Fórum Defesa Brasil

Sniper escreveu:

morcego escreveu:então por favor, NÃO SEQUESTRE O TÓPICO.

Desculpe-me morcego, isso não irá mais contecer...

P44 escreveu:Afundar a USN não podem , mas fazer bastantes estragos, minar o Estreito de Ormuz, afundar uns petroleiros com os seus Subs, lá isso podem.
Colocar o pitrol a 200U$, lá isso podem, e aí é que a porca torce o rabo.

P44 escreveu:Os EUA têm capacidade de atacar o Irão pelo ar , até podem lá lançar a bomba atómica, mas alguém diz que não?

O pior é depois, quando puserem o pezinho no Irão.

P44 escreveu:O pessoal se esquece que o Iraque praticamente não tinha Marinha (umas lanchas patrulha e nada mais)

EDSON escreveu:O que precisamos é de gente do amr ligado em estratégias e táticas navais para nos elucidar vários pontos.

talharim escreveu:A estratégia iraniana é de minagem do estreito com seus 3 subs Kilo.

A estratégia americana é encontrar esses 3 subs e destruí-los.

Tudo isso em águas rasas.Seria um belo jogo de gato e rato.Uma batalha de subs como nunca se vui.

Os Seawolfs e Virginias teriam vantagem contra os Kilos em água marrons ?

Inducted to be the main strike weapon of India's submarine arm between 2001 and 2006, this anti-ship cruise missile has never hit a target.

Seven of India's 10-kilo class submarines and the three Talwar class stealth frigates have been fitted with this weapon.

When I engage in naval tactical discussions that include technology discussion, I usually start with a single question. Have you ever read Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat by Wayne P. Hughes? In the industry, the answer is usually no, but when it is yes I usually find myself talking to a retired officer or someone who truly understands which technologies in naval warfare matter, and which are simply hype. The reason Captain Hughes book applies is simple, the fusion between tactics and technology Hughes lays out applies as well today as it does when the first edition was written, and the second edition is even better. Bottom line, the utilization of technology in naval tactics requires understanding the conditions, and without that type of objective context to the application of technology in tactics, a technology discussion alone is ultimately futile.

Lets discuss it anyway.

On Sunday DefenseReview.com ran an article called "U.S. Aircraft Carriers Vulnerable to Attack?: The Ticking Time Bomb" which basically claims carrier air power in the form of large carriers has been made by weapons like anti-ship missiles and the Shkval torpedo. The article propagates a number of myths common on the internet about naval weapon systems, and emphasizes the wrong technologies critical in naval tactical discussions.

When you talk about anti-ship missiles you are ultimately weighing factors in performance, specifically speed vs stealth plus range, guidance, and countermeasures. The debate some attempt to exercise is in determination of which weapons are better and why. What is ironic about the naval weapon technology debate is usually the metrics used by some in their proclamation of a weapon system being better is also the reason why it isn't. When you apply the wrong metrics, that can happen. Lets start by comparing supersonic vs subsonic missiles.

The advantage supersonic missiles have over subsonic missiles is speed. The greater the speed of the missile the less the engagement window exists to intercept the missile. The disadvantage of speed is that detection is made much easier, particularly via IR (although there are other methods). In other words, the advantage of supersonic missiles to reduce the engagement window ends up ultimately being negated because the missiles are easier to detect, thus easier to intercept.

The advantage subsonic missiles have over supersonic missiles is stealth. The greater the stealth of a missile the more difficult it is to detect and intercept. The disadvantage of subsonic missiles is that the engagement window is bigger due to its reduced speed. It is noteworthy that since 1982 that most subsonic anti-ship missiles that weren't detected at launch have effectively hit its target, and oh btw, most were not detected at launch. Unfortunately for supersonic missiles, modern detection systems are very apt in detecting the enormous signature generated when launching a supersonic weapon at sea.

Guidance is also critical. The best weapon systems utilize multiple options for guidance in a weapon system, whether it is IR, radar, GPS, Inertial, etc.., the more options for guidance the more effective the weapon system. There are various decoys and electronic warfare options for non kinetic defense against simplistic guidance systems, which is why it is becoming more common to see more complicated guidance capabilities on weapons.

Applying these basics, it becomes easy to debunk myths propagated in articles like the defense update article. For example, the SS-N-22 Sunburn (a.k.a. 3M-82 Moskit a.k.a. P270 Moskit) is the most overrated anti-ship missile you will ever read about. First, it is easily detected not only via IR but by its radar system. The missile has virtually no stealth at all. The missile only has radar guidance, making it easier to defeat without kinetic intercept, and finally the Sunburn has a very limited range and has no countermeasures. In other words, in the various technical categories that determine whether the weapon used to evaluate the capability of a weapon technology, the Sunburn ranks kindof low in each category but speed.

Compare the Sunburn to the latest Exocet missiles. The Exocet has inertial guidance that helps prevent jamming, the missile has protection from EW, it has more than twice the range of the Sunburn, and it has excellent stealth.

The VA-111 Shkval Supercavitating Rocket Torpedo can be judged by the same criteria. The super fast underwater weapon has terrible range, no guidance at all, no stealth at all, and no countermeasures at all. When ranking torpedo's, the Shkval belongs in the same category as the Mk 8 used in the Falklands by the Royal Navy.. better speed, same guidance, smaller warhead.

The Shkval is overrated, a use once weapon that does physical impact to a warship with a WWII era navy mine warhead. In other words, it is an effective weapon against smaller ships, the ships most likely to be able to avoid a hit from an unguided torpedo. It will take multiple hits to sink a larger vessel, and a larger vessel is likely to have escorts guaranteed to know the submarines position and kill it. Sorry, but if using a weapon gets you killed, the weapon might be overrated.

Future anti-ship missiles, and in fact future supercavitation weapon technologies, are attempting to find balance in all of the advantages without the disadvantages. Example, slower approach for stealth, inertial guidance in transit, EW protection, but will be fast (supercavitation or supersonic) in the terminal phase with multiple terminal guidance options.

Needless to say, I disagree with the defense update assessment that large carriers are obsolete solely because of technology advancements in anti-ship weapon technology. Technology has never been and still isn't the primary deciding factor in naval warfare, tactics is that factor.

I expect to see myths in naval weapons technology hit a fever pitch over the next few months as more and more people believe a war with Iran may become reality. The threat of the Sunburn or Shkval may frighten some as their characteristics are touted as overwhelming capabilities to which the US Navy has no counter, but those technologies don't rank in the top concerns I have regarding the threats facing the US Navy from Iran.

The disproportionate effect of mines (both dumb and smart) and submarines simply by their presence alone in naval warfare, combined with the relative simplicity to transport and deploy smaller weapons like the small and simple C-701 from truck sized mobile vehicles near the Iraqi Oil Terminals highlights how a focus on strengths and weaknesses in technology are irrelevant to the wise application of tactics to the battlefield.

Posted by Galrahn at 10:26 PM

Labels: Firepower, Military Disinformation

Observations of an Armchair Admiral

India isn't our enemy, although they also aren't our friend, there is potential for adjusting the relationship here. It will be interesting to see if the US makes a push.

Recent efforts by officers who seek to forge a comprehensive military relationship with India to offer the USS Kitty Hawk carrier to the Indian Navy

Carlos Mathias escreveu:

Observations of an Armchair Admiral

Sintra, o quê quer dizer este "Armchair Admiral"? Ele é alguém da marinha indiana ou porta-voz desta força? É do governo indiano?

Teve um post aí em que você desqualificou a BBC como fonte, disse até que sabe mais que eles e tal(e eu acredito em você). MAs agora estas fontes aí, que não são assim um Sintra, podem ser tidas como máximas verdades?

Godoyada?

E isso agora é fonte crível?

India isn't our enemy, although they also aren't our friend, there is potential for adjusting the relationship here. It will be interesting to see if the US makes a push.

Essa frase pode ser descrita como isenta e imparcial? É isso mesmo a fonte?

Recent efforts by officers who seek to forge a comprehensive military relationship with India to offer the USS Kitty Hawk carrier to the Indian Navy

Huuuuum, estão querendo vender navio e armas na Índia? Aaaaaah, tá bom então. Essa fonte aí é das melhores mesmo hein?

E olha, realmente estes contratos firmados entre a Rússia e a Índia são um indicativo do grau de insatisfação deles com os russos. Haja masoquismo nacional, êita povinho que gosta de sofrer, né?

E sobre acertar alvos, dá um procurada no Youtube que tem uns BRAHMOS acertando uns alvos lá. Tem casinha(?) e navio explodindo.

Mas então como é que é? Os caras fazem um míssil que acerta os alvos e outro que erra tudo? Huuuuum...

Um grande abraço, amigo Sintra!

Way Off Target

By Sandeep Unnithan

While the ship-launched missile was inducted without problems, the navy has been frantically trying to rectify the defect in the submarine-launched variant over the past three years without success. The Klub missiles were successfully test-fired in the Baltic Sea in 2001 and 2002. The problems surfaced when the missiles were test fired in Indian waters: minutes before reaching its target, the missile wobbled before diving into the water.

A detailed analysis of the missile recently carried out by Russian experts revealed that the problem was in the Kilo class submarine.

Every mobile military platform has, what is called, a gyroscope—a device which spins at high speed and tells a platform its roll, pitch and yaw—basically where it is heading, how its motion is changing and its axis of stabilisation. A gyroscope which stabilises the missile in flight is also the heart of a missile's on-board guidance system. Since the gyro cannot be kept switched on all the time, the coordinates are pre-fed to the missile from the gyro during pre-launch checks. When the Klub missile breaches the water surface, its gyro tells the missile its position and points itself in the direction of the target. However, a critical time-lag in the interface between the submarine's gyro and the missile, was pre-fed the wrong coordinates.

So, when the missile flew over the sea surface, the guidance coordinates fooled it into believing it was actually flying at an incline. So the missile's onboard gyroscope stabilised itself. This battle between the onboard coordinates and gyroscope continued several times and the manoeuvers exhausted the missile battery leading to a complete power loss.

New replacement gyros for the navy's submarines are now among the top of the list of items India desperately needs from Russia and the issue has already been raised at several high-level meetings.

Mais coisas acerca do assunto, os disparos efectuados no Baltico correram bem, os efectuados por submarinos no Indico foram um desastre, dai aquele "Não acertaram um tiro" é apenas parcialmente verdadeira...
Agora os Indianos andam a tentar descobrir se o problema está no missil ou no giroscopio dos submarinos.

Inducted to be the main strike weapon of India's submarine arm between 2001 and 2006, this anti-ship cruise missile has never hit a target.

There are three more frigates under construction in Russia similar to the Talwar, but it was noted early on these frigates would not have the Klub, instead they would have the Brohmos. Now we know why.

"Now we know why"

"There are problems that we have overcome but we are having dialogues,” says FOC-in-C, Eastern Naval Command, Vice-Admiral PS Suthan

“We will look into other missiles,” says Vice-Admiral Puthan.

We don't know if those accusations are true or not, but we do note there are some large defense contracts right now between Russia and India.

Admiral Sureesh Mehta said, "We are now actively looking at the second line of submarines after the Scorpenes. I think the global tender for the six new submarines should be floated in the next financial year (2008-2009)."

Admiral Mehta also confirmed India would lease 1 Akula class SSN next year from Russia for 10 years.

Compare the Sunburn to the latest Exocet missiles. The Exocet has inertial guidance that helps prevent jamming, the missile has protection from EW, it has more than twice the range of the Sunburn, and it has excellent stealth.

The missile has virtually no stealth at all. The missile only has radar guidance, making it easier to defeat without kinetic intercept, and finally the Sunburn has a very limited range and has no countermeasures

Future anti-ship missiles, and in fact future supercavitation weapon technologies, are attempting to find balance in all of the advantages without the disadvantages. Example, slower approach for stealth, inertial guidance in transit, EW protection, but will be fast (supercavitation or supersonic) in the terminal phase with multiple terminal guidance options.

talharim escreveu:A estratégia iraniana é de minagem do estreito com seus 3 subs Kilo.

A estratégia americana é encontrar esses 3 subs e destruí-los.

Tudo isso em águas rasas.Seria um belo jogo de gato e rato.Uma batalha de subs como nunca se vui.

Os Seawolfs e Virginias teriam vantagem contra os Kilos em água marrons ?

Plinio Jr escreveu:

talharim escreveu:A estratégia iraniana é de minagem do estreito com seus 3 subs Kilo.

A estratégia americana é encontrar esses 3 subs e destruí-los.

Tudo isso em águas rasas.Seria um belo jogo de gato e rato.Uma batalha de subs como nunca se vui.

Os Seawolfs e Virginias teriam vantagem contra os Kilos em água marrons ?

Com certeza, vale lembrar tbm, que a frota americana não iria se aproximar tanto sem antes ter limpado a região de qualquer pretensa ameaça, seja de subs, navios, minas e veiculos que possam transportar estes mísseis...

Fizeram isto 02 vezes no Iraque (1991-2003) e caso ocorra uma ofensiva contra o Irã, devem seguir o mesmo caminho....