[/quote]não estás a par do PATRIOT ACT, pois não?
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Re: O REGRESSO DA GRANDE RÚSSIA?
[quote="cabeça de martelo"]Ou seja na tua opinião é normal eles ameaçarem jornalistas? Mas que raio de democracia é que tu defendes Edson? Já agora que se acabe com a liberdade de imprensa, de expressão e de reunião e temos a democracia perfeita, certo?! [/quote]
não estás a par do PATRIOT ACT, pois não?
[/quote]não estás a par do PATRIOT ACT, pois não?
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Re: O REGRESSO DA GRANDE RÚSSIA?
percebendo os russos....
"While Russians are charming people their attitude towards leadership is patological from Western point of view. They seem to need a leader who is feared - strong, cunning and dangerous. Putin is like that, Stalin was like that, some greatest Czars were like that. Relations of power in Russia are built in a significant degree on fear.
A leader who reaches elevated posts in this kind of culture will always be looking for confrontation and will try to reach his goals by threatening others. He is expected to act as a tough, dangerous person and applauded when doing so. Putin follows this scheme, his present actions show that "we're a superpower again, we're feared again" and this is applauded in Russia. When Russia is feared - than Russians are proud of their country and fell good. Kinda bizarre for me. Nationalism or any other authoritarian/totalitarian system fits here perfectly."
do mp.net
"While Russians are charming people their attitude towards leadership is patological from Western point of view. They seem to need a leader who is feared - strong, cunning and dangerous. Putin is like that, Stalin was like that, some greatest Czars were like that. Relations of power in Russia are built in a significant degree on fear.
A leader who reaches elevated posts in this kind of culture will always be looking for confrontation and will try to reach his goals by threatening others. He is expected to act as a tough, dangerous person and applauded when doing so. Putin follows this scheme, his present actions show that "we're a superpower again, we're feared again" and this is applauded in Russia. When Russia is feared - than Russians are proud of their country and fell good. Kinda bizarre for me. Nationalism or any other authoritarian/totalitarian system fits here perfectly."
do mp.net
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Re: O REGRESSO DA GRANDE RÚSSIA?
IN DEPTH / The Russian empire strikes back
By Adi Schwartz, Haaretz Correspondent
Exactly 40 years ago, on a hot August day in 1968, Alexander Dubcek stood looking out his office window as thousands of Soviet soldiers poured into his city, Prague. The First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the architect of the "Prague Spring" knew it was only a matter of time until he heard a knock on the door.
In his memoir, "Hope Dies Last," Dubcek wrote, "The main door flew open again, and in walked some higher officers of the KGB, including a highly decorated, very short colonel. The little colonel quickly reeled off a list of all Czechoslovak Communist Party officials present and told us that he was taking us 'under his protection.' Indeed we were protected, sitting around that table - each of us had a tommy gun pointed at the back of his head."
Two days later, Dubcek was taken to the Kremlin, where then Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev explained the prevailing reality to him and cut short the democratic reforms by thumping his fist on the table. Dubcek was sent back to his country, where he spent the next 20 years as a forester in a remote region of Slovakia.
At least for now, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili is being spared that fate. He is still the ruler of the small Caucasian state. The outcome of this week's events, however, could prove quite similar to the drama of 40 years ago. The Soviet oppression of Czechoslovakia showed the whole world that the U.S.S.R. would not tolerate democratic adventures within its sphere of influence. The Soviet Union made it clear to Eastern Europe that the West, including the United States, would not lift a finger as Soviet tanks crushed a small sovereign state. The defeat of the Prague Spring truncated a wave of openness and democratization that had washed over both Eastern and Western Europe in the late 1960s.
The two decades that have passed since the fall of the Iron Curtain can now be divided in two. The first 10 years, dubbed the "end of history" by U.S. political philosopher Francis Fukuyama, lasted from 1989 until September 11, 2001, and were characterized by unflappable optimism. The cold war made way for globalization. The Western model trumped all available alternatives. The U.S. became the world's sole superpower, with unchallenged military, diplomatic and economic hegemony. China was taking baby steps toward a free-market economy and Russia was getting its first tastes of democracy.
Then came the terror attack against New York's World Trade Center. Suddenly it turned out that not everyone wanted to join the McDonald's and laptop festivals. The failed U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq caused a deep rift in the Western camp. Russia, which felt severely humiliated over the loss of Eastern Europe and the 15 republics that had made up the Soviet Union, switched gears. Under the scepter of former KGB officer Vladimir Putin, Russia reverted to tricks that were thought forgotten, such as poisoning the Ukrainian president or eliminating journalists and potential political rivals. Instead of human rights, a free-market economy and democracy, we got nationalizations, the imprisoning of rebellious oligarchs and tight supervision of the press.
'History is returning'
This week's events in Georgia are the most obvious manifestation of that shift. On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, with inelegant tardiness, that Washington will not allow Georgia to fall, as it did with Czechoslovakia in 1968. President George W. Bush, for his part, promised humanitarian aid and even delayed his vacation "for a day or two, at least," but for now the American response looks hesitant and anemic.
For the first time in 30 years, Russia has initiated a war beyond its borders. For the first time in 20 years, an elected democratic regime is being threatened by force. For the first time in 20 years, the West is standing exposed and helpless, with its stock exchanges, galloping euro, flourishing economy and highfalutin talk of human rights. The planes and tanks in Georgia have returned to Russia its status of superpower.
In a twist on Fukuyama's "end of history" hypothesis, former Israeli ambassador to Washington Itamar Rabinovich asserted that this week it seemed as though "history is returning in a big way, and America has to cope with a new reality." According to Rabinovich, "The Russians' power play succeeded and is likely to have a great many implications."
The most immediate change will be felt in the Caucasus, a region of utmost strategic and economic importance for both Russia and the West. Dr. Brenda Shaffer, an expert on the Caucasus from Haifa University, explains that the region's natural gas reserves are even more important than its oil. "It is too late to be talking about oil as a global weapon," she says. "In Israel and around the world people still think in terms of the energy crisis of the 1970s, but oil is a fluid that can be transported relatively easily. Oil can be purchased from Russia today, from Norway tomorrow and from Saudi Arabia next week. Gas, on the other hand, must be supplied via pipelines that cost billions of dollars to build. Gas pipelines must pass through several countries and are extremely dependent on local political conditions."
Shaffer notes that in the past few years, European countries have been trying to develop direct supply lines from Central Asian states holding large natural gas reserves. Europe's growing dependency on Russian oil and gas spurred the continent's efforts to find alternatives, which is irritating Russia. "Natural gas, which the Europeans find very attractive because it is more environmentally friendly than oil, has so far traveled from Central Asia to Europe only via Russia," continues Shaffer. "Of course oil also has its problems: The fact that a Sukhoi SU-25 fighter jet 'almost' hit the oil pipeline running from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea is interesting. The SU-25 is a very sophisticated plane that could easily have bombed the pipeline. Indeed, this doesn't seem like a miss but more like a message to the West: Don't mess with us."
This means that Europe is becoming increasingly dependent on Russia for energy. "Massive projects have been planned in recent years," says Shaffer, "such as the Nabucco Pipeline, to bring Central Asia's natural gas by way of the Caspian Sea and Georgia to the Mediterranean. We can forget about that project now. Russia has made that very clear. Russia did not invade Kazakhstan, but rather a small country that is a bottleneck between Central Asia and the West. No one will want to take the risk of angering the Russians again."
Beginnings of a new world order?
But Russia's message is not merely economic. "Several regimes in this region are wondering about where they are headed," says Shaffer. "America's blatant abandonment of its best friend in the region, President Saakashvili, will certainly prompt a policy reevaluation in countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. If until now these states were certain that it was in their best interest to befriend the Americans - and we saw how they responded to the war in Afghanistan - now they may think it more worthwhile to befriend Iran or Russia. Maybe these two states can protect them where the Americans have failed. From the point of view of U.S. foreign policy, this conclusion has very negative repercussions. The Russian invasion of Georgia exposed the Europeans and Americans' bluff, and left the Georgians on their own. I would even go so far as to say that maybe the presidents of Afghanistan and Iraq are already considering their next steps." This week's unprecedented support for Saakashvili by the presidents of Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania and Estonia indicates that the picture extends beyond the Caucasus. Alexander Rahr, a member of Germany's Council on Foreign Relations and author of a biography of Vladimir Putin, believes this marks the beginning of a new world order. "Bush's legacy is a foreign policy disaster," says Rahr. "The dream of democratizing the Middle East has been shattered. As his final months in office approached, he was at least trying to bring Ukraine and Georgia closer to NATO, and now that won't happen. He tried to install missiles in the Czech Republic and in Poland, and that won't happen either. It turns out that American influence has its limits, and that Russia has regained a sphere of influence. This is no longer the Russia of the 1990s, beaten and bruised, unable to act on behalf of its own interests. Russia is now in a position to respond, and that is exactly what it did.
"A very similar crisis could develop in the Crimean peninsula, which now belongs to Ukraine, but used to belong to Russia, and has a large Russian population. Now everyone realizes that the Russians are serious. The same thing could also happen in Azerbaijan. Public opinion in those countries could change - from pro-Western to not wanting to rankle the Russian neighbor." Rahr also feels this week's events could affect a possible military campaign against Iran, too. "America's space for maneuver has shrunk," he says, "both strategically and logistically. Now it will be much harder for America to operate in Russia's southern part. Diplomatically, too, Russia's voice will increasingly be heard."
Twilight of U.S. hegemony
The roaring of the Russian artillery near Tbilisi, which clearly revealed that the issue was not South Ossetia but rather Russia's status in the world, also prompted a reevaluation by Sovietologists and Russian historians.
"This is without a doubt a founding moment," says Anne Applebaum, a historian and author of the international best-seller "Gulag: A History." "This week the Russians set an example. Just like when they killed journalist Anna Politkovskaya. There is no need to kill all the country's journalists. One is enough, and all the rest get the message. That's what [Russia] did this week: There is no need to invade all the countries in the region, but they will all get the message.
"In recent years we have seen a deterioration in the human rights situation in Russia," Applebaum continues. "Now it is clear that rising Russian nationalism will extend beyond the country's borders. This week's events also made it clear that the belief that only the U.S. can flex its muscles is mistaken. They marked the end of an era in which the U.S. behaved like the only superpower. It was interesting to follow the events on a split-screen television, showing both the amazing spectacle China organized for the opening of the Olympic Games and pictures from Georgia. We saw two new superpowers, evincing different behavior, of course, but which completely undermine America's global hegemony. We saw history in the making, right before our eyes."
Historian Simon Sebag-Montefiore, author of two biographies of Josef Stalin, believes this is "the start of the twilight of America's sole world hegemony.
"The retaking of Ossetia is a minor part of the Russian campaign," says Montefiore, who has visited Georgia many times and is personally acquainted with the three presidents who have headed the country since the Soviet Union's disintegration. "More significant is the attack on Georgia proper, which reasserts Russia's hegemony over the Caucasus and defies American superpowerdom.
"The prospect of encirclement by triumphant America infuriated Russia," he continues. "Imagine if newly independent Wales joined the Warsaw Pact. This war is really a celebration of ferocious force in the realm of international power, a dangerous precedent. Russia has demonstrated the limits of U.S. power and Moscow's historic destiny as regional and world superpower. The Empire has struck back and shaken the order of the world."
By Adi Schwartz, Haaretz Correspondent
Exactly 40 years ago, on a hot August day in 1968, Alexander Dubcek stood looking out his office window as thousands of Soviet soldiers poured into his city, Prague. The First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the architect of the "Prague Spring" knew it was only a matter of time until he heard a knock on the door.
In his memoir, "Hope Dies Last," Dubcek wrote, "The main door flew open again, and in walked some higher officers of the KGB, including a highly decorated, very short colonel. The little colonel quickly reeled off a list of all Czechoslovak Communist Party officials present and told us that he was taking us 'under his protection.' Indeed we were protected, sitting around that table - each of us had a tommy gun pointed at the back of his head."
Two days later, Dubcek was taken to the Kremlin, where then Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev explained the prevailing reality to him and cut short the democratic reforms by thumping his fist on the table. Dubcek was sent back to his country, where he spent the next 20 years as a forester in a remote region of Slovakia.
At least for now, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili is being spared that fate. He is still the ruler of the small Caucasian state. The outcome of this week's events, however, could prove quite similar to the drama of 40 years ago. The Soviet oppression of Czechoslovakia showed the whole world that the U.S.S.R. would not tolerate democratic adventures within its sphere of influence. The Soviet Union made it clear to Eastern Europe that the West, including the United States, would not lift a finger as Soviet tanks crushed a small sovereign state. The defeat of the Prague Spring truncated a wave of openness and democratization that had washed over both Eastern and Western Europe in the late 1960s.
The two decades that have passed since the fall of the Iron Curtain can now be divided in two. The first 10 years, dubbed the "end of history" by U.S. political philosopher Francis Fukuyama, lasted from 1989 until September 11, 2001, and were characterized by unflappable optimism. The cold war made way for globalization. The Western model trumped all available alternatives. The U.S. became the world's sole superpower, with unchallenged military, diplomatic and economic hegemony. China was taking baby steps toward a free-market economy and Russia was getting its first tastes of democracy.
Then came the terror attack against New York's World Trade Center. Suddenly it turned out that not everyone wanted to join the McDonald's and laptop festivals. The failed U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq caused a deep rift in the Western camp. Russia, which felt severely humiliated over the loss of Eastern Europe and the 15 republics that had made up the Soviet Union, switched gears. Under the scepter of former KGB officer Vladimir Putin, Russia reverted to tricks that were thought forgotten, such as poisoning the Ukrainian president or eliminating journalists and potential political rivals. Instead of human rights, a free-market economy and democracy, we got nationalizations, the imprisoning of rebellious oligarchs and tight supervision of the press.
'History is returning'
This week's events in Georgia are the most obvious manifestation of that shift. On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, with inelegant tardiness, that Washington will not allow Georgia to fall, as it did with Czechoslovakia in 1968. President George W. Bush, for his part, promised humanitarian aid and even delayed his vacation "for a day or two, at least," but for now the American response looks hesitant and anemic.
For the first time in 30 years, Russia has initiated a war beyond its borders. For the first time in 20 years, an elected democratic regime is being threatened by force. For the first time in 20 years, the West is standing exposed and helpless, with its stock exchanges, galloping euro, flourishing economy and highfalutin talk of human rights. The planes and tanks in Georgia have returned to Russia its status of superpower.
In a twist on Fukuyama's "end of history" hypothesis, former Israeli ambassador to Washington Itamar Rabinovich asserted that this week it seemed as though "history is returning in a big way, and America has to cope with a new reality." According to Rabinovich, "The Russians' power play succeeded and is likely to have a great many implications."
The most immediate change will be felt in the Caucasus, a region of utmost strategic and economic importance for both Russia and the West. Dr. Brenda Shaffer, an expert on the Caucasus from Haifa University, explains that the region's natural gas reserves are even more important than its oil. "It is too late to be talking about oil as a global weapon," she says. "In Israel and around the world people still think in terms of the energy crisis of the 1970s, but oil is a fluid that can be transported relatively easily. Oil can be purchased from Russia today, from Norway tomorrow and from Saudi Arabia next week. Gas, on the other hand, must be supplied via pipelines that cost billions of dollars to build. Gas pipelines must pass through several countries and are extremely dependent on local political conditions."
Shaffer notes that in the past few years, European countries have been trying to develop direct supply lines from Central Asian states holding large natural gas reserves. Europe's growing dependency on Russian oil and gas spurred the continent's efforts to find alternatives, which is irritating Russia. "Natural gas, which the Europeans find very attractive because it is more environmentally friendly than oil, has so far traveled from Central Asia to Europe only via Russia," continues Shaffer. "Of course oil also has its problems: The fact that a Sukhoi SU-25 fighter jet 'almost' hit the oil pipeline running from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea is interesting. The SU-25 is a very sophisticated plane that could easily have bombed the pipeline. Indeed, this doesn't seem like a miss but more like a message to the West: Don't mess with us."
This means that Europe is becoming increasingly dependent on Russia for energy. "Massive projects have been planned in recent years," says Shaffer, "such as the Nabucco Pipeline, to bring Central Asia's natural gas by way of the Caspian Sea and Georgia to the Mediterranean. We can forget about that project now. Russia has made that very clear. Russia did not invade Kazakhstan, but rather a small country that is a bottleneck between Central Asia and the West. No one will want to take the risk of angering the Russians again."
Beginnings of a new world order?
But Russia's message is not merely economic. "Several regimes in this region are wondering about where they are headed," says Shaffer. "America's blatant abandonment of its best friend in the region, President Saakashvili, will certainly prompt a policy reevaluation in countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. If until now these states were certain that it was in their best interest to befriend the Americans - and we saw how they responded to the war in Afghanistan - now they may think it more worthwhile to befriend Iran or Russia. Maybe these two states can protect them where the Americans have failed. From the point of view of U.S. foreign policy, this conclusion has very negative repercussions. The Russian invasion of Georgia exposed the Europeans and Americans' bluff, and left the Georgians on their own. I would even go so far as to say that maybe the presidents of Afghanistan and Iraq are already considering their next steps." This week's unprecedented support for Saakashvili by the presidents of Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania and Estonia indicates that the picture extends beyond the Caucasus. Alexander Rahr, a member of Germany's Council on Foreign Relations and author of a biography of Vladimir Putin, believes this marks the beginning of a new world order. "Bush's legacy is a foreign policy disaster," says Rahr. "The dream of democratizing the Middle East has been shattered. As his final months in office approached, he was at least trying to bring Ukraine and Georgia closer to NATO, and now that won't happen. He tried to install missiles in the Czech Republic and in Poland, and that won't happen either. It turns out that American influence has its limits, and that Russia has regained a sphere of influence. This is no longer the Russia of the 1990s, beaten and bruised, unable to act on behalf of its own interests. Russia is now in a position to respond, and that is exactly what it did.
"A very similar crisis could develop in the Crimean peninsula, which now belongs to Ukraine, but used to belong to Russia, and has a large Russian population. Now everyone realizes that the Russians are serious. The same thing could also happen in Azerbaijan. Public opinion in those countries could change - from pro-Western to not wanting to rankle the Russian neighbor." Rahr also feels this week's events could affect a possible military campaign against Iran, too. "America's space for maneuver has shrunk," he says, "both strategically and logistically. Now it will be much harder for America to operate in Russia's southern part. Diplomatically, too, Russia's voice will increasingly be heard."
Twilight of U.S. hegemony
The roaring of the Russian artillery near Tbilisi, which clearly revealed that the issue was not South Ossetia but rather Russia's status in the world, also prompted a reevaluation by Sovietologists and Russian historians.
"This is without a doubt a founding moment," says Anne Applebaum, a historian and author of the international best-seller "Gulag: A History." "This week the Russians set an example. Just like when they killed journalist Anna Politkovskaya. There is no need to kill all the country's journalists. One is enough, and all the rest get the message. That's what [Russia] did this week: There is no need to invade all the countries in the region, but they will all get the message.
"In recent years we have seen a deterioration in the human rights situation in Russia," Applebaum continues. "Now it is clear that rising Russian nationalism will extend beyond the country's borders. This week's events also made it clear that the belief that only the U.S. can flex its muscles is mistaken. They marked the end of an era in which the U.S. behaved like the only superpower. It was interesting to follow the events on a split-screen television, showing both the amazing spectacle China organized for the opening of the Olympic Games and pictures from Georgia. We saw two new superpowers, evincing different behavior, of course, but which completely undermine America's global hegemony. We saw history in the making, right before our eyes."
Historian Simon Sebag-Montefiore, author of two biographies of Josef Stalin, believes this is "the start of the twilight of America's sole world hegemony.
"The retaking of Ossetia is a minor part of the Russian campaign," says Montefiore, who has visited Georgia many times and is personally acquainted with the three presidents who have headed the country since the Soviet Union's disintegration. "More significant is the attack on Georgia proper, which reasserts Russia's hegemony over the Caucasus and defies American superpowerdom.
"The prospect of encirclement by triumphant America infuriated Russia," he continues. "Imagine if newly independent Wales joined the Warsaw Pact. This war is really a celebration of ferocious force in the realm of international power, a dangerous precedent. Russia has demonstrated the limits of U.S. power and Moscow's historic destiny as regional and world superpower. The Empire has struck back and shaken the order of the world."
Triste sina ter nascido português
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Re: O REGRESSO DA GRANDE RÚSSIA?
http://www.barentsobserver.com/russia-s ... 16149.html
Russia sends aircraft carrier to Syria
The Russian aircraft carrier “Admiral Kuznetsov” is ready to head from Murmansk towards the Mediterranean and the Syrian port of Tartus. The mission comes after Syrian President Bashar Assad said he is open for a Russian base in the area.
The “Admiral Kuznetsov”, part of the Northern Fleet and Russia’s only aircraft carrier, will head a Navy mission to the area. The mission will also include the missile cruiser “Moskva” and several submarines, Newsru.com reports.
President Assad in meetings in Moscow this week expressed support to Russia’s intervention in South Ossetia and Georgia. He also expressed interest in the establishment of Russian missile air defence facilities on his land.
The “Admiral Kuznetsov” also last year headed a navy mission to the Mediterranean. Then, on the way from the Kola Peninsula and south, it stopped in the North Sea where it conducted a navy training exercise in the immediate vicinity of Norwegian offshore installations.
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Re: O REGRESSO DA GRANDE RÚSSIA?
26/08/2008 - 17h58
Medvedev ameaça resposta militar a escudo de antimísseis dos EUA
SOCHI (Reuters) - O presidente russo, Dmitry Medvedev, disse na terça-feira que responderia militarmente à instalação de mísseis dos Estados Unidos em regiões próximas da fronteira da Rússia.
A secretária de Estado dos EUA Condoleezza Rice assinou um acordo na Polônia na semana passada para a organização e preparação de dez mísseis interceptadores dos Estados Unidos no país, como parte de um escudo antimísseis. Washington diz que o escudo, que também envolve sistemas de rastreamento na República Tcheca, tem a intenção de proteger contra lançamentos de Estados nocivos, uma referência especialmente aplicada ao Irã.
"Esses mísseis estão próximos de nossas fronteiras e são uma ameaça", disse Medvedev à rede Al-Jazeera de televisão. "Isso irá criar tensões adicionais e teremos que responder de algum jeito, naturalmente usando meios militares".
A Rússia rejeita os argumentos dos Estados Unidos para o escudo e o vê como uma ameaça à sua defesa nuclear.
Medvedev havia falado antes de uma possível resposta militar, mas os comentários desta terça-feira foram os primeiros nessa linha desde que Rice concluiu o acordo.
Líderes políticos e militares da Rússia nunca especificaram quais medidas militares poderiam tomar.
Algumas autoridades militares sugeriram que a organização de mísseis na região de Kaliningrado, enclave russo na região báltica, e na ex-aliada soviética Belarus podem ser boas opções.
(Reportagem de Denis Dyomkin)
http://noticias.uol.com.br/ultnot/reute ... 75885.jhtm
Medvedev ameaça resposta militar a escudo de antimísseis dos EUA
SOCHI (Reuters) - O presidente russo, Dmitry Medvedev, disse na terça-feira que responderia militarmente à instalação de mísseis dos Estados Unidos em regiões próximas da fronteira da Rússia.
A secretária de Estado dos EUA Condoleezza Rice assinou um acordo na Polônia na semana passada para a organização e preparação de dez mísseis interceptadores dos Estados Unidos no país, como parte de um escudo antimísseis. Washington diz que o escudo, que também envolve sistemas de rastreamento na República Tcheca, tem a intenção de proteger contra lançamentos de Estados nocivos, uma referência especialmente aplicada ao Irã.
"Esses mísseis estão próximos de nossas fronteiras e são uma ameaça", disse Medvedev à rede Al-Jazeera de televisão. "Isso irá criar tensões adicionais e teremos que responder de algum jeito, naturalmente usando meios militares".
A Rússia rejeita os argumentos dos Estados Unidos para o escudo e o vê como uma ameaça à sua defesa nuclear.
Medvedev havia falado antes de uma possível resposta militar, mas os comentários desta terça-feira foram os primeiros nessa linha desde que Rice concluiu o acordo.
Líderes políticos e militares da Rússia nunca especificaram quais medidas militares poderiam tomar.
Algumas autoridades militares sugeriram que a organização de mísseis na região de Kaliningrado, enclave russo na região báltica, e na ex-aliada soviética Belarus podem ser boas opções.
(Reportagem de Denis Dyomkin)
http://noticias.uol.com.br/ultnot/reute ... 75885.jhtm
Re: O REGRESSO DA GRANDE RÚSSIA?
Esses misseís só servem pra atacar outros, ou podem sei la, carregar ogivas nucleares?
O pior de tudo é o conformismo!
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Re: O REGRESSO DA GRANDE RÚSSIA?
Um esquadrão de 24 Su-27SKM com mísseis anti-radição, mísseis laser e TV guiados e R-77 dariam conta do problema e depois voltariam pra toca.
O problema é o tal do "artigo 5" da OTAN. Mas acho que eles não seriam tolos a ponto de precisar recorrer a ela, pois seria a última vez que fariam isso.
abraços]
O problema é o tal do "artigo 5" da OTAN. Mas acho que eles não seriam tolos a ponto de precisar recorrer a ela, pois seria a última vez que fariam isso.
abraços]
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amor fati
amor fati
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Re: O REGRESSO DA GRANDE RÚSSIA?
Os dez mísseis não têm ogivas nucleares ou outras.
Os mísseis estão equipados em vez da ogiva com um «veículo de ataque exoatmosférico».
Os polacos garantiram o fornecimento de mísseis anti-aéreos, em principio Patriot-PAC-3. Isso, irritou os russos ainda mais...
Para atingir a Polónia a partir da Rússia, é preciso voar bastante.
Para atacar os radares na República Checa, só com mísseis.
A Rússia não tem aeronaves para fazer isso. Os Su-27 são tão «Stealth» que aparecem até nos radares em Paris.
Os próprios generais russos são muito claros quanto a isso. Ameaçaram a Polonia com ataques de mísseis e não com ataques de aeronaves. Eles sabem que se ameaçassem com ataques de aviões, ninguém os levaria a sério.
E o Artigo V que meteu medo à Rússia. Os russos da URSS nunca quiseram colocar a determinação da NATO em teste.
Esperemos que os actuais russos também gostem dos filhos deles...
Os mísseis estão equipados em vez da ogiva com um «veículo de ataque exoatmosférico».
Os polacos garantiram o fornecimento de mísseis anti-aéreos, em principio Patriot-PAC-3. Isso, irritou os russos ainda mais...
Para atingir a Polónia a partir da Rússia, é preciso voar bastante.
Para atacar os radares na República Checa, só com mísseis.
A Rússia não tem aeronaves para fazer isso. Os Su-27 são tão «Stealth» que aparecem até nos radares em Paris.
Os próprios generais russos são muito claros quanto a isso. Ameaçaram a Polonia com ataques de mísseis e não com ataques de aeronaves. Eles sabem que se ameaçassem com ataques de aviões, ninguém os levaria a sério.
Um ataque contra a Polónia ou contra a República Checa é um ataque directo contra todos os países da Aliança Atlântica.O problema é o tal do "artigo 5" da OTAN. Mas acho que eles não seriam tolos a ponto de precisar recorrer a ela, pois seria a última vez que fariam isso.
E o Artigo V que meteu medo à Rússia. Os russos da URSS nunca quiseram colocar a determinação da NATO em teste.
Esperemos que os actuais russos também gostem dos filhos deles...
Re: O REGRESSO DA GRANDE RÚSSIA?
Se à Rússia tem medo, à Europa e EUA também.Determinação é o que não falta na Rússia.Isso significa uma coisa conforme as palavras abaixo:pt escreveu:Os dez mísseis não têm ogivas nucleares ou outras.
Os mísseis estão equipados em vez da ogiva com um «veículo de ataque exoatmosférico».
Os polacos garantiram o fornecimento de mísseis anti-aéreos, em principio Patriot-PAC-3. Isso, irritou os russos ainda mais...
Para atingir a Polónia a partir da Rússia, é preciso voar bastante.
Para atacar os radares na República Checa, só com mísseis.
A Rússia não tem aeronaves para fazer isso. Os Su-27 são tão «Stealth» que aparecem até nos radares em Paris.
Os próprios generais russos são muito claros quanto a isso. Ameaçaram a Polonia com ataques de mísseis e não com ataques de aeronaves. Eles sabem que se ameaçassem com ataques de aviões, ninguém os levaria a sério.
Um ataque contra a Polónia ou contra a República Checa é um ataque directo contra todos os países da Aliança Atlântica.O problema é o tal do "artigo 5" da OTAN. Mas acho que eles não seriam tolos a ponto de precisar recorrer a ela, pois seria a última vez que fariam isso.
E o Artigo V que meteu medo à Rússia. Os russos da URSS nunca quiseram colocar a determinação da NATO em teste.
Esperemos que os actuais russos também gostem dos filhos deles...
O presidente russo, Dmitry Medvedev, disse na terça-feira que responderia militarmente à instalação de mísseis dos Estados Unidos em regiões próximas da fronteira da Rússia.
A Rússia rejeita os argumentos dos Estados Unidos para o escudo e o vê como uma ameaça à sua defesa nuclear.
Tradução: GUERRA.
É isso que vejo, colocar à culpa pela situação apenas na Rússia é um erro grotesco e usando as palavras da midia ocidental; “Inaceitável”, “ilegal” ou “injustificável”.
Re: O REGRESSO DA GRANDE RÚSSIA?
E como se posiciona o Brasil neste contexto?
Assina tratados militares estrategicos com Russia e com a Franca (OTAN) simultaneamente?
Me parece que ha algo nao estrategico nesta estrategia brasileira.
Assina tratados militares estrategicos com Russia e com a Franca (OTAN) simultaneamente?
Me parece que ha algo nao estrategico nesta estrategia brasileira.
Sempre e inevitavelmente, cada um de nós subestima o número de indivíduos estúpidos que circulam pelo mundo.
Carlo M. Cipolla
Carlo M. Cipolla
Re: O REGRESSO DA GRANDE RÚSSIA?
O Brasil pode escolher o lado do bem (tradução EUA, ou os Bad Guys), conforme palavras do senador rebuplicano McCain ao afirmar que o novo presidente americano deve ter uma visão "clara" do papel do país no mundo "como defensor dos oprimidos e uma força de bem".Santiago escreveu:E como se posiciona o Brasil neste contexto?
Assina tratados militares estrategicos com Russia e com a Franca (OTAN) simultaneamente?
Me parece que ha algo nao estrategico nesta estrategia brasileira.
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Re: O REGRESSO DA GRANDE RÚSSIA?
Mas um Tu-160 com mísseis Kh-55 pode atacar um radar a uma distância de quase 3000Km, sem precisar se aproximar muito. O míssil voa a baixa altura, dificultando a detecção.Os próprios generais russos são muito claros quanto a isso. Ameaçaram a Polonia com ataques de mísseis e não com ataques de aeronaves. Eles sabem que se ameaçassem com ataques de aviões, ninguém os levaria a sério.
Acho que isso seria muito mais perigoso do que mísseis balísitcos 'não nucleares'.
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amor fati
amor fati
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pt
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Re: O REGRESSO DA GRANDE RÚSSIA?
Talvez fosse bom dizer isso aos generais russos...Mas um Tu-160 com mísseis Kh-55 pode atacar um radar a uma distância de quase 3000Km, sem precisar se aproximar muito. O míssil voa a baixa altura, dificultando a detecção.
Acho que isso seria muito mais perigoso do que mísseis balísitcos 'não nucleares'.
Mas eu acho que eles não devem ligar muito para os catálogos de armas... russas...
Existe uma resposta, à altura, para cada acção que os russos tomarem, e eles sabem disso perfeitamente.
A Rússia sabe que as suas armas não estão à altura das ocidentais. Por isso os russos têm que falar «grosso» e apelar desde o inicio para o fogo pesado e para a ameaça clara, para que os países europeus possam ser intimidados.
Re: O REGRESSO DA GRANDE RÚSSIA?
Então quer dizer que para os europeus e americanos isso é uma barbada?Podemos dizer e afirmar que esse conflito já temos um ganhador: à UE e os EUA.pt escreveu:Talvez fosse bom dizer isso aos generais russos...Mas um Tu-160 com mísseis Kh-55 pode atacar um radar a uma distância de quase 3000Km, sem precisar se aproximar muito. O míssil voa a baixa altura, dificultando a detecção.
Acho que isso seria muito mais perigoso do que mísseis balísitcos 'não nucleares'.
Mas eu acho que eles não devem ligar muito para os catálogos de armas... russas...
Existe uma resposta, à altura, para cada acção que os russos tomarem, e eles sabem disso perfeitamente.
A Rússia sabe que as suas armas não estão à altura das ocidentais. Por isso os russos têm que falar «grosso» e apelar desde o inicio para o fogo pesado e para a ameaça clara, para que os países europeus possam ser intimidados.
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Re: O REGRESSO DA GRANDE RÚSSIA?
Barbada não, mas os sistemas russos estão atrasados em relação aos ocidentais (EF-2000, Rafale, Patriot, Stealthy´s), apesar dos esforços da Rússia em modernizar seus meios.kurgan escreveu:Então quer dizer que para os europeus e americanos isso é uma barbada?Podemos dizer e afirmar que esse conflito já temos um ganhador: à UE e os EUA.pt escreveu:Talvez fosse bom dizer isso aos generais russos...
Mas eu acho que eles não devem ligar muito para os catálogos de armas... russas...
Existe uma resposta, à altura, para cada acção que os russos tomarem, e eles sabem disso perfeitamente.
A Rússia sabe que as suas armas não estão à altura das ocidentais. Por isso os russos têm que falar «grosso» e apelar desde o inicio para o fogo pesado e para a ameaça clara, para que os países europeus possam ser intimidados.
Imaginem a Rússia levando um "couro" no combate. A quem eles apelariam? Aos Topol-M, Bulava, etc. Tudo com ogiva nuclear e logicamente seriam respondidos da mesma forma, ou seja, chuva de radiação na europa inteirinha.
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amor fati
amor fati