Sintra escreveu:jacquessantiago escreveu:Sintra escreveu:Adoro propaganda...
Aquilo produz uns 6 ou 7 kwts, energia suficiente para conseguir queimar uma antena radar de um missil adversário a uns... 20 cm´s de distância...
O MBTF daquela porra de radar é supostamente de 1250 horas e os tipos ainda não conseguiram chegar às 200 horas, este radar tem a mania de desligar-se a meio dos vôos e está farto de dar chatices.
O Mindef Australiano anda a tentar arranjar seja o que for para justificar a compra de um avião que está a ser tremendamente criticada por toda a gente mais o cão e o piriquito, e como tal de vez em quando arranja pérolas destas.
Sintra,
Tirando os forums de debate, onde tudo eh criticado corriqueiramente em funcao principalmente de paixoes pessoais, na imprensa australiana nao ha nada que chegue perto de alguma campanha contra esta aquisicao. Muito pelo contrario.
Suponho que muita coisa sobre APG-79 seja classificada. As unicas fontes sao os operadores e fabricante. Nao faco a minima ideia sobre suas capacidades. Sei porem, de acordo com o site do fabricante que ele possui capacidade de guerra eletronica. Que capacidade eh esta, de acordo com a materia do The Sydney Morning Herald, ainda eh um segredo.
(...) An advanced four-channel
receiver/exciter gives the
APG-79 wide bandwidth
capability and the ability to
generate a broad spectrum
of waveforms for air-to-air,
air-to-ground and
electronic
warfare missions. (...)
http://www.raytheon.com/products/apg79aesa/ O fabricante diz que o MTBF eh de 15.000h para a antena e de +1.250h para o sistema. Vc poderia compartilhar a sua fonte sobre os problemas que afligem este radar?
[]´s
Jacques
Bom dia Jacques
Meia dúzia de comentários muito rápidos que não tenho muito tempo agora.
1- A compra de Super Hornet´s foi atacada na Australia por dois Generais da RAAF na reforma (um deles o anterior Comandante em Chefe da RAAF, o AIR VICE-MARSHAL Peter Criss disse que o "Super Bug"é um "dog"), por TODA a oposição politica, o ministro sombra qualificou a compra como "desastrosa", o grupo de pressão "Airpower Australia" disse desta compra o que os Judeus não dizem do Toucinho, etc, etc, etc. Conheço pelo menos uma dúzia de artigos na Imprensa Australiana a criticar ferozmente a compra. O Ministro da Defesa Australiano teve de ir à Televisão dar explicações.
Creio que este excerto da entrevista na Televisão resume o tipo de crítica extremamente violenta que a compra tem suscitado:
AIR VICE-MARSHAL PETER CRISS (RET.): I am absolutely astounded that we're going to spend $6 billion of the taxpayers' money on an interim aircraft.
JOEL FITZGIBBON, OPPOSITION DEFENCE SPOKESMAN: The Super Hornet purchase is a $6 billion taxpayer funded election year fix. It's a patchup job.
MARK BANNERMAN: And it's not just the price that's stunned politicians and aviation experts, it is the plane itself.
PETER CRISS: I have trouble with the word 'super' and 'hornet', perhaps I would call it superdog or superbug, but certainly not a Super Hornet. The sting in the tail is not there.
MARK BANNERMAN: Peter Criss knows a thing or two about fighter planes and aircraft. He flew F 111s for longer than he cares to remember, and by the time he finished in the Air Force he was Air Commander Australia.
PETER CRISS: This thing will not survive in a fight now in our region - now, right now. Not another five years down the track, 10 years down the track. It is a dog.
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2007/s1873007.htm Mais:
Controversy continues in Australia regarding the government's plan to purchase the F-35 Lightning II as its next-generation fighter, and it has now spread to target the sudden F-18 E/F Super Hornet Block II purchase as well. Australia's government has faced widespread criticism, and has begun to respond.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/200 ... /index.php Posso arranjar uma quantidade enorme de evidências acerca destas críticas.
2- O APG-79 neste preciso momento tem sérios problemas de "Reliability". As fontes são o próprio construtor, mas principalmente o relatório (a parte publica do mesmo) do Opeval da US Navy que terminou à três meses. O nº de 200 horas veio directamente do construtor e da US Navy e é desse mesmo relatório..
Coisas como o que vai abaixo:.
An operational evaluation of the Super Hornet's new radar says it is "not effective and not suitable for combat operations," but it praised the design as a "quantum leap" in air-to-air capability.
Problems identified by the report include aircrew complaints that the air combat maneuvering modes were slow to lock onto targets. It took seconds instead of the split seconds that they wanted. There also were and continue to be problems with built-in tests that verify and detect hardware faults. So far there have been 23 software fixes.
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/ ... r%20Combat Aliás basta pensar que a esta altura do campeonato, segundo o "road map" original, já deveriam estar entregues mais de uma centena de radares APG-79 à US Navy... Foi entregue um quarto disso, e ainda estão a ser entregues "Super Bug´s" directamente da fábrica com o APG-73 (e vai continuar assim, pelo menos durante os próximos dois anos).
3- Quanto à capacidade de ataque electrônico do APG79.
"Jamming" ainda vá, é uma aplicação natural das capacidades de uma antena AESA, mas agora, destruir antenas de radar à distância, isto é propaganda pura. Estamos a década meia (pelo menos) de se conseguir o tipo de tecnologia necessária para se conseguir colocar num avião de caça o tipo de potência necessária para um tal objectivo. Antes de mais, NUNCA tal capacidade foi demonstrada seja porque radar seja...
Se uma antena de 700/800 mm de diâmetro, com 6 a 8 Kwts apoiada por um sistema de guerra electrónica (ALQ-214) conseguisse fritar as antenas dos mísseis a dezenas de km´s, uma coisa do tamanho e potência do APAR, ou do HERAKLES, ou do CEA-FAR fazia o quê? Rebentava com os sistemas electrónicos de aviões a centenas de km´s? Então um navio equipado com algo como o SPY-3 nem precisava de mísseis anti aéreos, neste ultimo caso estamos a falar de antenas AESA com centenas de metros quadrados de área e mais potência que um esquadrão de E3 Sentry´s.
Esta capacidade, neste exacto momento está mais próxima dos sonhos dos Engenheiros do que da realidade. Acredito nisso quando vir um “road map” a dizer claramente “esta capacidade vai ser obtida no block xpto no ano de xpto”. Esse “road map” não existe.
Abraços
Sintra,
Eh bem comum criticas de oficiais aposentados por aquelas paragens. Que programa nao sofreu com isso? F-22, F-18, F-16, F-15, etc. A questao eh que muitas vezes sao criticas sem uma argumentacao tecnica consistente (pois sao de outsiders, sem acesso a informacoes criticas), diferente da opiniao de insiders da US Navy, do Congresso americano e de suas comissoes, da RAAF, do parlamento australiano, das comissoes de defesa australianas, etc.
Tb posso citar aqui uma infinidade de artigos elogiando o programa S. Hornet e as capacidades do seu sistema de guerra eletronica e do novo radar APG-79, inclusive dentro do proprio artigo que vc citou (vide abaixo).
Ministerios "sombra" servem para fazer oposicao.
Ha um grupo de pressao na Australia, cujo maior expoente eh o Carlos Koop que critirará virulentamente qualquer opcao diferente do F-22.
Na maioria das vezes, as criticas contra o SH ficam no universo do juizo de valor, sem argumentacoes tecnicas. Principalmente entre os saudositas do F-14.
O artigo que postei originalmente, saiu no Sydney Herald que nao eh especializado em defesa. La realmente tem a palavra "burn". No artigo mais recente da Aviation Week and Space Technology abordando as capacidades do Super Hornet (Navy Details New Super Hornet Capabilities -
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/search/a ... 2607p2.xml)
tambem postado aqui, ha um trecho que explica estas capacidades, porem nao menciona a palavra queimar. Fica claro que o radar em conjunto com o sistema de guerra eletronica eh capaz de dirigir um feixe preciso contra alvos muito pequenos ou stealth e afeta-los de varias formas a grandes distancias:
(...) However, other Pentagon and aerospace industry officials say that while air-to-air missiles are struggling to reach the 60-100-mi.-range mark, some sophisticated electronic attack effects can reach well beyond that.
"That's at least 100 mi.," says a long-time Pentagon radar specialist. "There are different forms of electronic attack, and they include putting false targets or altered ranges, speeds and positions of real targets into the enemy's radars. Those are effects that require less power than jamming and therefore are effective at longer ranges."
An industry official with insight into AESA development says that the ability to affect a foe is limited by the enemy radar's range because the signal has to be captured, manipulated and returned. Therefore, long-range ground-based radars and even AWACS radars could be electronically attacked at ranges well over 100 mi. For air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles, the techniques would be the same but the effective ranges would be shorter. (...)
(...)"More importantly, we're going to marry the digitally cued receiver to single-ship geolocation algorithms [for precision location] and specific emitter ID algorithms with the AESA radar," says Gaddis. Also, the radar warning receiver and ALQ-214 jammers will be integrated to produce "high-gain electronic attack and high-gain electronic surveillance measures," he adds. "We would use them as a survivability upgrade against advanced air-to-air and a certain spectrum of the surface-to-air threat.
"We're going to create a high-speed data bus so that [electronic attack] techniques generated by the ALQ-214 will be sent through the AESA radar with much more power and effect," Gaddis says. "Rather than wait for a threat to develop some electronic countermeasure, we plan to attack him [at long range] through the radar."
The associated long-range, high-resolution electronic surveillance capability of the Super Hornet is making it popular with the intelligence community. The real-time data make the aircraft important for updating the electronic order of battle--what's emitting and from where.(...)
Este sistema esta entrando em servico, obvio que tenha ajustes e aperfeicoamentos a serem realizados, especialmente no software. Isso ocorre com qq novo sistema, vide o muito menos complexo Griffo/F-5, o Pesa RBE2/Rafale ou o APG-77/F-22.
Creio que nao ha dividas que estes problemas transitorios, tipicos de qq arma complexa que entre em servico, serao sanados e o que realmente importa eh a sua capacidade e potencialidade.
Para ser justo com o SH, vou postar abaixo o artigo completo do trecho que vc citou e realcar em negrito outros trechos positivos ao SH. As coisas sao muito menos negativas do que vc sugere:
Super Hornet Radar Not Ready For Combat
Mar 12, 2007
By David A. Fulghum
NAS PATUXENT RIVER, Md. - An operational evaluation of the Super Hornet's new radar says it is "not effective and not suitable for combat operations," but it praised the design as a "quantum leap" in air-to-air capability.
Navy officials say it will be fine-tuned for war in time for the first operational deployment in 2008.
The analysis was based on tests of older software (tape H-3) last summer. It says the Raytheon-built APG-79 radar "is effective and is suitable for training purposes," according to Capt. Donald Gaddis, F/A-18E/F program manager. It is in service with the Navy's first Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar-equipped Super Hornet squadron, VFA-213, based at Naval Air Station (NAS) Oceana, Va.
Senior Navy officials say the radar is using a new software tape (H-4E for E/F model F/A-18s) for flight-testing.
'More work to do'
Problems identified by the report include aircrew complaints that the air combat maneuvering modes were slow to lock onto targets. It took seconds instead of the split seconds that they wanted. There also were and continue to be problems with built-in tests that verify and detect hardware faults. So far there have been 23 software fixes.
"We have more work to do," Gaddis says. But, "there are no surprises in the report. The deficiencies that they write about, we knew about at the readiness review in June. In July we were already coding new software to correct those deficiencies. The corrected software has been in flight-test since December 2006."
The same report contends the radar has demonstrated a "quantum leap against significant tactical air threats," a reference to classified details about range, resolution, electronic attack options and the ability to positively identify targets - by fusing information from various sensors - at long range.
Gaddis won't discuss radar ranges. However, a long-time Pentagon radar specialist says the radar resolution is good enough to detect small targets, such as stealthy, subsonic cruise missiles, at ranges great enough to conduct effective attacks against them.
'Robust-funded road map'
The electronic attack capability of the AESA-equipped Super Hornet also exceeds the range of even the latest AIM-120D AMRAAM design and is estimated by Pentagon specialists at well more than 100 miles. By putting the output of the aircraft's electronic warfare effects generator through the powerful radar, false targets, altitudes, positions and speeds can be inserted into enemy radar-guided missiles and air defense radars.
"There are some AESA electronic attack [capabilities] already in the radar, and it will be tested this summer when we do our [test and evaluation] for our first deployment," Gaddis says. "We have a robust, funded road map that's going to spiral into more electronic attack capability. We're going to tie it together with our radar warning receiver and ALQ-214 defensive electronic attack system."
In the wake of the evaluation, Gaddis alluded to fifth generation capabilities for the AESA-equipped F/A-18Fs. Such claims raise the hackles of F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter program officials.
"There is no tactical fighter flying that is more effective in both air-to-air and air-to-ground [missions] as a Block II Hornet with AESA," Gaddis says. "It is the finest radar bomber in the world today. That goes for little platforms and big platforms" - a reference to the B-1 and B-2. The F-22 program has not yet completed its development of air-to-ground capabilities.
Critics of Gaddis' claim contend that cobbling together some pieces of the capability won't result in a fifth generation aircraft like the F-22 or F-35. "The whole point to fifth generation is the synergy of stealth, fusion and complete situational awareness," says a veteran Air Force fighter pilot. The point about fifth generation aircraft is that they can do their mission anywhere - even in sophisticated integrated air defense [IADS] environments. If you fly into heavy IADS with a great radar and sensor fusion, but no stealth, you will have complete situational awareness of the guy that kills you."
[]´s
Jacques