India

[Suetham]

Postagem mt frequente das promessas

[Suetham]

https://valor.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2 ... hina.ghtml
Índia precisa mais do que população para superar PIB da China

[Suetham]

https://observador.pt/opiniao/a-india-n ... m-mundial/
A Índia na nova ordem mundial

[Suetham]

[prometheus]

[Suetham]

A Índia precisa mudar muito para se tornar o que de fato o país pode se tornar: uma superpotência. Taxas de alfabetização, infraestrutura, desenvolvimento (como no acesso à água, saneamento, cuidados de saúde, etc.), igualdade de gênero (aproveitar o potencial de metade de sua população na produção de riqueza), distribuição de riqueza (por exemplo, tamanho da classe média e outros)... em todas essas e em muitas outras áreas, a Índia está MUITO atrás da China. É uma potência nuclear, uma grande economia, mas por mais rica que seja a Índia, muitos indianos são muito pobres ainda. O Lee Kuan Yew antes de morrer tinha esperanças da Índia fazer o contrapeso da China, um ano antes de morrer ele concluiu que isso provavelmente não aconteceria. A sua análise sobre a China é ainda mais evidente sobre isso.

[prometheus]

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comme ... ussian-oil

"TOKYO -- India's international stature has grown sharply due to its role as the effective leader of the so-called Global South, a shorthand term for emerging and developing economies that do not align with any major power blocs.

The country is chairing the Group of 20 nations this year, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi wasting no time in launching a diplomatic offensive to solidify India's position as a leading global player.

[...]

India has raised its international profile by trying to please both developed and developing economies. Modi stressed to the leaders of major industrialized nations the importance of unity among democratic nations, while sympathizing with poor countries struggling with inflation and climate challenges. Some call it omnidirectional diplomacy but others see it as just a "please-all" ploy.

India began to boost oil imports from Russia in April 2022, less than two months after Russia invaded Ukraine. In the year through March 2023, India imported a daily average of 1.02 million barrels of Russian crude. That represents an elevenfold increase from the previous year and 20% of the country's overall oil imports, according to India's Ministry of Commerce and Industry. As a result, Russia became the nation's largest oil supplier, rising from 10th place a year earlier. Russia was followed by Iraq, which supplied 1.01 million barrels and Saudi Arabia, which sold 790,000 barrels.

India depends on imports for 80% of its crude consumption. Ramping up oil imports from Russia offers India three benefits: curbing inflation, improving its trade balance and diversifying supply.

[...]

At first glance, Modi's "India First" policy seems to have helped Russia weather Western sanctions, but a careful study of trade figures reveals that what could look like an act of selfishness by India appears to have had benefits for others.

While India has sharply increased imports from Russia, its purchases from other major suppliers have dropped, freeing up more oil for countries in Europe and elsewhere. In fact, India saw imports from six of its top 10 suppliers fall in fiscal 2022, including a decrease of 49% from Nigeria, 24% from the U.S., 18% from Kuwait and 10% from Iraq. These nations apparently increased exports to countries other than India, including members of the G7 and EU.

India has also refined a large portion of imported Russian oil into products to be sold to countries that have joined the sanctions in a process some pundits half-jokingly called "oil laundering." India's shipments of petroleum products to the Netherlands surged 70% in fiscal 2022, making it the top supplier to Europe's oil trade hub, up from third place the year before. India's petroleum products appear to have offset shortages of Russian supplies to the EU.

India has been able to play this role in smoothing global flows of oil and oil products because it is the world's third-largest importer of crude and its fourth-biggest exporter of petroleum products.

Gasoline, naphtha, gas oil and heavy oil are all made from crude at different stages of refining. Many oil producing countries simply export any excess products. India, despite having no large oil reserves of its own, has still managed to successfully develop a large oil industry by strategically planning exports of its petroleum products. Last fiscal year, crude oil was India's biggest import item, while petroleum products made up the largest share of exports.

[...]

Thus, the G7 and the EU let India do the "dirty work" of purchasing Russian oil to avert a full-blown crisis, and India has played the role perfectly. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, some experts warned that oil prices could top $200 per barrel amid sanction-triggered confusion, but after peaking at just above $120, prices have fallen back to around $70.

[...]

Neither the G7 nor the EU may publicly acknowledge India's "contribution" to price stability, but there is no denying that the country has played a vital role in preventing a global economic crisis. India may not have intended to play that role, but the impact of its action clearly shows its growing influence, while making everyone aware of Modi's determination to pursue "strategic autonomy."

[prp]

[cabeça de martelo]

India Takes a Step Away from the Russian Defense Industry

Published July 31, 2023
By Matthew Stein

Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

Abstract

India and Russia have had a long-standing security cooperation partnership, with India relying heavily on Russian weapons and equipment for its armed forces. However, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the Make in India initiative in 2014 to develop the country’s defense industry and reduce dependence on imports. The war in Ukraine has caused India to accelerate this process and end negotiations or cancel agreements with Russia on several weapon system acquisitions. Indian officials cited Russia’s logistical problems in delivering new systems as the reason for the cancellations. This article examines how the conflict in Ukraine has impacted one of Russia’s key security cooperation partnerships and how India’s defense industry is developing to produce replacements for these systems. The study provides insights into the challenges and opportunities for India to achieve its goal of self-reliance in defense production.

India’s current security cooperation with Russia has roots in the solid relations between the Soviet Union and India. Diplomatic ties between India and the Soviet Union were established in 1947, but the relationship deepened in the 1950s and 1960s when India faced border disputes and conflicts with Pakistan and China, leading to increased economic and security cooperation. During these conflicts, US support for Pakistan instead of India also prompted New Delhi to strengthen ties with Moscow. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union altered the dynamics of the relationship, India and Russia have continued to maintain close ties. Despite not being each other’s top trading partners, the two countries have an estimated annual trade turnover of several billion USD, including significant defense expenditures by India.1

The inventories of India’s Army, Navy, and Air Force feature several Russian weapon systems. The Indian Army possesses an estimated 2,400 T-72 and 100 T-90 main battle tanks, 2,400 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, 150 BM-21 and 42 BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket-launch systems, and several dozen mobile and static air defense systems of Russian origin. The Indian Navy has seven Sindhughosh-class (previously Soviet Kilo-class) attack submarines, one Vikrant-class (previously Soviet Kiev-class) aircraft carrier, three Rajput-class (previously Soviet Kashin-class) guided-missile destroyers, six Talwar-class frigates (previously Soviet Krivak-class) frigates, one Abhay-class (previously Soviet Pauk-class) corvette, three Kumbhir-class (previously Soviet–Polish Polnocny-class) amphibious warfare vessels, and one Jyoti-class (previously Soviet Komandarm Fedko-class) replenishment tanker. In addition, the Indian Navy utilizes more than 40 MiG-29 multirole fighters, three Il-38 aircraft, and a dozen Ka-28 helicopters in anti-submarine and maritime patrol roles. The Indian Air Force has more than 60 MiG-29s, 50 MiG-21s, and 260 Su-30s in various combat roles, six Il-78 aerial tankers, 17 Il-76 heavy transports, more than 100 An-32 medium transports, over a dozen Mi-24 attack helicopter variants, more than 200 Mi-17 transport helicopters, and a dozen Mi-21 and Mi-29 trainer aircraft.2

To provide a balanced perspective, it should be noted that alongside Russian weapons, each of the three branches also possesses weapons systems of non-Russian origins. For instance, the Indian Army has an estimated 122 domestically produced Arjun main battle tanks and 36 Pinaka multiple rocket-launch systems. Similarly, the Indian Navy and Air Force operate a mix of Russian and non-Russian systems in the same functions. The navy has an equal number of domestically produced ships of various types, while the air force also has dozens of non-Russian combat aircraft, transports, and attack and utility helicopters. However, the large number of Russian systems in India’s inventory attests to the long-standing security cooperation between India and Russia prior to the war in Ukraine.

The depth of India’s security cooperation with Russia is demonstrated not only by the large number of Russian-origin weapon systems in India’s inventory, but also by the several joint ventures to produce systems in India. These ventures include the BrahMos cruise missile, the Su-30MKI multirole fighter, various ships for India’s navy, and other projects such as the production of the AK-203 assault rifle.3 Moreover, India purchased five Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile systems in October 2018, with the first deliveries taking place in late 2021.4 The sale of the S-400s, which Russia has sold to only a handful of other governments, highlights the strength of Indian–Russian ties. While the purchase did not include a technology transfer to manufacture the systems in India, it nevertheless underscores the close partnership between the two countries. This relationship was further highlighted in July 2019 when Russia declined to sell 50,000 Kalashnikovs to Pakistan after pressure from the Indian government, despite having lifted an arms embargo against Pakistan in 2014 and engaging in closer security cooperation up to that point.5

The Russian defense industry annually exports around USD 15 billion worth of equipment to various countries, with India being among the top four recipients.6 While defense exports generate significantly less revenue for Russia’s economy than energy exports, the export of weapons serves as a tool for Moscow to establish or maintain influence with various governments worldwide. Russian officials, including Vladimir Putin, have stated that defense exports support the country’s foreign policy by providing weapons and equipment to nations that do not have good relations with the West.7

The Make in India Initiative

Before discussing India’s cancelled agreements with Russia, it is important to note how the Indian government has been emphasizing the need to build up the country’s defense industry and reduced reliance on imports for its armed forces. The Make in India initiative, which covers several sectors of country’s economy, has three main objectives: increasing manufacturing growth, creating more manufacturing jobs, and raising the percentage of manufacturing as part of the country’s gross domestic production (GDP).

Indian officials have taken various steps to boost growth in the defense sector, including implementing a requirement that new acquisitions are produced domestically whenever feasible, as well as creating import ban lists that require the armed forces to purchase certain systems or equipment from a domestic supplier.8 The Indian Armed Forces are permitted to acquire weapon systems outside of these requirements if there is an urgent operational need. For example, the Indian Army has acquired light machine guns and different types of artillery and small arms ammunition through these types of acquisitions.9

The Make in India initiative has coincided with several years of increasing defense expenditures in India. By 2019, India’s defense budget had become the world’s third-largest, a position it maintained into 2022.10 India continues to prepare for a potential two-front war against Pakistan and China.11 As the Indian government allocates a significant portion of its budget to defense and seeks to develop its domestic defense industry, each acquisition takes on added significance. Because India’s defense industry cannot not yet meet all the requirements for the armed forces, the country will continue to import various weapon systems. Despite the impact of the war in Ukraine on their partnership, India is likely to continue working with Russia to build up its defense industry.The War in UkraineNew Delhi has maintained a neutral stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, urging both sides to end the war and find a diplomatic solution.12 India has indirectly supported Russia at the UN by abstaining from various votes against Russia at the UN General Assembly and as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council.13 India’s abstentions at the UN Security Council included a vote on the draft resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of four regions of Ukraine.14 While India condemned the killing of civilians in Bucha, Ukraine, early in the war, its representative at the UN called for an independent investigation into the incident without attributing blame to Russia for the deaths.15New Delhi has not implemented any sanctions against Russia, but it has expressed concerns about violating them. In July 2022, the US government granted India a waiver in connection with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), allowing India to purchase Russian systems, including the S-400s which have already been acquired.16 India has been importing Russian oil since the war in Ukraine began and remains one of Russia’s top buyers. Moreover, New Delhi did not commit to end purchases of Russian oil when the G7 governments introduced a price cap on Russian oil in early December 2022.17On 16 September 2022, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a rare public statement indirectly criticizing the war in Ukraine, telling Russian President Vladimir Putin that the “era of war is over.”18 This could be related to some of India’s business interests in Ukraine, including significant delays in train wheels for India’s Vande Bharat—a new semi-high-speed, intercity rail system—and spare parts for gas turbine engines for the Indian Navy. Both are manufactured in Ukraine, and the Ukrainian firms involved have been forced to delay production to support the war effort.19 It is unclear whether Modi’s state-ment was a direct criticism of Russia’s actions or a more general call for peace, but it could also be a response to the impact that the war has had on the rising cost of food, as India imports wheat and sunflower oil from Russia and Ukraine.20 Overall, India has generally avoided openly criticizing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.India’s Cancelled Agreements and the Russian Defense Industry’s Logistics IssuesThe Indian government cancelled or suspended several agreements with Russia to acquire new or upgraded weapon systems a few months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. The first cancelled agreement came on 16 April 2022, when the Indian Air Force cancelled plans to purchase 48 Mi-17 V5 helicopters from Russia. Indian officials claimed the decision to cancel the deal happened before the war to provide a boost to the Make in India initiative, but it marked the first in a series of decisions by the Indian government.21 On 18 April, the Indian Ministry of Defence opened a four-day conference with sessions dedicated to examining the impact of the war on deliveries of weapons and equipment to India.22 On 29 April, Indian Minister of Defence Rajnath Singh made a statement that the war in Ukraine highlights the need for India to become more self-sufficient in its defense industry.23 His statement followed announcements from other Indian officials who noted how the war in Ukraine has caused delays in the delivery of weapons, equipment, and spare parts for the Indian Army and Navy.24Several significant cancellations took place in the wake of these announcements. On 8 May, Indian Air Force officials announced the cancellation of plans to upgrade its inventory of 85 Russian Su-30MKI fighters due to logistical problems arising from the war in Ukraine. Officials stated this decision would bolster India’s defense industry.25 On 10 May, Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army Manjo Pande acknowledged logistics issues with certain types of ammunition and spare parts from Ukraine and Russia that were critical to the Indian Army’s readiness but noted that there were sufficient reserves for the immediate future. General Pande also indicated that India was exploring alternative sources for ammunition and supplies.26 On 17 May, the government announced that it was suspending negotiations to acquire 10 Russian Ka-31 airborne early warning and control helicopters for its Navy. The Indian Navy already has 14 Ka-31s and had sought to add more, but New Delhi was unable to find a way to pay for the new helicopters in the face of ongoing sanctions on Russia and doubted Russia’s ability to deliver them.27 The agreements to upgrade the Su-30MKI fighters and purchase the 10 Ka-31 helicopters were estimated to be worth several hundred million USD.India’s concerns over Russia’s ability to deliver new systems persisted as the war in Ukraine continued into July 2022. The Indian Army and Air Force had been seeking to replace their inventories of light combat and light utility helicopters that can operate in high-altitude environments for several years prior to the start of the war in Ukraine. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) had already introduced some indigenous light utility helicopters into operational units, but India planned to purchase 200 Russian Ka-226T helicopters to complement the HAL light utility helicopters. However, officials abandoned negotiations in early July due to logistical challenges related to the war in Ukraine.28An incident in late July 2022 prompted another decision to not pursue an agreement with Russia for a new system. On 28 July, an Indian Air Force MiG-21 crashed during a training flight, killing two pilots. This marked the sixth Indian MiG-21 crash in 18 months. Shortly after the incident, officials announced that the Indian Air Force would retire all its current inventory of MiG-21s by 2025. India had been negotiating with Russia to acquire MiG-29s and SU-30s before the July crash, but an agreement could not be reached because of the ongoing war in Ukraine.29Representatives in the Russian defense industry have acknowledged that ongoing contracts have been impacted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in addition to India cancelling contracts. On 17 August, the United Shipbuilding Corporation of Russia announced a six-month delay on two frigates currently being constructed for the Indian Navy. The delay was due to difficulties procuring components for the ships due to sanctions, and the ships had already been delayed by nine months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.30 A few days later, in an inter-view with the Indian newspaper The Hindu, Dmitry Shugaev, Russia’s Director of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, stated that Russia would take a tailored approach to fulfilling orders for Russian military equipment for each customer, accounting for logistical problems due to the ongoing war in Ukraine. He also mentioned that the Russian industry would provide alternative payment options to work around sanctions.31Finally, on 15 August 2022, Russia’s Rubin Design Bureau, a submarine designer and builder, withdrew from a request for proposal to construct six submarines for the Indian Navy, stating that the proposal was unrealistic. According to the deputy director of the bureau, the cost and requirement to build in India, the transfer of technology, and penalties for not meeting deadlines were too high. Although the war in Ukraine was not explicitly cited as a factor in withdrawing from the proposal, it marked another instance of Russia and India failing to reach an agreement since the war began.32OutlookBased on the history of Indian–Russian relations and New Delhi’s commitment to developing its domestic defense industry, Indian officials canceled agreements or ended negotiations for several weapon systems because they did not believe Russia could deliver them. Unlike the punitive measures that Western governments have carried out, these cancellations do not appear to be aimed at punishing Russia for the war in Ukraine. However, the cancellations have left India without clear replacements from its defense industry, and it is uncertain when a replacement will be available or if another security cooperation partner will step in to fulfill the country’s armed forces’ requirements.India has been clear for several years that it intends to import fewer weapon systems and develop its domestic defense industry, so Russia losing some defense agreements was expected. Still, the war in Ukraine has accelerated India’s plans. While it is unlikely that the Indian government will completely abandon its acquisitions of Russian weapon systems, Russia is likely to continue to face logistical difficulties in delivering weapon systems as the war in Ukraine continues. As Russia depends on defense exports to sustain its economy and shape foreign policy, this could weaken its international influence further. This, in turn, could ultimately offer other security cooperation partners an opportunity to fill in the gaps that Russia is leaving in its pursuit of the war in Ukraine. MATTHEW STEINMr. Stein is a contractor at the Foreign Military Studies Office, focusing on Eurasian security issues. He held a National Security Education Program (NSEP) Boren Fellowship in Kazakhstan (2008–2009) and has a master’s degree in Russian and Eurasian studies from the University of Kansas. He has published articles in Military Review, Small Wars and Insurgencies, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, and the Small Wars Journal.Notes1 “India: Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners,” Observatory of Economic Complexity, https://oec.world/ and “Russia: Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners,” https://oec.world/.2 “Asia: The Military Balance,” in The Military Balance 123, no. 1 (2023): 208–301, DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2023.21627183 Kartik Bommakanti, “India-Russia military-technical cooperation: Beyond commercial relations,” Observer Research Foundation, 22 June 2017. https://www.orfonline.org/; and Dinakar Peri, “AK-203 assault rifles production to begin by year-end: Russian official,” The Hindu, 18 October 2022. https://www.thehindu.com/.4 Dinakar Peri, “Deliveries of S-400 air defence system have begun, says Russian official,” The Hindu, 14 November 2021. https://www.thehindu.com/.5 Snehesh Alex Philip, “Russia rejects Pakistan request for 50,000 AK rifles, assures India of no deals in future,” The Print, 17 July 2019. https://theprint.in/.6 Mark Trevelyan, “Ignoring Ukraine setbacks, Putin touts ‘superior’ Russian weapons exports,” Reuters, 16 August 2022. https://www.reuters.com/.7 Richard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter,” Chatham House, Research Paper, 20 March 2017. https://www.chathamhouse.org/.8 Snehesh Alex Philip, “AK 203 and Kamov delayed, India and Russia aim for missile deal ahead of Modi visit,” The Print, 10 February 2020, https://theprint.in/; and Abhishek Bhalla and Manjeet Negi, “Mini UAVs, mine-protected vehicles among new list of 108 defence items banned for import,” India Today, 31 May 2021, https://www.indiatoday.in/.9 Press Trust of India, “Post Pulwama, Centre grants more financial powers to 3 services to buy weapons,” Times of India, 16 April 2019. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/; and “India to Procure 16,479 Light Machine Guns From Israel,” Force, 20 March 2020. http://forceindia.net/.10 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “World military expenditure passes $2 trillion for first time,” 25 April 2022, https://www.sipri.org/.11 “India must be prepared for 2-front war: Rawat,” Daily Excelsior, 7 September 2017, http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/.12 “Parliament proceedings | India called upon Russian, Ukrainian sides to return to path of diplomacy, dialogue: Govt.,” The Hindu, 21 July 2022. https://www.thehindu.com/.13 “As UN Votes to Remove Russia from UNHRC, India Abstains,” The Wire, 7 April 2022. https://thewire.in/; and “U.N. demands Russia reverse Ukraine annexations, India abstains from vote,” The Hindu, 13 October 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/.14 Sriram Lakshman, “India abstains on UNSC resolution condemning Russia’s ‘referenda’,” The Hindu, 1 October 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/.15 “At UNSC, India Supports Call for Independent Probe Into Bucha Civilian Killings in Ukraine,” The Wire, 5 April 2022, https://thewire.in/.16 “Important step for India’s purchase of Russian weaponry, says ex-diplomat on US sanction waiver,” India Today, 16 July 2022, https://www.indiatoday.in/.17 Press Trust of India, “Russia becomes India’s top oil supplier in October,” The Hindu, 6 November 2022. https://www.thehindu.com/.18 Suhasini Haidar, “PM Modi tells Vladimir Putin ‘now is not an era of war’,” The Hindu, 16 September 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/.19 “Wheels of Vande Bharat trains are on their way from war-torn Ukraine,” India Today, 24 April 2022, https://www.indiatoday.in/; Anirban Bhaumik, “Russia-Ukraine war: India assesses impact on defence supply from both nations,” Deccan Herald, 18 April 2022. https://www.deccanherald.com/.20 Samrat Sharma, “How the Russia-Ukraine war may affect India’s platter,” India Today, 29 March 2022, https://www.indiatoday.in/.21 Manjeet Negi, “To boost Make in India, IAF cancels plans to buy 48 Mi-17 choppers from Russia,” India Today, 16 April 2022, https://www.indiatoday.in/.22 Bhaumik, “Russia-Ukraine war.”23 Manjeet Negi, “Russia-Ukraine war highlights need for a self-reliant military: Rajnath Singh,” India Today, 29 April 2022, https://www.indiatoday.in/.24 A.K. Sachdev, “The Great Indian Dilemma,” Force India, April 2022, https://forceindia.net/.25 “India shelves ₹35,000 cr plan to upgrade Su-30 fighter fleet amid Russia-Ukraine war,” Live Mint, 8 May 2022, https://www.livemint.com/.26 Press Trust of India, “Supply chain of certain ammunition, spares impacted because of Ukraine war: Army chief,” New Indian Express, 10 May 2022, https://www.newindianexpress.com/.27 Anirban Bhaumik, “Amid Ukraine war, India halts KA-31 helicopter deal with Russia,” Deccan Herald, 17 May 2022, https://www.deccanherald.com/.28 Dinakar Peri, “Army Aviation augments combat power while ageing Cheetah, Chetaks await replacement,” The Hindu, 10 July 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/.29 Pradip Sagar, “Bye Bye MiG-21 Bison,” India Today, 31 July 2022, https://www.indiatoday.in/.30 Dinakar Peri, “Six-month delay in delivery of two stealth frigates by Russia due to war in Ukraine,” The Hindu, 17 August 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/.31 Dinakar Peri, “Customised defence deals offered to offset sanctions impact, says senior Russian military official,” The Hindu, 19 August 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/.32 Dinakar Peri, “Terms of Indian Navy’s mega submarine deal unrealistic: Russian official,” The Hindu, 15 August 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/.

[Suetham]

https://archive.is/lCmAI Will India Surpass China to Become the Next Superpower?


O vídeo é um registro da cidade de Xangai. Além disso, o India Superpower 2020 foi adiado para India Superpower 2030.

[Suetham]

https://theprint.in/the-fineprint/modi- ... m/1724092/
Modi can’t prove India is 5th largest economy. Data will fail him

Tá de sacanagem

[Suetham]

https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/08/indias- ... lobal.html
India’s ‘massive expansion’ set to be a key driver of global economic growth

[prometheus]

[...] Trudeau's move risks derailing a strategic economic and political shift many Western countries are making towards India to counter China. It also distracted attention from his push to address cost-of-living concerns, which have weighed heavily on his popularity in opinion polls.

Canada is home to about 770,000 Sikhs, the highest population outside the northern Indian state of Punjab, and the Indian government has for decades expressed its displeasure with some community members' outspoken support for Khalistan.

Sikhs punch above their weight in Canadian politics. They have 15 members in the House of Commons, more than 4 per cent of the seats, mostly from key battlegrounds in national elections, while comprising only about 2 per cent of the Canadian population [...]

Canada will suffer more than India in a trade war, expert warns as diplomatic row mounts

Fonte:https://tnc.news/2023/09/26/canada-india-trade-war/

Experts warn that if the growing dispute between Canada and India leads to a trade war, the consequences will be far worse for the Canadian economy than for India’s.

While Canadians are unlikely to see any immediate effects of this dispute at the grocery store, a leading food researcher says further escalation could lead to devastating consequences for the Canadian economy if India sanctions imports from Canada.

“India isn’t a major distributor of food globally nor is it a major trading partner with Canada,” said Sylvain Charlebois, a professor at Dalhousie University who researches food distribution, safety and security.

“Even if India bans the export of rice to Canada, the cost of rice shouldn’t increase, because Canada has other options like Thailand to purchase from.”

Canadian exports to India were over $5 billion during 2022, according to the United Nations database on international trade.

Pulse crops and potash fertilizer are Canada’s second and third largest exports to India.Canada’s largest export to India is crude oil and its related products.

India is a key player in the Indian pacific partnership and is well positioned to find other countries to purchase from, said Charlebois.

Canada will have a hard time finding another market as large as India and might find itself isolated, as other countries seem to be staying out of the dispute, he added.

Nijjar, a Sikh activist who was designated a terrorist by the Indian government for his involvement in the Khalistani separatist movement, was shot dead outside a Sikh gurdwara in Surrey, B.C. in June.

India temporarily halted all visa services in Canada, and issued an advisory warning Indian nationals and students in Canada of “anti-Indian activities.”

In turn, Canada updated its travel advisory for India to include warnings about “negative sentiments” towards Canadians.

US walks the thin line on Canada-India rift
Fonte: https://frankislam.com/article/us-walks ... ndia-rift/

The US faces a challenging position in the India-Canada diplomatic conflict over the killing of a Sikh Canadian citizen.

The diplomatic conflict between India and Canada over the recent killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Sikh Canadian citizen wanted on terror charges in India, places the United States (US) in a difficult position, given its close relationships with both countries. Canada, its northern neighbour, has been a steadfast ally with whom the US shares a rich history. The US’s alliance with India is relatively new but it has been lauded as a defining relationship of the 21st century by multiple presidents. Further complicating the issue is the possibility that Canada received the intelligence on the killing from the US, a notion partially confirmed by US ambassador to Canada, David Cohen, who informed a Canadian media outlet that it was “shared intelligence among Five Eyes partners” that suggested potential Indian involvement. (Five Eyes includes Britain, Australia and New Zealand besides Canada and the US.)

This possibility undoubtedly contributes to the measured tone of the US response to Trudeau’s charge. Up to this point, the two high-ranking officials who have weighed in on the issue, national security advisor Jake Sullivan and secretary of state Antony Blinken, have struck a balance in their statements by expressing support for Canada while refraining from criticising India. Now, more than a week after Trudeau’s explosive accusation, three distinct perspectives are coming into focus.

The first perspective emerging is that repairing the damage to India-Canada relations could require a Herculean effort. Few speeches by a national leader during times of peace have had as destructive an impact on bilateral ties in recent decades as Trudeau’s remarks. What triggered an exceptionally strong reaction from India was the historical context. The strained relationship between New Delhi and Ottawa can be traced back to the early 1980s when the Khalistan separatist movement was at its peak in Punjab. India accused Canada of harbouring terrorists and their supporters who undermined India’s sovereignty and caused death and destruction in Punjab. The memory of the Air India Kanishka jet bombing remains vivid in the national consciousness, and a majority of Indians feel that Canada has not taken sufficient steps to bring the culprits to justice.

The second perspective relates to the impact the dispute is having on the Indian diaspora, not only in Canada but also in the US. Already, both Sikh and Hindu Canadians have complained of being targeted and feeling insecure. The diplomatic fallout is likely to have an impact on Indian immigration to Canada, which has surged exponentially in the past decade, more than tripling from nearly 32,000 in 2013 to over 118,000 last year. India also sends the highest number of students to Canada compared to any other country.

The third perspective is the challenging position in which the US finds itself due to the rift. Some in India and the diaspora are incensed by the possibility that the US may have shared intelligence with Canada. They hypothesise that Washington might have directly or indirectly guided Trudeau to raise the issue, possibly as a means to curb India’s increasing global influence.

Nothing could be further from the truth. In reality, the India-Canada dispute came at a very inopportune moment for the US, potentially fracturing the coalition Washington has been carefully building in this 21st century. It is in America’s interest that India does not get any closer than it already is to Russia and China. Longtime watchers of US-India relations know how much the US has invested in its relations with India, especially since the days of the civil nuclear deal. Given this and the complexity of this conflict, the challenge for the US will be to determine whether its relations with India and Canada and its strategic international objectives can best be achieved by staying on the sidelines, acting as a referee, or getting directly involved in the problem-solving.

[akivrx78]

[Suetham]

https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2023/10/02/ind ... -2050.html
India’s elderly population will double and overtake the number of children by 2050