionary and indoamerican
Islam'. Molina is convinced of the importance of developing this
revolutionary brand of Islam to enrich the Muslim umma (nation)
worldwide. However, his space is also used to propagate opinions on
‘the political reality' of the continent from an ‘Islamic
revolutionary perspective'.[43]


Thus, the blog includes the speech by the Iranian ambassador to
Mexico, Dr Mohammad Hassan Ghadiri, delivered on 11 February 2009 on
occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Khomeinist revolution.
Similarly, it has 10 articles in its chapter on ‘Islam Indoamericano',
11 on ‘Islamic Resistance' and 21 on ‘Zionism Uncovered', all of which
are anti-Israeli and anti-US. Among the recommended links are
Hezbollah's website and several Iranian or pro-Iranian websites in
Spanish.


The following is a non-comprehensive list of Spanish Iranian or pro-
Iranian websites:
*Organization Islamica Argentina, http://www.organizacionislam.org.ar/.
*Unión de Mujeres Musulmanas Argentinas, http://www.umma.org.ar/.
*United Latino Muslims of America (ULMA) [actually an Iranian site for
Mexico and the Movimiento Mexicano de Solidaridad con el Pueblo Irani
(MMSPI)], http://u-l-m-a.com/default.aspx.
*Comunidad islamica Shia de Bolivia, http://usuarios.lycos.es/shiabolivia/.
*Oficina de Divulgación Islámica Fátimah Az-Zahra/San Salvador/El
Salvador, available in Spanish, English, French, Italian and
Portuguese (!), http://www.islamelsalvador.com/.
*Corporación de Cultura Islámica, Santiago, Chile, http://www.islamchile.com/pagina.php.
*Semanario Islámico, Temuco, Chile, http://www.islam.cl/.
*Fundación Cultural Oreinte, http://www.islamoriente.com/.
*Red Islam, http://www.redislam.com/.
*Agencia de Noticias Coránicas de Irán, http://www.iqna.ir/es/.
*Organización Cultural y de Relaciones Islámicas (OCRI), http://es.icro.ir/.
*Shia Latinos, http://shialatinos.blogspot.com/.
*Islam-Shia, http://www.islam-shia.org/.


Also, the pro-Iranian blog Imperialism and Resistance (http://
almusawwir.org/resistance/), that combines leftist revolutionary
rhetoric and messages with Islamist ideology, provides much Latin
American news (almusawwir is one of the 99 names of Allah in the
Quran: the Fashioner, the Bestower of Forms and the Shaper).


All these websites contain not only legitimate religious or cultural
texts and explanations, but also radical political anti-American, anti-
Israeli and anti-Western material. The Islam-Shia website, for
instance, recommends reading two books on Israel and Zionism by the
Argentine radical right-wing ‘philosopher' and strategist Norberto
Ceresole: The Falsification of Reality; Argentina in the Geopolitical
Space of Jewish Terrorism and The Conquest of the American Empire:
Jewish Power in the West and the East. Not only that, but it also
recommends the French Holocaust denier and ex-communist Roger
Garaudy's book The Fundamental Myths of the State of Israel and, to
crown it all, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.


On a broader strategic level, Iran planned to open a television
station ‘for all of Latin America' to be based in Bolivia. Morales
made the announcement at a gathering of coca farmers from the Chapare.
The station would be ‘for all of Bolivia, for all of Latin America,
recognising the great struggle of this peasant movement', Morales said.
[44] According to recent information, the Iranian government has
renounced, for unknown reasons, financing the installation of the TV
channel in Bolivia, although an Iranian TV team visited Bolivia to
follow its ‘political and cultural reality'.[45]


Opposition to Iranian Penetration


Farhi argues that the new-found intensity of Iran's relations in Latin
America is unsustainable. It is based on political opportunism, as a
diplomatic thorn in America's side, rather than on a more long-term
economic or military partnership. Already, the proposed deepwater
seaport is facing resistance in Nicaragua by land-rights activists.
Iran's real commitment to this project is also not clear and Tehran
has so far refused to forgo Nicaragua's US$152 million debt, despite
Ortega's specific request that it do so. Ultimately, Farhi predicts
that while bilateral relations between Iran and individual Latin
American countries will continue to gradually improve, based on
economic give-and-take and a degree of shared commitment to non-
alignment, the intensely vitriolic character of current relations is
unlikely to continue beyond Ahmadinejad's term in office.[46]


For instance, days after it was published that Iran had promised a
loan to build a hydroelectric dam in Nicaragua, the opposition party
Movimiento de Renovación Sandinista (MRS) criticised the government,
claiming that the interest rates asked by Iran were double those
offered by the World Bank and the Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.
Some have claimed that cooperation with Iran would permit President
Ortega to renounce cooperation with the US and Europe, who require
transparency and scrutiny.[47] Similar criticism has been aimed at
President Morales of Bolivia by Jorge Quiroga, the leader of the main
opposition party, and by the Governor of Cochabamba, Manfred Reyes
Villa.


It is interesting to note that in Iran itself a group of students has
criticised Ali Larijani, the Chairman/Speaker of the Iranian
parliament, and President Ahmadinejad for the support they give
President Chávez of Venezuela. The anonymous writer of this
information on a leftist blog notes that there are social and
political sectors in Iran that are opposed to the strengthening of
relations with Chávez, not with the Venezuelan people.[48]


According to this analysis, the danger exists that the interesting and
beneficial rapprochement of the last few years between Iran and Latin
America could confront a grater danger: that relations will freeze at
the level of the administrations and will not involve the peoples. The
danger is that any change in political leadership, in Iran or in the
Latin American countries, will actually result in a decrease in the
present level of bilateral relations. Therefore, the big challenge
will be to incorporate the social actors to bilateral cooperation.[49]
César Montúfar has commented that it is surprising and incoherent that
the Iranian president and his government, while deepening the
country's ties with the leftist governments of Latin America, is
implacably repressing its own leftist groups at home.[50]


The Middle East's Strategic Bonanza for Iran


The expansion of economic and political relations and cooperation with
Latin American countries is also intended to bring Iran strategic
assets in the Middle Eastern arena, its home turf. As already noted,
the support Iran received on the issue of its nuclear project from
Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia and even Brazil, is extremely
important for the Tehran regime, especially if the UN imposes harsher
economic sanctions and more states accept them.


In the regional arena, Venezuela and Bolivia strongly supported
Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War in July-August 2006. President
Chávez was extremely vociferous during that period. But the real test
came during the last war in Gaza, when Israel started ‘Operation Cast
Lead' to deter Hamas from bombing Israeli territory and staging
continuous terrorist activities against its citizens. Presidents
Chávez and Morales fully embraced Iran's position and complied with
Ahmadinejad's demand to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. The
decision was taken after the visiting Iranian Minister of Industry and
Mines, Ali Akbar Mehrabián, delivered a letter from his President to
the leaders of Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba.[51]


Venezuela not only broke off its relations with Israel ‘given the
inhumane persecution of the Palestinian people', it also promised to
request the prosecution of Israel's leaders at the International Court
for crimes against humanity and not to rest until they are punished.
[52] The visiting Iranian Minister of Cooperation, Mohammad Abbasi,
delivered a similar letter from his President to the leaders of Brazil
and Ecuador, who did not follow the Venezuelan and Bolivian example.


According to Kaveh Afrasiabi, from Tehran's point of view, an indirect
benefit of its special relations with Bolivia is that it impresses on
Moscow the services that Tehran can render in strengthening Moscow's
anti-unipolarist credo, which was spelled out by President Dmitry
Medvedev in his major foreign policy speech in September 2008.
Medvedev openly mentioned Russia's intention of seeking a ‘sphere of
influence' in politics and made a point of mentioning that it would be
sought ‘not only with neighbours'.[53]


Russian experts, including some at the Russian Centre for Strategic
Studies, have pointed out that in the aftermath of the Georgia crisis
Russia is inclined to strengthen its ties with countries such as Iran
and Venezuela. The growing rift between the US and Russia is an
opportunity for Tehran both to neutralise the UN Security Council's
efforts to impose tighter sanctions on account of its nuclear
programme but also to explore further, and more meaningful, strategic
cooperation with Russia and the Latin American leftist regimes vis-à-
vis the common threat of US unipolarism.[54]


Ahmadinejad's foreign policy advisors are openly counting on Iran's
new relations with Latin America as one of the net gains of his
presidency. In fact, the new level of cooperation between Iran and
Latin and Central American countries is a timely, further confirmation
of the strategic vision and outlook that they have brought to the
government compared to Mohammad Khatami's aim of reaching detente with
the West almost to the exclusion of all else.[55]


Iran and Terrorism in Latin America


Iran is still the world's ‘most active state sponsor of terrorism',
according to the US State Department in its most recent study on the
subject.[56] It is a label the Iranian regime has won, and worn
proudly, since the US government began keeping track of terrorist
trends more than a decade and a half ago.


The scope of this support is enormous. According to government
officials, Iran ‘has a nine-digit line item in its budget for support
to terrorist organizations'. The figure is estimated to include US$10
million or more monthly for its principal terrorist proxy, Hezbollah,
US$20-30 million annually for the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas,
US$2 million a year for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and -at least
until recently- upwards of US$30 million a year for Iraqi insurgents.
[57]


In 2006, the Assistant Secretary of State Thomas A. Shannon expressed
his concern about the kind of relationship Chávez wants to have with
Iran on the intelligence side. ‘One of our broader concerns is what
Iran is doing elsewhere in this hemisphere and what it could do if we
were to find ourselves in some kind of confrontation with Iran', he
said. In June 2008 Shannon declared that Iran ‘has a history of terror
in this hemisphere, and its linkages to the bombings in Buenos Aires
are pretty well established'.[58]


The 1992 suicide bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires is
arguably the first Islamist terrorist attack in the Western
Hemisphere. Although the attack has yet to be officially solved, the
bulk of the evidence points to Hezbollah. A car, driven by a suicide
bomber and loaded with explosives, smashed into the front of the
Embassy and killed 29 people and injured a further 242. On 18 July
1994, the Argentine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) building was
bombed, leaving 85 dead and 300 injured. This attack was the deadliest
terrorist toll ever in Argentina's history, and resulted in the
largest Jewish death toll from terrorism outside Israel since the
Second World War.


The AMIA case has gone through many ups and downs, involving
prosecution changes, witness tampering charges and several arrests
that ended in release. On 25 October 2006, Dr Alberto Nisman,
Argentina's Attorney General, and Marcelo Martínez Burgos presented
the findings of the special team which investigated the terrorist
attack that destroyed the AMIA building. The detailed report
unequivocally showed that the decision to blow up the building was
taken by the ‘highest instances of the Iranian government', and that
the Iranians had asked Hezbollah, which serves as a tool for its
strategies, to carry out the attack.


The report did not ignore the fact that the attack was carried out for
reasons connected to the conflict in the Middle East (including the
abduction of Mustafa Dirani and the Israeli bombing of the Hezbollah
training camp in the Beqa'a Valley). However, based on the evidence
collected, it concluded that the fundamental reason was the Argentine
‘government's unilateral decision to terminate the nuclear materials
and technology supply agreements that had been concluded some years
previously between Argentina and Iran'.


On 9 November 2006, Judge Corral adopted the Attorney General's
recommendations and issued international arrest warrants for seven
Iranians and one senior Hezbollah operative. The warrants were for the
upper echelons of the former Iranian government, including the former
President, Iranian diplomats posted to Buenos Aires and Imad
Moughnieh, head of Hezbollah's External Security Service and Hassan
Nasrallah's military deputy.


In March 2007, INTERPOL's Executive Committee, after considering
written submissions and oral presentations from Argentina and Iran in
connection with the 1994 bombing of the AMIA building in Buenos Aires
decided to endorse and adopt the conclusions of the report prepared by
INTERPOL's Office of Legal Affairs to the effect that Red Notices
should be issued for the following six individuals: Imad Fayez
Mughniyah, Ali Fallahijan, Mohsen Rabbani, Ahmad Reza Asghari, Ahmad
Vahidi and Mohsen Rezai. The Executive Committee also endorsed the
Office of Legal Affairs' conclusion that Red Notices should not be
issued for the former President of Iran, Ali Rafsanjany, the former
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati, or the former
Ambassador to Buenos Aires, Hadi Soleimanpour.[59] In November 2007,
delegates at the 76th INTERPOL General Assembly upheld the unanimous
decision made by the organisation's Executive Committee to publish six
of nine Red Notices requested in connection with the 1994 bombing of
the AMIA building in Buenos Aires.[60]


It has been sufficiently demonstrated that in his capacity as head of
Hezbollah's external security apparatus, Mughniyeh was the person who
received instructions from the Iranian Ministry of the Interior (after
the decision was made to carry out the attack) and that he implemented
these instructions by forming an operational group to carry it out.


It is interesting to analyse the Iranian reaction to Mughniyeh's
assassination in February 2008 in Damascus. The honours bestowed upon
the until then ‘invisible' Mughniyeh were outstanding: the Iranian
supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei hailedMughniyeh as a ‘great
man'; Ahmadinejhad called him a ‘source of pride for all believers';
heading a high-level Iranian delegation, Iran's Foreign Minister
Manouchehr Mottaki attended Mughniyeh's funeral in Beirut ‘to
commemorate the great hero' and expressed condolences ‘on behalf of
the Iranian government and people'. Mughniyeh was projected as an
Iranian hero who fought against Iraq and took part in several daring
operations behind Iraqi lines.[61]


Iranian leaders uttered harsh statements against Israel, stronger even
than Hezbollah's. The Iranian ambassador to Syria, Ahmad Moussavi,
warned that the death of Mughniyeh ‘will lead to an earthquake in the
Zionist regime'. Ali Akbar Mohtashamipur, a cofounder of Hezbollah and
current Secretary General of the International Committee for
Supporting the Palestinian People, claimed Mughniyeh's assassination
was a ‘prelude' to ‘very dangerous and major events in the next few
months'.[62]


Strangely, after the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki met
with senior Syrian officials in Damascus to discuss Mughniyeh's
assassination and announced a joint probe into the assassination, a
Syrian official dismissed the report as ‘totally baseless' and said
Damascus would conduct the investigation alone. The result has not yet
been made public, as it is immensely embarrassing for the Syrian
government to explain how this wanted terrorist was on its soil.


According to the investigation of Attorney General Alberto Nisman and
District Attorney Marcelo Martínez Burgos, numerous pieces of evidence
show that Argentina was infiltrated by Iran's intelligence service,
which in the mid 1980s began establishing a vast spy network that then
became a complete ‘intelligence service' that basically comprised: the
Iranian Embassy and its cultural attaché in Buenos Aires; extremist
elements that were associated with the Shiite mosques At-Tauhíd in
Floresta, Al Iman in Cañuelas and El Mártir in San Miguel de Tucumán;
the businesses referred to as ‘fronts' -GTC and Imanco-; and other
radicalised members of the Islamic community who were in Argentina for
the sole purpose of gathering the information and making the
arrangements that paved the way for the attack on AMIA on the morning
of 18 July 1994.[63] The situation seems to repeat itself today in
Venezuela and Bolivia, but this time with the active or passive
support of their governments, which are well aware of past
intelligence Iranian activity in the continent.


At the intelligence level, US officials say they are worried about the
possibility of terrorists and Iranian intelligence agents arriving on
the weekly flight between Caracas and Tehran. The State Department
charged in an April terrorism report that ‘passengers on these flights
were not subject to immigration and customs controls'.[64]


Bolivia's President Morales has ordered his Foreign Minister to lift
visa restrictions on Iranian citizens. The problem of visa-free
Iranian travel is the potential it affords for the creation of a
terrorist base of operations in the US's backyard. If anyone with an
Iranian passport can enter Bolivia without a visa or any further
documentation, the country will soon be open to covert officers of
Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security, its Islamic
Revolutionary Guard -which the State Department recently declared a
terrorist organisation- and the Quds Force, an Iranian military group
whose mandate is to spread Islamic revolution around the world.[65] A
further danger is if other Latin American countries follow the
Bolivian lead and lift visa restrictions. Iran has already proved what
it can do in Latin America with visa restrictions.


Hezbollah's Presence in Latin America and the Threat of Terrorism


Hezbollah's presence and nefarious activity in South America is well
documented. It was behind the two deadliest terrorist attacks in the
continent's history: the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish community
centre bombings in Buenos Aires, which took place in the early 1990s.
Hezbollah also established a significant presence in the ‘tri-border
area' (TBA, where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay converge) using
local businesses, drug trafficking and contraband networks to launder
funds for terrorist operations worldwide.[66]


Since 9/11, under US pressure, local governments in the tri-border
area and other countries, like Chile and Colombia, have monitored and
discovered part of the wide Hezbollah network active in the continent.
[67] However, despite the arrest of important activists in Paraguay,
Brazil and Chile, mainly for economic crimes or narcotics trafficking,
this large Hezbollah network continues to be active on the continent.
[68]


Increased focus on the TBA after Hezbollah-linked bombings in Buenos
Aires and again after the September 11 attacks in the US led to an
increased understanding of Hezbollah's fundraising operations, but
also led Hezbollah to shift them to other Latin American countries,
making their location, nature and extent largely unknown.[69]


Ecuador


Evidence linking Hezbollah to the emergence of Islamic mosques in
Ecuador, that promote radical religious views consistent with
Hezbollah's ideology, indicates that it recognises the need to
increase its ideological support base in Ecuador. Hezbollah's
promotion of radical religious ideology in Ecuador is consistent with
its organisational use of radical ideology to increase its legitimacy
by mitigating any sources of opposition from members of its radical
constituency in response to increased participation in the Lebanese
political system. This relationship specifically identifies diasporas
as strategically valuable to terrorist operations and results in
several important policy implications for their treatment by host-
nations determined to combat terrorist operations.[70]


In June 2005 Ecuadorean police broke up an international cocaine ring
led by a Lebanese restaurant owner suspected of raising money for
Hezbollah. The Lebanese ringleader, Rady Zaiter, had organised a large
narco-terrorist infrastructure using his Arab food restaurant in
northern Quito as a front. The Ecuadorean investigation led to related
arrests of 19 people in Brazil and the US.[71]


Colombia


In 2001, the Colombian Technical Investigation Corps (CTI) arrested a
Lebanese businessman, named Mohammed Ali Farhad, with ties to
Hizbollah for managing a US$650 million cigarette smuggling and money
laundering operation between Ipiales, Colombia, and ports in Ecuador.
The Farhad investigation established a link with a Hezbollah-backed
money-laundering operation run by Eric and Alexander Mansur, through
the Mansur Free Zone Trading Company NV129.[72]


On 21 October 2008 US and Colombian investigators dismantled an
international cocaine smuggling and money laundering ring that
allegedly used part of its profits to finance Hezbollah. The
authorities arrested at least 36 suspects, including a Lebanese
linchpin in Bogota, Chekry Harb, who used the alias ‘Taliban'. The
authorities accused Harb of being a ‘world-class money launderer'
whose ring washed hundreds of millions of dollars a year, from Panama
to Hong Kong, while paying a percentage to Hezbollah. The suspects
allegedly worked with a Colombian cartel and a paramilitary group to
smuggle cocaine to the US, Europe and the Middle East. Harb travelled
extensively to Lebanon, Syria and Egypt and was in phone contact with
Hezbollah members.[73]


Venezuela


According to the Los Angeles Times, a credible intelligence source
claimed that Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guard of Iran have formed
terrorist cells to kidnap Jews in South America and smuggle them to
Lebanon. The source alleged that Venezuelans have been recruited at
Caracas' airport to provide information about Jewish travellers.[74]


In June 2008 the US Treasury Department froze the assets of two
Venezuelans after having designated them as Hezbollah supporters and
accusing them of raising funds for the organisation. Ghazi Nasr al
Din, a Venezuelan diplomat of Lebanese ancestry, is accused of using
his position at embassies in the Middle East to raise funds for
Hezbollah and of discussing ‘operational issues with senior officials'
of the militia. In late January 2006, Nasr al Din facilitated the
travel of two Hezbollah representatives at the Lebanese Parliament to
Caracas to solicit donations and to announce the opening of a
Hezbollah-sponsored community centre and office in Venezuela. He is
currently assigned to Venezuela's Embassy in Lebanon. The second
Venezuelan noted by the Treasury Department is Fawzi Kanan, a Caracas-
based travel agent. He is also alleged to have facilitated travel for
Hezbollah members and to have discussed ‘possible kidnappings and
terrorist attacks' with senior Hezbollah officials in Lebanon.[75]
Instead of opening an investigation, Chávez said that the world was
using the allegations to ‘ make a move' against him. The Venezuelan
Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro lashed out at the US: ‘If they want to
search for terrorists, look for them in the White House'.[76]


A Kuwaiti newspaper reported that Hezbollah was training young
Venezuelans in military camps in south Lebanon to prepare them for
attacking American targets.[77] It was reported a few months later
that the Venezuelan Minister of the Interior, Tarek El Aissami, was
working directly with Ghazi Nasr al-Din to recruit young Venezuelans
of Arab descent that were supportive of the Chávez regime to train in
Lebanon with Hezbollah. Reportedly, the purpose was to prepare these
youths for asymmetric warfare against the US in the event of a
confrontation. According to this report, Hezbollah also established
training camps inside Venezuela, complete with ammunition and
explosives, courtesy of El Aissami.[78]


Chávez, meanwhile, is perhaps the most open apologist for Hezbollah in
the hemisphere. During the Israel-Hezbollah War of 2006, Chávez
withdrew the Venezuelan ambassador to Israel. He later accused Israel
of conducting its defensive war in ‘the fascist manner of Hitler'.
After making the comments on al-Jazeera television, Chávez returned
home and continued to malign Israel on his weekly television
broadcast, Aló Presidente.[79]


It comes as no surprise that Hezbollah's director of international
relations, Nawaf Musawi, attended an April 2008 ceremony at
Venezuela's Embassy in Beirut commemorating the sixth anniversary of
the defeat of the anti-Chávez uprising in Venezuela. As an invited
speaker, Musawi praised the survival of President Chávez' Bolivarian
Revolution while denouncing the US and ‘other powers that try to
defeat the sovereignty and free will of the combative peoples of the
world'.[80]

Tive que dividir o post por limitação de caracteres. Continuando:

‘Hezbollah América Latina'


Probably the most striking and worrying trend has been the appearance
in 2006 of a strange group calling itself ‘Hezbollah América Latina',
claiming to be active in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador and
Mexico. Actually, the organisation's backbone seemed to be ‘Hezbollah
Venezuela', led by one Teodoro Rafael Darnott who pretended to lead
the Latin American ‘network'. They presented themselves also as a
group of converted Wayuu Indians, Autonomía Islamica Wayuu, and issued
a strategic statement titled ‘The Jihad in America will Begin in
2007'. This ‘organisation' has been analysed in detail by this author
and the Spanish researcher Manuel Torres Soriano.[81]


‘Hezbollah Venezuela' Case Study: The True (?) Story
On 23 October 2006, José Miguel Rojas Espinoza, a 26-year-old student
of the state-run Bolivarian University, was arrested after the Baruta
Municipality police found two explosive devices near the US Embassy in
Caracas, Venezuela. One of the bombs was found in a box containing
leaflets making reference to the Lebanese Hezbollah, while the other
device was found outside a school, near the diplomatic premises.
According to the local police, the idea was apparently to create alarm
and publicise a message by scattering the pamphlets. It is possible
that the second device was intended to explode near the Israeli
Embassy but the suspect became nervous and dropped it near the US
Embassy.


‘Hezbollah Latin America' claimed responsibility for the attack on its
website and promised it would stage other attacks, with the same goal
of publicising the organisation. The website presented Rojas as ‘the
brother mujahedeen, the first example of dignity and struggle in the
cause of Allah, the first prisoner of the revolutionary Islamic
movement Hezbollah Venezuela'. Already on 18 August 2006 the
organisation threatened to explode a non-lethal device against an ally
of the US in a Latin American city in order to launch its propaganda
campaign. ‘Hezbollah Venezuela' would see this as the beginning of its
war against imperialism and Zionism and to show its solidarity with
the Lebanese Hezbollah after the July war in Lebanon.


The leader of ‘Hezbollah Venezuela', Teodoro Darnott, traces the
origins of the organisation to a small Marxist faction called ‘The
Guaicaipuro Movement for National Liberation' (Proyecto Movimiento
Guaicaipuro por la Liberación Nacional, MGLN)", which struggled
against the oppression of the poor, indigenous peasants in the Valle
de Caracas region. Darnott presented himself as Commander Teodoro, in
a clear imitation of Subcomandante Marcos, the Mexican guerrilla
leader in Chiapas. According to this account, the MGLN did not
withstand the pressure of the security forces and was forced to
retreat to Colombia. The group returned after five years to Venezuela
to convert into Hezbollah, without a clear explanation for its
metamorphosis. Darnott denied any link between ‘Hezbollah Venezuela'
and the Lebanese Hezbollah. Indeed, the religious and ideological
foundations of his documents are very poor and superficial.


In his article, Soriano emphasises the group's leftist revolutionary
background and rhetoric. Soriano considers that the group has a
significant synergy with the so-called Bolivarian revolution in
Venezuela. In one of its ideological editorials, the group expresses
enormous respect and positive appreciation for the achievements of
Hugo Chávez's regime: ‘Hezbollah América Latina respects the
Venezuelan revolutionary process, supports the policies of this
process concerning the social benefices for the poor and the anti-
Zionist and anti-American policy of this revolution'. However, the
group does not accept a socialist ideology, not because it opposes it,
but because Hezbollah's ideology is ‘theocratic and obeys divine
rules'. Therefore, for a new Venezuela to emerge, the revolution
should aspire ‘to the divine and the moral' and should firmly support
Hezbollah ‘political-military project'.[82]


On 2 November 2006 ‘Hezbollah Venezuela' announced, ‘out of respect
for the revolution and its leader', that it would suspend its
activities until after the elections of 3 December 2006, the day of
the presidential elections in Venezuela, a show of solidarity with the
regime and an attempt not to hamper it during the last days of the
election campaign.


Several weeks later Teodoro Darnott was arrested in Maracaibo, and
practically nothing was published by the Venezuelan authorities about
his fate. Until recently this ‘episode' in the short history of
‘Hezbollah Latin America' had not allowed the drawing of any clear
conclusions regarding the group's real characteristics and goals and
its relationship with the Lebanese Hezbollah.


However, in December 2008 Teodoro Darnott and José Miguel Rojas were
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for their terrorist attack against
the US Embassy,[83] and here begins the surprise. In October 2008
Darnott opened a blog, apparently from prison, in which he described
his religious and political beliefs and presented, apologetically, his
past activity.[84] He described himself as a mujahedeen
‘criollo' (born in Latin America of European descent) with the new
name of Teodoro Abdullah.


Darnott no longer presents himself as the leader of ‘Hezbollah
Venezuela', but as a theocratic political-religious leader, ambassador
and precursor of theocracy for Latin America. His very simplistic,
primitive ideas propose for the continent, and for Venezuela, a
theocratic nation, society and way of life and a new culture and
civilisation of the divine. For him, ‘Hezbollah Venezuela' -along with
Osama bin Laden and other mujahedeen- are not terrorists but jihadists
fighting the US and the secular state of Israel, the defenders of the
abhorred capitalist order and democracy.


It is not the intention here to analyse Darnott's religious ‘world
view' but mainly to discover the political and operational reality
behind ‘Hezbollah Venezuela' and ‘Hezbollah América Latina' and the
links between this project and the Lebanese Hezbollah. For the first
time this endeavour is possible due to the publication by Darnott in
his blog of a 100-page biography.[85]


How Does it Work?


A detailed analysis of Darnott's biography provides an insight into
the process of radicalisation and cooption to the Hezbollah network in
Latin America. However, the document requires a more thorough study to
check and confront on the ground the large amount of information cited
about people and organisations.


Darnott's first contact with Islam was in Maicao, Colombia, where he
met a Lebanese Shia, Musa Rada, who taught him Islam. He began to
visit the local mosque and read theological books and the journal
Azakalain (sic). Rada proposed that he study Islam at the Kausar
Islamic Institute in Cali, Colombia. The Shia Association in Maicao
paid his travel expenses to Cali, where he was already expected. There
he was awaited by one Rashi, a leader of the Muslim community of
African descent. The Institute's Director was Abdul Karin, a
university professor.


Darnott describes the studies there as informal and without
discipline. He returned to Maicao with the intention of integrating
himself in the local Arab community. He continued his activities in
the framework of MGLN.


He was also in contact, through his companion Gerardo Ortiz Palencia
with the guerrilla organisation FARC-EP in the Cúcuta region, under
the leadership of Comandante Rodrigo, active in the Norte de Santander
department, in Pamplona, Pamplonita and Cúcuta.


After visits to poor Muslim communities in Santa Marta and Cartagena
he decided to go to Bogotá, where he met a surgeon, Dr Juventino
Martínez, who introduced him to José Gabriel Jiménez, known as Yahia
(Juan).


According to Darnott, the Muslim community in Bogotá is made up of
various groups, including the Asociación Islámica de Bogotá, which
includes Palestinian, Lebanese and other Arab members. The second
group is La Sociedad Islámica de Bogotá, under the leadership of the
Colombian Imam Dr Carlos Sánchez and a Kuwaiti. According to
‘clandestine sources' the restaurant and free meals at this
organisation are financed by al-Qaeda, and therefore many Colombians
fear visiting it. The third group is the Centro Cultural Islámico de
Bogotá, under the leadership of Dr Julián Zapata.


When Dr Julián Zapata went to study in the Middle East, Dr Juventino
Martínez was appointed head of the Centro Cultural Islámico de Bogotá,
but soon the financial resources ‘disappeared' and the Centre was on
the verge of closing down.[86]


As he found no interest in Bogotá for his ‘liberation struggle
project' for the Wayuu people, Darnott travelled to Bucaramanga,
Santander. There he was approached by the Roman Catholic Bishop,
Alfredo Vesgas, who proposed that he become a priest in the Guajira
diocese. He accepted, as this served as a cover for his clandestine
activities. At the same time, under the influence of a ‘revolutionary'
priest, Padre Chucho, he finally found the ‘one and true God', the God
of liberation and salvation.


He continued his studies of Islam and theology at the local mosque in
Maicao and through the Internet and developed an ‘Islamo-Christian
theology of liberation', a mixture of the theologies of Imam Khomeni
and Gustavo Gutiérrez.[87]


It was then, according to Darnott, that he really converted to Islam
and the first thing he did was to change the symbols and messages of
the MGLN, which became the Autonomía Islámica Wayuu (Wayuu Islamic
Autonomy). Some accepted the changes while others left the community,
but the move fostered closer links with other Islamic entities and
many Muslims joined the movement, which called itself ‘revolutionary
Islamic' and accepted the messages of ayatollah Khomeini.


One day, a certain Nik made contact with Darnott, and after a period
of discussions and e-mail exchanges, the man disclosed that his real
name was Mohamed Saleh, of Lebanese origin, who worked as a professor
at the University of La Plata in Argentina.


Saleh told Darnott that he was working for the Iranian government,
that he was an important member of Hezbollah in Argentina and at the
same time the leader of Hizbul Islam for Latin America, an Islamic
party present in Uruguay and Paraguay. According to Darnott, Hizbul
Islam is actually Hezbollah. His Arab friends in Maicao confirmed that
Mohamed Saleh was a professor at the Universidad de la Plata and a
member of Hezbollah.


Saleh informed Darnott that the leadership of Hizbul Islam had
approved his nomination as its representative in Venezuela, but on
condition that he renounced all his work on the Internet. From
Darnott's point of view this meant renouncing to four years of
intensive professional revolutionary work on the web.


Mohamed Saleh frequently called Darnott to his Maicao phone number
during the last six months of 2006. They exchanged e-mails and in one
message Saleh proposed passing on weapons that Hezbollah had in
Paraguay: 400 Kalashnikovs, bazookas and ammunition. FARC-EP was
supposed to help transfer the weapons to Colombia.


The agreement stipulated that the MGLN would be transformed into a
Hezbollah cell into which Muslims would be recruited. The first
meeting with Mohamed Saleh was planned for 2 October 2006, after which
‘Hezbollah Venezuela' became an organised group under the orders of
the organisation's council in Latin America. He did not provide
Darnott with any further details but informed him that the
organisation was responsible for bombing the AMIA building in
Argentina.

Darnott describes in great detail his organisational work in Guajira
to form ‘Hezbollah Venezuela', the persons involved, the rivalries and
betrayals. He stresses the importance of the work on the Internet for
recruiting and propaganda and the fact that the Second Lebanon War
gave a lot of publicity to his ‘organisation'. He candidly notes that
the protests by Jewish organisations against his threats and the media
attention it received helped enhance the group's visibility and
outreach.


Finally, as regards the failed bombing at the US Embassy, Darnott
claims that although he new about the planning he did not support it
and accuses the perpetrators of lack of ‘professionalism'. Actually,
his declaration of jihad, his threat to attack US and Jewish targets
and the bombing itself were intended to give publicity to his ideas,
to serve as ‘loud speakers' to divulge his ideas and organisation. In
the end, however, he does not explain the Lebanese Hezbollah's role in
the group's ‘military' activity and what happened to their
relationship after the failed terrorist attack.


What made ‘Hezbollah Venezuela' worthy of attention was the timing of
its activities. It became visible at a time when ‘the strange liaison'
between Hugo Chávez and the Iranian President Ahmadinejad had become
an item of international interest.[88] Moreover, despite the long
detention of Darnott and Rojas and the information the Venezuelan
security forces already had about the group, the government did not
provide any details about who is really behind the network.


Teodoro Rafael Darnott, probably in jail, recently threatened the US
saying that ‘If the United States were to attack Iran, the only
country ruled by God, we would counterattack in Latin America and even
inside the United States itself. We have the means and we know how to
go about it. We will sabotage the transportation of oil from Latin
America to the US You have been warned'.[89]


Hezbollah Argentina


The current Argentine government is unsympathetic to radical
organisations or regimes, but there are many active groups and
movements of the radical right and left in the country which have
often expressed anti-Semitic, anti-Israeli and anti-US views. The
difficulties in the long investigation and prosecution of the
terrorist bombings of the Israeli Embassy and AMIA building, which at
times involved the arrest and trial of rightist or corrupt people,
bear witness to the tolerance of such radical activities.


A past analysis of ‘Hezbollah Argentina' showed a strikingly different
picture from that of ‘Hezbollah Venezuela'. While the Venezuelan group
is based on indigenous Wayuu Indians with a strong leftist background
and revolutionary rhetoric, the Argentine group seems to include
radical rightist mixed with leftist populist elements; the two trends
have very close relations with the local Arab Shia community and the
Iranian regime.[90] The rightist influence is clear in the publication
of some of the most anti-Semitic, anti-Israeli and anti-American texts
of Norberto Ceresole, the same whose pamphlets were published in the
Islam-Shia website. Ceresole made contact with the Iranian regime
immediately after the bombing of the Jewish AMIA building in 1994 and
visited Iran and Lebanon. Ceresole considered Iran, since the Khomeini
revolution, to be ‘the centre of resistance to Jewish aggression' and
the only state that has supplanted ‘the secular Arab resistance' in
fighting the Jewish State.


The more popular leftist trend is present in the group's cooperation
with Quebracho, a small Argentine militant group. The Patriotic
Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Patriótico Revolucionario, MPR, or
Quebracho) claims to be a political organisation fighting for ‘a
socially just, economically independent and politically sovereign
country' for the ‘National Antiimperialist Revolution'. Quebracho
militants refuse to define themselves as leftist or rightist. They
consider themselves ‘revolutionary patriots' in the framework of the
Latin American liberation struggle.


The Islamic Association of Argentina mainly consists of converts to
Shiism (while there are few Argentines who convert to Sunnism) and
cooperates closely with the Iranian Embassy. The Association and its
religious leader, Sheikh Abdala Madani, clearly identify themselves
with the Iranian regime. The link appeared on their website and
Khomeini posters are carried at every anti-Israel demonstration.


Things have not changed much in Argentina. If one looks at information
and photos in the media covering the July 2006 march in Buenos Aires
in solidarity with the Palestinian people, just days before bigger pro-
Hezbollah manifestations were staged during the Second Lebanon War,
the same Iranian-sponsored and linked groups appear: Organización
Islámica Argentina (OIA), Mezquita At-Tauhid, Asociación Argentino
Islámica (La Plata), Mezquita Ash-Shahid (Tucumán), Mezquita Al-Imam
(Cañuelas) and the leader of the Asociación Argentino Islámica, Sheikh
Abdala Madani. To be sure, Ayatollah Khomeini's portrait is ubiquitous.
[91]


Hezbollah and the Anti-globalisation Movement


On 17-19 September 2004 activists held an ‘International Strategy
Meeting' in Beirut under the title ‘Where Next for the Global Anti-War
and Anti-Globalisation Movements?'. The Beirut conference emerged from
a process that began at a May 2003 antiwar conference in Jakarta and
continued at an antiwar assembly at the Mumbai World Social Forum in
January 2004. The main conveners included Focus on the Global South
(Thailand), a ‘key player in the global movement', and the Civilian
Campaign for Protection of Palestinian People (France). The rest of
the working group that organised the conference hailed from Argentina,
South Africa, Japan, France, Nicaragua, India, the Philippines, Italy,
Brazil, Greece, the UK and the US, reflecting the broadly
international and south-weighted character of the initiative. Some 300
individuals from 50 countries participated in the conference,
representing various antiwar coalitions, social movements, NGOs and
other groups.[92]


The Arab sponsors (the Lebanese Welcoming Committee) included
‘progressives, seculars, and Islamists', such as Hezbollah, the
Lebanese Communist Party and the Progressive Socialist Party of the
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. Joining them were activists from Syria,
Egypt, and Morocco and Palestinian areas as well as a delegation of
Iraqis. The decision to hold the meeting in the Middle East was part
of a conscious effort to build closer links with antiwar and anti-
corporate globalisation activists in the region.


Hezbollah is not known for its antiwar or antiglobalisation stance and
had never before participated in such a conference. It was invited
because a group of radical Italian leftists insisted. Hezbollah was
described at the conference as ‘one of the leading welcoming
organisations [and] an example of successful, targeted and organised
resistance'. Ali Fayad, member of Hezbollah's Central Council and
Chairman of the Academic Centre for Documentation, stressed that
Islam's message is one of unity and collaboration, not division, and
that the conference was held in Beirut because Lebanon's resistance
‘defeated the Reagan project for the Middle East in the 1980s... [and]
liberated the land from occupation'.


It seems that Hezbollah decided to jump on the antiglobalisation
bandwagon at a sensitive moment in the war on terror and the situation
in Iraq -both fragile, explosive situations that could decide the
course of future events in the Middle East-.


Four years after the first Beirut anti-globalisation conference, and
during Israel's ‘Cast Lead' operation against Hamas violence from
Gaza, Hezbollah clearly took the lead and sponsored a similar
gathering. Dr Ali Fayyad, the Director of the Consultative Centre for
Studies and Documentation in Beirut, who hosted the Beirut Forum, laid
out its goals: ‘In this part of the world the resistance is Islamic.
The resistance movement here must introduce themselves to other forces
of resistance to imperialism around the world. The ideological
differences must be postponed. The resistance must prevail... An
important goal of the forum is how, despite the ideological
contradictions, to find how to work together hand in hand to achieve
unity against imperialism'.[93]


The Beirut International Forum for Resistance, Anti-Imperialism,
Solidarity between Peoples and Alternatives, held from 16 to 18
January 2009, assembled 400 delegates from all continents. The largest
number of delegates came from the Arab world, including the Ba'ath and
Communist Parties of Syria and Iran, but there were also many from
Latin America, including 30 from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
Guests from Venezuela comprised members of parliament, unionists and
youth from both the United Socialist Party (PSUV) and the Communist
Party of Venezuela (PCV).[94]


A prime organiser of the conference was Mohamed Kassem, a leader of
the Lebanese teachers' union. ‘For the first time, in Lebanon', he
said, ‘we have created a platform for struggling people all over the
world, secular, nationalist, leftist and Islamic to speak their views
and work together, against the wars in Palestine, Iraq and
Afghanistan, against the threats to Iran and the sanctions on Sudan,
against the blockade of Cuba and the attempts to block the
revolutionary direction in Venezuela, Bolivia and across Latin
America... We are building mechanisms of international cooperation and
South-South solidarity, and we plan to intensify those efforts in the
future'. This Forum, where Latin America, Asia and the Near East were
strongly represented, embodied the spirit of the Tri-continental.[95]


The final declaration of the conference, besides the usual anti-
Israeli and anti-American resolutions, related to specific Latin
American issues. It saluted ‘Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez as well
as Bolivian President Evo Morales for their support for the peoples'
resistance' and expressed ‘total support with the struggle of these
two leaders against any intervention of the United States in Latin
America'. It called for the lifting of the blockade on Cuba and the
release of Cuban prisoners held in US prisons and it condemned ‘the
alliance between the USA and the neofascist government of Colombia
that for four decades has terrorized its own people and worked to
destabilize the progressive governments of Latin America' and declared
‘their support to the revolutionary movements in struggle against this
regime'.[96]


In the opening session Hezbollah's Deputy Secretary Sheik Naim Kassem
‘captured the common spirit of the assembly: Today there are only two
camps in the world. The one of US imperialism and its allies and the
other one of the resistances; regardless of their ideological,
cultural or religious affiliation. The resistances must be unified
against its common enemy. This is only possible by respecting the
diversity of the resistance movements'.


Although planned long ahead of the war in Gaza, the entire event was
marked by a ‘profound support of the Palestinian resistance struggle
in Gaza'. Nobody, not even the forces present from non-Islamic
countries, used Hamas' leadership of the resistance in Gaza as a
pretext to reject support for the resistance, as had been common in
the past. However, notes a radical leftist reporter, ‘[c]areful
participants of the Beirut Forum could notice a certain wariness to
lend the same support to the Iraqi and Afghan resistance as they do
for Palestine. This wariness is due to the interests of Iran as a
regional power; interests which do conflict with these resistances.
Given Iran's record of support to the Iraqi regime installed by the US
occupiers the message by the Iranian president to the forum rightly
denouncing the Arab regimes which follow Israeli and US interest as
traitors appears somewhat vapid'.[97]


A representative of the Turkish conservative Islamist group Ozgur Der
at the Beirut Forum asked the participants to reach and build bridges
of understanding between opposition forces; to ‘globalise activist
networks from IT workers to European Muslim minorities, from Gaza to
local activists of Vancouver, from suburbs of Somalia to poor people
of Harlem, from oppressed Kurdish people of Turkey to mine workers of
Nigeria, from EZLN of Mexico to MNLF of Philippines, from HAMAS to
European left, from Venezuela to Iran'.[98]


Again and again, the importance of the Venezuelan link to Iran and its
‘revolutionary' global role was stressed during this multi-national
radical forum. Although the reports spoke of ‘many participants from
Latin America', according to the list of 100 adherents to the event
only Venezuela was represented, possibly by some 30 people from ‘De
Primera Mano Venezuela', ‘Azequiel Zamora Venezuela' and ‘APORREAR
Venezuela' groups.[99]


According to an official report of the Venezuelan Ministry of Popular
Power for Communication and Information, the Grupo Parlamentario
Venezolano del Parlamento Latinoamericano (Parlatino, GPVPL) ‘actively
participated' in the Beirut Forum. Deputies of the GPVPL, such as
Víctor Chirinos, Carolus Winmer, Víctor Hugo Morales, Yul Jabour and
Vidal Cisneros, participated in the ‘event of solidarity to the
Palestinian people and against the genocide committed by the Israeli
army'.


Carolus Wimmer, Vice-president of the GPVPL and Secretary for
International Relations of the Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV),
hailed the support given at the conference to President Chávez for his
‘courageous' decision to sever diplomatic relations between Venezuela
and Israel, asked all the ‘progressive' governments around the world
to follow Venezuela's and Bolivia's example in this and asked for an
oil embargo against Israel and the expulsion of the Jewish state from
the United Nations.


Conclusions


This long paper gives a glimpse of the extensive Iranian and Hezbollah
presence and activity in Latin America. The problem with this presence
and activity is that it goes beyond the normal political, economic,
social and cultural levels and creeps into the dangerous area of
terrorism and subversion, threatening not only outside actors and
interests but possibly the very stability of the host countries.


It is evident that Iran's political and strategic standing in Latin
America strengthens the Tehran regime and diminishes the possibility
of UN-backed international diplomatic and economic pressure to
convince it to renounce its nuclear project. Thus, indirectly at
least, it enhances the threat of Iran's nuclear hegemonic projection
vis-à-vis the moderate Arab states, with all that this means for the
stability of the Middle East, the stability of oil prices and nuclear
proliferation to other states in the region. The Bolivian decision to
move its Embassy from Cairo to Tehran is one small move in this
direction.


The proved Iranian and Hezbollah involvement in the worst terrorist
attacks on the continent, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, is a bad omen
for the future. In the event of Iran's vital interests -such as the
survival of its nuclear project- being threatened by the international
community, by the US alone or by Israel, Latin America would be a
preferred ground for retaliation, directly or with Hezbollah's
support.


The Hezbollah leadership could decide, based on its practical immunity
in the past, that to avenge the death of the arch-terrorist Imad
Mughniyeh or some serious incident on the border with Israel would be
easy in Latin America. Recently it became known that such attempts
have been foiled in Azerbaijan and in an unnamed European country.


In the longer term, exporting radical Shiite ideological and religious
teaching could serve to influence large sectors of society, especially
the poorest and most deprived, and thus add another element of
instability and radicalisation in a continent already plagued by socio-
economic hardship. Growing anti-Semitism, as witnessed lately in
Venezuela, could add to the existing sectarian turmoil in some
countries.


And what if Iran were to decide to deploy its long-range missiles in
Venezuela at the request of President Chávez, if he were to feel
threatened? Given Chávez's invitation to the Russian Navy to visit his
country, such a nightmarish scenario might be possible.


**Dr. Ely Karmon is Senior Research Scholar at the International
Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) and The Institute for Policy and
Strategy (IPS) at The Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzlyia, Israel


Right SideNews (Estados Unidos)

terra.com.br

ONU tenta programar retirada de Israel de aldeia libanesa


O vice-secretário-geral da ONU para as operações da manutenção de paz, Alain Le Roy, afirmou nesta segunda que não há data fixada para que Israel se retire da parte libanesa da aldeia de Ghajar.

"A Força Interina das Nações Unidas para o Líbano (Finul) está falando com as autoridades israelenses sobre como Israel deve se retirar, mas nenhuma data foi fixada até agora", afirmou Le Roy em entrevista coletiva em Nakura, onde as forças da ONU possuem um quartel-general.

A imprensa israelense destacou que o primeiro-ministro Benjamin Netanyahu examinará na quarta-feira a possibilidade de se retirar de Ghajar.

Esta localidade está dividida pela linha azul marcada pela ONU para certificar a retirada israelense do sul do Líbano em 2000 após 22 anos de ocupação.

Israel se retirou da parte libanesa de Ghajar em 2000, mas voltou a ocupar a área durante o conflito registrado entre julho e agosto de 2006.

"A resolução 1701 do Conselho de Segurança da ONU afirma de modo categórico que Israel deve se retirar de uma parte da aldeia de Ghajar e das áreas adjacentes ao norte. Não há dúvidas a respeito", acrescentou.

Ele lembrou que, no ano passado, as duas partes receberam uma proposta nesse sentido.

Le Roy viajará a Israel nos próximos dias para alcançar uma solução para esta questão.

"Espero que cheguemos em breve a um acordo, com base na proposta da Finul, que facilitará a retirada israelense de acordo com a resolução 1701", que colocou fim ao conflito de 2006.

Não sei se este topico é adequado para a noticia que eu vou postar, mas se não for, me perdoem o offtopic...

Base turca de Incirlik ganha importância estratégica para os EUA

Nicolas Bourcier
Enviado especial a Incirlik, Ancara (Turquia)


Nenhum avião de combate, nem um único remanejamento de tropas há meses. Incirlik, a gigantesca base militar turca utilizada parcialmente há mais de meio século pela aeronáutica americana, parece bem calma, junto de Adana, populosa metrópole do sul do país.

Menos de meia dúzia de aviões cargueiros da US Air Force esperam, com os compartimentos abertos, suas cargas. Mesmo a piscina, os campos de golfe e de beisebol parecem abandonados ao sol triunfante. Longe das altas grades, entre as avenidas residenciais bem cuidadas, somente um Starbucks recém-instalado e o edifício central de comando remetem à imagem de uma certa atividade.

"Faz algum tempo que meu telefone não toca mais", reconhece Philip McDaniel, um cinquentão robusto e descontraído. Coronel encarregado das operações americanas da base, ele se apressa para acrescentar em um sorriso que diz muito sobre ele: "Mas eu sei que falam de Incirlik nas altas esferas". Uma forma de evocar à sua maneira a hipótese de um retorno ao primeiro plano desse local altamente estratégico para os Estados Unidos, e utilizado, diversas vezes, como um formidável meio de pressão diplomática pelos homens fortes de Ancara.

A visita à capital turca, no início de março, da secretária de Estado Hillary Clinton, e a recente viagem de dois dias do presidente Barack Obama, considerada um sucesso por todos os comentaristas, trouxeram à tona o papel central que Ancara pode exercer na nova política regional americana. Missões de mediações com o Irã, Israel, Síria e Geórgia; encontros tripartites com os chefes de Estado afegão e paquistanês: os turcos, após os anos de tensões ligadas à administração Bush, avançam sobre a cena internacional munidos da aprovação dos americanos. Sobretudo, o aliado da Otan poderá ser chamado para representar uma divisão maior no Iraque e no Afeganistão. "São apostas para as quais compartilhamos objetivos comuns", garante-se à embaixada americana em Ancara.

A retirada programada das tropas do Iraque foi saudada com unanimidade pelos dirigentes turcos. E o reforço das unidades americanas no Afeganistão poderá ser acompanhado em seguida de um aumento do número de especialistas e de militares turcos na região. Dois teatros de operações onde "Incirlik continuará a exercer um papel importante", acrescenta com uma frase vaga, a fonte americana, antes de dizer: "Especialmente pelo Iraque, essa base continua sendo vital para nossas operações".

Construída pelos EUA nas primeiras horas da guerra fria em razão de sua localização ideal para seus bombardeios - um céu limpo o ano inteiro, um raio de ação que cobre todo o Oriente Médio e distante somente 1.600 km de Moscou -, Incirlik não parou de aumentar seu perímetro de intervenção. É daqui que veio o apoio aéreo para a expansão militar americana no Líbano durante a crise do verão de 1958. Foi aqui que os famosos aviões espiões U2 ficaram camuflados por muito tempo. Foi aqui também que o exército americano estocou, segundo diferentes ONGs, ogivas nucleares - 90 bombas B 61, de acordo com as últimas estimativas. "Assunto sobre o qual não me pronunciarei", interrompe, com seu sorriso imutável, o coronel McDaniel.

Mas é a partir da primeira guerra do Golfo (1990-1991) que a base ganhou sua fama na região. Transformada em quartel-general do exército americano, Incirlik se impôs como a rampa de lançamento das principais ofensivas militares e missões de bombardeio. Capaz de gerar duas operações simultaneamente, o local também serve de ponto de rotação para encaminhar ajuda humanitária aos curdos iraquianos.

Após a interdição de sobrevoo do norte do Iraque imposto em 1991 no regime de Bagdá, mais de 50% das missões americanas no mundo gravitam, segundo a revista "Air Force Times", pela Turquia. Um papel-chave que forçará Osama Bin Laden a posicionar a base entre os alvos de sua organização, a Al Qaeda.

A invasão iraquiana, lançada pela administração Bush, manchará por muito tempo as relações entre Washington e Ancara. Em março de 2003, os deputados turcos proibiram os soldados americanos de andarem sobre o solo do país. Seis meses de duras negociações foram necessários para que o governo contornasse o voto do Parlamento e autorizasse os Estados Unidos "enquanto aliados" a utilizarem Incirlik para facilitar o abastecimento das tropas.

Isso não impediu que a base se tornasse, segundo a expressão de Frank Hyland, ex-agente da CIA e atualmente especialista na Jamestown Foundation, "refém" de Ancara.

Burocracias administrativas, autorizações de sobrevoo do território concedidas a conta-gotas... em 2007, os turcos ameaçaram retirar seu apoio logístico se o Congresso americano adotasse um texto classificando como genocídio os massacres dos armênios perpetrados sob o Império Otomano, no início do século 20. Robert Gates, o atual secretário de Estado da Defesa, que ocupou esse posto durante esse período, se opôs então à resolução, invocando "as implicações consideráveis" para as operações militares americanas em caso de represálias.

O voto foi rejeitado. No mesmo ano, após novas pressões, o presidente George Bush aceitou fornecer informações em tempo real sobre a localização de rebeldes curdos do Partido dos Trabalhadores do Curdistão (PKK) obtida graças aos voos de vigilância no norte do Iraque.

"Agora esse jogo acabou", garantem os especialistas militares americanos em Incirlik e Ancara. "A lua de mel entre os EUA e a Turquia poderá fazer de Incirlik um dos símbolos desse renascimento", segue na mesma linha Lale Sariibrahimoglu, especialista em questões de defesa do jornal "Taraf". "Ainda que o transporte de armas e de soldados americanos continue sendo mal visto pela opinião pública turca, quem verá o carregamento dos aviões fora os militares turcos?"

Para Selin Bölme, doutoranda sobre Incirlik na Universidade de Ancara, a importância da base também deverá ser confirmada a partir da retirada da maior parte das tropas americanas do Iraque, em agosto de 2010. "No caso de uma degradação da situação ou de um imprevisto na região, ela oferece a resposta mais rápida e menos custosa", ela afirma. "As bases alemãs são distantes e caras. Os locais americanos alternativos como aqueles do Iraque ou do Cáucaso não possuem nem seu potencial, nem sua confiabilidade".

Por enquanto, 50% dos aviões de carga militares com destino ao Iraque passam por Incirlik. A cada dia, de seis a oito imponentes C-17 decolam das longas pistas da base. Dois deles partem para o Afeganistão, segundo os números divulgados pelo coronel McDaniel. "É um pouco menos para o Iraque do que um tempo atrás", ele sussurra, "e um pouco mais para o terreno afegão". Como em eco de uma tendência que se anuncia.

Tradução: Lana Lim

Le Monde - Uol Noticias

Brasil apóia egípcio polêmico contra brasileiros

De Eliane Oliveira:

Mesmo com dois brasileiros no páreo, o Brasil apoiará oficialmente o egípcio Farouk Hosni para o cargo de diretor-geral da Organização das Nações Unidas para a Educação, a Ciência e a Cultura (Unesco). Foram preteridos o diretor-adjunto da Unesco, Marcio Barbosa - com grandes chances de ganhar a eleição, prevista para setembro -, e o senador Cristovam Buarque (PDT-DF).

A opção por Hosni foi confirmada ontem pelo Itamaraty, que, na avaliação de aliados do governo, estaria desagradando não apenas à comunidade científica nacional, mas a parceiros importantes, como EUA, Rússia, México, Argentina, França, Índia e China, que já teriam declarado apoio ao brasileiro Barbosa. Os EUA, recentemente, vetaram o nome do Hosni, devido a seu discurso antissemita. Os franceses, que antes haviam escolhido o egípcio, retiraram seu apoio.

- Sinto-me frustrado - afirmou Barbosa ao GLOBO, por telefone, de Paris.

Ex-diretor do Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (Inpe), Barbosa conta com mais de 20 votos.

Segundo funcionários do governo e parlamentares que acompanham sua trajetória, um de seus méritos foi levar de volta à Unesco, junto com o atual diretor-geral do organismo, o japonês Koichiro Matsuura, os EUA, afastados desde meados da década de 80.

Barbosa e Cristovam foram avisados da decisão pelo próprio chanceler Celso Amorim, semana passada. Um dos argumentos, relatou o senador, foi que o Brasil vem procurando manter boas relações com países árabes. O apoio a Hosni seria fundamental nessa estratégia.

http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/noblat/

E dá-lhe PT e LULA, que só fodem com o Brasil.
Essa ta sendo uma das piores (se não a pior) políticas externa do Brasil nos últimos tempos.
Obter um acento na ONU é de fato mais importante do que a Unesco, mais não pode simplesmente deixar de colocar um brasileiro como diretor-geral desse organismo, por que quer fazer média com os países árabes. Esse nosso governo só decepção.

rafafoz escreveu:E dá-lhe PT e LULA, que só fodem com o Brasil.
Essa ta sendo uma das piores (se não a pior) políticas externa do Brasil nos últimos tempos.
Obter um acento na ONU é de fato mais importante do que a Unesco, mais não pode simplesmente deixar de colocar um brasileiro como diretor-geral desse organismo, por que quer fazer média com os países árabes. Esse nosso governo só decepção.

Concordo integralmente no que você disse.

E acrescento mais, eu acho que infelismente os Brasileiros em geral são uma decepição...o povo Brasileiro é pouco nacionalista e isto se reflete no comportamento dos nossos politicos.

rafafoz escreveu:E dá-lhe PT e LULA, que só fodem com o Brasil.
Essa ta sendo uma das piores (se não a pior) políticas externa do Brasil nos últimos tempos.
Obter um acento na ONU é de fato mais importante do que a Unesco, mais não pode simplesmente deixar de colocar um brasileiro como diretor-geral desse organismo, por que quer fazer média com os países árabes. Esse nosso governo só decepção.

[X 3] Concordo plenamente também.

Coitado do Barão do Rio Branco... deve estar rolando na cova uma hora dessas!!!

Eu já falei sobre esta pífia politica externa do governo atual em outros tópicos e não vou repetir, mas queria dizer que TUDO o que ocorre de ruim à política externa de hoje tem um personagem central: MARCO AURÉLIO top-top GARCIA!

E tenho dito.

[]'s a todos.

O nosso time(país), tem uns atacantes muito ruins, más não perde por calsa do restante do time( diplomatas de carreira), que é muito bom.

ciclope escreveu:O nosso time(país), tem uns atacantes muito ruins, más não perde por calsa do restante do time( diplomatas de carreira), que é muito bom.

? Desculpe mais não entendi, digo entendi em termos mais acho que está mal formulada a frase.
Ataque ruim + caUsa (calça?) restante do time (parece que o resto também é ruim) = Time inteiro ruim (que é bom?). Heim, cuma!

Acho que as acentuações (,) ficaram erradas

No es una novedad que, desde hace algunos años, Brasil ha aumentado su
gravitación en la escena internacional. Los indicios de ese
protagonismo son abundantes: desde la cantidad y el relieve de los
líderes mundiales que visitan sus principales ciudades hasta la
vocación de los actores más decisivos del planeta por establecer
acuerdos y asociaciones con ese país. La voz de la diplomacia
brasileña es cada vez más fuerte en los organismos multilaterales, en
especial en los destinados a cuestiones económicas y comerciales. No
puede desconocerse tampoco la simpatía que despierta en todo el mundo
el presidente Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, un fenómeno que es causa y a
la vez consecuencia de la relevancia brasileña.

Con el arribo de Barack Obama a la presidencia de los Estados Unidos,
el papel continental de Itamaraty, la cancillería brasileña, ha
recibido un llamativo refuerzo. Salvo Felipe Calderón, presidente de
México, Lula fue el único mandatario de la región que mantuvo
reuniones individuales con su par norteamericano. Antes de esa cumbre
había trascendido, en febrero pasado, una entrevista discreta entre
Obama y su antiguo profesor en Harvard, el ministro de Asuntos
Estratégicos de Brasil, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, que sirvió para
repasar los principales problemas de la agenda regional.


Las consecuencias de estos intercambios comenzaron a verse en las
últimas semanas. Lula le ofreció a Hugo Chávez ser un gestor de buenos
oficios para distender el vínculo entre Caracas y Washington. Más aún,
en la reunión del G-20, realizada en Londres, el canciller brasileño
imaginó que podía celebrarse una reunión entre Chávez y Obama en la V
Cumbre de las Américas; al final, no se concretó. En Trinidad y Tobago
hubo, en cambio, otra novedad: el gobierno de Cuba, que no está
invitado a participar de esos encuentros, se hizo representar por
Brasil y no por Venezuela a pesar de la declamada fraternidad entre
Chávez y el régimen castrista.


Estos episodios abonan la tesis de que la afinidad con Brasil podría
convertirse en un dispositivo principal de las relaciones entre los
Estados Unidos y la región. El gobierno brasileño comienza a
insinuarse, de este modo, como un intercesor ante Washington para los
demás países de la región. La diplomacia argentina parece haber
desistido de ocupar un rol activo y confiable frente a los grandes
actores internacionales que se interesan por América latina. Esta
defección de la política exterior de nuestro país hace juego con otros
fenómenos característicos de la época, como, por ejemplo, la pérdida
de peso relativo que viene registrando el mercado argentino como
receptor de las inversiones extranjeras que se destinan a la región.


Esta retracción internacional de la Argentina ha tenido una
manifestación reciente que, a la vez, vino a reforzar la percepción
sobre el creciente liderazgo regional de Brasil. Fue la noticia de
que, en la V Cumbre de las Américas, el ministro de Defensa de Brasil,
Nelson Jobim, y el asesor internacional de la Presidencia de ese país,
Marco Aurelio García, realizaron una gestión ante las autoridades del
Consejo Nacional de Seguridad de los Estados Unidos para que la
administración de ese país deponga su indiferencia ante los
funcionarios argentinos.


El gobierno de Cristina Kirchner se irritó con esa información. Es
comprensible: la mediación brasileña pone en tela de juicio de modo
muy severo la eficiencia de Jorge Taiana y del embajador en los
Estados Unidos, Héctor Timerman, como responsables directos de la
relación bilateral. Pero el hecho de que la Argentina necesite de un
vecino que le sirva de abogado frente al país más poderoso del
planeta, más que herir el orgullo oficial, debería obligar a pensar en
las consecuencias de la vocación aislacionista que, en muchos
aspectos, caracteriza a la política exterior del kirchnerismo. El
último ejercicio de esa propensión fue la negativa de la Cancillería a
respaldar a un candidato argentino, el embajador Rogelio Pfirter, a
quien otros países postularon para dirigir la estratégica Agencia
Internacional de Energía Atómica.


En Brasil, a diferencia de la Argentina, las instituciones del Estado
no son tomadas como el botín político de cada partido que llega al
poder. Esta virtud promueve, mucho más que en otros países de la
región, la independencia del Poder Judicial. Organismos como el
Tribunal de Cuentas de la Unión, que goza de un poder enorme para
vigilar la correcta aplicación de los recursos presupuestarios, están
puestos también a resguardo de cualquier pretensión facciosa. Lo mismo
puede decirse de la intachable transparencia del Instituto Brasileño
de Geografía y Estadísticas, equivalente del Indec argentino, y de
otras áreas de la vida de ese país, pionero del voto electrónico en la
región


La vocación de Brasil por ejercer un papel decisivo en la política
internacional ha sido siempre ostensible. En muchos casos, discutible,
sobre todo para muchos brasileños. Sin ir más lejos, un experto como
Luis Felipe Lampreia, quien fuera canciller con Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, acaba de manifestar su desconfianza acerca de que su país
pueda oficiar como "segundo violín" de los Estados Unidos.


Sin embargo, detrás de esa preponderancia de Brasil opera un conjunto
de rasgos de su cultura cívica que podrían servir de lección
edificante para sus socios del Río de la Plata.


http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1125178

Marino escreveu:No es una novedad que, desde hace algunos años, Brasil ha aumentado su
gravitación en la escena internacional. Los indicios de ese
protagonismo son abundantes: desde la cantidad y el relieve de los
líderes mundiales que visitan sus principales ciudades hasta la
vocación de los actores más decisivos del planeta por establecer
acuerdos y asociaciones con ese país. La voz de la diplomacia
brasileña es cada vez más fuerte en los organismos multilaterales, en
especial en los destinados a cuestiones económicas y comerciales. No
puede desconocerse tampoco la simpatía que despierta en todo el mundo
el presidente Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, un fenómeno que es causa y a
la vez consecuencia de la relevancia brasileña.
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Sin embargo, detrás de esa preponderancia de Brasil opera un conjunto
de rasgos de su cultura cívica que podrían servir de lección
edificante para sus socios del Río de la Plata.


http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1125178

A percepção que os demais paises da América do Sul tem do Brasil e de sua política externa e interna é muito diferente daquela que nós temos, especialmente alguns foristas. Para eles os brasileiros são patriotas e estão unidos para tornar o Brasil uma grande potência. Todas as ações da política externa visam fortalecer a posição brasileira.
Sempre leio, na Internet, jornais de vários países da América do Sul, especialmente os artigos sobre o Brasil. Há uma clara inveja, no bom sentido, de nossa situação no mundo. Outra coisa, na opinião geral deles o Lula e o Chavez são adversários e não amigos. Acreditam também que o Brasil, embora tenha aderido as iniciativas da Venezuela tipo Banco do Sul, por tras dos bastidores as tem sistematicamente boicotado, de modo que nunca saiam do papel. Citam ainda o caso do ingresso da Venezuela no Mercosul, bloqueado no senado brasileiro. Apesar das reiteradas declarações de Lula, não se move uma palha para apressar a votação e aprovar o ingresso.
O artigo que publicastes representa assim, de certa maneira, o pensamento dos demais países da américa do Sul em relação ao Brasil.

saudações

Olá Delmar,

É justificável esta posição da imprensa da América Latina pois eles não conhecem o Brasil como nós.

Não sei a opinião dos demais foristas sobre a política externa brasileiro de hoje, mas o que mais me enfurece é o governo tentar (tentou, tenta ou está tentando ainda) fazer uma "doutrinação" do Itamaraty segundo as ideologias de certas "vertentes" do partido do Presidente da República.

O Itamaraty que sempre prezou sua história em políticas de estado e não de governo, está em vias de ser transformado, se tudo continuar como está, em uma chancelaria medíocre como as de alguns países vizinhos que hoje tanto nos invejam, PRINCIPALMENTE quanto às políticas para a própria América Latina. Veja, nossa posição hoje é de destaque, mas ninguem garante que um dia estaremos como eles, nos vendo "nivelados por baixo" no jogo intenacional graças a ações mal planejadas e/ou tomadas. Exemplos não faltam!

[]'s.

Olá Delmar,

É justificável esta posição da imprensa da América Latina pois eles não conhecem o Brasil como nós.

Concordo, olhando de fora eles tem, muitas vezes, uma visão errada de nossa realidade.

saudações

Sem dúvida o Itamaraty tem tido algumas ações diplomáticas um tanto questionáveis. No entanto, a menos q eu esteja muito enganado, tenho a impressão de q o Brasil goza de grande prestígio nas atuais esferas de poder internacional, sendo um interlocutor importante em todos os fóruns multilaterais sobre os mais diversos assuntos, "fenômeno" iniciado no governo anterior, diga-se de passagem...

No entanto, é no mínimo "curioso" q alguns veículos de nossa mídia falem em "ideologização" da diplomacia brasileira no atual governo... Buenas, gostaria q alguém me explicasse o q não seria a "ideologização" da diplomacia brasileira?... Será q alguns pensam q a "tradicional diplomacia" brasileira (q seria a anterior ao atual governo) não era "ideológica"?...

Enfim, talvez eu seja um tanto "ingênuo" e não esteja percebendo alguma coisa...

Ou será q alguns acham q "ideologia política" é unidimensional?...