TÓPICO OFICIAL DO FX-2: GRIPEN NG

[Booz]

Infelizmente vou adentrar em mais um off topic - e inclusive já postado lá em "geopolítica". É que muito 9tudo) a ver com esses fatos relacionados à diplomacia brasileira e a o intervencionismo americano. Diga-se de passagem que isto é uma arrogância típica dos poderosos, posto que a Rússia, em seus tempos URSS, fazia pior nos países à sua órbita ou não.

Há cerca de dez anos um avião americano pousou em Manaus e um colega foi até ele checar a documentação da tripulação que tentava desembarcar.
No entanto, e para surpresa do colega, não só a tripulação retornou ao avião rapidamente e negava-se desembarcar para e mostrar a documentação e permitir checagem das bagagens, como impediu a subida a bordo do colega (PF).

O colega acionou a SR (sede) e o avião foi cercado. À torre foi solicitada informar procedência e condições do avião. Como resposta soube-se que o plano de vôo foi solicitado às pressas, como um pouso técnico de emergência, e só!
Com tais informações às mãos, um grupo armado nosso ameaçou invadir o avião sob força, caso não houvesse identificação formal. O clima ficou tenso e os relatos me eram passado on line por colega no próprio aeroporto.
Ao final o que ficou descoberto:
- Eram mariners em trajes civis
- A documentação - irregular (por isto impedia o desembarque regular, posto que só poderia ficar no salão de trânsito - e não era bem isto que desejavam.
- A bagagem trazia era formada de apetrechos pessoais, apetrechos próprios militares e armas para equipar - bem - uma CIA leve.

Os colegas fizeram contato com BSB e a FAB e a aeronave foi cercada e isolada. Depois a FAB assumiu o cerco e isolamento. Intensas tratativas diplomáticas se inciaram e a PF fez escolta da "bagagem" até uma unidade do EB.
A tripulação teve negado direito de desembarque e o avião pouco depois obteve autorização para decolar.
Quanto a bagagem não soube mais.
Este caso lembra a vocês alguma similaridade com o ocrrido recentemente na Colômbia?

Agora, veio à tona este caso, exposto pelos documento publicados na Folha, do adido militar americano flagrado por nossos militares em pleno vôo (não autorizado e classificado de ESPIONAGEM).

Tudo bem, todos os países fazem isto na medida do seu poder e interesse estratégico. Mas, chega de sermos tratados como quintal desses caras e de quisquer outros.
E ainda há imbecis que questionam fumaça de porta-aviões e por que precisamos de indústria de defesa e de equipar nossas FFAA.

[Luiz Bastos]

E ainda há imbecis que questionam fumaça de porta-aviões e por que precisamos de indústria de defesa e de equipar nossas FFAA.

O que mata o desenvolvimento do país são pessoas como as acima descritas. Para elas tanto faz como tanto fez.

Fui

[FIGHTERCOM]

Infelizmente vou adentrar em mais um off topic - e inclusive já postado lá em "geopolítica". É que muito 9tudo) a ver com esses fatos relacionados à diplomacia brasileira e a o intervencionismo americano. Diga-se de passagem que isto é uma arrogância típica dos poderosos, posto que a Rússia, em seus tempos URSS, fazia pior nos países à sua órbita ou não.

Há cerca de dez anos um avião americano pousou em Manaus e um colega foi até ele checar a documentação da tripulação que tentava desembarcar.
No entanto, e para surpresa do colega, não só a tripulação retornou ao avião rapidamente e negava-se desembarcar para e mostrar a documentação e permitir checagem das bagagens, como impediu a subida a bordo do colega (PF).

O colega acionou a SR (sede) e o avião foi cercado. À torre foi solicitada informar procedência e condições do avião. Como resposta soube-se que o plano de vôo foi solicitado às pressas, como um pouso técnico de emergência, e só!
Com tais informações às mãos, um grupo armado nosso ameaçou invadir o avião sob força, caso não houvesse identificação formal. O clima ficou tenso e os relatos me eram passado on line por colega no próprio aeroporto.
Ao final o que ficou descoberto:
- Eram mariners em trajes civis
- A documentação - irregular (por isto impedia o desembarque regular, posto que só poderia ficar no salão de trânsito - e não era bem isto que desejavam.
- A bagagem trazia era formada de apetrechos pessoais, apetrechos próprios militares e armas para equipar - bem - uma CIA leve.

Os colegas fizeram contato com BSB e a FAB e a aeronave foi cercada e isolada. Depois a FAB assumiu o cerco e isolamento. Intensas tratativas diplomáticas se inciaram e a PF fez escolta da "bagagem" até uma unidade do EB.
A tripulação teve negado direito de desembarque e o avião pouco depois obteve autorização para decolar.
Quanto a bagagem não soube mais.
Este caso lembra a vocês alguma similaridade com o ocrrido recentemente na Colômbia?

Agora, veio à tona este caso, exposto pelos documento publicados na Folha, do adido militar americano flagrado por nossos militares em pleno vôo (não autorizado e classificado de ESPIONAGEM).

Tudo bem, todos os países fazem isto na medida do seu poder e interesse estratégico. Mas, chega de sermos tratados como quintal desses caras e de quisquer outros.
E ainda há imbecis que questionam fumaça de porta-aviões e por que precisamos de indústria de defesa e de equipar nossas FFAA.

Prezado JP,

Estou meio desinformado. Qual é o caso da Colômbia?


Abraços,

Wesley

[Matheus]

Esqueçam FX, 2011 e 12 é arrocho, nem a inflação a Dilma quer dar pros servidores, depois vem o gasto com a Copa. Isto tá com cara de TAMPAX.

[Penguin]

Mais um Wikicable sobre o F-X2, de junho de 2008, 4 meses antes do anuncio do short list.
Estimavam que o SL seria anuciado no final de agosto de 2008. Foi anunciado em outubro.
Temiam o Gripen por seu pacote de offsets.
Esclarecimentos sobre o F-35...

WikiCables: The military/industrial complex at work

WikiCable I: The politics of arms sales

First, a 20 June 2008 dispatch from Clifford M. Sobel, the U.S. ambassador in Brasilia, on the embassy’s efforts to push the sale.

An excerpt:

If we want to close the deal with the traditional cup of Brazilian coffee, there are several ways in which U.S. policy can help Boeing’s case pending a formal request for advocacy. As stated above, the most important determinant of which aircraft Brazil ultimately chooses will be the offsets, and Boeing will be responsible for making its own sales pitch in this regard. The most important step the USG can take is to eliminate the idea that the U.S. does not transfer technology. When Brazilians tell us this, it is apparent that there is no clear understanding of what technology transfer means or why they believe the U.S. doesn’t do it. Boeing’s proposal should state specifically that sale of the planes would include full technology transfer.

The document is posted online here.

VZCZCXRO4621
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0847/01 1721802
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 201802Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1918
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8158
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6285
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2255
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2-I/J5/HSE/DIA REP//
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000847
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR PM AND WHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2016
TAGS: MARR ETTC BR PREL ETRD EAIR EIND

SUBJECT: U.S. AIRCRAFT IN CONTENTION TO BE BRAZIL’S NEXT PRIMARY MULTI ROLE FIGHTER

REF: A. A) BRASILIA 175
B. B) BRASILIA 643
C. C) EMBASSY BRASILIA-STATE-DTSA E-MAILS
D. MAY 2008
E. D) BRASILIA 638
F. E) BRASILIA 429

Classified By: A/DCM Frank Manganiello, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. On June 10, MLO Brasilia obtained an unofficial copy of a Request for Information (RFI – passed electronically to Washington agencies) from the Brazilian Air Force (BRAF) concerning the upcoming competition for Brazil’s next fighter aircraft. One U.S. origin fighter, the F-18 Super Hornet, is under consideration, along with the Eurofighter Typhoon, the SU-35, the Gripen and the Rafale. As noted in reftels, there are a number of political factors working against a decision to purchase the F-18, but post believes that there is also a strong case to be made for the Hornets and that there are several steps the USG should take immediately to maximize the chance of Boeing winning the contract. In addition to the economic benefit to a U.S. business, being chosen to supply Brazil,s main combat aircraft for the next generation would carry important political benefits and provide a foundation for improved defense cooperation. END SUMMARY.

2. (S/NF) Brazil is seeking replacements for the majority of its obsolete combat aircraft, which have been plagued by readiness problems. During the recent visit of the George Washington Carrier Strike Group, the Brazilian Navy was unable to muster a single working fighter for a joint flight with Navy F-18s. Key points of the RFI have been leaked to the British journal “Flight,” but the details remain close-hold. While the RFI contains considerable detail on performance requirements for the new fighter, post believes that the key criterion for the decision will be the economic benefit to Brazil, i.e. the offset packages to be offered by bidders. With no immediate airborne threats to Brazil, combat lethality will be a lesser consideration, although the GOB will also consider what they perceive to be the prestige of owning a modern fighter. We believe that the lesser prestige of an older design led to the F-16 being left out, even though it could fulfill most Brazilian defense requirements at a lower cost than other options.

PROS AND CONS
———————–
3. (C/NF) There are several factors that favor the success of the F-18 sale and several that could thwart it.

Pro:

– The F-18 has a proven combat record with unmatched reliability and durability.
– The likely beneficiary of any offsets, Embraer, would find the opportunity to enter into a business partnership with Boeing desirable, especially if Boeing intends to offer additional cooperation in commercial aviation.
– Many members of the BRAF would be eager for closer cooperation with the U.S.
– The F-18 has been selected for use by Canada, India and Australia, large countries with similar operational requirements.

Con:

– Key members of the Brazilian political leadership believe it would be to Brazil’s advantage not to be dependent on the U.S. for military technology. France and Russia are seen as more desirable partners.
– Government owned competitors could be able to offer a broader range of offsets.
– There is a perception in Brazil, encouraged by the Ministry of External Relations, that the U.S. refuses to transfer technology.

4. (C/NF) The negative factors cited above will make a successful outcome difficult, but post recommends that the USG make the greatest possible effort to achieve a sale. Although the RFI states that the BRAF will make its decision

BRASILIA 00000847 002 OF 003

on the factors cited, it is likely that political considerations, some driven by anti-U.S. sentiments, will also come into play. The political benefits to be gained by a clear affirmation of U.S.-Brazilian defense partnership would be enormous. Even an unsuccessful effort could help undermine the assumption that the U.S. is unwilling to transfer technology.

COFFEE IS FOR CLOSERS
———————————–
5. (C/NF) If we want to close the deal with the traditional cup of Brazilian coffee, there are several ways in which U.S. policy can help Boeing’s case pending a formal request for advocacy. As stated above, the most important determinant of which aircraft Brazil ultimately chooses will be the offsets, and Boeing will be responsible for making its own sales pitch in this regard. The most important step the USG can take is to eliminate the idea that the U.S. does not transfer technology. When Brazilians tell us this, it is apparent that there is no clear understanding of what technology transfer means or why they believe the U.S. doesn’t do it. Boeing’s proposal should state specifically that sale of the planes would include full technology transfer. In the meantime, we can help improve Brazilian understanding by providing a briefing to the BRAF and Defense Ministry of U.S. tech transfer policies with examples of how we have managed arrangements with other friendly countries. In doing so, we should be prepared to answer suggestions that other nations, tech transfer policies are more liberal than ours. As the Defense Minister has personally raised the case as an example (inaccurately) of U.S. restrictiveness, we should consider waiving the proviso on the Honeywell inertial navigation systems (ref c) so that the export licenses matches those already approved for both Brazil and Colombia.

6. (C/NF) In addition to the key issues of offsets and tech transfer, we can help make the case for the sale of U.S. aircraft by ensuring the Brazilian are familiar with the performance advantages of the Super Hornet. We can begin doing so during the July visits by Minister of Defense Jobim and Air Force Chief Saito to the U.S. There are already plans for Jobim to have a demonstration flight in a Super Hornet during his visit. A group of Brazilian F-5s will participate in this year’s Red Flag exercise in Nevada. We should ensure that the Brazilian pilots and crews get as much exposure as possible to the F-18 while there, including to any F-18s being operated by allied air forces. Should the F-18 make the Brazilian short list (to be announced in late August), we should ensure that Brazil has an opportunity to work with Super Hornets again at next year,s UNITAS. The Brazilian navy was impressed with the F-18,s performance at this year,s UNITAS, and the participation once again of a carrier with its air wing will provide another opportunity for the Brazilian command to see the capabilities the Super Hornet provides in action.

COMPETITORS: BEWARE THE GRIPEN
——————————————— ————
7. (C/NF) While the BRAF has its reasons for including each of the potential bidders in the RFI, there are several key considerations with the non-U.S. aircraft that could prove important for Brazil’s final decision. While most of Brazil’s pilots would prefer not to have to fly Russian-made planes, they would check the prestige box by giving Brazil the same fighters as neighboring Venezuela. The possible attractions of French planes are discussed in ref b. With successful sales campaigns in South Africa, the Czech Republic and Hungary, the Saab Gripen has emerged as a popular alternative to U.S. aircraft. As stated above, the most important consideration for the Brazilians will be the offset package, and Saab has built its success on its ability to provide the sort Brazil is seeking. Although no manufacturer is likely to propose transferring aircraft production facilities to Brazil (at least not for the 120 fighter fleet Brazil is considering), Saab, and the Swedish government may be able to come up with offsets to create jobs in Brazil’s manufacturing sector that would prove attractive. It should also be noted that the Gripen contains U.S. origin components, including a GE engine, that could potentially become a factor in advocacy efforts.

BRASILIA 00000847 003 OF 003

WHY NOT THE JSF?
—————————
8. (C/NF) The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is conspicuous in its absence from the Brazilian list for fighter purchases. In the past, Brazilian Air Force personnel, including Chief of Staff Saito, have indicated that the F-35 would be preferred in the long term. In discussions with post, the BRAF has expressed the view that the J35 would be too expensive to allow purchase of an adequate number of aircraft. Brazil is also concerned that the structure of the JSF consortium would make it difficult for new members to join and would prevent delivery of the aircraft in the timeframe required by the RFI.

COMMENT
—————
9. (S/NF) With resources being made available for defense modernization for the first time in a generation (see ref a), the purchase of Brazil,s next fighter aircraft will have effects far beyond a fat contract for the manufacturer. Brazil’s Defense Minister and Air Force leadership would prefer a closer relationship with the U.S. as a partner in guaranteeing hemispheric stability. Purchase of U.S.-origin fighter aircraft would represent a major investment of resources in such a partnership and would be a decisive move away from recent Brazilian leaders, portrayal of the U.S. as more a potential adversary than a partner. While the U.S. Air Force manages cooperation with partners flying the other aircraft under consideration, interoperability is obviously much stronger when both forces fly the same aircraft. With progress on pol/mil engagement stalled, a BRAF decision to purchase fighters from a U.S. manufacturer will give Brazil a monetary stake in improving cooperation in the area of security.
SOBEL

WikiCable II: Praise from the Secretary

Our second dispatch comes from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, offering her praise for the embassy’s work on the pushing the planes.

It’s short enough not to bother with an excerpt.

The document is posted online here.

VZCZCXYZ0038
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #7314 1282016
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 082003Z MAY 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 2638
S E C R E T STATE 047314
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2034
TAGS: PINR MARR MASS BR

SUBJECT: (S/NF) KUDOS FOR BRAZIL FIGHTER COMPETITION REPORTING (C-AL9-01070)

REF: A. BRASILIA 000041
B. BRASILIA 001590
C. BRASILIA 001589
D. BRASILIA 000216
E. BRASILIA 000069

Classified By: SUZANNE MCCORMICK, DIR., INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).

1. (S/NF) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS GREATLY APPRECIATE POST’S CABLES THAT DETAIL THE COMPLEXITIES AND PROGRESS OF THE BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE’S (FAB) F-X2 FIGHTER COMPETITION INVOLVING US, FRENCH, AND SWEDISH AIRCRAFT. ANALYSTS HAVE USED THIS REPORTING IN BRIEFINGS AND OTHER PRODUCTS, TO INCLUDE A GRAPHIC HIGHLIGHTING A TIMELINE THAT CHARTED THE FAB’S QUEST FOR A NEW FIGHTER OVER THE PAST EIGHT YEARS. ANALYSTS HAVE BENEFITED FROM THE TIMELINESS OF POST’S REPORTING AND ITS ABILITY TO KEEP ABREAST OF DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, AIR FORCE, AND F-X2 PROGRAM OFFICIALS. POST’S INSIGHTS INTO THE RECENT BRAZILIAN-FRENCH DEFENSE AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE COMPETITION, PARTICULARLY THE ROLE AND INTERACTION OF FRANCE’S DASSAULT AEROSPACE COMPANY WITH BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS AND BUSINESSES, WERE ALSO ARE EXTREMELY USEFUL.

2. (S/NF) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS APPRECIATE POST’S REPORTING THAT HAS IDENTIFIED CHANGES WITHIN THE COMPETITION AND DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS’ POLICIES REGARDING TECHNOLOGY SHARING AGREEMENTS, THE IMPACT OF BRAZIL’S ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON THE F-X2 PROGRAM, ATTITUDES OF FAB OFFICIALS TOWARDS THE PRICE AND AVAILABILITY OF THE FINAL THREE CONTENDING AIRCRAFT, AND THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE US FIGHTER AND ITS MAIN COMPETITOR, THE DASSAULT RAFALE. MANY THANKS AGAIN FOR AN OUTSTANDING JOB OF TRACKING AN OFTEN COMPLEX COMPETITION AND BRAZILIAN DEFENSE ISSUES. KIND REGARDS FROM WASHINGTON.
CLINTON

[knigh7]

8. (C/NF) The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is conspicuous in its absence from the Brazilian list for fighter purchases. In the past, Brazilian Air Force personnel, including Chief of Staff Saito, have indicated that the F-35 would be preferred in the long term. In discussions with post, the BRAF has expressed the view that the J35 would be too expensive to allow purchase of an adequate number of aircraft. Brazil is also concerned that the structure of the JSF consortium would make it difficult for new members to join and would prevent delivery of the aircraft in the timeframe required by the RFI.

Humm...e o Rafale custando 90 milhões de euros (aprox 130 milhões de dólares). Praticamente o mesmo que o F35...

[AlbertoRJ]

Bom, já foi dito aqui que o Rafale não custa 90 milhões de euros.

[]['s

[AlbertoRJ]

repetido

[knigh7]

Ele custa até mais. Depende da configuracão que se calcula o preco (com ou sem motor, com ou sem radar, etc).
O valor integral desse caca custou Eur 101 milhões em 2010 para os franceses.

http://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/CC/documents/ ... mement.pdf

O nosso até teve um descontinho de 10% segundo o Jobim.

[AlbertoRJ]

Ele custa até mais. Depende da configuracão que se calcula o preco (com ou sem motor, com ou sem radar, etc).
O valor integral desse caca custou Eur 101 milhões em 2010 para os franceses.

http://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/CC/documents/ ... mement.pdf

O nosso até teve um descontinho de 10% segundo o Jobim.

Isso é o custo de desenvolvimento. Já foi amplamente discutido aqui, o Prick e o Pepê já se cansaram de demonstrar, eu também já entrei nesses debates, mas isso sempre volta. Sempre o mesmo dado.
Veja lá na tabela que é o custo total do programa dividido pelo número de aviões.
O preço fly-away de um caça não é isso.

[]'s

[Carlos Lima]

8. (C/NF) The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is conspicuous in its absence from the Brazilian list for fighter purchases. In the past, Brazilian Air Force personnel, including Chief of Staff Saito, have indicated that the F-35 would be preferred in the long term. In discussions with post, the BRAF has expressed the view that the J35 would be too expensive to allow purchase of an adequate number of aircraft. Brazil is also concerned that the structure of the JSF consortium would make it difficult for new members to join and would prevent delivery of the aircraft in the timeframe required by the RFI.

Humm...e o Rafale custando 90 milhões de euros (aprox 130 milhões de dólares). Praticamente o mesmo que o F35...

O F-35 irá custar muito mais do que 130 Milhões de Dólares.

Independente da aeronave tem que levar em consideração o que o custo de aquisição agrega (além é claro do fato que muitas vezes o valor colocado reflete também os custos de desenvolvimento + a parte de infra-estrutura inicial para a aeronave que pode sair pesada).

[]s
CB_Lima

[Penguin]

Ele custa até mais. Depende da configuracão que se calcula o preco (com ou sem motor, com ou sem radar, etc).
O valor integral desse caca custou Eur 101 milhões em 2010 para os franceses.

http://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/CC/documents/ ... mement.pdf

O nosso até teve um descontinho de 10% segundo o Jobim.

Deve ser o IVA. Não se exporta imposto.

[knigh7]

Humm...e o Rafale custando 90 milhões de euros (aprox 130 milhões de dólares). Praticamente o mesmo que o F35...

O F-35 irá custar muito mais do que 130 Milhões de Dólares.

Independente da aeronave tem que levar em consideração o que o custo de aquisição agrega (além é claro do fato que muitas vezes o valor colocado reflete também os custos de desenvolvimento + a parte de infra-estrutura inicial para a aeronave que pode sair pesada).

[]s
CB_Lima

Para a Australia o F35 custou por célula 128 Milhões e para os EUA pelos valores que vc mesmo postou ele custou até mesmo um pouco menos. E se for pelo pacote, então o'valor Flyaway do F35 é menos ainda.

Aquele documento do tribunal de contas francês de 2010 separa o valor da unidade do custo de desenvolvimento. Dá o valor da célula. Com o custo do programa, o Rafale sairia por 142 milhões de Euros, o que não é o caso a que eu estou me referindo.

[AlbertoRJ]

Vou colocar um dado de 2008 onde aparece o custo mais próximo do custo fly-away para o Rafale (sem o desenvolvimento):

Le coût total du programme pour l'Etat est de 39,6 milliards d'euros, (conditions financières au 1er janvier 2008) ce qui ramène le coût unitaire par avion (hors développement) entre 64 et 70 millions d'euros en fonction des versions, cette valeur devant toutefois augmenter du fait des négociations en cours avec l'industriel résultant de la réduction de la cible initiale.

Tradução do Google:

O custo total do programa para o estado é de 39,6 bilhões de euros (termos financeiros em 1 de Janeiro de 2008) que traz o custo unitário por aeronaves (excluindo o desenvolvimento) de 64 a 70.000.000 € de acordo com a versões, mas esse valor a aumentar, porque as negociações em curso com a indústria resultantes da redução da meta original.

Fonte:
Projet de loi de finances pour 2009 : Défense - Equipement des forces
1. Le programme Rafale : une polyvalence renforcée en 2008
http://www.senat.fr/rap/a08-102-5/a08-102-516.html

[]'s

[Carlos Mathias]

Obrigado pela corda...

As stated above, the most important determinant of which aircraft Brazil ultimately chooses will be the offsets

Ué, mas são eles que decidem isso agora?

The most important step the USG can take is to eliminate the idea that the U.S. does not transfer technology. When Brazilians tell us this, it is apparent that there is no clear understanding of what technology transfer means or why they believe the U.S. doesn’t do it. Boeing’s proposal should state specifically that sale of the planes would include full technology transfer.

Agora o prego no sapato é a ToT...

As noted in reftels, there are a number of political factors working against a decision to purchase the F-18,

Garoto esperto !

post believes that the key criterion for the decision will be the economic benefit to Brazil, i.e. the offset packages to be offered by bidders. With no immediate airborne threats to Brazil, combat lethality will be a lesser consideration, although the GOB will also consider what they perceive to be the prestige of owning a modern fighter. We believe that the lesser prestige of an older design led to the F-16 being left out, even though it could fulfill most Brazilian defense requirements at a lower cost than other options.

Bastam espelhos e umas esmolinhas pros bugres.
E compramos caças para ter prestígio.
A sinceridade as vezes mata...

– The F-18 has a proven combat record with unmatched reliability and durability.
– The likely beneficiary of any offsets, Embraer, would find the opportunity to enter into a business partnership with Boeing desirable, especially if Boeing intends to offer additional cooperation in commercial aviation.

Sim...

– Many members of the BRAF would be eager for closer cooperation with the U.S.

Cara, que sinceridade.

Aí depois nego(e branco) vem negar.

– The F-18 has been selected for use by Canada, India and Australia, large countries with similar operational requirements.

Na ordem.
Canadá= Bucha.
Índia= chute no lombo
Austrália= Bucha.

– Key members of the Brazilian political leadership believe it would be to Brazil’s advantage not to be dependent on the U.S. for military technology. France and Russia are seen as more desirable partners.
– Government owned competitors could be able to offer a broader range of offsets.
– There is a perception in Brazil, encouraged by the Ministry of External Relations, that the U.S. refuses to transfer technology.

E agora o cara é o MinDef.

Even an unsuccessful effort could help undermine the assumption that the U.S. is unwilling to transfer technology.

Essa é prá quem tem medinho.
Os caras acham que mesmo perdendo, os esforços valerão à pena como demonstração de boa vontade, digamos assim.
Perdi, mas fico ali por perto.

As the Defense Minister has personally raised the case as an example (inaccurately) of U.S. restrictiveness, we should consider waiving the proviso on the Honeywell inertial navigation systems (ref c) so that the export licenses matches those already approved for both Brazil and Colombia.

E isso porque eles iam considerar os inerciais do St.
Imagina para um SH e seus sofisticados sistemas de ponta a novela que ia ser!

Depois eu termino.
Vou jantar.