NOTICIAS SUB NUCLEAR BRASILEIRO

[Túlio]

Quem é contra, só pode ser uma coisa, anti-patriota/anti-brasileiro.

X2! Bem por aí (Goldenberg vendilhão!!!)...

[thelmo rodrigues]

Quem é contra, só pode ser uma coisa, anti-patriota/anti-brasileiro.

X2! Bem por aí (Goldenberg vendilhão!!!)...

"POWS!" Mas, esse aí já é figurinha carimbada há muito tempo!

[cassiosemasas]

Portal da Globo - G1
Acordo entre USP e Marinha cria curso de engenharia nuclear em Iperó
Prédio será erguido no terreno do Centro Experimental Aramar.

10/05/2012 09h15

ta ai ja sei para que area vou fazer meu segundo Curso superior!!!!

[Sávio Ricardo]

Portal da Globo - G1
Acordo entre USP e Marinha cria curso de engenharia nuclear em Iperó
Prédio será erguido no terreno do Centro Experimental Aramar.

10/05/2012 09h15

ta ai ja sei para que area vou fazer meu segundo Curso superior!!!!

E pensar que com meu curso superior posso fazer pós em Geração de energia Nuclear...

[Marino]

Postado pelo Delta no fórum irmão:



 Re: Programa de Submarinos da MB
Divirtam-se!

Citação:
IMAGINE: ARGENTINA INVADES FALKLAND ISLANDS, BRAZIL BACKS DECISION

By: MICHAEL MORAN
Date: APRIL 16 , 2012

If macroeconomic policy bedevils efforts by Europe and the United States to keep Brazil “on side” in global affairs, Brazil’s very slow maturation as a traditional great power poses another dilemma. While its troops have a long record of joining international humanitarian actions under the UN flag, including a leadership role in the Haiti mission during the late 1990s, Brazil’s troops have not been in combat since the last year of World War II, when they sent an infantry brigade to join Allied forces in Europe.

President Rousseff, too, seems as an unlikely champion of a military buildup. Four decades ago, the Brazilian military dictatorship tortured her when she was a young guerrilla fighting their rule. Yet, starting under Lula and slowly accelerating, Brazil has significantly expanded its military power—particularly its naval power. This will change the dynamics of the southern Atlantic significantly, creating a true Brazilian zone of influence extending deep into the ocean above the oil riches recently discovered there. But it also means that, for the United States and Europe, accustomed to dictating events on the high seas—particularly in the Atlantic—some important facts will change, especially with regard to the long-running Falklands/Malvinas dispute.


Imagine, for a moment, a British admiral’s nightmare scenario: in the not-too-distant future, a nearly bankrupt Argentine government invades the oil-rich Falkland Islands. For the second time in half a century, Las Malvinas—the islands of Latin America regarded as a stolen piece of Argentina—spark a war meant to divert public attention from the Argentine government’s economic failings.

With twenty-first century budget cuts biting hard, the British, at the moment, have no aircraft carrier. Argentina retired its own carrier in the late 1960s. Yet, unlike 1982 when Britain’s prime minister Margaret Thatcher dispatched a flotilla to retake the islands the last time Argentina seized them, this time the South Atlantic is anything but empty. It’s home to a Brazilian carrier, the São Paulo, along with a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines being built in partnership with Argentina.

In effect, these weapons give Brazil the ability to impose an updated version of the Monroe Doctrine on regional waters. Call it the “Lula Doctrine.” With its new confidence and military ambition, Brazil is a vocal advocate of Argentina’s claim on Las Malvinas. While few can imagine Britain and Brazil ever coming to blows, signs of a very different reality for Britain are starting to take shape.

Brazil’s 2009 decision to build a fleet of five nuclear attack subs took Western military experts by surprise. Expected to start entering service in 2016, the submarines promise to dramatically alter the balance of power in the South Atlantic. Lula, who led the push for the nuclear sub program, said before leaving office that the subs were “a necessity for a country that not only has the maritime coast that we have but also has the petroleum riches that were recently discovered in the deep sea pre-salt layer.”

The last time this scenario played out, Britain won the day and the United States backed its European ally—even privately offering to lend it one of America’s huge aircraft carriers (an offer turned down because of the complexities of operating one on such short notice). Back in 1982, when the Argentine junta led by General Leopoldo Galtieri invaded the islands, Britain mustered a small but viable fleet of aircraft carriers, submarines, and surface ships to support a Royal Marine landing force that retook the islands. The retaking of the Falklands became emblematic of the determination of then prime minister Margaret Thatcher that the once-mighty British military not sink to third-class status. Yet it also left a deep scar on the Latin American psyche. Brazil and other Latin American countries backed Argentina during the war but had little real ability to help militarily. In particular, the region never forgot the single most deadly action of the war: the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, a hulking relic of World War II, by a British nuclear attack submarine, killing 323 sailors.

Until recently, experts regarded the Falkland Islands as an unlikely place for further trouble. But the discovery of oil in the North Falklands Basin in 2007 changed this. As a result of Argentina’s near-perpetual state of bankruptcy and Brazil’s new assertiveness on the world stage, sensitivities over the disputed islands have risen. In January 2011, for instance, Brazil refused a small British warship, HMS Clyde, permission to dock in Rio de Janeiro. Neighboring Uruguay turned away the British destroyer HMS Gloucester in 2010. In Britain, meanwhile, the commander of the 1982 Falklands fleet, Admiral Sir John Woodward, published an op-ed in June warning that current defense cuts likely would leave the Falklands helpless in the face of a new Argentine invasion, leading to political pressure to reinforce the British garrison.

But Brazil’s submarines change the naval balance of power in the region even more dramatically than Britain’s own defense woes. British strategists worry that Brazil may now demand that foreign powers simply steer clear of its backyard as the United States did in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Brazilian officials have been careful not to portray the subs as a response to any outside threat as they continue to support Argentina’s Malvinas claim in international bodies. Gentle giant or not, Brazil’s backyard will have to be respected.

http://www.commandposts.com/2012/04/ima ... -decision/

_________________
"Apenas o mais sábio e o menos sábio nunca mudam de opinião."

[thelmo rodrigues]

Gentle giant or not, Brazil’s backyard will have to be respected.

Para mim o fecho de ouro desse texto.

[Izaias Maia]

O quintal do Brasil terá de ser respeitado...

[WalterGaudério]

O quintal do Brasil terá de ser respeitado...

Parafraseando o comandante Marino, teremos o Lacus Brasilis.

[Andre Correa]

With twenty-first century budget cuts biting hard, the British, at the moment, have no aircraft carrier. Argentina retired its own carrier in the late 1960s. Yet, unlike 1982 when Britain’s prime minister Margaret Thatcher dispatched a flotilla to retake the islands the last time Argentina seized them, this time the South Atlantic is anything but empty. It’s home to a Brazilian carrier, the São Paulo, along with a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines being built in partnership with Argentina.

Que parceria é essa? Acho que o autor precipitou-se um pouco na sede de elogiar...

[Boss]

Parceria...

O deles já sumiu do noticiário, como previsto. Durou uma semana no La Nación e voltou pra tumba, exceto na cabeça do Mr. CITEFA e seus asseclas...

O nosso...

[WalterGaudério]

Parceria...

O deles já sumiu do noticiário, como previsto. Durou uma semana no La Nación e voltou pra tumba, exceto na cabeça do Mr. CITEFA e seus asseclas...

O nosso...

Pois é. O cidadão apesar de bem intencionado, viajou na batatinha. Houve uma notícia desse naipe no fim de 2009, ou no início de 2010. Mas foi só um rumor.

O que fica, e deve ser levado em consideração, é que nós entramos na equação.

Na verdade, sem me alongar muito, nós estávamos na equação em 1982..., foi esse o motivo do Sr. Alexander Haig(secretário de estado americano durante a crise das Malvinas) ter "subido pelas paredes" qdo. os ingleses manifestaram sua idéia de um ataque ao continente durante a guerra.

[pampa_01]

Nós iriamos partir para cima dos ingleses, caso ele tivessem atacado o continente?
Mas me digam uma coisa, qual era a nossa REAL capacidade de fazer isso nos idos de 1982?

Att

[WalterGaudério]

Nós iriamos partir para cima dos ingleses, caso ele tivessem atacado o continente?
Mas me digam uma coisa, qual era a nossa REAL capacidade de fazer isso nos idos de 1982?

Att

Força de Submarinos, com 3 deles em alto mar + 3 em condições de suspender em questão de 72h, e os outros 2 condições de suspender em até 2 semanas.

Não faltava munição.

[thelmo rodrigues]

Nós iriamos partir para cima dos ingleses, caso ele tivessem atacado o continente?
Mas me digam uma coisa, qual era a nossa REAL capacidade de fazer isso nos idos de 1982?

Att

Força de Submarinos, com 3 deles em alto mar + 3 em condições de suspender em questão de 72h, e os outros 2 condições de suspender em até 2 semanas.

Não faltava munição.

Caraca!

[JT8D]

Força de Submarinos, com 3 deles em alto mar + 3 em condições de suspender em questão de 72h, e os outros 2 condições de suspender em até 2 semanas.

Não faltava munição.

Caraca!

O Figueiredo disse diretamente para o Alexander Haig que o Brasil não aceitaria uma invasão no continente. Eu acho que ele não estava brincando.

[]´s,

JT