SYRIA

[romeo]

Não surgirá Síria do Norte, Sul ou qualquer fracionamento. O xeque-mate russo foi muito maior do que na área diplomática. Eles conseguiram meios político para evitar uma intervenção na Síria, se envolver ainda mais em troca da proteção de Assad.

Agora as forças do governo tem carta branca para esmagar os rebeldes e usar a força necessária, sem se preocupar com choro ocidental ou desculpas para um intervenção estrangeiras. Além disso, os russos garantem que as armas químicas não serão usadas contra civis.

Talvez... Talvez... Mas lembremos que mesmo sem interferência americana, a Arabia Saudita, o Qatar e a Turquia não vão dar esse jogo por perdido tão facilmente.

O mais provavel é que este conflito se estenda ainda por MUITO tempo ceifando vidas e alimentado pelo jogo sujo dos negros interesses do petróleo.

[cabeça de martelo]

Síria: mulheres de armas

Um batalhão só de mulheres
A Unidade de Defesa Feminina, ligada à Unidade de Defesa das Pessoas, braço armado do partido sírio Unidade Democrática, anunciou a formação do seu quarto batalhão, composto exclusivamente por mulheres.

Na luta pela democracia
Este braço armado feminino apelou às mulheres da região para que se unissem em defesa do território. Na base deste apelo está o receio do escalar da guerra na Síria. O objetivo deste batalhão é lutar por uma Síria democrática

Mulheres tomam a pulso a defesa do país
Este é o quarto batalhão feminino criado na Síria, composto essencialmente por mulheres curdas. As mulheres que agora treinam na vila de Qamishlo seguem as pisadas daquelas que ingressaram no primeiro batalhão, em março deste ano, e lutaram lado a lado com as forças da oposição em Alepo.

A guerra civil dentro da guerra civil
Além do conflito entre as forças da oposição e o regime sírio, as milícias curdas combatem também grupos da al-Qaeda que atuam no norte da Síria. Os curdos estão entre as maiores etnias sem Estado do mundo e representam atualmente 10% da população na Síria.

Lealdades divididas
O reclamado território curdo está dividido entre a Turquia, o Iraque, o Irão, Síria, Armênia e Azerbeijão. Com cerca de 500.000 km², o território curdo foi marcado pelas rebeliões em prol da criação de um Estado próprio, violentamente reprimidas pelos Governos dos vários países da região. Agora, as forças curdas da Síria juntam-se à oposição na luta contra Bashar al-Assad, e em prol da democracia na Síria

http://noticias.sapo.pt/fotos/siria-mul ... 7/#verfoto

[Marechal-do-ar]

Síria: mulheres de armas

Só eu que vejo isso como sinal de que estão acabando os soldados?

[LeandroGCard]

Síria: mulheres de armas

Só eu que vejo isso como sinal de que estão acabando os soldados?

Elas podem estar cavando a própria cova. Se os rebeldes vencerem Arábia Saudita & companhia garantirão que o governo a substituir Assad seguirá a Sharia, e estas mulheres passarão a ter tratamento semelhante às que recebem as do Golfo Pérsico ou do Afeganistão, não importando que sejam curdas ou o quê. Seria um retrocesso com relação ao status das mulheres na Síria hoje.

A esperança de mais liberdade para o povo curdo é uma motivação justa e poderosa, mas para elas especificamente o tiro provavelmente sairia pela culatra se vencessem.


Leandro G. Card

[Bourne]

Não li, mas parece bom.

The Real Reason Putin Supports Assad
Mistaking Syria for Chechnya
By Fiona Hill MARCH 25, 2013

Fonte: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ ... orts-assad

Few issues better illustrate the limits of the Obama administration’s “reset” with Russia than the crisis in Syria. For more than a year, the United States has tried, and failed, to work with Russia to find a solution to end the violence. Moscow has firmly opposed international intervention to remove Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from power, arguing that the conflict must be resolved through negotiations and that Assad must be included in any transitional arrangement leading to a new government. Although the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, reached out recently to the leaders of the Syrian opposition, these talks produced no indication that the Kremlin is seriously recalibrating its positions on Syria. And that’s hardly surprising: the main obstacle to any shift in Russia’s calculations is President Vladimir Putin himself, whose aversion to forcible regime change is intense and unwavering.

Why has Putin offered such steadfast support to Assad? On the surface, Moscow seems to profit from exporting arms to Syria, and it depends on the regime’s good will to maintain Russian access to a naval facility at the Mediterranean port of Tartus. But these are marginal and symbolic interests. Putin is really motivated to support the Assad regime by his fear of state collapse -- a fear he confronted most directly during the secession of Russia’s North Caucasus republic of Chechnya, which he brutally suppressed in a bloody civil war and counterinsurgency operation fought between 1999 and 2009. (In Russia, the republics are semi-autonomous federal units comprising the historic territories of the country’s non-ethnic Russian groups.) In a series of interviews he gave in 2000 for an authorized biography, Putin declared that “the essence of the ... situation in the North Caucasus and in Chechnya ... is the continuation of the collapse of the USSR.... If we did not quickly do something to stop it, Russia as a state in its current form would cease to exist.... I was convinced that if we did not immediately stop the extremists [in Chechnya], then in no time at all we would be facing a second Yugoslavia across the entire territory of the Russian Federation -- the Yugoslavization of Russia.” And we know how Putin feels about the demise of the Soviet Union; in 2005 he called it “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [twentieth] century,” a comment that was meant to bemoan the collapse of the Soviet state rather than the demise of communism.

For Putin, Syria is all too reminiscent of Chechnya. Both conflicts pitted the state against disparate and leaderless opposition forces, which over time came to include extremist Sunni Islamist groups. In Putin’s view -- one that he stresses repeatedly in meetings with his U.S. and European counterparts -- Syria is the latest battleground in a global, multi-decade struggle between secular states and Sunni Islamism, which first began in Afghanistan with the Taliban, then moved to Chechnya, and has torn a number of Arab countries apart. Ever since he took office (first as prime minister in 1999 and then as president in 2000) and was confronted by the Chechen war, Putin has expressed his fear of Sunni Islamist extremism and of the risks that “jihadist” groups pose to Russia, with its large, indigenous, Sunni Muslim population, concentrated in the North Caucasus, the Volga region, and in major cities such as Moscow. A desire to contain extremism is a major reason why Putin offered help to the United States in battling the Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11. It is also why Russia maintains close relations with Shia Iran, which acts as a counterweight to Sunni powers.

In the case of Chechnya, Putin made it clear that retaking the republic from its “extremist opposition forces” was worth every sacrifice. In a speech in September 1999, he promised to pursue Chechen rebels and terrorists even into “the outhouse.” He did just that, and some opposition leaders were killed by missile attacks at their most vulnerable moments. The Chechen capital city of Grozny was reduced to rubble. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed, along with jihadist fighters who came into Chechnya with the encouragement of extremist groups from the Arab world, including from Syria. Moscow and other Russian cities endured devastating terrorist attacks. Putin’s treatment of Chechnya became a cautionary tale of what would happen to rebels and terrorists -- and indeed to entire groups of people -- if they threatened the Russian state. They would either be eliminated or brought to their knees -- exactly the fate Putin wishes for today’s Syrian rebels.

After two decades of secessionist strife, Putin has contained Chechnya’s uprising. Ramzan Kadyrov, a former rebel who switched his allegiance to Moscow, now leads the republic. Putin granted Kadyrov and his supporters amnesty and gave them a mandate to go after other militants and political opponents. Kadyrov has rebuilt Grozny (with ample funds from Moscow) and created his own version of an Islamist and Chechen republic that is condemned by human rights organizations for its brutal suppression of dissent.

For the past two years, Putin has hoped that Assad would be able to do what he did in Chechnya and beat back the opposition. Based on the brutal record of Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, in suppressing uprisings, Putin anticipated that the regime would have no problem keeping the state together. But now Assad seems to have failed, and Putin is not one to back a losing horse. He and the rest of the Russian leadership are well aware that their staunch support for Assad has damaged Russia’s standing in the Arab world, but they have no alternative plan to get out of the stalemate. Putin is still not ready to sanction an intervention that could lead to the dismantling of the Syrian state and to risk creating a situation akin to that in Afghanistan in the 1990s, when warring groups of extremists fought each other and created a breeding ground for global jihadism. In Putin’s view, lawless post-Qaddafi Libya, which has become an exporter of guns, fighters, and refugees to its neighbors, only further underscores the dangers of international intervention.

Before abandoning Assad, Putin will need to have answers to some pressing questions: Who will be responsible for the fallout from the regime’s collapse? Who will keep Sunni extremists in check? Who will keep extremists away from the North Caucasus and other Russian regions with large Sunni Muslim populations? And finally, who will ensure the security of Syria’s chemical weapons? Putin certainly does not trust the United States to play this stabilizing role: as he sees it, when the United States pulled out of Iraq, it left behind a Shia strongman, Nouri al-Maliki, to suppress the Sunnis; the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is leaving only uncertainty in its wake. In short, Putin doubts that the United States and the international community can deliver stability to Syria, so he continues to stand by the flailing regime as the only means of avoiding the collapse of the state altogether.

Although Putin looks at Syria and sees Chechnya, the situations are quite different. All of Syria is in the throes of civil war, and Assad does not have the same resources that Putin had in dealing with Chechnya. He cannot eliminate key representatives and supporters of the opposition abroad as Putin did with the Chechens, including by assassinating the former acting Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in Qatar in 2004 to stop his fundraising and recruiting activities. Unable to crush or co-opt the opposition, Assad has taken Syria over the precipice. Syria is also bristling with conventional weaponry along with an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction that pose a significant threat to neighboring states. Those neighbors -- Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Israel, and Iran farther afield -- have been engulfed in the conflict. In contrast, in spite of the flows of money and men into Chechnya and the spillover of refugees and terrorist acts into the rest of Russia (and sometimes into Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey), there was no similar proliferation threat in the Chechen war, and no outside powers ever became heavily involved. Chechnya is in a bad neighborhood, but Syria is in a terrible neighborhood, and the effects of the Syrian conflict cannot be contained in the way that Chechnya’s were.

Neither these differences nor the scale of the humanitarian tragedy will convince Putin to change his mind on Syria. The Russian president will continue to hold out against intervention and insist that negotiations with Assad must be part of the way forward, until some strongman can be found to restore a semblance of order to Syria’s chaos. If, by some miracle, Syria does not turn into a full-scale regional disaster, Putin will pat himself on the back and say it was thanks to him because he prevented an intervention. If the more likely scenario plays out, Putin will blame Washington. He will hold the United States responsible for destroying Syria and empowering Sunni Islamist extremists by championing democracy and the Arab revolutions. Meanwhile, Putin’s obstinacy is already turning his worst nightmare -- the fracturing of a geopolitically important state -- into a reality.

[FoxTroop]

Não li, mas parece bom.

The Real Reason Putin Supports Assad
Mistaking Syria for Chechnya
By Fiona Hill MARCH 25, 2013

Fonte: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ ... orts-assad

Few issues better illustrate the limits of the Obama administration’s “reset” with Russia than the crisis in Syria. For more than a year, the United States has tried, and failed, to work with Russia to find a solution to end the violence. Moscow has firmly opposed international intervention to remove Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from power, arguing that the conflict must be resolved through negotiations and that Assad must be included in any transitional arrangement leading to a new government. Although the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, reached out recently to the leaders of the Syrian opposition, these talks produced no indication that the Kremlin is seriously recalibrating its positions on Syria. And that’s hardly surprising: the main obstacle to any shift in Russia’s calculations is President Vladimir Putin himself, whose aversion to forcible regime change is intense and unwavering.

Why has Putin offered such steadfast support to Assad? On the surface, Moscow seems to profit from exporting arms to Syria, and it depends on the regime’s good will to maintain Russian access to a naval facility at the Mediterranean port of Tartus. But these are marginal and symbolic interests. Putin is really motivated to support the Assad regime by his fear of state collapse -- a fear he confronted most directly during the secession of Russia’s North Caucasus republic of Chechnya, which he brutally suppressed in a bloody civil war and counterinsurgency operation fought between 1999 and 2009. (In Russia, the republics are semi-autonomous federal units comprising the historic territories of the country’s non-ethnic Russian groups.) In a series of interviews he gave in 2000 for an authorized biography, Putin declared that “the essence of the ... situation in the North Caucasus and in Chechnya ... is the continuation of the collapse of the USSR.... If we did not quickly do something to stop it, Russia as a state in its current form would cease to exist.... I was convinced that if we did not immediately stop the extremists [in Chechnya], then in no time at all we would be facing a second Yugoslavia across the entire territory of the Russian Federation -- the Yugoslavization of Russia.” And we know how Putin feels about the demise of the Soviet Union; in 2005 he called it “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [twentieth] century,” a comment that was meant to bemoan the collapse of the Soviet state rather than the demise of communism.

For Putin, Syria is all too reminiscent of Chechnya. Both conflicts pitted the state against disparate and leaderless opposition forces, which over time came to include extremist Sunni Islamist groups. In Putin’s view -- one that he stresses repeatedly in meetings with his U.S. and European counterparts -- Syria is the latest battleground in a global, multi-decade struggle between secular states and Sunni Islamism, which first began in Afghanistan with the Taliban, then moved to Chechnya, and has torn a number of Arab countries apart. Ever since he took office (first as prime minister in 1999 and then as president in 2000) and was confronted by the Chechen war, Putin has expressed his fear of Sunni Islamist extremism and of the risks that “jihadist” groups pose to Russia, with its large, indigenous, Sunni Muslim population, concentrated in the North Caucasus, the Volga region, and in major cities such as Moscow. A desire to contain extremism is a major reason why Putin offered help to the United States in battling the Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11. It is also why Russia maintains close relations with Shia Iran, which acts as a counterweight to Sunni powers.

In the case of Chechnya, Putin made it clear that retaking the republic from its “extremist opposition forces” was worth every sacrifice. In a speech in September 1999, he promised to pursue Chechen rebels and terrorists even into “the outhouse.” He did just that, and some opposition leaders were killed by missile attacks at their most vulnerable moments. The Chechen capital city of Grozny was reduced to rubble. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed, along with jihadist fighters who came into Chechnya with the encouragement of extremist groups from the Arab world, including from Syria. Moscow and other Russian cities endured devastating terrorist attacks. Putin’s treatment of Chechnya became a cautionary tale of what would happen to rebels and terrorists -- and indeed to entire groups of people -- if they threatened the Russian state. They would either be eliminated or brought to their knees -- exactly the fate Putin wishes for today’s Syrian rebels.

After two decades of secessionist strife, Putin has contained Chechnya’s uprising. Ramzan Kadyrov, a former rebel who switched his allegiance to Moscow, now leads the republic. Putin granted Kadyrov and his supporters amnesty and gave them a mandate to go after other militants and political opponents. Kadyrov has rebuilt Grozny (with ample funds from Moscow) and created his own version of an Islamist and Chechen republic that is condemned by human rights organizations for its brutal suppression of dissent.

For the past two years, Putin has hoped that Assad would be able to do what he did in Chechnya and beat back the opposition. Based on the brutal record of Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, in suppressing uprisings, Putin anticipated that the regime would have no problem keeping the state together. But now Assad seems to have failed, and Putin is not one to back a losing horse. He and the rest of the Russian leadership are well aware that their staunch support for Assad has damaged Russia’s standing in the Arab world, but they have no alternative plan to get out of the stalemate. Putin is still not ready to sanction an intervention that could lead to the dismantling of the Syrian state and to risk creating a situation akin to that in Afghanistan in the 1990s, when warring groups of extremists fought each other and created a breeding ground for global jihadism. In Putin’s view, lawless post-Qaddafi Libya, which has become an exporter of guns, fighters, and refugees to its neighbors, only further underscores the dangers of international intervention.

Before abandoning Assad, Putin will need to have answers to some pressing questions: Who will be responsible for the fallout from the regime’s collapse? Who will keep Sunni extremists in check? Who will keep extremists away from the North Caucasus and other Russian regions with large Sunni Muslim populations? And finally, who will ensure the security of Syria’s chemical weapons? Putin certainly does not trust the United States to play this stabilizing role: as he sees it, when the United States pulled out of Iraq, it left behind a Shia strongman, Nouri al-Maliki, to suppress the Sunnis; the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is leaving only uncertainty in its wake. In short, Putin doubts that the United States and the international community can deliver stability to Syria, so he continues to stand by the flailing regime as the only means of avoiding the collapse of the state altogether.

Although Putin looks at Syria and sees Chechnya, the situations are quite different. All of Syria is in the throes of civil war, and Assad does not have the same resources that Putin had in dealing with Chechnya. He cannot eliminate key representatives and supporters of the opposition abroad as Putin did with the Chechens, including by assassinating the former acting Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in Qatar in 2004 to stop his fundraising and recruiting activities. Unable to crush or co-opt the opposition, Assad has taken Syria over the precipice. Syria is also bristling with conventional weaponry along with an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction that pose a significant threat to neighboring states. Those neighbors -- Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Israel, and Iran farther afield -- have been engulfed in the conflict. In contrast, in spite of the flows of money and men into Chechnya and the spillover of refugees and terrorist acts into the rest of Russia (and sometimes into Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey), there was no similar proliferation threat in the Chechen war, and no outside powers ever became heavily involved. Chechnya is in a bad neighborhood, but Syria is in a terrible neighborhood, and the effects of the Syrian conflict cannot be contained in the way that Chechnya’s were.

Neither these differences nor the scale of the humanitarian tragedy will convince Putin to change his mind on Syria. The Russian president will continue to hold out against intervention and insist that negotiations with Assad must be part of the way forward, until some strongman can be found to restore a semblance of order to Syria’s chaos. If, by some miracle, Syria does not turn into a full-scale regional disaster, Putin will pat himself on the back and say it was thanks to him because he prevented an intervention. If the more likely scenario plays out, Putin will blame Washington. He will hold the United States responsible for destroying Syria and empowering Sunni Islamist extremists by championing democracy and the Arab revolutions. Meanwhile, Putin’s obstinacy is already turning his worst nightmare -- the fracturing of a geopolitically important state -- into a reality.

Realmente, esse texto......

[LeandroGCard]

Primeiro, o texto simplifica demasiadamente o assunto. Existem muitos outros motivos para a Rússia bancar o Assad além da Chechênia, embora ela seja também um motivo.

Segundo, ele não esconde uma visão totalmente parcial da situação. Acusa Putin de fechar os olhos à questão humanitária ao exigir que Assad seja parte da solução do problema sírio, mas esquece que os países ocidentais também fecham os olhos à mesmíssima questão humanitária quando exigem a saída antecipada dele como pré-requisito para qualquer negociação, esquecendo que muitos dos rebeldes que eles apoiam e sustentam são até piores do que Assad.


Leandro G. Card

[Bourne]

É claro que tem visão parcial. O texto defende um ponto de vista e abordagem. Ser imparcial não existe. ainda mais em uma coluna que nem texto jornalistico é.

[romeo]

Os russos aumentam sua presença naval no Mediterraneo...

http://rt.com/news/navy-warship-syria-m ... anean-800/

[romeo]

Sobre o massacre por armas químicas.

http://www.voltairenet.org/article180133.html

http://www.voltairenet.org/article180000.html

http://www.voltairenet.org/article180135.html

[felipexion]

Através da fronteira proibida, médicos de Israel tendem a ajudar feridos da Síria



A garota de 3 anos chamava "mamãe, mamãe" sem parar enquanto um estranho a balançava no colo e tentava reconfortá-la. Ela foi trazida da Síria para o hospital público nessa cidade ao norte de Israel cinco dias atrás, com o rosto queimado pelo que os médicos disseram ter sido, provavelmente, uma bomba ou um explosivo caseiro.

Na cama ao lado, uma garota de 12 anos, estava em sono profundo. Ela havia chegado à UTI infantil com uma ferida grave no estômago que já havia sido operada na Síria, e com um buraco nas costas.

Outra garota, de 13 anos, está aqui há mais de um mês se recuperando de ferimentos que precisaram de cirurgias complexas no rosto, braço e perna. Ela e o irmão, de 9 anos, haviam ido ao supermercado da vila quando uma bomba explodiu. Seu irmão morreu no ataque.

Conforme a briga entre forças do governo sírio e rebeldes cresce violentamente nos últimos meses em áreas perto das Colinas de Golã, parte de Israel, um grande número de acidentados sírios são discretamente transportados pela fronteira hostil atrás de tratamentos que podem salvar vidas em Israel, um país inimigo.

A maior parte é de homens entre 20 e 30 anos, a maioria deles com ferimentos de bala, que, provavelmente, estavam envolvidos na guerra. Porém, nas últimas semanas há mais civis com ferimentos de explosão, entre eles mulheres e crianças que chegaram sozinhas e traumatizadas.

Israel tem declarado repetidas vezes uma política de não intervenção na guerra civil da Síria, a não ser pela prontidão em atacar estoques de armas avançadas que considere uma ameaça à segurança. Autoridades também deixaram claro que Israel não abriria sua fronteira cada vez mais fortificada para um influxo de refugiados, assim como a Turquia ou a Jordânia fizeram, dado que Israel e Síria continuam oficialmente em estado de guerra.

Entretanto, as autoridades israelenses sancionaram essa pequena e discreta resposta à tragédia que toma conta da Síria, equilibrando décadas de hostilidade com as demandas de proximidade e vizinhança.

— A maioria chega aqui inconsciente com ferimentos na cabeça — disse Dr. Masad Barhoum, diretor geral do Hospital Western Calilee, em Nahariya, na costa mediterrânea, 9,7 km ao sul da fronteira libanesa. — Eles acordam depois de alguns dias, ou seja lá quando for, e ouvem uma língua estranha e veem pessoas estranhas — disse ele. — Se eles conseguem falar, a primeira pergunta é: 'Onde estou?'.

Ele completou:

— Estou certo de que haja um choque inicial quando ouvem que estão em Israel.

A identidade dos pacientes é preservada para que eles não estejam em perigo ao retornar para a Síria. Soldados sentam do lado de fora da enfermaria onde ficam os adultos, para protegê-los de possíveis ameaças e de jornalistas intrometidos. Todavia, os médicos liberaram o acesso às crianças na área isolada da UTI, com a condição de que nenhum detalhe que pudesse comprometer a segurança delas fosse publicado.

Assim como muitos hospitais israelenses, esse atende a uma população mista de judeus e árabes; e a equipe conta com médicos, enfermeiras e assistentes sociais que falam árabe. No lobby, uma vitrine de vidro exibe os restos de um foguete Katyusha que foi disparado do Líbano e atingiu o departamento oftalmológico do hospital durante a guerra de 2006 entre Israel e Hezbollah. O foguete penetrou quatro andares, mas ninguém se feriu porque toda a ala norte foi movida para o subsolo.

Com uma estimativa de mais de 100 mil pessoas mortas na guerra civil da Síria, Barhoum, um cidadão árabe cristão de Israel, reconheceu que a assistência médica israelense foi "uma gota no oceano".

No entanto, ele disse que tinha orgulho do nível de tratamento que suas equipes puderam prover e que estava orgulhoso de ser um cidadão em um país que permitia que ele tratasse qualquer pessoa igualmente. Ele disse que o custo do tratamento até agora já soma centenas de milhares de dólares e será pago pelo governo de Israel.

Desde março passado, quase 100 sírios chegaram a dois hospitais na Galileia. Quarenta e um sírios severamente machucados foram tratados aqui no Hospital Western Galilee, que tem uma nova unidade neurocirúrgica, assim como instalações pediátricas de tratamento intensivo. Dois deles morreram, 28 se recuperaram e foram transferidos de volta para a Síria, e 11 permanecem aqui.

Outros 52 sírios foram levados ao Hospital Rebecca Sieff, na cidade Galileia de Safed. O último, um homem de 21 anos baleado e com ferimentos de estilhaços, chegou no sábado. Uma mulher, de 50 anos, chegou na sexta com um pedaço de estilhaço no coração e foi mandada ao hospital Rambam, ao norte, na cidade portuária de Haifa, para realizar uma cirurgia.

Pouco é revelado sobre como eles chegaram aqui, exceto que o exército israelense cuida da parte técnica da operação. Os médicos dizem que tudo o que sabem é que os pacientes sírios chegam em ambulâncias militares e que o hospital avisa o exército para vir buscá-los quando estão prontos para voltar para a Síria.

O exército israelense, que também opera em um hospital de campo e conta com equipes móveis de médicos ao longo da fronteira com a Síria, tem sido relutante em anunciar essas instalações, em parte, pelo medo de receber uma inundação de sírios feridos maior do que eles podem atender.

O tenente coronel Peter Lerner, porta-voz do exército, disse que "vários sírios vieram até a cerca ao longo da fronteira das Colinas de Golã com diversos tipos de ferimento."

Ele diz que o exército "em uma base puramente humanitária, facilitou assistência médica imediata em solo, e, em alguns casos, evacuou pessoas para tratamento adicional em hospitais israelenses."

Agora, esforços estão em curso para trazer parentes para ajudar a acalmar as crianças desacompanhadas.

Quando a garota de 13 anos chegou, ela estava em um estado de terror e de alta ansiedade, de acordo com o Dr. Zeev Zonis, chefe da UTI pediátrica daqui.

"Grande parte do nosso tratamento era tentar abraçá-la num tipo de abraço virtual", ele disse. Dias depois, a tia da garota chegou da Síria. Ela começou a cuidar das crianças sírias daqui, morando e dormindo com elas na UTI. A equipe de funcionários e voluntários doou roupas e presentes.

A tia, com o rosto enquadrado por um hijab apertado, disse que uma bomba explodiu no supermercado da vila de repente, depois de uma semana de tranquilidade. Poucos dias depois, ela disse, um homem árabe que ela não conhecia foi até a vila.

— Ele nos disse que ele estava com a garota — ela disse. — Eles me levaram e, no caminho, me disseram que ela estava em Israel. Nós chegamos até a fronteira. Eu vi os soldados. Eu fiquei com um pouco de medo.

Entretanto, ela completou dizendo que o cuidado no hospital tem sido bom e que "o medo passou totalmente". Ela estava relutante em falar sobre a guerra no país natal, dizendo apenas:

— Eu rezo pela paz e tranquilidade.

Sentada na cama com uma camiseta rosa do Ursinho Puff, a sobrinha, que estava sorrindo, disse que sentia saudades de casa. Ela e sua tia devem voltar para a Síria em breve.

Questionada sobre o que ela dirá quando voltar para casa, a tia respondeu:

— Eu não vou dizer que estive em Israel. É proibido estar aqui, e eu tenho medo das reações.

http://zerohora.clicrbs.com.br/rs/mundo ... 53677.html

[GustavoB]

Como "Israel" é bonzinho...

[romeo]

Garanto que estas crianças sírias crescerão agradecidas e contarão à sua descendência sobre a ajuda que receberam dos judeus.
Esta sim é a atitude que deve ser estimulada, pois a via da perpetuação do estado judeu em uma área tão conturbada passa por atos assim face aos povos que os cercam, não pelo contrário.

[FOXTROT]

Já não falta mais nada, agora a síria recebe ajuda sionista!

Isso é propaganda pura e simples, alias, propaganda é a especialidade sionista vide 2º WW.


Saudações

[felipexion]

Já não falta mais nada, agora a síria recebe ajuda sionista!

Isso é propaganda pura e simples, alias, propaganda é a especialidade sionista vide 2º WW.


Saudações

Propaganda? Quem é que abastece e mantem os hospitais palestinos? Você acha que é a Jordânia ou o Egito? Apenas Israel e a Crescente vermelha.