Fica aqui um dos melhores textos que já vi acerca daquela velhissima discussão TiffieXRafa. O autor é Alemão e apresenta-se como Scorpion82.
This article is written by me, I provide it for free and you can distribute it. but it is forbidden to sell it or use it for other purposes! The article reflects the authors opinion which is based on his interpretion of the data and information researched over many years. There is no guarantee that all the information being contained are 100% and its for sure not complete. Spelling or grammar errors are to be excused as english isn't my first language, but I tried my best. Before commenting read the summary and think take it into account!
Enjoy the read.
Scorpion
--------------------------------------------
Introduction:
This article describes and compares Europe’s latest combat aircraft, their capabilities and the entire programmes. The French Dassault Aviation Rafale and the multinational Eurofighter Typhoon jointly developed by Germany, Italy, Spain and Great Britain are the most advanced and most capable combat aircraft ever developed by the European aerospace and defence industry. Europe’s newest fighters are an unique example for the most controversially discussed modern combat aircraft. The Rafale and Typhoon could be described as unequal twins. They have a lot of similarities, but differ in many details as well.
Development and program status:
The Rafale and Typhoon share common roots which can be tracked back to the late 1970s. At that time a number of western European NATO airforces were looking for the procurement of 4th generation fighters to replace a varity of ageing types. Countries like Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands or Belgium were looking for a fast, cheap and easy solution and eventually purchased the US made F-16 Fighting Falcon. Other nations like France, Great Britain or Germany opted for their own development to remain independent from the US, maintain their expertise in developing and producing advanced combat aircraft and for operational and economical benefits. A multinational approach was preferred by all due to the increasing complexity of advanced combat aircraft and their associated costs. Initial efforts didn’t materialize, however, due to the different requirements of the participating customer airforces and different concepts proposed by the national aerospace industries. The situation did not better when Italy and Spain joint the multinational effort in the early 1980s. At that time France and Great Britain initiated government funded technology demonstration programmes. The result were the Dassault Rafale A and the British Aerospace EAP (Experimental Aircraft Program). The 2 single piece demonstration aircraft were both flown in summer 1986 for the first time. On December 16th 1983 Europe started the FEFA program (Future European Fighter Aircraft). It was the last trial to jointly develop a 4th generation multirole fighter in Europe and for the first time 5 nations were involved, Germany, Italy, Spain, France and Great Britain. The FEFA soon became the EFA and ultimately evolved into the Eurofighter Typhoon. Issues about work share arrangements, design and industrial leadership, basic data such as dimensions, empty weight, engine thrust and the aerodynamic configuration couldn’t be resolved however. France finally left the EFA program in summer 1985 and decided to develop its own fighter, building on the Rafale A technology demonstrator prototype. The remaining 4 EFA partners decided to go ahead without France and were finally able to agree on a common solution. From that time on Europe developed to similar classed 4th generation multirole fighters in parallel.
When the development phases were started in the late 1980s the entry into service was scheduled for the second half of the 1990s. The end of the cold war and the german reunification led to significant delays, however. While the first of 4 Rafale prototypes took of to its maiden flight on May 19 1991, only a few month later than expected, the Typhoon programme encountered serious difficulties. A reorientation phase was established in 1992 after Germany’s threatened withdraw. The partners eventually decided to continue but the entire programme was reviewed and suited to the changed requirements and conditions. The first of 7 Typhoon prototypes did not takeoff to its maiden flight before March 27 1994, at least 2 years later than expected and about 3 years later than the Rafale. At the time of Typhoon’s first flight all Rafale prototypes were already flying.
Rafale’s series production began after the French government ordered a first batch of 13 aircraft in May 1997. When the first Rafale instrumented production aircraft was first flown on November 24th 1998 Typhoon component production had only begun. The Eurofighter’s umbrella production contract was signed on January 29th 1998 and a first production tranche covering 148 aircraft was ordered on September 18th the same year. The first Typhoon instrumented production aircraft took of to its first flight on April 5th 2002.
At that time the Rafale has served nearly 1 ½ years within the French navy (Aeronavale/Marine Nationale). The MN took delivery of first Rafale M F1 standard aircraft on December 4th 2000 and the Flottille 12F reformed as the first operational Rafale unit on May 18th 2001. When Typhoon twin seat block 1 series production aircraft received their four national type acceptance on June 30th 2003, the Flottile 12F had already achieved initial operating capability. First operational Typhoon test, evaluation and conversion units stood up between December 17th 2003 and May 27th 2004 within the partner airforces. Only few time later the Flottille 12F achieved its full operating capability on June 25th 2004. The Armee de l’Air took delivery of its first Rafale B F2 standard aircraft on December 22nd 2004, four years after the MN has received its first examples. Despite its later entry into service the first AdA Rafale unit, the EC 1/7 “Provence” achieved its full operating capability in the second half of 2006. At that time operational Typhoon units had not even achieved IOC status. In February 2007 the AdA and MN deployed first Rafale F2 standard aircraft to Afghanistan and conducted operational combat missions, droping some laser guided bombs. Typhoon units like the Royal Air Force No.3(F)/XI squadrons, the Aeronatica Militare Italiana’s 4° Stormo, the Luftwaffe’s Jagdgeschwader 74 and the Ejercito del Aire’s 111 Escuadron will achieve FOC between late 2007 and 2009.
Meanwhile production has been stabalized and the number of aircraft, flight hours and experience is growing. To date (July 07) 48 Rafales has been delivered to the AdA and MN, while the Typhoon customer airforces has received about 120 aircraft. Typhoon is slowly catching up in terms of deployed capabilities and owns a significant order book. France has contracted the delivery of 112 Rafales out of a total requirement for 294 aircraft. The MN will receive 60 Rafale M until 2015 and the AdA is expected to receive 234 Rafale B/C with an unspecified split between the single and twin seaters, which should be delivered by 2023. The four Eurofighter partners have signed an umbrella production contract for 620 aircraft (100 two seaters) and ordered a total of 384 aircraft within the first two production tranches. The 620 aircraft should be delivered around 2015 and include 232 for the RAF, 180 for the Lw, 121 for the AMI and 87 for the EdA.
Exports:
Dassault and Eurofighter are fighting for export orders since the mid 1990s. Both aircraft competed and still compete in a number of competitions. In 2002 both lost out in Australia, South Korea and the Netherlands and in 2005 the game repeated in Singapore. Australia saw both fighters as not good enough as a replacement for its F/A-18 Hornets, but didn’t evaluate them properly. The Netherlands conducted a political and economical evaluation where the Rafale scored better than the Typhoon. In South Korea the Typhoon was eliminated in a first round due to concerns about the capability related schedules as has been reported. The Rafale eventually won the technical part of the evaluation against the remaining Boeing F-15K which was finally selected for political reasons. Dassault and Eurofighter both decided not to bit for the Royal Korean Air Force’s 2nd phase of the procurement process. The situation was similar in Singapore. After the bad experience in South Korea Dassault requested a guarantee for a fair biding process from Japan, but didn’t receive an answer. Eurofighter however decided to make a proposal for the Japanese Air Self Defence Force’s fighter competition. In May 2006 Norway announced that the Rafale isn’t considered any longer, while the Typhoon is still in the competition. Despite these looses both aircraft still compete in a number of competitions such as in Denmark, Swiss, Bulgaria, Greece and India. Recent reports suggest that talks with Libya are under way as well. Additionally there’re markets where only one of the two fighters is offered. French sources reported about a deal with Morocco which is close to be finalised. And Dassault has fair chances in Brazil. Eurofighter is also bidding in Turkey and Romania. While the Rafale got better ratings or sustained at least longer in some competitions Dassault has still not scored a single export success.
Eurofighter on the other side has found to foreign customers by now. Austria has decided to purchase 15 aircraft which will be delivered between 2007 and 2009, while Saudi Arabia has ordered 72 aircraft. This brings the total number to 707 aircraft, including 87 examples for the first two export customers.
Aircraft capabilities:
Introduction
The Rafale and Typhoon were both from the outset conceived as swingrole capable tactical multirole fighters and were required to perform similar air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. Despite the similarities the requirements were slightly different and different priorities were set up for the AA and AG roles. The Typhoon was primarily designed for the air-to-air role optimised for the BVR area, but with good dogfighting capabilities and a robust but secondary air-to-ground attack/strike capability. For the Rafale an equal emphasis was placed on the AA and AG performance meaning the AG performance is of greater importance than for the Typhoon. The Typhoon is seen as the more potent AA fighter particularly in the BVR area, while the Rafale is rated as the better strike fighter in the general public opinion. The following comparison contrasts the two fighter’s capabilities in the different areas and can be seen as an attempt to evaluate their true capabilities. It is important to note that there’re a lot of unknown variables for some important factors, which has to be replaced by assumptions which might be more or less accurate. That means the eventual results might give an idea about the performance of Rafale and Typhoon in different areas, but they might not accurately reflect reality.
Beyond Visual Range - BVR aircombat:
Comparing the BVR performance of both fighters is probably the most interesting field as it is the most controversially discussed topic. BVR combat has become the primary kind of aircombat. The following comparison is based on the known capabilities of Rafale C F3 and Typhoon block 8 aircraft which will both be delivered in 2008.
The key to success in a BVR engagement is described with the three terms first look, first shot, first kill. But achieving these three firsts is a complex issue depending on a varity of factors. The first look requires a good situational awareness which is affected by the aircraft’s sensor capabilities and man machine interface. Rafale and Typhoon both feature a similar range of sensors. The primary sensor is in both cases an advanced X-band multimode radar. The main difference between the Rafale’s RBE2 (Radar a Balayage Electronice Deux planes) and the Typhoon’s Captor is the antenna technology being used. Both radars provide a number of BVR search and track modes and both are able to detect, track, prioritise and engage multiple targets simultaneously, provide look up/down, shoot up/down capabilities, incorporate a fighter to missile datalink and feature a raid assessment mode and a non cooperative target recognition (NCTR) capability and they are complemented by automated IFF systems (Identification Friend or Foe). The RBE2s passive electronically scanned array provides rapid/instanous beam sweeping and high beam agility enabling the radar to scan its entire field of view within milliseconds. The Captor’s mechanically scanned planar array, which is driven by 4 samarium-cobalt servo motors needs a couple of seconds to do so. The result is that the RBE2 is able to track up to 40 contacts simultaneously and engage 8 of them, while the Captor is only able to track at least 20 targets and engage 6 of them. Though it’s reasonable that the maximum number of tracks is even higher for the Captor it doesn’t match the wide FOV multi target track while scan capabilities of the RBE2. The RBE2 can update target data more frequently too and is able to track detected contacts while searching for new ones in a completely different sector, this capability is also known as track here while scan there. Another advantage of the RBE2 are its superior LPI features (Low Probability of Interception) reducing the detectability of the radar’s emissions. The Captor on the other side provides a 20° larger azimuth coverage. A noticeable disadvantage of ESA systems, especially PESA systems is that it needs phase shifting for sweeping the beam. This results in power loses the higher the beam sweep angle. That problem isn’t present with MSA systems and the Captor’s overall range performance is significantly superior to that of the RBE2, particularly at higher azimuth angles. The RBE2’s tracking range is given with 100 km against a 3 m² target in look down conditions, while the Captor’s tracking range is given with “well beyond 160 km” against a 5 m² target look ahead. It’s important to note that the RBE2’s range figures are dated and it is known that the radar has been improved over the time. AdA pilots claim that RBE2’s range performance is roughly similar to that of the Mirage 2000-5F’s mechanically scanned RDY radar. A detection range of 130-140 km against a 5 m² target in look ahead conditions is imaginable. The question is, is the RBE2 able to track targets at such distances? It’s also important to take into account that the Captor’s range figures are based on the tranche 1 examples Captor-C radar, but block 8 aircraft use the improved and partitialy redesigned Captor-D which might offer a longer range than the C-model.
The radars are complemented by passive electro-optical systems. The Rafale’s OSF (Optronique Secteur Frontal) comprises a dual band IRST/FLIR sensor (Infrared Search & Track/Forward Looking Infrared), an automated CCD type TV-camera and an eyesafe laser rangefinder. The Typhoon’s PIRATE (Passive Infrared Airborne Tracking Equipment) is based on a dual band IRST/FLIR sensor. The IRST sensors are able to detect and track multiple airborne targets simultaneously and can discriminate single targets within a group of aircraft. In contrast to the radars they offer a greater azimuth coverage, better angular resolution and are practically immune against electronic countermeasures, while not betraying the aircrafts presence by emitting detectable emissions. The detection range is given with ~100 km in best conditions for the OSF IRST and with up to 145 km for the PIRATE. It has been reported that the French forces aren’t fully satisfied with the Rafale’s IRST. The PIRATE is likely to be more powerful, effective and flexible. The system can prioritise and cinematically range threats and is able to generate a target image for visual target recognition at distances of 35-40 km or more. The OSF on the other side features the TV camera and laser range finder. The TV camera can be slaved to the primary target and is able to track and identify it at distances up 90 km, while being passive. The laser range finder can gather additional target data such as range, but the range performance of laser systems is limited and the laser energy could trigger a targets LWR. The laser range finder is therefore less suited for long range BVR engagements. The OSF’s advantages are a probably longer identification range, which is balanced at night and in adverse weather conditions and the ability to scan for targets, while tracking and identifying a single target. The PIRATE can perform only one of these tasks at a time.
Another essential tool for threat detection are the aircrafts fully integrated and automated electronic selfdefence and warfare systems. The Rafale’s Spectra (Système de Protection et d'Evitement des Conduites de Tir du Rafale) and the Typhoon’s DASS (Defensive Aids Sub System) belong to the most complete, advanced and capable electronic warfare suits in the world. The Spectra and DASS feature multiple sensors for threat detection. Both aircraft are equipped with advanced radar warning receivers (RWR) and electronic support measures (ESM). The RWR/ESM provide 360° azimuth coverage and ensure detection, precious localisation, exact identification and automatic priorisation of most radar emitters currently fielded. Both systems provide a similar accuracy, but it is known that the Spectra offers a greater frequency coverage (2-40 GHz), while the DASS is also able to detect lower frequency threats (100 MHz – 18 GHz). Details about their ranging capabilities, reliability and range performance are unknown. All Rafales and at least british Typhoons are equipped with laser warning receivers (LWR). The LWR provides full allround coverage and ensures detection and direction finding of laser emitters such as range finding or targeting systems. As the range performance of most laser systems is limited, it is unlikely that the LWR is of importance for long range BVR engagements. Much more important are the aircrafts missile approach warning systems. Both aircraft feature MAWS which provide full spherical coverage and are able to detect and track multiple missiles launched towards the aircraft. The main difference between them is the technology being used. The Rafale uses a passive system designated DDM, which is based on mid-wave infrared sensors, while the Typhoon uses impulse doppler mm-wave radars. Both technologies have their advantages and disadvantages. The Rafale’s passive MAWS can’t be jammed and doesn’t betray the aircraft’s presence. It additionally offers a higher angular resolution. The Typhoon’s MAWS is likely to offer a superior range performance, as it is unlikely that the Rafale’s MAWS is able to detect threats up to 100 km. Another advantage of the active MAWS is that its range performance is nearly independent from the weather conditions and the rocket motor’s burning status. Typhoon’s MAWS is also able to gather additional threat data such as range, closure rate etc. This enables the system to present most effective evasive manoeuvres to the pilot and to engage the countermeasures more effectively. The disadvantages of the active MAWS are the possibility to detect the system’s emissions and to jam it. It’s however likely that the Typhoon’s MAWS uses frequencies which aren’t covered by the typical RWR/ESM/ECM equipment of fighters.
Both aircraft are additionally equipped with the NATO LINK16 compatible MIDS-LVT datalink (Multifunction Information Distribution System – Low Volume Terminal). The MIDS is an advanced bi-directional digital datalink which ensures a secured, jamming resistant near realtime communication and data exchange. With help of MIDS both aircraft can be integrated into network centric warfare environments sharing their sensor data with other assets on the battlefield. They can receive almost complete sensor pictures which provide the crew with an overview over the tactical situation some hundreds of km around them. The MIDS can additionally receive target data which enable the two fighters to perform silent interceptions and engagements. Even with no early warning, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms such as AWACS available, up to 8 aircraft can be linked up to each other sharing their sensor pictures, tracks, target and position data as well as other information such as fuel or weapon status. This allows each member in a formation to operate more independent from each other, to coordinate attacks more easily and reduces the need for radio calls. The MIDS additionally ensures discrete voice communication over two secured channels and text message exchange for task distribution etc. The usage of offboard target data enables passive BVR tactics and vastly increases the pilot’s situational awareness.
In both cases sensor fusion is a true force multiplier. All the aircraft’s onboard and offboard sensor data such as from radar, IRST/EO, EWS, IFF and MIDS are collected, processed, analysed and eventually correlated and fused into a single tactical sensor picture. This provides the pilot with further enhanced situational awareness, while reducing his workload and improving data reliability and countermeasures resistance.
As mentioned above the aircraft’s man machine interface (MMI) is important as well. Both fighters provide very sophisticated MMIs. The high level of systems integration and automation, in combination with advanced coloured multifunctional displays, complemented by wide angle head-up displays, HOTAS controls (Hands On Throttle And Stick) and fully integrated self diagnostic and health monitoring systems vastly reduces the pilots workload and allows them to concentrate on the mission, choosing the right tactics and making the right decisions, rather than fighting the aircrafts flight controls or systems management. As closer details are unknown it is difficult to predict which MMI is superior. Some sources suggest that Typhoon’s MMI enjoys some advantages, but it is unlikely that the superiority is significant particularly for the BVR role. Known advantages of the Typhoon’s MMI include DVI (direct voice input) and the Striker helmet mounted display. The DVI enables the pilot to control some 26 non safety relevant functions, replacing time consuming tasks such as display selection, datalink management or data entries with short and quick voice commands. Rafale’s HOTAS on the other side controls some 36 functions, while that of the Typhoon is limited to 24. The HMD allows the pilot to fly the aircraft head up most of the time.
Though situational awareness is essential for achieving the first look the aircrafts signatures are important as well. Neither Rafale nor Typhoon has been designed as allround covered stealth aircraft, but a number of measures were taken to reduce their signatures. Most important is the radar signature. Both aircraft were optimised for low frontal radar cross section (RCS) which is most important in BVR engagements. Just from looking at the aircrafts there’re more external visible measures of stealth reduction for the Rafale. Though signature data are highly classified, it is likely that the Rafale enjoys an edge in terms of overall RCS. The frontal RCS is however unlikely to be significantly lower than that of the Typhoon especially in a combat configuration. The situation looks different in terms of the infrared signature. Both aircraft have the ability to supercruise and their engines provide low emission characteristics. But it is known that for Rafale’s M88-2 engines some IR-reduction measures were realized. Though that might have a little effect from the frontal hemisphere it might be a useful advantage in a couple of situations.
Most attention was spent on reducing the aircrafts detectable emissions as they are generated by the radar, radar altimeter, radios, datalink and jammers. The Typhoon is additionally equipped with an active MAWS and its radar has inferior LPI features as described above. Both aircraft can use a range of passive sensors and systems and feature emission control systems (EMCON) which manage the aircrafts emissions and reduce them to the currently necessary level. This vastly reduces detectability, once again the Rafale is likely to enjoy the edge.
The question to ask is: “Are Rafale’s signatures low enough to balance Typhoon’s superior sensor range performance?” It seems to be unlikely that particularly Rafale’s RCS is low enough to compensate the Typhoon’s superior radar range.
Achieving the first look forms a good base for making the first shot, but the first shot is also influenced by a number of other factors.
One of them is the aircraft’s armament. Both aircraft use active radar guided medium range missiles as their primary BVR weapons. The Rafale uses the MICA EM and the Typhoon the AIM-120B AMRAAM. Both missiles provide full fire & forget capabilities using their inbuilt inertial navigation systems (INS) and radar seekers, but they also incorporate datalinks to receive mid-course guidance updates from the launch platform or another platform increasing the probability of kill. Both missiles provide a robust countermeasures resistance, achieve top speeds about mach 4 and are relative manoeuvrable. The MICA EM might enjoy an edge in terms of seeker performance and maybe even range performance and manoeuvreability due to its lower weight and linear rocket motor burning profile. It’s however worth noting that the more advanced AIM-120C-5 is already integrated into the Typhoon and is or will be used at least by German and British Typhoons. The C-5 model is likely to balance the MICA EM’s advantages in most areas. A noticeable advantage of the Rafale is the ability to use the MICA IR which features an imaging wide angle IR seeker, instead of the Ku-band radar. The Rafale is able to perform silent interceptions with the combination of OSF, Spectra and MICA IR, though it is likely that a similar passive engagement capability exists for the EM too. The Typhoon’s DASS and PIRATE provide similar target data. At least theoretically it should be possible to perform silent engagements with the Typhoon as well, but there are no reports which indicate such a capability. Another unique capability of the Rafale is the ability to perform high off boresight angle BVR engagements with MIDS data and the MICA, but it is important to note that the range performance reduces the higher the angle as the missile looses energy with the sharp turn.
Launch range of the missiles is dependent on the launch conditions. A common rule says the faster and higher the launch platform the longer the missile’s reach. Flight performance is therefore crucial to engage a target at maximum range. Both aircraft are claimed to achieve top speeds up to mach 2 at altitude in a clean configuration and mach 1.8 with a load of air-to-air missiles (AAMs). Even with drop tanks both aircraft can still achieve mach 1.6. Even more impressive is the ability to supercruise. Both aircraft are claimed to be able to supercruise even in a combat configuration including a centre line drop tank and a load of AAMs. Though closer details are unknown reports suggest that the Typhoon enjoys the edge here. Supercruise allows the aircraft to fly supersonic for an extended period of time, while keeping the fuel consumption and the IR signature low. Supercruise additionally enables the aircraft to accelerate faster to a more moderate launch speed in the range of mach 1.6 to 1.8.
Service ceiling is given with 16765 m for both aircraft, but it is known that their absolute ceiling could be in the range of 18000 m and more. Though details are unknown it is likely that the Typhoon enjoys an edge here as well. The question is how much better is altitude performance and does it make a real difference. The highest speed and altitude is useless, however, if the aircraft isn’t able to reach it in a useful time. Acceleration and climb performance is therefore crucial. Though there is a lack of data it has been reported that the Typhoon enjoys a noticeable edge here, particularly in terms of acceleration. Supersonic manoeuvreability and agility is important as well to break away after missile launch, evade enemy counter fire and to quickly manoeuvre into a tactical advantageous position. Once again the Typhoon is claimed to be superior in that area.
The last important factor for BVR engagements are the countermeasures which are an integral part of the aircrafts EWS. Both aircraft are equipped with automated chaff/flare dispensers and an internal directed electronic countermeasures system (ECM). Both ECM use digital radio frequency memories (DRFM) and passive electronically scanned arrays (PESA). The ECM is able to jam multiple threats simultaneously and to direct optimised jamming beams precious and quickly towards the threat. This increases effectiveness and reduces the probability of detection. Due to the lack of more details it’s only fair to assume parity in that field. Some sources suggest that Italian Typhoons are equipped with a cross eye jammer, which requires a second rearward looking antenna in the right wing tip pod. Cross eye jamming causes aiming errors in enemy radars and is claimed to be very effective against monopulse radars. The most effective defence against monopulse radars are towed radar decoys (TRD), however. All Typhoons except german examples are equipped with the Ariel fibre-optic TRD two of which can be carried in the right ESM/ECM pod, or one in the case that a cross eye jammer is installed. The TRD enables offboard jamming techniques and is said to be significantly more effective than the internal ECM. The TRDs can be used at high supersonic speeds as well as high g manoeuvres. German Typhoons are likely to receive the similar Skybuzzer TRD.
Summing it up the both aircraft enjoy advantages in different areas in comparison to each other. But it is likely that the Typhoon offers better overall performance in the BVR area due to its greater radar coverage and range, superior flight performance in the relevant regimes and the TRD. The Rafale’s advantages might offer advantages in some specific situations and it might be that the Rafale performs better against some threats. It is worth noting that the lack of exact data in many of the areas is a variable which might have a more or less significant impact on the performance, dependent on how the real data differ from the assumptions.
Within Visual Range – WVR aircombat:
The close in combat is the traditional way to fight enemy aircraft and for decades it was the primary kind of aircombat. Today most fighter pilots will try to avoid close range aerial engagements, but there might be situations where the so called dogfight can’t be avoided. The dogfight can be divided into the classical gun fight and the modern missile fight. The WVR performance of Rafale and Typhoon are rated to be roughly equal.
In traditional gun fights the pilots were visually searching for each other. Once the enemy was spotted the pilot tried to manoeuvre his aircraft into the enemies 6 o’clock position, before aiming and shooting him down with the gun.
Rafale and Typhoon are equally sized and their engines provide low emission characteristics resulting in similar low visual signatures. Their cockpits provide a similar good allround visibility, which is necessary to visually search and track the enemy.
The flight performance of both fighters looks similar in the important areas at least on paper. Both aircraft can immediately pull into a sustained 9 g turn and achieve high instanous and sustained turning rates. They are easy to control and very manoeuvrable at low speeds and high AoAs as well. The Rafale has a slightly lower wing loading in a typical aircombat configuration, while the Typhoon offers a slightly better thrust/weight ratio (TWR). Though many data are unknown it seems to be likely that the Rafale enjoys an edge in terms of sustained turning rates and low speed and high AoA manoeuvrability. The Typhoon is more unstable and has a greater g-onset resulting in superior instanous turning rates and the aircraft is likely to enjoy an edge in terms of acceleration and climb rate. It looks like the differences aren’t that great, however and it is therefore unlikely that one of the two fighters enjoys a decisive edge.
Both aircraft are equipped with advanced digital fly-by-wire flight controls which ensure easy and safe handling qualities. Though the Rafale’s FCS provides a certain degree of carefree handling, the Typhoon’s FCS seems to be superior here. Though this won’t have a noticeable impact in a typical aircombat configuration it might be an advantage in heavier AG configurations.
With high performance fighters such as the Rafale and Typhoon, g-protection has become a serious issue. The limiting factor isn’t the aircraft, but the pilot. Both design teams opted for different solutions to achieve the goal of effective g-protection for the crew. Dassault decided to go with a specific cockpit layout combined with traditional pneumatic anti-g trousers and a positive pressure mask. The Rafale’s cockpit features side controls with arm rests and a heavily inclined seat (29°). Eurofighter selected a more conventional cockpit layout for ergonomic reasons. To achieve the necessary g-protection new flying suits were developed for the Eurofighter Typhoon. Most pilots wear a suit working with air chambers. The suit comprises anti-g trousers, boots and a west, augmented by a positive pressure mask. German pilots use the even more advanced Libelle-G suit which works autonomous and uses fluid muscles. The Libelle requires no connections to the aircraft’s onboard systems and provides undelayed protection effectively countering the rapid g-onset. The Libelle suit offers significantly better protection against g-forces and enables the pilot to use the aircraft’s full performance potential.
Once in the enemies six the pilot has just to aim and shoot with the guns. The fire control systems provide accurate gun sights and Typhoon’s FCS features an automated gun attack function as well. Both aircraft use large calibre single barrel guns. The Rafale’s GIAT DEFA 791B is a 30 mm gun, with an ammunition load of 125 rounds and a firing rate up to 2500 rounds/min. The Typhoon’s Mauser Bk27 is a 27 mm gun with an ammunition load of 150 rounds and a firing rate up to 1700 rounds/min.
Like in other advanced combat aircraft Rafale and Typhoon pilots are supported by technologies. All relevant flight reference and target data are presented in the pilots forward head up field of view on wide angle HuDs. Typhoon pilots also wear the Striker helmet, with an integrated HMD and an optical sighting system. Typhoon pilots can therefore keep an eye on all relevant parameters independent of were they are looking and target boxes, generated by the AIS, are presented in the pilot’s FOV. The HMD can present NVE- and FLIR imagery as well, vastly enhancing the aircraft’s night and bad weather fighting capabilities. Most of the functions for WVR engagements are automated and in combination with the HOTAS and DVI controls the pilots don’t need to take their hands off the controls. The radars of both aircraft incorporate specific dogfight modes for rapid automatic target acquisition. This keeps the workload low, while enabling quick target lock on for cueing missiles or gun aiming. It’s however unwise to use the radar, if the pilot isn’t aware about the aircraft’s presence. In such cases the IRST/EO sensors are very useful. These enable wide angle passive target detection, identification and tracking. The EWS and MIDS capabilities as described before will further enhance the pilots SA and increase the chance to evade enemy missile shots. The LWR might be helpful at close range as well as some fighters use laser range finders in combination with their passive EO sensors.
Though the gun might be useful in some situation it is rarely used and most pilots will try to avoid a pure gun fight. Modern fighters primarily rely on advanced IIR equipped short range missiles (SRAAM). The Rafale uses the flexible MICA IR, while Typhoons use the more specialised ASRAAM and IRIS-T missiles. All these missiles are fast, extremely agile and feature INS and IIR wide angle seekers with a field of view of +/-90°. The seekers are practically immune against flare decoys and might be able to target specific parts of a threat or to differ between different threats, reducing the probability of friendly kills. The MICA IR additionally features a datalink and is the only true BVR capable AAM of its kind. The missiles of both types feature lock on after launch (LOAL) capabilities, which enable the pilot to launch the missile at a target before the seeker has locked on it. The HOBS engagement capability allows the pilot to attack the enemy without making extensive manoeuvres to get in position. The Rafale relies on MIDS to make HOBS shots, while the Typhoon’s HMS provides an easier, independent and maybe quicker cueing capability for HOBS attacks.
Summing it up both aircraft are likely to perform similar well in a gun fight and the winner most likely depends on who gets the first look, is in a better position and has the better skills. The HMD/HMS combo is however likely to provide the Typhoon with an advantage, particularly at night and in adverse weather conditions.
Air-to-Ground attack & strike:
The Rafale and Typhoon initially entered service in pure airdefence configurations, but they were from the outset designed as swingrole capable multirole fighters. Both aircraft are required to perform a number of tasks, some of them are similar others are different. All this depends on the requirements of the customers and the available weapons. The AdA received the multirole capable F2 standard aircraft in December 2004 and weapons integration has made noticeable advances. F2 standard Rafales can use AASM missiles, Scalp-EG stand-off missiles and laser guided GBU-12 Paveway II bombs. F3 standard aircraft to be delivered from 2008 will feature all the systems and system functionalities required to perform all the aircraft’s roles currently intended. The required stores should all be available by 2009. The Rafale is currently far ahead in terms of AG weapons and systems integration and fielding. The Typhoon block 5 is currently limited to carry and drop laser guided Paveway II bombs such as the GBU-10/16 with 3rd party target designation, but this capability is still unused by the customers. The RAF will pioneer an austere AG capability in 2008 with initial integration of the Litening 3 laser designator pod (LDP) and Enhanced Paveway II dual-mode bombs with laser- and GPS guidance. Full swingrole capabilities will be explored with block 10 aircraft which benefit from the phase 1 enhancements and will be delivered around 2010/2011. Full AG capabilities with all or at least most planned weapons and all required systems and system functionanlities should be available by ~2014 with phase 2 enhancements. That means while the Rafale will be able to perform all currently required tasks by the end of the decade, the Typhoon won’t be able to do so before the next decade. It is therefore difficult to compare both fighters in all the roles as the future standards aren’t fully defined or the exact capabilities are unknown. Nonetheless we want to compare both fighters in different roles and their overall AG performance.
Despite being lighter and a little bit smaller the Rafale has a 1000 kg higher maximum takeoff weight (MTOW). The payload is up to 9500 kg distributed over up to 14 hardpoints while the Typhoon’s payload is given with ~7500 kg on up to 13 hardpoints. It is important to note that the outboard wing pylons are unused by AdA/MN Rafales and in most configurations the Rafale won’t use more than 9 to 11 of its pylons. Both aircraft have a robust self defence/escort capability carrying at least 4 to 6 AAMs and in the case of Typhoon 2 additional AAMs or anti radiation missiles.
The mission equipment is similar for both fighters with equal navigation and communication systems and the sensors being described above. The radars of both fighters provide a number of AG modes including DBS and SAR mapping, ground moving target indication/track, sea surface search and track while scan, AG ranging and terrain avoidance. The Captor is likely to provide a superior range performance, the RBE2 on the other side is capable of interleaving AA and AG modes, which provide some advantages for self defence especially in twin seat Rafale Bs. The RBE2 is able to generate 3-D maps combining terrain following and avoidance modes. In combination with an optimised digital radar altimeter, a digital terrain reference navigation system and the aircraft’s superior low level ride quality the Rafale provides a better low level flight performance, with more systems redundancy and flexibility. Though the Typhoon features the similar TERPROM II TRN, its radar altimeter is less optimised and there is no automatic terrain following flight function enabled by the radar.
Rafale’s lower signatures might be helpful for the aircraft’s survivability, but the large external stores somehow balances this.
The Typhoon’s advantages are a noticeably superior TWR and lower wingloading in combination with full carefree handling in heavy configurations. This results in superior flight performance and improves the aircraft’s self defence capabilities and therefore survivability. The TRD is going to help as well. It is known that block 10 Typhoons will include a more advanced MMI, which is claimed to be capable of simultaneous AA and AG targeting. If Typhoon’s MMI is really superior as some people suggest, that might have an impact on the overall AG performance as well. But it is important to note that while all Typhoons to be used for combat operations are single seaters. The AdA on the other side uses a large number of two seat Rafale B and a second crew member can be a significant help in complex situations.
Weapons and stores planned for both aircraft include the similar standoff missiles Scalp-EG for Rafale and Storm Shadow as well as KEPD-350 Taurus for Typhoon. Laser guided bombs (LGBs) include the ~1000 kg heavy GBU-24 Paveway III for both aircraft, 1000 kg and 454 kg GBU-10/16 Paveway II for the Typhoon, the 227 kg heavy GBU-12 PW II for Rafale and 454 kg UK PW II similar to the GBU-16. Most Typhoon customers will introduce the more advanced and flexible EGBU-16 and PW IV (RAF only) dual mode bombs with laser and GPS guidance. French forces seem to be interested in such weapons as well and the EGBU-24 is a possible option for both aircraft. The Rafale can also use the 340 kg AASM missile with combined IIR/INS/GPS guidance and a rocket booster. The AASM is therefore a fire & forget capable standoff weapon with HOBS target capabilities using the Spectra/OSF combination for targeting, identification and damage assessment. The Rafale can also use AM-39 Exocet block 3 anti-ship missiles, ASMP-A standoff nuclear missiles, a buddy-buddy refuelling pod and the RECO-NG tactical reconnaissance pod.
The Typhoon will additionally use the active mm-wave radar guided Brimestone missile which can be fired in salvos and which features a HOBS capability. This weapon is only planned for the RAF as well as the ALARM ARM. Though ALARM integration has yet to be approved and funded.
Both aircraft are able to use laser designator pods (LDP) such as the Damocles for Rafale and Litening 2/3 used by the Typhoon.
Both aircraft are therefore suited for precision strikes round the clock, in adverse weather conditions at low or high altitudes and at short or long ranges. Both aircraft feature a robust SEAD/DEAD capability (Surpression/Destruction of Enemy Airdefence) and can perform the CAS/BAI roles (Close Air Support/Battlefield Interdiction). Rafales can additionally perform nuclear strike, naval strike, tactical reconnaissance and MN Rafale Ms will be able to act as tankers.
Both aircraft are capable of switching between AA and AG roles during a single missions. This so called swingrole capability offers great flexibility and a useful selfdefence/escort capability.
Below are some examples of the typical weapon configurations for different AG missions for a direct comparison of the payload/range capabilities.
Standoff precison strike:
Rafale: 2xScalp-EG, 4xMICA, 3x2000 l tanks
Typhoon: 2xStormshadow, 4xAMRAAM, 2xASRAAM, 1x1000 l tank (up to 4 ARMs or 2 ARMs & 2 AAMs could be carried in addition)
Precision strike 1:
Rafale: 6xGBU-12 or AASM, 3x2000 l tank, 1xLDP, 4xMICA
Typhoon: 4xPW IV, 2x1000 l tank, 1xLDP or additional 1000 l tank, 4xAMRAAM, 2xASRAAM (If triple racks are used the Typhoon might be able to carry 6 PW IV & 8 AAMs)
Precision strike 2:
Rafale: 2xGBU-24, 3x2000 l tank, 1xLDP, 4 MICA
Typhoon; 2xGBU-24, 2x1000 l tank, 1xLDP, 2xASRAAM, 4xAMRAAM, 2xARM or E/GBU-16 or AAMs
CAS/BAI:
Rafale: 6xAASM/GBU-12, 3x2000 l tank, 1xLDP, 4xMICA
Typhoon : 18xBrimestone, 1x1000 l tank, 2xASRAAM, 4xAMRAAM or optional 12xBrimestone & 3x1000 l tank
Note:
The Rafale could carry up to 2 MICA and a RECCE pod in any of the mentioned configurations, if required and the outboard pylons would be used
As can be seen in the load configurations compared above the Rafale provides a significant range/endurance advantage and in some configurations a superior payload capability as well. The Typhoon enjoys an edge in terms of self defence/escort capabilities and has an edge in the CAS role, if using the Brimestone.
Growth potential:
As both aircraft will serve until at least 2040 or beyond, they were both foreseen with a great growth potential. The industry offers a number of options, which of them will find their way into the aircrafts remains uncertain in many cases. Some of the technologies are funded and in development, however. Some of the modifications might change the balance of the two fighters in various areas.
Most improvements will be avionics related. Both aircraft are likely to receive AESA radars (Active Electronically Scanned Array) around 2011/2012. But it has to be taken into account that the RBE2 AA is funded and definitely planned, while the Captor-E is just an option, with development work being conducted on the industry funded CAESAR demonstrator. AESA radars use transmit and receive modules (T/R modules) each of which is independent and able to generate, sweep, transmit and receive radar signals. AESA radars can easily interleave modes and tasks by using multiple beams. AESA radars provide a significantly superior range performance, lower probability of interception and increased reliability. They can track a larger number of targets simultaneously with higher quality and they are able to perform non-traditional tasks such as jamming or communication. With the introduction of AESA radars the advantages and disadvantages of their current radars could theoretically be balanced. Nonetheless the Captor-E could enjoy a performance advantage due to a larger antenna diameter and more room. AESA radars would balance the RBE2s current superiority in the fields multitasking, LPI for AA and AG operations and the Captors superiority in terms of azimuth and range performance.
Another priority is laid on the further development of the electro-optical systems. The Rafale’s planned OSF-IT will feature a significantly enhanced TV-camera, but will at least initially lack the IRST. A new IRST might be introduced at a later stage. The PIRATE will be further developed as well with new software, algorithms and maybe new hardware. How this is going to improve the aircrafts balanced performance is currently unpredictable.
The EWS might receive new ESM, improved ECM and directed infrared countermeasures (DIRCM) for both fighters and the Rafale will additionally receive a new and much more capable MAWS.
French forces are additionally interested in a HMD/S, which has yet to be developed. For export customers there is the option to integrate a simple sighting device, Israeli systems are the most likely choice. This would neglect the Typhoon’s current HMD/S advantage.
Both aircraft might receive additional weapons and particularly the Typhoon might be adapted for additional roles such as naval strike and tactical reconnaissance, if required by the customers. A definite planned weapon which will be integrated on both aircraft is the Meteor long range AAM. The Meteor will replace the current MICA EM and AMRAAM missiles as the Rafale’s and Typhoon’s primary weapon. The BVR performance will be significantly improved with the introduction of this ramjet powered missile and parity in terms of ARH guided BVR AAM is one of the results.
A strong possibility are 2000 l under wing tanks for the Typhoon and maybe conformal fuel tanks (CFT) for both aircraft (2 of which would be carried on each aircraft). 1150 l CFTs were tested for the Rafale and 1500 l CFTs are studied for the Typhoon. With these changes the Typhoon’s current significantly inferior range/endurance could be somehow balanced, but the aircraft will still not match the range performance of the Rafale. Stronger engines are another option, though there seems to be no interest. Potential Rafale export customers are most likely users for Rafales with stronger engines. Though stronger engines are a possibility for both aircraft it is currently more likely that the Rafale would receive them first. This would balance some of the performance gaps, particularly in heavy configurations.
The usage of twin missile launch rails for the Rafale and Typhoon could further increase the number of AAMs. The Rafale could theoretically carry 12 AAMs then, though the current number of 10 is still unused. The Typhoon is currently limited to 8 missiles, but independent of the load of tanks and this number could be increased to 12 as well.
Some further signature reduction features could be introduced as well. Particularly the Typhoon’s currently higher LPI and IR signature could be reduced by engine modifications and the introduction of an AESA radar. The Typhoon’s signatures would be significantly closer to that of the Rafale in the areas mentioned before.
Summary:
When looking closer to the two fighters it looks like the general opinion is right. That means it really looks like the Typhoon enjoys an edge in terms of BVR performance, while the Rafale seems to be the better strike fighter. The WVR performance seems to be similar. It is however important to note that both aircraft might excel each other in some situations in areas where they claimed to be inferior. It must also be taken into account that the lack of data prevents a really accurate analyses and the results might not reflect reality to 100%. If some of the estimated factors differ significantly from the real data, it might be that the aircraft claimed to be inferior in a specific area is superior in reality. It’s additionally possible that future improvements will change the balance of both fighters in various areas, but that depends on how the aircraft are further developed.
:
