http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... _s_revenge
Rumsfeld ganha a guerra da doutrina
Secretário da aposentadoria de Defesa, Robert Gates, na semana passada, foi acompanhado por calorosos elogios por seu estilo de liderança, sua perspicácia política, e seu juízo sobre questões de política crítica. Portões deixou o cargo amplamente considerado como um dos secretários de defesa mais eficaz, pois o escritório foi criado em 1947. Esta reputação está em nítido contraste com a de seu predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld, que deixou o Pentágono em 2006, sob uma nuvem de desprezo de Capitol Hill, os meios de comunicação, e dentro do departamento correu. Na verdade, Gates foi trazido especialmente para reverter muitas das políticas de Rumsfeld, que muitos acreditavam que estavam causando os Estados Unidos a perder a guerra no Iraque. Portões restaurados harmonia colegial e tenho o Pentágono através de um período negro.
Mas partida de Gates, a revisão ampla da equipe de Barack Obama de segurança nacional, e, mais importante, a decisão do presidente a retirar 33 mil soldados do Afeganistão até o próximo verão mostra que a "Doutrina Rumsfeld" é agora o procedimento operacional padrão aceito para a corrente e formuladores de políticas futuras. No final, Rumsfeld ganhou a Guerra Doutrina.
Durante o primeiro mandato de Bush, e mesmo antes dos ataques de 11/09, Rumsfeld lutou com o Pentágono, e especialmente o Exército, para criar mais rápido, mais leve, mais flexível e mais expedicionária forças militares. Planejamento para a campanha do Iraque, em 2002, expôs o racha entre Rumsfeld e planejadores do Exército, que preferiu não replicar o acúmulo lento maciça de divisões blindadas que haviam esmagado o exército iraquiano na campanha Tempestade no Deserto, em 1991. Estimulado pelo sucesso de um punhado de operadores de inteligência, os soldados de operações especiais, e poder de precisão de ar obtidos no Afeganistão, Rumsfeld forçou os planejadores Comando Central para rasgar as suas Desert Storm inspirado plano de guerra e optar por uma força muito menor do que seria apoiada por poder de fogo de precisão e as forças de operações especiais.
Mesmo como a insurgência iraquiana negou o sucesso inicial da campanha, Rumsfeld persistiu em institucionalizar o "mais rápido, mais leve" doutrina expedicionária. Em 2003, Rumsfeld trouxe Gen. Peter Schoomaker , que passou a maior parte de sua carreira em operações especiais, a aposentadoria para ser chefe de gabinete do Exército. Encarregado de implementar a visão de Rumsfeld, a inovação mais notável Schoomaker foi a conversão do Exército a partir da grande divisão como a unidade básica para a implantação de menor e mais fácil de implantar brigada. Como a insurgência piorou no Iraque, Rumsfeld resistiu à pressão para construir um compromisso maior e mais pesado do solo dos EUA. Ele também resistiu à pressão para adicionar ao Exército e dos Fuzileiros Navais contagens de pessoas para aliviar a pressão sobre os soldados implantação, preferindo que o Pentágono financiamento permanecem comprometidos com a pesquisa e modernização de equipamentos, em vez de ser desviados para contas pessoais. A campanha no Iraque se tornou uma distração para agenda de Rumsfeld transformação e, em sua opinião, a alimentação de mais recursos para ele só criaria dependência iraquiano.
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Conceitos, Teoria, teoricos (textos e vídeos)
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marcelo l.
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Re: Conceitos, Teoria, teoricos (textos e vídeos)
Editado pela última vez por marcelo l. em Qua Jan 18, 2012 9:39 am, em um total de 1 vez.
"If the people who marched actually voted, we wouldn’t have to march in the first place".
"(Poor) countries are poor because those who have power make choices that create poverty".
ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant
"(Poor) countries are poor because those who have power make choices that create poverty".
ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant
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marcelo l.
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- Mensagens: 6097
- Registrado em: Qui Out 15, 2009 12:22 am
- Agradeceu: 138 vezes
- Agradeceram: 66 vezes
Re: Conceitos, Teoria, teoricos (textos e vídeos)
http://onwarandwords.wordpress.com/2011 ... eterrence/
The Use of Force Needn’t Imply a Failure of Deterrence
Thomas Rid has been doing some very interesting work (of which this is only a soupçon) about deterrence and its role in dealing with an enemy which can never be definitively defeated. In this context, he has argued that the use of force doesn’t always imply a failure of deterrence but may, in fact, be a necessary condition for its maintenance.
To me this has always been somewhat reminiscent of the “tit-for-tat” strategy that Robert Axelrod found so robust in tournaments of the “iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma” game and which he discussed in his remarkable book The Evolution of Cooperation.
However, I’ve run across an interesting historical example of a strategy that even more precisely fits what Thomas talks about. While at this weeks Society for Military History conference, I picked up a copy of Three Byzantine Military Treatises edited by George T. Dennis. One of the treatises in this volume is the 10th Century “Skirmishing,” which is traditionally, though incorrectly, attributed to the Emperor Nikephoros.
The text was written at a time when one of Byantium’s foremost military problems was dealing with the Muslim raiders often entered Byzantine border lands. The text advises a remarkable method of dealing with this problem. “Instead of confronting the enemy as their on their way to invade Romania, it is in many respects more advantageous and convenient to get them as they are returning from our country to their own.”
There are several reasons for this, according to the author. The raiders will be “worn out” and disorganized after their raiding and plundering. Furthermore, “they are likely to be burdened with a lot of baggage, captives and animals.” In addition, attacking them on their way out, would allow the “Romans” extra time to mobilize a larger force to confront and destroy them.
Most to the point, however, “attacking them as they return has this advantage…It will instill in them the fear that each time they want to invade, we will occupy the passes, and after a while they may cut out their constant incursions.” [Emphasis added.] Note that implicit in this strategy is that in order to deter future raids, at least one must take place. In other words, violence must be applied in order to deter future violence.
Two caveats are in order. First, “Skirmishing” is a prescriptive book, a military manual, not a history and it is not clear (to me) that the Byzantines actually applied this strategy, though I rather suspect that experts in the period could tell us. Secondly, the editor of this book does note that whatever the military merit of such a strategy, the local civilians can’t have appreciated it much!
__________
Como encontrar os indices IDHs.
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/KWT.html - Kwait.
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commen ... on-dilemma
Joseph S. Nye
The Use of Force Needn’t Imply a Failure of Deterrence
Thomas Rid has been doing some very interesting work (of which this is only a soupçon) about deterrence and its role in dealing with an enemy which can never be definitively defeated. In this context, he has argued that the use of force doesn’t always imply a failure of deterrence but may, in fact, be a necessary condition for its maintenance.
To me this has always been somewhat reminiscent of the “tit-for-tat” strategy that Robert Axelrod found so robust in tournaments of the “iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma” game and which he discussed in his remarkable book The Evolution of Cooperation.
However, I’ve run across an interesting historical example of a strategy that even more precisely fits what Thomas talks about. While at this weeks Society for Military History conference, I picked up a copy of Three Byzantine Military Treatises edited by George T. Dennis. One of the treatises in this volume is the 10th Century “Skirmishing,” which is traditionally, though incorrectly, attributed to the Emperor Nikephoros.
The text was written at a time when one of Byantium’s foremost military problems was dealing with the Muslim raiders often entered Byzantine border lands. The text advises a remarkable method of dealing with this problem. “Instead of confronting the enemy as their on their way to invade Romania, it is in many respects more advantageous and convenient to get them as they are returning from our country to their own.”
There are several reasons for this, according to the author. The raiders will be “worn out” and disorganized after their raiding and plundering. Furthermore, “they are likely to be burdened with a lot of baggage, captives and animals.” In addition, attacking them on their way out, would allow the “Romans” extra time to mobilize a larger force to confront and destroy them.
Most to the point, however, “attacking them as they return has this advantage…It will instill in them the fear that each time they want to invade, we will occupy the passes, and after a while they may cut out their constant incursions.” [Emphasis added.] Note that implicit in this strategy is that in order to deter future raids, at least one must take place. In other words, violence must be applied in order to deter future violence.
Two caveats are in order. First, “Skirmishing” is a prescriptive book, a military manual, not a history and it is not clear (to me) that the Byzantines actually applied this strategy, though I rather suspect that experts in the period could tell us. Secondly, the editor of this book does note that whatever the military merit of such a strategy, the local civilians can’t have appreciated it much!
__________
Como encontrar os indices IDHs.
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/KWT.html - Kwait.
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commen ... on-dilemma
Joseph S. Nye
"If the people who marched actually voted, we wouldn’t have to march in the first place".
"(Poor) countries are poor because those who have power make choices that create poverty".
ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant
"(Poor) countries are poor because those who have power make choices that create poverty".
ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant