CONFLITO: CORÉIA DO NORTE x CORÉIA DO SUL

[Bolovo]

Sabem como funciona esse boost inicial que tira o missil do envolucro, antes no motor ser iniciado?

Chama-se "lançamento a frio" (cold launch), onde primeiro o míssil é expulso do canister com uma injeção de gás, ligando seu motor quando estiver totalmente do lado de fora. Já o "lançamento quente" (hot launch) difere-se pelo fato do míssil ligar o seu motor já dentro do canister.

[LeandroGCard]

Sabem como funciona esse boost inicial que tira o missil do envolucro, antes no motor ser iniciado?

Em geral o motor fica apoiado sobre algum tipo de suporte dentro do silo, e abaixo deste suporte é queimada uma carga de propelente de queima lenta que gera pressão e empurra a plataforma para fora, lançando o míssil no ar onde então o motor é acionado.

Em alguns sistemas a carga de propelente é menor e especificamente desenvolvida para gerar mais calor, só que está imersa em uma certa quantidade de água. A função dela é vaporizar esta água, e o vapor impulsiona o míssil para fora do silo. Só que neste caso da Coréia do Norte a fumaça inicial é preta (vapor d'água é branco)e isso indica que o sistema é o primeiro mesmo, onde a carga propelente é usada diretamente. E após o acionamento do motor do míssil vê-se um objeto caindo, provavelmente um componente da plataforma onde o míssil estava apoiado.


Leandro G. Card

[Grep]

Interessante, obrigado.

[Wingate]

VEJA implanta Novilíngua na redação. Vejam a nova definição de "bombardeiro".


Lançadores de bomba (?) dos EUA sobrevoaram fronteira norte-coreana


Veja.abril.com.br/mundo/lancadores-de-bomba-dos-eua-sobrevoaram-fronteira-norte-coreana/



https://abrilveja.files.wordpress.com/2 ... 453&crop=1


Wingate

[P44]

North Korea tests 'Scud'-based SRBM, air defence system

Gabriel Dominguez, London and Neil Gibson, London - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
31 May 2017



North Korea test-fired what appears to have been a new 'Scud'-based short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) on 29 May, shortly after announcing that it successfully tested what was probably an improved version of the country's Pongae-5 (also known as KN-06) surface-to-air missile (SAM) system.

The ballistic missile was fired in an easterly direction from an area near North Korea's eastern port city of Wonsan, in Kangwon Province, at around 0540 h local time and travelled a linear distance of about 400 km (249 miles) before falling into waters within Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Sea of Japan (also known as East Sea), according to Japanese, South Korean, and US officials.

The SRBM reached an altitude of 120 km (75 miles), according to South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The launch, which followed two other ballistic missiles tests by North Korea in as many weeks, was aimed at verifying a new type of precision guidance system and the reliability of a new mobile launch vehicle under different operational conditions, Pyongyang's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on 30 May.

KCNA said the test also demonstrated the flight stability of the missile, which landed within only 7 m of its target, and "reconfirmed the accuracy of velocity correction and attitude stabilisation system by a small heat jet engine in the middle flying section" of the missile. It added that the SRBM was also equipped with an advanced automated pre-launch sequence designed to "markedly reduce" the launching time.

North Korean state media released images of the missile being fired from a tracked transporter erector launcher (TEL) showing many similarities with the older Soviet 2U218 that was initially used for the 2K3 (SS-1B 'Scud A') missile system and the 2P19 initially used with the 9K72 El'brus (SS-1C 'Scud B') system.

The images also revealed that the recently tested missile was almost identical to the Hwasong-5 or Hwasong-6-based SRBMs - which are derivatives of the R-17 ('Scud B') - that were first displayed by North Korea during its parade on 15 April in Pyongyang to mark the 105th anniversary of the birth of the country's late founder, Kim Il-sung.

http://www.janes.com/article/70898/nort ... nce-system

[cabeça de martelo]

North Korea Stares Into the Abyss
All the signs are there: The U.S. is telling North Korea, in no uncertain terms, that war is approaching.

By George Friedman

The U.S. Navy has announced that the USS Nimitz will leave Bremerton, Washington, on June 1, for the Western Pacific. This is the third carrier battle group to be sent to the region – enough to support a broader military mission – and it will take roughly a week to get to its station, after which it will integrate with the fleet.
So here’s the situation: Soon the United States will have its naval force in waters near North Korea. It already has strategic bombers in Guam, and it already has fighter aircraft in Japan and South Korea.
The United States is preparing for war, which is still several weeks away – if indeed war actually breaks out. Between now and then, diplomacy will intensify. The international community will demand that North Korea abandon its nuclear program and allow inspectors to monitor the destruction of missiles, fissile material and reactors. And after Pyongyang refuses to heed those calls – which it probably will – the United States will have to decide whether it will strike.
Importantly, the United States doesn’t want to strike North Korea. (It hasn’t even wanted to meddle in peninsular affairs all that much since the Korean War.) All wars are complicated – and only those who ignore the history of war would think otherwise – but striking North Korea would require a particularly long and complicated air campaign, not to mention some potential ground operations.
And yet the United States is under pressure to strike. The pressure comes from the thought of a world in which North Korea has deliverable nuclear weapons. Pyongyang may not intend to use them or sell them right now, since its ultimate goal is survival, and having nuclear weapons deters attacks. But no one knows what North Korea will do in a decade or two. What North Korea does then may be determined by a person no one yet knows and whose behavior cannot be predicted. The U.S. government is thinking about what North Korean leaders intend to do later as much as it is thinking about what they might do now.

Not knowing what it might do later is what really scares the U.S. North Korea has been willing to sell technologies to third parties in the past. Perhaps its program will be used only for deterrence for generations. But what’s to stop Pyongyang from selling technologies to third parties, even if North Korea itself never intends to launch an attack against the United States? The United States can try to detect such sales, but detecting all of them is very difficult; there are plenty of ways to deliver these weapons, and there are plenty of people who would be willing to buy them.
The United States may be convinced, therefore, that the next few weeks will be its last opportunity to keep any of this from happening. More broadly, Washington may be convinced that this is a turning point for U.S. policy, shifting from a strategy in which it knows North Korea has no nuclear weapons to one in which it struggles to make sure North Korea doesn’t do something to hurt U.S. interests. However uncertain war can be, an unmolested North Korean nuclear program may be even more uncertain. Alternatively, the United States is also more likely to make economic concessions and political guarantees to North Korea than perhaps it once was. Either way, Washington can’t allow nuclear weapons to exist, and it can’t allow Pyongyang to determine what happens.
But, ironically, it is to some degree up to Pyongyang to see what happens next. The North Koreans calculated that now was the moment to make the rush from an advanced program to deliverable weapons. Their reasons for doing so are unclear. Perhaps it is because of the turmoil in Washington. Perhaps they knew they would inevitably cross the red line and decided to go for broke. Whatever the reason, they are now in a position where they probably can’t capitulate even if they wanted to. Kim Jong Un has made the nuclear program the foundation of his – and therefore the government’s – legitimacy. The country has little else to offer other than this symbol of power. If he were to capitulate, Kim would appear weak, and that is something he simply cannot afford.
If the goal of acquiring nuclear weapons is to inoculate the government against foreign threats, then abandoning the goal necessarily invites internal threats. Kim sits on top of a complex bureaucracy, which is terrified of him but also terrified of instability. Kim has to believe that even if the regime survives, he might be removed from power. And for all that is said about North Korea’s reclusion, Kim could not give in to the United States without his people knowing. Some news does filter into the North from South Korea, and even if the U.S. agreed to keep the capitulation secret, keeping political secrets in Washington is difficult, and never harder than today.
Kim has only bad choices, but for a few reasons, the least bad choice for him is war. First, it’s possible that the U.S. is bluffing and that nothing will come from this episode. Second, it’s possible that China or Russia will intervene to save him, though neither country is up to the task of fighting a conventional war with the U.S. (Neither country is all that interested in saving the Kim government either.) It’s possible that South Korea, afraid for Seoul, will block the attack. It’s possible that Japan will get involved. It’s possible that the U.S. attack will fail. It’s possible that the nuclear program is further along than everyone thinks and that that will deter an attack.
Barring this last scenario, it seems to me that the U.S. cannot refuse to go to war unless North Korea capitulates. North Korea cannot capitulate. Neither country wants to go to war, but neither can accept what is happening without war. My best guess is that North Korea currently does not have a weapon that could be readily delivered by stealth, and it would have to be demonstrated before an attack began, not after. I think we are looking at the prospect of a few weeks of quiet diplomacy and noisy public threats that will lead to war.
The signs are all there. The United States does not deploy the force it has deployed unless it’s serious. Such was the case in Desert Storm, in Kosovo, and in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. By sending the USS Nimitz, the U.S. is telling North Korea, in no uncertain terms, that war is approaching. Now, it is North Korea’s move. Pyongyang had been quiet for a few days until firing a missile on May 28, which landed in the Sea of Japan. Still, you have to consider that North Korea is staring down into the abyss.

https://geopoliticalfutures.com/north-k ... res-abyss/

[Sterrius]

texto sensato. Se ocorrer não estaria surpreso.

Mtas incertezas e governos odeiam incertezas. Voltar pro status quo anterior parece impossivel.

[Bolovo]

Esse míssil é grande, heim.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IyY9iUrPJJo

[Penguin]

A Coreia do Norte é um estado tampão para a China e Rússia, cujo regime será protegido por ambos.
Aos 2 não interessa uma Coréia unida que possivelmente seguisse um modelo a la Coreia do Sul, e que fosse aliada dos EUA. Esse seria um risco inaceitável para China e Russia. Ter mais um aliado dos EUA em suas fronteiras.

[cabeça de martelo]

Preço da gasolina dispara na Coreia do Norte devido a restrições chinesas

A alegada restrição da China no fornecimento de crude à Coreia do Norte levou a um aumento do preço da gasolina no país, com uma subida de 20% na semana passada, avançou um jornal de desertores norte-coreanos.

A China poderá estar a limitar o fornecimento de crude a Pyongyang, devido à insistência do regime de Kim Jong-un em realizar testes nucleares e com mísseis balísticos.

Habitantes das províncias norte-coreanas de Hamgyong e Yangang, citados pelo jornal digital Daily NK, cuja redação é composta por desertores do país, afirmaram que o preço da gasolina subiu 20% só na semana passada.

Fontes citadas pelo mesmo jornal garantiram que os táxis em Pyongyang e camiões que fazem transporte interurbano de pessoas e mercadorias não aumentaram as tarifas.

No entanto, o número de passageiros transportados por viagem aumentou, visando contornar o aumento do preço da gasolina, indicaram as mesmas fontes.

A Coreia do Norte depende quase exclusivamente da China para importar crude e derivados.

Vários analistas consideraram que incluir produtos petrolíferos num novo pacote de sanções das Nações Unidas poderá constituir um golpe duro para o país.

A China, que até há pouco tempo mantinha com a Coreia do Norte uma relação descrita como de “unha com carne”, tem-se progressivamente afastado do país, consciente de que este representa cada vez mais uma fonte de tensão regional e um embaraço para a diplomacia chinesa.

O Presidente dos Estados Unidos, Donald Trump, tem pedido a Pequim para que trave o programa nuclear de Kim Jong-un.

Em fevereiro passado, o Ministério do Comércio chinês anunciou a suspensão total das importações de carvão oriundas da Coreia do Norte.

http://24.sapo.pt/atualidade/artigos/pr ... s-chinesas

[Túlio]

Esses Chineses imperialistas capitalistas num têm mais jeito. Onde já se viu, fazer uma maldade dessas com o nosso querido Zé Pancinha, Kim III, o Fidel da Ásia...

[chris]

Esses Chineses imperialistas capitalistas num têm mais jeito. Onde já se viu, fazer uma maldade dessas com o nosso querido Zé Pancinha, Kim III, o Fidel da Ásia...

Que bom que você acreditou. Essa é a idéia!!!

[P44]

[Bourne]

Ou seja, os chineses disseram que "fera, se atacar Guam, se virá aí. Não vou declarar guerra a coreia do sul/EUA por sua causa de você."

Chinese paper says China should stay neutral if North Korea attacks first

BEIJING (Reuters) - If North Korea launches an attack that threatens the United States then China should stay neutral, but if the United States attacks first and tries to overthrow North Korea's government China will stop them, a Chinese state-run newspaper said on Friday.

President Donald Trump ratcheted up his rhetoric toward North Korea and its leader on Thursday, warning Pyongyang against attacking Guam or U.S. allies after it disclosed plans to fire missiles over Japan to land near the U.S. Pacific territory.

China, North Korea's most important ally and trading partner, has reiterated calls for calm during the current crisis. It has expressed frustration with both Pyongyang's repeated nuclear and missile tests and with behavior from South Korea and the United States that it sees as escalating tensions.

The widely read state-run Global Times, published by the ruling Communist Party's official People's Daily, wrote in an editorial that Beijing is not able to persuade either Washington or Pyongyang to back down.

"It needs to make clear its stance to all sides and make them understand that when their actions jeopardize China's interests, China will respond with a firm hand," said the paper, which does not represent government policy.

"China should also make clear that if North Korea launches missiles that threaten U.S. soil first and the U.S. retaliates, China will stay neutral," it added.

"If the U.S. and South Korea carry out strikes and try to overthrow the North Korean regime and change the political pattern of the Korean Peninsula, China will prevent them from doing so."

China has long worried that any conflict on the Korean peninsula, or a repeat of the 1950-53 Korean war, could unleash a wave of destabilizing refugees into its northeast, and could end up with a reunified county allied with the United States.

North Korea is a useful buffer state for China between it and U.S. forces based in South Korea, and also across the sea in Japan.

The Global Times said China will "firmly resist any side which wants to change the status quo of the areas where China's interests are concerned".

"The Korean Peninsula is where the strategic interests of all sides converge, and no side should try to be the absolute dominator of the region."

(Story refiles to correct typographical error to "them", not "then", paragraph 1.)

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-north ... SKBN1AO011

[Sterrius]

o problema é a interpretação do ataque a guam.

Por exemplo, se cair numa praia e não ferir ninguém.

Foi um ataque ou foi só uma provocação? Dependende de quem vai responder a pergunta :p.