O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
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Re: O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
MISSILE FIRING STATION (RBS 70) -------- Posto de tiro de míssil RBS 70.
"A disciplina militar prestante não se aprende senhor, sonhando e na fantasia, mas labutando e pelejando." (CAMÕES)
Jauro.
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Re: O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
Nenhum. São lançadores (UTs), equipamentos de Ap e Mntç e um de Simulação. Se tem alguma Mun, está em outro contrato.Marechal-do-ar escreveu:Nessas faturas, qual iten se refere ao míssil em si?
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P. Sullivan (Margin Call, 2011)
P. Sullivan (Margin Call, 2011)
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Re: O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
A revista ASAS em banca na matéria sobre a defesa AAe da FAB diz-se que o projeto do Pantsyr está cancelado, mesmo que não oficialmente.
Por hora o que se busca é a melhoria dos grupos já existentes e no futuro pensar em complementar, mas sem compromisso com datas e/ou prazos.
Sistemas nacionais podem ser pensados como alternativa, mas sem indicação de qual tipo.
A ver.
Abs
Por hora o que se busca é a melhoria dos grupos já existentes e no futuro pensar em complementar, mas sem compromisso com datas e/ou prazos.
Sistemas nacionais podem ser pensados como alternativa, mas sem indicação de qual tipo.
A ver.
Abs
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Re: O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
Uma grande pena, inclusive pela versão naval: o Pantsir é um bicho tão desgranhudo que até foguetes Grad (122 mm) andou interceptando na Síria, imaginemos se fosse MAN ou Cruiser, que são bem maiores e mais lentos. Pena mesmo, até parece que MANPADS e V-SHORAD faz isso...
“Look at these people. Wandering around with absolutely no idea what's about to happen.”
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Re: O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
Russia Just Might Have the Perfect Weapon to Crush 'Swarm' Attacks
Sebastien Roblin
January 20, 2018
Early in the morning of January 6, Russian radars stationed around Latakia, Syria detected no less than thirteen kamikaze drones approaching. Ten of the explosive-laden unmanned vehicles streaked towards Hmeimim airbase, while three others swooped towards the Russian naval base at Tartus. Just a week earlier, Hmeimim had sustained a mortar attack that killed two personnel and likely damaged several aircraft.
According to Moscow, electronic-warfare assets allowed them to take control of six of the drones. The remaining seven were blasted out of the sky by Pantsir-S antiaircraft vehicles, which combine two rapid firing thirty-millimeter autocannons with a twelve surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
A poster presented at a Russian arms expo claims to detail additional activity by Russian military Pantsirs in Syria, including the destruction of a number of drones around the naval base of Tartus: a Turkish Bayraktar drone in May, three Israeli Heron drones between April and July, and on May 27 an RQ-21A Blackjack, a roughly one-hundred-pound recon drone used by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. It also lists intercepts of three unguided rockets around Hmeimim airbase—with the Russian government claiming at least two more rocket intercepts in December 2017.
A Syrian Pantsir is alleged to have shot down a Turkish RF-4 Phantom reconnaissance jet in 2012, though it is also possible that a longer-range missile system was responsible. Pantsirs have also been spotted in territory held by Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine.
The Pantsir (“Armor” or “Carapace”), which is also known by the NATO codename SA-22 Greyhound, is descended from a line of Soviet-era weapons meant to protect tank battalions from air attack, starting with deadly ZSU-23-4 “Shilka,” which was based on the chassis of a PT-76 amphibious tank. In contrast to preceding self-propelled flak guns, the Shilka introduced an onboard radar to guide the four rapid-firing twenty-three-millimeter cannons in its turret, allowing it to rip low-flying jets and helicopters to shreds with little forewarning. In one action during the Yom Kippur War, Egyptian Shilkas destroyed three low-flying Israeli Phantom jets on an air-defense suppression mission, and crippled two more.
While the Shilka remain in service across the world, the type was succeeded in the 1980s by smaller production run of more sophisticated 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19) vehicles, which swapped the quad guns for twin thirty-millimeter cannons—research had shown fewer, larger shells were more likely to down a plane than many small ones—and added on better radar and eight surface-to-air missiles, dramatically enlarging the system’s engagement range. This extra firepower was hoped to suffice for defeating NATO’s then-new armored A-10 Thunderbolt attack jets and Apache helicopter gunships.
In the 1990s, Russia began working on a Tunguska successor, swapping out the tracked, armored chassis for a truck body and increasing the missile load to twelve. While the armored Tunguska was suitable for accompanying tanks over rough terrain on the frontline, the idea was to make a cheaper but faster road-mobile system suitable for rear-area point-defense duty, including protection of long-range SAM batteries from incoming antiradar missiles and low-flying aircraft.
This Pantsir has gone through many variations since the first prototype debuted in 1995, with varying truck chassis and radar configurations. The most prevalent model in Russian service uses a Kamaz 6560 truck and has a crew of three. A Pantsir can operate independently, or an entire battery can be slaved to control of a command post or a more powerful radar unit, from which the vehicles can receive firing orders.
The antiaircraft system can detect approaching aircraft up to around twenty-two miles away using its Passive Electronically Scanned Array search radar. This allows it to cue its shorter-range but more precise engagement radar to begin locking onto a target from fifteen miles away—a process that can be accomplished in just six seconds. Additionally, the Pantsir has an electro-optical tracking turret with multiple imaging systems including a thermal channel as a backup sensor, particularly if jamming impairs the radar’s performance.
Once a targeting solution is acquired, the Pantsir can ripple-fire up to four missiles at two or three different targets at the same time, with just 1.5 seconds between each launch. A total of twelve are slung in launch containers on either side of the turret, and they can reach targets up to twelve miles away, and between near ground-level and fifty thousand feet high. The 57E6 missiles don’t have any onboard guidance systems, but instead continually receive targeting data via radio from the launch vehicle until they detonate near the target while soaring at Mach 3, supposedly with an estimated 70 percent hit probability.
If the missiles don’t do the trick, the Pantsir can engage incoming targets with its rapid-fire thirty-millimeter cannons housed in its rotating gun turret. The 2A38M cannons can rip out up to forty rounds per second each—two or three times the rate of fire of most machine guns—and can hit aerial targets up to two miles distant.
The Pantsirs in Syria have attracted less attention than long-range weapons like the S-400, because it’s easier to avoid the smaller protected radius that the former defend. However, a Pantsir battery will typically be the lowest-tier of multi-layer integrated air-defense system, which also incorporates long-range high-altitude systems like the S-400, and medium-range SAMs such as the Buk or S-350. The short-range Pantsir serves as a final line of defense, as well as a counter to low-flying planes and helicopters, missiles, drones and even rocket artillery. This capability is crucial in the current age of guided missile proliferation: reportedly the Pantsir successfully shot down a cruise missile in a 2012 test, and hit targets traveling at nearly three times the speed of sound in a later test.
Integrated air defense networks can be taken apart from the air by a coordinated suppression campaign, and short-range air defenses in particular can be countered by coordinated use of long-range missiles and bombs. But doing so requires planning, time, and more expensive weapons and aircraft, which may not be readily available in a high-intensity conflict. In the case of missiles, short-range air defenses will also have a better shot at thinning out the incoming warheads before they strike.
The Pantsir has had only modest export success in the Middle East and Africa, perhaps due to the system’s non-negligible cost of roughly $13 to $15 million, with between thirty-five to fifty each in service or on order with Algeria, Iraq, Syria, the UAE and Jordan. Over a hundred Pantsirs reportedly serve with the Russian military, and there are supposedly plans to install a navalized version on the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov. A modernized Pantsir-S2 debuted in 2015 with a more powerful radar that can detect targets up to twenty-five miles away and improved 57E6-E missiles with a range of eighteen miles. Russia has also introduced the Pantsyr-SA, an arctic warfare variant using an all-terrain vehicle chassis, which ditches the cannons for six extra missiles that can function at negative fifty degrees Celsius. Defense officials claim that a new Pantsyr-SM model under development will be capable of engaging ballistic-missile targets traveling several kilometers a second, normally a tall order for a short-range system.
The U.S. military doesn’t have a short-range air-defense system nearly as capable as the Pantsir. This is because the American ground forces have been able to count on the Air Force to clear the skies of aerial threats, while Russia’s military expects that its ground troops could come under sustained air attack—which is why they have developed such a diverse array of air-defense systems.
However, air superiority may not be achieved immediately in the crucial early phase of a conflict. More importantly, the mass drone attack in Syria perfectly illustrates why UAVs are making ground-based air defense essential. While U.S. fighters have shot down several drones over Syria, the jet fuel and guided missiles expended in such intercepts are likely far more expensive than the targets they are swatting—and few patrolling jets would struggle to counter a massed attack. Therefore, the mass drone attack on the Russian base in Syria—the largest of its kind to occur so far—is likely a harbinger of what is to come.
Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.
Sebastien Roblin
January 20, 2018
Early in the morning of January 6, Russian radars stationed around Latakia, Syria detected no less than thirteen kamikaze drones approaching. Ten of the explosive-laden unmanned vehicles streaked towards Hmeimim airbase, while three others swooped towards the Russian naval base at Tartus. Just a week earlier, Hmeimim had sustained a mortar attack that killed two personnel and likely damaged several aircraft.
According to Moscow, electronic-warfare assets allowed them to take control of six of the drones. The remaining seven were blasted out of the sky by Pantsir-S antiaircraft vehicles, which combine two rapid firing thirty-millimeter autocannons with a twelve surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
A poster presented at a Russian arms expo claims to detail additional activity by Russian military Pantsirs in Syria, including the destruction of a number of drones around the naval base of Tartus: a Turkish Bayraktar drone in May, three Israeli Heron drones between April and July, and on May 27 an RQ-21A Blackjack, a roughly one-hundred-pound recon drone used by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. It also lists intercepts of three unguided rockets around Hmeimim airbase—with the Russian government claiming at least two more rocket intercepts in December 2017.
A Syrian Pantsir is alleged to have shot down a Turkish RF-4 Phantom reconnaissance jet in 2012, though it is also possible that a longer-range missile system was responsible. Pantsirs have also been spotted in territory held by Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine.
The Pantsir (“Armor” or “Carapace”), which is also known by the NATO codename SA-22 Greyhound, is descended from a line of Soviet-era weapons meant to protect tank battalions from air attack, starting with deadly ZSU-23-4 “Shilka,” which was based on the chassis of a PT-76 amphibious tank. In contrast to preceding self-propelled flak guns, the Shilka introduced an onboard radar to guide the four rapid-firing twenty-three-millimeter cannons in its turret, allowing it to rip low-flying jets and helicopters to shreds with little forewarning. In one action during the Yom Kippur War, Egyptian Shilkas destroyed three low-flying Israeli Phantom jets on an air-defense suppression mission, and crippled two more.
While the Shilka remain in service across the world, the type was succeeded in the 1980s by smaller production run of more sophisticated 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19) vehicles, which swapped the quad guns for twin thirty-millimeter cannons—research had shown fewer, larger shells were more likely to down a plane than many small ones—and added on better radar and eight surface-to-air missiles, dramatically enlarging the system’s engagement range. This extra firepower was hoped to suffice for defeating NATO’s then-new armored A-10 Thunderbolt attack jets and Apache helicopter gunships.
In the 1990s, Russia began working on a Tunguska successor, swapping out the tracked, armored chassis for a truck body and increasing the missile load to twelve. While the armored Tunguska was suitable for accompanying tanks over rough terrain on the frontline, the idea was to make a cheaper but faster road-mobile system suitable for rear-area point-defense duty, including protection of long-range SAM batteries from incoming antiradar missiles and low-flying aircraft.
This Pantsir has gone through many variations since the first prototype debuted in 1995, with varying truck chassis and radar configurations. The most prevalent model in Russian service uses a Kamaz 6560 truck and has a crew of three. A Pantsir can operate independently, or an entire battery can be slaved to control of a command post or a more powerful radar unit, from which the vehicles can receive firing orders.
The antiaircraft system can detect approaching aircraft up to around twenty-two miles away using its Passive Electronically Scanned Array search radar. This allows it to cue its shorter-range but more precise engagement radar to begin locking onto a target from fifteen miles away—a process that can be accomplished in just six seconds. Additionally, the Pantsir has an electro-optical tracking turret with multiple imaging systems including a thermal channel as a backup sensor, particularly if jamming impairs the radar’s performance.
Once a targeting solution is acquired, the Pantsir can ripple-fire up to four missiles at two or three different targets at the same time, with just 1.5 seconds between each launch. A total of twelve are slung in launch containers on either side of the turret, and they can reach targets up to twelve miles away, and between near ground-level and fifty thousand feet high. The 57E6 missiles don’t have any onboard guidance systems, but instead continually receive targeting data via radio from the launch vehicle until they detonate near the target while soaring at Mach 3, supposedly with an estimated 70 percent hit probability.
If the missiles don’t do the trick, the Pantsir can engage incoming targets with its rapid-fire thirty-millimeter cannons housed in its rotating gun turret. The 2A38M cannons can rip out up to forty rounds per second each—two or three times the rate of fire of most machine guns—and can hit aerial targets up to two miles distant.
The Pantsirs in Syria have attracted less attention than long-range weapons like the S-400, because it’s easier to avoid the smaller protected radius that the former defend. However, a Pantsir battery will typically be the lowest-tier of multi-layer integrated air-defense system, which also incorporates long-range high-altitude systems like the S-400, and medium-range SAMs such as the Buk or S-350. The short-range Pantsir serves as a final line of defense, as well as a counter to low-flying planes and helicopters, missiles, drones and even rocket artillery. This capability is crucial in the current age of guided missile proliferation: reportedly the Pantsir successfully shot down a cruise missile in a 2012 test, and hit targets traveling at nearly three times the speed of sound in a later test.
Integrated air defense networks can be taken apart from the air by a coordinated suppression campaign, and short-range air defenses in particular can be countered by coordinated use of long-range missiles and bombs. But doing so requires planning, time, and more expensive weapons and aircraft, which may not be readily available in a high-intensity conflict. In the case of missiles, short-range air defenses will also have a better shot at thinning out the incoming warheads before they strike.
The Pantsir has had only modest export success in the Middle East and Africa, perhaps due to the system’s non-negligible cost of roughly $13 to $15 million, with between thirty-five to fifty each in service or on order with Algeria, Iraq, Syria, the UAE and Jordan. Over a hundred Pantsirs reportedly serve with the Russian military, and there are supposedly plans to install a navalized version on the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov. A modernized Pantsir-S2 debuted in 2015 with a more powerful radar that can detect targets up to twenty-five miles away and improved 57E6-E missiles with a range of eighteen miles. Russia has also introduced the Pantsyr-SA, an arctic warfare variant using an all-terrain vehicle chassis, which ditches the cannons for six extra missiles that can function at negative fifty degrees Celsius. Defense officials claim that a new Pantsyr-SM model under development will be capable of engaging ballistic-missile targets traveling several kilometers a second, normally a tall order for a short-range system.
The U.S. military doesn’t have a short-range air-defense system nearly as capable as the Pantsir. This is because the American ground forces have been able to count on the Air Force to clear the skies of aerial threats, while Russia’s military expects that its ground troops could come under sustained air attack—which is why they have developed such a diverse array of air-defense systems.
However, air superiority may not be achieved immediately in the crucial early phase of a conflict. More importantly, the mass drone attack in Syria perfectly illustrates why UAVs are making ground-based air defense essential. While U.S. fighters have shot down several drones over Syria, the jet fuel and guided missiles expended in such intercepts are likely far more expensive than the targets they are swatting—and few patrolling jets would struggle to counter a massed attack. Therefore, the mass drone attack on the Russian base in Syria—the largest of its kind to occur so far—is likely a harbinger of what is to come.
Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.
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Re: O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
Que se há de fazer...Túlio escreveu:Uma grande pena, inclusive pela versão naval: o Pantsir é um bicho tão desgranhudo que até foguetes Grad (122 mm) andou interceptando na Síria, imaginemos se fosse MAN ou Cruiser, que são bem maiores e mais lentos. Pena mesmo, até parece que MANPADS e V-SHORAD faz isso...
Enquanto não houver mudanças radicais no processo de organização e sistemática da AAe no Brasil, vamos continuar nesse eterno impasse com cada força olhando para o seu próprio umbigo e dando um f...-se nas demais. Pior, querendo referenciar nossa defesa AAe a partir de ameaças regionais.
E ainda falam em desenvolvimento nacional...
ps: dizem que a necessidade faz o homem, e a oportunidade o ladrão. quem sabe, uma destas premissas nos faz acordar para a realidade do mundo lá fora.
abs.
Editado pela última vez por FCarvalho em Qui Jan 25, 2018 8:51 pm, em um total de 1 vez.
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Re: O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
Não existem propostas, projetos ou alternativas nacionais para sistemas AAe. Nenhuma das 3 forças dispõe disso sequer no papel, e menos ainda no campo das ideias.
E a falta de proposição é tanta que sequer a AAe faz parte dos planos atuais de atualização/modernização.
O que esperar de um país que ignora ou menospreza a sua defesa AAe em um mundo onde o poder aéreo é cada vez mais expressivo do poder de uma nação sobre as demais?
abs.
E a falta de proposição é tanta que sequer a AAe faz parte dos planos atuais de atualização/modernização.
O que esperar de um país que ignora ou menospreza a sua defesa AAe em um mundo onde o poder aéreo é cada vez mais expressivo do poder de uma nação sobre as demais?
abs.
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Re: O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
Teste do Umkhonto versão terrestre no final de 2016:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rpBgBvDeaNM
Com a Avibrás herdando da Mectron o projeto do A-Darter, não entendo porque ainda não surgiu algum interesse brasileiro no Umkhonto, que compartilha muita coisa com o A-Darter. Veja que a versão terrestre é bem compacta e seria muito facilmente instalada em um caminhão 6x6 do Astros 2020. Poderia inclusive equipar as nossas futuras corvetas/fragatas (por exemplo, a MEKO A200 é equipada com o Umkhonto). O estranho é existir uma parceria da Avibrás com a MBDA com o míssil CAMM, que um míssil britânico e muito caro (por ter dual-datalink etc), e engraçado que aqui no Brasil sempre se questiona os custos, mas não nessas horas.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rpBgBvDeaNM
Com a Avibrás herdando da Mectron o projeto do A-Darter, não entendo porque ainda não surgiu algum interesse brasileiro no Umkhonto, que compartilha muita coisa com o A-Darter. Veja que a versão terrestre é bem compacta e seria muito facilmente instalada em um caminhão 6x6 do Astros 2020. Poderia inclusive equipar as nossas futuras corvetas/fragatas (por exemplo, a MEKO A200 é equipada com o Umkhonto). O estranho é existir uma parceria da Avibrás com a MBDA com o míssil CAMM, que um míssil britânico e muito caro (por ter dual-datalink etc), e engraçado que aqui no Brasil sempre se questiona os custos, mas não nessas horas.
"Eu detestaria estar no lugar de quem me venceu."
Darcy Ribeiro (1922 - 1997)
Darcy Ribeiro (1922 - 1997)
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Re: O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
Pois é. Todo mundo reclama aqui de custos, da falta de grana para investimentos, de produtos de ponta caros, e no entanto, não soubemos, ou não quisemos, aproveitar as sinergias entre as industrias dos dois países.
Sei lá, parece até um tipo de paranóia com tudo que não seja fabricado na Europa ou USA.
Vai entender.
abs.
Sei lá, parece até um tipo de paranóia com tudo que não seja fabricado na Europa ou USA.
Vai entender.
abs.
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Re: O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
Tem alguma referência concreta ao custo do CAMM? Porque sempre li que ele é um míssil de baixo custo (e dual-datalink é só um walktalk metido a besta, não é isso que encarece o míssil), mas nunca vi quanto, de fato, é esse baixo custo.Bolovo escreveu:O estranho é existir uma parceria da Avibrás com a MBDA com o míssil CAMM, que um míssil britânico e muito caro (por ter dual-datalink etc), e engraçado que aqui no Brasil sempre se questiona os custos, mas não nessas horas.
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Re: O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
Bolovo, quem foi que herdou os Piranha A/B e o MAR-1? São da Elbit agora?Bolovo escreveu:Teste do Umkhonto versão terrestre no final de 2016:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rpBgBvDeaNM
Com a Avibrás herdando da Mectron o projeto do A-Darter, não entendo porque ainda não surgiu algum interesse brasileiro no Umkhonto, que compartilha muita coisa com o A-Darter. Veja que a versão terrestre é bem compacta e seria muito facilmente instalada em um caminhão 6x6 do Astros 2020. Poderia inclusive equipar as nossas futuras corvetas/fragatas (por exemplo, a MEKO A200 é equipada com o Umkhonto). O estranho é existir uma parceria da Avibrás com a MBDA com o míssil CAMM, que um míssil britânico e muito caro (por ter dual-datalink etc), e engraçado que aqui no Brasil sempre se questiona os custos, mas não nessas horas.
I know the weakness, I know the pain. I know the fear you do not name. And the one who comes to find me when my time is through. I know you, yeah I know you.
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Re: O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
O 12o GAAAe entrou em operação em Manaus semana passada com seus Igla.
Já me sinto muito mais protegido agora.
abs.
Já me sinto muito mais protegido agora.
abs.
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Re: O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
o EB finalmente aprendeu a usar os treinadores do Igla pra atingir os drones de treinamento? ou ainda continuam reclamando da baixa taxa de acertos?FCarvalho escreveu:O 12o GAAAe entrou em operação em Manaus semana passada com seus Igla.
Já me sinto muito mais protegido agora.
abs.
I know the weakness, I know the pain. I know the fear you do not name. And the one who comes to find me when my time is through. I know you, yeah I know you.
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Re: O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
Acredito eu que a SIATT Engenharia, uma nova empresa criada por ex-funcionários da Mectron.Viktor Reznov escreveu:Bolovo, quem foi que herdou os Piranha A/B e o MAR-1? São da Elbit agora?Bolovo escreveu:Teste do Umkhonto versão terrestre no final de 2016:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rpBgBvDeaNM
Com a Avibrás herdando da Mectron o projeto do A-Darter, não entendo porque ainda não surgiu algum interesse brasileiro no Umkhonto, que compartilha muita coisa com o A-Darter. Veja que a versão terrestre é bem compacta e seria muito facilmente instalada em um caminhão 6x6 do Astros 2020. Poderia inclusive equipar as nossas futuras corvetas/fragatas (por exemplo, a MEKO A200 é equipada com o Umkhonto). O estranho é existir uma parceria da Avibrás com a MBDA com o míssil CAMM, que um míssil britânico e muito caro (por ter dual-datalink etc), e engraçado que aqui no Brasil sempre se questiona os custos, mas não nessas horas.
http://www.siatt.com.br
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Darcy Ribeiro (1922 - 1997)
Darcy Ribeiro (1922 - 1997)
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Re: O futuro da AAAe no Brasil
Toda vez que eu venho aqui nesse tópico e olho esse vídeo fico cada vez mais puto da vida.
Porra, que mal tinha em comprar uns desses aí para colocar nos míseros 5 GAAAe que nós temos e ir formando doutrina com algo de verdade em termos de mísseis? Por acaso comprar uma única e simples bateira para cada grupo seria algo tão caro ou complicado assim que levasse o EB à falência ou é só parte do nossa nossa mais que escrota e retardada doutrina AAe que não deixa o EB atirar em nada acima de 3 mil metros de altura sem pedir penico para a FAB?
O Unkhonto não é um míssil, é uma família de mísseis. O que tínhamos a perder comprando a versão terrestre dele? Nada, pois nem isso temos aqui. Opera com qualquer radar que se quiser ligar a ele, e isso nós já temos aqui. Se adapta a qualquer dessas tranqueiras em matéria de caminhão que se fabrica aqui. O que mais queriam? Um convite ou levar de graça? Até a merda de um C2 para AAe já fabricamos aqui.
Até a FAB que vira e mexe vive falando em desenvolvimento nacional e que não precisa de sistemas tão complicados assim, poderia ter optado por este míssil, que para a nossa realidade tá mais do que boom, mas...
Putz, país de pobre é uma merda mesmo. Até a mentalidade é pequena e míope.
ps: vi agora no site da Denel, e o peso do sistema todo com 8 mísseis é de apenas 7,1 tons. Até um Agrale 7500 leva o bicho no lombo sem precisar de muito coisa. E por pouco mais de 100 mil reais.
abs.
Porra, que mal tinha em comprar uns desses aí para colocar nos míseros 5 GAAAe que nós temos e ir formando doutrina com algo de verdade em termos de mísseis? Por acaso comprar uma única e simples bateira para cada grupo seria algo tão caro ou complicado assim que levasse o EB à falência ou é só parte do nossa nossa mais que escrota e retardada doutrina AAe que não deixa o EB atirar em nada acima de 3 mil metros de altura sem pedir penico para a FAB?
O Unkhonto não é um míssil, é uma família de mísseis. O que tínhamos a perder comprando a versão terrestre dele? Nada, pois nem isso temos aqui. Opera com qualquer radar que se quiser ligar a ele, e isso nós já temos aqui. Se adapta a qualquer dessas tranqueiras em matéria de caminhão que se fabrica aqui. O que mais queriam? Um convite ou levar de graça? Até a merda de um C2 para AAe já fabricamos aqui.
Até a FAB que vira e mexe vive falando em desenvolvimento nacional e que não precisa de sistemas tão complicados assim, poderia ter optado por este míssil, que para a nossa realidade tá mais do que boom, mas...
Putz, país de pobre é uma merda mesmo. Até a mentalidade é pequena e míope.
ps: vi agora no site da Denel, e o peso do sistema todo com 8 mísseis é de apenas 7,1 tons. Até um Agrale 7500 leva o bicho no lombo sem precisar de muito coisa. E por pouco mais de 100 mil reais.
abs.
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