Marinha da República Popular da China (PLAN)

[Corsário01]

EU TAMBÉM APOIO!

[Paisano]

[saullo]

Corsário e Paisano, sou flamenguista, mas hoje vou dar uma força pro Botafogo, afinal do outro lado...

Abraços

[rcolistete]

Dá pra competir com os chineses ? rsrsrsrsrs

A falta de qualidade na construção poderá comprometer esses navios no futuro, mas, isso é importante para eles?

Será que seus navios de guerra seguem esta linha de construção?

Seria esta a razão da Marinha do Brasil não se sensibilizar por produtos chineses?

A resposta pode estar nestas imagens abaixo.

O que acham?

Olá Padilha,

Caramba, estão construindo ou destruindo navios ??? Um ferro-velho de desmantelamento de navios nos EUA ou Europa é 10x mais organizado e profissional !

Próxima missão de risco para o pessoal do Base Militar : em um navio chinês construido em 10 dias, atravessando o cabo Horn, com o Padilha tirando foto no topo do mastro

[]s, Roberto

[tflash]

O aço chinês é tão bom que eu comprei um martelo numa loja chinesa bem baratinho e ele rachou ao meio depois de umas marteladas, ficando o cabo de madeira intacto. só espero que não seja o mesmo aço que eles usam nos navios...

[bielniteroi]

alguem sabe como anda acordo entre o Brasil e a China ?
a ultima informação que eu tive foi que o Brasil ajudaria os chineses no treinamento de tripulações na operação de navios-aeródromo e a China poderia estar ajudando o Brasil a construir submarinos nucleares.
Aqui o site q vi a noticia:so coloquei este para nao ficar colocando vários.
http://defesabr.com/blog/index.php/23/1 ... na-brasil/
Alguem mais sobre o tema?

ABRAÇOS.

[Carlos Mathias]

Quer dizer que os caras mandam astronautas para a órbita terrestre e não sabem fazer aço, é isso mesmo?

[Moccelin]

É que de vez em quando tem gente que quer comparar o ferro fundido de um martelo (Pelo preço que você pagou você realmente acreditou que era aço?) com o aço de um navio, ou blindado, ou qualquer coisa que o valha.

Aquelas fotos OBVIAMENTE é de um ferro-velho, eles estão desmantelando o navio, e não construindo. Tem N fotos mostrando os estaleiros chineses, e todos são organizados do jeito que são por aqui.

E não podemos nos esquecer também da REALIDADE história e social deles na hora de analisar fotos e qualquer coisa que venha de lá. Por aqui existem leis trabalhistas que protegem o trabalhador de diversas formas, por lá não. Ou vocês acham que eles entregam um produto eletrônico por metade do preço pagando tudo que uma empresa daqui paga?

Outra coisa que eu já ouvi muito comentário é sobre o uso extensivo de bambú em andaimes de construção civil e industrial, além de qualquer tipo de material usado pra elevação. Isso é a realidade deles. Lá eles confiam mais no bambú do que nos andaimes de ferro que usamos por aqui, por isso é tão constante por lá.

Não estou protegendo os chineses como um partidário do PSTU, porém eu acho sacanagem avacalhar analisando de forma errônea fotos e vídeos que vem de lá. Tem MUITO argumento melhor pra isso.

[Enlil]

Friday, April 23, 2010

Chinese Naval Power Expands to Waters the U.S. Dominates
A NYT write-up on the topic that avid readers of this blog may already be aware of.

"the speed with which it is building blue-water capabilities has surprised foreign military officials."

Surprised? not really.

April 23, 2010
Chinese Naval Power Expands to Waters the U.S. Dominates
By EDWARD WONG

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world ... gewanted=1

YALONG BAY, China — The Chinese military is seeking to project naval power well beyond the Chinese coast, from the oil ports of the Middle East to the shipping lanes of the Pacific, where the United States Navy has long reigned as the dominant force, military officials and analysts say.

Chinese admirals call the new strategy “far sea defense,” and the speed with which it is building blue-water capabilities has surprised foreign military officials.

The strategy is a sharp break from the traditional, narrower doctrine of preparing for war over the self-governing island of Taiwan or defending the Chinese coast. Now, Chinese admirals say they want warships to escort commercial vessels that are crucial to the country’s economy, from as far as the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia, and to help secure Chinese interests in the resource-rich South and East China Seas.

In late March, two Chinese warships docked in Abu Dhabi, the first time the modern Chinese Navy made a port visit in the Middle East.

The overall plan reflects China’s growing sense of self-confidence and increasing willingness to assert its interests abroad. China’s naval ambitions are being felt, too, in recent muscle flexing with the United States: in March, Chinese officials told senior American officials privately that China would brook no foreign interference in its territorial issues in the South China Sea, said a senior American official involved in China policy.

The naval expansion will not make China a serious rival to American naval hegemony in the near future, and there are few indications that China has aggressive intentions toward the United States or other countries.

But China, now the world’s leading exporter and a giant buyer of oil and other natural resources, is also no longer content to trust the security of sea lanes to the Americans, and its definition of its own core interests has expanded along with its economic clout.

In late March, Adm. Robert F. Willard, the leader of the United States Pacific Command, said in Congressional testimony that recent Chinese military developments were “pretty dramatic.” China has tested long-range ballistic missiles that could be used against aircraft carriers, he said. After years of denials, Chinese officials have confirmed that they intend to deploy an aircraft carrier group within a few years.

China is also developing a sophisticated submarine fleet that could try to prevent foreign naval vessels from entering its strategic waters if a conflict erupted in the region, said Admiral Willard and military analysts.

“Of particular concern is that elements of China’s military modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region,” the admiral said.

Yalong Bay, on the southern coast of Hainan Island in the South China Sea, is the site of a new underground submarine base not far from five-star beach resorts. The base allows submarines to reach deep water within 20 minutes and roam the South China Sea, which has some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes and areas rich in oil and natural gas that are the focus of territorial disputes between China and other Asian nations.

That has caused concern not only among American commanders, but also among officials in Southeast Asian nations, which have been quietly acquiring more submarines, missiles and other weapons. “Regional officials have been surprised,” said Huang Jing, a scholar of the Chinese military at the National University of Singapore. “We were in a blinded situation. We thought the Chinese military was 20 years behind us, but we suddenly realized China is catching up.”

China is also pressing the United States to heed its claims in the region. In March, Chinese officials told two visiting senior Obama administration officials, Jeffrey A. Bader and James B. Steinberg, that China would not tolerate any interference in the South China Sea, now part of China’s “core interest” of sovereignty, said an American official involved in China policy. It was the first time the Chinese labeled the South China Sea a core interest, on par with Taiwan and Tibet, the official said.

Another element of the Chinese Navy’s new strategy is to extend its operational reach beyond the South China Sea and the Philippines to what is known as the “second island chain” — rocks and atolls out in the Pacific, the official said. That zone significantly overlaps the United States Navy’s area of supremacy.

Japan is anxious, too. Its defense minister, Toshimi Kitazawa, said in mid-April that two Chinese submarines and eight destroyers were spotted on April 10 heading between two Japanese islands en route to the Pacific, the first time such a large Chinese flotilla had been seen so close to Japan. When two Japanese destroyers began following the Chinese ships, a Chinese helicopter flew within 300 feet of one of the destroyers, the Japanese Defense Ministry said.

Since December 2008, China has maintained three ships in the Gulf of Aden to contribute to international antipiracy patrols, the first deployment of the Chinese Navy beyond the Pacific. The mission allows China to improve its navy’s long-range capabilities, analysts say.

A 2009 Pentagon report estimated Chinese naval forces at 260 vessels, including 75 “principal combatants” — major warships —and more than 60 submarines. The report noted the building of an aircraft carrier, and said China “continues to show interest” in acquiring carrier-borne jet fighters from Russia.

The Pentagon does not classify China as an enemy force. But partly in reaction to China’s growth, the United States has recently transferred submarines from the Atlantic to the Pacific so that the majority of its nuclear-powered attack submarines are now in the Pacific, said Bernard D. Cole, a former American naval officer and a professor at the National War College in Washington.

The United States has also begun rotating three to four submarines on deployments out of Guam, reviving a practice that had ended with the cold war, Mr. Cole said.

American vessels now frequently survey the submarine base at Hainan Island, and that activity leads to occasional friction with Chinese ships. A survey mission last year by the American surveillance ship. Impeccable resulted in what Pentagon officials said was harassment by Chinese fishing vessels; the Chinese government said it had the right to block surveillance in those waters because they are an “exclusive economic zone” of China.

The United States and China have clashing definitions of such zones, defined by a United Nations convention as waters within 200 nautical miles of a coast. The United States says international law allows a coastal country to retain only special commercial rights in the zones, while China contends the country can control virtually any activity within them.

Military leaders here maintain that the Chinese Navy is purely a self-defense force. But the definition of self-defense has expanded to encompass broad maritime and economic interests, two Chinese admirals contended in March.

“With our naval strategy changing now, we are going from coastal defense to far sea defense,” Rear Adm. Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, said in an interview with Xinhua, the state news agency.

“With the expansion of the country’s economic interests, the navy wants to better protect the country’s transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes,” he added. “In order to achieve this, the Chinese Navy needs to develop along the lines of bigger vessels and with more comprehensive capabilities.”

The navy gets more than one-third of the overall Chinese military budget, “reflecting the priority Beijing currently places on the navy as an instrument of national security,” Mr. Cole said. China’s official military budget for 2010 is $78 billion, but the Pentagon says China spends much more than that amount. Last year, the Pentagon estimated total Chinese military spending at $105 billion to $150 billion, still much less than what the United States spends on defense.

The Chinese Navy’s most impressive growth has been in its submarine fleet, said Mr. Huang, the scholar in Singapore. It recently built at least two Jin-class submarines, the first regularly active ones in the fleet with ballistic missile capabilities, and two more are under construction. Two Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarines recently entered service.

Countries in the region have responded with their own acquisitions, said Carlyle A. Thayer, a professor at the Australian Defense Force Academy. In December, Vietnam signed an arms deal with Russia that included six Kilo-class submarines, which would give Vietnam the most formidable submarine fleet in Southeast Asia. Last year, Malaysia took delivery of its first submarine, one of two ordered from France, and Singapore began operating one of two Archer-class submarines bought from Sweden.

Last fall, during a speech in Washington, Lee Kuan Yew, the former Singaporean leader, reflected widespread anxieties when he noted China’s naval rise and beseeched the United States to maintain its regional presence. “U.S. core interest requires that it remains the superior power on the Pacific,” he said. “To give up this position would diminish America’s role throughout the world.”

http://china-defense.blogspot.com/

[soultrain]

Carry on carrier

by Kenneth Payne on 3 May 2010 · 11 comments

Varyag

Why build an aircraft carrier? John Arquilla thinks they’re military dodos, vulnerable to networked enemies. I’m no maritime guru, but I can see that swarming and autonomy will present quite a challenge for a system (the carrier group) that concentrates its assets so heavily in one big, slow moving platform. Patrick Porter, on the other hand, disagrees. The Chinese are pressing on with the Varyag, the Indians are buying, and the Russians are again interested in carriers. Even we’re building two (for now). All this interest in carriers suggests that the fashionistas of future war have got it wrong. Why invest so much in an obsolete technology? Surely these huge financial commitments indicate that the carrier will remain the most formidable expression of mobile power for a good while yet?

Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko have a great paper in the current edition of International Security that points to the answer. They apply Henri Tajfel and John Turner’s social identity theory to Chinese foreign policy behaviour after the Cold War. The reasons states behave the way they do are not ‘rational’, at least in the theoretical sense of rationality, beloved of 20th century social science. In particular, Tajfel and co argued, the social groups we form will go a long way to shaping our behaviours and attitudes. We conform to the norms of our group, often unconsciously. And we have a lot vested in our group – notably our sense of self-esteem. The groups themselves are not static – we have multiple identities, engaged at different times and in differing circumstances. They are, as Tajfel wrote, in a constant flux, of coming and going. Also from the social psychologists comes the idea that groups are defined not only by their own norms, but also in contrast to those of other groups. States, like other social groups, can differ from each other in more profound ways than size or economic capacity, while still retaining their inherent state-ness.

How does that fit with China and the Varyag? Well, suppose you’re in the inferior group as judged by a commonly accepted yardstick. You’ve got some options: suck it up, at cost to self-esteem; compete with the big boys; or reimagine the ways in which you are a state, and in so doing change the rules of the game. You can’t physically change the rather large group that is ‘China’ – because it’s got a pretty strong hold on the imagination of all concerned. But you can shape what it means to be China. You don’t have to play by the existing rules that suit the hegemonic, or dominant group. And indeed there’s both scope and merit in defining yourself differently from others – especially if one conceives of prestige and self-esteem, not power and security, as the overarching rationale for behaviour.

The Varyag was China’s attempt to play by the big boys rules. It’s a status symbol that says, ‘we’ve arrived’. Or that was the aim. In fact, that won’t cut it, because whichever way you squint at it, it’s still a reverse engineered Soviet hand-me-down. Or an upgraded Macao casino. Regardless of its capabilities, proper respect will have to wait till China has designed and built one themselves from the keel up (and that’s from a native of a country currently hard at work on a French designed carrier).

From this perspective, the Varyag reconstruction is not wholly the result of a rational assessment of maritime technology and trends, and it won’t do much to boost China’s material power capabilities (their efforts in developing effective anti-carrier weaponry will probably do much more to upset the balance of power in the Far East than shifting the ratio of carriers from 11-0 to 11-1). Actually, it’s the equivalent of those huge Middle East arms deals for advanced fighter aircraft: flashy, but a bit flaky. It’s the same too as the inter-war Irish army who, in Theo Farrell’s great illustration, structured itself in conventional fashion, with armoured formations, but hardly any armour. Group status and self-esteem are driving military structures in these examples – not power and the need for security. So, is the Varyag a convincing demonstration that carriers remain viable? Hardly – it’s a new investment banker’s first Porsche: a bit tacky and not quite the Aston Martin he’s secretly craving.

There are alternatives to coming second best and feeling constantly chippy about it. One such, as the EU states have demonstrated, is to reinvent the rules – redefining security in a more expansive way and seeking, as Robert Cooper has persuasively described, to extend the bounds of your conception, by converting the barbarians at the gates into model Europeans. Say what you will about the realism of that project, or its reliance on American extended-deterrence – but you cannot doubt that the Europeans, at least European elites, are sincere and have constructed a normatively distinct conception of sovereignty and power. This is a construct that affords self-esteem, and indeed, some measure of respect elsewhere. I’m not alone in worrying that it underestimates the potential for trouble on the European block, but my point is not that it’s the best conception of how to imagine oneself: just that it’s the sincere conception of the governments of the EU. Has China done that, or is it still sucking it up, at the cost of impaired self esteem? Larson and Shevchenko can see the origins of something uniquely Chinese in its foreign policy of responsibility:

China has increasingly taken on a more activist, constructive world role that includes increased support for multilateralism, a policy that has reassured other states, enhanced China’s global role, and increased its relative status.

Maybe – but I still see a traditional conception of prestige as driving China, embodied in its derivative carrier.

Social psychology has much to offer constructivist approaches to IR – it lends scientific rigour to the often interesting but speculative contentions of those who see meaning and identity as key factors in accounting for state behaviour. And constructivism, in turn, has much to offer realists – power is an elusive concept, and until the next big maritime battles, we can’t be absolutely sure about the utility of carriers. Given the inherent uncertainty involved, perception is an inescapable part of how we deploy our resources for future defence – perception of the threat, and also perception of ourselves. Don’t get me wrong – carriers continue to have military value in a variety of scenarios, and at some level you can construct as many conceptions of yourself as a good-egg, few of which will avail you when the wolves call at the door. But in the end, the activity dockside at Dalian says as much about what it means to be Chinese today as about what it will take to prevail in the naval clashes of the future.

http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/05/carry-on-carrier/

[P44]

[Carlos Mathias]

Deixa ver se eu entendi.
Os EUA tem uma porrada de PAs e estão reclamando da China ter um (1)? É isso mesmo?

[P44]

qual 1? Então aquilo não se vê logo que é um casino, olha as mesas de roleta a serem içadas para bordo!

[Carlos Mathias]

Ah tá...
Obrigado por esclarecer-me.

[P44]

Agora a sério, esse texto não é mais do que um discurso arrogante de um ocidental que despreza a China.

Daqui a uns anos veremos quem tinha razão.