Antes uma correcao. O Missil era R-24 ou AA-7 Apex.
De acordo com o texto da ACIG (abaixo) simplesmente os Mig-23 tinham limitada capacidade lock down shoot down, a ponto de nao impedir as incursoes da SAAF.
The appearance of MiG-23s in the Angolan skies did not cause any kind of panic within the SAAF. Quite on the contrary, due to their intensive training in air-to-air combat (especially in high-speed manoeuvring), the South Africans were looking forward to engage them in air combat. They continued flying operational sorties over the battlefield like before, despite the obvious fact that the MiG-23ML had a distinct advantage over the Mirage F.1CZ and F.1AZ: the MiG was armed with R-24 (ASCC-code AA-7 Apex) medium-range, all-aspect air-to-air missiles, with an engagement envelope of out to 24km at levels above 15.000ft. The South Africans lacked a weapon to counter R-24: their best air-to-air missile was Kukri, a licence version of the early Matra R.550 Magic Mk.1. The Kukri was much too short-ranged engagements against aircraft operating at such high speeds like MiG-23s. It also lacked structure capable of surviving manoeuvres at anything over 4gs; this was confirmed by several cases in which Kukris fell apart after aircraft carrying them pulled tight manoeuvres.
Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that the R-24 had nothing like an effective range of up to 40kms, as usually claimed: in fact, the average maximal range from which they could be launched against low-flying SAAF fighters even from the forward hemisphere was only between seven and ten kilometres.
The MiG-23ML as delivered to Angola also had only a minimal look-down/shoot down capability, and their pilots were not flying low - because of the MANPAD threat. The R-24 was still a threat for South African Mirages, then the SAAF had no air-to-air missile in their arsenal that could be fired from similar ranges, and even less one that was capable of attacks from the forward hemisphere.
Further comparison between the Mirage F.1 and MiG-23 showed that the Mirage was originally designed as a medium- and high-altitude interceptor, and that its small wings and good thrust-to-weight ratio made it a very good low-level interdictor. The MiG-23 was developed for flying fast at low levels, and delivering "slash"-attacks from the rear hemisphere. Essentially, neither was a true "dogfighter": both were at their best at high subsonic speeds and medium level.
The SAAF pilots expertly matched the capabilities of their aircraft: operating at levels around ten meters over the completely flat terrain of southern Angola, in the face of the MiG-23ML-threat they continued flying intensive combat operations against targets up to 300km inside Angola. Most of such strikes were never detected by any of over 70 Angolan and Cuban radar stations deployed in southern Angola, and ever less so by either Angolan and Cuban radars, or FAPA-DAA's interceptors. On the other side, while experts in technical details of their aircraft, both the Cubans and Angolans lacked realistic interception training and proved poor in tactics. At least in theory, they did not need to be excellent pilots by any means, despite demanding aircraft they flew: the Soviets expected the pilot's role in MiG-23 to be minimal, as the plane had a highly automated weapons system, heavily dependable on proper ground support to function. With intensive Soviet and East German support, the Angolans have indeed developed an excellent control system in their country during the 1980s, with over 50 radar stations. The fact was, however, that even this was insufficient to properly cover the whole huge battlefield of southern Angola. Besides, the South Africans were such experts in low-level operations - and the local terrain in southern Angola was suitable for ultra-low-level flying - that this system proved only marginally useful. Consequently, the Cubans and Angolans were not really in position to use the advantage of their radar coverage over the battlefield.
Neither the Mirage F.1 nor the MiG-23 were good “dogfighters”, and both lacked good and reliable multi-function airborne-intercept radars with long detection range. Their initial and sustained turning capabilities were poor compared to new fighters appearing in the 1980. Nevertheless, in the hands of good pilots they were still very potent fighters, and both could under specific conditions outturn even the MiG-21. In a direct comparison the Mirage had some advantage in orner velocity, however, and was therefore more likely to win a turning fight. The MiG-23, on the contrary, had superb acceleration and speed in combat configuration, and could dictate the engagement.
Over Angola pilots of both aircraft were suffering from poor situational awarenes: although having 50 radar stations in central and southern Angola, the FAPA-DAA could not really detect or track low-flying South Africans, while the South Africans lacked any serious radar coverage over the battlefield because this was moving away from South-West African borders as the time went by. Both sides were frequently operating on verge of their combat range and pilots always had to have one eye glued on their fuel gauges. Also, the FAPA-DAA never had a sufficient number of MiG-23MLs in operational condition to fly in larger formations - as originally envisaged for this type. Not only that attrition in combat and service was high, but due to the high MANPAD-threat Cuban pilots flew regularly at medium and high levels, expecting to perform a slash-attack and then use the performance to either disengage or outdistance the opponent.
Lauro Melo escreveu:jacquessantiago escreveu:talharim escreveu:Mirage F-1 um magnífico caça ?
Magnífico caça e que é muito pouco falado é o
MIG-23 !!!
Os MIG-23 Angolanos simplesmente MASSACRARAM os Miarges F-1 da Força Aérea Sulafricana.................NOTA:os pilotos Sulafricanos eram muito melhores preparados...........então não tem desculpa........
O Mirage F-1 é uma porcaria francesa sucata imprestável pior que o Mirage III.
Nunca houve nenhum massacre de Mirage F-1 por parte dos Mig-23.
Veja esses dois links do
http://www.acig.org:
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_193.shtmlhttp://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_184.shtml (Angola: Claims & Reality about SAAF Losses)
Teoricamente a vantagem dos Mig-23 eram os misseis R-23. Porem na pratica nao se mostraram efetivos.
Pq o Mig-23 seria um magnifico caca? Ele eh menos manobravel que seu antecessor (Mig-21) e tem uma "ficha corrida" digamos que "humilde".
Jacques Santiago,
Os R-23 não se mostraram efetivos. Porque ? Inicio de operações ?
sds,