Sobre o plano do trump de salvar a economia deles. Uma opinião que achei interessante. Pra quem quer saber pra onde vai a economia americana.
Pelo visto vai ter altissima inflação por lá.
Pq o problema da crise atual é OFERTA! e o trump decidiu dar fix nisso aumentando a DEMANDA!
What? No, people not going out and buying stuff is textbook lack of demand.
An economic downturn is going to be caused by lack of consumer spending, that's absolutely a demand-side problem.
No.
I'm sorry to get all professorial on you, but maybe this needs baby steps to explain.
Demand & Supply
First off, to be clear, GDP means the quantity of total goods produced and sold in an economy. "Sold" means a transaction - there is a demander and there is a supplier. It is a two-sided thing, not a one-sided thing.
Remember definitions:
Demand = total quantity buyers (be they consumers, firms, or government) are willing and able to buy.
Supply = total quality producers are willing and able to produce and sell.
What is deficient at this moment is not the willingness or ability to buy, but the ABILITY TO PRODUCE and the ABILITY TO SELL.
Firms cannot produce because workers aren't allowed to show up for work. Firms cannot sell because shops are not allowed to open. THAT is the problem we have. It is not lack of demand, it is lack of supply.
Does that make sense?
Demand & Supply Shocks
Let's take it to another level. Again, forgive the pedantry, but sit down for a moment with with a conventional S&D diagram.
Economic downturns means GDP goes down - that's a decline in the amount of total goods produced and sold. You measure that on the horizontal quantity axis.
There are two ways quantity sold suddenly declines from your initial position - either (1) there is less demand (demand curve shifts left) or (2) there is less supply (supply curve shifts left). They have independent causes.
(1) Demand shock - this is the conventional case in many recessions. Demand suddenly declines because of e.g. lack of consumer confidence, wealth declines (people try to save more to make up for it), rising interest rates (firms shelve investment spending), tax increases, cuts in government spending, or rising exchange rates (prefer to import).
The 2001* & 2008 recessions were conventional demand shocks from evaporating wealth (stock market in 2001 & real estate market in 2008 going belly up) and (in 2008) rising interest rates (in a liquidity crunch), prompting people to suddenly try to save more and firms to cut back projects.
(* - the channel for the 2001 recession is actually trickier; in my estimation, the channel by which it hit was initially via supply. I can get into more details why, but essentially during the dot-com bubble a lot of workers and capitalists were underpaid, foregoing real wages and profits to ride on the stock market's rising value, until reality hit).
(2) Supply shock - this is the cause of both of the recessions of the 1970s. Supply shocks are typically caused by suddenly rising costs, e.g. energy price spikes, bad harvests, unexpectedly high wage or profit demands, etc.
What we have here is a supply shock. Firms cannot stay open, they cannot produce, they cannot pay people enough to produce because people are forbidden from showing up at their job. This is a massive supply shock.
In a demand-driven downturn, goods would be piling unsold, and firms would have their warehouses filling up. That's not the case here. Goods aren't piling up unsold. Goods aren't being produced to begin with. It is not for lack of consumer orders - orders are there, but workers aren't showing up to work.
You respond to demand-shock and supply-shocks differently. The number one lesson from the 1970s is that you don't respond to supply-driven recessions by increasing demand - you just end up with stagflation, i.e. inflation and unemployment.
How can you tell?
Now let's take this another step further. Granted that GDP downturns can be caused by either demand shocks or supply shocks, how do you, in practical terms, tell the difference?
If you only look at GDP (i.e. quantity), you can't. Both demand and supply shocks drive GDP down. But there is an additional clue: prices.
Do this diagramatically. Let's go two steps:
(1) Suppose there is a demand-driven recession (like in say 2008). Demand curve shifts left - diagramatically, both quantity and price goes down.
(2) Suppose there is a supply-driven recession (like in say 1978). Supply curve shifts left - diagramatically, quantity goes down but price goes up.
So looking at GDP and CPI simultaneously give us a clue to the situation we're in. Are prices declining? We don't know yet - as the BLS has not yet measured CPI yet (and it is going to be tough to measure, since the BLS uses real store shelf prices to measure CPI, but if stores are closed, not sure how they're going to adjust their methods. EDIT: just checked, BLS's website is down for maintenance for the day, LOL). But at least in online stores, it is apparent that prices are not falling. Firms are desperate to keep up with orders, they aren't trying to get rid of accumulating unsold items. This isn't a demand-driven recession.
Granted, it is all very fuzzy in that we have yet to measure it, and there is panic buying, adjustment of habits, etc. But certainly demand is not the immediate problem.
But there is an immediate clue we see that we don't need to actually measure: factories are shut, shops are closed. That is by order of the authorities. If you're confused, I remind: supply is the producers willingness & ABILITY to produce & sell. We don't need to wait for CPI measures to see that firms are having a production & selling problem that is entirely due to artificial restrictions has NOTHING to do with the amount of consumer orders they're getting.
How do you respond?
As I averred to earlier, once you decipher the nature of the downturn, you should respond according to it.
(1) Suppose you have a demand-driven recession. Demand curve shifts left (quantity & price declines). Suppose government responds to it by typical demand boosting - lowering interest rates, lowering taxes, increasing government spending, etc. Then demand curve shifts right (quantity & price increases). We compensate the recession exactly, and we return quantity & price to where they were before. This is the right thing to do in this situation.
(2) Suppose you have a supply-driven recession. Supply curve shifts left (quantity declines & price increases). Suppose government responds to it the same way (boosting demand, quantity increases & prices increases again). So it is responding to a supply shift with a demand shift. We are not compensating shifts exactly, we are not returning to where the situation was before - we might restore quantity, but prices will be twice as high as before. We get the start of inflation. Or at least a one-time increase in prices. This is the wrong thing to do in this situation.
In real terms are people better off? Probably not. Quantity may be returned, but their purchasing power is declining because of your attempt to respond to it via demand-boosting. The usual inflationary mechanism goes into motion. Even if quantity is restored, my real wages are lower, so I will demand a wage increase to make up for higher prices.
Those higher wages now constitute an additional supply shock to firms - they will respond to rising wage costs as they normally do, by lay-offs and curbing production. So once again, supply curve goes down and quantity declines (& prices go up some more). Once again government needs to respond again. If it responds again by raising demand, that raises quantity again (& prices even more). My real wages are now lower than before, once more I demand my wages be adjusted for inflation, etc.
By responding to the initial supply shock wrongly, the government is setting inflation in motion, an acceleration mechanism when prices start climbing setting off a chain of additional supply shocks. And if it responds in the same kind again, inflation just accelerates further while quantity just stagnates. You're forced run twice or thrice as fast in a desperate attempt just to remain in the same place. (diagramatically, think of it as a series of supply curve shifts to the left followed by a series of demand curve shifts to the right. Q remains in place, but P rises continuously)
At some point, inflation expectations set in and begin to be written into wage contracts. At that point, the dance is over - you're not even having any effect on quantity anymore. Demand-boosting policy reactions are counteracted by supply shifts before they can even begin. Quantity now falls permanently - you can't prevent unemployment from rising while inflation becomes permanent, i.e. stagflation.
That's the 1970s in a nutshell for you.
Lesson: don't make the initial mistake. Diagnose the problem correctly before you respond to it. Think before you act. Be functional - tailor your response to the nature of the problem.
Basic Econ 101. I hope this makes sense.
You seem to be arguing against a strawman that supports UBI and nothing else.
Which is very odd, who exactly do you think is suggesting such a thing? Just because it doesn't solve every issue does not mean it wouldn't be very much needed, just as a component of a larger economic stimulus that attacks the issue from multiple angles.
That's what's in this bill. And should not be in the bill.
It is $1 trillion poorly spent - two-thirds completely wasted, one-third barely worth it. If you transferred that two-thirds to bulk up the one-third that need it, e.g. actually pay wages of the suddenly unemployed and to support small businesses that have been forced to shut down, you would at least give relief. This way it accomplishes nothing.
Two-thirds of that trillion is going to people like me. There's no reason to give me $1,000. I am employed, I can work from home, I have more than enough money to spend, there's no reason to give me any more money. It does nothing for businesses in my neighborhood - I cannot buy more, because they cannot open.
A windfall of an extra $1,000 just means I will bid up the price of toilet paper online, and set us down the road to inflation.
What I suspect is driving the supporters of the this bill - I mean the real supporters, not folks like you who are simply confused about economics - is a desire to prop up the stock market. It is because they hope people like me, people who don't need it and who cannot spend the money on goods and services because goods are services are not to be, will use it to buy stocks. What else am I going to do with the money? It is either bidding for toilet paper or bidding for stocks.
This is a massive indirect way the government can undertake a large purchase of stocks.
This is a poorly-thought response to the current crisis. It's aim (and certainly its effect) will be merely to boost the stock market and prop up the wealth of capitalists. Because rising stock prices do nothing for most firms at the moment - under current conditions, when they are operating far under capacity (if at all), they are not going to suddenly expanding capacity and hiring people that are not allowed show up for work.
Now, you may argue it is preventive - in the sense, that falling stocks may make middle class bourgeois (*grumble, vile greedy grumble*) timid sometime in the future, and so at least by using massive amounts of tax money to prop up their wealth portfolios means they won't (sometime in the future) get worried about their savings and start saving more (i.e. a real demand decline). But we're not even close to that yet.
What we have now, what we have immediately, is a serious supply shock, that needs to be addressed directly. And this scheme constitutes an erroneous demand-response that is not addressing what is going on, and indeed setting things in the wrong direction.