Fórum Defesa Brasil

The first 5 Ticos were offer to the Royal Navy as a stop gap measure to replace the retiring Type 42s, before the commissioning of the Type 45s. I guess they didn't want them because they want to spend as much money as possible on new hulls rather than rent old ones.

These Ticos should still be pretty good for many navies in the world. Too bad no one can afford them, or willing to afford them.

old escreveu:El penultimo de los Burkes USS Gridley (DDG 101) realizara proximamente las pruebas finales de calificacion de combate con fuego real junto con Fragatas F300 y F100.

El ultimo sera el USS Sampson y cerrara la fabricacion de esta serie de destructores.




http://www.gogibraltarsite.com/Mediterr ... lNews.html

JLRC escreveu:

old escreveu:El penultimo de los Burkes USS Gridley (DDG 101) realizara proximamente las pruebas finales de calificacion de combate con fuego real junto con Fragatas F300 y F100.

El ultimo sera el USS Sampson y cerrara la fabricacion de esta serie de destructores.




http://www.gogibraltarsite.com/Mediterr ... lNews.html

Julgo que esta informação não está correcta. A série deverá continuar até ao DDG 112.
Assim teremos:

DDG 103 Truxtun (Assentº da quilha em 11-04-05)
DDG 104 Sterett (Assentº da quilha em 17-11-05)
DDG 105 Dewey (Assentº da quilha em 10-02-06)
DDG 106 Stockdale (Assentº da quilha em 08-10-06)
DDG 107 Gravely (Encomendado em 13-09-02)
DDG 108 Wayne E. Meyer (Encomendado em 13-09-02)
DDG 109 Sem nome (Encomendado em 13-09-02)
DDG 110 Sem nome (Encomendado em 13-09-02)
DDG 111 Sem nome (Encomendado em 13-09-02)
DDG 112 Sem nome (Encomendado em 13-09-02)

Nota : O DDG 103 Truxtun, em construção nos estaleiros NGSS Ingals, Pascagoula, sofreu no dia 20-05-06 um violento incêndio na parte eléctrica, causando prejuízos de alguns milhões de dólares.

http://acquisition.navy.mil/programs/ships/ddg_51

talharim escreveu:Vamos especular quem ficará com as 62 AB para lá de 2026 ?

Portugal com 4,Brasil com 4,etc.....

Navy Terminates Littoral Combat Ship 3

From the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Public Affairs

WASHINGTON (NNS) -- Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter announced April 12 that the Department of the Navy is terminating construction of the third Littoral Combat Ship (LCS 3) for convenience under the termination clause of the contract because the Navy and Lockheed Martin could not reach agreement on the terms of a modified contract.
The Navy issued a stop-work order on construction on LCS 3 in January following a series of cost overruns on LCS 1 and projection of cost increases on LCS 3, which are being built by Lockheed Martin under a cost-plus contract.
The Navy announced in March that it would consider lifting the stop-work order on LCS 3 if the Navy and Lockheed Martin could agree on the terms for a fixed price incentive agreement by mid-April. The Navy worked closely with Lockheed Martin to try to restructure the agreement for LCS 3 to more equitably balance cost and risk, but could not come to terms and conditions that were acceptable to both parties.
The Navy remains committed to completing construction on LCS 1 under the current contract with Lockheed Martin. LCS 2 and 4 are under contract with General Dynamics, and the Navy will monitor their cost performance closely. The Navy intends to continue with the plan to assess costs and capabilities of LCS 1 and LCS 2 and transition to a single seaframe configuration in fiscal year 2010 after an operational assessment and considering all relevant factors. General Dynamics’ ships will continue on a cost-plus basis as long as its costs remain defined and manageable. If the cost performance becomes unacceptable, then General Dynamics will be subject to similar restructuring requirements.
“LCS continues to be a critical warfighting requirement for our Navy to maintain dominance in the littorals and strategic choke points around the world,” said Winter. “While this is a difficult decision, we recognize that active oversight and strict cost controls in the early years are necessary to ensuring we can deliver these ships to the fleet over the long term.”

Navy Terminates Littoral Combat Ship 3


(Source: US Department of Defense; issued April 12, 2007)



Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter announced today that the Department of the Navy is terminating construction of the third Littoral Combat Ship (LCS 3) for convenience under the Termination clause of the contract because the Navy and Lockheed Martin could not reach agreement on the terms of a modified contract.

The Navy issued a stop-work order on construction on LCS 3 in January following a series of cost overruns on LCS 1 and projection of cost increases on LCS 3, which are being built by Lockheed Martin under a cost-plus contract. The Navy announced in March that it would consider lifting the stop-work order on LCS 3 if the Navy and Lockheed Martin could agree on the terms for a fixed price incentive agreement by mid-April.

The Navy worked closely with Lockheed Martin to try to restructure the agreement for LCS-3 to more equitably balance cost and risk, but could not come to terms and conditions that were acceptable to both parties.

The Navy remains committed to completing construction on LCS 1 under the current contract with Lockheed Martin. LCS 2 and 4 are under contract with General Dynamics, and the Navy will monitor their cost performance closely.

The Navy intends to continue with the plan to assess costs and capabilities of LCS 1 and LCS 2 and transition to a single seaframe configuration in fiscal year 10 after an operational assessment and considering all relevant factors.

General Dynamics’ ships will continue on a cost-plus basis as long as its costs remain defined and manageable. If the cost performance becomes unacceptable, then General Dynamics will be subject to similar restructuring requirements.

“LCS continues to be a critical warfighting requirement for our Navy to maintain dominance in the littorals and strategic choke points around the world,” said Winter. “While this is a difficult decision, we recognize that active oversight and strict cost controls in the early years are necessary to ensuring we can deliver these ships to the fleet over the long term.” (ends)



Lockheed Martin Expresses Disappointment Over U.S. Navy Termination of Littoral Combat Ship Contract


(Source: Lockheed Martin Corporation; issued April 12, 2007)



BETHESDA, Md. --- Lockheed Martin Corporation today expressed disappointment over the U.S. Navy's decision to terminate its contract for construction of the second of two new Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), a radically new class of surface combatants.

The Navy announced the action at the expiration of a 90-day stop work order imposed on the second ship in January to allow the service time to review costs associated with construction of the first LCS. On March 15, Navy Secretary Donald Winter announced that the stop work order would be lifted only if Lockheed Martin agreed to accept a fixed price incentive contract for its second ship.

"As a team of men and women who hold ourselves accountable for our actions, we are greatly disappointed by the cost growth experienced on the first LCS and by our inability to reach a satisfactory conclusion with our Navy customer on a path forward for the second ship," said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer Bob Stevens. "We committed to a course of action that was intended to break the long-standing cycle of first-in-class ship cost growth and, while achieving several important program objectives, did not meet that goal. Although we successfully maintained the ship's schedule and improved on its design, cost growth also occurred.

“Our team is understandably frustrated that, having invested nearly three years of dedicated effort and significant corporate resources to bring LCS 1 to within 20 percent of completion, we will not have the opportunity to apply lessons learned to a second ship, see this program through to conclusion and deliver a superior capability to sailors as they meet unique challenges defending our nation's interests in the coastal waters battle space where the U.S. Navy will increasingly face challenges in the future."

Stevens said a Lockheed Martin team worked diligently over the past month to develop a proposal that responded to the Navy's request to restructure the contact for the second LCS ship. "We believe that our proposal was fully consistent with the Secretary's stated desire to bring the benefits of increased competition to shipbuilding while holding the Navy's industrial partners accountable for cost performance within their control," he stated.

Lockheed Martin's LCS team -- including naval architect Gibbs & Cox and shipbuilders Bollinger Shipyards and Marinette Marine -- was one of two industry groups competitively selected in May 2004 to each design and build two ships for evaluation by the Navy. The Lockheed Martin team was cleared to commence detailed design and construction of the first ship in December 2004; the keel for LCS 1, FREEDOM, was laid in June 2005 at Marinette Marine in Wisconsin, where the ship was christened and launched in September 2006.

In June 2006, the Navy awarded the Lockheed Martin team a cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) contract to commence work on its second ship, LCS 3, at Bollinger Shipyards in Louisiana.


Headquartered in Bethesda, Md., Lockheed Martin employs about 140,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services. The corporation reported 2006 sales of $39.6 billion.

-ends-

Showdown Ends in Cancellation
U.S. Navy Scraps LCS 3 After Dispute With Lockheed

By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS


The U.S. Navy’s abrupt decision to cancel construction of a Lockheed Martin Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) leaves many wondering what it means to Lockheed, the LCS program, shipbuilders, service acquisition and the fleet itself.
Navy Secretary Donald Winter, who has pledged to use any method at his disposal to hold down shipbuilding costs, has repeatedly urged industry to modernize and find new ways to build ships.
But shipbuilders are digging in, tired of the badgering from Navy officials and lawmakers alike. They say too little attention is given to shipboard equipment and other things that are sending ship costs skyrocketing.
“Both sides are sending messages that they need to change the way they do business,” said Byron Callan, a defense industry analyst.
The decision capped a month of negotiations in which the Navy sought to change the contract for LCS 3, the second Lockheed ship, from a cost-plus to a fixed-cost-plus-incentive model. On March 15, Winter declared that unless a “meeting of the minds” on a new contract could be reached, the Navy would cancel construction. On April 12, he made good on that threat.
The cancellation of LCS 3 was only the latest setback to the program, which envisions a 55-ship fleet of small, fast warships designed to counter threats in contested coastal waters.
At its inception in 2002, the program was viewed as a prime example of the transformational concepts envisioned by then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Adm. Vern Clark, Rumsfeld’s chief of naval operations, championed the LCS, promising a low-cost warship that would depend largely on a family of mission-specific “modules” of weapons, sensors and vehicles.
“I need it yesterday,” Clark told lawmakers, reporters, contractors and sailors alike.
When Adm. Mike Mullen succeeded Clark in 2005, he became just as emphatic in his support. But lately, “yesterday” is looking further off.
At the beginning of this year, the Navy had four LCS ships under contract and was authorized to buy two more. But in March, Winter said that more than $400 million authorized for the fifth and sixth ships would be used to cover cost overruns on the first four. The cancellation of LCS 3 means there are only three ships under construction.
Further, the Navy will scale back plans to ask for three ships in 2008 and six in 2009 to a likely two ships in ’08 and three in ’09.
That means that by 2010, when the service will decide on a single design for the remainder of the fleet, a total of eight ships will be in service, under construction or under contract, rather than the 15 envisioned just three months ago.
Winter’s cancellation decision follows an April 3 address at a Navy League symposium in Washington where he declared a policy of “tough love” with shipbuilders to hold down costs. The secretary has been deeply involved in the LCS program since the end of the year, when the Navy discovered that costs had grown unexpectedly on the USS Freedom (LCS 1), Lockheed’s first ship.
The ship, which was launched in September at Marinette Marine in Marinette, Wis., was originally planned to cost about $220 million. But design and production problems, coupled with a tight building schedule, have driven the price to between $350 million and $375 million by the Navy’s estimates. Others believe the cost could ultimately top $400 million.
In January, the Navy began a deep inquiry into the program to understand what was happening with costs on both Lockheed ships and two other ships being built by General Dynamics to a competing design. On Jan. 12, Winter issued a 90-day stop-work order on LCS 3, which was to be built at Lockheed’s second shipyard, Bollinger, in Lockport, La.
The stop-work order itself was an indication of the tough approach Winter is taking. Several industry sources said a less-formal move — even a phone call — would have had the same effect pending the Navy’s re-evaluation of the program.
A ‘Disastrous’ Decision?
“At first glance, this appears to be a disastrous decision by the secretary,” said Bob Work, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington who has long followed the LCS program.
“This obviously is part of the secretary’s tough-love approach to shipbuilders,” Work said. “But whether this is the program he should be putting so much uncertainty into is a really big question. It’s a blow to the program.”
Cancellation of the ship wasn’t the only option available to Winter. Other options included giving in on some of the negotiation points or restructuring the program to account for higher costs and longer building times — at least for the first ships.
Accounts of the failed negotiations varied, but sources said the primary sticking points revolved around price, assignment of risk and intellectual property issues.
The price gap at the break-off point in contract talks also was disputed, with some sources claiming the difference was $50 million to $60 million and others claiming a gap of only about $10 million.
The Navy’s leadership expressed confidence in the soundness of their actions.
“While this is a difficult decision, we recognize that active oversight and strict cost controls in the early years are necessary to ensuring we can deliver these ships to the fleet over the long term,” Winter said in a statement announcing the decision.
Bob Stevens, Lockheed’s president and chief executive officer, said in a statement released following Winter’s announcement that Lockheed was “greatly disappointed” and “frustrated” in the decision and sorry the company “will not have the opportunity … to see this program through to conclusion.”
Investment analysts generally applauded the decision for both the Navy and Lockheed.
“While losing the contract is clearly a disappointment, we do applaud the company for its financial discipline and in walking away from a fixed-price contract that could have been detrimental to shareholder value,” Merrill Lynch analyst Ron Epstein said in a note to his clients.
Callan agreed.
“Companies are saying they’re not going to take contracts their shareholders won’t tolerate,” he said. “For the Navy, they’ve got only so much to spend on their 313-ship fleet and they’ve got to hold the line on cost if they’re to meet their goal of recapitalizing the fleet.”
Many questioned Lockheed’s future in the program, which now puts the company one ship behind competitor General Dynamics. But Rear Adm. Chuck Goddard and Allison Stiller, the Navy’s top ship acquisition officer, speaking to reporters from the Pentagon about the decision, stressed that the number of ships would not affect the Navy’s ability to evaluate the designs.
“We hope and expect that both Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics will compete for … future LCS procurements,” Goddard said.
And while the cancellation decision doesn’t affect the General Dynamics ships, the Navy continued to put GD on notice. “We will continue to monitor General Dynamics’ performance on LCS 2 and 4,” Goddard said. “If GD experiences comparable growth, we will use a similar process to seek to restructure the contract.”
But the nature of Lockheed’s participation in shipbuilding programs — the company owns no shipyard — brings into question the future of integrators as lead ship contractors rather than shipbuilders like Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics.
Winter, in his April 3 address, said he wanted to do away with the lead system integrator approach to shipbuilding. “The Navy should be the lead integrator,” he said.
Analyst Epstein noted the development in his note to clients.
“We believe the termination points to a potential weakness in the system integrator model and suggests that domain expertise is of vital importance,” he wrote.
The Effect on the Fleet
Beyond the hard dollars-and-cents nature of the acquisition decisions lie further questions on how the cutback in LCS procurements will affect the Navy’s ability to integrate the ships into the fleet and develop the concept to maturity regardless of which design is ultimately built.
The questions include proving the Navy’s concept of operations, how the multi-ship manning system will function, how the mission modules will integrate into the ship, the simultaneous operation of multiple off-board manned and unmanned vehicles, the efficacy of a networked command-and-control system and the ability of the logistics train to keep the ships and their modules at peak combat efficiency.
The Navy is well aware of these issues and has spent a great deal of effort building simulation trainers and developing plans. But until the ships are in service, those concepts remain theoretical.
“The ships are a prototype for an entirely new type of battle-networked combatant,” Work said. “They have a host of operational innovations that we won’t be able to determine until we get the ships in the water.”
Further, the LCS ships comprise the biggest chunk — one sixth — of the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet.
“What has this move done to the Navy’s plan?” Work asked. “It appears to me the entire LCS program is now up in the air, and that means the entire 313-ship fleet is up in the air.”

Defense bill authorizes new sub and carrier

A House-passed measure may give Newport News yard a shot at cruisers.

WASHINGTON -- The House passed a defense bill Thursday that authorizes construction of an aircraft carrier and submarine, as well as gives troops a 3.5 percent pay raise.

The $503.8 billion bill also provides money aimed at speeding up plans to double sub production. And it would give Northrop Grumman Newport News an opening to build Navy cruisers for the first time in decades by requiring that the next generation of cruisers be nuclear-powered.

The annual spending blueprint, which sets policy for all military programs, also erects another hurdle to a long-range Navy proposal to move a nuclear carrier from Hampton Roads to Mayport, Fla.

The Navy has been studying that option since deciding to retire Florida's only carrier, the conventionally powered USS John F. Kennedy, last year. The Navy is conducting an environmental assessment to determine whether and how to equip Mayport Naval Station for nuclear ships.

But the House bill goes a step further by requiring the Navy to complete a separate study by Oct. 1 on the full costs of constructing nuclear sites and port improvements at Mayport.

The study would also require "a detailed assessment of alternative sites" for a nuclear carrier.

The defense authorization bill, which passed the House 397-27, largely mirrors the defense budget that President Bush proposed in February.

It provides about $2.8 billion to begin construction of the carrier Gerald Ford at Northrop Grumman Newport News, the nation's only carrier builder.

It also provides $2.5 billion for another Virginia-class sub, which is built jointly by Newport News and the Electric Boat shipyard in Connecticut.

But the House bill makes some changes that could trigger fights with the Bush administration.

The Pentagon, for example, requested authority to shrink the Navy's fleet of carriers from 11 to 10 temporarily - in 2013 and 2014 - to cover a gap before the Ford enters the fleet.

The White House maintains that the Navy can operate with 10 carriers "with acceptable risk," according to a statement of administration policy issued by the Office of Management and Budget. The House bill deletes that provision, but the issue is sure to be revived in coming years.

The House bill must still be reconciled with a coming Senate version. The Senate Armed Services Committee is scheduled to draft its own bill next week.

The House version would boost a proposed pay raise for troops from 3 percent to 3.5 percent, in an effort to keep military pay competitive with private-sector salaries. But the White House opposes the increase, saying it would cost $265 million more next year.

In a potential boost for the Newport News shipyard, the House bill would require that future cruisers be nuclear-powered. That would avoid the need for refuelings during deployments.

That provision would make the current builders of surface combatants dependent on a nuclear yard - either Newport News or Electric Boat - to help construct those ships.

cabeça de martelo escreveu:Desculpem-me o offtopic.
Padilha...tu tens um sósia cá em Portugal! Porra são mesmo parecidos, vejo-o de vens em quando no Hiper-mercado!