Fórum Defesa Brasil

India Opens Bids In $10.4Bn Combat Plane Tender


(Source: Manorama Online; published Nov. 4, 2011)



NEW DELHI --- India Friday began the last step to decide the lowest bidder in the $10.4-billion tender for equipping its air force with 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft by opening the commercial offers from European consortium Eurofighter and France's Dassault Aviation.

But the suspense over the winner of the contract, said to be one of the largest in the Indian context, is far from over, as the Indian defence ministry and Indian Air Force will burn the midnight oil over the next couple of weeks to figure out the lowest bidder.

"The commercial bids for the MMRCA (medium multi-role combat aircraft) deal from the two competing firms were opened here in the presence of their representatives," a defence ministry official said.

The bids of the European consortium from Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain and EADS Cassidian, as also Dassault Aviation, will be perused by the Indian officials to figure out the fly-away cost, life cycle cost, technology transfer cost and the offset offers before the winner of the contract will be known.

The four-year-long tendering process -- one of the shortest as per Indian standards -- had begun in August 2007.

The offset clause in the tender, included under the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) of 2006, requires the winner of the tender to reinvest 50 per cent of the deal amount in the Indian defence industry in an effort to energise it.

The clause, an accepted norm in global military purchases, mandates that any foreign firm that wins a defence deal worth over Rs.300 crore will have to plough at least 30 per cent of the contract amount back into Indian defence industry. In the case of the combat jet order, the offset value has been raised to 50 per cent

India had in April down-selected the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Dassault Rafale and asked the manufacturers to extend their commercial bids, that were on the point of expiring, till the middle of December.

The down-select had resulted in the rejection of four other contending aircraft -- the Lockheed Martin F-16, the Boeing F/A-18, Russian United Aircraft Corporation's MiG-35 and Swedish SAAB's Gripen.

The shortlist had taken place after rigorous flight and weapons trials of the six aircraft held in different terrain -- Bangalore in south India, Leh in Jammu Kashmir's high altitude Ladakh region and in Rajasthan's desert under searing heat conditions.

After losing out in the MMRCA race, the Americans openly expressed their displeasure and are now pitching their new F-35 Lightning-II Joint Strike Fighter, a fifth generation combat jet from the Lockheed Martin stable.

India has already signed a deal with Russia for the joint development of a fifth generation fighter aircraft or FGFA on the Sukhoi T-50 plane design.

-end-

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articl ... s-mum.html

Primeiros rumores:

1- A proposta da Dassault tem valores marginalmente inferiores mas levará mais tempo para que seja escolhida a melhor proposta sob todos os parâmetros estabelecidos.

2- Os valores totais ficaram acima dos US$ 10 bilhões inicialmente estipulados, o que não é uma surpresa.

3- Uma reunião entre o presidente Sarkozy e o primeiro-ministro Manmohan, que aconteceria durante a cúpula do G-20, foi cancelada. Suspeita-se que esse cancelamento poderia estar relacionado com a abertura das propostas do MMRCA.

Fonte: Compiladas pelo Rafale News e Livefist.

India Unseals MMRCA Bids from Dassault, EADS
By VIVEK RAGHUVANSHI
Published: 4 Nov 2011 11:35

NEW DELHI - The Indian defense ministry unsealed bids by the final two competitors in the $10 billion Medium Multirole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition, but a final decision is up to two months away.

The bids will be evaluated for lowest life-cycle cost.

"The lowest bidder will be announced after six to eight weeks," ministry spokesman Sitanshu Kar said.

The acquisition process is being kept secret to ensure transparency, said another ministry official.

Officials from neither Dassault, which is offering the Rafale, nor EADS, which is offering the Eurofighter, were available for comment.

The acquisition process is being kept secret to ensure transparency, said another ministry official.

Aqui foi exatamente o oposto, vazou de tudo quanto foi coisa.

Carlos Mathias escreveu:The acquisition process is being kept secret to ensure transparency, said another ministry official.

Aqui foi exatamente o oposto, vazou de tudo quanto foi coisa.

Lá teve notícias de corrupção ao primeiro ministro, teve vazamentos de quem foi bem ou mal nos testes para todos gostos, houve até o erro de vazamento confidencial que o MIG iria vencer do livefist. Acredito que a grande diferença é que quem decide lá quer decidir, aqui bem...

Teve não, lá teve fofoca da mídia, mas vazamento de coisa oficial, não teve não.

Carlos Mathias escreveu:Teve não, lá teve fofoca da mídia, mas vazamento de coisa oficial, não teve não.

Juro, agora fiquei confuso. Então para você o que a Eliane Cantanhede publicou na coluna dela no Jornal Folha de São Paulo agora é coisa oficial?!

MMRCA Deal: Europe Versus France Contest Begins for World's Biggest Combat Aircraft


(Source: Times of India; published Nov. 5, 2011)


NEW DELHI --- India on Friday opened the financial bids of the two fighters left in the fray for the world's biggest combat aircraft deal, but promptly declared it would take at least two-three weeks to declare the eventual winner since tons of data had to be computed.

For all its promises of "full transparency" in the medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) contract to acquire 126 fighters, likely to be the single biggest defence deal in the run-up to the 2014 polls with its overall value set to exceed $20 billion, the defence ministry refused to say anything concrete.

Sources, however, said the "unit flyaway cost" or "direct acquisition cost" of each Eurofighter Typhoon was "higher" than the French Rafale fighter, both of which fall in the $80-$110 million bracket, much costlier than the American, Russian and Swedish jets earlier eliminated after exhaustive technical evaluation by IAF pilots.

But the unit flyaway cost will not be the only factor to determine the lowest bidder (L-1). The MoD will also take into account "life-cycle costs" or the cost of operating the fighters over a 40-year period, with 6,000 hours of flying.

Besides, there are costs of the transfer of technology (ToT) since the first 18 jets will be bought from abroad in a flyaway condition, while the rest 108 will be manufactured in India, under licence, by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.

"The bids were opened today in front of the Indian contract negotiating committee, comprising MoD, IAF, finance, production and quality assurance officials, as well as representatives from French Dassault and EADS (backed by UK, Germany, Spain and Italy). It will take a few weeks to examine and evaluate their commercial proposals to arrive at a verifiable cost model to determine the L-1," said an official.

IAF wants the actual contract to be inked by January-February to ensure the delivery of first 18 jets begins by early-2015 to stem its fast-eroding combat edge, with HAL beginning the manufacturing of the rest 108 from early-2017 onwards. "The first jet built by HAL should roll out in early-2017," said an official.

India is also likely to go in for another 63 fighters after the first 126, if the timelines for the under-development Tejas LCA (light combat aircraft) and the stealth Indo-Russian FGFA (fifth-generation fighter aircraft) projects are not met.

-ends-

COLUMN | F-35: Should India Really Ride The Lightning?

By Mihir Shah
& Aditya Mandrekar

The recent statement by a United States Department of Defence official, that the US would be willing to discuss a possible sale of the F-35 Lightning II to India, or even consider bringing India into the ambitious programme as a partner, has generated a lot of attention in
the Indian media. While this is not the first time the F-35 has been offered to India, the timing of this fresh pitch is interesting. Coming six months after the two American contenders vying for the lucrative Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) contract -- the F-16 and F/A-18 -- failed to make the Indian Air Force (IAF) shortlist, and just days before the bids by EADS Cassidian and Dassault were opened, many perceive this as an attempt by the US and Lockheed-Martin to work themselves back into the equation. Sections of the Indian news media – both print and electronic – have called for the F-35's consideration in the MMRCA tender itself (and some have called for an outright purchase) resulting in a new round of teeth-gnashing over a topic that has stretched over a decade. All things considered, here's why we don't think the F-35 for India is a very good idea.

To be clear, there is no doubt that the F-35 will meet accuracy and modernity standards required from any new-generation military equipment. But does it provide true bang-for-buck that the Indian Air Force needs? The way we see it, not really.

The Lightning II can barely be called a “medium weight” aircraft – the only aircraft heavier than it in the MMRCA competition was the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. Now couple this with the fact that its payload just about matches that of the Tejas, and you start to wonder whether it's such a good fit for the IAF. Next, even if it is advertised as a “multirole” aircraft, its capability on the aerial warfare front is still seriously suspect. At present the best it can do is carry four air-to-air missiles internally, less than half the capability of either the Typhoon or Rafale. It cannot operate without air cover as it does not possess a swing-role capability. Also, its stealth is not all-aspect like the F-22’s, and so it cannot be relied upon to make its way in and out of enemy territory unassisted.

Additionally, the F-35 features a significantly smaller combat radius than either MMRCA finalist when on internal fuel and weapons (which also means a smaller payload due to restrictions on space available). There is no official mention yet about external fuel tanks on the F-35, and the moment you hang weapons on external pylons, you can kiss both range and stealth goodbye. There are doubts, too, about its aerodynamic capabilities. The aircraft features thrust-to-weight ratio and wing loading figures poorer than those of any contemporary fighter. One wonders how well it would perform in the key strike role in the thin air over the Himalayas and the Tibetan plateau – the likely setting of any future India-China conflict.

There is also an issue that seems minor at first sight, but could throw a spanner in procurement. The IAF has, over the last two decades, gravitated towards two-man crews for any aircraft that will be involved in strike roles beyond close air support. This was highlighted in the Kargil War when IAF Mirages had to perform precision bombing tasks at high altitude while avoiding air defences, staying within the border and keeping an eye on possible interception. It is the reason why a third of the MMRCA batch is touted to comprise tandem-seaters just as all the new Jaguars have been. The lack of a two-seat F-35 means that not only will the IAF not get what it wants for deep penetration strike roles, but it means that any pilot training will have to be done on expensive simulators only.

Another problem is the complexity of the design itself and the fact that many of its technologies are radically new and untried. The USAF is learning the hard way that the F-22’s radar absorbing skin (which the F-35 also uses) is highly vulnerable to rain and dust, and very expensive and difficult to maintain. Advertised as having the computing power of two Cray supercomputers, it is so complex that it can only fly for an average of 1.7 hours before suffering a critical failure. Even six years after it entered service, new and potentially fatal problems continue to surface with alarming regularity. It isn’t too hard to guess how the F-35, whose design borrows heavily from that of the F-22 and even outclasses it in certain aspects, will fare in this regard.

If that wasn't bad enough, it gets worse once we start talking about timelines and costs. As of today, the F-35 (without development costs included) is priced at the same level as the Eurofighter and the Rafale. But while the latter two are combat proven and available today (in a fashion), the Lightning II won't be for a decade. Going by past experience, further schedule slippages and cost overruns look like a distinct possibility. Now, factor in the additional uncertainty created by the possible need to develop a tandem-seat version for the IAF alone, and one quickly begins to see why any optimism regarding timelines and costs could be highly misplaced. In the midst of all these arguments and calculations, the main reason why new medium fighters are being bought is often forgotten: the IAF needs new aircraft as fast as possible to shore up numbers and make up for the rapid obsolescence of a large portion of its fleet, and each delay only serves to make an already precarious situation worse. It is already taking a significant risk with the Indo-Russian Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) as it is. What is the point of bringing more uncertainty into the equation now, that too to procure a fighter that offers little in addition to low-observability?

And speaking of low-observability, how much will it cost to maintain the stealth features, especially in the hazy, dusty conditions of India? For that matter, will the IAF even get an aircraft that is as stealthy as the ones the US and UK operate? Will it get all the avionics, even watered down versions? The US is reluctant today to provide the UK, the only level-1 partner in the project, with full access to the aircraft’s source code. What are the chances of India getting a better deal?

Finally, there is one additional issue that bears examination in this debate, and that is how procuring the F-35 will affect the indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) project. Because of the similar roles the two aircraft shall be expected to fulfil, there is a distinct possibility that purchasing the F-35 will kill the AMCA for good, with disastrous long-term consequences. Detractors may argue that the AMCA is nowhere close to completion, and may be delayed by years just like the Tejas has been. That may well be the case, but if the AMCA does suffer inordinate delays, India can always place a future order for an F-35 with many of its niggles hopefully sorted out. There is little reason to make that call now, when the AMCA is still a design on paper.

Having said all that, one can imagine a few scenarios in which the F-35, even with all its problems, would serve a useful purpose in the IAF. For years, the IAF maintained a handful of high-maintenance MiG-25R Foxbats for a niche profile: reconnaissance of enemy territory, out of reach of interceptors or SAMs. Likewise, the IAF could consider one or two squadrons of the Lightning II, for the simple purpose of “kicking the door down” in the first few days of the war, taking out vital air defence nodes, logistics nodes, or AEW&C and tanker aircraft before handing over the heavy lifting to other aircraft that can announce their presence.

And yet, the reason this may turn out to be a bad idea is that in the same way the MiG-25 was replaced not by another aircraft but an indirect replacement – spy satellites – the F-35's role can be performed not by another aircraft, but by missiles. We already operate the ground-launched BrahMos. The air-launched version should be available within the next few years, giving us a 300-km reach anywhere beyond its launch point. Throw the Shaurya into the mix and suddenly we can hit targets deep inside enemy territory without having to risk aircraft or pilots. Granted, missiles cannot do everything an aircraft can but even if cruise missiles provide partial coverage, the costs in maintaining a squadron’s worth of special aircraft and pilots cannot be justified.

This is not to suggest that the F-35 Lightning II is a turkey, or that the US military is making a humongous blunder in buying it. But in the Indian context, we see little rationale behind spending large sums of money today on something that will only arrive a decade from now at the very best, be a difficult fit in our existing doctrine as well as punch a hole in our finances. If Lightning should strike our enemies, we would rather it not have our tricoloured roundels on it.

MIHIR SHAH is a US-based engineer who tracks aerospace issues closely. He has contributed before to Livefist and Pragati magazine. He works at a firm specialising in energy efficiency consulting.

ADITYA MANDREKAR is an electrical and avionic systems engineer who currently writes embedded software for an electronics company in the UK.

This column reflects the personal & independent views of the contributing columnists | Photo / Lockheed-Martin

http://livefist.blogspot.com/2011/11/co ... -ride.html

Penguin escreveu:

Carlos Mathias escreveu:Teve não, lá teve fofoca da mídia, mas vazamento de coisa oficial, não teve não.

Juro, agora fiquei confuso. Então para você o que a Eliane Cantanhede publicou na coluna dela no Jornal Folha de São Paulo agora é coisa oficial?!

Acho que agora todo mundo ficou confuso, ora o relatório era da FAB, ora era fofoca da Cantanhede, eu hein....

Pessoal tem que se decidir logo

Segundo os azuis, era oficial sim, porque estão pendurados nele até hoje prá malhar o Rafale.
Segundo os azuis, era tão oficial que forçou o MinDefe o cmte da FAB a espremer o Lula diante do atropelo.
Era tão oficial que até hoje abanam as supostas vantagens do Gripen-NG, como ter um custo mais baixo, coisa que, se não era oficial, ninguém sabe.

E USAntiago, logo você vem, querer me espremer?
Depois de, num post pedir só informações de fontes oficiais (porque aí as infos "oficiais era favoráveis) e depois noutro dizer que não é bem assim (aí a fofoca já era mais favorável), que serve coisa de fórum, mas não serve, mas depois serve...

Fio, o cara que só fala besteira baseada em fofocas sou eu, lembra?

Mais uma versão. Agora do Deccan Herald: http://www.deccanherald.com/content/203 ... inues.html

MMRCA: agora outro jornal indiano diz que Typhoon é o mais barato
8 de novembro de 2011, em Concorrências Internacionais, Noticiário Internacional, por Fernando "Nunão" De Martini

Segundo reportagem do Deccan Herald, preço unitário básico do Eurofighter Typhoon é mais baixo que o do Dassault Rafale – mas o suspense sobre o resultado do MMRCA continua

http://www.aereo.jor.br/2011/11/08/mmrc ... is-barato/

Penguin escreveu:

Onde eu creio que o Typhoon deve levar grande desvantagem nesse ciclo é no Development Cost. Pra colocar nele tudo que o Rafale tem ANTES do cronograma de finaciamento e desenvolvimento do consórcio, os indianos teriam que tirar do bolso.

O fato é que não se sabe certamente o que é oficial e o que não, é, são só especulações com relação ao FX-2