Fórum Defesa Brasil

jacquessantiago escreveu:Os italianos estao dando sinais de que nao querem Typhoon para ataque ao solo. Isso faz muito sentido jah que eles vao adquirir F-35, stealth. Para que gastar mais com o um caca nao stealth e muito mais vulneravel? Nao me surpreenderia se os italianos passassem a utilizar o F-35 em missoes ar-ar...como farao os americanos, australianos, canadenses, holandeses, ingleses e outros.

Vamos aguardar os proximos acontecimentos...

Sintra escreveu:

jacquessantiago escreveu:Os italianos estao dando sinais de que nao querem Typhoon para ataque ao solo. Isso faz muito sentido jah que eles vao adquirir F-35, stealth. Para que gastar mais com o um caca nao stealth e muito mais vulneravel? Nao me surpreenderia se os italianos passassem a utilizar o F-35 em missoes ar-ar...como farao os americanos, australianos, canadenses, holandeses, ingleses e outros.

Vamos aguardar os proximos acontecimentos...

Ou então, é porque se alguém fosse dizer ao parlamento Italiano que uma frota de 140 Typhoon´s (compra total Italiana) completamente desenvolvidos até ao Block 10 será muitissimo mais letal tanto em ar-ar como em ar-terra do que TODA a AMI actual com os seus Viper´s, Tornados e AMX, alguém ia perguntar (e com razão) "então, sr general, explique-me lá para que é que precisa de mais de uma centena de F35`s?"

O problema com o Typhoon "multirole" é que caso a AMI avançar com o desenvolvimento do caça até algo como o Block 10, a compra de F35´s vai desta para melhor, morre, ou melhor, devem adquirir uns 20/25 VSTOL para enfiar no Cavour...

Entratanto deixo aqui uma pequena questão, quando é que é suposto o F35 ter os sistemas de detecção passiva, o APG 81, os datalink´s, a integração do AIM9X e do AIM120D, isto tudo operacional?
Se a resposta for "2025", está correcta.

Sintra escreveu:

jacquessantiago escreveu:Os italianos estao dando sinais de que nao querem Typhoon para ataque ao solo. Isso faz muito sentido jah que eles vao adquirir F-35, stealth. Para que gastar mais com o um caca nao stealth e muito mais vulneravel? Nao me surpreenderia se os italianos passassem a utilizar o F-35 em missoes ar-ar...como farao os americanos, australianos, canadenses, holandeses, ingleses e outros.

Vamos aguardar os proximos acontecimentos...

Ou então, é porque se alguém fosse dizer ao parlamento Italiano que uma frota de 140 Typhoon´s (compra total Italiana) completamente desenvolvidos até ao Block 10 será muitissimo mais letal tanto em ar-ar como em ar-terra do que TODA a AMI actual com os seus Viper´s, Tornados e AMX, alguém ia perguntar (e com razão) "então, sr general, explique-me lá para que é que precisa de mais de uma centena de F35`s?"

O problema com o Typhoon "multirole" é que caso a AMI avançar com o desenvolvimento do caça até algo como o Block 10, a compra de F35´s vai desta para melhor, morre, ou melhor, devem adquirir uns 20/25 VSTOL para enfiar no Cavour...

Entratanto deixo aqui uma pequena questão, quando é que é suposto o F35 ter os sistemas de detecção passiva, o APG 81, os datalink´s, a integração do AIM9X e do AIM120D, isto tudo operacional?
Se a resposta for "2025", está correcta.

Q: A question for the Admiral. So is the commitment from Italy to buy JSF or possibly to buy JSF, does that change in any way the plans for Eurofighter?

Di Paola: I am grateful for your question because the answer is very straightforward. It's been put forward many many times in Italy so I am grateful for your question.

The answer is not. We are fully engaged in the Eurofighter program. We are a major participant to that project. We have already, we are in the procurement phase of 121 Eurofighters, we will continue to that. Our plan is to have basically two major aircraft for our air power requirements. That means Eurofighter for air defense as the primary role air superiority, and the Joint Strike Fighter for defensive air power, sea-based, land-based. So that's the way we envision our fit for our air power capability in the horizon of 2016. We have firmly committed, the contract is already there. So definitely the answer is not. The two programs are complementary from operation point of view and also from industrial point of view so we are definitely engaged in the program of Eurofighter. We will continue with that.

Saturday, April 1, 2006

F-35 Electronic Warfare Suite: More Than Self-Protection

http://www.aviationtoday.com/av/categor ... y/845.html

The F-35 will combine radar warning, signals collection and analysis, passive emitter location and countermeasures functions in an integrated electronic warfare suite deeply linked to radar and imaging sensors. The design aims to bootstrap pilot situa
Ron Sherman

At A Glance: Integration is at the heart of the F-35's electronic warfare (EW) capability.

This article discusses: General capabilities of the EW system, including its radar warning, electronic support measures and countermeasures functions, as well as the corresponding equipage;
Integration synergies both internal to the EW system and in the context of the other mission systems; and
Highlights of the EW system's ground test and flight test schedules.


Electronic warfare (EW) systems allow modern combat aircraft to use the electromagnetic spectrum against the enemy. EW includes the ability to collect, identify and locate signals, detect hostile radars and missile attacks, and activate countermeasures to disrupt or degrade enemy offenses and defenses. While some aircraft remain dedicated to the EW mission, the F-35 is designed to accomplish a wide range of electronic warfare tasks simultaneously with air-to-air and air-to-ground functions in support of its overall mission. Taken together, the Joint Strike Fighter's (JSF's) electronic warfare system is designed to extend the pilot's situational awareness and to identify, locate, track and defeat enemy defenses both in the air and on the ground.

JSF designers are attempting an unprecedented level of integration--between elements of the electronic warfare suite and within aircraft mission systems. Older fighters like the F-14 had federated EW systems, explains Mark Drake, F-35 business development manager with BAE Systems, the designer of the F-35's EW suite. There was a box for the radar warning receiver (RWR) and a box for dispensing chaff and flares. The pilot would see a missile launch on one display and detect other signals in the environment through another system. The pilot was the ultimate information integrator.

The F-35's EW system, by contrast, would lessen that workload. JSF is designed from the ground up to be an integrated system that would incorporate all the different aspects of survivability and mission accomplishment, Drake says.

While the JSF package is not the first integrated EW system--the F-22 does the same--it is the "first real improvement on fighter-based EW systems that is clearly linked from the beginning to do a combination of jobs," he says. "The novelty of the JSF is its ability to draw together an abundance of data and formulate it into actionable knowledge for the pilots," permitting them to focus on tactics and strategies for overall dominance, says Eric Branyan, vice president of JSF mission systems for Lockheed Martin, the F-35 prime contractor.

Deep Integration

Integration of EW sensors with the F-35's AN/APG 81 active electronically scanned array (AESA), communications and electro-optical distributed aperture systems puts offensive, defensive, coms and data-gathering sensors at the service of the pilot to process onboard and offboard data. The EW system employs a range of dedicated antennas and shares the AESA antenna for tasks such as electronic support measures or signals collection and analysis. The F-35's high-gain, electronically steered radar array provides jamming support under the control of the EW system. Because the AESA array provides very directional radio frequency (RF) output, the JSF could target a very small area and selectively jam it, which enhances survivability by reducing electronic emissions.

Integration of the EW system's elements is intended to reduce system volume and power requirements and increase affordability. But it also can aid survivability, compared with federated systems. Integrating the radar warning and countermeasures functions, for example, shortens response time. "The [systems'] handshake is intimate," Branyan says.

At a deeper level of integration, EW and other mission sensors are connected via a common, large-scale computing resource--the F-35's integrated core processor, or ICP. Integration at this level, for example, enables the electro-optical distributed aperture system (EODAS) sensor to support the deployment of countermeasures. Although the RF-based EW system and infrared (IR) -based EODAS system are built to run separately in different frequency domains, they are tied together at the ICP level. Instead of having the pilot operate EW and IR displays separately to detect threats with the individual sensors, "the airplane can deploy the optimal countermeasures with or without pilot action," Branyan says. This level of automation and improved situational awareness shortens the timeline of detection and response.

The integrated core processor aggregates and correlates multisource data and formulates solutions for presentation to the pilot, mixing the best data from each sensor. This maximizes detection ranges and provides the pilot options to evade, engage, counter or jam threats.

"The end result will be maximum situational awareness within individual cockpits and throughout strike packages, linked to command and control nodes, to ensure the battlespace is fully detected, understood and exploited," asserts Jon Waldrop, Lockheed Martin's director of international programs. At the EW system level, the F-35 will about equal the F-22 in performance, Branyan predicts. But because the newer aircraft's EW suite was developed from the start for reliability and affordability, it promises twice the reliability at half the cost, compared with legacy aircraft.

The F-35's EW system is all-digital, which translates to reduced size, weight and power requirements, as well as greater speed and accuracy. The ICP will process data at up to 1 trillion operations per second, and that capacity could double before the F-35 becomes operational, says Waldrop. Lockheed Martin selected a commercial-based ICP, which costs considerably less than its mil-spec predecessors and promises orders of magnitude more power.

Always active, the EW system would provide all-aspect, broadband protection. "If you were to put a ... circle around an aircraft, there would be no one quadrant, degree or section that is not covered instantaneously, all the time," Drake asserts. Six low-observable EW apertures are distributed around the aircraft--two embedded inside the leading edge of each wing and one in the trailing edge of each horizontal tail. Located inside the aerodynamic mold line of the aircraft, the EW apertures are designed to allow the aircraft to perform missions without altering its radar cross-section. One aperture can be used to identify the mode of a hostile radar, and two or more apertures can be used to determine the direction of enemy emissions. There are three, four-channel wideband EW receivers.

Of the various mission sensors, the EW elements, aided by the AESA antenna, probably would detect the enemy first, after which the aircraft's electro-optical system could scan it. The radar and EW apertures cooperate closely in the RF domain. The F-35's AESA antenna and the EW receivers are connected to support quick, long-range searches throughout the AESA antenna's bandwidth.

The radar warning function includes analysis, identification and tracking of hostile radars, as well as mode detection and monopulse, angle-of-arrival direction finding. The EW system discriminates one emitter from another by determining signal characteristics such as frequency, pulse width and pulse repetition frequency. Mode determination includes defining the operating function of an emitter at a given time, e.g., search, acquisition, tracking, based on known characteristics.

The self-protection system includes a response manager and RF/IR countermeasures. Two countermeasure dispensers are located in the aft area of the aircraft, carrying IR flares and chaff. The IR flares are relatively small, allowing more to be carried than was possible in predecessor aircraft. The EW system claims a 440-hour mean time between failures. An onboard diagnostics and fault isolation system, which automatically downlinks data to maintainers, allows line replaceable modules to be ready when the aircraft returns to base. This should simplify logistics and increase combat sortie rates.

EW Testing

Six years ago Lockheed Martin selected BAE Systems as the F-35's EW supplier. Now about 50 months into the F-35's 10-year development cycle, the company has completed proof-of-design work and met the form, fit, functionality and maturity goals established for this initial phase of development, Branyan says.

Key F-35 Milestones:

First Flights Schedule:

Fall 2006: F-35A Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL)

Late 2007: F-35B Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing (STOVL)

Early 2009: F-35C Carrier Variant (CV)

Initial Operating Capability (IOC) Schedule:

2012 U.S. Marine Corps

2013 U.S. Air Force

2013 U.S. Navy

2014 UK Royal Air Force

2014 UK Royal Navy

The F-35's flight test program is slated to commence in the fourth quarter of 2006, using the first seven aircraft. But these are "flight sciences" aircraft, fitted with only the basic avionics infrastructure to support coms and navigation functions. They will be used to evaluate flying qualities, stability, envelope expansion and weapons release.

Last July BAE Systems flight tested the EW system built to the proof-of-design maturity level. The company used a leased T-39, the military version of the Sabreliner business jet. This internally funded risk reduction effort conducted at the Naval Air Weapons Station, China Lake, Calif., "proved the system worked and exceeded all predicted performance parameters," Drake asserts. According to the company's announcement at the time, the EW sensors collected simulated RF threat data from ground emitters, using the system's digital receivers.

Block 0.5 Suite

The China Lake test provided airborne evidence of early system maturation and fed into the proof-of-manufacturing phase. BAE Systems is testing the proof-of-manufacturing-level electronic warfare system at its Nashua, N.H., facility.

Lockheed Martin expects to receive the equipment later this month in Fort Worth, Texas. With the initial Block 0.5 configuration, BAE Systems will deliver the processing architecture, apertures and about 35 percent of the software. These elements will be enough to start evaluating the basic functionality. In 2007 BAE will start delivering more capable, Block 1.0 software and the final countermeasures suite. The Block 1.0 EW version will be evaluated on system development and demonstration (SDD) jets. Block 1.0 also provides the initial operational capability (IOC) that will be installed on the low-rate initial production jets to be used in operational test and development.

When the Block 0.5 equipment arrives, Lockheed will perform testing in a simulation and stimulation environment. The EW system can be exercised from a flight simulator, which is "flown" to an area with simulated threats that test whether the EW system correctly identifies, tracks and engages the hostile emitters. Stimulation refers to the input of RF signal simulation in order to evaluate EW functions against simulated threats. Lockheed also will use an open air, full-scale F-35 model, mounted on a pole outside the facility, to further verify EW capabilities. The apertures can be installed on this open air model, so other aircraft can be put up to test the EW system and essentially "fly against it," Branyan says. Airborne testing of the integrated sensor suite is set to begin in the first quarter of 2007 on Lockheed's F-35 Cooperative Avionics Testbed, a modified Boeing 737, shown at left.

Flight testing of the EW system on the F-35A is planned to begin in the fourth quarter of 2008 with the first flight of a fully integrated "avionics aircraft." This aircraft will include the first full-production EW suite, slated for delivery in the first three months of 2007. The suite will be identical in all U.S. and international F-35 variants.

Producibility Focus

According to Dan Gobel, BAE Systems' vice president of F-35 programs, the development program is unique in using performance-based specifications instead of the traditional military specifications. "Performance" in this context refers to aircraft performance and supportability.

Performance-based specs have been a major factor in meeting cost and reliability goals. "We set defined goals very early in development," says Gobel. "In the critical design review, we were 10 percent below our weight goal and below the target for recurring fly-away costs." Last year BAE Systems quoted EW system weight as 185 pounds (84 kg).

Leveraging legacy technology and past problem-solving techniques helped solve early issues. BAE Systems' team, for example, used lessons learned from the F-22's AN/ALR-94 RF warning and countermeasures subsystem, which the company developed. "We made a point to involve the average guy on the line, all the way up to a vice president, from day one, as we designed the system," Drake says.

"Every element of the [F-22] team was interviewed at length, and the [design] problem was examined from every possible angle and from every level of seniority, expertise and function. They were asked what they would do differently if they had to do it all over again."

As a result, JSF's EW system--both the architecture and the manufacturing and assembly methodology--avoided processes, materials or techniques that would have increased cost or weight, or adversely affected supportability, Drake says. The design of the aircraft's low-observable antenna arrays, for example, benefited, as these elements "were a follow-on to a previous design," he says. By introducing producibility considerations at the beginning of development engineering, BAE asserts it was able to reduce production risk and increase system reliability and affordability. "It was a very good strategic decision," Drake says.

Also important is the use of spiral development practices to leverage the commonalities between the F-35 and F-22A. Waldrop says: "Every time the F-22A flies we learn more. We can now spiral advanced technology developed for the F-35 back into the Raptor." The similarities between both sensor suites allow for an unprecedented degree of technical cross-fertilization. The F-35's iterative flight test program will contribute significantly to JSF maturation, as well. The flight test schedule is built around a series of periodic block releases, allowing content and function to be influenced by test results.

JSF's EW suite uses an open architecture to simplify integration and future evolution. It uses industry-standard components, including software written in the C++ programming language, field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), 6U circuit cards in the VME format, and PowerPC microprocessors. F-35 mission systems designers aim to avoid the rigidities of firmware "burned into" hardware devices to provide the flexibility for spiral updates.

Total Integration

Within the JSF's overall mission systems package there is considerable overlap between the sensors. The best example is the aircraft's electro-optical distributed aperture system. While not part of the EW suite, EODAS has six strategically placed, embedded sensors, providing a fully spherical, continuously operating IR shield that can identify and track threats such as missiles, vastly increasing pilot situational awareness, says Branyan. Operating in the midwave-IR range, EODAS can provide warning at "tactically significant ranges," he says. EW and EODAS are two elements of an integrated sensor suite designed to detect and identify the full spectrum of air- and ground-based threats. EW, coupled with EODAS, provides integrated RF-IR domain coverage, Branyan says.

"Within the battlespace, pilots must be continually aware of both threats and friendly assets," Waldrop says. "While integrated systems like EW and DAS significantly ease pilot workload, it's ultimately up to the pilot to prioritize threats to ensure mission success." In the case of long-range detection, he says, the pilot has more time to detect and assess the threat. The ability to find and analyze a threat well before it detects the F-35 maximizes both offensive lethality and survivability. But it's a definite advantage to know that the integrated EW suite continues to operate in the background.

"It is important to note that as F-35 pilots fly a mission, the integrated sensor suite provides full situational awareness," says Waldrop. Sensor information includes not only onboard radar, EODAS and EW, but also offboard information. This could involve data from E-3 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, Joint STARS (E-8C ground surveillance) aircraft, data-linked air and ground intelligence, other combat aircraft, and both space- and sea-based elements. All the tactical/defensive information, both on board and off board, is fed to the pilot through the F-35's integrated core processor.

The JSF team has overcome some big systems integration challenges, including "the ability to provide the pilot with incredible amounts of information in a very intuitive way," enabling the pilot to maintain the tactical advantage over any adversary, asserts Waldrop. The aircraft's open architecture design and use of commercial off-the-shelf components, furthermore, should improve sustainment and allow efficient upgrades.

The overarching challenge, Waldrop says, is to detect and assess relevant events in the battlespace, drawing from and publishing critical data into the "infosphere." In the final analysis, he concludes, the ultimate goal of the pilot-JSF integrated sensor interface is to achieve "a maximum level of actionable situational awareness."

jacquessantiago escreveu:

Sintra escreveu:

jacquessantiago escreveu:Os italianos estao dando sinais de que nao querem Typhoon para ataque ao solo. Isso faz muito sentido jah que eles vao adquirir F-35, stealth. Para que gastar mais com o um caca nao stealth e muito mais vulneravel? Nao me surpreenderia se os italianos passassem a utilizar o F-35 em missoes ar-ar...como farao os americanos, australianos, canadenses, holandeses, ingleses e outros.

Vamos aguardar os proximos acontecimentos...

Ou então, é porque se alguém fosse dizer ao parlamento Italiano que uma frota de 140 Typhoon´s (compra total Italiana) completamente desenvolvidos até ao Block 10 será muitissimo mais letal tanto em ar-ar como em ar-terra do que TODA a AMI actual com os seus Viper´s, Tornados e AMX, alguém ia perguntar (e com razão) "então, sr general, explique-me lá para que é que precisa de mais de uma centena de F35`s?"

O problema com o Typhoon "multirole" é que caso a AMI avançar com o desenvolvimento do caça até algo como o Block 10, a compra de F35´s vai desta para melhor, morre, ou melhor, devem adquirir uns 20/25 VSTOL para enfiar no Cavour...

Esta eh uma boa questao.
Se o Typhoon tivesse todo esse potencial, nao seria necessario gastar uma dinheirama no F-35. Ou melhor, nao seria necessario aumentar o numero de F-35 a ser encomendado. Gastar-se-ia em mais Typhoon, gerando empregos na Europa. Que parlamento se posicionaria contra isso? Ninguem eh obrigado a comprar mais de 100 F-35. Nem a AMI.

O Typhoon, por mais que se agreguem novas tecnologias para torna-lo discreto, nao eh stealth, nao carrega armas internamente, carregara combustivel externamente e estara em termos de sistemas pelos menos meia geracao atras do F-35.

Entratanto deixo aqui uma pequena questão, quando é que é suposto o F35 ter os sistemas de detecção passiva, o APG 81, os datalink´s, a integração do AIM9X e do AIM120D, isto tudo operacional?
Se a resposta for "2025", está correcta.

Vc esta insinuando que entre 2012 e 2025 o caca vai estar sem radar, sem data link, sem os sistemas de deteccao passiva e sem armas....so uma carcaca voadora.... Entao a USAF, US Navy, Marines e um bom numero de paises que estao investindo pesadamente terao suas capacidades seriamente afetadas. Devem ser idiotas...

OBS.: Projected Initial Operational Capabilities (IOC) dates: STOVL variant in 2012 (USMC); CTOL variant in 2013 (Air Force); CV variant in 2013 (Navy). Fonte: Department of The Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (http://acquisition.navy.mil/organizations)

O que diz Giampaolo Di Paola (First, Admiral and Italian Secretary General Of Defense and National Armaments Director), em 2002, quando questionado se a aquisicao do F-35 afetaria o Typhoon:

Q: A question for the Admiral. So is the commitment from Italy to buy JSF or possibly to buy JSF, does that change in any way the plans for Eurofighter?

Di Paola: I am grateful for your question because the answer is very straightforward. It's been put forward many many times in Italy so I am grateful for your question.

The answer is not. We are fully engaged in the Eurofighter program. We are a major participant to that project. We have already, we are in the procurement phase of 121 Eurofighters, we will continue to that. Our plan is to have basically two major aircraft for our air power requirements. That means Eurofighter for air defense as the primary role air superiority, and the Joint Strike Fighter for defensive air power, sea-based, land-based. So that's the way we envision our fit for our air power capability in the horizon of 2016. We have firmly committed, the contract is already there. So definitely the answer is not. The two programs are complementary from operation point of view and also from industrial point of view so we are definitely engaged in the program of Eurofighter. We will continue with that.

"defensive air power"....

[]´s

Sintra escreveu:

jacquessantiago escreveu:

Sintra escreveu:

jacquessantiago escreveu:Os italianos estao dando sinais de que nao querem Typhoon para ataque ao solo. Isso faz muito sentido jah que eles vao adquirir F-35, stealth. Para que gastar mais com o um caca nao stealth e muito mais vulneravel? Nao me surpreenderia se os italianos passassem a utilizar o F-35 em missoes ar-ar...como farao os americanos, australianos, canadenses, holandeses, ingleses e outros.

Vamos aguardar os proximos acontecimentos...

Ou então, é porque se alguém fosse dizer ao parlamento Italiano que uma frota de 140 Typhoon´s (compra total Italiana) completamente desenvolvidos até ao Block 10 será muitissimo mais letal tanto em ar-ar como em ar-terra do que TODA a AMI actual com os seus Viper´s, Tornados e AMX, alguém ia perguntar (e com razão) "então, sr general, explique-me lá para que é que precisa de mais de uma centena de F35`s?"

O problema com o Typhoon "multirole" é que caso a AMI avançar com o desenvolvimento do caça até algo como o Block 10, a compra de F35´s vai desta para melhor, morre, ou melhor, devem adquirir uns 20/25 VSTOL para enfiar no Cavour...

Esta eh uma boa questao.
Se o Typhoon tivesse todo esse potencial, nao seria necessario gastar uma dinheirama no F-35. Ou melhor, nao seria necessario aumentar o numero de F-35 a ser encomendado. Gastar-se-ia em mais Typhoon, gerando empregos na Europa. Que parlamento se posicionaria contra isso? Ninguem eh obrigado a comprar mais de 100 F-35. Nem a AMI.

O Typhoon, por mais que se agreguem novas tecnologias para torna-lo discreto, nao eh stealth, nao carrega armas internamente, carregara combustivel externamente e estara em termos de sistemas pelos menos meia geracao atras do F-35.

Entratanto deixo aqui uma pequena questão, quando é que é suposto o F35 ter os sistemas de detecção passiva, o APG 81, os datalink´s, a integração do AIM9X e do AIM120D, isto tudo operacional?
Se a resposta for "2025", está correcta.

Vc esta insinuando que entre 2012 e 2025 o caca vai estar sem radar, sem data link, sem os sistemas de deteccao passiva e sem armas....so uma carcaca voadora.... Entao a USAF, US Navy, Marines e um bom numero de paises que estao investindo pesadamente terao suas capacidades seriamente afetadas. Devem ser idiotas...

OBS.: Projected Initial Operational Capabilities (IOC) dates: STOVL variant in 2012 (USMC); CTOL variant in 2013 (Air Force); CV variant in 2013 (Navy). Fonte: Department of The Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (http://acquisition.navy.mil/organizations)

O que diz Giampaolo Di Paola (First, Admiral and Italian Secretary General Of Defense and National Armaments Director), em 2002, quando questionado se a aquisicao do F-35 afetaria o Typhoon:

Q: A question for the Admiral. So is the commitment from Italy to buy JSF or possibly to buy JSF, does that change in any way the plans for Eurofighter?

Di Paola: I am grateful for your question because the answer is very straightforward. It's been put forward many many times in Italy so I am grateful for your question.

The answer is not. We are fully engaged in the Eurofighter program. We are a major participant to that project. We have already, we are in the procurement phase of 121 Eurofighters, we will continue to that. Our plan is to have basically two major aircraft for our air power requirements. That means Eurofighter for air defense as the primary role air superiority, and the Joint Strike Fighter for defensive air power, sea-based, land-based. So that's the way we envision our fit for our air power capability in the horizon of 2016. We have firmly committed, the contract is already there. So definitely the answer is not. The two programs are complementary from operation point of view and also from industrial point of view so we are definitely engaged in the program of Eurofighter. We will continue with that.

"defensive air power"....

[]´s

Faça lá o favor de ler melhor o que escrevi... O que eu afirmei é que o F35 terá as suas capacidades ar-ar "full", o que o Tiffie tem agora, em 2025...
EXACTO, quanto ao AIM9X ainda nem sequer está planeada a integração do mesmo, o ETOPS é dado como completamente funcional em 2025 (leu bem) e o radar APG 81 estará completamente desenvolvido lá para 2020...
NESSA altura faça uma comparação com o Tiffie, até lá estamos a falar de um "paper plane".
Quanto à aquisição do F35 È NORMALISSIMO que isso aconteça, afinal o IOC do primeiro esquadrão Italiano vai acontecer em 2018 enquanto o do Tiffie foi em 2006...
Que mania de comparar coisas incomparáveis, um avião e sistema de armas que está em serviço AGORA com um que vai estar em serviço daqui a DOZE anos.

Patton escreveu:

Sintra escreveu:

jacquessantiago escreveu:

Sintra escreveu:

jacquessantiago escreveu:Os italianos estao dando sinais de que nao querem Typhoon para ataque ao solo. Isso faz muito sentido jah que eles vao adquirir F-35, stealth. Para que gastar mais com o um caca nao stealth e muito mais vulneravel? Nao me surpreenderia se os italianos passassem a utilizar o F-35 em missoes ar-ar...como farao os americanos, australianos, canadenses, holandeses, ingleses e outros.

Vamos aguardar os proximos acontecimentos...

Ou então, é porque se alguém fosse dizer ao parlamento Italiano que uma frota de 140 Typhoon´s (compra total Italiana) completamente desenvolvidos até ao Block 10 será muitissimo mais letal tanto em ar-ar como em ar-terra do que TODA a AMI actual com os seus Viper´s, Tornados e AMX, alguém ia perguntar (e com razão) "então, sr general, explique-me lá para que é que precisa de mais de uma centena de F35`s?"

O problema com o Typhoon "multirole" é que caso a AMI avançar com o desenvolvimento do caça até algo como o Block 10, a compra de F35´s vai desta para melhor, morre, ou melhor, devem adquirir uns 20/25 VSTOL para enfiar no Cavour...

Esta eh uma boa questao.
Se o Typhoon tivesse todo esse potencial, nao seria necessario gastar uma dinheirama no F-35. Ou melhor, nao seria necessario aumentar o numero de F-35 a ser encomendado. Gastar-se-ia em mais Typhoon, gerando empregos na Europa. Que parlamento se posicionaria contra isso? Ninguem eh obrigado a comprar mais de 100 F-35. Nem a AMI.

O Typhoon, por mais que se agreguem novas tecnologias para torna-lo discreto, nao eh stealth, nao carrega armas internamente, carregara combustivel externamente e estara em termos de sistemas pelos menos meia geracao atras do F-35.

Entratanto deixo aqui uma pequena questão, quando é que é suposto o F35 ter os sistemas de detecção passiva, o APG 81, os datalink´s, a integração do AIM9X e do AIM120D, isto tudo operacional?
Se a resposta for "2025", está correcta.

Vc esta insinuando que entre 2012 e 2025 o caca vai estar sem radar, sem data link, sem os sistemas de deteccao passiva e sem armas....so uma carcaca voadora.... Entao a USAF, US Navy, Marines e um bom numero de paises que estao investindo pesadamente terao suas capacidades seriamente afetadas. Devem ser idiotas...

OBS.: Projected Initial Operational Capabilities (IOC) dates: STOVL variant in 2012 (USMC); CTOL variant in 2013 (Air Force); CV variant in 2013 (Navy). Fonte: Department of The Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (http://acquisition.navy.mil/organizations)

O que diz Giampaolo Di Paola (First, Admiral and Italian Secretary General Of Defense and National Armaments Director), em 2002, quando questionado se a aquisicao do F-35 afetaria o Typhoon:

Q: A question for the Admiral. So is the commitment from Italy to buy JSF or possibly to buy JSF, does that change in any way the plans for Eurofighter?

Di Paola: I am grateful for your question because the answer is very straightforward. It's been put forward many many times in Italy so I am grateful for your question.

The answer is not. We are fully engaged in the Eurofighter program. We are a major participant to that project. We have already, we are in the procurement phase of 121 Eurofighters, we will continue to that. Our plan is to have basically two major aircraft for our air power requirements. That means Eurofighter for air defense as the primary role air superiority, and the Joint Strike Fighter for defensive air power, sea-based, land-based. So that's the way we envision our fit for our air power capability in the horizon of 2016. We have firmly committed, the contract is already there. So definitely the answer is not. The two programs are complementary from operation point of view and also from industrial point of view so we are definitely engaged in the program of Eurofighter. We will continue with that.

"defensive air power"....

[]´s

Faça lá o favor de ler melhor o que escrevi... O que eu afirmei é que o F35 terá as suas capacidades ar-ar "full", o que o Tiffie tem agora, em 2025...
EXACTO, quanto ao AIM9X ainda nem sequer está planeada a integração do mesmo, o ETOPS é dado como completamente funcional em 2025 (leu bem) e o radar APG 81 estará completamente desenvolvido lá para 2020...
NESSA altura faça uma comparação com o Tiffie, até lá estamos a falar de um "paper plane".
Quanto à aquisição do F35 È NORMALISSIMO que isso aconteça, afinal o IOC do primeiro esquadrão Italiano vai acontecer em 2018 enquanto o do Tiffie foi em 2006...
Que mania de comparar coisas incomparáveis, um avião e sistema de armas que está em serviço AGORA com um que vai estar em serviço daqui a DOZE anos.

Entao voce nao acredita no F-35? Acredita que sera' simplesmente um "bomb truck?" Eu nao sei mas eu acho que o F-35 deve ser mais avancado do Tiffy. Simplesmente nao faria sentido se nao fosse. Eu tenho duas problemas com o F-35 1) falta da capacidade supercruise, e 2) falta de 2D TVC com uma signatura IR reduzido.

O meu principal problema com o F35 nem são tanto as caracteristicas dinâmicas serem "médias" (acho que vai muito parecido, em termos de vôo, ao F/A-18A),o mais grave é que anda a comer verbas que deveriam estar a ser empregues na compra de mais F22 (que deveria estar a ser encomendado às centenas) e no desenvolvimento de UCAV´s e no futuro bombardeiro da USAF.

F-35 Lightning II Flight Tests
Chief Test Pilot Recounts Early Flights

By Eric Hehs

http://www.codeonemagazine.com/archives ... index.html

The F-35 Lightning II took to the air for the first time on 15 December 2006 with chief test pilot Jon Beesley at the controls. During this maiden flight, Beesley performed a military power takeoff and executed a series of maneuvers to evaluate the handling qualities of the aircraft. The airplane flew to 15,000 feet and a maximum speed of 225 knots. The F-35 test program has since expanded the flight envelope of this first Lightning II and will continue to expand the envelope in the coming months. More importantly, this first aircraft is being used to evaluate the performance of highly sophisticated subsystems that form a baseline for subsequent F-35s.

Beesley has an extensive flight test résumé that begins with graduation from the US Air Force Test Pilot School in 1979. After working on several classified programs, he became one of the first USAF pilots to fly the F-117. When he left the Air Force in 1986 to join General Dynamics in Fort Worth, Texas, he initially flew developmental flight tests for an innovative night attack system for the F-16 called Falcon Eye. This program was one of the first to use helmet-mounted displays, or HMDs, and head-steered infrared devices on a tactical aircraft.

In 1990, Beesley became a project test pilot on the YF-22 during the Advanced Tactical Fighter competition. He was principally involved with evaluating and demonstrating the flying qualities of the YF-22. Many of these flights demonstrated the tremendous high angle of attack capabilities of the aircraft. Longtime Code One readers may recall his article on flight testing the YF-22, "Report From the Future," in 1991.

After the US Air Force selected the F-22 as the winner of the Advanced Tactical Fighter competition, Beesley became the Fort Worth project pilot for the F-22 program. He was the second pilot to fly the Raptor and one of the lead pilots in envelope expansion flights. Over his career, he has accumulated more than 5,000 hours of flight time in more than forty-five different types of aircraft.

Beesley became chief test pilot for the F-35 program in 2002. He will be in charge of flight testing all three variants to be produced: the F-35A conventional takeoff and landing, or CTOL, variant; the F-35B short takeoff/vertical landing, or STOVL, variant; and the F-35C carrier variant, or CV. Code One editor Eric Hehs interviewed him for his impressions of flying the first F-35 and for his perspective on flight testing this and subsequent Lightning II fighters.

What is your strongest memory from the first flight of the F-35?

The thrust impressed me most. The first flight profile called for the F-35 to immediately go to 15,000 feet. I had to keep the speed at 225 knots during the climb since I had to keep the gear down, which limited the maximum speed.

I used nose attitude instead of modulating engine thrust to control airspeed during the climb to 15,000 feet. In other words, I had to raise the nose to slow down the airplane. I took off and started pulling back on the stick. I had to keep pulling back to stop from accelerating over the 225-knot limit. So I reached a rather steep angle, about twenty-five degrees of pitch. The steep angle, witnessed by the crowds on the ground, highlighted the raw power I was experiencing in the cockpit. The thrust surprised me. Not in the sense of "Gee, how am I going to handle all of this power?" But more like, "Wow, this is more than I expected."

What was your overall impression of the airplane after that flight?

Overall, I was impressed by how well the entire first flight came together. I started the airplane, ran through all of our ground checks, taxied out to the end of the runway, and took off. The test team told me I taxied out to the end of the runway much faster than I did for any of the taxi tests. But I was ready to go and so was the airplane.

I was also pleased with how smoothly the airplane went through all the ground checks and how smoothly the airplane flew. As an example, the flap schedules on the original F-22 shook the Raptor at speeds above 200 knots. This objectionable buffet was addressed right away through a software change. Paul Metz [first pilot to fly the F-22] and I are the only two pilots who ever experienced that buffeting. I thought that I might experience some sort of buffeting with the first F-35, but I didn't.

We learned a lot from the F-22. Our engineers deserve a lot of credit. In fact, many of those who completed the checkout and testing of similar systems on the F-22 Raptor are performing the same work on the F-35. To name a few prominent examples: Kevin McTeague works on electrical systems; John Magbuhat works on flight controls; Paul Thoennes works on hydraulics; and Roy Schoberle from Pratt & Whitney works on the F135 engine. Many others with similar experience did the design integration work over the last several years. We also have some seasoned veterans involved in flight testing the new airplanes, which includes Mary Beth O'Loughlin as the test conductor for the first flight. We have a great team.

How has your impression of the F-35 changed in subsequent flights?

I continue to be impressed with the performance of the aircraft. The F-16s flying chase don't have near the fuel capacity or payload capability as the F-35. The Lightning II does very well in comparison. For example, the F-35 often forces the chase aircraft into afterburner when it is in military power.

The airplane's handling qualities continue to be very good throughout the flight envelope. When I raise the landing gear, the airplane flies very smoothly. The landing gear is sequenced, which is unique for a fighter. The nose gear comes up first, then the main gear follows. The gears drop down in reverse order. Another strong impression is that the airplane wants to fly a lot faster than we are allowed to fly at this point in the flight test program. Most of the time we fly at about thirty to forty percent of available thrust. This airplane can go out to high subsonic speeds very easily without using afterburner.

Describe the basic progression of the first flight tests.

On the first flight takeoff, we received an air data degrade caution message. It indicated a mismatch in the lower-level comparison in the air data system, specifically with angle of attack. However, we had no loss of capability. Simply put, readings from the right and left air data probes need to agree within a certain tolerance, and they didn't on the first flight.

Because the air data system is redundant, we were able to fly on the left probe after the right one was turned off. The caution message cut the flight short, but we still managed to perform some of the planned maneuver blocks, which included throttle transients and one-half stick and pedal inputs. The handling qualities in these maneuvers were excellent with a notably smoother response and a better roll rate than I expected.

The greatest accomplishment of the first flight was the performance of the subsystems. The integrated power package, electrical, electro-hydrostatic actuators, flight control computers, and other subsystems worked without a problem for the entire flight. The performance of these systems is a great testimony to the team that brought the F-35 to first flight. After the faulty probe was replaced, we performed an additional 110-knot taxi test on 4 January to calibrate the new probe. We gathered additional air data on subsequent flights during January to further calibrate the air data system.

On Flight 2, we cycled the landing gear and then flew formation for the first time with the gear up. On Flight 3, we performed the first military power takeoff. On Flight 4, we performed the first low-altitude maneuvering. On Flight 5, we performed the first afterburner engine transient as well as performing other engine transient testing. On Flight 6, we conducted a fuel dump test. This test was conducted early in the flight test program to gather real-world data to inform design decisions on the fuel dump mechanization for the carrier variant, or F-35C. We performed higher angle of attack maneuvers on Flight 6 as well.

On Flight 7, we evaluated the speed brake operation. The F-35, like the F-22, doesn't have a dedicated speed brake like most previous fighters. Instead, it decelerates through the flight control software by deflecting control surfaces in the same manner as the Raptor. We use the leading-edge flaps as well as the trailing-edge flaps and the rudders to slow the airplane. Unlike the F-22, the F-35A and F-35B have no ailerons. That explains why it uses a combination of leading- and trailing-edge flaps and rudders to slow down. I found that the buffet levels were very low, essentially the same as buffet levels of the F-16 with the speed brake in operation. Deceleration rates in the F-35 are similar to the
F-16 as well, which is a design goal.

On Flight 8, we flew the software fix for the air data system issues we saw on the first flight. The new software allowed me to use full lateral stick rolling maneuvers. Handling qualities during these rolls were outstanding with roll rates matching predictions. We had to cut this flight short because our chase aircraft had a mechanical problem.

On Flight 9, we performed the first afterburner takeoff. Flight 9 was also our longest flight to that point, 1.5 hours. We took off with 3,500 pounds short of a full fuel load and landed with about 4,000 pounds of fuel remaining. So we shorted ourselves more fuel than the entire internal fuel capacity of an F-16 and still flew for 1.5 hours without aerial refueling. During Flight 9, we also flew close formations, power approaches, and maneuver blocks to sixteen-degrees angle of attack at 20,000 feet.

On Flight 10, we flew with the HMD for the first time. The mission included full-stick 360-degree rolls, snap engine transients in afterburner, and close formation flying. We also landed in fifteen-knot crosswinds for the first time. Flight 11 involved several lower altitude maneuver blocks as well as maneuvering with the speed brake. Jeff Knowles, the second pilot to fly the F-35, completed his first flight on Flight 12. I took the aircraft to 30,000 feet on Flight 13, performed a touch-and-go landing, completed maneuvers to seventeen-degrees angle of attack, and cycled the aerial refueling door.

As far as envelope expansion goes, we have conducted engine transients up to maximum afterburner from takeoff to 30,000 feet. We have been to 345 knots, 3.5 g's, and sixteen-degrees angle of attack and seventeen degrees with the landing gear down. We have three engines available for AA-1 but have flown only one. We want to fly as many hours as we can on it.

Summing up the flying characteristics: the F-35 flies a lot like the F-22 and has the size and feel of an F-16. The F-35 is a solid and very responsive airplane.



How does this test progression compare to previous fighter flight test programs you have worked?

The F-35 envelope expansion and flying qualities work is similar to previous fighter programs. That similarity may give the impression that we're conducting the same tests in the same ways. But that impression is false. A superficial comparison between the development of this fighter and the development of legacy fighters neglects mission capability.

Our customers are getting a whole lot more in the F-35 program. They are getting a baseline configuration with capabilities that required twenty or thirty years to develop for the F-16: infrared sensors, targeting pods, night vision systems, head-mounted cueing systems, and agile beam radars to name a few. During those years of development, the Air Force and Lockheed Martin conducted separate test programs to validate those capabilities. Those capabilities are all incorporated in this phase of the F-35 program. A truer comparison between legacy programs and the F-35 program would include the development time and cost for these additional capabilities.

Are any of these capabilities and systems unique to the F-35?

The F-35 has many unique capabilities. The helmet-mounted display and the integrated power package, or IPP, are two good examples. We began flying the HMD on Flight 10 and have flown with it on all succeeding flights. The HMD is much more than a helmet-mounted sight, which is flying in operational F-16s today as the joint helmet-mounted cueing system, better known as JHMCS. Our HMD also functions as a head-up display. That is, it shows all the information normally placed on the HUD, including speed, altitude, heading, and flight path information.

The system is working very well, and pilots quickly forget that the flight symbology is being displayed on the helmet rather than on a conventional head-up display. We don't have a HUD on the first F-35. And we have no plans to put one in any other F-35. Putting an HMD in the first airplane is a gutsy call. We are on track with its development. The initial results of incorporating an HMD in the test program have been better than we expected. The HMD is a significant jump in technology. This system has been performing very well.

The IPP, my second example, is a sophisticated turbine that acts as the auxiliary power unit on engine starts. When the engine is running, the IPP functions as an environmental control system, or ECS. When required, it also functions as an emergency power unit during emergency mode transitions. The IPP, then, performs the functions of three subsystems found on legacy fighters.

The first F-35 represents a configuration of the aircraft before the company undertook a significant weight-reduction effort. Why is the program testing an aircraft that is not completely representative of subsequent production models?

While the internal structure may be different, the shape of this first F-35 is almost identical to subsequent production versions. So gathering aerodynamic data on this configuration gives us an opportunity to evaluate performance characteristics on a real aircraft as opposed to making predictions using models or simulations. Additionally, testing and integrating all of the new systems in the F-35, as I described previously, gives us more than a year's head start on problems that we may encounter in testing and integrating these same systems in subsequent aircraft. Along with the HMD and IPP, other systems and features incorporated on subsequent F-35s include the F135 engine, electrical system, fuel system, electro-hydrostatic actuators, cockpit, weapon bay doors, and bay ventilation. So this first version of the Lightning II gives us an outstanding opportunity to reduce risk as we move forward with the program.

Let's take the cockpit as one example of the similarities between this and subsequent aircraft. With the exception of two switches, the AA-1 cockpit is the same as the next F-35, which will be a STOVL variant. And that F-35B STOVL cockpit will be the same across all three variants. On the STOVL airplane, one switch will read "conversion" instead of "hook." All of the other switches are the same. While the engine page on the F-35B has a display that deals with STOVL, most every other display on this variant is the same as the displays on the other variants. The missions systems are the same on all three variants. This commonality reduces the total scope—and expense—of the program. We are combining into one program what would have involved three separate and independent development programs in the past.

The electro-hydrostatic actuators, or EHAs, are another excellent example of risk reduction we're accomplishing on AA-1. This is the first real electric jet. The flight control actuators, while they have internal closed-loop hydraulic systems, are controlled and driven by electricity—not hydraulics. The F-35 is the only military aircraft flying with such a system. We proved that the approach works on six flights of the AFTI F-16 during the concept demonstration phase of the JSF program. We already have many more flights on EHAs on this test program. Because we are flying production versions of the EHAs on AA-1, we won't have to prove the EHA design on subsequent F-35s.

What are the immediate production plans for subsequent F-35s, and how will those aircraft be used in the flight test program?

Current plans call for fifteen flight test aircraft, including AA-1. The next four aircraft produced will be F-35B short takeoff/vertical landing, or STOVL, variants. These will be followed by three conventional takeoff and landing, or CTOL, aircraft. Then the first three carrier variant, or CV, aircraft will be produced followed by another STOVL aircraft and one more CV. Two more CTOL aircraft complete the production run of test aircraft. AF-1 and AF-2, the next CTOL variants to be produced, will be used for flight sciences; that is, they will be used to test aero-dynamics and flight controls and to expand the flight envelope. AF-3, 4, and 5 will be used to develop and test mission systems.

We will have three F-35B, or STOVL, variants for flight sciences and two F-35Bs for testing mission systems. The first flight sciences B-model will be dedicated to STOVL operations. The other two B-models will be used to expand the flight envelope.

We will have four F-35Cs dedicated to the flight test program. The first two carrier variants will be used for flight sciences. The third aircraft will be used for carrier suitability testing. The fourth aircraft will be used to test mission systems.

We had as many as six aircraft devoted to testing mission systems for the F-22. We have seven aircraft in this program. Fortunately, everything we do on the F-35A for mission systems applies to the F-35B and F-35C. The variants have only minor differences in terms of antenna sizes and shapes.

But the real virtue of this flight test program is that we have seven flight sciences aircraft. While the F-22 had only one true flight sciences aircraft, we need more because we have three variants as well as many external payload configurations that require testing as well. The potential external loadings on the internal weapon stations and six external hard points create a very large test matrix, which will eventually include most of the weapons carried by the F-16, F/A-18, Harrier, and A-10.

What will be the biggest challenge for the flight test program?

For AA-1, our biggest challenge is to be aggressive enough to find out all the things we don't yet know about the aircraft's performance. We have some real opportunities to learn how EHAs work at high speeds. Proving the HMD is another challenge. Testing the first aircraft gives our predictions for subsequent aircraft credibility. We want to knock off all the big risks with this first airplane and reduce all the other risks for future airplanes. After that, a big challenge is managing fourteen flight test aircraft in three test sites. Testing short takeoffs and vertical landings is always a challenge. First, we have to make STOVL work. We have to make short takeoffs and vertical landings as straightforward and as easy as possible. Pilots should not have to spend most of their training time on the first and last five minutes of the flight. How we mechanize transitions from horizontal to vertical flight will free up time for training skills more pertinent to the mission.

Developing mission systems will be a huge challenge, and testing those systems is one of the more critical parts of the program. The CATBird, a 737 modified to carry the F-35 sensor suite and associated systems, will help us reduce risk associated with mission systems. The number of weapons and configurations to clear also represents a challenge. If pilots can't employ weapons, the airplane is of no value. And we are testing these weapons in a large envelope. The F-35 can maneuver post-stall like an F/A-18. So we have a lot ahead of us. But we are certainly up to these challenge.

Eric Hehs is the editor of Code One.

...e dai eu desconfiar que estamos em presença de um digno substituto do P47 e não do P51...
E um P-47 era capaz de escavacar a oposição aérea e depois ir rebentar Tigres e Leopard´s, creio que a ideia do F35 é mais ou menos a mesma.

jacquessantiago escreveu:

O meu principal problema com o F35 nem são tanto as caracteristicas dinâmicas serem "médias" (acho que vai muito parecido, em termos de vôo, ao F/A-18A),o mais grave é que anda a comer verbas que deveriam estar a ser empregues na compra de mais F22 (que deveria estar a ser encomendado às centenas) e no desenvolvimento de UCAV´s e no futuro bombardeiro da USAF.

Sintra,

O mais concreto que li sobre o desempenho do F-35 foi a entrevista com o piloto de provas chefe do programa (2007):

OBS.: acrescentei a figura abaixo, na qual fica claro a semelhanca de configuracao com o F-22.

[]´s

F-35 Lightning II Flight Tests
Chief Test Pilot Recounts Early Flights

By Eric Hehs

http://www.codeonemagazine.com/archives ... index.html

The F-35 Lightning II took to the air for the first time on 15 December 2006 with chief test pilot Jon Beesley at the controls. During this maiden flight, Beesley performed a military power takeoff and executed a series of maneuvers to evaluate the handling qualities of the aircraft. The airplane flew to 15,000 feet and a maximum speed of 225 knots. The F-35 test program has since expanded the flight envelope of this first Lightning II and will continue to expand the envelope in the coming months. More importantly, this first aircraft is being used to evaluate the performance of highly sophisticated subsystems that form a baseline for subsequent F-35s.

Beesley has an extensive flight test résumé that begins with graduation from the US Air Force Test Pilot School in 1979. After working on several classified programs, he became one of the first USAF pilots to fly the F-117. When he left the Air Force in 1986 to join General Dynamics in Fort Worth, Texas, he initially flew developmental flight tests for an innovative night attack system for the F-16 called Falcon Eye. This program was one of the first to use helmet-mounted displays, or HMDs, and head-steered infrared devices on a tactical aircraft.

In 1990, Beesley became a project test pilot on the YF-22 during the Advanced Tactical Fighter competition. He was principally involved with evaluating and demonstrating the flying qualities of the YF-22. Many of these flights demonstrated the tremendous high angle of attack capabilities of the aircraft. Longtime Code One readers may recall his article on flight testing the YF-22, "Report From the Future," in 1991.

After the US Air Force selected the F-22 as the winner of the Advanced Tactical Fighter competition, Beesley became the Fort Worth project pilot for the F-22 program. He was the second pilot to fly the Raptor and one of the lead pilots in envelope expansion flights. Over his career, he has accumulated more than 5,000 hours of flight time in more than forty-five different types of aircraft.

Beesley became chief test pilot for the F-35 program in 2002. He will be in charge of flight testing all three variants to be produced: the F-35A conventional takeoff and landing, or CTOL, variant; the F-35B short takeoff/vertical landing, or STOVL, variant; and the F-35C carrier variant, or CV. Code One editor Eric Hehs interviewed him for his impressions of flying the first F-35 and for his perspective on flight testing this and subsequent Lightning II fighters.

What is your strongest memory from the first flight of the F-35?

The thrust impressed me most. The first flight profile called for the F-35 to immediately go to 15,000 feet. I had to keep the speed at 225 knots during the climb since I had to keep the gear down, which limited the maximum speed.

I used nose attitude instead of modulating engine thrust to control airspeed during the climb to 15,000 feet. In other words, I had to raise the nose to slow down the airplane. I took off and started pulling back on the stick. I had to keep pulling back to stop from accelerating over the 225-knot limit. So I reached a rather steep angle, about twenty-five degrees of pitch. The steep angle, witnessed by the crowds on the ground, highlighted the raw power I was experiencing in the cockpit. The thrust surprised me. Not in the sense of "Gee, how am I going to handle all of this power?" But more like, "Wow, this is more than I expected."

What was your overall impression of the airplane after that flight?

Overall, I was impressed by how well the entire first flight came together. I started the airplane, ran through all of our ground checks, taxied out to the end of the runway, and took off. The test team told me I taxied out to the end of the runway much faster than I did for any of the taxi tests. But I was ready to go and so was the airplane.

I was also pleased with how smoothly the airplane went through all the ground checks and how smoothly the airplane flew. As an example, the flap schedules on the original F-22 shook the Raptor at speeds above 200 knots. This objectionable buffet was addressed right away through a software change. Paul Metz [first pilot to fly the F-22] and I are the only two pilots who ever experienced that buffeting. I thought that I might experience some sort of buffeting with the first F-35, but I didn't.

We learned a lot from the F-22. Our engineers deserve a lot of credit. In fact, many of those who completed the checkout and testing of similar systems on the F-22 Raptor are performing the same work on the F-35. To name a few prominent examples: Kevin McTeague works on electrical systems; John Magbuhat works on flight controls; Paul Thoennes works on hydraulics; and Roy Schoberle from Pratt & Whitney works on the F135 engine. Many others with similar experience did the design integration work over the last several years. We also have some seasoned veterans involved in flight testing the new airplanes, which includes Mary Beth O'Loughlin as the test conductor for the first flight. We have a great team.

How has your impression of the F-35 changed in subsequent flights?

I continue to be impressed with the performance of the aircraft. The F-16s flying chase don't have near the fuel capacity or payload capability as the F-35. The Lightning II does very well in comparison. For example, the F-35 often forces the chase aircraft into afterburner when it is in military power.

The airplane's handling qualities continue to be very good throughout the flight envelope. When I raise the landing gear, the airplane flies very smoothly. The landing gear is sequenced, which is unique for a fighter. The nose gear comes up first, then the main gear follows. The gears drop down in reverse order. Another strong impression is that the airplane wants to fly a lot faster than we are allowed to fly at this point in the flight test program. Most of the time we fly at about thirty to forty percent of available thrust. This airplane can go out to high subsonic speeds very easily without using afterburner.

Describe the basic progression of the first flight tests.

On the first flight takeoff, we received an air data degrade caution message. It indicated a mismatch in the lower-level comparison in the air data system, specifically with angle of attack. However, we had no loss of capability. Simply put, readings from the right and left air data probes need to agree within a certain tolerance, and they didn't on the first flight.

Because the air data system is redundant, we were able to fly on the left probe after the right one was turned off. The caution message cut the flight short, but we still managed to perform some of the planned maneuver blocks, which included throttle transients and one-half stick and pedal inputs. The handling qualities in these maneuvers were excellent with a notably smoother response and a better roll rate than I expected.

The greatest accomplishment of the first flight was the performance of the subsystems. The integrated power package, electrical, electro-hydrostatic actuators, flight control computers, and other subsystems worked without a problem for the entire flight. The performance of these systems is a great testimony to the team that brought the F-35 to first flight. After the faulty probe was replaced, we performed an additional 110-knot taxi test on 4 January to calibrate the new probe. We gathered additional air data on subsequent flights during January to further calibrate the air data system.

On Flight 2, we cycled the landing gear and then flew formation for the first time with the gear up. On Flight 3, we performed the first military power takeoff. On Flight 4, we performed the first low-altitude maneuvering. On Flight 5, we performed the first afterburner engine transient as well as performing other engine transient testing. On Flight 6, we conducted a fuel dump test. This test was conducted early in the flight test program to gather real-world data to inform design decisions on the fuel dump mechanization for the carrier variant, or F-35C. We performed higher angle of attack maneuvers on Flight 6 as well.

On Flight 7, we evaluated the speed brake operation. The F-35, like the F-22, doesn't have a dedicated speed brake like most previous fighters. Instead, it decelerates through the flight control software by deflecting control surfaces in the same manner as the Raptor. We use the leading-edge flaps as well as the trailing-edge flaps and the rudders to slow the airplane. Unlike the F-22, the F-35A and F-35B have no ailerons. That explains why it uses a combination of leading- and trailing-edge flaps and rudders to slow down. I found that the buffet levels were very low, essentially the same as buffet levels of the F-16 with the speed brake in operation. Deceleration rates in the F-35 are similar to the
F-16 as well, which is a design goal.

On Flight 8, we flew the software fix for the air data system issues we saw on the first flight. The new software allowed me to use full lateral stick rolling maneuvers. Handling qualities during these rolls were outstanding with roll rates matching predictions. We had to cut this flight short because our chase aircraft had a mechanical problem.

On Flight 9, we performed the first afterburner takeoff. Flight 9 was also our longest flight to that point, 1.5 hours. We took off with 3,500 pounds short of a full fuel load and landed with about 4,000 pounds of fuel remaining. So we shorted ourselves more fuel than the entire internal fuel capacity of an F-16 and still flew for 1.5 hours without aerial refueling. During Flight 9, we also flew close formations, power approaches, and maneuver blocks to sixteen-degrees angle of attack at 20,000 feet.

On Flight 10, we flew with the HMD for the first time. The mission included full-stick 360-degree rolls, snap engine transients in afterburner, and close formation flying. We also landed in fifteen-knot crosswinds for the first time. Flight 11 involved several lower altitude maneuver blocks as well as maneuvering with the speed brake. Jeff Knowles, the second pilot to fly the F-35, completed his first flight on Flight 12. I took the aircraft to 30,000 feet on Flight 13, performed a touch-and-go landing, completed maneuvers to seventeen-degrees angle of attack, and cycled the aerial refueling door.

As far as envelope expansion goes, we have conducted engine transients up to maximum afterburner from takeoff to 30,000 feet. We have been to 345 knots, 3.5 g's, and sixteen-degrees angle of attack and seventeen degrees with the landing gear down. We have three engines available for AA-1 but have flown only one. We want to fly as many hours as we can on it.

Summing up the flying characteristics: the F-35 flies a lot like the F-22 and has the size and feel of an F-16. The F-35 is a solid and very responsive airplane.



How does this test progression compare to previous fighter flight test programs you have worked?

The F-35 envelope expansion and flying qualities work is similar to previous fighter programs. That similarity may give the impression that we're conducting the same tests in the same ways. But that impression is false. A superficial comparison between the development of this fighter and the development of legacy fighters neglects mission capability.

Our customers are getting a whole lot more in the F-35 program. They are getting a baseline configuration with capabilities that required twenty or thirty years to develop for the F-16: infrared sensors, targeting pods, night vision systems, head-mounted cueing systems, and agile beam radars to name a few. During those years of development, the Air Force and Lockheed Martin conducted separate test programs to validate those capabilities. Those capabilities are all incorporated in this phase of the F-35 program. A truer comparison between legacy programs and the F-35 program would include the development time and cost for these additional capabilities.

Are any of these capabilities and systems unique to the F-35?

The F-35 has many unique capabilities. The helmet-mounted display and the integrated power package, or IPP, are two good examples. We began flying the HMD on Flight 10 and have flown with it on all succeeding flights. The HMD is much more than a helmet-mounted sight, which is flying in operational F-16s today as the joint helmet-mounted cueing system, better known as JHMCS. Our HMD also functions as a head-up display. That is, it shows all the information normally placed on the HUD, including speed, altitude, heading, and flight path information.

The system is working very well, and pilots quickly forget that the flight symbology is being displayed on the helmet rather than on a conventional head-up display. We don't have a HUD on the first F-35. And we have no plans to put one in any other F-35. Putting an HMD in the first airplane is a gutsy call. We are on track with its development. The initial results of incorporating an HMD in the test program have been better than we expected. The HMD is a significant jump in technology. This system has been performing very well.

The IPP, my second example, is a sophisticated turbine that acts as the auxiliary power unit on engine starts. When the engine is running, the IPP functions as an environmental control system, or ECS. When required, it also functions as an emergency power unit during emergency mode transitions. The IPP, then, performs the functions of three subsystems found on legacy fighters.

The first F-35 represents a configuration of the aircraft before the company undertook a significant weight-reduction effort. Why is the program testing an aircraft that is not completely representative of subsequent production models?

While the internal structure may be different, the shape of this first F-35 is almost identical to subsequent production versions. So gathering aerodynamic data on this configuration gives us an opportunity to evaluate performance characteristics on a real aircraft as opposed to making predictions using models or simulations. Additionally, testing and integrating all of the new systems in the F-35, as I described previously, gives us more than a year's head start on problems that we may encounter in testing and integrating these same systems in subsequent aircraft. Along with the HMD and IPP, other systems and features incorporated on subsequent F-35s include the F135 engine, electrical system, fuel system, electro-hydrostatic actuators, cockpit, weapon bay doors, and bay ventilation. So this first version of the Lightning II gives us an outstanding opportunity to reduce risk as we move forward with the program.

Let's take the cockpit as one example of the similarities between this and subsequent aircraft. With the exception of two switches, the AA-1 cockpit is the same as the next F-35, which will be a STOVL variant. And that F-35B STOVL cockpit will be the same across all three variants. On the STOVL airplane, one switch will read "conversion" instead of "hook." All of the other switches are the same. While the engine page on the F-35B has a display that deals with STOVL, most every other display on this variant is the same as the displays on the other variants. The missions systems are the same on all three variants. This commonality reduces the total scope—and expense—of the program. We are combining into one program what would have involved three separate and independent development programs in the past.

The electro-hydrostatic actuators, or EHAs, are another excellent example of risk reduction we're accomplishing on AA-1. This is the first real electric jet. The flight control actuators, while they have internal closed-loop hydraulic systems, are controlled and driven by electricity—not hydraulics. The F-35 is the only military aircraft flying with such a system. We proved that the approach works on six flights of the AFTI F-16 during the concept demonstration phase of the JSF program. We already have many more flights on EHAs on this test program. Because we are flying production versions of the EHAs on AA-1, we won't have to prove the EHA design on subsequent F-35s.

What are the immediate production plans for subsequent F-35s, and how will those aircraft be used in the flight test program?

Current plans call for fifteen flight test aircraft, including AA-1. The next four aircraft produced will be F-35B short takeoff/vertical landing, or STOVL, variants. These will be followed by three conventional takeoff and landing, or CTOL, aircraft. Then the first three carrier variant, or CV, aircraft will be produced followed by another STOVL aircraft and one more CV. Two more CTOL aircraft complete the production run of test aircraft. AF-1 and AF-2, the next CTOL variants to be produced, will be used for flight sciences; that is, they will be used to test aero-dynamics and flight controls and to expand the flight envelope. AF-3, 4, and 5 will be used to develop and test mission systems.

We will have three F-35B, or STOVL, variants for flight sciences and two F-35Bs for testing mission systems. The first flight sciences B-model will be dedicated to STOVL operations. The other two B-models will be used to expand the flight envelope.

We will have four F-35Cs dedicated to the flight test program. The first two carrier variants will be used for flight sciences. The third aircraft will be used for carrier suitability testing. The fourth aircraft will be used to test mission systems.

We had as many as six aircraft devoted to testing mission systems for the F-22. We have seven aircraft in this program. Fortunately, everything we do on the F-35A for mission systems applies to the F-35B and F-35C. The variants have only minor differences in terms of antenna sizes and shapes.

But the real virtue of this flight test program is that we have seven flight sciences aircraft. While the F-22 had only one true flight sciences aircraft, we need more because we have three variants as well as many external payload configurations that require testing as well. The potential external loadings on the internal weapon stations and six external hard points create a very large test matrix, which will eventually include most of the weapons carried by the F-16, F/A-18, Harrier, and A-10.

What will be the biggest challenge for the flight test program?

For AA-1, our biggest challenge is to be aggressive enough to find out all the things we don't yet know about the aircraft's performance. We have some real opportunities to learn how EHAs work at high speeds. Proving the HMD is another challenge. Testing the first aircraft gives our predictions for subsequent aircraft credibility. We want to knock off all the big risks with this first airplane and reduce all the other risks for future airplanes. After that, a big challenge is managing fourteen flight test aircraft in three test sites. Testing short takeoffs and vertical landings is always a challenge. First, we have to make STOVL work. We have to make short takeoffs and vertical landings as straightforward and as easy as possible. Pilots should not have to spend most of their training time on the first and last five minutes of the flight. How we mechanize transitions from horizontal to vertical flight will free up time for training skills more pertinent to the mission.

Developing mission systems will be a huge challenge, and testing those systems is one of the more critical parts of the program. The CATBird, a 737 modified to carry the F-35 sensor suite and associated systems, will help us reduce risk associated with mission systems. The number of weapons and configurations to clear also represents a challenge. If pilots can't employ weapons, the airplane is of no value. And we are testing these weapons in a large envelope. The F-35 can maneuver post-stall like an F/A-18. So we have a lot ahead of us. But we are certainly up to these challenge.

Eric Hehs is the editor of Code One.

Patton escreveu:

Sintra escreveu:

Gostaria dizer obrigado pela resposta bem explicado. Entao nao acredita que o F-35 sera' um "dogfighter" tao bom quanto o EF-2000?

Eles ja' disserem que o Lightning II sera' tao agil com cumbustivel e misseis internais quanto um F-16 LIMPO. Pelo menos foi isso que eu ouvi. A USN esta precisando muito de algo melhor do que o Super Bug. Pelo menos tem que concordar que o F-35C sera' melhor do que o F-18E em qual quer funcao. Talves no futuro LM pode criar um F-35D com asas modificados e um 2D TVC para ser uma verdadeira substituto pela F-14.

Concordo que a USAF deve e provavilmente vai receber mais F-22s. De fato tem pessoas que acreditam que a USAF deve abandonar o projeto JSF e ter uma forca de cacas F-22As e F-15Es.

Alexandre Beraldi escreveu:

...e dai eu desconfiar que estamos em presença de um digno substituto do P47 e não do P51...
E um P-47 era capaz de escavacar a oposição aérea e depois ir rebentar Tigres e Leopard´s, creio que a ideia do F35 é mais ou menos a mesma.

Não fala isso que o povo da FAB morre do coração... É capaz de o pessoal de Santa Cruz vender até as cuecas para comprar o F-35....

Japan to Design Stealth Jet
Agence France-Presse | Jul 25, 2007

http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publish ... 012794.php

Digg this | Send Article | Print this | Discuss this
Japan’s defense ministry hopes to make a prototype of a next-generation stealth plane, the first new fighter jet designed by the officially pacifist country in 30 years, a report said July 24.

The ministry will include funds to develop the manned prototype in its budgetary request for the fiscal year from April 2008, the Yomiuri Shimbun daily cited anonymous defense ministry officials as saying.

Japan has been officially pacifist since its defeat in World War II but has one of the world’s largest defense budgets and has gradually been expanding its military role.

The defense ministry is hoping to keep its technology up to date and also gain an edge in negotiations with the United States when it selects new fighter jets, the best-selling newspaper said.

A defense ministry spokesman denied it had made the budgetary request but said it had not ruled it out either.

"But we have been studying stealth and other capabilities," the spokesman said. "We are also working on a plan to study small aircraft. We will continue to work on these tasks.”

Japan has indicated it wants to buy F-22 Raptors, the latest U.S. Air Force jets built to evade radar detection at supersonic speeds.

U.S. law prohibits export of Raptors. But the United States flew Raptors to Japan earlier this year on their first foreign flight, showing its commitment to the two countries’ security alliance amid tensions with North Korea.

Japan and the United States already jointly design F-2 support fighters, but production is set to end in March 2012.

The Japanese government has not supported development of a domestic fighter aircraft since the F-1 support fighter jet in the 1970s.

F-15 fighter jets, which form the core of Japan’s fighter force, are being manufactured here under a license agreement with the United States.

The Yomiuri said development of Japan’s new prototype would likely cost hundreds of millions of dollars over 10 years.

The design would not include installing weapons and it is unclear whether Japan would actually produce the prototype due to the huge cost of building a full aircraft, it said.

jacquessantiago escreveu:Se nesta altura do campeonato os japoneses tem a intencao de desenvolver aeronaves stealth (e os russos e parece que os chineses tb), isto quer dizer que nao ha uma contra-tecnologia efetiva no horizonte.

Japan to Design Stealth Jet
Agence France-Presse | Jul 25, 2007

http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publish ... 012794.php

Digg this | Send Article | Print this | Discuss this
Japan’s defense ministry hopes to make a prototype of a next-generation stealth plane, the first new fighter jet designed by the officially pacifist country in 30 years, a report said July 24.

The ministry will include funds to develop the manned prototype in its budgetary request for the fiscal year from April 2008, the Yomiuri Shimbun daily cited anonymous defense ministry officials as saying.

Japan has been officially pacifist since its defeat in World War II but has one of the world’s largest defense budgets and has gradually been expanding its military role.

The defense ministry is hoping to keep its technology up to date and also gain an edge in negotiations with the United States when it selects new fighter jets, the best-selling newspaper said.

A defense ministry spokesman denied it had made the budgetary request but said it had not ruled it out either.

"But we have been studying stealth and other capabilities," the spokesman said. "We are also working on a plan to study small aircraft. We will continue to work on these tasks.”

Japan has indicated it wants to buy F-22 Raptors, the latest U.S. Air Force jets built to evade radar detection at supersonic speeds.

U.S. law prohibits export of Raptors. But the United States flew Raptors to Japan earlier this year on their first foreign flight, showing its commitment to the two countries’ security alliance amid tensions with North Korea.

Japan and the United States already jointly design F-2 support fighters, but production is set to end in March 2012.

The Japanese government has not supported development of a domestic fighter aircraft since the F-1 support fighter jet in the 1970s.

F-15 fighter jets, which form the core of Japan’s fighter force, are being manufactured here under a license agreement with the United States.

The Yomiuri said development of Japan’s new prototype would likely cost hundreds of millions of dollars over 10 years.

The design would not include installing weapons and it is unclear whether Japan would actually produce the prototype due to the huge cost of building a full aircraft, it said.

The newspaper hints at a dispute within the Japanese defense establishment over the project, with some arguing that a demonstration of domestic stealth technology would ease US qualms about exporting the F-22. This is now expressly forbidden by the Obey amendment, and US officials have argued that "sanitizing" the F-22 for export would be prohibitively expensive - instead, they have tried to interest Japan in the JSF.

On the other hand, the newspaper reports. some officials "argue that since domestic fighters have not been considered as a candidate for the next F-X fighter jet, the U.S. government would not be swayed by the ministry's negotiation strategy of parleying its interest in developing domestic fighter jets to win concessions from the U.S. government."

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/de ... 6f6ceca4d7

Or, briefly, they are arguing that the Japanese stealth project is a hollow bluff unless the government is willing to pay the huge sums necessary for another domestic fighter program.