OPERAÇÕES ESPECIAIS

[FCarvalho]

Fico pensando aqui com os meus botões que embora seja necessário treinar e formar tropas africanas para que eles mesmos deem conta de sua segurança, ao mesmo tempo esse é um risco alto a se correr, visto a total falta de estrutura social e de Estado no continente.

Os soldados recrutados não raro tem mais fidelidade as suas tribos, territórios e/ou religiões do que a bandeira do país que teoricamente os representa. E esse é um dos principais fatores de instabilidade no continente. Sem uma reforma completa da estrutura de Estado é difícil imaginar que um dia essas guerras fraticidas terão um fim.

Mas este é aparentemente um trabalho de formiguinha no longuíssimo prazo que ninguém está disposto a bancar na África. Nem os próprios africanos.

abs

[cabeça de martelo]

GIOE fornece Formação, Mentoria e Assistência a unidades Contra-Terroristas no Sahel



Sahel é uma faixa de 5 400 km de extensão no centro norte do continente africano que atravessa os seguintes países (de oeste para leste): Gâmbia, Senegal, a parte sul da Mauritânia, o centro do Mali, Burkina Faso, a parte sul da Argélia e do Níger, a parte norte da Nigéria e dos Camarões, a parte central do Chade, o sul do Sudão, o norte do Sudão do Sul e a Eritreia. A existência de vastos territórios onde o controle do Estado é insuficiente ou inexistente, particularmente em áreas rurais ou semidesérticas, e a dificuldade de monitorizar fronteiras favorecem a presença de grupos terroristas e de todo o tipo de organizações criminosas na região. O desenvolvimento da segurança torna-se um elemento-chave no Plano de Acção Regional 2015 – 2020 da Estratégia da União Europeia para a região do Sahel.



Nessa perspectiva, a Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR) através do Grupo de Intervenção de Operações Especiais (GIOE) participa no projecto Europeu GAR-SI SAHEL (Groupes d’Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel) com militares empenhados na formação e monitorização de unidades de contra-terrorismo que serão empenhadas nas zonas mais problemáticas. Neste projecto participam mais três Estados-membros da União Europeia: a Guardia Civil (Espanha), a Gendarmerie Nacional (França) e a Guarda dei Carabinieri (Itália).



O projeto teve início em janeiro de 2017, e o GIOE tem como principal objetivo do projeto, a criação de unidades de intervenção, ao nível das Forças de Segurança dos 6 países beneficiários, que disponham de capacidade efetiva para responder a situações de grave alteração da ordem pública, mas também para assegurar a prevenção e combate ao crime, procurando assegurar a afirmação do Estado de Direito na totalidade do território dos referidos Estados do Sahel. Para tal desiderato, e até ao momento, o projeto logrou a criação de Unidades de Intervenção Rápida (Unidades GARSI) em cada um dos Estados beneficiários, unidades estas que integram um total de mais de 800 militares, altamente formados e treinados, e que têm desempenhado um papel fundamental em domínios como sejam a prevenção e o combate ao terrorismo e à radicalização, aos diversos tipos de tráficos ilícitos, bem como à imigração ilegal. A GNR vinha a assegurar a subcoordenação das unidades regionais deste projeto, em dois países de importância capital: Níger e Burkina-Faso. Recentemente, a GNR passou a assumir por completo a coordenação do projecto a nível do Mali, Niger e Burkina-Faso.​



No apoio dado a estas unidades existem formações periódicas, para as quais se deslocam de Portugal elementos especializados. Em 2020 está prevista uma formação no Mali e no Burquina Faso que conta com a participação de Snipers do GIOE, bem como de uma equipa do Centro de Inativação de Engenhos Explosivos (EOD). Também está prevista a deslocação do comandante do GIOE ao Senegal e ao Burquina Faso em missão de mentoria.

As equipas do GARSI treinadas pelo GIOE têm obtido vastos sucessos no combate ao terrorismo. Ainda recentemente, em 19 de Maio de 2020, uma operação no Burquina Faso, na província de Kossi junto à fronteira com o Mali, eliminou 47 elementos do Grupo de Apoio ao Islão e aos Muçulmanos (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims – GSIM), a principal formação jihadista na região do Sahel, grupo aliado da Al-Qaeda. Os elementos da Gendarmerie Nationale sediados na localidade de Barani tinham como missão desmantelar várias bases terroristas que atuavam na área chamada Boucle du Mouhoun. Nesta intervenção, para além das baixas inimigas, conseguiram destruir 2 bases terroristas, capturar um número muito elevado de motociclos, várias armas e munições (Kalashnikov, Zastava, PKM, RPG) e um elevado volume de combustível.



O GIOE, é uma das forças militares Portuguesas de Operações Especiais, parte integrante da Guarda Nacional Republicana, e que constitui a unidade de resposta, para a gestão e atuação em situações complexas e de emergência e, que requerem o compromisso de homens especialmente treinados e equipados, com técnicas, táticas e meios especiais de intervenção, para realizar ações contra-terroristas e resgates de reféns em Portugal ou onde o Governo Português entenda por necessário.



Em Portugal, a decisão de criar uma unidade de resposta especializada a situações de alta violência, considerando-se como tal os atentados que envolvem raptos, tomada de reféns, pirataria aérea e ações de terrorismo, dentro da Guarda Nacional Republicana, foi tomada em 24 de outubro de 1978 e ganhou o nome de Grupo Especial de Intervenção (GEI). Em 1983, o GEI iniciou a formação no Centro de Instrução de Operações Especiais (CIOE), do Exército Português. As razões prendiam-se com as necessidades de formação, alicerçadas na forma de atuar no valor anímico, na inteligência, no espírito de sacrifício, na energia e tenacidade, numa vontade forte e constante, na rusticidade e resistência física e na sobriedade e discrição, que só o CIOE em Portugal conseguiria transmitir, pautando-se por elevados padrões de conduta, de camaradagem, de coesão, de espírito de corpo e de sentido de entreajuda. Com esta qualificação em “Operações Especiais” e após a formação com aproveitamento de 3 Cabos e 29 Soldados, o GEI passou em 21 de abril de 1983 a designar-se Pelotão de Operações Especiais (POE). Em 30 de abril de 2003, o Pelotão de Operações Especiais passa a designar-se Companhia de Operações Especiais (COE). Constituindo-se como Companhia, articula-se por Comando, por seção de comando e Pelotões de Operações Especiais. Em 2007, a Guarda decide dimensionar as Operações Especiais para um novo patamar de resposta aos desafios do futuro. Assim, é criado Grupo de Intervenção de Operações Especiais (Portaria 1450/2008, 16DEC), que aumenta a sua dimensão para duas Companhias de Operações Especiais e uma Secção de Comando.



Em território nacional, o GIOE atua na área de responsabilidade da Guarda, que compreende 96% do território e 56% da população portuguesa, apoiando quando necessários as restantes Unidades da GNR dispersas pelo país, bem como aquelas que estão mais próximas junto dos órgãos de soberania. Ao nível da segurança de pessoas e de locais sensíveis, o GIOE tem apoiado o dispositivo territorial em eventos de massa, como é o caso das cerimónias religiosas de Fátima ou da segurança das instalações da seleção nacional, tanto com elementos em segurança próxima, como com equipas de sniper colocados em pontos dominantes.

O GIOE é uma força com uma importância enorme, tanto no que toca a segurança nacional como Internacional, e a sua capacidade de mobilizar os seus militares para qualquer zona do planeta em cerca de 48h, coloca-a a par de qualquer uma das suas congéneres Mundiais.

http://warriors.pt/galerias/gioe-fornec ... -no-sahel/

[cabeça de martelo]

Fonte - https://assets.exercito.pt/SiteAssets/J ... Ago20.aspx

[cabeça de martelo]

SEAL Team Six Executes Long Distance Rescue Operation Of Kidnapped American In Nigeria

Armed gunmen had abducted Philip Walton from his home in neighboring Niger earlier in the week and there were fears he could be sold to terrorists.
BYJOSEPH TREVITHICKOCTOBER 31, 2020

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/3 ... in-nigeria

[FCarvalho]

EUA utilizam 21 aeronaves para ousado resgate de cidadão norte americano na África Ocidental
Por Fernando Valduga -01/11/2020

https://www.cavok.com.br/eua-utilizam-2 ... L0T1WVTXH4

Um exemplo simples e claro de que para ter capacidade real de operações especiais, é preciso ter recursos, humanos e materiais sempre no mais alto nível e disponibilidade, em qualquer lugar e a qualquer momento.

abs

[Henrique Brito]

Quando você sabe que nunca será deixado para trás, vale a pena pagar seus impostos.

[jambockrs]

Milícias e traficantes ainda são um problema mais policial do que de defesa. Por enquanto o que vale é inteligência + FE policiais + ocupação do Estado dos vazios deixados para o crime organizado.

Mas concordo, do jeito que as coisas estão indo por aqui, se não houver de fato uma resposta conjunta e coordenada de todas as esferas da segurança pública, qualquer hora dessas vamos ver o exército se cagando todo tendo que enfrentar uma guerra de verdade aqui. Vai ficar pior que a fronteira com o Paraguai.

Aí é como diz o ditado, depois que Inês é morta, não adianta reclamar.

abs

[FCarvalho]

Se temos deficiência numérica de forças especiais nas ffaa's, a mim me parece que a situação na esfera da segurança pública não é muito diferente.
Aliás, honestamente, sou absolutamente contra a normalização de ações por parte forças militares em segurança pública sob quaisquer pretexto.
Ainda estamos em tempo e condições de oferecer ao setor de segurança pública os recursos e os meios necessários para combater a violência crescente a os descaminhos do crime organizado e do tráfico de drogas.
Mas primeiro o exército tem de largar mão dessa mania de querer ser polícia do país.
E segundo, a criação do Ministério do Interior e de uma força de Carabineiros a nível nacional.
Se conseguirmos tirar o DPF desse trabalho típico de polícia ostensiva nas fronteiras, e em outras operações típicas de PM, e concentrar-se em investigação, prevenção e inteligência no combate ao crime, damos um passo enorme.
Quem tem que combater o crime tem que estar preparado e vocacionado para isso. Colocar militares para fazer papel de polícia do Estado é um erro crasso e estamos incorrendo na repetição de soluções que já se mostraram mais do que ineficazes, ineficientes.

abs

[cabeça de martelo]

Comandos - Treino de Combate - Nov 2020
Ficam aqui algumas imagens de uma sessão de treino de combate que os Comandos Portugueses executaram no Mês de Novembro de 2020.

https://www.facebook.com/TWOTWarriors/v ... 2009383271

[cabeça de martelo]

[cabeça de martelo]

Caçadores Especiais o antepassado do militar de Operações Especiais de Lamego.

[LM]

Para quem quiser saber mais, página de um amigo dedicada à companhia do Pai dele: http://4cce.org/

[cabeça de martelo]

In Shake-Up, Acting SecDef Elevates Special Operations to Be 'On Par' with Service Branches

Acting Defense Secretary Christoper Miller announced Wednesday that U.S. Special Operations Command will now report directly to him, putting it on par with the service branches.

He said the move comes in recognition of the nation's increasing reliance on its covert forces.

"I have directed the special operations civilian leadership to report directly to me," Miller said. "It will put Special Operations Command on par with the military services for the first time. This reform will immediately improve agility for the department and the command and will enable us to streamline decision flow; enhance decision-making; and more adeptly support our commanders and their superb soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines."

With the support of President Donald Trump, "We are forging the next chapter in the history of U.S. Special Operations forces and formalizing a watershed reform," he added. "Right now, we start the transition to provide greater civilian oversight of and, critically, advocacy for our special operators."

Miller made the announcement at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on his first trip outside the Pentagon since being appointed to take over from fired Defense Secretary Mark Esper on Nov. 9.

He said Congress had endorsed the move to elevate SOCOM's status in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act.

The action follows Miller's sudden announcement Tuesday that U.S. forces will draw down from about 4,500 to 2,500 in Afghanistan, and from about 3,000 to 2,500 in Iraq, by Jan. 15 -- five days before the inauguration of President-elect Joe Biden.

The acting SecDef also appeared to signal that he intends his time in office to be transformative. He said that enhancing the status of Special Operations Command is in line with his three priorities: Bringing an end to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; carrying out the National Defense Strategy, which focuses on China and Russia; and accelerating efforts to combat transnational threats.

Miller also noted turmoil at the Pentagon and the blowback his initiatives have received during his short tenure. He cited a remark often attributed to President Harry S Truman: "If you want a friend in Washington, buy a dog."

In authorizing the change, Miller addressed a long-standing complaint of special operators since Special Operations Command was made one of the Combatant Commands in 1987.

The secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force report directly to the defense secretary but the assistant secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) report through the undersecretary of Defense for Policy.

The job of reporting directly to Miller will go to Ezra Cohen-Watnick, a former aide to Trump's first national security advisor, Michael Flynn. Cohen-Watnick is now filling the role of assistant secretary of defense for SO/LIC on an acting basis.

In remarks at Fort Bragg, Cohen-Watnick said that Miller's action in underlining the importance of Special Operations Command was "following the vision of John F. Kennedy, who predicted the rise of Special Operations 60 years ago."

"Now, under the leadership of President Trump, we are fully realizing President Kennedy's prescient view of Special Operations forces," Cohen-Watnick said.

Miller, a retired Army colonel who served several deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq as a special operator, noted that the announcement was taking place in front of the monument known as "Bronze Bruce," a special warfare memorial on U.S. Army Special Operations Command Memorial Plaza at Fort Bragg.

The ceremony concluded with the playing of the 1966 song "Ballad of the Green Beret."

https://www.military.com/daily-news/202 ... nches.html

[cabeça de martelo]

Nine-minute rescue – analysis of the recent Royal Navy and special forces operation
More details are emerging about the operation on 25th October to free the crew of the MV Nave Andromeda in the face of violent stowaways. Here will examine the incident and the role played by the Royal Navy in protecting commercial shipping and the waters of UK.


The backstory

The 42,000-tonne crude oil tanker, Nave Andromeda sailed from Lagos, Nigeria on 23rd September bound for Southampton. Her complex management arrangements are typical of the commercial shipping world, a being Liberian-flagged tanker, operated by Navios Maritime Holdings, owned by a Greek company and having a multi-national crew. Seven stowaways managed to board the ship in Nigeria and planned to either make an illegal entry or claim asylum in Europe.

It has emerged the crew became aware of their unwanted passengers at some point several days before they entered UK waters. The ship was off the Canary Islands on 5th October before continuing North, taking a detour into French waters near Saint-Nazaire on 20th October. It has come to light that the French authorities refused the permission for the ship to berth and disembark the seven men. The master then chose to continue as planned toward the UK. On arrival off the South Coast, the passengers became violent when they learned they would not be allowed to quietly disappear into the country. A master is obliged to report the presence of stowaways to the authorities under normal maritime protocols.



MV Nave Andromeda proceeding slowly, south of the Isle of Wight during the morning of 25 October. She was sailing in ballast and bound for the Fawley oil terminal on Southampton Water. (Photo used by permission of Island Echo)

The incident

The stowaways became aggressive and began a stand-off with the 22 crew members who retreated into the ‘citadel’. Many merchant ships now have safe rooms where the crew can lock themselves in if the ship is subject to pirate attacks or hijacking attempts. There is fresh water and food for a few days, access to communications equipment and an independent power supply. It is reported that in this case, the captain managed remained in control, locked in the bridge with the chief engineer locked in the engine room.

The master put out a mayday call around 0900 on Sunday morning requesting immediate assistance as stowaways had surrounded the ship’s bridge and he was attempting to keep them calm. This was received by the coastguard and passed to Hampshire Police. The tanker zig-zagged slowly off the south coast of the Isle of Wight and by the afternoon the Police had formally requested military assistance. An exclusion zone was enforced around the vessel which was monitored by coastguard helicopters and RLNI boats through the afternoon.

The crews actions were in line with an obscure manual called Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security, 5th edition (BMP5) This document was originally developed by the RN and other agencies to advise mariners how to prevent and, if necessary, respond to piracy and boarding attacks in the Gulf region.

The response

Contingency planning by the military probably began at an early stage in the day as it was clear how things would likely develop. Preparation using all available intelligence is a cornerstone of special forces operations and being in communication with the master would have been a big help in determining the location of the suspects. The ship’s owner would also likely have provided plans of the vessel to help understand the layout.

For the operation the RN deployed 16 members of the Special Boat Service (SBS), carried in two Merlin helicopters, supported by two Wildcat helicopters and the frigate, HMS Richmond. The Merlins Mk4s of 845 and 846 NAS have capacity for up to 24 fully laden troops but two aircraft provides a back-up and allowed the SBS to land in separate parts of the ship to surround the suspects. The Merlin is fitted with a powerful winch for rescue work and securing point above the door for roping. When in use, the winchman has the ability to take a limited degree of flying control from the pilot using a small joystick just inside the door.

The Maritime Interdiction (MI) Flight is part of 815 Naval Air Squadron, consisting of double-manned Wildcat flights held at high readiness to support UK Special Forces. It is available for Counter-Narcotics, Counter-Piracy and Maritime Counter-Terrorism (MCT) operations. The MI Wildcats may be used to provide top cover or troop insertion/extraction for Special Forces. A 43 Commando Maritime Sniper Team (MST) or SBS Sniper is usually embarked for these operations.

The 4 aircraft of the Commando Helicopter Force took off from RNAS Yeovilton at around 1545 and arrived at the SBS headquarters in Poole. Chinook helicopters from RAF Odiham, were also in the air during the afternoon, probably collecting personnel and equipment from the Special Forces Support Group (SFSG) at St Anthan and delivering them to Poole.

On Sunday HMS Richmond was at anchor in Tor Bay during a break in Fleet Operational Sea Training and was conveniently placed to assist. It is possible that Richmond’s Pacific 24 RIBs were launched, on hand to rescue anyone who might have ended up in the water. The frigate could also shadow the tanker if the master had lost control and it began to move off. It could also refuel helicopters if the operation became extended and could act as the on-scene command and control facility.


As night fell the ship is surrounded by boats and helicopters a few minutes before she was boarded. (Photo used by permission of Island Echo)

The action

The action to recover the ship began after dark at around 1945. The master was clearly acting under instructions and turned the ship onto a westerly heading into the wind to assist the helicopters in the hover. Observers on the Isle of wight also saw the deck floodlighting extinguished.

It is unclear if the ship was boarded using small assault craft and troops scaling the sides using grappling hooks, a demanding task in darkness and moderate seas. What is certain is that four helicopters arrived over the ship The noise, downdraft and blinding searchlights are a useful way to disorientate the adversary and the SBS quickly descended from the two Merlins by rope onto the deck. Snipers in the back of the Wildcats provided covering fire, should it have been needed.

The stowaways were apparently quickly apprehended and gave up without resistance, caught in a pincer movement by the small SBS teams in a single group, together on the central part of the upper deck. Once the ship was secured, the suspects were handed over to police and the SBS quickly withdrew. In all the operation had taken just 9 minutes with no injury or loss of life. The ship is now safely docked in Southampton and is subject to a police investigation. How the stowaways boarded the ship, when the crew was first aware of them and the actions of the French authorities will be of interest.

The seven men have been detained at Police stations in Hampshire, arrested on suspicion of seizing or exercising control of a ship by use of threats. (Under the provisions of the hijacking section of the 1990 Aviation and Maritime Security Act). This is an offence that can carry a prison-term, potentially up to life sentence.

The Shakies

While the SAS are world-famous and subject of enormous fascination, their sister and rival special forces formation, the SBS is much less well known. They were originally part of the SAS but separated and became the Special Boat Squadron in 1943. In 1983 they were renamed the Special Boat Service and given particular responsibility for maritime counter-terrorism – protecting ports, shipping and offshore energy infrastructure. They have also served in many land campaigns, most recently distinguishing themselves in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Nicknamed Shakies, the SBS is akin to the US Navy Seals and specialises in maritime operations. Selection for the SBS is open to all UK forces personnel and they share a common selection process with the SAS (and the 90% failure rate). Unsurprisingly, SBS applicants are predominantly Royal Marines and the unit has around 200 operators in 4 squadrons; C,X, M and Z. The SBS has a wide variety of specialisms including support of amphibious operations, operating small boats, canoeing, diving, underwater demolitions and beach reconnaissance. Like all SF units, their activities are rarely officially acknowledged and many of their operations that have directly protected the UK may never become public.

The analysis

This cannot be described as a terrorist incident or even a planned hijacking, rather a spectacularly bungled attempt at illegal immigration. It would appear the stowaways became frustrated at the prospect of being denied to opportunity to enter the country covertly. The requirement for expensive military intervention was prompted by both the need to protect the crew and to ensure that a tanker in UK waters remained firmly under control.

From the perspective of the SBS, the incident was probably not altogether unwelcome, providing some action and an opportunity to demonstrate their abilities, conveniently close to their base in Poole. In this example, the much greater risk factor was roping from helicopters onto a ship at sea in the dark, rather than from a few unarmed migrants.

Special Forces involvement means the MoD will only make very limited comment on the incident and refused to issue any imagery of the action. For the RN it was a chance to demonstrate its ability to deliver maritime security very close to home and in the public gaze. This was a definite awareness and PR win, especially as nothing excites the British media more than stories involving special forces.

While the media focus may be on the men in black abseiling onto the ship, executing an operation like this is more complex than it may first appear. A warship, four helicopters, the SBS and their equipment had to be brought together at the right time and place. This required headquarters to co-ordinate and liaise with various government agencies and get authorisations from politicians and senior commanders, all in a tight timeframe.

This action is very similar to the incident that occurred in the Thames Estuary in Dec 2018. An SBS team descended on the MV Grande Tema in the Thames Estuary after stowaways threatened the crew. The prompt response by authorities to in these events helps provide reassurance to merchant crews and the shipping industry that help will be close at hand, especially in UK waters. Despite another good result, merchant shipping remains a vulnerability. A more professional terrorist group that took control of a vessel could pose a much more serious threat to UK ports, waters or overseas interests. Maritime security demands 24-hour readiness, vigilance and preparedness from the Royal Navy.

https://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/nine-m ... operation/

[cabeça de martelo]

TAKING “DE OPPRESSO LIBER” TO THE STREETS: WHY THE US ARMY’S SPECIAL FORCES QUALIFICATION COURSE NEEDS TO BECOME MORE URBAN
Sandor Fabian



The old military maxim, “train as you fight,” remains as relevant as ever. And yet, at least in one particular and important way, it is not being followed in the current US Army Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC).

Unconventional warfare has been the foundation of the SFQC from its beginnings and although historically its curriculum has always been updated to reflect the characteristics of actual conflicts, the training requirements generated by the emergence of urban warfare as the primary way of conflict do not seem to have gained appropriate attention in the US Army’s Special Forces training. If the SF community wants to maintain its strategic relevance—specifically, its ability to enable local resistance forces—it must understand that such future resistance will increasingly be conducted in major urban centers. The US Army must acknowledge this reality, and the educational and training implications associated with it, and realign the curriculum of the SFQC toward combat skills that enable future SF operators to effectively conduct their operations in complex, built-up areas.

How the US Army Trains its Special Forces Soldiers at the SFQC

According to the academic handbook published by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the SFQC is designed to train US Army officers and noncommissioned officers and is sixty-seven weeks long (with an additional thirty-six weeks for medical sergeants) with six phases of training and mainly conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

The first phase is six weeks long and introduces the candidates to the foundations of Special Forces history, attributes, tasks, land navigation, and unconventional warfare. During the nine-week second phase, trainees focus on small-unit tactics and skills that enable them to effectively operate as part of an ODA—the twelve-soldier Operational Detachment Alpha. The small-unit training is mostly conducted in traditional “green” areas with little focus on operations in urban settings. During the sixteen-week third phase, students undertake specialized training based on their individual SF military occupational specialties to prepare them for their future roles within an ODA. This phase also contains only limited information about the opportunities and challenges generated by built-up areas. The fourth phase of the SFQC centers on a four-week culmination exercise, called Robin Sage, where students are being both trained and evaluated in their SF skills while they are performing their duties in an unconventional warfare–based scenario. The exercise is conducted on both private and public property ranging across ten counties and covering approximately 4,500 square miles. While Robin Sage includes some direct-action tasks conducted in urban settings, the main focus of the exercise is on enabling guerrillas in remote areas. The fifth phase five is twenty-five weeks long and focuses on language and culture training. Taught skills also include rapport-building techniques, cultural mitigation strategies, and interacting through interpreters. The SFQC culminates with the five-week final phase, during which students are awarded the SF tab and green beret, and also includes military free fall parachute training.

The point of describing the entire SFQC training pipeline is to draw out an important fact: although there are some elements of urban warfare, the current curriculum clearly lacks a sufficient focus on the combat skills that will be increasingly necessary for success in future operations.

Why Realign?

The 2017 US National Security Strategy clearly switches focus from fighting terrorism toward great power competition. Although the US military still seeks to maintain the capabilities it needs to address terrorism and other nonstate threats, it has clearly shifted its orientation toward the requirements that will enable it to fight near-peer and peer competitors such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. While the specific roles and tasks of SF in this new environment are still being debated in both military circles and academia, several recent developments provide some significant clues about the likely future role of Army SF—and the terrain in which they must be prepared to fulfill it.

Although a direct confrontation between the United States and a great power competitor on within either party’s own territory might be possible in the long term, a conflict between these actors are highly likely to at least start on the soil of one or more partner or allied countries. Recently, more and more small countries aligned with the United States and NATO have begun to realize this fact. They have also acknowledged the fact that, in the event of an aggression against their territory, they cannot defend themselves conventionally and it will take some time for US help to arrive. For these reasons several potentially vulnerable countries have started to implement new strategic approaches to try to mitigate an aggressor’s conventional military capabilities. One example of such an approach in smaller states is the total defense concept, which aims to regain national sovereignty through resistance operations after an invasion and during any subsequent occupation.

Significantly, these countries have also recognized that modern resistance operations against a numerically and technologically superior conventional enemy are most viable in urban areas. A series of wargames conducted by the RAND Corporation in 2014 and 2015 produced a sobering and widely quoted conclusion: in the event of an attack against the Baltic states, Russian forces could arrive at either Estonia’s capital of Tallinn or Latvia’s capital of Riga (or both) within thirty-six to sixty hours. But that vulnerability also presents a potential opportunity for threatened states. “The Russians can get to Tallinn in two days,” Brig. Gen. Riho Uhtegi, commander of the Estonian Defence League and former commander of Estonian special operations forces, said in 2018. “But they will die in Tallinn. And they know this. . . . They will get fire from every corner, at every step.”

Uhtegi’s assessment reflects observations from recent conflicts where it has become clear that while modern conventional forces can easily advance through natural landscapes they struggle when they enter built-up areas. The characteristics of the modern cities prevent conventional forces to effectively employ their normal tactics, techniques, and procedures while also significantly reducing the capabilities of modern conventional equipment and weapon systems—and sometimes even them irrelevant. At the same time, the same characteristics act as force multipliers for the resistance force. Recent examples from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria clearly demonstrate that even in less developed urban areas a significantly inferior resistance force can make life extremely difficult for conventional militaries. The key takeaway for SF from these developments is that in future conflicts, in order to maximize their contribution by supporting and enabling a resistance force behind enemy lines, they must be prepared to operated effectively in urban settings. SF training begins with the SFQC, and it should be made to reflect these realities by realigning it to incorporate more training focused on dense urban terrain.

What to Do?

Although it is paramount that the SFQC continues to train future SF operators for the basics of special operations across all phases of the course, parts—perhaps even the majority portions—of phases two, three, and four should be redesigned and placed into an urban scenario. During the small-unit tactics phase, a balance must be struck between learning how to operate in traditional “green” environments and learning tactics, techniques and procedures that will enable them to effectively conduct small-unit operations in urban settings. That balance should tilt toward the latter. SF personnel operate among the people, and in a world that has been more urban than rural for years and is becoming more urbanized every day, SF training environments should also be more urban than rural. Learning how to navigate and survive in major cities, how to conduct infiltration and exfiltration using nonstandard platforms on the surface, in subsurface, and in the air, how to maneuver in small and large formations, and how to train indigenous forces to conduct these activities in urban terrain should be the primary focus of the second phase.

Each part of the individually focused military occupational specialty training should also be redesigned to better reflect the requirements of future urban combat. While continuing to provide comprehensive training across the full spectrum of military problems Special Forces officers’ education should emphasize the development of skills that will enable future detachment commanders to effectively lead their teams and indigenous forces in urban terrain. Besides being trained in the specific characteristics of urban operations (with special focus on urban resistance), future detachment commanders must also have a clear understanding of the functions of other 18-series specialties in urban settings.

The training undertaken by each of the noncommissioned officers should also be modified. For example, after learning the basics of direct- and indirect-fire systems and their associated procedures, weapons sergeants should be extensively trained on how to best utilize these systems in and adapt procedures to urban environments. They should also be educated about the capabilities and limitations of the future adversaries’ weapons to be able to mitigate their effects in built-up areas as well as how to operate those weapons effectively so they and the supported resistance force can make the best use of captured enemy weapons.

Engineer sergeants’ training should also be realigned toward the skills necessary for effective urban combat. All five modules of the training—construction, demolition, improvised explosive devices, reconnaissance, and field exercise—should incorporate urban-specific considerations. These SF soldiers must have a deep understanding of the characteristics of man-made urban structures and their utility in resistance operations; small- and large-scale demolitions and their consequences within, under, and between buildings; the creation, deployment, and employment of improvised explosive devices in built-up areas; and how to assess and conduct reconnaissance of enemy infrastructure. These are just some of the general skills that urban environments require and that should be included in the training of the engineer sergeants.

Turning to medical sergeants, many might argue that the individual skills of these SF team members should be the same under all conditions. However, military operations—especially resistance operations—conducted far from the support of conventional forces and in a complex urban environment generate unique requirements. Some examples might include the creation and long-term operations of field treatment facilities (probably discreet and possibly even clandestine) in built-up areas, the utilization of civilian medical centers and pharmacies without detection, long-term care for wounded team members and indigenous force members, reaction to mass-casualty events in tight physical spaces, and instructing physically separated (trapped) individuals on the application of self-aid.

Finally, the content and focus of communications sergeants’ training should also be reconsidered given the specific considerations of complex, built-up areas on communication and the opportunities presented by the presence of major information networks in modern cities. While communications sergeants must be masters of all modern communication platforms they also should have deep knowledge and skills in the application of less sophisticated methods like communication tactics, techniques and procedures used by terrorist groups and insurgents. Additionally, it is crucial that communications sergeants understand the capabilities and limitations (both outside and inside built-up areas) of the communication platforms of near-peer and peer competitors so they can both avoid detection and effectively target enemy communications.

The recommended changes in both the second (small-unit tactics) and third (specialty-specific training) phases of the SFQC naturally lead to the requirement to make significant changes in the design of the Robin Sage scenario, as well. While the fundamental idea of the US Army’s SF soldiers supporting and enabling indigenous resistance forces should remain in the framework of the exercise, it should also be updated to realistically reflect future requirements. The indigenous resistance forces in coming conflicts will fight in major cities as guerrilla warfare moves “out of the mountains,” and those forces will increasingly take on a character shaped by their urban settings—composed perhaps in part by some surviving conventional military members, but also by lawyers and bus drivers, factory workers and IT engineers. The Robin Sage exercise must be updated to match this reality in terms of its scenario, duration, setup, role players, and mission. In short, it should offer an opportunity for students to be trained and evaluated under the conditions that correspond to their most likely future operations and not their past activities.


Realigning a foundational training course is extremely difficult, but sometimes it must be done. If the US Army wants its Special Forces to remain the sharpest possible tip of the spear, optimized for the missions it is most likely to face in an era of great power competition, then now is the time for SFQC to do just that. Changes in the US National Security Strategy, the emergence of near-peer and peer competitors, the reconceptualization of US partner and allied countries’ defense strategies, and the emergence of urban environments as the battlefield of future the future must lead those responsible for the curriculum of the SFQC to implement fundamental changes across the different phases of the course. While the specific changes required need deeper investigation than this article can provide, an open and much-needed discussion should begin. The motto of US Army SF, De Oppresso Liber, will continue to be put to the test in future conflicts. Whether or not future SF soldiers will be adequately prepared to free the oppressed depends on whether the Army is ready give them the training that they need.

Sandor Fabian is a former Hungarian Special Forces lieutenant colonel with more than twenty years of military experience. He is a graduate of the Miklos Zrinyi Hungarian National Defense University, holds a master’s degree in Defense Analysis (Irregular Warfare) from the US Naval Postgraduate School, and has a graduate certificate in National Security and Intelligence Studies from the University of Central Florida. Sandor is currently a faculty member at the NATO Special Operations School and a PhD candidate in Security Studies at the University of Central Florida. His research has appeared in Defense & Security Analysis, the Special Operations Journal, Combating Terrorism Exchange, the Florida Political Chronicle, and the Hungarian Seregszemle journal.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image: Special Forces candidates assigned to the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School patrol through a wooded area during the final phase of field training known as Robin Sage in central North Carolina, July 9, 2019. (Credit: K. Kassens, US Army)

https://mwi.usma.edu/taking-de-oppresso ... ore-urban/