IRÃ

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Re: IRÃ

#646 Mensagem por P44 » Qua Jan 19, 2022 10:30 am

Varyag Flotilla Arrives in Iran
January 18, 2022


Imagem

A detachment of ships of the Pacific Fleet as part of the Guards Order of Nakhimov missile cruiser Varyag, a large anti-submarine ship Admiral Tributs and a large sea tanker Boris Butoma anchored on the roadstead of the port of Chahbehar of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In the port, the official delegation of the Russian Navy will take part in a planning conference to hold a joint naval exercise of warships of Russia, Iran and China.

In addition, Russian ships will replenish supplies of food, water and fuel.

Reference:

A detachment of ships of the Pacific Fleet went on a long march from Vladivostok a few days before 2022.

It is planned that during the period of performance of the tasks, the ships will visit the ports of a number of states, including the Republic of Seychelles. The call will be timed to coincide with the 105th anniversary of the visit of the armored cruiser Varyag to the Russian fleet of the port of Victoria of the Seychelles.

During the campaign, planned, including international, exercises will be held as part of a detachment of warships in various areas.

https://seawaves.com/?p=18355




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Re: IRÃ

#647 Mensagem por Suetham » Seg Mai 23, 2022 7:12 pm



Um coronel Hassan Sayad Khodayari do IRGC foi assassinado.




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Re: IRÃ

#648 Mensagem por Suetham » Sex Jun 03, 2022 1:16 pm



Eu ainda não fiz a verificação disso, mas publicarei. Acima, o tweet exemplifica que o Irã pode fazer 5 bombas nucleares em 6 meses, ou seja, pode se tornar uma potência nuclear até o final desse ano.




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Re: IRÃ

#649 Mensagem por Suetham » Qua Jun 08, 2022 8:26 am



De acordo com imagens de satélite, um motor de combustível líquido pesado foi testado recentemente no complexo de mísseis Khojir. A imagem de satélite VHR de 3 de junho de 2022 reforça a suposição de que o Irã realizou um teste de motor de míssil de propelente líquido de um ICBM entre 27 de maio e 1º de junho de 2022 no complexo de Khojir.




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Re: IRÃ

#650 Mensagem por Suetham » Sex Jun 10, 2022 11:54 am

Eles seriam úteis no Donbass. Testes de um enxame de drones "kamikaze" (munição vagabunda) no Irã. Vídeo de teste de um sistema protótipo para o uso em grupo de um enxame de munição vagabunda (drones-"kamikaze") desenvolvido pela Organização de Pesquisa de Jihad e Auto-Suficiência das Forças Terrestres do Exército Iraniano. É relatado que o alcance de combate da munição vagabunda varia de 10 a 400 km com a derrota simultânea de 10 alvos.




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Re: IRÃ

#651 Mensagem por Suetham » Seg Jun 13, 2022 7:21 pm


As opções para a neutralização da atividade nuclear iraniana para Biden terminaram. Exceto uma, a militar. Vale lembrar que ano passado, Israel se tornou responsabilidade do CENTCOM(mesma área de responsabilidade do Irã), retirando a responsabilidade do EUCOM que estará mais envolvido em conter a Rússia.




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Re: IRÃ

#652 Mensagem por Suetham » Sáb Jun 18, 2022 7:30 pm





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Re: IRÃ

#653 Mensagem por knigh7 » Dom Jun 19, 2022 12:37 pm

Infelizmente o restante é fechado para assinantes, mas vale o colocar o que está disponível para quem não é:

Imagemhttps://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles ... ium=social




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Re: IRÃ

#654 Mensagem por Suetham » Dom Jun 19, 2022 7:00 pm

knigh7 escreveu: Dom Jun 19, 2022 12:37 pm Infelizmente o restante é fechado para assinantes, mas vale o colocar o que está disponível para quem não é:

Imagemhttps://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles ... ium=social
O artigo completo:
Iran on the Nuclear Brink

The End of the Deal Would Leave Only Bad Options to Thwart a Dash for the Bomb

By Eric Brewer June 17, 2022

Last month, Iran’s nuclear program entered dangerous new territory: Tehran now possesses enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb. That material, enriched to 60 percent, would need to be further enriched to roughly 90 percent—so-called weapons-grade uranium—before it could be used in a nuclear weapon. But that process, known as “breakout,” will now take just weeks due to Iran’s advances since 2019, when Tehran began casting off the constraints of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal following the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement. Although this action alone would not give Iran a bomb, it is the most important step in building one.

The consequences of this milestone are profound. Until now, the international community has had months, if not years, to prevent any Iranian dash to bomb-grade material—plenty of time to resolve the crisis diplomatically. Should that fail, the United States has always kept military options as a last resort. Indeed, this fact has helped deter Iran from trying to build a bomb. But as U.S. envoy Robert Malley noted last month, Iran’s capabilities have reached the point where Tehran “could potentially produce enough fuel for a bomb before we could know it, let alone stop it.” Given that Democrats and Republicans have long maintained that they will not allow Iran to produce nuclear weapons, the fact that the United States might not be able to prevent an Iranian dash should be deeply worrying.

The easiest solution to this problem, and the one the United States appears to still be banking on, would be a return to the Iran nuclear deal. This would buy time by rolling back many of these nuclear gains, putting Iran’s breakout timeline at roughly six months. But talks to revive the accord have stalled over Iran’s demand that the U.S. State Department remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from its designated terrorist list—apparently a bridge too far for the Biden administration. The problem with waiting for a bargain to materialize, however, is that the longer the stalemate drags on, the less likely a deal becomes as its benefits diminish for both Tehran and Washington.

Unfortunately, the international community might be faced with an Iran at the threshold of a nuclear weapon for the foreseeable future. Washington will have to think creatively about how to manage this state of affairs if it wants to avoid an Iranian bomb and the negative consequences that would follow.

BREAKING DOWN BREAKOUT

It is useful to think about the challenges posed by breakout as being governed by three clocks. The first clock measures the time it would take Iran to produce enough material for a bomb. The second, the time it would take international inspectors or Western capitals to detect those activities. And the third, the amount of time required for the international community to respond. Historically, the time on the first clock has been sufficiently longer than the time on the second and third clocks. But today that is no longer the case.

According to U.S. officials, Iran would need “a matter of weeks” to produce enough material for a bomb, while some outside experts have estimated that it could be done in about ten days (the first clock). This timeline will probably continue to shrink as Iran’s program advances. Inspectors visit Iran’s enrichment sites about once a week (the second clock). Thus, Iran could time a breakout so that inspectors arrive and find out too late or with just days left before Iran produces enough material for a bomb. Iran could also fabricate an excuse to deny inspectors their normal access and complete production in their absence.

Inspectors would report the situation back to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) leaders, but that information would then need to reach Washington. It is also possible, although by no means certain, that the United States or one of its allies would detect preparations for a breakout through their own intelligence collection. Even so, the United States would want to analyze the information and convene senior officials to discuss and debate options—a process that would take more time.

With Iran at or near the end of its breakout, Washington would have to quickly respond (the third clock). Unfortunately, there would be no time for diplomacy, and the United States would need to intervene militarily. Whether a military option is available in that time frame would depend on a range of other factors. The United States would probably want to use the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, reportedly the weapon most capable of reaching the deeply buried Iranian nuclear facilities where this breakout would be taking place, which is carried by B-2 bombers based in Missouri. Flight time to Iran could be over 30 hours, possibly too long to prevent a breakout in this scenario. That flight would also require refueling aircraft and presumably multiple B-2s: would those planes be available at a moment’s notice?

Things get even more complicated—and potentially more time-consuming—from there. The United States might want to strike multiple nuclear sites, target Iran’s radar and air defense systems to minimize the risk of U.S. aircraft being shot down, or have missile defense and other capabilities in place in the region to defend against Iranian retaliation. Some of these options would be impossible to execute in such narrow time frames, which could dissuade the United States from acting at all.

Rather than trying to break out at known sites, Iran could also try to divert its nuclear material to a covert facility between inspections for further enrichment to 90 percent. To do so, Iran would need to have a clandestine enrichment facility, and there are no indications that it does (although a lack of inspector access to cameras monitoring Iran’s centrifuge production since February 2021 makes that harder to confirm). But unlike in the past, when Iran would be starting from slower, first-generation centrifuges and low-enriched uranium, Iran now has growing stockpiles of 60 and 20 percent enriched material and has mastered more advanced centrifuges. This means that Iran could build a smaller enrichment plant that would be harder to detect, enabling it to enrich the material to 90 percent much faster than before. The United States would need to know the location of the covert facility and the missing nuclear material were Washington to use military power to stop Iran’s march toward a nuclear weapon.

Of course, having the fissile material for a bomb is not a bomb itself. Iran would need longer—perhaps a year or two—to build a nuclear device and mount it on a missile. But fissile material production remains the most heavily monitored, and therefore the most detectable, part of building a bomb. Weaponization activities can take place at a variety of scattered facilities, which are not subject to any robust monitoring and carry fewer telltale signatures. The United States may struggle to detect the remaining weaponization processes after Iran produces the requisite fissile material.

Even if Iran never produces a bomb or the necessary fissile material, a nuclear-capable Tehran would still generate serious policy challenges. Iranian foreign policy would grow bolder and more aggressive if Tehran believes it can hang the nuclear breakout sword of Damocles over the head of the international community. Iran could also consolidate its nuclear hedge in ways that do not require a full-fledged nuclear weapons program, including by developing intercontinental ballistic missiles. Finally, faced with an Iran on the cusp of a bomb and doubts about Washington’s ability to stop it, countries in the region could embark on their own nuclear hedging efforts or bomb programs, posing a further challenge to the global nonproliferation regime. Those same allies and partners might try to leverage the threat of going nuclear to press the United States for stronger security assurances and defense assistance—a strategy that has been used by U.S. allies in Asia. Washington would find itself caught between two unpalatable options: deeper military commitments in the Middle East at a time when it would prefer to allocate attention elsewhere, or remaining at a distance and risking further nuclear and missile proliferation.

WINDING BACK THE CLOCK

With the fate of the Iran nuclear deal hanging in the balance, Tehran has little incentive to halt its nuclear advances, which it believes put pressure on the West. That becomes doubly true if talks to revive the deal collapse. While it waits on diplomacy, Washington should therefore focus on what it can control: clocks two and three—speeding up detection and its response.

To increase the odds that the international community would detect an Iranian breakout, the United States, its allies, and, if possible, China and Russia should push Iran to allow daily IAEA visits to Iran’s two enrichment sites and nuclear material storage locations. In addition, Iran should resume using online enrichment monitors—an automated technology that continuously monitors enrichment levels when IAEA officials are not present. These measures were in place under the Iran nuclear deal, but Iran has since discarded them. In addition, the United States should increase its own intelligence collection efforts and coordinate with allies to help provide as much warning time as possible. When just days might separate Iran and enough material for a bomb, every second counts. These measures would provide valuable time and help deter a breakout.

There are reasons to believe that Iran might adopt such conditions. First, there is a powerful, apolitical argument that these added precautions are necessary for the IAEA to do its monitoring job since Iran is the only country producing highly enriched uranium that does not possess nuclear weapons. Second, these measures could help provide vital assurance to the international community that Iran was not sprinting for a bomb and therefore reduce the chances of a military strike, something Iran would presumably see as in its interests. With such a narrow margin of error, any delay in inspector access to Iran’s sites—even if genuinely rooted in a misunderstanding or accident and not a breakout attempt—could lead to a miscalculation that Iran should be keen to avoid. Finally, none of these steps would require Tehran to halt any of its nuclear advances, such as 60 percent enrichment, increasing its stockpile of material, or adding advanced centrifuges, which it believes provide important negotiating leverage.

The United States and its allies would also need to speed up their ability to respond. The National Security Council should establish a modified committee at the principal level that would convene immediately upon receiving information indicating an Iranian breakout. As in any crisis, indicators may be ambiguous and data points may be conflicting. To simulate that reality, this group should practice convening, assessing likely types of information they might receive, and game out options beforehand.

The most impactful step the United States could take, however, would be to shorten military response time. This step might also be the hardest. One option would be increasing readiness and ensuring that all capabilities required for a strike, such as refueling aircraft, would be available on short notice. Another would be positioning aircraft, missile defense systems, and other support assets in the region. U.S. B-2 bombers, for instance, periodically deploy outside the United States but have no sustained overseas presence. Washington would need to examine the requirements, and risks, of more frequent deployments or permanent stationing abroad. Still, these steps would give the United States more flexibility should a crisis arise and would signal to partners in the region as well as to Iran that the United States is prepared to act if needed.

The United States must properly communicate and sequence these diplomatic and military moves. Washington needs to monitor intelligence about Iran’s threat perceptions closely and think carefully about which steps to disclose and which to keep secret so that it does not inadvertently trigger a scenario it hopes to avoid: an Iranian dash to a nuclear weapon. Although Iran may well reject the idea, the United States should also push to establish a direct line of communication with Tehran to help with crisis management. Finally, the United States should be open to holding off on some military steps in the unlikely event that Iran opts for nuclear restraint and transparency. The goal, after all, is not to bomb Iran but to prevent an Iranian bomb.

This approach would be compatible with U.S. efforts to reach a diplomatic settlement. But it would also require the United States to confront the uncomfortable reality that it cannot pin its hopes solely on the eventual revival of the Iran nuclear deal to solve the current dilemma. These options are not ideal, but in the absence of a restored nuclear agreement, they may be all Washington has left to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.




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Re: IRÃ

#655 Mensagem por Suetham » Ter Jun 21, 2022 10:53 pm






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Re: IRÃ

#656 Mensagem por knigh7 » Dom Jun 26, 2022 4:39 pm





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Re: IRÃ

#657 Mensagem por Suetham » Dom Jun 26, 2022 8:38 pm

knigh7 escreveu: Dom Jun 26, 2022 4:39 pm
Não duvido disso. A IAEA ainda teve a brilhante ideia esse ano de condenar o programa nuclear iraniano, a retaliação dos persas foi claramente desligar as câmeras da agência internacional das suas centrífugas. Se antes, o monitoramento já era difícil das instalações de produção de centrífugas iranianas, agora a questão se tornou mais séria do que o inimaginável. E, parte de culpa inicial nisso têm os EUA em abandonar o JCPOA unilateralmente.

O Irã percorreu um longo caminho até aqui. Só para colocar as coisas em perspectiva do Irã: Há mais de 20 anos, quando os países ocidentais souberam do enriquecimento nuclear do Irã, eles pediram que todas as operações fossem interrompidas, incluindo ordenando a eliminação de todos os cursos de física nuclear em seu currículo universitário;

Para o Irã, o abandono dos EUA do JCPOA era a oportunidade perfeita para obscurecer o programa nuclear sob à vista de todos com argumentos sólidos, mas sempre mantendo o pensamento em Israel, este que não tinha nenhum acordo vinculativo com o JCPOA e podia realizar alguma ação unilateralmente, um dos problemas para o regime de Teerã. E o Irã sabia que Israel iria realizar mesmo sob forte condenação dos EUA, porque no submundo das políticas a portas fechadas, os EUA mais do que apoiam essas ações de Israel no O.M.

Ironicamente, quem mais conhecia os EUA era um dos seus maiores inimigos, Fidel Castro. Recomendo a todos que leiam as reflexões de Fidel Castro sobre as tensões no Irã há 10 anos.

http://en.cubadebate.cu/reflections-fid ... y-theread/

Fidel Castro conhecia o comportamento dos EUA e sabia que Israel tem toda aprovação para uma ação maior contra o Irã. O Irã foi apenas uma desculpa, Israel foi apenas um gatilho para uma guerra maior.

O problema é que agora Israel não tem mais garantias nenhuma de que pode vencer uma guerra contra o Irã. A verdade é que o Irã está a apenas alguns meses de enriquecer urânio suficiente para pelo menos 2 bombas e, neste momento, trata-se apenas da vontade da liderança iraniana. E isso está considerando apenas as capacidades abertas do Irã e ignorando completamente a possibilidade de capacidades latentes não documentadas que são conhecidas desde o lançamento do projeto AMAD em 1989.

Esse cara Lewis é um 'pesquisador' que finalmente chegou às conclusões certas (quase) com todo o raciocínio errado nos últimos 15 anos.


Esta é mais uma razão, entre muitos, que o Irã já está armado e já faz um bom tempo. Minha conjectura é que o Irã estava armado antes do momento em que a primeira pá de construção atingiu a terra em Natanz, que é muito antes de 2002. Desnecessário dizer que o Irã tinha centrífugas funcionando muito antes de Natanz ser concluída. Qualquer um pode chegar a mesma conclusão lendo todos os relatórios da AIEA que em 2003 o Irã encerrou o projeto AMAD e se tornou um estado nuclear armado.

Tenho certeza de que o Irã já adquiriu a experiência nuclear para bombas de fissão. Agora o Irã deve passar para as armas termonucleares e quando estiver pronto, declara que é um estado nuclear. Felizmente, a hesitação da liderança iraniana em declarar que eles são um estado nuclear é porque eles estão trabalhando em armas termonucleares. Nesse caso, o silêncio deles é compreensível.

Natanz: https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/de ... expected/8




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Re: IRÃ

#658 Mensagem por Túlio » Seg Jun 27, 2022 1:20 pm

E os aiatolás não sossegam: Irã solicita ingresso nos BRICS! [005]

Iran’s surge to BRICS membership

Tehran, IRNA – The BRICS is going to hold a summit themed “Foster High-quality BRICS Partnership, Usher in a New Era for Global Development” via video conference on Thursday, as Iran’s membership is soliciting increasing support from major members like China and Russia.

https://en.irna.ir/news/84798563/Iran-s ... membership

Ainda estamos vendo apenas as consequências INICIAIS da barbeiragem ianque-europeia de cortar um País grande do SWIFT e ainda por cima roubar seus ativos no exterior: como já falei antes, o resto do mundo também tá vendo, e claro que todos vão procurar alternativas, pois um dia pode e vai chegar a sua vez.

Me parece (e repito, ainda em estágio inicial) que a hegemonia dos EUA e sua capanga Europa Ocidental está caminhando alegremente para o abismo.




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Re: IRÃ

#659 Mensagem por Suetham » Sex Jul 01, 2022 8:56 pm









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Re: IRÃ

#660 Mensagem por Suetham » Qui Jul 07, 2022 9:15 pm

A prisão do vice-embaixador britânico no Irã pelo IRGC - o que aconteceu no Irã?

Ontem, 6 de julho, a mídia estatal iraniana noticiou a detenção de vários estrangeiros, incluindo o vice-embaixador britânico Giles Whittaker, por suspeita de espionagem.

Segundo a mídia iraniana, um diplomata britânico coletou amostras de solo na área da base das Forças Aeroespaciais do IRGC no deserto de Deshte Lut, 60 km a leste de Kerman, durante um exercício em andamento na instalação.

Membros da unidade de contra-inteligência do IRGC também prenderam quatro cidadãos poloneses, liderados pelo professor da Universidade Nicolau Copérnico Maciej Walczek, enquanto tentavam remover amostras de solo do mesmo deserto.

Depois de estudar os materiais dos serviços especiais, foi estabelecido que os detidos também estavam no deserto de Deshte-Lut durante os exercícios iranianos no campo de treinamento. As fotos e vídeos capturados foram enviados pelo mensageiro do WhatsApp para uma certa Patricia, com quem Valchek conversou em polonês.

Outro detido por suspeita de espionagem era o marido do adido cultural austríaco em Teerã, Ronald Geish. De acordo com o IRGC, ele também coletou amostras de solo da área da instalação militar iraniana enquanto caminhava com seus filhos.

Funcionários da República Islâmica disseram que os detidos estavam coletando informações confidenciais sobre os programas nuclear e de mísseis em nome das autoridades britânicas. Os dados seriam usados ​​para fabricar novas acusações contra a liderança iraniana durante as negociações do acordo nuclear.

No entanto, ainda não está claro quando as pessoas acima mencionadas foram detidas e o que acontecerá com elas. Ao mesmo tempo, o Ministério das Relações Exteriores britânico rejeitou todas as declarações do IRGC sobre a prisão de um alto funcionário.

Kazem Gharib-Abadi, secretário-geral do Conselho Supremo de Direitos Humanos do Irã, acusou o governo britânico de promover a política anti-iraniana, inclusive em consulta com a AIEA.

A situação está tomando um rumo interessante em meio a negociações paralisadas entre a liderança iraniana e os países ocidentais liderados pelos Estados Unidos para devolver o Irã ao acordo sobre pesquisa nuclear.

O Irã claramente usará a prisão de cidadãos estrangeiros para promover seus interesses durante a discussão do acordo nuclear. Especialmente tendo como pano de fundo a pressão dos estados de onde vêm as pessoas detidas pelo IRGC.

Ainda não está claro como a liderança dos países dos cidadãos presos irá agir. O colega iraniano @zadolmosafer expressou uma ideia interessante de que o governo Boris Johnson, que ainda está no poder, aproveitará essa situação para desviar a atenção de todos da crise política interna no Reino Unido. E a gestão iraniana da publicação de materiais que deveriam ser mantidos em segredo, só ajuda o atual governo britânico.




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