ESTRATÉGIA NAVAL

[Marino]

Got Sea Control?
By Captain Victor G. Addison Jr., U.S. Navy and Commander David Dominy, Royal Navy
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U.S. Navy (Joshua J. Wahl)

Classic blue-water naval conflicts are giving way to complex littoral operations involving failed states, piracy, and joint relief operations, forcing the United States to assess sea control. Left, Sailors and Marines on board the amphibious dock landing ship USS Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) in October 2009 pass stores during a vertical replenishment with the Military Sealift Command ship USNS San Jose (TAFS-7) in humanitarian support of the Republic of the Philippines following two major storms.
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The United States and United Kingdom have the most powerful combined naval force on the planet. Does this mean we can control the seas where and when we want? Maybe not.

Naval history is replete with tales of victory by great fleets on the high seas. But it is also punctuated by the stunning defeats of many of these same fleets in their adversaries' coastal waters, or littorals. Although it may seem self-evident that a coastal navy would not fare as well in blue-water warfare, the limitations of a blue-water navy in the littorals are less obvious and often unanticipated.

Take, for example, the experience of ancient navies. In 1178 B.C.E., the Egyptians defeated a large fleet of sea raiders that had dominated the Mediterranean for more than 100 years by ambushing them from shore with flaming arrows. In 480 B.C.E., the Greeks conquered a much larger Persian fleet by luring them into the restricted waters of the Straits of Salamis, where they were outmaneuvered and could not bring their superior numbers and firepower to bear.

Flaming arrows have been replaced by antiship missiles, but the principle remains the same: the ability to control blue water does not necessarily apply to the littorals. In coastal waters, an adversary does not require a navy to successfully repel a naval attack. This is one of many reasons why great navies historically have prefered deeper water.
Control vs. Command

Our modern understanding of sea control has its origins in the writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Stafford Corbett. Mahan built his theory of "command of the seas" on naval superiority, the concentration of forces, and decisive battles. Corbett subsequently introduced the concept of "control of the seas" as a relative, rather than absolute, condition that applies naval power toward the broader goal of achieving national objectives. According to Corbett, control of the seas is not an end in itself but a means to conduct operations in peace and war that produces effects on land. As our memories of classic blue-water naval battles fade and we find ourselves increasingly engaged in complex littoral operations spanning great distances to counter challenges associated with failing states, regional instability, crime, and violent extremism, the writings of Corbett deserve a closer read.

Recognizing that total control of the seas is not practical, then Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner coined the phrase "sea control" to connote "more realistic control in limited areas and for limited periods of time."1

British Maritime Doctrine applies these boundary conditions and introduces the notion of purpose.

Sea control is the condition in which one has freedom of action to use the sea for one's own purposes in specified areas and for specified periods of time and, where necessary, to deny or limit its use to the enemy. Sea control includes the airspace above the surface and the water volume and seabed below.2

Taking this definition one step further by tying sea control directly to specific military objectives provides greater contrast between the littoral and blue-water cases. In blue water, sea-control challenges are likely to come from enemy fleets with naval objectives focused, in the spirit of Mahan, on decisive battle. In the littorals, sea-control challenges are often asymmetric in nature, with military objectives, such as establishing a sea base or conducting an amphibious landing, tied to the broader context of influencing events on shore. A simple definition of sea control that covers the full range of operations, therefore, is the use of the sea as a maneuver space to achieve military objectives.
Beyond Blue Water

The importance of sea control has been understated in recent years because of our longstanding maritime blue-water supremacy. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower categorizes sea control as one of the sea services' six expanded core capabilities, but does not distinguish it. With the continuing proliferation of anti-access and area-denial capabilities around the world, the likelihood is increasing that our local sea control will be challenged, particularly in the littorals. Military planners who require naval power to support operations ashore must take this into account.

As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked in an April 2009 address at the U.S. Naval War College, we face potential conflicts that "will range across a broad spectrum of operations and lethality. Where near-peers will use irregular or asymmetric tactics that target our traditional strengths—such as our ability to project power via carrier strike groups. And where non-state actors may have weapons of mass destruction or sophisticated missiles."

These challenges include unpredictable political circumstances that will restrict overseas access, basing, and overflight rights at inopportune moments. The role of sea control as the most fundamental naval capability that facilitates joint and coalition freedom of action is therefore obvious. Retired Major General David Fastabend, then the U.S. Army's director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, underscored this critical joint force interdependency during Navy-Army Warfighter Talks in 2008 when he observed, "If you can't provide maritime supremacy, we are buying the wrong kind of Army."

Perhaps the most apt question regarding sea control is not, Can we? but, How do we know if we can? Although joint planners depend on sea power to deliver access, mobility, firepower, and 90 percent of joint-force supplies, there is no generally accepted methodology or doctrine to assess our "sea-control potential" during the campaign-design process.
Start with a Framework

In keeping with traditional Pentagon staffing principles, a first step in developing such a methodology would be to propose a subjective analytical framework based on sea-control levels, such as the following:

* Unopposed: Military objectives can be achieved without significant losses.
* Opposed: Military objectives can be achieved, but losses may be significant.
* Denied: Military objectives cannot be achieved and/or there is a high probability of unacceptable losses.

Levels of sea control should be considered in the context of objectives and can be referenced as either an assessment of the operating environment or as a strategy. In this regard, an assessment can be used to define risk and present strategic options to planners in terms of force posture and sequencing. For example, the presence of an adversary's (red) surface action group and shore-based antiship missile batteries may produce a hostile environment for an amphibious landing, but have little impact on allied (blue) submarines and carrier-based aircraft. Allied strategy to successfully execute the amphibious landing could then be to deny the operations area to the red surface action group by using their asymmetric advantage in submarine warfare and to neutralize the missile batteries using their tactical aircraft.

This simple framework may be adequate for a high-level briefing, but planners require more detailed assessment criteria. While there appears to be an infinite range of elements to assess in determining a navy's sea control potential, the following five provide a starting point
* Capacity: The combat power a force can bring to bear in a local operations area—a critical factor in attrition warfare.
* Capability: The attributes a force possesses that determine its potential to disrupt an adversary.
* Information Dominance: The situational understanding required to operate forces with relative advantage under dynamic circumstances.
* Tactical Readiness: A force's ability to perform its assigned missions effectively in battle as a function of tactics, training, and procedures.
* Maneuver Space: The constraints and conditions within which a naval force must operate.

Since these elements are neither discrete nor unique to sea control, it is within the context of the objective that they become relevant. Using the previous example, the allied, or blue, force would have to assess in relative terms, at a minimum, its capacity to wipe out red missile batteries; its capability to disrupt the red surface action group; its tactical readiness to execute the full range of missions culminating in the amphibious landing; its ability to achieve and maintain situational understanding in dynamic conditions; and the impact of the littoral operating environment on red and blue forces. A similar assessment should be conducted from the perspective of the red force.

These elements become increasingly intertwined and difficult to assess when it comes to littoral sea control. A proliferation of disruptive shore-based capabilities can pressure naval forces as they move out of blue water and toward the coast. The at-sea tactical picture becomes more cluttered, making it more difficult to distinguish threats among ambiguous targets. Most important, littoral regions are typically defined by limitations—physical, political, or otherwise—that restrict a naval force's freedom of action. Potentially limitless tactical permutations await the joint sea-control planner.

One method of calibrating a predictive model is to run it against known historical data. By virtue of its overwhelming conventional superiority, the U.S. Navy has operated in a relatively unopposed sea-control environment for many decades and offers limited historical data for developing such a model. Two of America's closest allies, the United Kingdom and Israel, however, have been involved in stressing sea-control cases that are more suitable for analysis.
1982: Britain and Argentina in the Falklands

The 1982 Falklands War is a good example of the challenges navies confront when conducting sea control in the littorals of adversaries at a distance of more than than 8,000 miles. Of the many detailed accounts of the Falklands War, only the memoir of Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days, provides the perspective of the task force commander. Woodward notes that "there were several competent organizations which initially suspected the whole operation was doomed." One of these organizations was "the United States Navy, which considered the recapture of the Falkland Islands to be a military impossibility." Although this assessment turned out to be slightly pessimistic, Woodward himself observed that "we fought our way along a knife edge, I realize perhaps more than most that one major mishap, a mine, explosion, a fire, whatever, in either of our two aircraft carriers, would certainly have proven fatal to the whole operation."

A more specific risk estimate from a sea-control assessment would probably not have dissuaded former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from ordering the recapture of the Falklands, but it might have influenced campaign strategy. It is illustrative to examine the Falklands campaign as two distinct sea-control problems: blue water and littoral. An actual assessment of these phases by a headquarters staff would require subcategories, weighting factors, and a great deal of PowerPoint. What follows is the distilled version of a relative sea-control assessment that would have been provided for senior Royal Navy leadership.
Blue-Water Phase

In the blue-water phase, the British Task Force's objective was to rapidly conduct an unopposed transit to the South Atlantic and establish a 200-nautical-mile radius "tactical exclusion zone" around the Falkland Islands in preparation for an amphibious assault. Argentina's objective was to deny the Royal Navy the use of the sea as maneuver space through disruption and attrition, thereby preventing an amphibious assault.

The Scorecard

Capacity: Each side owned sufficient naval assets to defeat the other, but Argentina had a five-to-one advantage in tactical aircraft that could potentially overwhelm the British Task Force's air-defense capacity. The lack of an overmatch by the United Kingdom in this category, which includes the challenge of an 8,000 nautical mile logistics chain, probably influenced the U.S. Navy's dire assessment of the Royal Navy's chances. Advantage: Argentina.

Capability: Argentina's fighter aircraft had superior speed and maneuverability compared with the United Kingdom's Harriers, but the United States leveled the playing field somewhat by supplying the British with the advanced AIM-9 Sidewinder missile for air-to-air combat. The Argentine Navy had a significant advantage with the French Exocet antiship missile, but their supply was limited. In the Royal Navy's favor, its three nuclear fast-attack submarines provided an asymmetric antiship and intelligence-gathering capability for Woodward's task force. Advantage: Toss-up.

Information Dominance: The Royal Navy received strategic intelligence from the United States and derived a great deal of tactical intelligence from their fast-attack submarines. Advantage: United Kingdom.

Tactical Readiness: The British developed dog-fighting tactics that would greatly increase the kill ratio of the Harriers. Additionally, the Royal Navy placed significant tactical emphasis on protecting its aircraft carriers and using forward-operating fast-attack submarines to threaten the Argentine Navy's "high value units." Advantage: United Kingdom.

Maneuver Space: The Royal Navy planned to exploit the vast sea area around the Falkland Islands to position its fleet for tactical advantage, keeping the carriers out of strike range and forcing the Argentine strike aircraft to fly through defensive missile screens. Advantage: United Kingdom.

Overall assessment of sea-control level for the blue-water phase: Opposed.

The military objective of controlling the seas around the Falklands in advance of the littoral campaign phase would be achievable with acceptable losses.
Littoral Phase

The United Kingdom's objective during the littoral sea-control phase was to conduct an amphibious assault that established an onshore launching pad from which to defeat Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands. The choice of amphibious objective area was based primarily on the desire to conduct an unopposed landing operation using naval escorts in the Falkland Sound to blunt the anticipated Argentine air assault. Argentina's objective was to use air power to deny the British task force the necessary maneuver space to conduct the amphibious assault and disable it.

The Scorecard

Capacity: The same blue-water imbalance of power carried forth to the littorals. Advantage: Argentina.

Capability: Once the British task force moved toward its amphibious objective area, it was squarely within range of Argentina's shore-based tactical aircraft and missile batteries, a potentially decisive asymmetric advantage for Argentina. Advantage: Argentina.

Information Dominance: The Royal Navy's forces would be easier to find and fix within the confines of the littoral battlespace, thereby negating their strategic and tactical intelligence advantage. Advantage: Toss-up.

Tactical Readiness: The British advantage in blue-water tactics and training would not necessarily apply in the littorals, where the highly proficient Argentine Air Force would become a greater factor. Advantage: Toss-up.

Maneuver Space: The British Task Force was severely restricted in its ability to maneuver in the littorals and, specifically, in Falkland Sound. Advantage: Argentina.

Overall assessment of sea-control level for the littoral phase: Denied.

The military objective of controlling the Falkland Sound for the amphibious landing would place the task force well within range of Argentina's air force, so the probability of unacceptable losses was extremely high.
Actual Campaign Summary

During the blue-water phase, the Royal Navy exploited the extensive maneuver space to protect its aircraft carriers from Argentina's 200 jets. Concurrently, Britain's asymmetric undersea warfare advantage became decisive when its fast-attack submarine HMS Conqueror torpedoed Argentina's heavy cruiser General Belgrano. This strategic knock-out punch sidelined the Argentine navy—including its aircraft carrier, the ARA Veinticinco de Mayo—for the rest of the war.

The battle shifted markedly in Argentina's favor during the littoral sea-control phase, because the British task force was constrained by its objective, the amphibious landing, and was forced to operate in the sights of Argentina's modern, shore-based air force. Argentina's potentially decisive asymmetric air-warfare advantage was ultimately squandered by a tactical failure. During the littoral sea-control phase, every single British escort operating in Falkland Sound was hit by bombs dropped from Argentina's air force, but many of the bombs did not explode. Admiral Woodward summarized this aspect of the littoral sea-control phase best when he noted in his memoir, "We lost Sheffield, Coventry, Ardent, Antelope, Atlantic Conveyor, and Sir Galahad," but concluded that if Argentina's bombs had been properly fused for low-level air raids, Britain would have lost the war.
Same Game, New Rules

A new dimension has been added to littoral sea control by what is referred to as "the hybrid threat," which retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman defines as any adversary that employs a fusion of "conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives." For example, the hybrid threat posed by the intersection of Somali pirates and the terrorist organizations al-Shabab and al Qaeda near the Bab-el-Mandeb has provided an unprecedented challenge for Coalition navies struggling to keep one of the world's most strategic oil chokepoints open. Nation states that do not possess the capability to directly challenge powerful navies may also employ hybrid sea-denial strategies. This is particularly relevant if the adversary's objective is not to defeat their enemy in conventional terms, but to undermine political will through a protracted struggle that imposes significant costs.

The 2006 Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah provides an example of a struggle for littoral sea control within the context of a hybrid threat. The Israeli Navy possessed a clear overmatch in conventional capabilities and developed its tactics accordingly. There is another perspective—Hezbollah's—that will be considered for this sea-control assessment.
2006: Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon

During the 2006 Lebanon War, the Israeli Navy's objective was to impose a naval blockade to isolate Hezbollah and thus help to advance Israeli defense force operations ashore. Hezbollah's objective was less complicated: inflict damage on a regional superpower, survive the conflict, and win the public relations war. Since Hezbollah doesn't have a navy, this example typifies the "hybrid sea denial" approach that navies may encounter in the littorals.

The Scorecard

Capacity: The Israeli Navy held an absolute capacity overmatch in regular naval forces, but Hezbollah's hybrid forces were not negligible and had to be considered. Advantage: Israel.

Capability: The Israeli Navy clearly overmatched Hezbollah in conventional capabilities. Hezbollah employed hybrid tactics that included missiles, suicide bombers, crime, manipulation of civilian infrastructure, and propaganda. Advantage: Israel.

Information Dominance: The Israeli Navy possessed significant intelligence, command-and-control, and cyber capabilities, but was not aware of Hezbollah's C-802 antiship missiles that could be fired from trucks against naval targets. Since the Israeli Navy had to operate near shore to maintain a blockade, this simplified Hezbollah's targeting problem. Hezbollah also had significant intelligence resources augmented by capabilities from regional allies and was exceptionally media savvy. Advantage: Toss-up.

Tactical Readiness: The Israeli Navy was tactically proficient and well-defended against the C-802 missile when its use was anticipated. Both the Israeli Navy and Hezbollah are very good at what they do. Advantage: Toss-up.

Maneuver Space: The Israeli Navy was constrained by the littoral operating environment, rules of engagement, military doctrine, and international law. Hezbollah's maneuver space was not similarly constrained. Advantage: Hezbollah.

Overall assessment of sea-control level for the 2006 Lebanon War: Opposed.

The Israeli Navy undoubtedly considered its blockade to be an unopposed sea-control operation based on the complete absence of conventional Hezbollah naval capability.
Actual Campaign Summary

The Israeli Navy ship Hanit was severely damaged by a C-802 missile on 14 July 2006. Following a United Nations-brokered ceasefire, the war ended when Israel lifted its naval blockade on 8 September 2006. The chief of the Israeli Navy resigned in 2007. During a panel discussion at the 2009 Surface Navy Association conference, a senior Israeli naval officer advised against spending too much time in the littorals because of the complex threat environment, emphasizing the point that if you don't have to be there, "don't go there."
The Littoral Truth

SIr Julian Corbett was right: to support joint force, national, and even international objectives, we must operate in the littorals. For powerful navies, the most difficult aspect of operating in the littorals is acquiring the necessary mindset and realizing that the default sea-control level is "opposed." It doesn't seem just that our multibillion-dollar ships can be damaged or even sunk by cheap mines, missiles, or skiffs laden with explosives. But we must realistically admit the possibility. History has shown us that in the complicated littoral sea-control environment, losses are not only possible, they are inevitable. Littoral sea control, therefore, needs to be assessed, not assumed, as an important component of campaign design. Powerful navies may not particularly like the idea of operating in the littorals, but it's where the jobs are.




1. Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy, "Missions of the U.S. Navy," Naval War College Review, 1974, Vol. XXVI, No. 5., p. 7.

2. BR 1806 British Maritime Doctrine, Third Edition, 2004, p. 289.

Captain Addison is assigned to the staff of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5) as branch head for advanced concepts (N511). He is an oceanographer and former submarine strategic weapons officer.

Commander Dominy is assigned to the Pentagon as the first Royal Navy Liaison Officer to OPNAV N3/N5. A surface warfare officer, he commanded the destroyer HMS Manchester, which was integrated into the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group during operations in the Arabian Gulf.

[Andre Correa]

Se o Brasil tivesse se envolvido directamente no conflito das Malvinas, teriam os EUA feito o mesmo a favor dos britânicos?

[Marino]

Plano Brasil
Mísseis Antinavios
13/06/2010


Autor: Bosco

Plano Brasil

Enquanto a visão de uma invasão de milhares de tanques aterrorizava a mente dos estrategistas ocidentais, a visão de centenas de navios capitaneados por porta-aviões gigantescos aterrorizava os estrategistas da ex-URSS.


Como diz um velho ditado, “a necessidade é a mãe da invenção”, e em relação à tecnologia militar não é diferente. Logicamente o “ocidente” se esmerou na luta antitanque e os soviéticos na luta antinavio.


Até a SGM o principal meio de atacar navios era o canhão, o torpedo e as bombas, respectivamente por navios, submarinos e aviões. Isso mudou a partir da década de sessenta com a introdução em larga escala pela URSS do míssil antinavio.


Já na época da SGM houve a introdução de armas guiadas lançadas por bombardeiros na tentativa de atingir navios, mas a tecnologia se mostrou tardia para influir no conflito de modo contundente, tornado-se madura só a partir da década de 60.


Foi só após o ataque ao destróier Eilat por mísseis Styx de fabricação russa lançados de lanchas egípcias na Guerra dos Seis Dias (1967) que o ocidente se deu conta, surpreso, que havia um imenso gap tecnológico com a URSS em relação à “mísseis de cruzeiro antinavios” (ASCM).


Os soviéticos estavam claramente na dianteira dessa corrida já que a OTAN, na mesma época, não possuía nenhum míssil antinavio dedicado.


Míssil Styx de origem russa.


Logo o “ocidente” arregaçou as mangas e se pôs a desenvolver seus “produtos”, e logo também, se viu a diferença da doutrina adotada pela URSS e pelo Ocidente, tendo em vista que os primeiros tinham como objetivo neutralizar uma armada sob a proteção de super porta-aviões.


Ou seja, para lograr êxito os mísseis soviéticos deveriam ter longo alcance, devido à cobertura aérea fornecida por um porta-aviões. Deveriam também ter uma ogiva excepcionalmente grande para poderem atingir de forma contundente um navio com mais de 60.000 toneladas de deslocamento e suas escoltas que em geral deslocavam mais de 10.000 t.


Tais requisitos operacionais fizeram com que os mísseis antinavios soviéticos assumissem um tamanho avantajado tendo em vista a conciliação da necessidade com a tecnologia disponível na época.


A Marinha Soviética, embora extremamente poderosa, se valia de seus submarinos para “projetar força” em detrimento dos navios de superfície, que tinham pouca expressão estratégica, e em geral não estavam sob o guarda chuva protetor de um porta-aviões. Tais características moldaram os mísseis ocidentais de modo a lhes conferir menores dimensões que seus congêneres do outro lado da Cortina de Ferro.


A ABORDAGEM SOVIÉTICA/RUSSA


Os soviéticos sempre deram ênfase a mísseis com poderosas ogivas e alcances que invariavelmente superam as 150 milhas náuticas.


Há uma variedade de opções que vão desde os subsônicos até os supersônicos, lançados por aeronaves, navios, submarinos e lançadores terrestres móveis.


Comparação do míssil russo SS-N-19 com um caça F-16.


Também, todos os sistemas de propulsão disponíveis foram utilizados, desde o foguete líquido, o foguete sólido, passando pelos turbopropulsores e motores ramjet.


Em geral são mísseis pesados e de grande alcance. Alguns chegam a 7 toneladas e alcançam 600 km.


Também são os únicos até agora a operarem mísseis antinavios supersônicos, como o AS-4 lançado pelo Backfire da década de 80 e os famosos SS-N-22 e SS-N-26, entre muitos outros. Só agora outros países os seguem, como a Índia, Taiwan e Japão.


Míssil russo SS-N-22


Enquanto a OTAN tinha no avião o vetor mais apropriado para ataques de grande alcance, os soviéticos, e depois os russos, tinham no poder de seus mísseis seu grande trunfo.


Para lograr êxito contra os grandes porta-aviões americanos os mísseis russos tinham que ter grande alcance e uma pesada ogiva que não raro chegava a 1 tonelada. A maioria dos mísseis tinha também uma versão dotada de ogiva nuclear.


Mísseis com grandes ogivas e grande alcance ficavam pesados e grandes, portanto, fáceis de serem detectado e interceptados.


Para tentar vencer as defesas de uma força tarefa capitaneado por um porta-aviões e sob o manto protetor do Sistema AEGIS a abordagem escolhida foi um incremento na velocidade, de modo a reduzir o tempo de reação da defesa.


Com esta foto podemos observar as dimensões dos lançadores de mísseis SS-N-12.


Míssil SS-N-12 Sandbox


Enquanto o Ocidente desenvolvia pequenos mísseis subsônicos com capacidade “sea skimming”, os soviéticos desenvolviam grandes mísseis supersônicos, alguns chegando a Mach 3, guiados por sistema inercial e com cabeça de busca autônoma baseada em um radar ativo, capacidade “fire-and-forget” e alcance OTH (além do horizonte).


A combinação de mísseis de grandes dimensões e velocidade supersônica trouxe alguns inconvenientes como, por exemplo, uma maior assinatura radar e térmica e uma menor capacidade de manobra.


Navio com lançadores de mísseis SS-N-12.


Outra característica da doutrina russa é o “ataque de saturação” que visa sobrecarregar as defesas do “grupo tarefa”.


Míssil supersônico russo SS-N-26


Do lado ocidental o míssil Tomahawk em sua versão antinavio (TASM) dos anos 80 foi o que mais se identificou com a doutrina soviética/russa. Tinha um alcance de 500 km e uma ogiva de 450 quilos.


Míssil Brahmos indiano baseado no SS-N-26 russo.


Ainda hoje o Tomahawk na sua versão Block IV é o míssil ocidental com capacidade antinavio de maior alcance, superando inclusive os grandes mísseis russos. Chega a 1000 milhas náuticas.


Mísseis soviéticos/russos (designação da OTAN):
• SS-N-1 Scrubber
• SS-N-2 Styx
• SS-N-3 Shaddock
• SS-N-7 Starbright
• SS-N-9 Siren
• SS-N-12 Sandbox
• SS-N-19 Shipwreck (P-700 Granit)
• SS-N-22 / AS-X-22 Sunburn (Moskit)
• SS-N-25 / AS-20 Switchblade (Harpoonski)
• SS-NX-26 Yakhont / Brahmos
• SS-N-27 (P-900 Klub)
• AS-1 Kennel
• AS-2 Kipper
• AS-4 Kitchen
• AS-5 Kelt
• AS-6 Kingfish
• AS-16 Kickback
• AS-17 Krypton
• AS-18 Kazoo

O CONCEITO OCIDENTAL


Já no lado ocidental, motivado pelo incidente do Eilat, e tendo em vista se contrapor à Marinha Soviética que em geral não estava sob a proteção de um porta-aviões, a tendência foi no sentido de desenvolver mísseis de menor tamanho, menor alcance e “pequenas” ogivas.


Dois mísseis se sobressaíram no Ocidente, o Exocet francês e o Harpoon americano. Esses dois exemplos resumem a doutrina ocidental em relação a mísseis anti-navios. Possuem capacidade OTH (além do horizonte), operam no modo LOAL (travamento após o lançamento), são subsônicos, de pequenas dimensões, pesando menos que 700 quilos, ogivas aptas a neutralizar navios de menor tonelagem (6000 t), guiados por um sistema inercial até um ponto pré-determinado onde ativam seu buscador autônomo baseado em um radar ativo miniaturizado e possuem perfil de vôo “sea skimming”, usando o “fundo” para enganar o radar e reduzir o tempo de reação da defesa.


O Exocet ficou famoso na Guerra das Malvinas nas mãos dos argentinos, conseguindo atingir algumas unidades britânicas. É um pequeno míssil subsônico, guiado por radar ativo, com motor foguete sólido e alcance em torno de 70 km. Pode ser lançado de navios, submarinos submersos, aviões de asa fixa, helicóptero de grande porte e plataformas costeiras.


O Harpoon tem o dobro do alcance e é propulsado por um turbojato miniaturizado. Também é subsônico, guiado por radar ativo, de peso leve, reduzida assinatura térmica e radar e grande capacidade de manobra, podendo inclusive efetuar manobras terminais tipo pop-up.


Míssil Harpoon americano.


Ao contrário dos grandes mísseis russos com ênfase anti porta-aviões, os mísseis antinavios ocidentais são compatíveis com caças de pequeno porte e alguns são disparados inclusive por tubos de torpedos convencionais de submarinos.


A capacidade OTH (além do horizonte) exige que o alvo seja designado por uma plataforma avançada, como por exemplo, um helicóptero ou um avião de patrulha marítima.


Mísseis antinavios subsônicos com alcance extremamente grande, por volta de 100 milhas náuticas, obriga a adoção de um sistema de data-link para que possam receber atualizações da posição do navio alvo em tempo real sob pena de não conseguirem detectá-lo nas coordenadas previstas.


Míssil russo SS-N-25


Vale salientar que mísseis com características ocidentais têm sido desenvolvidos e produzidos também na Rússia para armar navios de pequena tonelagem e aviões, sendo o SS-N-25 (Kh-35) um exemplo.


Mísseis “ocidentais”:
• Exocet
• Exocet Block 3
• Harpoon
• RBS15
• Otomat
• NSM
• Gabriel
• Penguin
• Maverick F
• SLAM-ER
• Kormoran
• Sea Eagle
• Tomahawk Block IV (?)
• “JSOW C-1 “
• XASM-3


MÍSSEIS DE PEQUENO PORTE LANÇADOS DE HELICÓPTEROS


O helicóptero é um meio imprescindível nas operações de guerra moderna. Nas operações navais não é diferente e ele desempenha as mais diversas funções que vão desde o resgate, esclarecimento, luta antisubmarina e guerra antisuperfície.


Míssil Sea Skua lançado de helicópteros.

Na função antisuperfície ele é um meio extremamente valioso tanto para esclarecimento e designação de alvos além do horizonte como no ataque direto a meios flutuantes com seus armamentos próprios.


Para cumprir com eficiência essa função foram desenvolvidos vários mísseis antinavios de menor porte e alcance. A grande maioria, propulsados por motores foguetes já que não se espera desses mísseis terem um alcance muito grande.


Em relação aos sistemas de orientação há uma maior variedade, tais como os buscadores térmicos, imagem infravermelha, laser semi-ativo, radar ativo, radar semi-ativo e CLOS com link de radiofreqüência.


Mísseis dessa classe, em geral, têm menos de 400 kg e um alcance máximo em torno de 30 km.


AGM-114M Hellfire


Alguns são oriundos de mísseis antitanques pesados. Um exemplo é o Hellfire II (AGM-114M) guiado por “laser semi-ativo” que pesa 45 kg e tem alcance de 9 km.


Embora não tenham sido projetados para atacarem navios de médio e grande porte, eles podem ser úteis mesmo contra estes se usados no conceito “mission killer” em que o míssil não causa danos capazes de neutralizar um navio de forma definitiva, mas causa a degradação ou a completa perda da sua capacidade operacional, por atingir pontos vitais, tais como, antenas de radar, lançadores de mísseis, etc.



Míssil Exocet de origem francesa. Ficou famoso nas mãos dos argentinos na Guerra das Malvinas.


Uma exceção à regra é o AS-39 Exocet que embora pesando em torno de 700 kg pode ser lançado de helicópteros de maior porte como por exemplo o SH-3.


Esses mísseis assumiram uma grande importância nas operações navais costeiras e alguns inclusive podem ser lançados por navios de pequena tonelagem ou mesmo de plataformas terrestres.


Míssil Penguin lançado de helicóptero.


Hoje, a tendência aponta para mísseis de dupla função, com capacidade antinavio e contra alvos terrestres móveis.


Mísseis de pequeno porte lançados por helicópteros:
• AS-12
• Sea Skua
• Maverick F
• Penguin
• NSM
• Sea Killer
• AS15TT
• Hellfire II (AGM-114M)
• Exocet AM-39


OPERAÇÕES LITORÂNEAS


Durante toda a época da Guerra Fria os estrategistas pensavam a guerra naval em termos de “alto mar”, onde frotas navais se enfrentariam aos moldes das grandes batalhas da SGM.


Com a dissolução da União Soviética em 1991 e o fim da Guerra Fria e mais ainda, após o fatídico “11 de Setembro”, houve a percepção que o futuro da guerra naval seria com forças assimétricas se enfrentando na faixa litorânea.


Tal mudança de paradigma trouxe uma inevitável reformulação da doutrina e consequentemente, do equipamento.


Num primeiro momento se deu a impressão que os mísseis antinavios usados pela OTAN e pela antiga URSS estavam irremediavelmente condenados já que eram aptos a operarem em mar aberto e com pouca utilidade contra pequenas e velozes embarcações na congestionada faixa costeira.


Forçosamente os mísseis teriam que se adaptar. Essa adaptação não tardou.


Com a introdução de sistemas de navegação de precisão por satélite, como por exemplo, o GPS, que usa uma “constelação” de satélites NAVSTAR para prover a posição em tempo real de qualquer objeto no solo ou no ar com erro menor que 10 metros, foi possível reintroduzir o míssil antinavio na ordem do dia.


Tal precisão, possibilitada pelo GPS e similares, permite que mísseis possam seguir caminhos predeterminados por vários pontos de baliza de modo a contornarem acidentes geográficos comuns no litoral e atingirem seus alvos com precisão.


De quebra se ganhou a possibilidade desses mísseis antinavios serem usados inclusive contra alvos no solo já que os sistemas de navegação por satélite, combinados com sistemas de navegação inercial, permitem que alvos fixos sejam atingidos com precisão.

COMO ULTRAPASSAR AS DEFESAS DE UM NAVIO DE GUERRA?


Há meio século essa pergunta tem sido feita e muito esforço tem sido desprendido para respondê-la.


Enquanto os grandes mísseis soviéticos se desenvolveram mais no sentido de aumentarem sua velocidade tentando reduzir o tempo de reação, no lado ocidental a abordagem foi no sentido de manter o míssil o mais discreto possível, com pequenas dimensões e velocidade subsônica.


A velocidade subsônica e ogivas de menor tamanho permitem mísseis menores. Também possibilita um incremento na capacidade de manobra, o que pode ser usado para ludibriar os sistemas defensivos.


Um míssil subsônico em geral é propulsado por turbojatos ou turbofans, o que permite uma excelente relação de massa x alcance x ogiva, além de facilitar a discrição pela baixa emissão térmica.


Outra “abordagem” é o ataque de saturação. Vários mísseis atacando simultaneamente e, na dependência das características defensivas do navio alvo, vindo de uma mesma direção ou de direções diferentes, podem saturar a defesa de modo a que algum atinja seu objetivo, mesmo contra uma defesa consistente.


Hoje é comum em algumas regiões do globo ver navios armados com um grande número de mísseis, bem acima das tradicionais oito unidades.


Já o perfil de vôo “sea skimming” ficou mundialmente famoso quando na Guerra das Malvinas pelo uso do míssil Exocet pelos Argentinos, que era provido de tal capacidade.


Voar a poucos metros da superfície do mar foi e ainda é um dos meios mais usados para possibilitar o ocultamento do míssil, reduzindo o tempo de reação das defesas.


Para tanto o míssil deve possuir um altímetro de radar (ou laser) e software compatível. O inconveniente é que o vôo em altitude tão baixa (3 metros) aumenta o arrasto e, portanto, reduz o alcance.


A “velocidade supersônica” é outro recurso que os projetistas de mísseis antinavios adotam, para atingi-la, necessita-se de propulsores gastadores de combustível, como por exemplo, ramjets, foguetes líquidos, turbojatos com pós-combustores, etc. Em geral a relação massa x alcance nesses mísseis não é muito satisfatória se comparada aos subsônicos, o que obriga células grandes e mísseis pesados. Se o objetivo do míssil supersônico for “neutralizar” um Nimitz, também exige uma grande ogiva. Ou seja, no final o míssil está do tamanho de um F-5 Tiger.


Outro inconveniente da velocidade supersônica é a assinatura térmica exagerada, tanto devido ao atrito como devido à grande emissão de chamas do propulsor.


A manobrabilidade também é restrita em mísseis supersônicos, o que, entre outros fatores, limita seu uso em operações litorâneas e facilita a interceptação.


Na década de 80 tanto os EUA quanto a França desenvolveram e testaram mísseis antinavios supersônicos, mas não chegaram a ser produzidos.


O Míssil supersônico japonês XASM-3.

O Japão está desenvolvendo um míssil antinavio supersônico “peso leve”, o XASM-3, capaz de ser lançado de um F-16, a exemplo do “Krypton” russo. A Índia desenvolveu o Brahmos baseado no SS-N-26 russo e Taiwan por sua vez se baseou no SS-N-22 para desenvolver seu Hsiung Feng 3.


Por último temos a “furtividade”. Com o desenvolvimento e a generalização de radares navais e aéreos com capacidade de detectar consistentemente mísseis “sea skimming”, e também com uma ampla variedade de sistemas antimísseis automáticos capazes de fazer frente a mísseis antinavios supersônicos e ataques de saturação, os projetistas de mísseis antinavios tiveram que evoluir.


Essa evolução está se materializando na adoção do conceito “stealth”. Desde a introdução do caça F-117 na década de 80 do século passado que há por parte dos estrategistas e dos engenheiros um “movimento” no sentido de reduzir substancialmente a possibilidade de detecção de um “alvo”, suprimindo ou alterando algumas de suas características.


Se algo não pode ser detectado não poderá ser destruído.


A tecnologia “stealth” visa reduzir a “assinatura” de uma aeronave, navio ou míssil em todo o espectro eletromagnético.


Um míssil antinavio pequeno como o Harpoon (550 kg) tem um RCS em torno de 0,1 m2, muito grande se for comparado com o bombardeiro B-2 (150 toneladas) que é de 0,0014 m2.


Técnicas de forma e materiais que absorvam as ondas de radar se fazem necessários.
Uma redução substancial da assinatura térmica obriga que o míssil seja subsônico e de preferência, voe alto.


Também é interessante que o míssil use uma cabeça de busca por homing passivo, como por exemplo, um “sistema de imagem térmica”, já que as emissões na faixa de microondas de um radar ativo podem ser detectadas por um navio alvo, alertando a defesa.


Mísseis como o SLAM-ER ou o NSM adotam o conceito “stealth” em sua plenitude.


Míssil “stealth” SLAM-ER.

A bomba planadora JSOW C-1 com função antinavio também é outro exemplo do conceito stealth. Guiada por um sistema de imagem térmica (passivo), não é dotado de propulsão, alcançando 100 km quando lançada de uma aeronave em grande altitude.


Uma vantagem associada ao conceito stealth é a possibilidade de poder voar alto, não necessitando usar o perfil “sea skimming”. Na verdade, como dito anteriormente, não é desejável voar baixo.


Voar alto traz ainda outra grande vantagem, há um menor arrasto e, portanto, um incremento no alcance. O SLAM-ER só por ser Stealth tem o dobro do alcance do Harpoon, que lhe deu origem.


A compatibilização da tecnologia stealth com a velocidade supersônica não é de todo impossível, muitos alegam tê-la, como exemplo o Brahmos (russo/indiano) e o XASM-3 (japonês).


Claro que embora possível, deve haver um comprometimento do nível de furtividade que foi considerado aceitável tendo em vista o ganho com a velocidade supersônica na redução do tempo de reação.


O míssil de dois estágios SS-N-27 ainda na “fase subsônica”.

Uma solução interessante e inovadora foi adotada pelos russos com seu míssil 3M-54E Klub (SS-N-27). Ele é um míssil de dois estágios, sendo o primeiro impulsionado por um motor turbofan usado na fase de cruzeiro, permitindo grande alcance em velocidade subsônica e mantendo a furtividade alta durante a maior parte da trajetória.

Tão logo o sistema de radar ativo do míssil detecta o navio alvo após ser acionado no ponto predeterminado (em torno de 15 km de distância), o segundo estágio se solta e acelera até Mach 3, impulsionado por um foguete sólido com baixa emissão de fumaça.


Tal conceito combina as vantagens dos sistemas altamente furtivos e manobráveis com a velocidade supersônica.


Um outro conceito muito interessante parece ser o uso de mísseis balísticos de médio alcance na função antinavio. Os chineses anunciaram que já possuem operacionais mísseis ASBM (míssil balístico antinavio) com alcance de 3000 km e velocidade de Mach 10.


Pesando quase 15 t, o DF-21 é dotado de uma ogiva de reentrada com um sistema de orientação por radar ativo que é acionado na fase terminal da trajetória balística. Aletas móveis possibilitam que o veículo de reentrada mude sua trajetória de modo a atingir um navio com precisão.


Lançador do míssil balístico chinês DF-21


Míssil balístico chinês DF-21


Contra “mísseis balísticos antinavios” os sistemas antimísseis atuais são completamente ineficazes. A única defesa possível é por meio de sistemas antibalísticos altamente avançados, usados por um reduzido grupo de nações.


Outra tecnologia que desponta é a dos mísseis de cruzeiro hipersônicos dotados de propulsão scramjet. Tais mísseis poderão atingir velocidades acima de Mach 6 e com certeza os navios do futuro terão que lidar com esse tipo de ameaça também.


Um programa de alta prioridade no âmbito da U.S. Navy está sendo ansiosamente aguardado. Ele foi designado como LRASM (míssil antinavio de longo alcance) e visa selecionar o substituto do Harpoon naquela força.


Com certeza será interessante ver qual conceito irá melhor satisfazer as necessidades da mais poderosa marinha do mundo.

[julio_cmb]

A MB deve ter tais novos conceitos em mente já que os escoltas ficarão por muito tempo navegando...

[alb]

Marino, show este texto, aprendi muito sobre estas operações , nunca tinha visto/lido um texto tão bom, sobre o assunto. .
Parabéns!!
Abraço
Alb

[Strike7]

Editado.

[Strike7]

Lições da maior batalha naval pós II GM:

As contas da guerra tendem para o centro, quando analizamos apenas o naufrágio dos dois navios, em particular:

O Cruzador argentino General Belgrano e o britânico HMS Sheffield.

Afundados por um submarino nuclear e um "míssil inteligente", respectivamente, o falecimento destes dois navios refletem importantes lições a serem aprendidas sobre a guerra naval, mas eles devem ser vistos num contexto mais amplo.

Submarinos e Armas "inteligentes" desempenharam um papel muito maior no conflito do que simplesmente afundar dois barcos;

A primeira operação envolvendo um submarino nas Malvinas foi da Argentina, utilizando seu submarino Santa Fe, ou ex-USS Catfish (SS 339), um sub classe diesel, encomendado em 1945.

O Santa Fé foi para as Ilhas Malvinas para secretamente afundar navios de suprimentos que seriam usadas pela guarnição, mas quando eles estavam se aproximando do porto de Grytviken, foram descobertos por um helicóptero britânico em Abril 25.2. O helicóptero era um de um grupo de cinco que consiste em: um Wessex, dois Wasp e dois Sea Lynx, que posteriormente dispararam sobre o submarino. Desamparados com as cargas de profundidade, o submarino tinha pouca defesa, exceto as espingardas encontradas a bordo. Então a equipe do Santa Fé encalhou estratégicamente o submarino danificado, para não afundar.

Embora este foi um encontro casual, ele destaca a vulnerabilidade de um submarino quando na superfície. Como o submarino é uma arma de cautela, uma vez que a discrição é removido, torna-se um pato sentado aos ataques do ar e mar.

O Santa Fe não foi o primeiro submarino em cena, no entanto, com o conflito político encaminhado em março, os submarinos nucleares britânicos Spartan, Splendid, foram requisitados para embarcar para as Ilhas Malvinas, para "preparar secretamente uma força-tarefa para o Atlântico Sul''

Essa ação mostrou duas vantagens do submarino nuclear moderno: velocidade e
stealth.

Graças às suas instalações de propulsão nuclear, os submarinos foram capazes de chegar muito antes do resto da força-tarefa britânica. Além disso, essa ação ocorreu sem que afeta-se a situação política. Porque os navios poderiam permanecer indetectados quase que indefinidamente.

Os Argentinos não tinham idéia de que os submarinos estavam fora de sua costa a menos que o britânico disse-lhes, assim, não agravariam uma situação já tensa. Na verdade, se os políticos tivessem sido capazes de resolver o conflito naquele momento, não teria havido nenhum vestígio dos submarinos britânicos na região.

O governo britânico acabou por informar a presença de seus submarinos, quando institui as 200 milhas "zona de exclusão marítima" em torno das Malvinas em 12 de abril. Isso efetivamente interrompeu qualquer operação naval argentina na área: o navio que se atrevesse a entrar nas águas de risco, patrulhadas pelos submarinos britânicos, seriam destruidos.

De fato, em um iluminação interessante sobre o ataque de submarinos nucleares, os britânicos poderiam ter atacado os argentinos, sem eles nunca saboubessem, como um submarinista britânico brincou, "a única forma de ter a certeza de que há um submarino inimigo, é quando o outro começa a perder navios''

Essa zona de exclusão marítima resultou no encontro de submarinos mais famosos da
guerra, o afundamento do cruzador argentino General Belgrano pelo HMS Conqueror. Em Maio. Segundo consta, o Belgrano e outras duas escoltas passaram a patrulhar fora da zona de exclusão.

Esta foi a primeira vez que um submarino nuclear atacou um navio de superfície em combate real.

Os argentinos aprenderam a lição muito bem: a marinha argentina ficou essencialmente escondida no porto a maior parte da guerra, especialmente a sua transportadora Veinticinco de Mayo.

Talvez a lição mais perturbadora da guerra é no reino do Anti-Submarine Warfare
(ASW). Argentina tinha apenas quatro submarinos diesel Guerra Mundial II da era, dos quais dois foram amarrados no porto: a bateria Salta foi empobrecido e Santiago del Estro foi canibalizado para parts de reposição.

Como mencionado acima, o Santa Fé foi danificado no início da guerra e, assim, permaneceu inoperante durante o conflito. No entanto, os britânicos gastaram uma quantidade extraordinária de tempo tentando localizar esses poucos submarinos. Uma enorme quantidade de explosivos foi lançada sobre contatos falsos, enquanto Sea King helicópteros anti-submarino constantemente patrulhavam a area.

Seus esforços foram confundidos pela dificuldade para realizar operações de sonar em agua rasa.

Os britânicos gastaram tanto tempo e poder de fogo ineficaz perseguindo um submarino diesel, que isto mostra a dificuldade de luta ASW e a letalidade dos submarinos, ainda mais para uma frota de grandes superfícies.

Na verdade, o San Luis disparou vários torpedos em navios britânicos, no entanto, o submarino não obteve sucesso. Suspeita-se que o "desalinhamento causou informações incorretas", e que, além disso, um excesso de zelo" o suboficial principal ... tinha incorretamente reconectado chumbo usado para dar um power-up nos torpedos. Provocou falhas nos misseis.

Isto mostra que é necessário não apenas ter a tecnologia, deve-se também ser bem treinados em usá-lo eficazmente.

Apesar da importância das operações de ASW, o objetivo britânico foi, finalmente, para ter de volta as ilhas.

Isto exigiu aviões para fornecer apoio aéreo às tropas de terra, e proteger a própria frota. O Sea Harrier, uma variante do verticaltakeoff Harrier caça a jato projetado para a Royal Navy, mostrou-se admiravelmente ao longo do conflito. O Sea Harriers foram lançados a partir do Hermes e Invincible, dois Vertical / Short Take-Off and Landing (V / STOL) transportadoras. Armado com mísseis AIM-9L Sidewinder, o Harriers superou as expectativas de seus comandantes, abater vários aviões da Argentina e fornecendo apoio aéreo próximo para o Exército e Marines.12 Royal Seu sucesso levou alguns na Marinha E.U. a considerar aumentar ou mesmo substituir a nossa frota das transportadoras convencionais com V / STOL modelos.

Observadores muitas vezes esquecemos que a vitória britânica nas Malvinas foi de modo algum uma certeza:

os britânicos Battle Group comandante, o almirante Sandy Woodward, disse que "grandes danos no Hermes ou Invincible ... provavelmente iria causar-nos a abandonar todo o Falkland Island operação. "

Para proteger esses recursos vitais, vários destroyers e fragatas foram enviadas essencialmente para constituem a primeira linha de defesa contra ataques aéreos argentinos. Um desses o destruidor, o HMS Sheffield foi afundado por um míssil Exocet francês.

O Sheffield não foi o único navio a ser atacado, No entanto, o Coventry, Glasgow, e ardente foram atingidos por armas convencionais (somente o Glasgow sobreviveu)

Da mesma forma, o Atlantic Conveyor, foi derrubado por dois mísseis Exocet e
Glamorgan escapou de outro Exocet. Além disso, o Sheffield não foi o primeiro navio a
ser afundado por uma "arma" inteligentes; já em 1967 os egípcios lançaram Styx de fabricação soviética mísseis, afundando o destróier israelense Eilat. Ao examinar o que causou esses navios a serem atingidos e / ou irrecuperáveis, podemos aprender lições vitais sobre a guerra de superfície.

Primeiro, a força-tarefa britânica faltava Airborne Early Warning (AEW), que pode detectar aviões jatos inimigo de longe, permitindo que navios tenham tempo para armar suas defesas e outros aviões tempo para abater o inimigo. Na verdade, as pesadas perdas como resultado de falta de AEW têm estimulado o Britânico para atualizar seus aviões Sea King AEW capability.

Como um almirante disse, é mais fácil "Atirar em índios, do que em setas."

De fato, oficiais da Marinha britânica explicaram depois do conflito que seus navios não foram concebidos para o conflito das Malvinas mas sim por um conjunto NATO com o apoio aéreo próximo fornecido pela Navy.

No entanto, a depender da ajuda única. Vários almirantes aposentados manifestaram preocupação: o almirante Hyman Rickover disse que eles iriam durar "cerca de dois dias" em um grande conflito com os soviéticos.

Assim, convite à apresentação de sistemas de defesa em muitos navios próprios para abater mísseis que passem pela defesas do portador. Aqui, os E.U. pontos da Marinha para o Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (Carinhosamente conhecido como o CIWS) como defesa última trincheira contra mísseis.

No entanto, nenhum sistema de defesa é útil se ele não é ativado. Esta lição mostrou-se bem no começo da o USS Stark, no Golfo Pérsico em 1987 por um míssil Exocet quase idênticos aos que bateu o Sheffield, Atlantic Conveyor, e Glamorgan. Como o Sheffield, o Stark não empregar as contramedidas disponíveis, seu capitão alegou que o aviso eletrônico do navio sistema não conseguiu detectar o míssil, e que o sistema Phalanx não estava no automático, com medo de atacar forças aliadas. Uma proposta é integrar as tecnologias de inteligência artificial em fechar os sistemas de armas, como Aegis da Marinha system.

Enfim, não importa o quão bem defendido é um navio, existe sempre a possibilidade de ser atingido. Examinando os navios no conflito das Malvinas, obtemos lições valiosas em controle de danos, combate a incêndios e concepção dos navios.

Um aspecto frequentemente esquecido do conflito das Malvinas, é o papel da logística.

Apesar da fantasia das armas "inteligentes" e "state-of-the-art tecnologia de aviação, a guerra, como todas as guerras desde o alvorecer do combate foi ganho com a logística.

Os britânicos tinham de fornecer as balas "e feijão" para abastecer os seus marinheiros e soldados em uma guerra 8.000 milhas longe de casa. Eles realizaram isso por dois métodos: Primeiro, eles estabeleceram um "forward" base na Ilha de Ascensão, o transporte aéreo e tropas para a ilha no início do conflict.

Embora a ilha estivesse a 3750 milhas de distância das Malvinas, isto cortou pela metade a distância necessária para reabastecer a frota britânica.

Em segundo lugar, o British utilizou a sua frota mercante, considerável, para enviar suprimentos de Ascensão para a tarefa vigor. Esta solução "particularmente engenhosa" envolveu o uso de um número de navios civis, incluindo o luxo liner Queen Elizabeth II, para o transporte de tropas e materiel.

Claro, O plano funcionou, principalmente porque os argentinos não conseguiram atacar esses navios mercantes. O Argentinos essencialmente cometeu o mesmo erro que os japoneses tinham na II Guerra Mundial: a atacar os navios de guerra ao invés dos mal defendidos navios de logística.

Dado este quadro mais amplo do conflito das Malvinas, pode-se tirar lições importantes
dos submarinos e da guerra de superfície. A vulnerabilidade dos submarinos à superfície, a velocidade e descrição dos submarinos nucleares, a dificuldade das operações de ASW, a viabilidade das transportadoras CTOL, a necessidade de alerta aéreo e defesas de guerra eletrônica, ea importância da logística.

[Andre Correa]

Umas perguntas:
1. No caso de sofrer um possível ataque ou de atacar um alvo de superfície, uma ou mais fragatas estão sempre acompanhadas por um submarino?
2. Uma fragata, quando quer atacar um submarino, utiliza sempre seu Heli ASW?
3. Em que caso uma fragata usa um torpedo para atacar? Não compensa mais atacar com um Exocet ou Harpoon? E o Canhão, é usado quando?
4. Numa formação de 5 escoltas para um NAe, usam 1 para todas funções de detecção, exemplo: Aérea, Superfície e Sonar, ou cada uma com uma função, ou ainda todas com todas funções online (No caso de combate)?

[papagaio]

Vou dar minha opinião:
1) Que tipo de ataque ?
2) O helicóptero oferece grande flexibilidade, ataque a maiores distâncias, ... mas os escoltas possuem tubos lançadores de torpedo para atacar submarinos. Caindo em desuso, existem sistemas que transportam torpedos a maiores distâncias (exemplo, foguete ASROC, IKARA, ....)
3) Torpedos são armas atualmente para ataques a submarinos. Torpedos lançados por navios para ataques a outros navios, estão em desuso, costumavam ser usados em destroyers da segunda guerra e pequenos navios patrulhas nos anos 50/60/70 .... Torpedos que atacam navios são diferentes (muito maiores) do que torpedos que atacam submarinos.
Exocet / Harpoon são mísseis anti-navio, não podem ser usados contra submarinos (apenas na remota hipótese do mesmo estar na superfície).
Canhões são usados para atacar navios, alvos terrestres, aeronaves, .... são armas muito flexíveis e os ingleses se arrependeram muito, pois alguns de seus navios não possuíam canhões nas Falklands, erro corrigido nas classes de navios que se seguiram. Pense também que navios possuem um estoque de mísseis limitados e contra alvos simples, não vale a pena disparar um míssil, que é muito caro.
4) Isso vai depender do tipo de ameaça esperada. Se for esperado um ataque aéreo, todos os navios estarão com seus radares de busca aérea ligados, mas conectados por link de dados. Se houver ameaça de submarino, todos estarão efetuando buscas com seus sonares, ....
Abs,

[ciclope]

O que me espanta nesse texto e que eles adimitem que se os argentinos estivessem com uma força submarina boa e torpediassem os seus porta-aviões a guerra acabaria!

[Marino]

What is Green Water?

Advocates of building out a balanced force structure consisting of
larger numbers of smaller, shallow draft ships to complement a smaller
number of higher end surface combatants often use the term "green
water" to characterize the environment where a smaller vessel
capability would operate. But what does green water really mean?
During a recent CSBA workshop on maritime irregular warfare, a lively
debate ensued on this issue, without much consensus.

The NOC delineates three categories which one might assume are
included to help differentiate operating environments and steer the
range of capabilities that might be required by naval forces in those
areas:

"Blue water refers to the open ocean; green water refers to coastal
waters, ports and harbors; and brown water refers to navigable rivers
and their estuaries." The distinction is important, not just from an
operating paradigm, but in relation to the spectrum of future (and
current) naval force structures.

An advocate of exclusively high end ships would be quick to point out
that large combatants are equally capable of operating in coastal
waters. Which of course is true, as deep draft cruisers, destroyers,
and amphibious ships frequently perform missions in areas near the
OPLATs in the Northern Arabian Gulf or within sight of land off
various third world coasts. Because blue water ships are capable of
operating in coastal areas, one will frequently hear the argument that
a force of less green water ships to complement multi-mission blue
water ships isn't required.

Balanced force "green water" evangelists must challenge this logic. In
an effort further the discourse, let me suggest a new definition for
consideration: green water is a maritime environment in which a large
naval vessel is unable to perform effectively due to any number of
operational constraints. These reasons could include, but are not
limited to:

Draft - The most obvious limitation of large ships in coastal areas is
hydrography. For example, the LCS' 15 foot draft opens up the number
of ports that the Navy can access globally from 362 to 1,111.
Extrapolated from the number ports to actual of square miles of
acessible waterspace, a 15-20 feet less draft makes a considerable
impact and a sub-10 foot draft exponentially more so. As much as we
may want to relive the glory days of WWII and Cold War naval
operations, the more likely scenario is that current and future
operations and conflicts will occur in the littorals. The ability to
operate in nearly every square meter of water is an imperative to
exercising US sea power globally.

Partner Force Overmatch - When working with nascent navies, employing
billion dollar vessels that in some cases represents a significant
percentage of a partner nation's GDP makes little sense. At best,
utilizing larger surface combatants even in exercise roles can be
patronizing or intimidating. Small navies more readily identify with
vessels that are actually within the realm of the possible for them to
procure, operate, and maintain.
Sovereignity Considerations - In a scenario where the US Navy
operationally supports a partner nation in a FID role in coastal
waters, the host nation would probably like to minimize the perception
of US involvement. Large, overtly-US ships conducting MSO or other
missions inside territorial waters may create a sense of illegitimacy
toward the host-nation government. Ironically, the same constraint
applies even to HA/DR operations in situations where host government
control is tenuous. Deploying our large blue-water hospital ships in
such an environment isn't advisable if a lower profile vessel with
adequate medical capability is available.
Enemy Decision Cycle - In an hybrid warfare environment, a stateless
enemy with only a handful of higher end, state-provided, sea denial
capabilities such as anti-ship cruise missiles will likely choose his
targets carefully to maximize impact at a minimal cost. A capital
surface combatant off the coast makes a more tempting and high profile
target than a larger number of smaller green water combatants.

Vulnerability to Sea Denial Threats - Although losing the initiative
in naval warfare is always tactically unwise; recent history, culture,
and ROE leads one to the conclusion that US surface ships usually take
the first hit upon initiation of hostilities at sea. Given this
probability, smaller, less expensive vessels should be stationed
closer to shore than large ships where land-based enemy sea denial
threats such as ASCMs, FAC swarm attacks, mines, or any combination of
those may be expected. Although unpleasant to think about, the loss of
a billion+ dollar combatant and hundreds of Sailors is much less
palatable to the American people than a couple dozen Sailors and a sub-
one hundred million dollar vessel. The oft-heard counter-argument is
that larger ships are more survivable than smaller ships; in future
posts, we'll explore that contention in more detail.

The above green water definition is admittedly imperfect; however the
debate of high end only versus balanced force must take into account
non-traditional constraints to blue water ship operations in the
littorals. A corollary of this definition that favors maintenance of a
robust force of large combatants is that smaller vessels are often
unable to operate independently for any duration in "blue water" due
to considerations such as range or sea state. Clearly a properly
balanced blue/green/brown water naval force is in order to deal with
the full range of operating environments.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author
alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or
any of its agencies.

[Marino]

AirSea Battle

By Richard Halloran

A new operational concept looks to prepare the US and its allies to
deter or defeat Chinese power.
After three Air Force C-130 pilots and crews from Yokota Air Base in
Japan finished an exercise called Cope West 10 in Indonesia in April,
they wrote up evaluations of Halim Air Base and other airfields from
which they had operated, assessing the condition of runways,
reliability of electrical supply, safety of fuel storage, and adequacy
of parking ramps.
Until now, that would have been a routine report to prepare for the
next time American airmen might use Indonesian air bases. With the
emergence of a joint Air Force-Navy operational concept called AirSea
Battle, however, intelligence on airfields has taken on new
significance.
A critical element in the concept is to identify alternate airfields
all over Asia that Air Force and Navy aircraft might operate from one
day. US aircraft can be dispersed there, making life hard for a
potential enemy such as China to select targets. Dispersed bases
simultaneously would make it easier for an American pilot needing an
emergency landing site to find one if his home base had been bombed.
AirSea Battle looks to prepare the US and its allies to deter or
defeat China’s rising military power. It envisions operations of USAF
fighters, bombers, and missiles coordinated with Navy aircraft flown
from carriers and land bases—plus missiles launched from submarines
and surface ships. Nuclear war plans will also be folded into the
AirSea Battle operation.
A question, however, has arisen over who will control the joint war.
USAF expects the 613th Air and Space Operations Center of 13th Air
Force at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, to be assigned that task, but the Navy
has traditionally been loath to give up control of its carrier air
wings.
Moreover, the Navy has organized Maritime Operations Centers that
would need to be meshed with USAF’s AOCs, and Air Force and Navy
sensors and communications gear that are not now compatible need to be
made so.
At US air and naval bases in Japan, South Korea, and Guam, the
evolving AirSea concept calls for hardening command centers,
communication nodes, hangars and repair facilities, fuel tanks,
electrical generators, warehouses, shipyard machine shops, and just
about anything else that can be protected from missile attack. For
runways and ramps that can’t be protected, RED HORSE engineers are to
be posted in protective shelters nearby from which they can swiftly
emerge to repair damaged areas.
The plan even calls for developing new materials that will harden in
far less time than ordinary concrete to make a damaged runway
operational again.
Further, AirSea Battle will incorporate an "active" defense, employing
a variety of measures to destroy enemy aircraft and missiles or to
reduce the damage of such attacks. Active defense relies on aircraft,
air defense weapons, electronic warfare, and cyber operations. In
particular, AirSea Battle calls for greater emphasis on the
development of ballistic missile defenses.
The purpose of AirSea Battle is clearly to deter China, with its
rapidly expanding and improving military power, from seeking to drive
the US out of East Asia and the Western Pacific. If deterrence fails,
AirSea Battle’s objective will be to defeat the People’s Liberation
Army, which comprises all of China’s armed forces. The Obama
Administration and the Pentagon contend that war with China is not
inevitable, which may be so, but a memo outlining the purpose of a
previous AirSea Battle wargame left no doubt that the US is preparing
for that possibility.
"The game will position US air, naval, space, and special operations
forces against a rising military competitor in the East Asian littoral
with a range of disruptive capabilities, including multidimensional
‘anti-access’ networks, offensive and defensive space control
capabilities, an extensive inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles,
and a modernized attack submarine fleet," the memo read. "The scenario
will take place in a notional 2028."
There is only one "rising military competitor in the East Asia
littoral," and that is China. Long term, China offers the only real
potential threat to US national security, far more than Iraq,
Afghanistan, Iran, or North Korea.
In perhaps the most remarkable expansion of military power since the
US geared up for World War II, China has relied on its surging economy
to provide double-digit annual increases in military budgets. The
Chinese are fielding an array of advanced jet aircraft, anti-aircraft
missiles, radar, anti-air and anti-submarine ships, and minelayers
intended to deny US air and naval forces access to Chinese skies and
nearby waters. They are building a blue-water Navy to project power
eastward toward Alaska, Guam, and even Hawaii and south into the South
China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Coordinated Requests
AirSea Battle is not conceived as a "go-it-alone" initiative but one
that will rely on allies in the Pacific and Asia, notably Japan and
Australia, as US forces seek to overcome what is known in this region
as the tyranny of distance. Americans who haven’t traveled the Pacific
often have no notion of how far apart things are. For example, it is
twice as far from Tokyo to Sydney, Australia (4,921 miles), as from
Washington, D.C., to San Francisco (2,442 miles).
In addition to Japan continuing to host American forces, AirSea Battle
calls for greater integration of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces with US
forces stationed in that country, particularly in intelligence and
warning systems. Japan would be asked to continue contributing to the
development of ballistic missile defenses and to increase its own air
defenses. AirSea Battle would call on Japan to expand its anti-
submarine barriers down through the Ryukyu Islands in southwestern
Japan and into the Sea of Japan. Political turmoil in Tokyo today will
make that coordination difficult, to say the least.
In contrast, the alliance between Australia and the US, resting on a
foundation laid down during World War II and continuing ever since, is
less likely to be affected by political changes in the government.
Thus, AirSea Battle would have the Australians develop anti-ship
cruise missiles and to erect long-range radar that would improve
coverage in the southern hemisphere. The Australians take a special
interest in the Southwest Pacific region that can be helpful to the
US. Overall, Australia provides the alliance with strategic depth.
AirSea Battle calls on the Air Force and Navy to devise a division of
labor to eliminate duplication in resources and equipment. The two
services, for instance, have begun planning for a new joint air
launched cruise missile to replace the aging AGM-86 and BGM-109
Tomahawk. So far, only relatively small change has been spent for
wargames and research. Those engaged in AirSea Battle say that
coordinated requests will go forward in the Fiscal 2012 budget. A good
portion of that will go into joint training and robust wargames.
Even as the Pentagon is contemplating AirSea Battle to deter or defeat
China, the US has been seeking stable, working military relations with
the PLA. At the annual Shangri-La gathering of Asian and Pacific
military leaders in Singapore in June, Secretary of Defense Robert M.
Gates said the US wanted "sustained and reliable military-to-military
contacts at all levels that reduce miscommunication, misunderstanding,
and miscalculation. There is a real cost to the absence of military-to-
military relations. I believe they are essential to regional security—
and essential to developing a broad, resilient US-China relationship
that is positive in tone, cooperative in nature, and comprehensive in
scope."
At the same time, Gates has been publicly supportive of the AirSea
Battle venture. In the Quadrennial Defense Review published in
February, he said the Pentagon was directing "more focus and
investment in a new air-sea battle concept, long-range strike, space
and cyberspace, among other conventional and strategic modernization
programs."
The precedent for AirSea Battle was AirLand Battle, an Army-Air Force
effort in the 1980s to dissuade the Soviet Union from striking through
the Fulda Gap in Germany and seeking to drive to the English Channel.
Gen. Colin L. Powell, onetime corps commander in Germany and later
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had said the US might resort to
nuclear arms if NATO could not stop the first two waves of the Soviet
force.
No Fait Accompli
The concept of AirSea Battle is being forged in a collaborative effort
of Pacific Air Forces, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, and the Pentagon’s influential Office of Net Assessment.
AirSea Battle was begun under the former PACAF commander, Gen. Carrol
H. Chandler, now vice chief of staff of the Air Force. CSBA is a
Washington think tank with close ties to the Pentagon, two of its
chief researchers, Jan M. van Tol and Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.,
having worked in the Office of Net Assessment, while Mark A. Gunzinger
was engaged in drafting the Pentagon’s Defense Planning Guidance and
Jim Thomas toiled on the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Office of Net
Assessment, often labeled the Defense Department’s internal think
tank, has been led for nearly 40 years by Andrew W. Marshall,
considered to be among the nation’s foremost strategic thinkers.
Over the last three years, the collaborators have staged a half-dozen
wargames to scope the tasks of AirSea Battle and have sent their
findings to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. Norton A.
Schwartz, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Gary Roughead.
Schwartz and Roughead signed a memorandum of understanding in
September to proceed on AirSea Battle. Each appointed a team of four
O-6s to draft tentative doctrine to govern AirSea Battle.
The draft doctrine will undoubtedly be sandpapered for many months
before an agreement is reached.
Based on PLA writings, researchers at CSBA have discerned a likely
Chinese strategy for seeking to drive US forces out of the western
Pacific, a strategy they say "mimics the Imperial Japanese strategy of
1941-1942."
The Japanese mounted the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7,
1941, intending to destroy the US Pacific Fleet. Simultaneously, the
Japanese Army invaded the Philippines and broke out of northern
Vietnam to transit across Thailand into what is now Malaysia and on to
Singapore. They took what is now Indonesia, critical islands in the
South Pacific, and threatened Australia, then marched to the gates of
India. Japan intended to present the Western powers with a fait
accompli and sue for peace. That strategy, however, failed.
China, say the researchers, may be planning a pre-emptive missile
strike intended to destroy US air bases at Osan and Kunsan in South
Korea; Misawa, Yokota, MCAS Iwakuni, and Kadena in Japan; and bases on
the US island of Guam, plus US naval bases at Yokosuka and Sasebo in
Japan. South Korean and Japanese forces would be attacked. Chinese
missile, naval, and air forces would try to keep other US forces out
of range, to disrupt US command lines, and to block logistic
resupply.
"The overall strategy may be to inflict substantial losses on US
forces, lengthen US operational timelines, and highlight the United
States’ inability to defend its allies," the CSBA analysts wrote.
"Once this is accomplished, the PLA could assume the strategic defense
and deny reinforcing US forces access to the theater until the US
determines that it would be too costly to undo what would, in effect,
be a fait accompli."
If the Chinese attack, AirSea Battle would have US forces begin an
active defense, disperse aircraft and ships, and rely on hardening and
resilience to ride out and to recover from the assault.
The US and its allies would initiate a "blinding campaign" to knock
out Chinese reconnaissance aircraft, surveillance satellites, and long-
range, over-the-horizon radar. B-52 bombers and Ohio-class submarines,
both armed with conventional cruise missiles, would seek to suppress
further Chinese missile salvos and aerial assaults.
Gradually, the US would gain the initiative in the air, on the sea’s
surface, and in the undersea domain, relying on the better quality of
US aircraft, ships, and submarines and the superior training of
airmen, sailors, and submariners.
American forces from the continental US would begin to flow into the
Pacific to enter a protracted campaign. A "distant blockade" against
Chinese shipping would be started in the East and South China Seas and
the Strait of Malacca and other passages, as Chinese industry is
heavily dependent on imports. That would be easier than a close
blockade just outside Chinese ports.
Basing Options Abound
A sustained logistic flow from the US into the Pacific would be built
up, and industrial production of weapons, equipment, and especially
precision guided munitions would be stepped up.
A complicated aspect of AirSea Battle will be identifying alternate
air bases such as the one the C-130 crews operated from in Indonesia
and then gaining long-term access to them. For many bases, the State
Department may be required to negotiate agreements permitting US
aircraft to fly in on short notice. That may stir diplomatic trouble
as some nations worry that the Chinese will object.
In addition, funds may be required to bring the condition of some
airfields up to snuff.
High on the list of basing possibilities are air bases the US has used
in the past, such as Clark Air Base in the Philippines, dating back to
1903. The Philippine government and the volcanic eruption of Mount
Pinatubo caused the US to leave Clark in 1991, but the base’s runways
have been scraped off, and the airfield is occasionally used by US
forces passing through the Philippines. In the Northern Marianas,
airfields on Saipan and Tinian were built by naval construction
battalions (Seabees) during World War II. Airfields at U Tapao and
Korat in Thailand were built by the Thais but upgraded and expanded by
the US during the war in Vietnam.
Air bases in northern Australia have been used for joint exercises.
An intriguing possibility might be Tan Son Nhut, the airport near
Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City) in Vietnam, built by French colonials in
the 1930s and expanded by the US during the war in Vietnam. It is now
the major civilian airport in southern Vietnam.
Similarly, the Vietnamese port at Cam Ranh Bay, the finest in
Southeast Asia, was a stopping place for a Russian fleet on the way to
disaster at the hands of the Japanese in the Battle of Tsushima in
1905. Japan used it to prepare for its drive into Southeast Asia
during World War II, and the US enlarged it during the Vietnam War.
Whether the Vietnamese, who don’t much like the Chinese but see no
need to anger them, would allow US warships to use the port is open to
question.
US military leaders have been cultivating Indian military leaders for
several years and might ask for access to the many airfields there. In
Pakistan next door, the US used a military airfield at Peshawar, in
the Northwest Frontier province, as a base for U-2 intelligence
flights over the Soviet Union for three years until Francis Gary
Powers got shot down in 1960.
Although AirSea Battle has China in mind, American political leaders
have publicly maintained that the US is not seeking to contain China.
An American aviator, however, pointed to a map marking air bases from
Osan in South Korea, to Korat in Thailand, to Peshawar in Pakistan,
and asked: "It does sort of look like a picket line, doesn’t it?"
Who Controls AirSea Battle?
A key player in executing AirSea Battle would be Adm. Robert F.
Willard, who leads US Pacific Command from his headquarters in
Honolulu. After taking command last fall, Willard set up five focus
group to examine PACOM’s strategy toward China, India, and North
Korea, treaty partners and friends from Japan to Singapore, and
transnational issues such as terror, piracy, drug smuggling, and human
trafficking.
"This is what combatant commanders across the globe should be
attending to," Willard said in an interview. Most American military
leaders are comfortable with day-to-day operations, he said, but
needed "more of a focus on alignment with our national strategies and
policies and more of a focus on understanding the strategies and
policies of our regional counterparts."
Elaborating later, Willard seemed cautious about how AirSea Battle
would fit into his vision for PACOM. He said he had been briefed on
the concept, and "I expressed some issues with what I heard,
especially with regard to their ability to adapt whatever their
concept derives to the ground forces." Willard contended that "the
AirSea Battle construct will unquestionably need to integrate with
what our Marine forces bring to the game," and because the battlespace
"includes the littorals, what the Army brings to the game is
important, too. So there is a great deal of work yet to do to see if
this concept really reveals something that will be useful."
Willard, a naval aviator (as is the Pacific Fleet commander, Adm.
Patrick M. Walsh), was asked who controls AirSea Battle. "It’s
presumptive to get into the command relations debate now when the
concept is in fledgling development," he said.
"I need to see where and how it’s intended to be adapted, and then we
can talk about the command relations," he added.
________________________________________
Richard Halloran, formerly a New York Times foreign correspondent in
Asia and military correspondent in Washington, D.C., is a freelance
writer based in Honolulu. His most recent article for Air Force
Magazine, "China Turns Up the Heat," appeared in the April issue.

[Marino]

What's New About the AirSea Battle Concept?

Issue: Proceedings Magazine - August 2010 Vol. 136/8/1,290

By Jose Carreno, Thomas Culora, Captain George Galdorisi, U.S. Navy
(Retired), and Thomas Hone

Four naval strategists take a look back at Navy-Air Force cooperation
in the past to explain all the buzz surrounding this latest strategy.

The Navy-Air Force AirSea Battle Concept (ASBC), modeled after the
Army-Air Force Air Land Battle Doctrine of a previous generation, has
been heralded by some as the answer to compelling strategic and
operational challenges facing the U.S. military today. But is this
really a new strategy? And old or new, will it help the United States
deal with compelling world-wide issues?

Understanding where we have been may provide insight into where we can
go and what we can accomplish with this concept. It may also prepare
the Navy and Air Force for some of the likely as well as unintended
consequences this concept may create.

Writing in a National Defense University National War College
publication in 1992, then-Commander James Stavridis stated: "We need
an air sea battle concept centered on an immediately deployable,
highly capable, and fully integrated force-an Integrated Strike
Force."1 As this quote-by now-Admiral Stavridis, the current Supreme
Allied Commander Europe-suggests, neither the term "AirSea Battle
Concept" nor the concept itself is brand new. Rather, this integration
of sea and air forces has roots that extend back over a half-century.
Taking to the Air Against U-Boats

The first useful example of an ASBC occurred during the Battle of the
Atlantic campaign to defeat German U-boats. By January 1943, more than
100 submarines were prowling the Atlantic Ocean. Their most effective
hunting ground was in the so-called "air gap" between the southern tip
of Greenland and the longest range of patrol aircraft based in North
America. In this area, convoys relied on their own surface escorts for
protection.

Previously, Atlantic convoys had often been routed around U-boats
waiting to ambush them by using intelligence based on ULTRA decrypts
of intercepted German radio communications. But before the Allies
could effectively pinpoint the locations of the U-boats using ULTRA,
for three weeks in March 1943 wolf packs operating mostly in the air
gap sank more than 20 percent of all Allied shipping plying the North
Atlantic. During this same month British, Canadian, and American
forces responsible for countering the U-boat threat put a plan in
place to allocate a small force of very-long-range B-24 Liberator
aircraft to cover the gap.

When the B-24s and aircraft from the newly assigned escort carriers
started covering convoys, the advantage tipped in favor of the Allies.
In May 1943, the German Navy lost 47 U-boats in the North Atlantic.
When this precursory ASBC was expanded in October 1943 to include long-
range Allied patrol aircraft operating from the Azores, U-boats were
at greater risk over even larger areas of the Atlantic.

In this long campaign, British, Canadian, and U.S. forces considered
and implemented a number of other coordinated air-sea battle tactics,
including: bombing the U-boat bases on the French coast; ambushing U-
boats transiting the Bay of Biscay from the air; targeting the yards
where they were built; and reinforcing surface convoy escorts with
land-based blimps and seaplanes.

All of these efforts were part of an extended air-sea battle of
attrition, where Allied air and naval units worked together to punch
through an anti-access, area-denial envelope that German naval forces
tried to impose on the North Atlantic sea lanes. Over the course of
that long campaign, naval and air officers developed means of
cooperation and coordination-especially of air assets-that prevailed.
But it is important to understand that the Navy, by itself, was able
then and is capable now to conduct an air-sea battle. The salient
question is, to what extent did and does cooperation either make U.S.
forces more efficient or create real synergy?
Aircraft and Amphibs in the Philippines

Another useful illustration is the effective air-sea campaign waged in
and around the Philippines in late 1944 by U.S. Army and Navy aircraft
and Navy and Marine Corps amphibious forces. U.S carrier task forces
and U.S. Army long-range, land-based air forces struck distant
Japanese bases and made it difficult for the Japanese to reinforce
their air assets in the Philippines. Moreover, the 7th Fleet escort
carriers directly under General Douglas MacArthur's command provided
fighter and attack support in a display of real integration.

The key factor-well understood by both Army and Navy planners?-was the
critical role long-range, land-based aviation had in expanding the
offensive air envelope under which amphibious forces operated.
Accordingly, the Army and Navy assaulted the islands of Biak and
Morotai before moving on to Leyte because air units flying from those
islands were crucial to the penetration of Japanese defenses in the
Philippines.

Thus, Navy and Army air assets complemented each other to accomplish
critical operational tasks to support campaign victories in both the
Atlantic and Pacific theaters during World War II. The precedent had
been set, crucial lessons learned, and the power and synergy of the
combined land- and sea-based air forces established.
Why the AirSea Battle Concept?

Earlier this year, Todd Harrison wrote the following in The New Guns
Versus Butter Debate, published by the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments (CSBA): "The fiscal reality is that in a flat or
declining budgetary environment, [the DOD] cannot continue to do both
[fund personnel accounts as well as acquisition accounts] to the same
extent it does today."2

Throughout the Cold War, the potential fight on the plains of Europe
dominated U.S. strategic thinking. The military element of this
strategy, primarily carried out by the Army and Air Force, had by the
1980s evolved into what became known as the AirLand Battle Doctrine.
The doctrine led to new operational concepts that recognized an
emerging threat based on Soviet numerical superiority coupled with a
narrowing technological gap. A memorandum cosigned by the Army and Air
Force chiefs outlined steps to achieve procurement and operational
synergies to restore conventional warfighting capabilities after the
Vietnam War.

But for nearly a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S.
military-strategic planners had little motivation to develop a broad
fighting doctrine, and the services had even less incentive to
collaborate.

The one notable exception to this came during Operation Desert Storm.
But in that case, the opposing air and sea forces were minimal and the
core doctrine only tangentially employed. By the early 1990s, analysis
by the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment began to examine whether a
"dramatic shift in the character of military competitions was
underway." Their prescient conclusion now resonates as they
highlighted the real possibility of the rise of potential challenge
from a "peer competitor" (i.e., China) and a "second order challenge
from a 'non-peer' competitor" (i.e., Iran).3

Pentagon strategists examining the changing nature of warfare were
given new impetus by the congressionally mandated National Defense
Panel (NDP) 1997 report's conclusion that "The United States 'must
radically alter' the way in which its military projects power."4
However, this momentum slowed as the attacks of 9/11 dramatically
changed the focus of the U.S. military to the exigencies of a war on
terrorism.
The Timeline, China, and the Economy

By the end of the first decade of the 21st century several trends
converged that demanded a new focus on an ASBC. One was the Obama
administration's shift in emphasis away from the war on terrorism and
its decision to draw down the U.S. commitment to Iraq and Afghanistan
on a finite timeline. A second was the startlingly rapid rise of China
over this decade. As the head of Pacific Command, Admiral Robert
Willard, has noted, "Elements of China's military modernization appear
designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region."5 And a
third was the unanticipated economic recession faced by the United
States.

On the heels of the deepest economic crisis since the 1930s, and with
the federal budget deficit running in excess of $1.5 trillion in
Fiscal Year 2010, the age-old "guns versus butter" debate has brought
into sharper focus the consistent theme that the U.S. military may not
have the strategic assets needed to deter, and if necessary prevail,
against a high-end peer competitor like China. A key assumption
underpinning the ASBC is that without better coordination between and
among the U.S. military services, especially the Navy and the Air
Force, this outcome is all but guaranteed. Moreover, the concept will
have limited or no effect unless these joint air and naval planners
tie actual operational requirements to specific capabilities.

Faced with a rising threat of peer and near-peer competitors with
alarming anti-access/area-denial capabilities-as well as long-term
budget pressures-the ASBC can be viewed as greater than an attempt to
do more with less. Rather, it is a return to historical precedents
when, like today, compelling strategic and operational realities
forced U.S. naval and air forces to work together in a truly
integrated fashion to project power against a determined foe. But a
skeptic who doubts the ability of the current procurement system to
respond in a meaningful way to this rising challenge may opine that
the ASBC will only result in a rearrangement of existing doctrine and
systems and not be a truly adaptive and dynamic approach.
Just What Is the AirSea Battle Concept?

Also earlier this year, the CSBA published Air Sea Battle: A Point of
Departure Operational Concept, which stated: "The most important
question proponents of the AirSea Battle Concept must answer is
whether the concept would help to restore and sustain a stable
military balance in the Western Pacific."6

At the request of Secretary of Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Chief
of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead and Air Force Chief of Staff
General Norton Schwartz directed an effort to explore how U.S air and
naval forces could combine and integrate their capabilities to
confront increasingly complex threats to U.S. freedom of action.7

To gain a global perspective, this joint team interviewed each U.S.
combatant commander to understand the scope of threats they are likely
to face over the next 10 to 20 years, particularly at the "high-end of
warfare." Government officials have been keen to point out that the
ASBC is not aimed at any particular country or region. But ultimately,
the goal is to identify how combined Air Force and Navy capabilities
can address these threats.8

After months of teasers and speculation in defense journals and
conferences, the release of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
provided greater clarity on the scope and raison d'être behind this
concept. As part of its guidance to rebalance the force, the QDR
directed the development of the air-sea battle concept to:

[Defeat] adversaries across the range of military operations,
including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area
denial capabilities. The concept will address how air and naval forces
will integrate capabilities across all operational domains-air, sea,
land, space, and cyberspace-to counter growing challenges to U.S.
freedom of action.9
Protecting Power-Projection Capability

Independent analysts have been less reticent in naming specific
regional adversaries. Two studies by the CSBA highlight the efforts of
China and Iran as catalysts behind the concept. As the first of these
studies lays out, both nations are investing in capabilities to "raise
precipitously over time-and perhaps prohibitively-the cost to the
United States of projecting power into two areas of vital interest:
the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf."10 By adopting anti-access/
area-denial capabilities, these potential adversaries seek to deny U.S
forces the sanctuary of forward bases, hold aircraft carriers and
their air wings at risk, and cripple U.S. battle networks. In other
words, strike at the weak point of U.S. power-projection capability.
To be effective, the ASBC must change that through a combination of
capabilities and operational warfighting. If it doesn't, adversaries
will still be able to deny access to U.S. forces.

In its second study, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational
Concept, CSBA analyzes possible options to counter the anti-access/
area-denial (A2/AD) threat posed by the Chinese People's Liberation
Army (PLA). First and foremost, CSBA argues, the AirSea Battle Concept
should help "set the conditions" to retain a favorable military
balance in the Western Pacific.11 By creating credible capabilities to
defeat A2/AD threats, the United States can enhance stability in the
Western Pacific and lower the possibility of escalation by deterring
inclinations to challenge the United States or coerce regional allies.
12

The precise nature of the ASBC will not be known until Pentagon
planners complete their work. But based on the broad outlines of the
CSBA's Point-of-Departure Operational Concept study, it is likely that
in the initial stages of hostilities the United States would need to
withstand an initial attack and limit damage to U.S. and allied forces
while executing a blinding campaign against the PLA battle networks.
However, the need to withstand an initial attack is a potential flaw
in the CSBA plan. Prudence and technical reality would suggest that
the ASBC should find a way to make U.S. forces less visible and
targetable while retaining the ability to be forward with credible
combat power. Being less visible and targetable raises the risk of
initiating a first strike and contributes to deterring a potential
foe.

Failing deterrence, the ASBC assumes that a conflict with China would
involve a protracted campaign where U.S-led forces would then sustain
and exploit the initiative in various domains, conduct distant
blockade operations against ships bound for China, maintain
operational logistics, and ramp up industrial production of needed
hardware, especially precision-guided munitions. However, it is
important to note that in a shorter (and perhaps more likely)
conflict, blockade, logistics, and procurement will have minimal
impact on the outcome.
The Strategy

But it is the ways Navy and Air Force assets would provide mutual
support in this campaign that can make the ASBC, if it evolves in a
manner that many strategic thinkers believe it should, a modern-day
equivalent of some of the innovative strategies and tactics employed
by U.S. air and sea forces in World War II. If the ASBC evolves as the
CSBA study suggests, Navy and Air Force planners may evolve a strategy
in which:

* Air Force counter-space operations would blind PLA space-based
ocean surveillance systems to prevent the PLA from targeting Navy
surface assets, providing the Navy with operational freedom of
maneuver.
* Navy Aegis ships would supplement other missile-defense assets
in Air Force forward bases in the Western Pacific.
* Long-range penetrating strike operations would destroy PLA
ground-based, long-range maritime surveillance systems and long-range
ballistic-missile launchers to expand the Navy's freedom of maneuver
and reduce strikes on U.S. and allied bases. Concurrently, Navy
submarine-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
and strike support against PLA integrated air defense systems would
pave the way for Air Force strikes.
* Navy carrier-based fighters' progressive rollback of PLA manned
and unmanned airborne ISR platforms and fighters would secure the
forward operation of Air Force tankers and other support aircraft.
This would require the Navy to rethink its current inventory of
missiles, jammers, and decoys.
* Air Force aircraft would support the antisubmarine warfare
campaign through offensive mining by stealthy bombers and persistent
non-stealthy bomber strike support of Navy ships conducting distant
blockade operations.13

The evidence also suggests that this ASBC will, indeed, gain traction
throughout the U.S. military. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral
Mike Mullen has already put his imprint on the concept. Speaking at
the U.S. Air Force Academy graduation and commissioning ceremony
earlier this year he noted, "[The ASBC] is a prime example of how we
need to keep breaking down stovepipes between services, between
federal agencies, and even between nations."14
Implications of an Evolving Concept

According to CSBA's study, AirSea Battle: A Point-of- Departure
Operational Concept, "The Defense Department's Program of Record
forces and current concepts of operations do not accord sufficient
weight to the capabilities needed to successfully execute an AirSea
Battle campaign."15

However the elements outlined here combine to form a coherent ASBC,
myriad strategic, institutional, and programmatic implications, both
understood and unintentional, will arise. These will vary depending on
the concepts envisioned and the course adopted. A sampling of a few
that may immediately surface include:

Naming Names-U.S. policy toward China has been centered on managing
the "peaceful rise" of this emerging peer competitor across a broad
range of issues. Moreover, the United States has been careful not to
paint China as a threat or engage in activities that could lead to an
arms race. This may be changing, and the development of the ASBC may
contribute to this change.

By actively and publicly planning, training, and equipping a joint air-
sea force to confront even something as benignly described as a
"pacing threat," the United States is implicitly challenging China's
military influence in Asia. It is one thing for the independent
thinkers at CSBA to issue a set of reports and conceptual papers on
the ASBC; it is quite another for Navy and Air Force staffs to
collaborate on a comprehensive approach to counter PLA systems,
doctrine, and operational plans.

Reassurance-A growing perception on the part of U.S. allies and
potential partners in the region is that American naval and air forces
have not kept pace with expanding Chinese military capabilities.

The premise of the ASBC in fact rests on this trend. With this
perception, countries have started to rethink their political,
economic, and military strategies to ensure their continued security
and independence as U.S. will, capacity, and capability wane. A
serious, sustained commitment to ASBC will reinforce credible U.S.
combat power and will assuage and persuade both friend and foe of
America's commitment to the region. However, failure to fully embrace
and enact the ASBC could have opposite and unforeseeable strategic
consequences.

Dispersed Basing-A critical implied task in articulating the
operational construct of the ASBC will be to find ways to reduce risk
to both land and sea air bases, to minimize the impact of early salvo
strikes, and to persist in any protracted war longer than a couple of
weeks. Beyond extensive hardening and rapid runway repair, dispersal
may emerge as an effective operational approach likely to be
considered.

But dispersal is not without its challenges. Domestic political
objections in countries where the United States will desire multiple
basing options, including the creative approaches of the Cold War such
as highway-runways and concealed operating bases for vertical short-
takeoff and landing aircraft, will be high. Even in countries where
the United States currently has basing rights, such as Japan, the
political challenges will be immense. Moreover, countries that sign on
to this plan know they are certain targets and may calculate that the
costs of allowing this basing plan outweigh the benefits. And to be
truly effective, maintenance, logistics, and personnel must be made
mobile to support this scheme, which rapidly becomes a very expensive
approach that might best be tackled another way.

Beyond Purple to Cobalt Blue-Another key to the success of the ASBC
will be institutionalizing a close collaborative relationship between
the Navy and Air Force beyond the initial exhilaration of the ASBC's
maiden release. The model for this is the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act
that forced cooperation among all the services using clear incentives
tied to promotion of the officer corps. For the ASBC to sustain a
protracted pattern of cooperation, an institutionalized cadre of
officers, planners, and procurement specialists must be put in place.
Otherwise, the services will fall back into their familiar patterns of
competition.

Where the Family Shops-It is too early to tell what impact the ASBC
will have on procurement and the focus of the industrial base. If the
plan calls for a refinement of legacy systems, then the impact could
be light. But if the ASBC introduces a radical approach, the impact
could be quite large, even if this change is more evolutionary than
revolutionary. This would be good news for some and troubling news for
others.

The ASBC is as much about developing credible combat power and the
military doctrine to support it as it is about long-term competition.
Thus, any concept must analyze the holistic impact and strategic costs
to sustain and win the long-term competition with any peer or near-
peer state. While the adjustments to doctrine, operational plans, and
system acquisition resulting from the ASBC are yet unknown, ultimately
the ASBC must be more than simply a sharing of assets or cooperation
for its own sake. It must integrate some unique set of capabilities
from both services to create real synergistic effects that neither
service can accomplish individually.

1. CDR James Stavridis, USN, A New Air Sea Battle Concept: Integrated
Strike Forces (Washington D.C.: National Defense University National
War College, 1992), p. 3.

2. Todd Harrison, The New Guns Versus Butter Debate, (Washington,
D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), p.10.

3. Andrew Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington, D.C.: Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), p. 8.

4. National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), pp. 12-13.

5. ADM Robert Willard, prepared statement before the House Armed
Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, 23 March 2010.

6. Jan Van Tol, et. al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure
Operational Concept (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessment, 2010), p. 95.

7. Christopher Cavas, "USAF, U.S. Navy to Expand Cooperation," Defense
News, 9 November 2009. See also: Andrew Krepinevich, Why AirSea
Battle?, p. 1.

8. Cavas, "USAF, U.S. Navy to Expand Cooperation."

9. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010), p. 55.

10. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle?, p. 7.

11. Van Tol, et. al., Battle: A Point of Departure Operational
Concept, p. ix.

12. Ibid., p. 18.

13. Ibid., p. 95.

14. Donna Miles, "Defense Leaders Laud Air-Sea Battle Concept
Initiative," American Forces Press Service, 7 June 2010.

15. Van Tol, et. al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational
Concept, p. 81.

Mr. Carreno is the head of the Strategic and Business Planning Branch
at SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific, and has written previously for
Proceedings.

Professor Culora is the chairman of the Warfare Analysis and Research
Department at the Naval War College. He is a retired Navy captain who
commanded both HSL-47 and the USS Boxer (LHD-4) and was a fellow at
both Harvard University and the Council on Foreign Relations in New
York.

Captain Galdorisi is director of the Corporate Strategy Group at
SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific. His latest book is Leave No Man Behind:
the Saga of Combat Search and Rescue (MBI Publishing Co., 2009).

Mr. Hone is a former special assistant to the commander of the Naval
Air Systems Command, co-author of American & British Aircraft Carrier
Development, 1919-1941 (Naval Institute Press, 1999), and a professor
at the Naval War College.

AirSea Battle Concept Fundamentals

* Omnipresent unmanned combat air systems to provide persistent
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)

* Full development of unmanned underwater vehicles and other
persistent unmanned underwater systems

* Configuration, load out, or perhaps even saliency of Nimitz/Ford-
class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in this particular context

* Rethinking of the size and structure of the amphibious force
(despite their current role in humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief)

* Increased, sustainable, and survivable aerial refueling capacity
if the need for persistent manned aircraft is still deemed critical

* Significant increase in long-range ISR assets like Global Hawk,
with increased range and sensors

* Less emphasis on short-range Navy fighters (Super Hornets and
Joint Strike Fighters)

* A radical new look at mission modules for the Littoral Combat
Ship (decoy, deception)

* Potential capping or slight drawdown of special operations
forces

* Increased emphasis on submerged precision strike (more nuclear-
powered guided-missile submarines (SSGN) conversions or SSGN follow-
on)

* Increased emphasis on Electronic Warfare

* A geographic shift to the "One Hub" posture of the Center for
Naval Analyses Tipping Point paper

* A joining of 10th Fleet and the 24th Air Force to address joint
cyber and command-and-control issues

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[Marino]

Será??????????????????????????????????????

The Twilight of Network-Centric Warfare (Op-Ed/Blog)

Lexington Institute, August 6, 2010

By Loren B. Thompson

When a Defense Business Board task force recommended last month that the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) eliminate its networking and
information integration secretariat, it signaled just how far from grace the
notion of network-centric warfare has fallen. The secretariat was
established at the tail-end of the dot.com boom to coordinate the joint
force's migration from industrial-age warfare into the era of information
warfare. Proponents of network-centric warfare believed new information
technologies were so powerful that they could overthrow traditional
warfighting concepts if backed up with appropriate military doctrine and
organizations. OSD's office of networks and information integration -- NII
for short -- was supposed to shepherd this vision into reality by ove rseeing
a raft of multi-billion-dollar investment projects.

A decade later, nobody talks about military transformation anymore, and
joint initiatives begun under its banner such as the Transformational
Communications Satellite and Future Combat System are fading memories.
Service-level projects like the Navy's Next-Generation Enterprise Network
increasingly look like wasteful efforts to re-invent the wheel -- efforts
that are doomed to be canceled as Washington turns to deficit reduction and
military budgets shrink. So what went wrong? How is it possible for every
policymaker in the five-sided building to embrace a common vision of
information-age warfare at the beginning of a decade, and for it all to be
forgotten by decade's end?

The first thing that went wrong was that threats evolved differently than
military planners expected. The authors of network-centric warfare thought
that the joint force was in the midst of a prolonged "strategic pause" when
the decade began, after which some new peer or near-peer adversary would
emerge. That pause ended unexpectedly on 9-11, and America suddenly found
itself facing a very different kind of danger. Networks and information
technology have certainly proven useful in dealing with elusive new
adversaries, but so far they haven't proven to be the winning weapon that
visionaries expected. It turns out that all those networks the Pentagon was
planning are just conduits, and that what matters more for victory is the
accuracy and completeness of the information moving through the networks.

The second problem that proponents did not see coming was that the new
technology itself might become a source of weakness. Planners implicitly
assumed that if the Pentagon invested heavily enough in cutting-edge
networks and information applications, it could leverage the w arfighting
potential of the new technology while staying comfortably ahead of other
countries with similar ideas. Well, it hasn't worked out that way. We now
know that everybody from the Taliban to Mexican drug cartels can benefit
from the reach and richness of wideband networks. Even worse, they can tap
into our own networks, as China proves on a daily basis. So the military has
had to launch a crash program to prevent its gee-whiz networks from being
used against it (incidentally, the Navy is inexplicably trying to replace
the one big network that so far has proven largely immune to hostile
penetrations, in order to implement a more "advanced" architecture).

And then there is the cost of network-centrism. When the decade began,
America was basking in the prosperity of the dot.com revolution, generating
nearly a third of all global economic output. Since then its economy has
swooned and tax receipts hav e collapsed to a point where over 40 percent of
the federal budget is being borrowed. So one by one, all of the big
networking initiatives begun during the Bush years are being canceled. That
isn't so hard to do since there are no immediate consequences for
warfighters and the projects never developed firm political constituencies.
The Defense Business Board's proposal to kill the Pentagon's networking shop
is just the latest installment in what has become a long-running chronicle
of decline. No doubt about, networks have changed the way the world wages
war. But network-centric warfare is an idea whose time has passed.

[LeandroGCard]

Pelo texto a impressão que fica não é a de que o conceito de NCW teria sido um engano ou estaria morto, mas sim que ele teria se tornado uma "commodity" disponível para todos e muito mais vulnerável do que se imaginava no início.

Os planejadores do pentágono de uma década atrás tinham uma visão de mundo bastante otimista e egocêntrica (provavelmente causada por uma certa arrogância justificável após terem vencido a guerra fria) e imaginaram uma era onde as armas e sistemas americanos reinariam absolutos nos campos de batalha, podendo destruir qualquer coisa e qualquer um em qualquer lugar do planeta sem serem ameaçados por nenhuma força opositora eficaz. Aviões como o F-22, navios como a classe Zumwalt, armas de precisão guiadas por GPS, redes invioláveis de supercomputadores e coisas assim tornariam as forças armadas americanas semelhantes a deuses, cuja vontade não poderia ser contestada por nenhum ser humano em lugar nenhum da Terra.

Como sempre acontece, só esqueceram de combinar isso com os inimigos potenciais e o resto do mundo, que continuou evoluindo, gerando novas realidades não previstas inicialmente e tornando estes sonhos de superioridade absoluta do Pentágono em apenas isso, sonhos. E a crise econômica atual foi o golpe de misericórdia. Vamos ver como os planejadores americanos vão pensar daqui para a frente.


Leandro G. Card