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Alguém já se perguntou o motivo dos americanos terem criado uma Riverine Force?

The Navy's Not Serious About Riverine Warfare

Issue: Proceedings Magazine -

By Lieutenant Daniel A. Hancock, U.S. Navy

After looking at past successful riverine operations and critically
examining the capabilities of today's riverine force, it appears the
Navy is not in a strategic paradigm shift toward the littorals after
all, but rather merely making cursory modifications that only
superficially alter its core identity.

The American experience with riverine warfare began during the
Revolutionary War and has continued intermittently through the
Seminole Wars, the Civil War, World War II, the Vietnam War, the
Colombian drug wars, and operations today in Iraq. Throughout the U.S.
Navy's existence, its riverine force has consistently disappeared as a
force capability in times of peace. The need for a riverine force is
the subject of great deliberation among naval strategists and leaders.
Strategic banter became policy with the 2004 Request for Forces from
Central Command and publication of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) that called for the creation of a riverine force.

As the Navy fights to ensure its relevance in the war on terrorism, it
is paramount that officers fully understand the tacit and imbedded
impetuses that drive their organization's policies.1
Why a Riverine Force?

As former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Vern Clark left his
post in 2005, he clearly delineated several areas that could "expand
the Navy's capabilities to prosecute the Global War on Terror [GWOT]."
Included in these remarks was the concept of a new riverine force.2
Admiral Mike Mullen, Clark's successor, was quick to adopt this
concept. He reaffirmed Clark's position, stating:

We need a fleet that can operate at the other end of the
spectrum. . . . We need a green water capability and a brown water
capability. . . . I want a balanced force in every sense of the
word. . . . I believe our Navy is missing a great opportunity to
influence events by not having a riverine force. We're going to have
one.3

The CNO plainly stated that he wanted a balanced force to meet the
diverse post-9/11 threats. This meant broadening the definition of sea
power to include the littorals, rivers, and the high seas.

U.S. Navy riverine operations have a distinguished history, but
despite that experience, the service has never regarded such
operations as fundamental to its core "tradition, identity, and
ethos."4 They have always competed for resources with pre-existing
programs and missions.5 Even in its most successful era, the Vietnam
War, riverine warfare was never seen as career-enhancing. Instead, the
blue-water Navy has viewed it as an aberration.6 Furthermore, the up-
and-down nature of the riverine force limits its immediate impact on
any emergent combat scenario. Not one strategic document—from the
Vietnam War until the 2006 QDR—alludes to it.
The Worthington Study

From the end of the Vietnam War until Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
only time Big Navy touched the subject of riverine warfare was in
August 1990. The Navy/Marine Corps Board asked the Commander of Naval
Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), Rear Admiral George
Worthington, to assess the Navy's riverine capability and develop a
concept of operations for a riverine force to be drawn from existing
U.S. Navy forces.

When Admiral Worthington completed his study in December 1990, his
report called for a battalion-size riverine force, joint Navy and
Marine Corps training, and joint operations. His force structure
called for an extensive command element, a Marine air-ground task
force, and a riverine assault group. The command element would also be
augmented by organic combat service support elements.

All this would require 3,000 personnel and more than 75 watercraft.
Because of the budget restraints of the 1990s and the extensive DOD
drawdown in forces, no one ever acted on Worthington's study.7 The
funding requirement for his proposed force was simply too much for the
post-Cold War Navy.

Aside from feigned interest in the report, the Navy has completely
ignored riverine warfare strategy, doctrine, tactics, and training in
the years leading to the war in Iraq. Instead, it has been content to
let U.S. Special Operations Command (led by NAVSPECWARCOM) and the
Marine Corps develop their own riverine doctrine, tactics, and skills,
which naturally focused on special operations.
Where Is the Riverine Threat?

The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) performed an exhaustive survey of
all countries in the world that have river systems within 175 miles of
an accessible coastline. It codified each country according to its
potential for military operations and its ability to facilitate
riverine operations.

Countries were labeled "functioning Core" or "non-integrated Gap." The
CNA defined Core as "countries that embrace globalization . . . they
accept the content flow and possess normative rule sets that bind
countries together in mutually assured dependence associated with
integrating one's national economy to the global economy." All other
countries are non-integrated Gap states.8 Stated succinctly, the most
likely threat to the United States will come from these Gap countries.

In 2005, military leaders identified the rivers of Iraq as one area in
which the Navy could make a more substantive in-country contribution.
The Navy responded by proposing the current riverine force, which
falls under the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). Led by Rear
Admiral Donald K. Bullard, an aviator, the NECC encompasses 40,000
personnel, specializing in naval coastal warfare, explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD), mobile diving and salvage, naval expeditionary
logistics support, naval construction, naval security, and other
specialized Navy forces.9

Within the NECC, the Riverine Group comprises the riverine capability
of the U.S. Navy. This includes a headquarters element and three
squadrons. The first squadron, Riverine Squadron ONE, just returned
from initial deployment to Iraq. Riverine Squadron TWO is in Iraq now,
and Riverine Squadron THREE is scheduled to deploy this spring. Each
squadron has 12 riverine craft, broken down into three detachments of
four boats. According to its concept of operations, each boat team
will be designated alpha—delta and will be manned by two five-man
crews to allow port and starboard rotation during high operational
tempo surge operations.10
Capability and Capability Gaps of Riverine Forces

The Navy has created a riverine force out of necessity, with the
intention of contributing in-country in four major types of
operations: security assistance, counter-insurgency (COIN), the war on
terrorism, and major combat operations (MCO). However, significant
gaps show in the Navy's current riverine force to wage war across the
Joint Requirements Oversight Committee's range of military operations.

When the first squadron deployed in Fiscal Year 2007, the Navy had
substantial capability to execute humanitarian assistance, counter-
drug operations, or security assistance, but severely lacked in other
critical areas like major COIN, the war on terrorism, and MCO. Even
with three deployable squadrons, the Navy's riverine force will only
marginally improve across the board, still lacking sustained
capability in those three areas.

Security assistance is one area the proposed riverine force will have
no problem addressing immediately. The NECC/Riverine Group ONE is
capable of providing anti-terrorism/COIN area security. The Center for
Naval Analyses estimates this will obligate 60 percent of the initial
squadron's boats on any single facility, however. To conduct river
control, only one boat detachment would be available if the riverine
squadron also must perform area security. The FY 07 riverine force
will have only four boats to control a river.

This is window dressing. It is naive to think that a major riverine
environment can be controlled with four boats. In addition, river
control and area security are undermined by one critical shortcoming—
no organic combat service-support element. In other words, the
riverine force is incapable of sustaining itself down range. The
logistical train to support a riverine squadron must leach off other
theater assets.
Boats Fall Short

The boats being used have physical limitations, too. The small unit
riverine craft lacks stabilized gun mounts, making it difficult to
effectively lay down fields of fire.11 Furthermore, rapid wear on the
boats prohibited continuous operations during the first squadron's
maiden deployment. As the Navy takes the watch on the rivers of Iraq,
it is painfully clear that while the concept is sound, funding and
credibility are lacking. The riverine squadron concept is capable, but
only skin-deep.

Major combat operations constitute river assault, direct-action raids,
and potentially mine countermeasure and countermobility operations.
MCOs require the same level of effort and investment as they did in
the Vietnam War.12 Unfortunately, the initial riverine squadron has a
mere 200 Sailors. MCOs will not be possible with that level of manning
and only 12 boats. Even with three operational squadrons totaling 700
sailors and 36 boats, the Navy riverine force will still fall woefully
short of achieving limited, much less sustained, MCO capability.

In Vietnam, the Navy conducted MCO along 17,700 kilometers of inland
waterways and 93,700 square kilometers of the Mekong Delta. The number
of personnel involved is staggering. At its peak in the late 1960s,
some 4,500 personnel manned 450 riverine craft. Furthermore, 500 boats
(and ships) and 9,000 Sailors were in direct support of the operations
in the rivers. Beyond these numbers, another 22,645 served in indirect
support of riverine operations.13 The current Riverine Group force
structure is handicapped from the start.

To ask a riverine squadron to duplicate such an effort in Iraq or
elsewhere is unrealistic. The Navy wants to be viewed as contributing
to the war on terrorism, but the numbers tell a different story in
this case. Careful analysis of the Riverine Group shows a tacit
unwillingness from the Navy to fully commit to the concept.

Optimally, the Riverine Group will be able to support battalion-size
Army and Marine operations.14 This pales in comparison to the level of
output in Vietnam. The group's ability to dominate a combat operation
or break the will of an insurgency is limited, at best. A total of 22
Gap countries will be out of the projected range of Navy riverine
force capabilities, including hot spots like Burma, Colombia, Iraq,
North Korea, Nigeria, Venezuela, and Vietnam.15 This undermines the
Navy's assertion that it wants a viable brown-water Navy.

In short, the facts do not match the rhetoric of Admirals Mullen and
Clark. While both may have had the imagination and desire to field a
competent riverine force, the bureaucracy of the Navy organization is
not allowing it. The riverine force contradicts the ideological
convictions that all Navy officers are taught throughout their
training. The Navy is about expensive programs. Whether it is
conscious of it or not, its members have on some level successfully
subverted the riverine vision of Admiral Mullen.
Riverine Officers?

According to Andrew Scutro, writing in Navy Times, "If Navy
Expeditionary Combat Command continues to grow as it has, it may soon
have its own community of specialized officers. As the newest type
command, joining aviation, surface, and submarine, the force will
begin developing its own brand of officers. That could bring an
officer expeditionary warfare qualification program and pin."16

Not likely. This is not a priority for the Navy.

At their core, surface warfare officers (SWOs) are meant to be blue-
water, preferably Aegis, tactical action officers. Division officers
must qualify as SWOs and complete a first tour before spending 18
months on a second-tour riverine job. This is hardly building a core
cadre of riverine officers. Looking at the NECC hierarchy, it seems
obvious that Big Navy is not serious about the long-term viability of
the NECC when it places an aviator in charge.

As a department head, a SWO can only be billeted to a riverine job
after completing one tour on a conventional surface combatant and
qualifying as a tactical action officer. The idea of the Navy
developing a specialized cadre of riverine officers is absurd, despite
no shortage of willing officers currently serving in these billets.
The aim of a SWO is to command a ship-of-the-line, a cruiser, or maybe
a sleek guided-missile destroyer. Most of the officers in the Riverine
Group are SWOs. The others are EOD/special operations officers.

The SWOs, both those on division-officer tours and those serving
during their department years, serve 18 months at most. Considering
that the initial proposed pipeline of training for a riverine squadron
to deploy is more than six months long, it hardly seems feasible that
any substantial expertise in riverine warfare is being developed among
the officer corps when it is not a closed-loop community.

The institution is throwing a few officers at the Riverine Group in
begrudging fashion to comply with the CNO's vision, but this hardly
qualifies as developing riverine officers. As quickly as possible, the
Navy will ship its specialized riverine officers back out to sea to
fulfill traditional SWO billets on conventional surface ships. From
Riverine Squadron ONE's initial combat deployment, only the executive
officer will still be with the squadron when it redeploys to Iraq next
year.
An Identity Crisis

Some see the Navy in the war on terrorism as in the periphery. Many
experts view the Navy's budget as the most susceptible to cuts in the
next 20 years. As Grace Jean explains in National Defense: "The Navy
does not have a coherent message explaining what its role is, in the
long war."17 The Navy is having an identity crisis right now. It is
terribly uncomfortable being pushed into green- and brown-water
operations, but it sees this as a last resort to remain relevant and
to keep the dollars flowing its way. The former chiefs of naval
operations articulated a clear vision, but the Navy is dragging its
feet in implementing that vision.

The Navy worships tradition. In The Masks of War, Carl Builder
expounds:

The reverence for tradition in the Navy has continued right to
present, not just in pomp or display, but in almost every action from
fighting to eating—from tooth to fang. In tradition, the Navy finds a
secure anchor for the institution against the dangers it must face. If
in doubt, or if confronted with a changing environment, the Navy looks
to its tradition to keep it safe.18

The truth is that the Navy is leaving as light a footprint as possible
in the littorals. If the conflict in Iraq begins to wind down, the
Navy hopes to be able to quickly and forcefully redirect its energy to
blue-water operations. That is Navy tradition. This is reality for an
institution facing a changing environment and looking for a secure
anchor. Ergo, the littoral combat ship grows costlier, plans for the
DDG-1000 and CG(X) go forward, and the riverine force remains woefully
light-loaded financially and in personnel.

In Essence of Decision, authors Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow lay
out their Organizational Behavior Model (Model II), which argues that
government behavior is best understood as outputs of large
organizations within them rather than as logical or rational decisions
made by a single unitary actor.19 For any given instance, a government
organization's output will reflect a set of standard operating
procedures established prior to that event.20 The Navy is not capable
of refashioning its traditions and core beliefs on the fly and under
pressure in the metaphorical "War on Terror."

In The Masks of War, Builder explains this succinctly: The Navy loves
tradition. Thus, its flexibility of response to the war is limited.
Each organization responds to a problem in terms of the impact of the
problem (threat and opportunity) on the organization. This is no
different for the Navy.
No Shift in the Rudder

Despite the rhetoric and pomp surrounding the new NECC and riverine
force, metric data contradict the idea that the Navy is shifting its
strategic rudder toward a serious realignment into the littorals. The
bottom line is that Big Navy is paying the riverine concept only the
attention required to keep the service relevant. The reality is that
the riverine force is underfunded, undermanned, and organized in such
a manner that it cannot achieve success across the full span of
operations in Iraq, much less in other potential riverine
environments.

Riverine Squadron ONE completed a successful deployment to Iraq
recently. However, its success is largely because of the tactical
innovation of its officers in charge and leadership as well as the
rich logistical provisions that sustained it in that specific area of
operations. The riverine model will not sustain itself as successfully
in a less mature theater on its own. Ultimately, the latest iteration
of a Navy riverine force is a forced product of survival rather than
any substantive strategic diversion from a traditional blue-water,
high-value-unit-centered Navy.

1. Author used Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow's Model II, or
organizational behavior model for analysis in Essence of Decision, one
of the seminal contributions to the field of political science.

2. Director, Navy Staff Memorandum, "Implementation of Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) Guidance-Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Capabilities
(U),"unclassified Navy Staff Memorandum,
http://www.navytimes.com/content/editor ... forces.pdf

3. Chief of Naval Operations, "Remarks delivered to the Naval War
College," Unclassified, http://www.navy.mil/navy-data/cno/speec ... n05081.txt

4. Robert Benbow et al., Renewal of Navy's Riverine Capability: A
Preliminary Examination of Past, Current and Future Capabilities,
(Alexandria, VA: The Center for Naval Analyses, 2006), p. 98.

5. Ibid, p. 21.

6. Iris Gonzales, The Colombian Riverine Program: A Case Study of
Naval International Programs and National Strategy, (Washington: CRM
94-182, 1995).

7. Stephen Trimble, "The US Navy's Riverine Revival-Riverine revival,"
Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 February 2007, http://www.jdw.janes.com
(accessed through NPS DKL portal account).

8. Benbow et al., p. 42.

9. Ibid, p. 8.

10. Ibid, p. 8.

11. Ibid, p. 74.

12. Ibid, p. 74.

13. Ibid, pp. 7, 75.

14. Ibid, p. 76.

15. Ibid, p. 77.

16. Andrew Scutro, "New NECC officers, new pin?" Navy Times, 28 August
2006, Legacy section.

17. Grace Jean, "Identity Crisis," National Defense No. 636 (2006): p.
24.

18. Carl Builder, The Masks of War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1989), p. 18.

19. Allison and Zelikow, p. 143.

20. Ibid, pp. 143-4.

Lieutenant Hancock is stationed at the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, California, completing an MA in National Security Affairs
with a specialization in Middle East Studies. On graduation in March
2008, he will attend the Defense Language Institute to study Arabic. A
native of Augusta, Georgia, Lieutenant Hancock is a 2002 graduate of
the U.S. Naval Academy. A qualified surface warfare officer, he has
completed several deployments in support of Operations Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

The oft-stated reemphasis on littoral operations by the Navy's top
leaders has been nothing but window dressing, this author says.
width=

Lt. Hancock Proceedings 2008

Author of the Year - 2nd Prize

After looking at past successful riverine operations and critically
examining the capabilities of today's riverine force, it appears the
Navy is not in a strategic paradigm shift toward the littorals after
all, but rather merely making cursory modifications that only
superficially alter its core identity.

The American experience with riverine warfare began during the
Revolutionary War and has continued intermittently through the
Seminole Wars, the Civil War, World War II, the Vietnam War, the
Colombian drug wars, and operations today in Iraq. Throughout the U.S.
Navy's existence, its riverine force has consistently disappeared as a
force capability in times of peace. The need for a riverine force is
the subject of great deliberation among naval strategists and leaders.
Strategic banter became policy with the 2004 Request for Forces from
Central Command and publication of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) that called for the creation of a riverine force.

As the Navy fights to ensure its relevance in the war on terrorism, it
is paramount that officers fully understand the tacit and imbedded
impetuses that drive their organization's policies.1
Why a Riverine Force?

As former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Vern Clark left his
post in 2005, he clearly delineated several areas that could "expand
the Navy's capabilities to prosecute the Global War on Terror [GWOT]."
Included in these remarks was the concept of a new riverine force.2
Admiral Mike Mullen, Clark's successor, was quick to adopt this
concept. He reaffirmed Clark's position, stating:

We need a fleet that can operate at the other end of the
spectrum. . . . We need a green water capability and a brown water
capability. . . . I want a balanced force in every sense of the
word. . . . I believe our Navy is missing a great opportunity to
influence events by not having a riverine force. We're going to have
one.3

The CNO plainly stated that he wanted a balanced force to meet the
diverse post-9/11 threats. This meant broadening the definition of sea
power to include the littorals, rivers, and the high seas.

U.S. Navy riverine operations have a distinguished history, but
despite that experience, the service has never regarded such
operations as fundamental to its core "tradition, identity, and
ethos."4 They have always competed for resources with pre-existing
programs and missions.5 Even in its most successful era, the Vietnam
War, riverine warfare was never seen as career-enhancing. Instead, the
blue-water Navy has viewed it as an aberration.6 Furthermore, the up-
and-down nature of the riverine force limits its immediate impact on
any emergent combat scenario. Not one strategic document—from the
Vietnam War until the 2006 QDR—alludes to it.
The Worthington Study

From the end of the Vietnam War until Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
only time Big Navy touched the subject of riverine warfare was in
August 1990. The Navy/Marine Corps Board asked the Commander of Naval
Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), Rear Admiral George
Worthington, to assess the Navy's riverine capability and develop a
concept of operations for a riverine force to be drawn from existing
U.S. Navy forces.

When Admiral Worthington completed his study in December 1990, his
report called for a battalion-size riverine force, joint Navy and
Marine Corps training, and joint operations. His force structure
called for an extensive command element, a Marine air-ground task
force, and a riverine assault group. The command element would also be
augmented by organic combat service support elements.

All this would require 3,000 personnel and more than 75 watercraft.
Because of the budget restraints of the 1990s and the extensive DOD
drawdown in forces, no one ever acted on Worthington's study.7 The
funding requirement for his proposed force was simply too much for the
post-Cold War Navy.

Aside from feigned interest in the report, the Navy has completely
ignored riverine warfare strategy, doctrine, tactics, and training in
the years leading to the war in Iraq. Instead, it has been content to
let U.S. Special Operations Command (led by NAVSPECWARCOM) and the
Marine Corps develop their own riverine doctrine, tactics, and skills,
which naturally focused on special operations.
Where Is the Riverine Threat?

The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) performed an exhaustive survey of
all countries in the world that have river systems within 175 miles of
an accessible coastline. It codified each country according to its
potential for military operations and its ability to facilitate
riverine operations.

Countries were labeled "functioning Core" or "non-integrated Gap." The
CNA defined Core as "countries that embrace globalization . . . they
accept the content flow and possess normative rule sets that bind
countries together in mutually assured dependence associated with
integrating one's national economy to the global economy." All other
countries are non-integrated Gap states.8 Stated succinctly, the most
likely threat to the United States will come from these Gap countries.

In 2005, military leaders identified the rivers of Iraq as one area in
which the Navy could make a more substantive in-country contribution.
The Navy responded by proposing the current riverine force, which
falls under the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). Led by Rear
Admiral Donald K. Bullard, an aviator, the NECC encompasses 40,000
personnel, specializing in naval coastal warfare, explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD), mobile diving and salvage, naval expeditionary
logistics support, naval construction, naval security, and other
specialized Navy forces.9

Within the NECC, the Riverine Group comprises the riverine capability
of the U.S. Navy. This includes a headquarters element and three
squadrons. The first squadron, Riverine Squadron ONE, just returned
from initial deployment to Iraq. Riverine Squadron TWO is in Iraq now,
and Riverine Squadron THREE is scheduled to deploy this spring. Each
squadron has 12 riverine craft, broken down into three detachments of
four boats. According to its concept of operations, each boat team
will be designated alpha—delta and will be manned by two five-man
crews to allow port and starboard rotation during high operational
tempo surge operations.10
Capability and Capability Gaps of Riverine Forces

The Navy has created a riverine force out of necessity, with the
intention of contributing in-country in four major types of
operations: security assistance, counter-insurgency (COIN), the war on
terrorism, and major combat operations (MCO). However, significant
gaps show in the Navy's current riverine force to wage war across the
Joint Requirements Oversight Committee's range of military operations.

When the first squadron deployed in Fiscal Year 2007, the Navy had
substantial capability to execute humanitarian assistance, counter-
drug operations, or security assistance, but severely lacked in other
critical areas like major COIN, the war on terrorism, and MCO. Even
with three deployable squadrons, the Navy's riverine force will only
marginally improve across the board, still lacking sustained
capability in those three areas.

Security assistance is one area the proposed riverine force will have
no problem addressing immediately. The NECC/Riverine Group ONE is
capable of providing anti-terrorism/COIN area security. The Center for
Naval Analyses estimates this will obligate 60 percent of the initial
squadron's boats on any single facility, however. To conduct river
control, only one boat detachment would be available if the riverine
squadron also must perform area security. The FY 07 riverine force
will have only four boats to control a river.

This is window dressing. It is naive to think that a major riverine
environment can be controlled with four boats. In addition, river
control and area security are undermined by one critical shortcoming—
no organic combat service-support element. In other words, the
riverine force is incapable of sustaining itself down range. The
logistical train to support a riverine squadron must leach off other
theater assets.
Boats Fall Short

The boats being used have physical limitations, too. The small unit
riverine craft lacks stabilized gun mounts, making it difficult to
effectively lay down fields of fire.11 Furthermore, rapid wear on the
boats prohibited continuous operations during the first squadron's
maiden deployment. As the Navy takes the watch on the rivers of Iraq,
it is painfully clear that while the concept is sound, funding and
credibility are lacking. The riverine squadron concept is capable, but
only skin-deep.

Major combat operations constitute river assault, direct-action raids,
and potentially mine countermeasure and countermobility operations.
MCOs require the same level of effort and investment as they did in
the Vietnam War.12 Unfortunately, the initial riverine squadron has a
mere 200 Sailors. MCOs will not be possible with that level of manning
and only 12 boats. Even with three operational squadrons totaling 700
sailors and 36 boats, the Navy riverine force will still fall woefully
short of achieving limited, much less sustained, MCO capability.

In Vietnam, the Navy conducted MCO along 17,700 kilometers of inland
waterways and 93,700 square kilometers of the Mekong Delta. The number
of personnel involved is staggering. At its peak in the late 1960s,
some 4,500 personnel manned 450 riverine craft. Furthermore, 500 boats
(and ships) and 9,000 Sailors were in direct support of the operations
in the rivers. Beyond these numbers, another 22,645 served in indirect
support of riverine operations.13 The current Riverine Group force
structure is handicapped from the start.

To ask a riverine squadron to duplicate such an effort in Iraq or
elsewhere is unrealistic. The Navy wants to be viewed as contributing
to the war on terrorism, but the numbers tell a different story in
this case. Careful analysis of the Riverine Group shows a tacit
unwillingness from the Navy to fully commit to the concept.

Optimally, the Riverine Group will be able to support battalion-size
Army and Marine operations.14 This pales in comparison to the level of
output in Vietnam. The group's ability to dominate a combat operation
or break the will of an insurgency is limited, at best. A total of 22
Gap countries will be out of the projected range of Navy riverine
force capabilities, including hot spots like Burma, Colombia, Iraq,
North Korea, Nigeria, Venezuela, and Vietnam.15 This undermines the
Navy's assertion that it wants a viable brown-water Navy.

In short, the facts do not match the rhetoric of Admirals Mullen and
Clark. While both may have had the imagination and desire to field a
competent riverine force, the bureaucracy of the Navy organization is
not allowing it. The riverine force contradicts the ideological
convictions that all Navy officers are taught throughout their
training. The Navy is about expensive programs. Whether it is
conscious of it or not, its members have on some level successfully
subverted the riverine vision of Admiral Mullen.
Riverine Officers?

According to Andrew Scutro, writing in Navy Times, "If Navy
Expeditionary Combat Command continues to grow as it has, it may soon
have its own community of specialized officers. As the newest type
command, joining aviation, surface, and submarine, the force will
begin developing its own brand of officers. That could bring an
officer expeditionary warfare qualification program and pin."16

Not likely. This is not a priority for the Navy.

At their core, surface warfare officers (SWOs) are meant to be blue-
water, preferably Aegis, tactical action officers. Division officers
must qualify as SWOs and complete a first tour before spending 18
months on a second-tour riverine job. This is hardly building a core
cadre of riverine officers. Looking at the NECC hierarchy, it seems
obvious that Big Navy is not serious about the long-term viability of
the NECC when it places an aviator in charge.

As a department head, a SWO can only be billeted to a riverine job
after completing one tour on a conventional surface combatant and
qualifying as a tactical action officer. The idea of the Navy
developing a specialized cadre of riverine officers is absurd, despite
no shortage of willing officers currently serving in these billets.
The aim of a SWO is to command a ship-of-the-line, a cruiser, or maybe
a sleek guided-missile destroyer. Most of the officers in the Riverine
Group are SWOs. The others are EOD/special operations officers.

The SWOs, both those on division-officer tours and those serving
during their department years, serve 18 months at most. Considering
that the initial proposed pipeline of training for a riverine squadron
to deploy is more than six months long, it hardly seems feasible that
any substantial expertise in riverine warfare is being developed among
the officer corps when it is not a closed-loop community.

The institution is throwing a few officers at the Riverine Group in
begrudging fashion to comply with the CNO's vision, but this hardly
qualifies as developing riverine officers. As quickly as possible, the
Navy will ship its specialized riverine officers back out to sea to
fulfill traditional SWO billets on conventional surface ships. From
Riverine Squadron ONE's initial combat deployment, only the executive
officer will still be with the squadron when it redeploys to Iraq next
year.
An Identity Crisis

Some see the Navy in the war on terrorism as in the periphery. Many
experts view the Navy's budget as the most susceptible to cuts in the
next 20 years. As Grace Jean explains in National Defense: "The Navy
does not have a coherent message explaining what its role is, in the
long war."17 The Navy is having an identity crisis right now. It is
terribly uncomfortable being pushed into green- and brown-water
operations, but it sees this as a last resort to remain relevant and
to keep the dollars flowing its way. The former chiefs of naval
operations articulated a clear vision, but the Navy is dragging its
feet in implementing that vision.

The Navy worships tradition. In The Masks of War, Carl Builder
expounds:

The reverence for tradition in the Navy has continued right to
present, not just in pomp or display, but in almost every action from
fighting to eating—from tooth to fang. In tradition, the Navy finds a
secure anchor for the institution against the dangers it must face. If
in doubt, or if confronted with a changing environment, the Navy looks
to its tradition to keep it safe.18

The truth is that the Navy is leaving as light a footprint as possible
in the littorals. If the conflict in Iraq begins to wind down, the
Navy hopes to be able to quickly and forcefully redirect its energy to
blue-water operations. That is Navy tradition. This is reality for an
institution facing a changing environment and looking for a secure
anchor. Ergo, the littoral combat ship grows costlier, plans for the
DDG-1000 and CG(X) go forward, and the riverine force remains woefully
light-loaded financially and in personnel.

In Essence of Decision, authors Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow lay
out their Organizational Behavior Model (Model II), which argues that
government behavior is best understood as outputs of large
organizations within them rather than as logical or rational decisions
made by a single unitary actor.19 For any given instance, a government
organization's output will reflect a set of standard operating
procedures established prior to that event.20 The Navy is not capable
of refashioning its traditions and core beliefs on the fly and under
pressure in the metaphorical "War on Terror."

In The Masks of War, Builder explains this succinctly: The Navy loves
tradition. Thus, its flexibility of response to the war is limited.
Each organization responds to a problem in terms of the impact of the
problem (threat and opportunity) on the organization. This is no
different for the Navy.
No Shift in the Rudder

Despite the rhetoric and pomp surrounding the new NECC and riverine
force, metric data contradict the idea that the Navy is shifting its
strategic rudder toward a serious realignment into the littorals. The
bottom line is that Big Navy is paying the riverine concept only the
attention required to keep the service relevant. The reality is that
the riverine force is underfunded, undermanned, and organized in such
a manner that it cannot achieve success across the full span of
operations in Iraq, much less in other potential riverine
environments.

Riverine Squadron ONE completed a successful deployment to Iraq
recently. However, its success is largely because of the tactical
innovation of its officers in charge and leadership as well as the
rich logistical provisions that sustained it in that specific area of
operations. The riverine model will not sustain itself as successfully
in a less mature theater on its own. Ultimately, the latest iteration
of a Navy riverine force is a forced product of survival rather than
any substantive strategic diversion from a traditional blue-water,
high-value-unit-centered Navy.

1. Author used Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow's Model II, or
organizational behavior model for analysis in Essence of Decision, one
of the seminal contributions to the field of political science.

2. Director, Navy Staff Memorandum, "Implementation of Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) Guidance-Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Capabilities
(U),"unclassified Navy Staff Memorandum,
http://www.navytimes.com/content/editor ... forces.pdf

3. Chief of Naval Operations, "Remarks delivered to the Naval War
College," Unclassified, http://www.navy.mil/navy-data/cno/speec ... n05081.txt

4. Robert Benbow et al., Renewal of Navy's Riverine Capability: A
Preliminary Examination of Past, Current and Future Capabilities,
(Alexandria, VA: The Center for Naval Analyses, 2006), p. 98.

5. Ibid, p. 21.

6. Iris Gonzales, The Colombian Riverine Program: A Case Study of
Naval International Programs and National Strategy, (Washington: CRM
94-182, 1995).

7. Stephen Trimble, "The US Navy's Riverine Revival-Riverine revival,"
Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 February 2007, http://www.jdw.janes.com
(accessed through NPS DKL portal account).

8. Benbow et al., p. 42.

9. Ibid, p. 8.

10. Ibid, p. 8.

11. Ibid, p. 74.

12. Ibid, p. 74.

13. Ibid, pp. 7, 75.

14. Ibid, p. 76.

15. Ibid, p. 77.

16. Andrew Scutro, "New NECC officers, new pin?" Navy Times, 28 August
2006, Legacy section.

17. Grace Jean, "Identity Crisis," National Defense No. 636 (2006): p.
24.

18. Carl Builder, The Masks of War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1989), p. 18.

19. Allison and Zelikow, p. 143.

20. Ibid, pp. 143-4.

Lieutenant Hancock is stationed at the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, California, completing an MA in National Security Affairs
with a specialization in Middle East Studies. On graduation in March
2008, he will attend the Defense Language Institute to study Arabic. A
native of Augusta, Georgia, Lieutenant Hancock is a 2002 graduate of
the U.S. Naval Academy. A qualified surface warfare officer, he has
completed several deployments in support of Operations Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

Got Sea Control?
The United States and United Kingdom have the most powerful combined
naval force on the planet. Does this mean we can control the seas
where and when we want? Maybe not

Issue: Proceedings Magazine - March 2010 Vol. 136/3/1,285

By Captain Victor G. Addison Jr., U.S. Navy and Commander David
Dominy, Royal Navy
USNI Image Gallery
U.S. Navy (Joshua J. Wahl)

Classic blue-water naval conflicts are giving way to complex littoral
operations involving failed states, piracy, and joint relief
operations, forcing the United States to assess sea control. Left,
Sailors and Marines on board the amphibious dock landing ship USS
Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) in October 2009 pass stores during a vertical
replenishment with the Military Sealift Command ship USNS San Jose
(TAFS-7) in humanitarian support of the Republic of the Philippines
following two major storms.
Pictures

The United States and United Kingdom have the most powerful combined
naval force on the planet. Does this mean we can control the seas
where and when we want? Maybe not.

Naval history is replete with tales of victory by great fleets on the
high seas. But it is also punctuated by the stunning defeats of many
of these same fleets in their adversaries' coastal waters, or
littorals. Although it may seem self-evident that a coastal navy would
not fare as well in blue-water warfare, the limitations of a blue-
water navy in the littorals are less obvious and often unanticipated.

Take, for example, the experience of ancient navies. In 1178 B.C.E.,
the Egyptians defeated a large fleet of sea raiders that had dominated
the Mediterranean for more than 100 years by ambushing them from shore
with flaming arrows. In 480 B.C.E., the Greeks conquered a much larger
Persian fleet by luring them into the restricted waters of the Straits
of Salamis, where they were outmaneuvered and could not bring their
superior numbers and firepower to bear.

Flaming arrows have been replaced by antiship missiles, but the
principle remains the same: the ability to control blue water does not
necessarily apply to the littorals. In coastal waters, an adversary
does not require a navy to successfully repel a naval attack. This is
one of many reasons why great navies historically have prefered deeper
water.
Control vs. Command

Our modern understanding of sea control has its origins in the
writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Stafford
Corbett. Mahan built his theory of "command of the seas" on naval
superiority, the concentration of forces, and decisive battles.
Corbett subsequently introduced the concept of "control of the seas"
as a relative, rather than absolute, condition that applies naval
power toward the broader goal of achieving national objectives.
According to Corbett, control of the seas is not an end in itself but
a means to conduct operations in peace and war that produces effects
on land. As our memories of classic blue-water naval battles fade and
we find ourselves increasingly engaged in complex littoral operations
spanning great distances to counter challenges associated with failing
states, regional instability, crime, and violent extremism, the
writings of Corbett deserve a closer read.

Recognizing that total control of the seas is not practical, then Vice
Admiral Stansfield Turner coined the phrase "sea control" to connote
"more realistic control in limited areas and for limited periods of
time."1

British Maritime Doctrine applies these boundary conditions and
introduces the notion of purpose.

Sea control is the condition in which one has freedom of action to use
the sea for one's own purposes in specified areas and for specified
periods of time and, where necessary, to deny or limit its use to the
enemy. Sea control includes the airspace above the surface and the
water volume and seabed below.2

Taking this definition one step further by tying sea control directly
to specific military objectives provides greater contrast between the
littoral and blue-water cases. In blue water, sea-control challenges
are likely to come from enemy fleets with naval objectives focused, in
the spirit of Mahan, on decisive battle. In the littorals, sea-control
challenges are often asymmetric in nature, with military objectives,
such as establishing a sea base or conducting an amphibious landing,
tied to the broader context of influencing events on shore. A simple
definition of sea control that covers the full range of operations,
therefore, is the use of the sea as a maneuver space to achieve
military objectives.
Beyond Blue Water

The importance of sea control has been understated in recent years
because of our longstanding maritime blue-water supremacy. A
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower categorizes sea control
as one of the sea services' six expanded core capabilities, but does
not distinguish it. With the continuing proliferation of anti-access
and area-denial capabilities around the world, the likelihood is
increasing that our local sea control will be challenged, particularly
in the littorals. Military planners who require naval power to support
operations ashore must take this into account.

As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked in an April 2009 address
at the U.S. Naval War College, we face potential conflicts that "will
range across a broad spectrum of operations and lethality. Where near-
peers will use irregular or asymmetric tactics that target our
traditional strengths—such as our ability to project power via carrier
strike groups. And where non-state actors may have weapons of mass
destruction or sophisticated missiles."

These challenges include unpredictable political circumstances that
will restrict overseas access, basing, and overflight rights at
inopportune moments. The role of sea control as the most fundamental
naval capability that facilitates joint and coalition freedom of
action is therefore obvious. Retired Major General David Fastabend,
then the U.S. Army's director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy,
underscored this critical joint force interdependency during Navy-Army
Warfighter Talks in 2008 when he observed, "If you can't provide
maritime supremacy, we are buying the wrong kind of Army."

Perhaps the most apt question regarding sea control is not, Can we?
but, How do we know if we can? Although joint planners depend on sea
power to deliver access, mobility, firepower, and 90 percent of joint-
force supplies, there is no generally accepted methodology or doctrine
to assess our "sea-control potential" during the campaign-design
process.
Start with a Framework

In keeping with traditional Pentagon staffing principles, a first step
in developing such a methodology would be to propose a subjective
analytical framework based on sea-control levels, such as the
following:

Unopposed: Military objectives can be achieved without significant
losses.
Opposed: Military objectives can be achieved, but losses may be
significant.
Denied: Military objectives cannot be achieved and/or there is a
high probability of unacceptable losses.

Levels of sea control should be considered in the context of
objectives and can be referenced as either an assessment of the
operating environment or as a strategy. In this regard, an assessment
can be used to define risk and present strategic options to planners
in terms of force posture and sequencing. For example, the presence of
an adversary's (red) surface action group and shore-based antiship
missile batteries may produce a hostile environment for an amphibious
landing, but have little impact on allied (blue) submarines and
carrier-based aircraft. Allied strategy to successfully execute the
amphibious landing could then be to deny the operations area to the
red surface action group by using their asymmetric advantage in
submarine warfare and to neutralize the missile batteries using their
tactical aircraft.

This simple framework may be adequate for a high-level briefing,
but planners require more detailed assessment criteria. While there
appears to be an infinite range of elements to assess in determining a
navy's sea control potential, the following five provide a starting
point
Capacity: The combat power a force can bring to bear in a local
operations area—a critical factor in attrition warfare.
Capability: The attributes a force possesses that determine its
potential to disrupt an adversary.
Information Dominance: The situational understanding required to
operate forces with relative advantage under dynamic circumstances.
Tactical Readiness: A force's ability to perform its assigned
missions effectively in battle as a function of tactics, training, and
procedures.
Maneuver Space: The constraints and conditions within which a
naval force must operate.

Since these elements are neither discrete nor unique to sea control,
it is within the context of the objective that they become relevant.
Using the previous example, the allied, or blue, force would have to
assess in relative terms, at a minimum, its capacity to wipe out red
missile batteries; its capability to disrupt the red surface action
group; its tactical readiness to execute the full range of missions
culminating in the amphibious landing; its ability to achieve and
maintain situational understanding in dynamic conditions; and the
impact of the littoral operating environment on red and blue forces. A
similar assessment should be conducted from the perspective of the red
force.

These elements become increasingly intertwined and difficult to assess
when it comes to littoral sea control. A proliferation of disruptive
shore-based capabilities can pressure naval forces as they move out of
blue water and toward the coast. The at-sea tactical picture becomes
more cluttered, making it more difficult to distinguish threats among
ambiguous targets. Most important, littoral regions are typically
defined by limitations—physical, political, or otherwise—that restrict
a naval force's freedom of action. Potentially limitless tactical
permutations await the joint sea-control planner.

One method of calibrating a predictive model is to run it against
known historical data. By virtue of its overwhelming conventional
superiority, the U.S. Navy has operated in a relatively unopposed sea-
control environment for many decades and offers limited historical
data for developing such a model. Two of America's closest allies, the
United Kingdom and Israel, however, have been involved in stressing
sea-control cases that are more suitable for analysis.
1982: Britain and Argentina in the Falklands

The 1982 Falklands War is a good example of the challenges navies
confront when conducting sea control in the littorals of adversaries
at a distance of more than than 8,000 miles. Of the many detailed
accounts of the Falklands War, only the memoir of Rear Admiral Sandy
Woodward, One Hundred Days, provides the perspective of the task force
commander. Woodward notes that "there were several competent
organizations which initially suspected the whole operation was
doomed." One of these organizations was "the United States Navy, which
considered the recapture of the Falkland Islands to be a military
impossibility." Although this assessment turned out to be slightly
pessimistic, Woodward himself observed that "we fought our way along a
knife edge, I realize perhaps more than most that one major mishap, a
mine, explosion, a fire, whatever, in either of our two aircraft
carriers, would certainly have proven fatal to the whole operation."

A more specific risk estimate from a sea-control assessment would
probably not have dissuaded former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
from ordering the recapture of the Falklands, but it might have
influenced campaign strategy. It is illustrative to examine the
Falklands campaign as two distinct sea-control problems: blue water
and littoral. An actual assessment of these phases by a headquarters
staff would require subcategories, weighting factors, and a great deal
of PowerPoint. What follows is the distilled version of a relative sea-
control assessment that would have been provided for senior Royal Navy
leadership.
Blue-Water Phase

In the blue-water phase, the British Task Force's objective was to
rapidly conduct an unopposed transit to the South Atlantic and
establish a 200-nautical-mile radius "tactical exclusion zone" around
the Falkland Islands in preparation for an amphibious assault.
Argentina's objective was to deny the Royal Navy the use of the sea as
maneuver space through disruption and attrition, thereby preventing an
amphibious assault.

The Scorecard

Capacity: Each side owned sufficient naval assets to defeat the other,
but Argentina had a five-to-one advantage in tactical aircraft that
could potentially overwhelm the British Task Force's air-defense
capacity. The lack of an overmatch by the United Kingdom in this
category, which includes the challenge of an 8,000 nautical mile
logistics chain, probably influenced the U.S. Navy's dire assessment
of the Royal Navy's chances. Advantage: Argentina.

Capability: Argentina's fighter aircraft had superior speed and
maneuverability compared with the United Kingdom's Harriers, but the
United States leveled the playing field somewhat by supplying the
British with the advanced AIM-9 Sidewinder missile for air-to-air
combat. The Argentine Navy had a significant advantage with the French
Exocet antiship missile, but their supply was limited. In the Royal
Navy's favor, its three nuclear fast-attack submarines provided an
asymmetric antiship and intelligence-gathering capability for
Woodward's task force. Advantage: Toss-up.

Information Dominance: The Royal Navy received strategic intelligence
from the United States and derived a great deal of tactical
intelligence from their fast-attack submarines. Advantage: United
Kingdom.

Tactical Readiness: The British developed dog-fighting tactics that
would greatly increase the kill ratio of the Harriers. Additionally,
the Royal Navy placed significant tactical emphasis on protecting its
aircraft carriers and using forward-operating fast-attack submarines
to threaten the Argentine Navy's "high value units." Advantage: United
Kingdom.

Maneuver Space: The Royal Navy planned to exploit the vast sea area
around the Falkland Islands to position its fleet for tactical
advantage, keeping the carriers out of strike range and forcing the
Argentine strike aircraft to fly through defensive missile screens.
Advantage: United Kingdom.

Overall assessment of sea-control level for the blue-water phase:
Opposed.

The military objective of controlling the seas around the Falklands in
advance of the littoral campaign phase would be achievable with
acceptable losses.
Littoral Phase

The United Kingdom's objective during the littoral sea-control phase
was to conduct an amphibious assault that established an onshore
launching pad from which to defeat Argentine forces on the Falkland
Islands. The choice of amphibious objective area was based primarily
on the desire to conduct an unopposed landing operation using naval
escorts in the Falkland Sound to blunt the anticipated Argentine air
assault. Argentina's objective was to use air power to deny the
British task force the necessary maneuver space to conduct the
amphibious assault and disable it.

The Scorecard

Capacity: The same blue-water imbalance of power carried forth to the
littorals. Advantage: Argentina.

Capability: Once the British task force moved toward its amphibious
objective area, it was squarely within range of Argentina's shore-
based tactical aircraft and missile batteries, a potentially decisive
asymmetric advantage for Argentina. Advantage: Argentina.

Information Dominance: The Royal Navy's forces would be easier to find
and fix within the confines of the littoral battlespace, thereby
negating their strategic and tactical intelligence advantage.
Advantage: Toss-up.

Tactical Readiness: The British advantage in blue-water tactics and
training would not necessarily apply in the littorals, where the
highly proficient Argentine Air Force would become a greater factor.
Advantage: Toss-up.

Maneuver Space: The British Task Force was severely restricted in its
ability to maneuver in the littorals and, specifically, in Falkland
Sound. Advantage: Argentina.

Overall assessment of sea-control level for the littoral phase:
Denied.

The military objective of controlling the Falkland Sound for the
amphibious landing would place the task force well within range of
Argentina's air force, so the probability of unacceptable losses was
extremely high.
Actual Campaign Summary

During the blue-water phase, the Royal Navy exploited the extensive
maneuver space to protect its aircraft carriers from Argentina's 200
jets. Concurrently, Britain's asymmetric undersea warfare advantage
became decisive when its fast-attack submarine HMS Conqueror torpedoed
Argentina's heavy cruiser General Belgrano. This strategic knock-out
punch sidelined the Argentine navy—including its aircraft carrier, the
ARA Veinticinco de Mayo—for the rest of the war.

The battle shifted markedly in Argentina's favor during the littoral
sea-control phase, because the British task force was constrained by
its objective, the amphibious landing, and was forced to operate in
the sights of Argentina's modern, shore-based air force. Argentina's
potentially decisive asymmetric air-warfare advantage was ultimately
squandered by a tactical failure. During the littoral sea-control
phase, every single British escort operating in Falkland Sound was hit
by bombs dropped from Argentina's air force, but many of the bombs did
not explode. Admiral Woodward summarized this aspect of the littoral
sea-control phase best when he noted in his memoir, "We lost
Sheffield, Coventry, Ardent, Antelope, Atlantic Conveyor, and Sir
Galahad," but concluded that if Argentina's bombs had been properly
fused for low-level air raids, Britain would have lost the war.
Same Game, New Rules

A new dimension has been added to littoral sea control by what is
referred to as "the hybrid threat," which retired Marine Lieutenant
Colonel Frank Hoffman defines as any adversary that employs a fusion
of "conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal
behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives."
For example, the hybrid threat posed by the intersection of Somali
pirates and the terrorist organizations al-Shabab and al Qaeda near
the Bab-el-Mandeb has provided an unprecedented challenge for
Coalition navies struggling to keep one of the world's most strategic
oil chokepoints open. Nation states that do not possess the capability
to directly challenge powerful navies may also employ hybrid sea-
denial strategies. This is particularly relevant if the adversary's
objective is not to defeat their enemy in conventional terms, but to
undermine political will through a protracted struggle that imposes
significant costs.

The 2006 Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah provides an example
of a struggle for littoral sea control within the context of a hybrid
threat. The Israeli Navy possessed a clear overmatch in conventional
capabilities and developed its tactics accordingly. There is another
perspective—Hezbollah's—that will be considered for this sea-control
assessment.
2006: Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon

During the 2006 Lebanon War, the Israeli Navy's objective was to
impose a naval blockade to isolate Hezbollah and thus help to advance
Israeli defense force operations ashore. Hezbollah's objective was
less complicated: inflict damage on a regional superpower, survive the
conflict, and win the public relations war. Since Hezbollah doesn't
have a navy, this example typifies the "hybrid sea denial" approach
that navies may encounter in the littorals.

The Scorecard

Capacity: The Israeli Navy held an absolute capacity overmatch in
regular naval forces, but Hezbollah's hybrid forces were not
negligible and had to be considered. Advantage: Israel.

Capability: The Israeli Navy clearly overmatched Hezbollah in
conventional capabilities. Hezbollah employed hybrid tactics that
included missiles, suicide bombers, crime, manipulation of civilian
infrastructure, and propaganda. Advantage: Israel.

Information Dominance: The Israeli Navy possessed significant
intelligence, command-and-control, and cyber capabilities, but was not
aware of Hezbollah's C-802 antiship missiles that could be fired from
trucks against naval targets. Since the Israeli Navy had to operate
near shore to maintain a blockade, this simplified Hezbollah's
targeting problem. Hezbollah also had significant intelligence
resources augmented by capabilities from regional allies and was
exceptionally media savvy. Advantage: Toss-up.

Tactical Readiness: The Israeli Navy was tactically proficient and
well-defended against the C-802 missile when its use was anticipated.
Both the Israeli Navy and Hezbollah are very good at what they do.
Advantage: Toss-up.

Maneuver Space: The Israeli Navy was constrained by the littoral
operating environment, rules of engagement, military doctrine, and
international law. Hezbollah's maneuver space was not similarly
constrained. Advantage: Hezbollah.

Overall assessment of sea-control level for the 2006 Lebanon War:
Opposed.

The Israeli Navy undoubtedly considered its blockade to be an
unopposed sea-control operation based on the complete absence of
conventional Hezbollah naval capability.
Actual Campaign Summary

The Israeli Navy ship Hanit was severely damaged by a C-802 missile on
14 July 2006. Following a United Nations-brokered ceasefire, the war
ended when Israel lifted its naval blockade on 8 September 2006. The
chief of the Israeli Navy resigned in 2007. During a panel discussion
at the 2009 Surface Navy Association conference, a senior Israeli
naval officer advised against spending too much time in the littorals
because of the complex threat environment, emphasizing the point that
if you don't have to be there, "don't go there."
The Littoral Truth

SIr Julian Corbett was right: to support joint force, national, and
even international objectives, we must operate in the littorals. For
powerful navies, the most difficult aspect of operating in the
littorals is acquiring the necessary mindset and realizing that the
default sea-control level is "opposed." It doesn't seem just that our
multibillion-dollar ships can be damaged or even sunk by cheap mines,
missiles, or skiffs laden with explosives. But we must realistically
admit the possibility. History has shown us that in the complicated
littoral sea-control environment, losses are not only possible, they
are inevitable. Littoral sea control, therefore, needs to be assessed,
not assumed, as an important component of campaign design. Powerful
navies may not particularly like the idea of operating in the
littorals, but it's where the jobs are.

1. Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy, "Missions of the U.S.
Navy," Naval War College Review, 1974, Vol. XXVI, No. 5., p. 7.

2. BR 1806 British Maritime Doctrine, Third Edition, 2004, p. 289.

Captain Addison is assigned to the staff of the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5) as branch head
for advanced concepts (N511). He is an oceanographer and former
submarine strategic weapons officer.

Commander Dominy is assigned to the Pentagon as the first Royal Navy
Liaison Officer to OPNAV N3/N5. A surface warfare officer, he
commanded the destroyer HMS Manchester, which was integrated into the
USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group during operations in the
Arabian Gulf.

Eu estava dando uma olhada no fórum da UFJF Defesa para ver se havia alguma novidade.
Mas não pude deixar de ler, mais uma vez, a imensa colaboração para o pensamento de Defesa nacional de meu irmão Orestes.
Para aqueles que ainda não leram, não percam a oportunidade:
http://www.ecsbdefesa.com.br/defesa/fts/IEFNB.pdf

Do Poder Naval:
O Atlântico Sul no Contexto Sul-Americano de Segurança e Defesa

Atlântico Sul já foi rota marítima obrigatória rumo ao Índico e ao Pacífico, até que a abertura dos canais de Suez (1869) e do Panamá (1914) concentrasse o fluxo do comércio marítimo ocidental no Mediterrâneo e no Atlântico Norte. Durante o Século XX, o Atlântico Sul permaneceu como “o mais pacífico dos oceanos”, apesar de algumas ações isoladas de superfície, nas 1ª e 2ª guerras mundiais, e da campanha submarina do Eixo, na 2ª Guerra Mundial.

O Atlântico Sul voltou a ganhar certa importância na época dos superpetroleiros, durante os anos 70 do século passado, em função da primeira crise do petróleo e da interrupção temporária do tráfego de navios pelo Canal de Suez. Entre abril e junho de 1982, tornou-se cenário de um conflito armado entre Argentina e Reino Unido, pela posse das ilhas Malvinas (Falklands). É provável que o longo isolamento geopolítico deste oceano esteja chegando ao fim.

O incremento da produção petrolífera das reservas localizadas nas bacias sedimentares dos litorais da América do Sul e da África Ocidental pode aumentar a importância estratégica do Atlântico Sul, contribuindo para a redução da dependência dos Estados Unidos e demais países ocidentais em relação ao petróleo do Oriente Médio.

Sem incluir o potencial do présal brasileiro, a produção diária de petróleo no mar na América do Sul pode crescer de 2,5 milhões de barris em 2005 para 6,1 milhões de barris até 2030 (crescimento de 144%). No mesmo período, a produção no litoral da África pode passar de 4,9 a 12,4 milhões de barris por dia (crescimento de 153%).

O aumento do comércio internacional, cada vez mais dependente do transporte marítimo, levou à estruturação de um sistema fortemente globalizado e essencialmente transnacional de uso econômico dos mares. O símbolo de tal sistema é o contêiner de dimensões padronizadas, empregado quase universalmente no transporte de cargas dos mais diferentes tipos.

Qualquer que seja sua bandeira, o navio mercante frequentemente é propriedade de um conglomerado multinacional, enquanto que a carga pertence a outro e o seguro é feito por um terceiro. A tripulação geralmente procede de diversos países. A qual país caberia dar proteção ao navio e sua carga, assim como à tripulação, contra possíveis ameaças?

A complexidade da tarefa de garantir a segurança do tráfego marítimo e das atividades ligadas ao uso econômico do mar, em escala global, sugere a adoção de soluções cooperativas. Isto se justifica, pois a segurança de cada nação está cada vez mais ligada à segurança do sistema internacional e pode ser afetada por qualquer ameaça ao uso dos mares.

Atualmente, mais de dois bilhões de pessoas vivem à distâncias de até 100 km de uma linha costeira. Pelos mares circulam aproximadamente 50 mil navios de porte oceânico, que transportam 80% do comércio mundial. Todos os anos, quase dois bilhões de toneladas de petróleo (60% de todo o petróleo produzido) são transportados por via marítima.

As rotas marítimas de interesse imediato para o Brasil incluem a da América do Sul, com ramificações para o Pacífico, a América do Norte e a Europa, e as da África Ocidental e do Cabo da Boa Esperança. Contudo, nossos interesses comerciais estão se deslocando para a Ásia e passando a incluir países como China, Japão, Índia, Coréia do Sul e Indonésia.

Os interesses marítimos do Brasil não estão limitados à área vital, constituída pela “Amazônia Azul”.

A área primária de influência do Poder Naval brasileiro abrange todo o Atlântico Sul, entre a América do Sul e a África, bem como parte do Oceano Antártico. A área secundária inclui o Mar do Caribe e parte do Pacífico Sul, nas proximidades do litoral sul-americano.

O Brasil necessita de uma Marinha oceânica, capaz de operar em toda a extensão do Atlântico Sul, contando para isso com os meios e a capacidade de apoio logístico necessários. É essencial que o Brasil disponha de meios diversificados, para exercer a vigilância e a defesa das águas sob jurisdição nacional, bem como manter a segurança das linhas de comunicação marítima.

A pirataria é uma grave ameaça ao uso pacífico dos mares, que pode tornar necessário o emprego de forças navais. No Atlântico Sul, até hoje só foram confirmados ataques a navios no litoral de países africanos situados no Golfo da Guiné. Nos últimos anos, a maioria dos casos tem ocorrido na região conhecida como “Chifre da África” (Golfo de Áden e litoral da Somália).

A proteção das atividades marítimas em escala global excede a capacidade de um só país, mesmo se for uma superpotência. Por isso, a Marinha dos EUA lançou, em 2005, a iniciativa denominada Parceria Marítima Global (mais conhecida como “A Marinha dos mil navios”), confirmada pela nova Estratégia Marítima norte-americana em 2007. A interrupção de atividades marítimas vitais pode causar sérios danos à economia do Brasil. Além de incrementar a cooperação com a Parceria Marítima Global, é de extrema relevância para nosso País envidar esforços em favor da constituição de uma “Parceria Marítima Regional do Atlântico Sul”, envolvendo as Marinhas de ambos os lados deste oceano.

O Poder Marítimo de uma nação pode ser definido como a capacidade que esta tem de utilizar o mar em benefício de sua soberania e de seus interesses nacionais. Ao Poder Naval, componente militar do Poder Marítimo, compete prover a segurança dos demais componentes deste poder, em tempo de paz ou de guerra.

A natureza do Poder Naval é dupla, pois este é também o componente marítimo do Poder Militar. No Brasil, país-continente que tem pouca mentalidade marítima, embora tenha amplos interesses marítimos a defender, é comum o erro de considerar a Marinha de Guerra apenas como parte das Forças Armadas.

O Brasil deve desenvolver uma estratégia marítima de âmbito mundial, capaz de viabilizar um ciclo sustentado de crescimento econômico e desenvolvimento social. Em tal contexto, caberá ao Poder Naval, revitalizado e fortalecido, garantir a segurança dos demais componentes do Poder Marítimo brasileiro.

Eduardo Italo Pesce – Especialista em Relações Internacionais, professor da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro e colaborador permanente da Escola de Guerra Naval.

Fonte: Monitor Mercantil Digital

Prezado Marino este post sobre Riverine Force é preocupante, estive em Assunción a .... E vi por lá para, meu espanto, duas embarcações americanas (USNAVY) tipo PBR. Não dava para se aproximar, assuntei pelo trapiche, soube que os caras estão por lá desde 2001. Porquê seria ?

Pq será que os EUA criaram uma Riverine Force??????
Boa pergunta, não?
Eles disseram que era para usar no Iraque, nos rios Tigre e Eufrates.
Vc acredita?

É obvio que não. Colômbia!!!!!

A total of 22
Gap countries will be out of the projected range of Navy riverine
force capabilities, including hot spots like Burma, Colombia, Iraq,
North Korea, Nigeria, Venezuela, and Vietnam.15 This undermines the
Navy's assertion that it wants a viable brown-water Navy.

Pertinho, pertinho... e pronto para "eventualidades" ...

Pois é.

Marino escreveu:Pq será que os EUA criaram uma Riverine Force??????
Boa pergunta, não?
Eles disseram que era para usar no Iraque, nos rios Tigre e Eufrates.
Vc acredita?

Mas os caras ainda estão em Assunción ?

Resolvi postar neste tópico, para não abrir outro, bem como pelo fato de estar relacionado ao campo das táticas e ações navais. Houve uma época em que o Brasil usou o sistema Astros como arma anti-navio, com cabeça de submunições, o Irã em sua estratégia de guerra assimétrica naval, com o objetivo de bloquear o estreito que separ o golfo do Mar do Arábia. Agora eles desenvolveram um balístico com guiagem terminal, o Khalij Fars" (Persian Gulf) pode ser mais um blefe iraniano o míssil pode não acertar nada, se apenas um balístico incapaz de acertar um alvo móvel. Aqui vão os links. Vale a pena usar um balistico como míssil antinavio.

http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/

http://uskowioniran.blogspot.com/

Pessoal,

Embora os submarinos convencionais sejam aptos para patrulharm pontos fixos, se uma FT imprimir velocidades altas quase que contantes (e grande parte das marinhas do 1 Mundo tem essa capacidade-o que inclui navios tanque, escoltas com 2 turbinas e P. As nucleares) como velocidades acima de 25, 26 kts, praticamente não anulariam o poder desses submarinos?

Marino escreveu:Pq será que os EUA criaram uma Riverine Force??????
Boa pergunta, não?
Eles disseram que era para usar no Iraque, nos rios Tigre e Eufrates.
Vc acredita?

Que nada Marino. É para patrulhar os Everglades...A Flórida possui riquezas incalculáveis... Mas isto é coisa de neurótico anti-americano, bla,bla,bla.

Abraços!

knigh7 escreveu:Pessoal,

Embora os submarinos convencionais sejam aptos para patrulharm pontos fixos, se uma FT imprimir velocidades altas quase que contantes (e grande parte das marinhas do 1 Mundo tem essa capacidade-o que inclui navios tanque, escoltas com 2 turbinas e P. As nucleares) como velocidades acima de 25, 26 kts, praticamente não anulariam o poder desses submarinos?

Olá Knigh7

O submarinos, sejam eles convencionais ou nucleares, de fato procuram não se mover a mais do que alguns poucos nós de velocidade quando em situação de combate, pois caso contrário suas emissões de ruído aumentariam muito e eles passariam a ser alvos relativamente fáceis para o inimigo. Por isso eles precisam manobrar previamente para se colocar "no caminho" da FT inimiga, que ao passar por eles seria atacada. Isto evidencia a grande importância dos sistemas de detecção e rastreio do inimigo, bem como das comunicações, para que se possa obter o bom aproveitamento de uma força de submarinos.

No caso de sub´s convencionais, após passar (se conseguir passar) a FT estará livre a ameaça, a menos que esteja em uma área de partulha por onde irá circular continuamente. Por isso, para aumentar a chance de algum sub estar na posição correta e não permitir que o inimigo passe incólume, é muito importante contar com vários subs em patrulha formando uma rede da qual o inimigo não tem como se desviar. Por isso os subs convencionais são considerados muito mais eficientes quando operam em grupo. Já no caso de submarinos nucleares é possível esperar a FT inimiga se afastar, aumentar a velocidade e "dar a volta", colocando-se novamente "no caminho" dela. Este é um dos motivos deles serem mais eficientes que os convencionais, e por isso ser necessário um menor número deles.


Um abraço,


Leandro G. card