Moderador: Conselho de Moderação
Eles retiraram alguns dos caças, mas reforçaram os helicópteros... para ataque ao solo!P44 escreveu:Não foram os russos que deram por terminadas as intervenções aéreas???? Ou as reduziram, de qq modo...
http://www.kyivpost.com/article/content ... 09001.html
portanto acho que não é por aí
![8-]](./images/smilies/icon_cool.gif "Cool"){kind=icon}
Bolovo escreveu:O único avião que foi totalmente retirado foi o Su-25. O resto continua lá, só que em menor número. E como o cabeça já disse, os helicópteros aumentaram e muito em quantidade e qualidade.
Sim. Continuam por lá 3~4 Su-30SM, 3~4 Su-35S, 4 Su-34 e algo entre 8~12 Su-24M. Foto da semana passada:joaolx escreveu:Bolovo escreveu:O único avião que foi totalmente retirado foi o Su-25. O resto continua lá, só que em menor número. E como o cabeça já disse, os helicópteros aumentaram e muito em quantidade e qualidade.
Os Flankers ainda lá estão Bolovo?
http://iswresearch.blogspot.com.br/2016 ... il-19.htmlRussian Airstrikes in Syria: April 19 - May 12, 2016
By Genevieve Casagrande
Pro-regime forces supported by Russian airpower are continuing operations to encircle and besiege the Syrian opposition in Aleppo City following the expiration of a series of temporary ceasefires on May 12. Russian air operations in Aleppo from April 19 – May 12 demonstrate Russia’s continued prioritization of support to its client regime in Damascus. Russia has nonetheless continued to present itself as a constructive international arbiter to the Syrian conflict through a series of Russian- and U.S.-brokered partial ceasefire deals from May 4 – 11. Russia maintains a robust military presence in Syria and has continued its military campaign, following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of a partial withdrawal on March 14 and subsequent reports of continued Russian drawdown. Russia has rather begun to reshape its military deployment in Syria, withdrawing certain airframes from the Bassel al Assad airbase while deploying additional rotary wing aircraft, developing new basing near Palmyra, and maintaining “several thousand” Russian ground forces in the country. “Dozens” of Russia’s fixed wing aircraft reportedly remain at its airbase in Latakia and continue air operations against both the armed opposition and ISIS across Syria.
Russian air operations seek to preserve strategic regime-held terrain and Russia’s military basing in Syria. Russian airstrikes escalated against ISIS’s positions throughout Syria to include areas in Homs, Deir ez-Zour, and Raqqa, following ISIS’s resumption of large-scale operations against pro-regime forces in central Homs on May 3. These operations have been primarily focused on seizing strategic gas fields that serve as the regime’s primary source of natural gas for areas in western Syria. ISIS seized the Sha’er Gas Field from pro-regime forces on May 5 and subsequently severed the primary regime ground line of communication (GLOC) between Homs City and Palmyra on May 10, inhibiting the ability of pro-regime forces to redeploy to critical frontlines with ISIS in the area. Russian airstrikes responded to this threat, targeting ISIS’s positions in the Sha’er Gas Field and the nearby Mahr Gas Field. ISIS’s operations also pose a threat to Russian’s own military contingent in central Homs, which includes its newest military base near Palmyra as well as its reported rotary wing deployment in the regime’s T4 and Shayrat airbases. Western journalists brought to Palmyra by Russia as well as local activists reported that Russia established a new military base in Palmyra, following the regime’s recapture of the ancient city on March 27. The base reportedly facilitates Russian demining operations and is guarded by air defense systems and armored vehicles. Russian advisors are likely deployed near active frontlines, as indicated by the death of a Russian soldier in Homs Province on May 11 in addition to ISIS’s claims to kill at least five Russian Spetnaz personnel during regime operations to seize Palmyra in late March.
Russia is using the series of strained and intermittent ceasefires in Aleppo to reset its operations against opposition forces in the area. Russian air operations have continued in Aleppo, which was once the primary focus of Russia’s air campaign, albeit at decreased and sporadic rates. The Syrian regime has in turn barraged Aleppo with intense airstrikes beginning on April 22, making Russian airstrikes in the area difficult to discern. Regime and Russian strikes in Aleppo from April 22 – 30 killed and injured over 145, including a strike on a Doctors Without Borders hospital that killed over 60. ISW was not able to assess any Russian strikes with low confidence in Aleppo from April 30 – May 4, but airstrikes resumed targeting the Syrian opposition in the city on May 5. Russia has also reportedly begun to deploy additional assets to Aleppo, including ground forces to the Efrin Canton in northwestern Aleppo to support the Syrian Kurdish YPG and artillery units north of Aleppo City. The opposition meanwhile launched major operations against regime forces south of Aleppo City, securing the town of Al Eis on April 1 as well as Khan Touman on May 5 - 6. Delayed and limited Russian airpower was unable to reverse gains made during the opposition’s offensive against the town of Khan Touman south of Aleppo led by al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar al Sham. The offensive was timed alongside a Russian-organized concert in the ancient ruins of Palmyra, which required a significant number of Russian attack helicopters and armored vehicles to secure the guests in attendance. Iranian forces, without the support of major Russian airstrikes, suffered heavy losses in the Khan Touman offensive. Pro-regime forces, however, resumed operations to encircle opposition forces in Aleppo City through its northern industrial outskirts on May 12 as the as the temporary 48-hour ceasefire expired. Opposition forces reportedly prevented pro-regime advances in the area despite Russian airstrikes.
http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/buc ... pquicktakeWhat the Khan Tuman defeat means for Iran
By Paul Bucala
May 12, 2016
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has suffered its first significant setback in the Aleppo campaign. Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and allied groups in the Jaish al Fatah coalition overran Iranian positions in the town of Khan Tuman south of Aleppo city on May 6, leading to scores of casualties among IRGC troops and proxy militia forces.[1] This development could cause an intensification of Iranian military involvement to avenge the losses even as the U.S. presses Russia to resume the rapidly collapsing “cessation of hostilities.”
The Guards suffered at least 37 casualties in the fight, ranking it among the bloodiest days for Tehran in Syria’s civil war. The IRGC Karbala Division based in Mazandaran province suffered the heaviest losses with nearly 13 killed and 21 wounded.[2] A soldier from Tehran’s provincial IRGC unit, an IRGC Quds Force commander, and a retired IRGC brigadier general were also among the dead.[3] Fighters from the Afghan Shia Fatimiyoun Brigade, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba are estimated to have suffered around 50 deaths.[4] At least five Iranians were captured by rebel forces, along with an unspecified number of fighters from Iranian proxy groups. [5]
The scale of Tehran’s losses is surprising, but the composition of those forces is not. The casualty rolls support the Critical Threats Project’s previous assessment that the IRGC is deploying elements from its conventional units to serve as an integrating force among Iran’s diverse set of proxies around Aleppo.[6] The IRGC 25th Karbala Division appears to have been serving in this role since at least the second week of April when a large rebel offensive killed soldiers from that unit south of Aleppo.[7] The other proxy forces probably served as frontline fighters integrated within the Iranian command structure, strengthening our hypothesis that the conventional IRGC troops serve as command cadre for foot soldiers drawn from among the militias on the battlefield.
Other IRGC units have suffered significant losses in Syria, although not at quite this level. The IRGC 2nd Imam Sajjad Brigade lost at least 10 soldiers within three days in February, for example.[8] The IRGC 2nd Imam Mojtaba Brigade lost at least six men during the operations that had culminated in the seizure of Khan Tuman from rebel forces in December.[9] Iranian officials could justify those losses as the price of victory on the battlefield, but the recent clashes are a very public defeat for Iran’s much-touted “Axis of Resistance” in Syria.
Iranian officials have predictably clamored to explain the defeat. IRGC Deputy Commander Hossein Salami blamed the loss on a “tactical change” by the rebels and maintained that Iranian and pro-regime forces are still “in full control of the situation.”[10] Salami’s assessment is probably correct in that opposition operations around Khan Tuman appear to be part of a significant counter-offensive, quite possibly timed to coincide with the major Russian media effort to bring reporters to its positions near Palmyra.[11] That effort required the diversion of Russian air assets, and the opposition may have planned the attack at Khan Tuman to take advantage of Russia’s distraction. Former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei claimed more hyperbolically that the defeat was the result of U.S., Turkish, and Saudi generals embedding with the rebel groups, underscoring Tehran’s perception of the rebel offensive as an intensification in the regional proxy war.[12]
The strategic logic of Iran’s Syria mission will likely drive the IRGC toward greater escalation in response to this setback. Iran has incrementally ramped up its support for the Assad regime in order to fill capability gaps in the past, and there is no indication that Tehran will dial back support now.[13] The Guard will want to avenge this defeat, moreover, and re-establish its credibility in the fight around Aleppo, which remains a strategically important prize for the Assad regime. Iranian military officials have vowed to retake Khan Tuman and Iranian news outlets have published pictures of Iranian-backed forces massing for fresh counter-attacks on the town.[14] At least one IRGC soldier has already been reported killed in fresh fighting around Khan Tuman. [15]
The impact of this defeat on the strength of the Iranian-Russian-Syrian coalition in Syria is less clear. The heavy Russian air-cover that enabled Iranian advances around Aleppo in recent months noticeably did not come to the aid of the Iranian troops at Khan Tuman, possibly because of the Palmyra photo-op, or because Moscow prefers to maintain the fiction of a reduction in fighting around Aleppo to facilitate continued negotiations with the U.S. More than one Iranian reporter has criticized the Russians for being “indifferent” about the plight of Iranians at Khan Tuman, although regime officials have taken a much more neutral tone.[16] The coming weeks will be a crucial indicator for the health of the Tehran-Moscow alliance as Iranian backed forces ramp up for a probable offensive south of Aleppo. They will also reveal how much effort Iran is willing to put into the Syrian war and how much it is prepared to lose on behalf of the Assad regime.
Vou chutar:César escreveu:Uma pergunta: Com forças terrestres Iranianas cada vez mais envolvidas na Síria, e com perdas cada vez mais pesadas, inclusive de oficiais generais (http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk ... g-in-syria), o que impede o Irã de enviar também sua força aérea para participar na campanha?
Ao que parece, essa última derrota da guarda revolucionária Iraniana se deveu à falta de apoio aéreo Russo.
Perdas pesadas? Depende que contexto se vê isto. Para o Exército Sírio 200 são baixas pesadas para o iraniano 10.000 serão pesadas. Hora mas operam na Síria a muita distância então podemos dizer que 1.000 serão pesadas pois a logística envolvida para transportar mais 1.000 serão custosas. No caso dos fatímidas nenhuma baixa é custosa pois é o exército de voluntários Hazaras que sempre podem ser repostos pois neste caso sendo de outro país quem recruta são o mulas.César escreveu:Uma pergunta: Com forças terrestres Iranianas cada vez mais envolvidas na Síria, e com perdas cada vez mais pesadas, inclusive de oficiais generais (http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk ... g-in-syria), o que impede o Irã de enviar também sua força aérea para participar na campanha?
Ao que parece, essa última derrota da guarda revolucionária Iraniana se deveu à falta de apoio aéreo Russo.
Abraços
César
A resposta esta na tua pergunta pois a força aérea iraniana tem que ser toda renovada.Clermont escreveu:Vou chutar:César escreveu:Uma pergunta: Com forças terrestres Iranianas cada vez mais envolvidas na Síria, e com perdas cada vez mais pesadas, inclusive de oficiais generais (http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk ... g-in-syria), o que impede o Irã de enviar também sua força aérea para participar na campanha?
Ao que parece, essa última derrota da guarda revolucionária Iraniana se deveu à falta de apoio aéreo Russo.
Fornecer apoio aéreo fora de casa custa muito caro só pra começar a fazer os aviões levantarem vôo numa base estrangeira. E, depois que eles estão no ar, sempre há o risco de o inimigo colocá-los no chão com algum míssil antiaéreo. E mesmo que eles voltem, eles se desgastam à cada missão, geram consumo de combustível, munições e coisas do gênero. Trocando em miúdos: é preciso ter muita bala na agulha (dinheiro) pra mandar um contigente aéreo pra fora do país em missão de guerra.
E será que o Irã, que mal saiu do bloqueio econômico ocidental, está com essa fartura toda?
Bem, há um aumento no número de perdas, inclusive de oficiais superiores. Daí a minha pergunta.EDSON escreveu:Perdas pesadas? Depende que contexto se vê isto. Para o Exército Sírio 200 são baixas pesadas para o iraniano 10.000 serão pesadas. Hora mas operam na Síria a muita distância então podemos dizer que 1.000 serão pesadas pois a logística envolvida para transportar mais 1.000 serão custosas. No caso dos fatímidas nenhuma baixa é custosa pois é o exército de voluntários Hazaras que sempre podem ser repostos pois neste caso sendo de outro país quem recruta são o mulas.César escreveu:Uma pergunta: Com forças terrestres Iranianas cada vez mais envolvidas na Síria, e com perdas cada vez mais pesadas, inclusive de oficiais generais (http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk ... g-in-syria), o que impede o Irã de enviar também sua força aérea para participar na campanha?
Ao que parece, essa última derrota da guarda revolucionária Iraniana se deveu à falta de apoio aéreo Russo.
Abraços
César
Na maioria são oficiais superiores pois eles veem para ganhar conhecimento neste tipo de conflito. Número de mortos das forças iranians é de 241 até ultima vez que vi semana passada.César escreveu:Bem, há um aumento no número de perdas, inclusive de oficiais superiores. Daí a minha pergunta.EDSON escreveu: Perdas pesadas? Depende que contexto se vê isto. Para o Exército Sírio 200 são baixas pesadas para o iraniano 10.000 serão pesadas. Hora mas operam na Síria a muita distância então podemos dizer que 1.000 serão pesadas pois a logística envolvida para transportar mais 1.000 serão custosas. No caso dos fatímidas nenhuma baixa é custosa pois é o exército de voluntários Hazaras que sempre podem ser repostos pois neste caso sendo de outro país quem recruta são o mulas.
Ingenuamente, acreditava que os custos de uma operação terrestre, via de regra, são maiores que operações aéreas. Não só pelas baixas maiores, mas também pela quantidade maior de pessoal envolvido. Talvez eu esteja errado então. Ainda assim, uma participação nula da força aérea Iraniana me é estranho.
Originalmente achei que isso acontecia para o Irã não declarar abertamente participação de forças regulares suas na Síria. Não é mais o caso.
Abraços
Custos de operação e o fato de que a maioria das aeronaves de combate são dependentes de peças praticamente impossíveis de se encontrar no mercado devido ao embargo Americano de armas.César escreveu:Uma pergunta: Com forças terrestres Iranianas cada vez mais envolvidas na Síria, e com perdas cada vez mais pesadas, inclusive de oficiais generais (http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk ... g-in-syria), o que impede o Irã de enviar também sua força aérea para participar na campanha?
Ao que parece, essa última derrota da guarda revolucionária Iraniana se deveu à falta de apoio aéreo Russo.
Abraços
César
Mas podiam enviar os Su-22, Su-24, Su-25, MiG-29 etc. Poderiam compartilhar a manutenção com os sírios e russos.Viktor Reznov escreveu:Custos de operação e o fato de que a maioria das aeronaves de combate são dependentes de peças praticamente impossíveis de se encontrar no mercado devido ao embargo Americano de armas.César escreveu:Uma pergunta: Com forças terrestres Iranianas cada vez mais envolvidas na Síria, e com perdas cada vez mais pesadas, inclusive de oficiais generais (http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk ... g-in-syria), o que impede o Irã de enviar também sua força aérea para participar na campanha?
Ao que parece, essa última derrota da guarda revolucionária Iraniana se deveu à falta de apoio aéreo Russo.
Abraços
César
