Marinha da Austrália

[FCarvalho]

Diz o ditado popular que não bom colocar todos os ovos em uma mesma cesta.
No caso de sistemas de defesa a história está cheia de exemplos.

Abs

[Matheus]

Quase R$ 15bi cada fragata? Carailos!!!

[old]

Diz o ditado popular que não bom colocar todos os ovos em uma mesma cesta.
No caso de sistemas de defesa a história está cheia de exemplos.

Abs

[J.Ricardo]

Tirando os problemas com custos, a Austrália leva muito a sério sua defesa.

[FCarvalho]

É o preço que se paga pela vizinhança instável e pelas amizades complicadas.

Abs

[P44]

[P44]

BAE Systems Australia signs Hunter-class work deal

Jon Grevatt - IHS Jane's Defence Industry
04 October 2018



BAE Systems and the Australian government have signed an Advanced Work Arrangement (AWA) deal in support of the Royal Australian Navy’s project to acquire Hunter-class frigates (pictured here). Source: Royal Australian Navy

The Australian government and BAE Systems have signed an interim contract agreement in support of the programme to build Hunter-class frigates for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).

BAE Systems Australia said the Advanced Work Arrangement (AWA) agreement - announced on 4 October - will facilitate continuing work in the programme before the signing of a head contract, which is expected later this year.

The AWA covers work on maturing the design of the Hunter-class platform, engineering plans, personnel requirements, and the setting up of infrastructure that will enable prototyping to start in 2020.

In signing the AWA, the two sides also confirmed that negotiations on the head contract are continuing. Talks to enable BAE Systems Australia's acquisition of the ASC Shipbuilding, a division of the state-owned naval shipbuilder ASC Pty Ltd, are also ongoing.

Nigel Stewart, the managing director of BAE Systems Australia's Hunter-class project, said, "This is a very important and early milestone … The AWA demonstrates a commitment by both BAE Systems and the Australian government to ensure timely progress on this critical defence programme."

Australia's Minister for Defence Christopher Pyne added that the AWA is an "important first step" in integrating ASC Shipbuilding into BAE Systems.

"The process of transitioning ASC Shipbuilding into BAE Systems is well under way," said Pyne, "and ASC Shipbuilding, BAE Systems, and the Department of Finance are making good progress in negotiations".

Pyne also confirmed that the head contract will be signed between the government and ASC Shipbuilding, which will become a whollyowned BAE Systems subsidiary on completion of the acquisition talks.

Work on constructing the frigates is scheduled to begin in December 2020 and will commence with building prototypes to demonstrate that the Hunter-class design, shipyard processes, and workforce are ready to commence full-scale production.

https://www.janes.com/article/83557/bae ... -work-deal

[Diupa]

Austrália compra 12 submarinos convencionais por 35,5 bilhões de euros do Naval Group

Autoridades australianas prometeram comprar 12 submarinos de ataque do Naval Group da França no maior projeto de aquisição de defesa de Canberra. Os especialistas temem que os submarinos sejam muito caros e façam “muito pouco”. Representantes da França e da Austrália assinaram um acordo de submarinos recorde em Canberra, na segunda-feira, após quase dois anos de negociações frustrantes.

No documento, a Austrália compromete-se a pagar 50 bilhões de dólares australianos (35,5 bilhões de euros) ao Naval Group da França por 12 novos submarinos. As embarcações fazem parte do plano da Austrália de aumentar seu poder na região da Ásia-Pacífico, onde interesses estratégicos da China, dos EUA e de outros países colidem. “Isso significa que estamos garantindo que estamos na frente do bloco quando se trata dos mais recentes navios e poder de fogo”, disse o primeiro-ministro Scott Morrison a jornalistas em Canberra.

Os novos submarinos “Shortfin Barracuda” serão movidos convencionalmente, usando uma combinação de motores elétricos e a diesel. Seu projeto, no entanto, será baseado no modelo nuclear Barracuda do Naval Group. Paris e Canberra concordaram em construir os navios em um novo estaleiro no sul da Austrália. Os primeiros navios estarão prontos para serem entregues à Marinha Australiana no início dos anos 2030, e o projeto está programado para ser concluído em algum momento da década de 2050.

Diluindo a Marinha

O Naval Group arrebatou o contrato em 2016, superando as ofertas da japonesa Mitsubishi e da Kawasaki, além da alemã ThyssenKrupp. Mas o projeto estava sob fogo na Austrália por medo de explodir custos e atrasos. Em 2017, a empresa de consultoria australiana Insight Economics publicou um relatório mostrando os riscos “extremamente altos” associados à frota de projeto personalizado. “Pagaremos demais por um navio que fará muito pouco”, disse o professor Hugh White, do Centro Estratégico e de Defesa da Universidade Nacional da Austrália.

O relatório também alerta que, mesmo que todos os prazos sejam cumpridos, a Marinha Australiana terá apenas um submarino em funcionamento em 2034 e até quatro em 2040. A Austrália opera atualmente uma frota de seis submarinos envelhecidos da classe Collins, de projeto sueco e construídos na Austrália entre 1996 e 2003.

FONTE: Rádio Alemã Deutsche Welle

https://www.naval.com.br/blog/2019/02/1 ... val-group/

[P44]

https://www.facebook.com/groups/1216058 ... 4/?app=fbl

[P44]

https://www.facebook.com/12962120708801 ... 8/?app=fbl

[jambockrs]

Meus prezados
Luta contra pirataria e drogas no Oriente Médio: o resultado positivo do emprego das embarcações ZODIAC MILPRO
por Luiz Padilha



Apesar das ocorrências de pirataria terem diminuído na região da Somália, o Golfo da Guiné, situado no entorno estratégico do Brasil, tem “tomado a dianteira” em relação a incidentes relacionados diretamente à pirataria. O relatório do IMB (Veja aqui) aponta que os incidentes no Golfo da Guiné já ultrapassam 80% do quantitativo mundial.
Em recente seminário de operações de paz realizado pela Marinha do Brasil (MB), o assunto Golfo da Guiné veio à tona. Além disso, as questões relacionadas àquela região foram incluídas na justificativa para o término da missão de um navio da MB junto à missão da ONU no Líbano (UNIFIL).

Embarcações Zodiac Milpro Hurricane podem ser içadas ou arriadas com o navio em movimento
Logo é importante que nossos Navios, que possam vir a operar na região do Golfo da Guiné, estejam dotados de embarcações adequadas à tarefa a ser realizada, o que contribuirá para dissuasão e ampliará fortemente a segurança das tripulações envolvidas.
O exemplo da Somália e Oriente Médio
A pirataria é realizada em barcos que desenvolvem velocidades superiores aos Navios mercantes e muitas vezes também aos Navios de Guerra. Para combatê-la é necessário possuir apoio aéreo e embarcações de alto desempenho, preparadas para operar em condições adversas de mar (certificadas para ventos até força 8 na escala Beaufort e ondas de até 4 metros) e com possibilidade de se deslocar em alta velocidade, operando a considerável distância de sua base, seja em terra ou navio.

Abordagem a barco pirata feita usando as embarcações Zodiac Milpro Hurricane da Marinha australiana – Foto: Commonwealth of Australia

O mesmo relatório da IMB citado acima aponta uma drástica queda de ações de pirataria na região marítima limítrofe, a Somália, fruto dos esforços de diversas Marinhas em buscar a estabilidade naquela região, dentre as quais ressaltamos as experiencias exitosas da França e da Austrália.
A Marinha Nacional Francesa emprega, para esta tarefa, as embarcações de 9 metros Zodiac Milpro da linha Hurricane (ZH-930), denominadas ECUME (Embarcation Commando à Usage Multiple), uma plataforma única projetada para atender a 6 diferentes missões e operar em condições adversas em grande velocidade.
Também a Marinha Australiana utiliza embarcações as Zodiac Milpro de 9 metros (ZH-929), customizadas de acordo com seus requisitos específicos. Operando a partir da Fragata HMS Ballarat, as embarcações Hurricane Zodiac Milpro foram, por exemplo, decisivas na operação que culminou com a apreensão de 2,6 toneladas de drogas ilícitas (vide reportagem de maio de 2019).

HMAS Ballarat (FF 155) Foto Mel Orr
Consideradas o Estado da Arte em embarcações semirrígidas, com casco de alumínio ou fibra de vidro, as Hurricane possuem um peso inferior às opções construídas com Polietileno de alta densidade, não necessitando de adaptação em aparelhos de força, e podem ser içadas ou arriadas com o Navio em movimento. Além disso seu desenho e soluções de engenharia permitem uma maior manobrabilidade e segurança, atingindo maior velocidade e consumo inferior para uma motorização similar. São o modelo ideal para operar com fiabilidade e eficácia em ambientes hostis e em severas condições climáticas.
Olhando-se as lições apreendidas na região da Somália, é importante equipar os Navios da Marinha com embarcações apropriadas para consecução das tarefas que lhe serão impostas.
Seria extremante relevante considerar estes aspectos na hora de escolher a embarcação que irá dotar os futuros Navios da Classe Tamandaré.


Fonte: blog Poder Aéreo 5 jan 2020

[J.Ricardo]

Será que o Brasil não consegue produzir lanchas equivalentes?
Acho que esse tipo de compra poderia ser atendida por empresas nacionais...

[akivrx78]

[FCarvalho]

Será que o Brasil não consegue produzir lanchas equivalentes?
Acho que esse tipo de compra poderia ser atendida por empresas nacionais...

Poder até pode. O que não falta no pais são empresas produzindo botes semi-rígidos.
O problema é saber se eles conseguem atender às especificações militares de emprego deste tipo de embarcação.

abs

[akivrx78]

ASPI raises mounting concerns about SEA 1000 future submarine costs

Maritime and Undersea Warfare　28 April 2020
By: Stephen Kuper

ASPI analyst Marcus Hellyer has raised renewed concerns about the costs associated with the long-term development and ‘future-proofing’ of the Royal Australian Navy’s future-Attack Class submarines at a time when both regional competitors are accelerating their modernisation plans and local budgets are going to be continually strained.

It is shaping up to be one hell of a labour and birthing process for Australia's multibillion-dollar SEA 1000 Attack Class submarine program as government, Defence and Naval Group move to allay the fears of Australia's strategic policy community and the public.

Despite repeated rebuffs by senior Defence uniformed personnel, bureaucrats and successive ministers of defence and defence industry, concerns released recently by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) in the report titled Future Submarine – Transition to design, combined with political concerns, all serve as powerful fuel to question the program.

When first announced, the Attack Class was promised to deliver a quantum leap in the capability delivered to the Royal Australian Navy and its submarine service by leveraging technology and capabilities developed for nuclear submarines, implemented on a conventional submarine.

Further complicating matters is the constantly fluctuating price associated with the program, with figures ranging from the original $80 billion as stated by former defence industry and defence minister Christopher Pyne, to a now estimated $145 billion as revealed by Future Submarine Program manager Rear Admiral Greg Sammut during Senate estimates.

This cost explosion is further exacerbated by an apparent 'slip' in the planned commencement date for construction of the lead boat, HMAS Attack, which was widely publicised as 2022-23 and has now subsequently been pushed back to the 2024 time frame – further exposing Australia's ageing Collins Class vessels to potential adversary over match.

RADM Sammut was quick to explain this away, like a skilled operator, informing Senate estimates that the slated time frame was referencing the standing up of construction personnel, tools, infrastructure, processes and equipment to commence the construction of HMAS Attack's pressure hull in 2024.

Finally, with the first vessel expected to enter the water in the mid-to-late 2030s, concerns regarding the cost, delivery and capability of the vessels is serving to raise questions about the value proposition for a conventional submarine at a time of increasing technological advancement in comparable vessels operated by peer and near-peer competitors in the Indo-Pacific.

While each of these individual challenges will impact the recapitalisation of the Royal Australian Navy's submarine fleet, the growing program delays and estimated cost overruns will have dramatic impacts on the long-term modernisation and recapitalisation of the Royal Australian Navy in the middle of the 21st century.

In response to these mounting concerns, Marcus Hellyer, defence economist and analyst with ASPI has raised new alarms surrounding the costs associated with planned "batch building" and costs associated with the technology insertions required to maintain "regional superiority" over the life of the Attack Class, begging the question, how much are these things going to cost?

Please explain

Hellyer highlights concerns raised by former submariner and independent senator Rex Patrick regarding the wildly fluctuating costs associated with 'out turning' the future submarine fleet and the ramifications it will have on the capability delivered to the Royal Australian Navy.

Senator Patrick: It has been two years since DCNS, now Naval Group, were announced the winners. You’ve done a bit of work. Are there any updated costs on the acquisition for the submarine?

RADM Sammut: It’s still in the order of $50 billion based on the work that we’ve done to date on early design activities.

Senator Patrick: Do you have any idea of, say, the design cost or the build costs?

RADM Sammut: Those costs are being determined in greater detail as we complete preparations to enter the full contract for design and build of the submarine. At this stage, as I said, total acquisition for the 12 submarines is remaining at $50 billion.

"If the $50 billion constant/$80 billion outturned estimate hadn’t changed since Naval Group was selected, then the window in which the estimate increased must have been between the receipt of bids from the participants in the competitive evaluation process at the end of November 2015 and the announcement in April 2016," Hellyer posits.

Building on this, Hellyer states, "What caused the change? Recently there’s been discussion — for example, at Senate estimates — about whether the Commonwealth has been commercially ‘captured’ by Naval Group because it chose a single provider too early, exposing itself to cost increases. While that’s an ongoing risk to guard against, it doesn’t explain cost increases during the competitive evaluation process when there was still competitive tension.

"There are likely two reasons for the growth of the estimate during the competitive evaluation process. The first is that Defence’s $50 billion outturned figure was already too low. ASPI’s 2009 estimate of $36.5 billion constant becomes around $42 billion constant when rebaselined to 2015. Outturned, that becomes $67 billion.

"The second reason for the increase is the more demanding performance requirements. The 2016 white paper moderated the requirements for the future submarine by dropping its strategic strike role, which should also have reduced the cost. But the white paper also introduced the undefined term ‘regionally superior’. If anything was going to lead to an open-ended expansion of requirements, that would be it."

The alternate options? Leveraging hunter-killer, cruise missile subs and unmanned systems

Drawing on advances in unmanned underwater systems like the Boeing Orca system, combined with a fleet of complementary, highly capable hunter-killer and cruise missile submarines designed to modified off-the-shelf solutions, further serves as a capability aggregator for the RAN.

The increasing proliferation of conventionally powered submarines incorporating vertical launch modules for accommodating advanced cruise missile systems, provides an important capability for Australian consideration, particularly when paired with unmanned underwater and aerial systems providing ISR capabilities enhancing the nation's deterrence capabilities.

Developing mutually complementary submarine fleets of approximately nine dedicated hunter-killer submarines for critical maritime interdiction, task force escort and anti-submarine operations, combined with a fleet of approximately nine dedicated cruise missile submarines, enables the development of a complementary and highly capable submarine fleet.

When using the costs for the sixth Soryu Class submarine of approximately US$540 million ($803.5 million), a fleet of 18 such submarines could cost Australia approximately between US$10 billion ($14.8 billion) and US$15 billion ($22.3 billion), while delivering the pound-for-pound most lethal conventional submarine force in the world.

By contrast, the Saab/Kockums A-26 Oceanic ER is estimated to have a unit price worth approximately US$945 million ($1.46 billion) compared to the multibillion unit costs associated with the Attack Class submarines depending on the figures chosen, be it the $50 billion, the $80 billion or larger figures associated with turned out costs.

Finally, establishing and maintaining a dedicated fleet of hunter-killer submarines designed to a common standard as the fleet of cruise missile submarines serves to lower costs, crewing requirements and long-term sustainment and operational costs despite acquiring a larger fleet of submarines than outlined in the 2016 Defence White Paper.

Questions to be asked

As an island nation, Australia is defined by its relationship and access to the ocean, with strategic sea-lines-of-communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost effective and reliable nature of sea transport.

Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and choke points of south-east Asia annually.

While the Indian Ocean and its critical global sea-lines-of-communication are responsible for more than 80 per cent of the world's seaborne trade in critical energy supplies, namely oil and natural gas, which serve as the lifeblood of any advanced economy.

Submarines are critical to the nation's ability to protect these strategically vital waterways and key naval assets, as well as providing a viable tactical and strategic deterrent and ensure the nation's enduring national and economic security – recognising this, the previously posed questions will serve as conversation starting points.

However, given the geographic area of responsibility Australia will become increasingly responsible for and dependent on, is the RAN and the recapitalisation and conventionally-focused modernisation program for Australia's submarine fleet enough for Australia to maintain its qualitative and quantitative lead over regional peers?

Traditionally, Australia has focused on a platform-for-platform acquisition program – focused on replacing, modernising or upgrading key capabilities on a like-for-like basis without a guiding policy, doctrine or strategy, limiting the overall effectiveness, survivability and capability of the RAN.

Let us know your thoughts in the comments section below, or get in touch with Stephen.Kuper@momentummedia.com.au or editor@defenceconnect.com.au.

https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/marit ... rine-costs

Vai se o submarino convencional com o preço de um nuclear estrategico.