Fórum Defesa Brasil

Plinio Jr escreveu:Pode juntar o que os sírios e iranianos tem em suas FA´s que tomam pau dos israelenses de qualquer jeito....

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Israel used electronic attack in air strike against Syrian mystery target

Oct 8, 2007
By David A. Fulghum and Douglas Barrie

Mysteries still surround Israel’s air strike against Syria. Where was the attack, what was struck and how did Israel’s non-stealthy warplanes fly undetected through the Russian-made air defense radars in Syria?

There also are clues that while the U.S. and Israel are struggling in the broader information war with Islamic fundamentalists, Tel Aviv’s air attack against a “construction site” in northern Syria may mean the two countries are beginning to win some cyberwar battles.

U.S. officials say that close examination of the few details of the mission offers a glimpse of what’s new in the world of sophisticated electronic sleight-of-hand. That said, they fault the Pentagon for not moving more quickly to make cyberwarfare operational and for not integrating the capability into the U.S. military forces faster.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said last week that the Israelis struck a building site at Tall al-Abyad just south of the Turkish border on Sept. 6. Press reports from the region say witnesses saw the Israeli aircraft approach from the Mediterranean Sea while others said they found unmarked drop tanks in Turkey near the border with Syria. Israeli defense officials finally admitted Oct. 2 that the Israeli Air Force made the raid.

U.S. aerospace industry and retired military officials indicated the Israelis utilized a technology like the U.S.-developed “Suter” airborne network attack system developed by BAE Systems and integrated into U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle operations by L-3 Communications. Israel has long been adept at using unmanned systems to provoke and spoof Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, as far back as the Bekka Valley engagements in 1982.

Air Force officials will often talk about jamming, but the term now involves increasingly sophisticated techniques such as network attack and information warfare. How many of their new electronic attack options were mixed and matched to pull off this raid is not known.

The U.S. version of the system has been at the very least tested operationally in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last year, most likely against insurgent communication networks. The technology allows users to invade communications networks, see what enemy sensors see and even take over as systems administrator so sensors can be manipulated into positions where approaching aircraft can’t be seen, they say. The process involves locating enemy emitters with great precision and then directing data streams into them that can include false targets and misleading messages that allow a number of activities including control.

Clues, both good and unlikely, are found in Middle East press reports. At least one places some responsibility for the attack’s success on the U.S.

After the strike, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Watan reported that U.S. jets provided aerial cover for Israeli strike aircraft during the attack on Syria. Similar statements of American involvement were made by Egyptian officials after the 1967 and 1973 wars with Israel.

More interesting is the newspaper’s claim that “Russian experts are studying why the two state-of-the-art Russian-built radar systems in Syria did not detect the Israeli jets entering Syrian territory,” it said. “Iran reportedly has asked the same question, since it is buying the same systems and might have paid for the Syrian acquisitions.”

Syria’s most recent confirmed procurement was of the Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) short-range mobile SAM system. It uses vehicle-mounted target-acquisition and target-tracking radars. It is not known whether any of the Tor systems were deployed in the point-defense role at the target site struck by Israeli aircraft. If, however, the target was as “high-value” as the Israeli raid would suggest, then Tor systems could well have been deployed.

Iran bought 29 of the Tor launchers from Russia for $750 million to guard its nuclear sites, and they were delivered in January, according to Agence France-Presse and ITAR-TASS. According to the Syrian press, they were tested in February. Syria has also upgraded some of its aging S-125s (SA-3 Goa) to the Pechora-2A standard. This upgrade swaps out obsolete analog components for digital.

Syrian air defense infrastructure is based on for the most part aging Soviet SAMs and associated radar. Damascus has been trying to acquire more capable “strategic” air defense systems, with the country repeatedly associated with efforts to purchase the Russian S-300 (SA-10 Grumble/SA-20) long-range SAM. It also still operates the obsolescent S-200 (SA-5 Gammon) long-range system and its associated 5N62 Square Pair target engagement radar. There are also unconfirmed reports of Syrian interest in the 36D6 Tin Shield search radar.

There remains the second mystery of the actual site of the target and its use. Israeli news reports contend it was a compound near Dayr az-Zwar in north central Syria, and not Tall al-Abyad farther north. The site of the attack has been described as a transshipment point for weapons intended for the Hez­bollah in Lebanon to restock missile stores that were used in last summer’s fighting with Israel. Others contend it is a site with nuclear materials that may be associated with Iran’s nuclear bomb program. Mentions are also made of a North Korean ship arriving in Syria only days before the attack and the presence of North Korean workers in Syria for several months.

“There are always indications the North Koreans are doing something they shouldn’t, Vice Adm. Robert Murrett, director of the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency (NGA), told Aviation Week & Space Technology in response to a question about the shipment of nuclear materials from North Korea to Syria, which were subsequently bombed. “They are a high priority. We work as a key element . . . on the trafficking of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and high-interest arms shipments anyplace.”

It’s part of a growing NGA role in spotting the proliferation of weapons technology “which may be coming from East Asia to the Middle East . . . that we don’t want to cross borders.” Other crucial boundaries for surveillance include the borders in all directions in Afghanistan and Iraq—which includes Syria and Iran—as well as semi-governed areas such as the Horn of Africa. The use of automation to aid rapid analysis is improving, but that’s being balanced by the fact that “the sheer volumes of data we are ingesting now . . . continue to increase by a couple of orders of magnitude on an annual basis,” he says.

Wolfgang escreveu:Israel enganando os TOR?

vilmarmoccelin escreveu:

Wolfgang escreveu:Israel enganando os TOR?

Pior que isso deixa a Rússia em uma posição ruim, tanto pra vendas como na defesa do seu próprio território.

Tudo bem que todos sabem que os árabes, em geral, são péssimos operadores de sistemas modernos, com forças armadas majoritariamente formada por pessoas com pouquíssima escolaridade, e, logicamente dificuldades em operar equipamentos modernosos... Massss...

E sempre tem aquela opção de os F-15 na verdade serem F-22 hehehehehehe...

Pode por o que quiser lá e seja lá quem for operando, os caras são bons e não tem discussão....são exemplo de competencia e ser seguido e não a ser desmerecido ....

DATE:10/10/07
SOURCE:Flightglobal.com
Electronic warfare may have blitzed Israeli TV signals
By Arie Egozi

Millions of Israeli television viewers have endured a frustrating month of "frozen" satellite-feed pictures with no end in sight despite frantic efforts by the Yes satellite broadcast company to resolve the problem.

Yes uses the Amos 1 and Amos 2 communications satellites owned by SpaceCom, which has declared both to be functioning normally. Many Yes subscribers, mainly in northern Israel, are threatening to terminate their subscriptions.

The interference began shortly after the 6 September Israeli air raid on Syria, which, according to US and UK press reports, was made possible by Israeli use of an electronic warfare system that "blinded" Syria's state-of-the-art Russian-supplied air defence radar.

Some reports linked the satellite TV interference to the Israeli military activity, but this theory was discounted because the interference has continued. The Israeli Government seems as clueless as Yes as to the cause of the problem.

A second theory linked the interference to intelligence ships of different nations sailing in the Mediterranean, but governments quizzed by Israel deny that their intelligence-gathering could be causing the interference.

Finally, Israeli experts said on 9 October that the interference is caused by "a very strong source" the Israeli minister of communications says ministry experts hope to know the source of the interference in "a few days".

Top North Korean official to visit Syria amid nuclear fears

SEOUL, Oct 13 (AFP) Oct 13, 2007

A top North Korean official is to visit Syria, the country's official media said on Saturday, amid fears the two countries are collaborating on a secret nuclear programme.
Choe Thae-Bok, chairman of the communist country's rubber-stamp Supreme People's Assembly, left on Saturday for a foreign trip which will also take him to Italy, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.

"Chairman of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly Choe Thae-Bok and his party left here on Saturday to visit Italy and Syria," said the one-line dispatch, monitored here.

Syria last month denied a British newspaper report that Israel seized nuclear material in a commando raid on a secret military site.

US media reports also said a mysterious Israeli air strike in Syria in September may have targeted a joint nuclear project.

Suspicions were heightened when North Korea's number two Kim Yong-Nam had "a friendly talk" with a high-ranking Syrian delegation in Pyongyang two weeks after the strike.



All rights reserved. © 2005 Agence France-Presse.

Israel attacked unfinished Syrian nuclear reactor: report

WASHINGTON, Oct 13 (AFP) Oct 13, 2007

The air raid on Syria conducted by Israel last month targeted a site that Israeli and US intelligence specialists believe was a partly constructed nuclear reactor that may have been modeled after one in North Korea, The New York Times reported on its website Saturday.
Citing unnamed US and foreign officials with access to the intelligence reports, the newspaper said it appeared Israel carried out the September 6 raid to demonstrate its determination to snuff out even a nascent nuclear project in a neighboring state.

The administration of President George W. Bush was divided about the strike, and some senior policymakers still regard it as premature, the report said.

The facility that the Israelis struck in Syria appears to have been much further from completion than the Osirak nuclear reactor that Israel destroyed in Iraq in 1981, the paper said.

Officials said it would have been years before the Syrians could have used the reactor to produce the spent nuclear fuel that could, through a series of additional steps, be reprocessed into bomb-grade plutonium, according to The Times.

In Washington and Israel, the raid has been shrouded in secrecy and information restricted to few officials while the Israeli press has been prohibited from publishing information about the attack, the report said.

The officials did not say that the Bush administration had ultimately opposed the Israeli strike, but that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates were particularly concerned about the ramifications of a pre-emptive strike in the absence of an urgent threat, the paper said.



All rights reserved. © 2005 Agence France-Presse.

Israel attacked unfinished Syrian nuclear reactor: report

Photographs of the site taken before the secret Sept. 6 airstrike depict an isolated compound that includes a tall, boxy structure similar to the type of building used to house a gas-graphite reactor. They also show what could have been a pumping station used to supply cooling water for a reactor,

The site is also close to an irrigated area, which would explain statements by some officials privy to details of the attack that the facility was located near orchards. A small airstrip about two miles away could have been used to transport personnel to the site.

Syrian air defense infrastructure is based on for the most part aging Soviet SAMs and associated radar. Damascus has been trying to acquire more capable “strategic” air defense systems, with the country repeatedly associated with efforts to purchase the Russian S-300 (SA-10 Grumble/SA-20) long-range SAM. It also still operates the obsolescent S-200 (SA-5 Gammon) long-range system and its associated 5N62 Square Pair target engagement radar. There are also unconfirmed reports of Syrian interest in the 36D6 Tin Shield search radar.

Vários órgãos de comunicação social ocidentais, fizeram referências ao que alegadamente poderá ser uma negociação paralela entre a Síria e o Irão, para a aquisição de 10 unidades do sistema de defesa aérea de curto alcance, conhecido como Pantsyr (concha) que começou recentemente a ser produzido na Rússia.

Além de já ter vendido várias unidades do Pantsyr para os Emirados Árabes, a Rússia está em negociações com a Síria para a aquisição por aquele país de até 50 unidades deste equipamento.