Thanks to 16 OBr SpN for providing the information in the last post.
As the VDV (Airborne) went on the offensive against the mujahidden in 1980, small groups of
paratroopers began to receive intensive instructions in reconnaissance and diversionary tactics,
many of them from Anatoli Ilyin, a veteran fighter with many years experience in Spetsnaz and
in the VDV (Airborne), including some time as commander of a Spetsnaz company at the Ryazan
College (equivalent to US Military Academy at West Point). From Ilyin: “In Afghanistan there
could be no “norms”, our world was unforgiving. The enemy was cunning, so all the time we had
to be using our brains, not just following the manual, or carrying out instructions. The emphasis had
to be on high mobility, speed, security and effectiveness”.
If any of our Russian friends have additional information on Anatoli Ilyin either through personal
experience or from other sources, I would be interested in hearing it.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
.
I don't remember Ilyin. At least while I was in RVVDKU our commander was a different person. There were numerous famous instructors: Fomin, Boyko, Grudnev, Lomakin, Kojevnikov, etc.
I graduated from RVVDKU's (Ryazan Airborne School) faculty of "tactical reconnassance"(9th Company). Later went to Frunze Military Academy, where I studied for a short period.
Currently, the "tactical reconnaissance" (a.k.a. Spetsnaz) faculty is now transferred to Novosibirsk Military Command School. Their graduates are very good. I've witnessed their high level of proficiency during our yearly competitions.
Nevertheless, there is still a "reconnaissance" faculty in RVVDKU which now teaches VDV and other infantry units.
Here is some information for you.
During the Afghan campaign, SpN groups were using different designation numbers. It was done for the reasons of keeping a low profile.
Units were given the designations of "OMSB". It stands for Separate Motorised Infantry Batallion. Spetsnaz brigades were given "OMSBr" (Separate Motorised Infantry Brigade)
Here is a list (as far as I can remember).
Brigades:
15 OBr SpN - 150 OMSBr
22 OBr SpN - 20 OMSBr
Units:
370 OO SpN - 6 omsb
154 OO SpN - 1 omsb
334 OO SpN - 5 omsb
668 OO SpN - 4 omsb
173 OO SpN - 3 omsb
177 OO SpN - 2 omsb
411 OO SpN - 8 omsb
If you see these "false" designations in any sources, you'll know that its actually spetsnaz units.
Spetsnaz units were commanded by the HQ of two brigades. Here is their structure:
15 OBr SpN commanded: 668; 154; 334; and 177 OO SpN.
22 OBr SpN commanded: 370; 186; 411; and 173 OO SpN.
As you've probably noticed, the list does not include the 459 OR SpN (Kabul Company). It was a very small unit of 60 people, and due to its specific nature, and operations was left as an independent unit.
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
A Experiencia Russa no Afeganistão 1979-1989
Moderador: Conselho de Moderação
Question for 16 OBr SpN
I haven't found any reference to Naval Spetsnaz or Naval Infantry/Marines
being deployed during the Soviet-Afghan War. Do you know why they
weren't utilized? Also you have commented on the quality of the Afghan
government forces, but how would you rate the Afghan Spetsnaz. I also
await your follow-up on recon missions.
Если единственный инструмент, который Вы имеете - молоток, рассмотрите все как гвоздь
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
Several officers from Naval SpN were sent to Afghanistan, but they were positioned within several units of Army SpN. They had very short tours. There were couple of guys from Naval SpN in our unit.
As for Afghan Spetsnaz. I wouldn't say they were SpN. There were some units which employed tactics similar to our units. Afghans had the so called "Mobile infantry units". They were comprised of people loyal to then current government, and sympathetic to our troops. But again, for the most part they could not be trusted. There were very few officers whom we could trust. During the first stages of Afghan war, their knowledge of terrain was critical. But later on, we learned the terrain really good. Besides, there were constant reports of them sharing information with the mujahedin.
Some of their units participated in our operations, but we tried not to let them inside our planning process.
From Afghan units, there were two most successful ones: a) operating in Herat; and b) operating in Charikar.
The reason why naval SpN units were not widely utilised was because of their specific nature.
Oops, I have to go... Sad
I'll write more later.
I haven't found any reference to Naval Spetsnaz or Naval Infantry/Marines
being deployed during the Soviet-Afghan War. Do you know why they
weren't utilized? Also you have commented on the quality of the Afghan
government forces, but how would you rate the Afghan Spetsnaz. I also
await your follow-up on recon missions.
Если единственный инструмент, который Вы имеете - молоток, рассмотрите все как гвоздь
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
Several officers from Naval SpN were sent to Afghanistan, but they were positioned within several units of Army SpN. They had very short tours. There were couple of guys from Naval SpN in our unit.
As for Afghan Spetsnaz. I wouldn't say they were SpN. There were some units which employed tactics similar to our units. Afghans had the so called "Mobile infantry units". They were comprised of people loyal to then current government, and sympathetic to our troops. But again, for the most part they could not be trusted. There were very few officers whom we could trust. During the first stages of Afghan war, their knowledge of terrain was critical. But later on, we learned the terrain really good. Besides, there were constant reports of them sharing information with the mujahedin.
Some of their units participated in our operations, but we tried not to let them inside our planning process.
From Afghan units, there were two most successful ones: a) operating in Herat; and b) operating in Charikar.
The reason why naval SpN units were not widely utilised was because of their specific nature.
Oops, I have to go... Sad
I'll write more later.
Forum member ßå$tĮТHÏ¿ð asked 16 OBr SpN about a Spetsnaz article in the Military History and Tactics section.
It takes quite a bit of information from an author named Viktor Suvorov. 16 OBr Spn replied that 80% of Suvorov’s
material is B.S. I agree, and would probably put that percentage even higher. On page 5 of this thread I go into some
detail about the capabilities of the bulk of the spetsnaz soldiers who served in Afghanistan.
I mentioned that there were a number of author’s who came up with some pretty outlandish tales of Spetsnaz’s
capabilities. Viktor Suvorov is at the top of the list. Sovorov’s real name is Vadimir B. Rezun, a former Soviet GRU
Major who defected to the West in the late 1970’s. Until Suvorov began writing his books on the subject, little
attention was paid (publicly at least) to Soviet special forces aside from obvious elite units such as the Soviet
Airborne Divsions (VDV). Certainly, there has always been some appreciation for Soviet partisan warfare and
unconventional tactics, but not for the extensive type of special operations portrayed by Suvorov.
He luridly depicts Spetsnaz as a bunch of highly trained multilingual sportsmen-killers, with a bent for assassination
and other mayhem. He suggested that they would be used in missions to eliminate NATO VIP’s in the event of war,
as well as carrying out more conventional commando-style operations against key NATO facilities. He elevated
Spetsnaz to mythical proportions, aided and abetted by a large number of credulous western writers who just echoed
his exaggerated portrayal.
This type of mythmaking ignores the primary role of such forces, which is deep reconnaissance. Commando-style
sabotage missions are a secondary mission of Spetsnaz. Ii was in Afghanistan that their role was changed to direct
action missions to fit a particular need, in this case interdiction of mujahidden supply caravans.
Selection to become a recruit in the Spetsnaz was a great honor for a conscript soldier, but it amounted to only a
two-year tour of duty. For an officer selection for spetsnaz meant a tough duty assignment with little hope of future
advancement. Spetsnaz was not a stepping-stone within the GRU, since most GRU assignments favored candidates
with strong analytical and administrative skills (like our CIA), or with extensive experience in espionage functions during
foreign assignments.
Spetsnaz officers could hope to become majors or colonels and command one of the Spetsnaz Brigades, but they’re few
prospects beyond that point. (This may have changed in recent years) The Spetsnaz did attract many fine officers
who preferred an adventurous lifestyle over the bureaucratic life of the average Soviet officer. But other services were
a stronger magnet, particularly after Col. General Margelov (who I mentioned earlier in this thread) revived the VDV
In the 1960’s.
The VDV (Airborne) offered significant career opportunities since the force was more than ten times the size of the
Spetsnaz. Under Margelov, the VDV began to be regarded as a prestigious assignment, whereas the Spetsnaz brigades
remained obscure and highly classified until the very end of the Soviet Union, as we knew it.
So if you have read Sovorov’s tales, remember that Spetsnaz, like most of the Soviet armed forces, was a conscript
force. In a Spetsnaz detachment, eighteen of the twenty men were conscripts, and only two were professional (career)
soldiers, 90 percent of Spetsnaz tactical units were made up of eighteen to twenty-year-old conscript soldiers with
only a limited amount (several months) of specialized training.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
It takes quite a bit of information from an author named Viktor Suvorov. 16 OBr Spn replied that 80% of Suvorov’s
material is B.S. I agree, and would probably put that percentage even higher. On page 5 of this thread I go into some
detail about the capabilities of the bulk of the spetsnaz soldiers who served in Afghanistan.
I mentioned that there were a number of author’s who came up with some pretty outlandish tales of Spetsnaz’s
capabilities. Viktor Suvorov is at the top of the list. Sovorov’s real name is Vadimir B. Rezun, a former Soviet GRU
Major who defected to the West in the late 1970’s. Until Suvorov began writing his books on the subject, little
attention was paid (publicly at least) to Soviet special forces aside from obvious elite units such as the Soviet
Airborne Divsions (VDV). Certainly, there has always been some appreciation for Soviet partisan warfare and
unconventional tactics, but not for the extensive type of special operations portrayed by Suvorov.
He luridly depicts Spetsnaz as a bunch of highly trained multilingual sportsmen-killers, with a bent for assassination
and other mayhem. He suggested that they would be used in missions to eliminate NATO VIP’s in the event of war,
as well as carrying out more conventional commando-style operations against key NATO facilities. He elevated
Spetsnaz to mythical proportions, aided and abetted by a large number of credulous western writers who just echoed
his exaggerated portrayal.
This type of mythmaking ignores the primary role of such forces, which is deep reconnaissance. Commando-style
sabotage missions are a secondary mission of Spetsnaz. Ii was in Afghanistan that their role was changed to direct
action missions to fit a particular need, in this case interdiction of mujahidden supply caravans.
Selection to become a recruit in the Spetsnaz was a great honor for a conscript soldier, but it amounted to only a
two-year tour of duty. For an officer selection for spetsnaz meant a tough duty assignment with little hope of future
advancement. Spetsnaz was not a stepping-stone within the GRU, since most GRU assignments favored candidates
with strong analytical and administrative skills (like our CIA), or with extensive experience in espionage functions during
foreign assignments.
Spetsnaz officers could hope to become majors or colonels and command one of the Spetsnaz Brigades, but they’re few
prospects beyond that point. (This may have changed in recent years) The Spetsnaz did attract many fine officers
who preferred an adventurous lifestyle over the bureaucratic life of the average Soviet officer. But other services were
a stronger magnet, particularly after Col. General Margelov (who I mentioned earlier in this thread) revived the VDV
In the 1960’s.
The VDV (Airborne) offered significant career opportunities since the force was more than ten times the size of the
Spetsnaz. Under Margelov, the VDV began to be regarded as a prestigious assignment, whereas the Spetsnaz brigades
remained obscure and highly classified until the very end of the Soviet Union, as we knew it.
So if you have read Sovorov’s tales, remember that Spetsnaz, like most of the Soviet armed forces, was a conscript
force. In a Spetsnaz detachment, eighteen of the twenty men were conscripts, and only two were professional (career)
soldiers, 90 percent of Spetsnaz tactical units were made up of eighteen to twenty-year-old conscript soldiers with
only a limited amount (several months) of specialized training.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004