A Experiencia Russa no Afeganistão 1979-1989
Moderador: Conselho de Moderação
Each ambush can be divided into three main forces.
Recon group; Attack group; and support group.
1) Recon groups were usually 3 person groups located at the two ends of the ambush at 500-600 meter distance.
2) Attack group was usually a 12 men group divided into three sections. Machinegunners in the center; and AGS-17 operators on both flanks.
3) Support group was usually positioned on the side of a flank from which caravan arrives or facing the nearby village. It was done to engage the possible reinforcements, and basically cut-off the main caravan.
Mostly we had the armored backup on stand-by at 10-15 km. distance.
The chopper was also a great thing to have during the ambush.
Here is the most common formation of the caravans we engaged:
1) First group. It was usually a 6-10 men group. Moved in front of the caravan, at 300-500 meters distance. Sometimes this group was separated into two even smaller ones. First (3-4 men) goes 500-600 meters in front, and the remaining ones move after them.
2) Main group. It was the "heart" of the caravan, carrying the goods, with heavy protection force.
3) Rear group 8-12 men group, which followed the main group, at a 400-500 meter distance.
Sometimes mujahedin would set up outposts 1-2 days in advance (2-3 men) on the high positions overlooking the future path, in order to warn of any threats.
The thing we found the most useful was the compact and mobile radio intercepting equipment. They were present on some helicopters and could monitor radio communications easily, thus giving us the great advantage. Unfortunately that equipment was not adequately supplied.
Our favorite time for ambush was of course during the night. It was a truly shocking experience for the enemy, and gave less chances of possible casualties among our troops. But the problem again comes up to lower visibility, and harder coordination of the group. Nevertheless, it was/is the most "productive" time for an ambush.
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
Recon group; Attack group; and support group.
1) Recon groups were usually 3 person groups located at the two ends of the ambush at 500-600 meter distance.
2) Attack group was usually a 12 men group divided into three sections. Machinegunners in the center; and AGS-17 operators on both flanks.
3) Support group was usually positioned on the side of a flank from which caravan arrives or facing the nearby village. It was done to engage the possible reinforcements, and basically cut-off the main caravan.
Mostly we had the armored backup on stand-by at 10-15 km. distance.
The chopper was also a great thing to have during the ambush.
Here is the most common formation of the caravans we engaged:
1) First group. It was usually a 6-10 men group. Moved in front of the caravan, at 300-500 meters distance. Sometimes this group was separated into two even smaller ones. First (3-4 men) goes 500-600 meters in front, and the remaining ones move after them.
2) Main group. It was the "heart" of the caravan, carrying the goods, with heavy protection force.
3) Rear group 8-12 men group, which followed the main group, at a 400-500 meter distance.
Sometimes mujahedin would set up outposts 1-2 days in advance (2-3 men) on the high positions overlooking the future path, in order to warn of any threats.
The thing we found the most useful was the compact and mobile radio intercepting equipment. They were present on some helicopters and could monitor radio communications easily, thus giving us the great advantage. Unfortunately that equipment was not adequately supplied.
Our favorite time for ambush was of course during the night. It was a truly shocking experience for the enemy, and gave less chances of possible casualties among our troops. But the problem again comes up to lower visibility, and harder coordination of the group. Nevertheless, it was/is the most "productive" time for an ambush.
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
Question for 16 OBr Spn
There is a unit I’ve been trying to identify that was involved in Soviet interdiction
efforts in Logar Province. This SO unit was based at Baraki Barak. It operated
in platoon–size patrols for up to two or three days in extended dismount operations.
I believe it moved around Afghanistan like a mobile “fire brigade”. Any information you have would be appreciated.
Also you mentioned:
“3) Yes, there were some units were mostly consisting of officers (459th OR SpN; 66th and 70th Infantry Batallion; 154 OO SpN).”
I know that the 66TH & 70th MRB were specifically created for counter-insurgency operations. You had already told me that the Air Assault Battalions assigned to these
units were VDV (Airborne). I though the Air Assault Battalions of these units were structured like a regular VDV (Airborne) Battalion. I wasn’t aware that they consisted mostly of officers. As I mentioned at the beginning of this thread, the mujahidden referred
To the 66th Air Assault Battalions as “Septsnaz”.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
Special operations in Loghar province were performed by different units. Those were: recon units of 70th Batallion; VDV.
As for Spetsnaz GRU in particular, we had the 668th OO SpN located in Baraki Barak (we called it simply Baraki).
Several raids against large enemy bases were performed as combination of all forces present in the province. Recon units of the 70th batallion along with the VDV (100th and 512th recon companies) were blocking out the area, and occupying the high grounds to set up observation posts.
Artillery of the 70th batallion was providing support, along with a group of SU-25's, and Mi-24's.
Before starting the attack much focus was given to prior information gathering (questionning of prisoners; sigint; and foto recon by planes).
Second stage was tactical dropping of recon groups of VDV and letting them occupy the strategic points, and set observation posts.
70th batallion was setting up ambushes on possible escape routes.
Then the storming troops from SpN GRU would move towards the target (first within "bronegruppas", and then on foot).
After SpN GRU located the base, they gave the coordinates to the artillery, and air-support. Once the coordinates were given, the massive artillery and bomb strikes were executed, after which spetsnaz stormed the base and destroyed the survivors. At this stage, ZSU-23-4 (Shilka) is a must.
In order to escape our massive bombing, mujahedin were trying to retreat in very small groups through system of tunnels and caves, but roughly 90% of all of them would get into ambushes set up in the outer perimeter by 70th batallion, and VDV.
The other important factor was the presence of quick response teams which were positioned in the headquarters. Those teams would be put into action if a particular unit faced a much bigger enemy group.
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
There is a unit I’ve been trying to identify that was involved in Soviet interdiction
efforts in Logar Province. This SO unit was based at Baraki Barak. It operated
in platoon–size patrols for up to two or three days in extended dismount operations.
I believe it moved around Afghanistan like a mobile “fire brigade”. Any information you have would be appreciated.
Also you mentioned:
“3) Yes, there were some units were mostly consisting of officers (459th OR SpN; 66th and 70th Infantry Batallion; 154 OO SpN).”
I know that the 66TH & 70th MRB were specifically created for counter-insurgency operations. You had already told me that the Air Assault Battalions assigned to these
units were VDV (Airborne). I though the Air Assault Battalions of these units were structured like a regular VDV (Airborne) Battalion. I wasn’t aware that they consisted mostly of officers. As I mentioned at the beginning of this thread, the mujahidden referred
To the 66th Air Assault Battalions as “Septsnaz”.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
Special operations in Loghar province were performed by different units. Those were: recon units of 70th Batallion; VDV.
As for Spetsnaz GRU in particular, we had the 668th OO SpN located in Baraki Barak (we called it simply Baraki).
Several raids against large enemy bases were performed as combination of all forces present in the province. Recon units of the 70th batallion along with the VDV (100th and 512th recon companies) were blocking out the area, and occupying the high grounds to set up observation posts.
Artillery of the 70th batallion was providing support, along with a group of SU-25's, and Mi-24's.
Before starting the attack much focus was given to prior information gathering (questionning of prisoners; sigint; and foto recon by planes).
Second stage was tactical dropping of recon groups of VDV and letting them occupy the strategic points, and set observation posts.
70th batallion was setting up ambushes on possible escape routes.
Then the storming troops from SpN GRU would move towards the target (first within "bronegruppas", and then on foot).
After SpN GRU located the base, they gave the coordinates to the artillery, and air-support. Once the coordinates were given, the massive artillery and bomb strikes were executed, after which spetsnaz stormed the base and destroyed the survivors. At this stage, ZSU-23-4 (Shilka) is a must.
In order to escape our massive bombing, mujahedin were trying to retreat in very small groups through system of tunnels and caves, but roughly 90% of all of them would get into ambushes set up in the outer perimeter by 70th batallion, and VDV.
The other important factor was the presence of quick response teams which were positioned in the headquarters. Those teams would be put into action if a particular unit faced a much bigger enemy group.
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
About the martial arts.
During a single raid, one guy from our unit killed 7 mujahedin in hand-to-hand engagements.
He had this "signature" kill - a regular metal spike (nail) slammed into their throats. He even made special pockets for those nails at the front of his vest.
BTW, my personal favorite was a simple rib bone of a cow or a lamb, with a sharpened tip. It was very practical: lightweight, and "disposable" (just slam it into a "patient's" body and leave it) Wink
From the aesthetic point of view it was nice, because its color nicely blended with my Gorka. Very Happy
Walking in the mountains was only a part of the problem. The other thing was just a hellish heat, and constant thurst as a result of sweating all the time during daytime operations. After coming back on the base we smelled utterly disgustingly, to us it seemed as if the smell was so deep inside our noses. It is even worse when you lay low in an ambush and this smell is a plain torture apart from the heat and constant thurst.
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
------------------
I remember during our training, the instructor would tell the watchers to take something made of metal and make a noise. Guys grabbed metal baskets, etc. and slammed it with some kind of a stick.
The noise was so loud and irritating that it easily shifted your focus from the fight.
And the fights were always full contact with no rules at all. The only one to stop a fight was the instructor.
The martial art we were tought was combat Sambo, modified by the specialists of GRU.
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
During a single raid, one guy from our unit killed 7 mujahedin in hand-to-hand engagements.
He had this "signature" kill - a regular metal spike (nail) slammed into their throats. He even made special pockets for those nails at the front of his vest.
BTW, my personal favorite was a simple rib bone of a cow or a lamb, with a sharpened tip. It was very practical: lightweight, and "disposable" (just slam it into a "patient's" body and leave it) Wink
From the aesthetic point of view it was nice, because its color nicely blended with my Gorka. Very Happy
Walking in the mountains was only a part of the problem. The other thing was just a hellish heat, and constant thurst as a result of sweating all the time during daytime operations. After coming back on the base we smelled utterly disgustingly, to us it seemed as if the smell was so deep inside our noses. It is even worse when you lay low in an ambush and this smell is a plain torture apart from the heat and constant thurst.
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
------------------
I remember during our training, the instructor would tell the watchers to take something made of metal and make a noise. Guys grabbed metal baskets, etc. and slammed it with some kind of a stick.
The noise was so loud and irritating that it easily shifted your focus from the fight.
And the fights were always full contact with no rules at all. The only one to stop a fight was the instructor.
The martial art we were tought was combat Sambo, modified by the specialists of GRU.
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
The terrain is mostly mountainous. There are “green zones” (foliage). In the summer the weather is oppressively
hot and in the winter the snow can reach belt deep. Many roads are narrow, and the mujahidden exploited the
high ground like no guerrilla force or army ever has. During the winter season, military operations slowed considerably
due to the weather.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
hot and in the winter the snow can reach belt deep. Many roads are narrow, and the mujahidden exploited the
high ground like no guerrilla force or army ever has. During the winter season, military operations slowed considerably
due to the weather.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
Throughout this thread, you have read or seen references to ZSU-23-4.
Just so your aware, the ZSU-23-4 Shilka is a Russian self-propelled air defense weapon that fires four
23mm machine guns simultaneously. The Russians used this weapon system in Afghanistan for counter ambushes
and the destruction of ground targets. It is one piece of military hardware that you don’t point at your
friends. It has a fearsome rate of fire. Each one second burst contains sixty projectiles totaling twenty-five
pounds of steel and high explosive. It can literally fill the sky with “iron”. I believe it has on board radar for
it’s anti-aircraft role.
To follow up with the discussion of Russian unarmed combat training, I’m going to list a training routine that
VDV(Airborne) or Air Assault forces would use in their preparation for close combat. As you have seen, the
Russian’s fully understand that no matter what the conflict and no matter how “high tech” current or future wars
become, units can be cut off, ammunition does run out, and positions can be overrun. The physical and psychological
benefits that unarmed combat training provides are immeasurable.
During classes in hand-to-hand combat against an enemy, airborne assault troops develop fighting skills, boldness, resolve,
initiative, resourcefulness, self-confidence, composure and self-control. Special 16-count moves with and without weapons
are included in the course content, along with preparatory exercises, self-defense techniques, leg and arm blows and defenses
against them, strangulation techniques, and throws. Various methods of tying up the enemy are practiced using improvised
means, escaping from an escort under various situations and other techniques and actions. Bayonet thrusts,
blows with a knife, shovel, metal plate, and other piercing objects are practiced on training dummies, mannequins and
targets.
At the end of each class, there is a comprehensive training session on a rotation method or in the form of sparring where an
individual works against one, two, or three persons using previously studied techniques.
A typical training scenario will have 5 stations:
First Training Station:
Fighting stances, moves and turns, attacking arms and leg thrusts, and defenses or blocks against arm and leg thrusts.
Second Training Station:
Methods of throwing a knife or bayonet, a small sapper shovel, and other piercing objects from various positions.
Third Training Station:
Possible training situations in hand-to-hand combat against several enemies armed with a variety of weapons. The
trainees determine the type of defense and attack techniques to be applied and orient themselves spatially on the
spot and in a combat situation.
Fourth Training Station:
Methods of tying up an enemy using a trouser belt, ropes, or lines, an airborne backpack, and a stick.
Fifth Training Station:
Free sparring with both one-on-one and multiple opponents. On closing, the soldiers employ throws, and blows
with elbows, knees, and head. In every convenient situation, they attack with concentration, accuracy, speed
and at full strength.
With this information, and with what 16 OBr SpN related to us, you have an appreciation of what encountering SOF
at close quarters would and did entail for the Resistance.
An example of the Resistance having a reversal on the battlefield occurred in May 1987 at Jegdalay in Kabul Province. A position had been established
approximately 3,000 meters above the Saroubi-Kolala road by National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA) Mujahidden, and was used to ambush military convoys. Repeated attempts by Soviet Motorized Rifle assaults failed to dislodge the guerrillas, so special forces were used. A mujahidden survivor of the assault
recounted how 3 hours into the battle the spetsnaz just appeared over the edge of the cliff, having free-climbed straight up with their rucksacks and weapons,
an incredible feat, and how then, without pausing for breath, they drove the defenders off the mountain in hand-to-hand combat.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
Just so your aware, the ZSU-23-4 Shilka is a Russian self-propelled air defense weapon that fires four
23mm machine guns simultaneously. The Russians used this weapon system in Afghanistan for counter ambushes
and the destruction of ground targets. It is one piece of military hardware that you don’t point at your
friends. It has a fearsome rate of fire. Each one second burst contains sixty projectiles totaling twenty-five
pounds of steel and high explosive. It can literally fill the sky with “iron”. I believe it has on board radar for
it’s anti-aircraft role.
To follow up with the discussion of Russian unarmed combat training, I’m going to list a training routine that
VDV(Airborne) or Air Assault forces would use in their preparation for close combat. As you have seen, the
Russian’s fully understand that no matter what the conflict and no matter how “high tech” current or future wars
become, units can be cut off, ammunition does run out, and positions can be overrun. The physical and psychological
benefits that unarmed combat training provides are immeasurable.
During classes in hand-to-hand combat against an enemy, airborne assault troops develop fighting skills, boldness, resolve,
initiative, resourcefulness, self-confidence, composure and self-control. Special 16-count moves with and without weapons
are included in the course content, along with preparatory exercises, self-defense techniques, leg and arm blows and defenses
against them, strangulation techniques, and throws. Various methods of tying up the enemy are practiced using improvised
means, escaping from an escort under various situations and other techniques and actions. Bayonet thrusts,
blows with a knife, shovel, metal plate, and other piercing objects are practiced on training dummies, mannequins and
targets.
At the end of each class, there is a comprehensive training session on a rotation method or in the form of sparring where an
individual works against one, two, or three persons using previously studied techniques.
A typical training scenario will have 5 stations:
First Training Station:
Fighting stances, moves and turns, attacking arms and leg thrusts, and defenses or blocks against arm and leg thrusts.
Second Training Station:
Methods of throwing a knife or bayonet, a small sapper shovel, and other piercing objects from various positions.
Third Training Station:
Possible training situations in hand-to-hand combat against several enemies armed with a variety of weapons. The
trainees determine the type of defense and attack techniques to be applied and orient themselves spatially on the
spot and in a combat situation.
Fourth Training Station:
Methods of tying up an enemy using a trouser belt, ropes, or lines, an airborne backpack, and a stick.
Fifth Training Station:
Free sparring with both one-on-one and multiple opponents. On closing, the soldiers employ throws, and blows
with elbows, knees, and head. In every convenient situation, they attack with concentration, accuracy, speed
and at full strength.
With this information, and with what 16 OBr SpN related to us, you have an appreciation of what encountering SOF
at close quarters would and did entail for the Resistance.
An example of the Resistance having a reversal on the battlefield occurred in May 1987 at Jegdalay in Kabul Province. A position had been established
approximately 3,000 meters above the Saroubi-Kolala road by National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA) Mujahidden, and was used to ambush military convoys. Repeated attempts by Soviet Motorized Rifle assaults failed to dislodge the guerrillas, so special forces were used. A mujahidden survivor of the assault
recounted how 3 hours into the battle the spetsnaz just appeared over the edge of the cliff, having free-climbed straight up with their rucksacks and weapons,
an incredible feat, and how then, without pausing for breath, they drove the defenders off the mountain in hand-to-hand combat.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
I’m not familiar with reports of direct Iranian involvement. I know that the Pakistani ISI (Inter-Service Intelligence) used
Special Branch personnel to help train and equip the Resistance. They sometimes participated in special operations against Soviet forces disguised
as mujahideen. There was an instance of Iranian Revolutionary Guards ambushing a Resistance caravan (near their border) that was transporting Stingers. The Russians called the Pakistani special forces “Black Storks”. Perhaps 16 OBr SpN or other veterans have information pertaining to Iran’s involvement.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
--------------------------
ranians were setting up training camps outside the cities located close to Afghani border. To my knowledge, there were two large camps in cities of Tayebad, and Zabol (or Zavol), (sorry if I misspelled them).
Several Iranian intelligence officers were trying to infiltrate Afghanistan, moving with the caravan of the mujahedin in order to meet some of the commanders. But they got into an ambush somwhere in Herat... Wink
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
Special Branch personnel to help train and equip the Resistance. They sometimes participated in special operations against Soviet forces disguised
as mujahideen. There was an instance of Iranian Revolutionary Guards ambushing a Resistance caravan (near their border) that was transporting Stingers. The Russians called the Pakistani special forces “Black Storks”. Perhaps 16 OBr SpN or other veterans have information pertaining to Iran’s involvement.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
--------------------------
ranians were setting up training camps outside the cities located close to Afghani border. To my knowledge, there were two large camps in cities of Tayebad, and Zabol (or Zavol), (sorry if I misspelled them).
Several Iranian intelligence officers were trying to infiltrate Afghanistan, moving with the caravan of the mujahedin in order to meet some of the commanders. But they got into an ambush somwhere in Herat... Wink
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
The Soviets had conducted heliborne operations of many sizes. On 21 April 1984 the Resistance destroyed the upper
structure of the Mattok Bridge on the Ghorband River, south of Salang tunnel. When they concentrated for a repeated
attack on the bridge, the Soviets launched a surprise heliborne operation that wiped out the entire force, estimated
to be 1,500 - 2,000 strong. The rebels tried to hide during the day in a valley, the Soviets landed two companies, some
200 troops, on two mountains which controlled the back exit from the valley, and blocked it. Almost immediately, the
trapped Resistance forces were subjected to aerial strikes by helicopters and aircraft. Any attempt to advance out of
the valley was blocked by the Soviet troops. Available reports emphasized the ferocity of the Soviet fire support and
the high level of casualties. Apparently, some of the attacks were carried out too close to the heliborne troops.
There were casualties among them. Thus, in a relatively brief operation, the Soviets virtually eliminated the threat
to their main axis of transportation before any meaningful damage could be done.
During a Panjsher offensive in May 1982, Soviet helicopters inserted blocking forces that acted as the
'anvil' to the 'hammer' of the mechanized combined arms force.
Whenever a Soviet troop column or supply convoy moved into rebel territory, it was accompanied by a mixture of HINDs
and HIPs. While half of the helicopters remain overhead watching for Resistance activity, the others land troops on
key terrain ahead of the advancing column. These troops provide security until the column passes after which the
process is repeated. Another variant of this activity involves flank protection for advancing forces. While one
helicopter element is moving to capture a commanding height or road intersection in an aggressive air strike combined
with disembarking troops, helicopters of another element would apply wait and see ambush tactics, ready to move to
another 'hide' position or to attack from the flank any enemy threatening the advancing force. This type of leapfrogging
tactic generally made it difficult for the Afghan rebels to halt Soviet offensives by striking at supply lines.
A typical rebel tactic in the early stages of war was to besiege villages containing Soviet forces. Hostile tribesmen,
usually in rocky defensive positions surrounding the towns, were attacked first by rockets and napalm from MiG-21s and
then by rockets and machinegun fire from the Mi-24 helicopter gunships. This was quickly followed by airborne infantry
carried in Mi-6 helicopters, each able to carry 75 soldiers who hunted out the insurgents, killing, capturing or driving
them away. Within a short time, sieges had been raised, and the mujahidin pushed back several miles.
Helicopter-borne assault landings (desant) had for some years been an attractive option for Soviet Army commanders who
wished to destroy important targets or to capture vital ground or installations in the enemy rear. The war in Afghanistan
had made it possible to put doctrine into practice and refine the helicopter as a weapon, which permitted the seizure of
key road junctions, control of key terrain, prevented commitment of reserves, disrupted movement to contact, isolated command
and control and broke logistic routes to mention a few.
In the spring of 1980 when the Soviets realized they were in Afghanistan to stay, they committed to a thorough lesson learning and techno tactical reformation. A major conference of senior officers in the summer of 1980 addressed most of the problems they'd encountered. In order to optimize their lesson learning effort in Afghanistan, the Soviets had established
a sophisticated system that identified these lessons, studied and tested them, reached conclusions and recommendations and implemented them in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Gen. Arm Yazov was in charge of this system.
In spring 1981, the General chaired an extremely significant conference on the qualities and decision-making authority and flexibility of the junior commander. The conference included both theoretical papers and active demonstrations on training and firing ranges. Addressing the conference on the role of the junior leader in battle, Gen. Yazov explained:
"In the accomplishment of all these tasks, an
important role belongs to you, the commander of
small subunits. You stand closest to the soldiers
and direct their daily service and training.
Remember, much depends on you in the further
raising of combat readiness of subunits and
units. . ."
From Spring 1981, the influence of those solutions was felt in Afghanistan. At least one rebel leader had testified to the results. His camp, high in inaccessible hill country, was suddenly attacked by black uniformed commandos who swept in from the darkness to inflict severe casualties. Heliborne forces, which penetrate deep into Resistance territory to surround rebel positions, indicated an unprecedented degree of responsibility for the leaders on the spot. The combined arms battalion had become the base maneuver element in the war and tanks were employed in conjunction with infantry forces.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
structure of the Mattok Bridge on the Ghorband River, south of Salang tunnel. When they concentrated for a repeated
attack on the bridge, the Soviets launched a surprise heliborne operation that wiped out the entire force, estimated
to be 1,500 - 2,000 strong. The rebels tried to hide during the day in a valley, the Soviets landed two companies, some
200 troops, on two mountains which controlled the back exit from the valley, and blocked it. Almost immediately, the
trapped Resistance forces were subjected to aerial strikes by helicopters and aircraft. Any attempt to advance out of
the valley was blocked by the Soviet troops. Available reports emphasized the ferocity of the Soviet fire support and
the high level of casualties. Apparently, some of the attacks were carried out too close to the heliborne troops.
There were casualties among them. Thus, in a relatively brief operation, the Soviets virtually eliminated the threat
to their main axis of transportation before any meaningful damage could be done.
During a Panjsher offensive in May 1982, Soviet helicopters inserted blocking forces that acted as the
'anvil' to the 'hammer' of the mechanized combined arms force.
Whenever a Soviet troop column or supply convoy moved into rebel territory, it was accompanied by a mixture of HINDs
and HIPs. While half of the helicopters remain overhead watching for Resistance activity, the others land troops on
key terrain ahead of the advancing column. These troops provide security until the column passes after which the
process is repeated. Another variant of this activity involves flank protection for advancing forces. While one
helicopter element is moving to capture a commanding height or road intersection in an aggressive air strike combined
with disembarking troops, helicopters of another element would apply wait and see ambush tactics, ready to move to
another 'hide' position or to attack from the flank any enemy threatening the advancing force. This type of leapfrogging
tactic generally made it difficult for the Afghan rebels to halt Soviet offensives by striking at supply lines.
A typical rebel tactic in the early stages of war was to besiege villages containing Soviet forces. Hostile tribesmen,
usually in rocky defensive positions surrounding the towns, were attacked first by rockets and napalm from MiG-21s and
then by rockets and machinegun fire from the Mi-24 helicopter gunships. This was quickly followed by airborne infantry
carried in Mi-6 helicopters, each able to carry 75 soldiers who hunted out the insurgents, killing, capturing or driving
them away. Within a short time, sieges had been raised, and the mujahidin pushed back several miles.
Helicopter-borne assault landings (desant) had for some years been an attractive option for Soviet Army commanders who
wished to destroy important targets or to capture vital ground or installations in the enemy rear. The war in Afghanistan
had made it possible to put doctrine into practice and refine the helicopter as a weapon, which permitted the seizure of
key road junctions, control of key terrain, prevented commitment of reserves, disrupted movement to contact, isolated command
and control and broke logistic routes to mention a few.
In the spring of 1980 when the Soviets realized they were in Afghanistan to stay, they committed to a thorough lesson learning and techno tactical reformation. A major conference of senior officers in the summer of 1980 addressed most of the problems they'd encountered. In order to optimize their lesson learning effort in Afghanistan, the Soviets had established
a sophisticated system that identified these lessons, studied and tested them, reached conclusions and recommendations and implemented them in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Gen. Arm Yazov was in charge of this system.
In spring 1981, the General chaired an extremely significant conference on the qualities and decision-making authority and flexibility of the junior commander. The conference included both theoretical papers and active demonstrations on training and firing ranges. Addressing the conference on the role of the junior leader in battle, Gen. Yazov explained:
"In the accomplishment of all these tasks, an
important role belongs to you, the commander of
small subunits. You stand closest to the soldiers
and direct their daily service and training.
Remember, much depends on you in the further
raising of combat readiness of subunits and
units. . ."
From Spring 1981, the influence of those solutions was felt in Afghanistan. At least one rebel leader had testified to the results. His camp, high in inaccessible hill country, was suddenly attacked by black uniformed commandos who swept in from the darkness to inflict severe casualties. Heliborne forces, which penetrate deep into Resistance territory to surround rebel positions, indicated an unprecedented degree of responsibility for the leaders on the spot. The combined arms battalion had become the base maneuver element in the war and tanks were employed in conjunction with infantry forces.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
Heliborne operations were also used in conjunction with Soviet decapitation efforts against guerrilla
leaders. The preferred tactic was the hiring of Afghan assassins by KHAD (Afghan KGB). In 1984
immediately before the Panjshar VII offensive, an attempt was made to kill Ahmad Shah Massoud.
In December of 1984, KHAD infiltrators in a competing resistance group killed Zabiollah, a Jamiat
Commander in the Mazar-e-Sharif area.
Other actions were carried out by the Soviets. Examples include the killing of guerrilla commander
Qari Samad at the village of Siachok in Shinwar by heliborne SOF, the February 1985 attempt to kill
Abdul Haq in Panshawar, the killing of Captain Mohammed Afghan, a former Kabul regime army officer
and National Islamic Front of Afghanistan commander in Kabul Province in March 1985. There was an
unsuccessful 1985 ambush of Wardak Province resistance leader Mohammed Amin Wardak Also, the
1987 killing of Kunduz resistance leader Amin Ghulam. Operations were carried out against resistance
leaders in both Afghanistan and Pakistan by Soviet SOF.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
leaders. The preferred tactic was the hiring of Afghan assassins by KHAD (Afghan KGB). In 1984
immediately before the Panjshar VII offensive, an attempt was made to kill Ahmad Shah Massoud.
In December of 1984, KHAD infiltrators in a competing resistance group killed Zabiollah, a Jamiat
Commander in the Mazar-e-Sharif area.
Other actions were carried out by the Soviets. Examples include the killing of guerrilla commander
Qari Samad at the village of Siachok in Shinwar by heliborne SOF, the February 1985 attempt to kill
Abdul Haq in Panshawar, the killing of Captain Mohammed Afghan, a former Kabul regime army officer
and National Islamic Front of Afghanistan commander in Kabul Province in March 1985. There was an
unsuccessful 1985 ambush of Wardak Province resistance leader Mohammed Amin Wardak Also, the
1987 killing of Kunduz resistance leader Amin Ghulam. Operations were carried out against resistance
leaders in both Afghanistan and Pakistan by Soviet SOF.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
The photos of Soviet air power during the Soviet-Afghan War will usually
feature the Mi-24 Hind gunship. The workhorse of the Afghanistan war was
the Mi-8MTB Hip assault helicopter. The appearance of man-portable missiles
like the Stingers made helicopter operations more dangerous, but these machines
would sport devices to lure away the missiles, including an Ispanka IR jammer on
it’s spine, a pair of scab-mounted IR flare dispensers, and a large gas mixer over
the engine exhaust.
The summer campaigns of 1985 saw the largest use of heliborne assault tactics of
the entire war. In late May, the 40th Army began an assault in the Kunar Valley to
relieve the besieged Afghan garrison at Barikot. The initial ground attacks were
conventional ground operations, heavily supported by tanks and artillery. The second
phase of the operation, code named Operation Pustynya (desert), made heavy use of
Spetsnaz from the 1st Brigade as well as VDV (Airborne) forces flown in by helicopter.
In total, 7,000 troops were carried aboard helicopters during the battle. At Barikot, a VDV battalion leapfrogged ahead of the tank columns, landing by helicopter directly
into the perimeter of the fortified base once the ground forces were within striking
range.
After the siege at Barikot had been lifted and the successful conclusion of the relief
operation, the VDV pulled its troops back to the Kabul area for rest and rebuilding.
The next major offensive in 1985 used an even larger number of heliborne missions.
The attack in Paktia Province began on August 21, 1985. Pakita was southeast of Kabul
and it controlled another key road leading eastward into Pakistan via Gardeya and Khost.
The intention of the operation was to crush large mujahidden forces in the province, and to lift the sieges at Khost and Ali Khel, and to interdict the mujahidden supply routes in the area.
The initial phase was a combined-arms assault preceded by heavy air strikes. Once the
mechanized columns were well under way, the heliborne assaults by VDV (Airborne)
and Spetsnaz units began. The helicopter operation was code-named Poltina (dam),
and its main purpose was to cut off the growing flow of sophisticated weapons to
the rebels.
In total more than 12,000 troops were airlifted during the battle, which was the largest
single airmobile operation of the war. In one of the most dramatic actions of the helicopter operation, 3 VDV battalions and 3 DRA Afghan battalions were flown directly
into the besieged garrison at Khost.
The mujahidden were caught off guard and were by this time running out of ammunition and were forced to retreat. The reinforced garrison at Khost went on the offensive and
began an attack on the mujahidden stronghold at Zhawar, which was close to the Pakistan
Border.
Despite the heavy helicopter support, Zhawar couldn’t be conquered and the Khost column was finally forced to withdraw to the fortified city. Zhawar would not be captured until 1986.
The Soviets could conduct and win operations any where they pleased with their helicopter tactics, but the DRA (Afghan Army) wasn’t capable of holding onto any of their gains.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
feature the Mi-24 Hind gunship. The workhorse of the Afghanistan war was
the Mi-8MTB Hip assault helicopter. The appearance of man-portable missiles
like the Stingers made helicopter operations more dangerous, but these machines
would sport devices to lure away the missiles, including an Ispanka IR jammer on
it’s spine, a pair of scab-mounted IR flare dispensers, and a large gas mixer over
the engine exhaust.
The summer campaigns of 1985 saw the largest use of heliborne assault tactics of
the entire war. In late May, the 40th Army began an assault in the Kunar Valley to
relieve the besieged Afghan garrison at Barikot. The initial ground attacks were
conventional ground operations, heavily supported by tanks and artillery. The second
phase of the operation, code named Operation Pustynya (desert), made heavy use of
Spetsnaz from the 1st Brigade as well as VDV (Airborne) forces flown in by helicopter.
In total, 7,000 troops were carried aboard helicopters during the battle. At Barikot, a VDV battalion leapfrogged ahead of the tank columns, landing by helicopter directly
into the perimeter of the fortified base once the ground forces were within striking
range.
After the siege at Barikot had been lifted and the successful conclusion of the relief
operation, the VDV pulled its troops back to the Kabul area for rest and rebuilding.
The next major offensive in 1985 used an even larger number of heliborne missions.
The attack in Paktia Province began on August 21, 1985. Pakita was southeast of Kabul
and it controlled another key road leading eastward into Pakistan via Gardeya and Khost.
The intention of the operation was to crush large mujahidden forces in the province, and to lift the sieges at Khost and Ali Khel, and to interdict the mujahidden supply routes in the area.
The initial phase was a combined-arms assault preceded by heavy air strikes. Once the
mechanized columns were well under way, the heliborne assaults by VDV (Airborne)
and Spetsnaz units began. The helicopter operation was code-named Poltina (dam),
and its main purpose was to cut off the growing flow of sophisticated weapons to
the rebels.
In total more than 12,000 troops were airlifted during the battle, which was the largest
single airmobile operation of the war. In one of the most dramatic actions of the helicopter operation, 3 VDV battalions and 3 DRA Afghan battalions were flown directly
into the besieged garrison at Khost.
The mujahidden were caught off guard and were by this time running out of ammunition and were forced to retreat. The reinforced garrison at Khost went on the offensive and
began an attack on the mujahidden stronghold at Zhawar, which was close to the Pakistan
Border.
Despite the heavy helicopter support, Zhawar couldn’t be conquered and the Khost column was finally forced to withdraw to the fortified city. Zhawar would not be captured until 1986.
The Soviets could conduct and win operations any where they pleased with their helicopter tactics, but the DRA (Afghan Army) wasn’t capable of holding onto any of their gains.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
Heliborne Insertions & Attack Helicopters
The Mujahideen had great difficulty in coping with heliborne assaults
supported by gunships and ground attack aircraft. Soviet/DRA troops inserted by
helicopter could achieve surprise in a way that ground forces could rarely do. They
could also reach places inaccessible to the latter. Attack helicopters could deliver a
high volume of fire accurately against small, point targets that were invisible to
tanks or artillery observers. For this reason, they were feared and their arrival
often silenced heavy weapons and could be the signal for breaking-off an action and
withdrawing.
At first, the Soviets seem to have used airmobile troops largely in small-scale raids
to snatch or kill local Mujahideen commanders. They were also used to insert
ambush parties and elements of the cordon in search and destroy operations. As
time went on, however, air assaults went deeper and became more aggressive, even
against more formidable groupings. Several mountain bases that had proved
impervious to purely terrestrial attack fell to a combination of vertical envelopment
and a ground thrust; a link up by ground forces was usually considered essential if
lightly-equipped heliborne troops were to stay for any great time in an area where
the guerrillas were strong (i.e. to destroy supplies and facilities in a captured base
depot).
The Mujahideen suffered from inadequate air defence until the war was approaching
its closing stages. Heavy machine guns could be effective when firing from ambush,
from caves against passing aircraft, from mountain tops downwards or from fire
positions sited away from the target on likely approach routes. Sometimes, bait
was offered to attract aircraft into an ambush. However, only the advent of the
Stinger made it unsafe for Soviet low-level flight wherever they wished. Another
favored Mujahideen tactic was to destroy aircraft at their bases with rocket and
mortar attacks.
The guerrillas learned through experience that certain measures were necessary to
counter heliborne raids, or at least to minimize their impact. Early warning from
outposts and air defense ambushes were important. So too was contingency
planning and the establishment of drills for quick reaction and the creation of a
rapid reaction force. An effective answer was to hit the assault force as it was
landing, helicopters being vulnerable to massed RPG and light machine gun fire,
and then to overrun the LZ before the assault troops could get organized. However,
the Mujahideen often failed to establish in advance air defense and/or minefields on
likely LZs, despite the fact that the Soviets used some mountain ones repeatedly.
Better prior preparation would have prevented the establishment of an effective
cordon in many search and destroy operations.
The Soviet-Afghan War can be divided into four phases.
Phase One (December 1979 to February 1980)
This phase began with the entry of Soviet forces into Afghanistan, their stationing in garrisons, and their final organization for securing bases and various installations. During this phase, the enemy deployed comparatively powerful forces against the Soviet forces. The Soviet forces did not avoid direct conflict with them. The Soviet forces, fighting alongside DRA forces, took the most difficult missions for themselves. The Afghan forces were poorly trained to conduct independent actions and played a secondary role in the fulfillment of operational and tactical missions.
Phase Two (March 1980 to April 1985)
Active combat characterizes this phase. Soviet forces undertook combat on a wide scale, mainly employing only Soviet forces, but also conducting joint actions with regiments and divisions of the DRA. By the start of this phase, the enemy, having suffered heavy losses, was switching to guerrilla tactics and moving into the mountains. Principally, these tactics consisted of avoiding combat with superior Soviet forces; conducting surprise action against small groups; and refusing to fight conventional, positional warfare while conducting widespread maneuver using autonomous groups and detachments. If the Mujahideen were unable to avoid combat, they reverted to close combat where it was difficult, if not impossible, to use air strikes and artillery fire against their dug-in firing positions. Under these circumstances, the Soviet forces attempted to conduct "combat operations" with a clear superiority in forces and means.
Phase Three (April 1985 to January 1987)
During this phase, the Soviets conducted a two-step conversion from primary active combat to supporting Afghan forces with aviation, artillery, and engineer subunits. Soviet motorized rifle, airborne, and tank subunits mainly became the reserve to raise the morale and warrior spirit of the Afghan forces. Soviet Spetsnaz forces continued to operate to stop the supply of weapons and ammunition from across the border. During this phase, Soviet authorities withdrew six Soviet regiments into the Soviet Union.
During the third phase of the war, the brunt of the fighting was transferred to the Afghan forces. Soviet forces withdrew from large-scale operations and primarily conducted small-sized ambushes based on intelligence reports. However, from time to time, Soviet forces conducted large-scale operations. Basic missions during this period were LOC security, security of key military and civil installations, and convoy escort.
Phase Four (January 1987 to February 1989)
This phase was marked by Soviet forces' participation in the Afghan government's program of national reconciliation. During this time, the Soviet forces conducted virtually no offensive actions and went into combat only when attacked by the Mujahideen or when supporting combat by Afghan forces. During this phase, the Soviet forces prepared for their total withdrawal.
The military-political missions assigned to the Soviet forces over the various phases of the war in Afghanistan were also among the important factors that impacted on the formation and development of this part of the military art. Other factors include the special conditions of the country during the 40th Army's stay, the 40th Army organization, the weapons and tactics of the enemy, and the combat capabilities of their own divisions, regiments, and subunits.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
The Mujahideen had great difficulty in coping with heliborne assaults
supported by gunships and ground attack aircraft. Soviet/DRA troops inserted by
helicopter could achieve surprise in a way that ground forces could rarely do. They
could also reach places inaccessible to the latter. Attack helicopters could deliver a
high volume of fire accurately against small, point targets that were invisible to
tanks or artillery observers. For this reason, they were feared and their arrival
often silenced heavy weapons and could be the signal for breaking-off an action and
withdrawing.
At first, the Soviets seem to have used airmobile troops largely in small-scale raids
to snatch or kill local Mujahideen commanders. They were also used to insert
ambush parties and elements of the cordon in search and destroy operations. As
time went on, however, air assaults went deeper and became more aggressive, even
against more formidable groupings. Several mountain bases that had proved
impervious to purely terrestrial attack fell to a combination of vertical envelopment
and a ground thrust; a link up by ground forces was usually considered essential if
lightly-equipped heliborne troops were to stay for any great time in an area where
the guerrillas were strong (i.e. to destroy supplies and facilities in a captured base
depot).
The Mujahideen suffered from inadequate air defence until the war was approaching
its closing stages. Heavy machine guns could be effective when firing from ambush,
from caves against passing aircraft, from mountain tops downwards or from fire
positions sited away from the target on likely approach routes. Sometimes, bait
was offered to attract aircraft into an ambush. However, only the advent of the
Stinger made it unsafe for Soviet low-level flight wherever they wished. Another
favored Mujahideen tactic was to destroy aircraft at their bases with rocket and
mortar attacks.
The guerrillas learned through experience that certain measures were necessary to
counter heliborne raids, or at least to minimize their impact. Early warning from
outposts and air defense ambushes were important. So too was contingency
planning and the establishment of drills for quick reaction and the creation of a
rapid reaction force. An effective answer was to hit the assault force as it was
landing, helicopters being vulnerable to massed RPG and light machine gun fire,
and then to overrun the LZ before the assault troops could get organized. However,
the Mujahideen often failed to establish in advance air defense and/or minefields on
likely LZs, despite the fact that the Soviets used some mountain ones repeatedly.
Better prior preparation would have prevented the establishment of an effective
cordon in many search and destroy operations.
The Soviet-Afghan War can be divided into four phases.
Phase One (December 1979 to February 1980)
This phase began with the entry of Soviet forces into Afghanistan, their stationing in garrisons, and their final organization for securing bases and various installations. During this phase, the enemy deployed comparatively powerful forces against the Soviet forces. The Soviet forces did not avoid direct conflict with them. The Soviet forces, fighting alongside DRA forces, took the most difficult missions for themselves. The Afghan forces were poorly trained to conduct independent actions and played a secondary role in the fulfillment of operational and tactical missions.
Phase Two (March 1980 to April 1985)
Active combat characterizes this phase. Soviet forces undertook combat on a wide scale, mainly employing only Soviet forces, but also conducting joint actions with regiments and divisions of the DRA. By the start of this phase, the enemy, having suffered heavy losses, was switching to guerrilla tactics and moving into the mountains. Principally, these tactics consisted of avoiding combat with superior Soviet forces; conducting surprise action against small groups; and refusing to fight conventional, positional warfare while conducting widespread maneuver using autonomous groups and detachments. If the Mujahideen were unable to avoid combat, they reverted to close combat where it was difficult, if not impossible, to use air strikes and artillery fire against their dug-in firing positions. Under these circumstances, the Soviet forces attempted to conduct "combat operations" with a clear superiority in forces and means.
Phase Three (April 1985 to January 1987)
During this phase, the Soviets conducted a two-step conversion from primary active combat to supporting Afghan forces with aviation, artillery, and engineer subunits. Soviet motorized rifle, airborne, and tank subunits mainly became the reserve to raise the morale and warrior spirit of the Afghan forces. Soviet Spetsnaz forces continued to operate to stop the supply of weapons and ammunition from across the border. During this phase, Soviet authorities withdrew six Soviet regiments into the Soviet Union.
During the third phase of the war, the brunt of the fighting was transferred to the Afghan forces. Soviet forces withdrew from large-scale operations and primarily conducted small-sized ambushes based on intelligence reports. However, from time to time, Soviet forces conducted large-scale operations. Basic missions during this period were LOC security, security of key military and civil installations, and convoy escort.
Phase Four (January 1987 to February 1989)
This phase was marked by Soviet forces' participation in the Afghan government's program of national reconciliation. During this time, the Soviet forces conducted virtually no offensive actions and went into combat only when attacked by the Mujahideen or when supporting combat by Afghan forces. During this phase, the Soviet forces prepared for their total withdrawal.
The military-political missions assigned to the Soviet forces over the various phases of the war in Afghanistan were also among the important factors that impacted on the formation and development of this part of the military art. Other factors include the special conditions of the country during the 40th Army's stay, the 40th Army organization, the weapons and tactics of the enemy, and the combat capabilities of their own divisions, regiments, and subunits.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
From an article:
In the Near East, water is life itself. Over the centuries, the local inhabitants of Iran, Afghanistan and Western Pakistan have taken some extraordinary measures to preserve and conserve this precious resource. Since many of the rivers are seasonal, the rural inhabitants have found ways to prolong their agricultural water supply during the dry months. Open-ditch irrigation is used in the northern part of the country, where the water table is relatively shallow, but in eastern, southern and southwest Afghanistan, the extensive underground karez (manmade water system) is necessary. A common sight, when flying over these regions, are the neat lines of mounds which lead from the foothills across the desert to the "green zones" of vegetation surrounding towns and villages. The mounds are actually the entrances to shafts, which intersect the water table and are connected to each other by tunnels. The deepest shaft highest on the hillside intercepts the water table. The water then moves through the tunnels and then out in the irrigation ditches and fields by the towns and villages. Some of these karez stretch for several kilometers underground. Some claim that the karez system was already working when Alexander the Great came through Afghanistan in 328 B.C.
The karez are dug by farmers. Occasionally they use large ceramic tile drainpipes to shore up weak sections of the strata. It is dangerous work for the shafts reach nine to 15 meters, with some over 30 meters deep. The karez are labor and maintenance-intensive. The silt must be cleaned out annually and hauled to the shaft surface by a windlass using goatskin bags.
The karez have another use. Since ancient times, these underground waterways have been used by the villagers for shelter against invading armies. Accounts of the chroniclers of Afghan history in medieval times refer to the use of the karez by civilians, as well as combatants, during the invasion of Genghis Khans's Mongol armies in 1221 A.D. The Mongols set out to destroy all major cities in Afghanistan and the neighboring area and made every effort to massacre the inhabitants to the last man. The Mongols did not go into the tunnels after the refugees. Rather, a day or two after destroying the town, the Mongols would send a small detachment back to the area to cut down the resurfaced survivors. They did this to insure that no potential resistance against Mongol rule remained. The Mongols learned, during their initial campaigns, that the official surrender of a city does not guarantee the permanent submission of the area, since the inhabitants would often rise against the invader, once his main force had moved on.
During the Soviet occupation, the villagers and the local Mujahideen guerrillas used the karez system as a hiding place. Since the towns and villages are close to the karez system, they are ready-made shelters from bombing and artillery attacks. The guerillas would dig caves in the sides of the shafts to hide weapons and themselves and use the karez tunnel network to move undetected to and from ambush sites and attack positions. According to Mujahideen eyewitness accounts, the Soviet forces passing through an area would not usually conduct an elaborate effort to flush out the refugees and guerrillas hiding in the tunnels. However, in major cordon and search actions, the Soviets and Afghan communist forces made special attempts to destroy the underground Mujahideen.
In the mid-1980s, the Soviets ran a tunnel neutralization course in Paghman Province some 14 kilometers to the northwest of the capital city of Kabul. The course was designed for Afghan special forces soldiers and was similar to courses run for Soviet sappers in Afghanistan. The school was necessary since men do not readily go underground to fight. Tunnels are ideal locations for a booby trap, a knife thrust from a side tunnel and cave-ins. Further; tunnels teem with snakes, scorpions and other creatures. After a quick course in theory, the tunnel neutralization course moved out to the field for practical application.
The soldiers conducted a reconnaissance to find the shaft entries (usually marked by a mound). The Soviets taught the soldiers to form into two covering groups and hold two adjacent shafts simultaneously. Since civilians often hid in these karez, the first step was to yell into the shaft demanding that anyone sheltering inside come out. The soldiers were taught to do their yelling without exposing themselves to answering gunshots from within the karez. If no one answered and came out, the next step was to throw in two RGD-5 concussion grenades. After the grenades exploded, it was customary to again demand that the occupants surrender since the karez was about to be blown up.
The depth of the shaft could be determined from the sound of a falling rock tossed inside. Then the soldiers would use a mirror to reflect sunlight down into the shaft and examine the shaft. If there were any areas that could not be examined, the soldiers would tie a cord to a grenade and lower the grenade to the suspect area before detonating it. Only after this, would the soldiers lower a blasting charge on detonating cord. Usually they would use captured TS-2.5 or TS-6.1 Italian anti-vehicular blast mines. They had many of these available. The soldiers would lower the first charge to the bottom of the shaft. Then they would prepare a second charge using three or four meters of detonating cord and 800 grams (two and three-quarters pounds) of high explosive. Then they would tie or tape the detonation cord to a standard hand grenade fuse. They would weight down this firing assembly with a rock or wedge it near the shaft mouth. Two trained soldiers could prepare a 20-meter shaft for detonation in about three minutes. All that remained was to pull the ring on the firing assembly. After four seconds, the charges would explode. During the explosion, it was necessary to stand some five or six meters from the mouth of the shaft, since the explosion would throw rocks out like a volcano.
This charge placement was particularly effective since the top charge would explode a fraction of a second earlier than the bottom charge. This top explosion would tightly plug the shaft with gases. Then the bottom charge would explode. The shock wave from this explosion would rebound off the higher gas mass and rush back down and against the sides of the shaft and tunnels. This creates a deadly over-pressure between the two charges. The Soviets called this "the stereophonic effect".
The stereophonic effect can be multiplied by preparing two adjoining shafts for simultaneous detonation. The Soviets would prepare each site as described above. Then they would join the detonation cord at the midpoint between the two shafts. They would again tape the detonation cord to a standard hand grenade fuse. When the charges were set off, a wider area of over- pressure and destruction resulted. The Soviets called this "the quadraphonic effect"
After the dust had settled, the Soviets would toss a smoke pot down each shaft. The smoke is non-toxic and the ventilation in a karez system is excellent. If the smoke disappeared, that meant that some tunnels were intact and that the search team could go in without wearing respirators. Search teams consisted of three or four men. Two of these would search to the front while the remainder would guard their backs from a sneak attack from the rear. The lead man had a line tied to his leg. In case the lead man found enemy material, he would tie the line to it and come back so they could all drag it out. In case the lead man was killed or wounded, his team members could drag him back by this line.
The search group was armed with knifes, entrenching tools*, hand grenades, pistols, and assault rifles. A flashlight was taped to the forestock of the automatic rifles. The magazines of the assault rifles were loaded with tracer ammunition.
The Soviets developed a psychological weapon for underground combat using their SM signal mine. The SM is basically a Roman candle which shoots a series of red, green or white signal stars some five to 20 meters. The signal mine simultaneously emits a siren-like sound. Although designed for trip-wire release by an unwary enemy, the SM can safely be ignited while holding it in one's hand. The Soviets would tape three to six of these signal mines together and, holding them in one hand, ignite them and fire them ahead into a tunnel. For nine seconds, a brilliant shaft of light, screams of sirens, and a fountain of signal stars would fill the tunnel. The signal stars would ricochet of the tunnel walls like tracers. The Soviets would find the unsuspecting foe covering his head with his arms, even though there was no real danger unless a signal star hit someone in the eye.
Flamethrowers were also used against karez. The Soviets replaced the short-range LPO-50 backpack flamethrowers with the RPO-A flamethrower. The RPO-A is a disposable system with a maximum range of 1000 meters, a maximum effective range of 600 meters and a minimum range of 20 meters. The round is 93mm in diameter. It has three types of projectile: thermobaric (fuel-air), incendiary and smoke. The fuel-air round was most effective against karez. The problem was that flamethrower gunners drew more small-arms fire than radiomen. An incendiary round from an RPO-A could clear out any opposition on the surface around a shaft entrance, but no flame thrower gunner wanted to lean over the mouth of a karez to fire down the shaft. He might be shot before he could get off a round. The Soviets would secure the shaft entrance and then lock and cock an RPO-A with a thermobaric round. They would tie two lowering lines on the RPO-A and a string on the trigger. Then they would slowly lower the RPO-A down the shaft until it was facing a tunnel. They would then pull the trigger string to fire the thermobaric round down the tunnel. The resulting over-pressure of the fuel-air round could be devastating.
*The entrenching tool was a weapon of choice for Soviet soldiers in hand-to-hand combat. Elite forces normally kept a razor-sharp edge on their entrenching tools.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
In the Near East, water is life itself. Over the centuries, the local inhabitants of Iran, Afghanistan and Western Pakistan have taken some extraordinary measures to preserve and conserve this precious resource. Since many of the rivers are seasonal, the rural inhabitants have found ways to prolong their agricultural water supply during the dry months. Open-ditch irrigation is used in the northern part of the country, where the water table is relatively shallow, but in eastern, southern and southwest Afghanistan, the extensive underground karez (manmade water system) is necessary. A common sight, when flying over these regions, are the neat lines of mounds which lead from the foothills across the desert to the "green zones" of vegetation surrounding towns and villages. The mounds are actually the entrances to shafts, which intersect the water table and are connected to each other by tunnels. The deepest shaft highest on the hillside intercepts the water table. The water then moves through the tunnels and then out in the irrigation ditches and fields by the towns and villages. Some of these karez stretch for several kilometers underground. Some claim that the karez system was already working when Alexander the Great came through Afghanistan in 328 B.C.
The karez are dug by farmers. Occasionally they use large ceramic tile drainpipes to shore up weak sections of the strata. It is dangerous work for the shafts reach nine to 15 meters, with some over 30 meters deep. The karez are labor and maintenance-intensive. The silt must be cleaned out annually and hauled to the shaft surface by a windlass using goatskin bags.
The karez have another use. Since ancient times, these underground waterways have been used by the villagers for shelter against invading armies. Accounts of the chroniclers of Afghan history in medieval times refer to the use of the karez by civilians, as well as combatants, during the invasion of Genghis Khans's Mongol armies in 1221 A.D. The Mongols set out to destroy all major cities in Afghanistan and the neighboring area and made every effort to massacre the inhabitants to the last man. The Mongols did not go into the tunnels after the refugees. Rather, a day or two after destroying the town, the Mongols would send a small detachment back to the area to cut down the resurfaced survivors. They did this to insure that no potential resistance against Mongol rule remained. The Mongols learned, during their initial campaigns, that the official surrender of a city does not guarantee the permanent submission of the area, since the inhabitants would often rise against the invader, once his main force had moved on.
During the Soviet occupation, the villagers and the local Mujahideen guerrillas used the karez system as a hiding place. Since the towns and villages are close to the karez system, they are ready-made shelters from bombing and artillery attacks. The guerillas would dig caves in the sides of the shafts to hide weapons and themselves and use the karez tunnel network to move undetected to and from ambush sites and attack positions. According to Mujahideen eyewitness accounts, the Soviet forces passing through an area would not usually conduct an elaborate effort to flush out the refugees and guerrillas hiding in the tunnels. However, in major cordon and search actions, the Soviets and Afghan communist forces made special attempts to destroy the underground Mujahideen.
In the mid-1980s, the Soviets ran a tunnel neutralization course in Paghman Province some 14 kilometers to the northwest of the capital city of Kabul. The course was designed for Afghan special forces soldiers and was similar to courses run for Soviet sappers in Afghanistan. The school was necessary since men do not readily go underground to fight. Tunnels are ideal locations for a booby trap, a knife thrust from a side tunnel and cave-ins. Further; tunnels teem with snakes, scorpions and other creatures. After a quick course in theory, the tunnel neutralization course moved out to the field for practical application.
The soldiers conducted a reconnaissance to find the shaft entries (usually marked by a mound). The Soviets taught the soldiers to form into two covering groups and hold two adjacent shafts simultaneously. Since civilians often hid in these karez, the first step was to yell into the shaft demanding that anyone sheltering inside come out. The soldiers were taught to do their yelling without exposing themselves to answering gunshots from within the karez. If no one answered and came out, the next step was to throw in two RGD-5 concussion grenades. After the grenades exploded, it was customary to again demand that the occupants surrender since the karez was about to be blown up.
The depth of the shaft could be determined from the sound of a falling rock tossed inside. Then the soldiers would use a mirror to reflect sunlight down into the shaft and examine the shaft. If there were any areas that could not be examined, the soldiers would tie a cord to a grenade and lower the grenade to the suspect area before detonating it. Only after this, would the soldiers lower a blasting charge on detonating cord. Usually they would use captured TS-2.5 or TS-6.1 Italian anti-vehicular blast mines. They had many of these available. The soldiers would lower the first charge to the bottom of the shaft. Then they would prepare a second charge using three or four meters of detonating cord and 800 grams (two and three-quarters pounds) of high explosive. Then they would tie or tape the detonation cord to a standard hand grenade fuse. They would weight down this firing assembly with a rock or wedge it near the shaft mouth. Two trained soldiers could prepare a 20-meter shaft for detonation in about three minutes. All that remained was to pull the ring on the firing assembly. After four seconds, the charges would explode. During the explosion, it was necessary to stand some five or six meters from the mouth of the shaft, since the explosion would throw rocks out like a volcano.
This charge placement was particularly effective since the top charge would explode a fraction of a second earlier than the bottom charge. This top explosion would tightly plug the shaft with gases. Then the bottom charge would explode. The shock wave from this explosion would rebound off the higher gas mass and rush back down and against the sides of the shaft and tunnels. This creates a deadly over-pressure between the two charges. The Soviets called this "the stereophonic effect".
The stereophonic effect can be multiplied by preparing two adjoining shafts for simultaneous detonation. The Soviets would prepare each site as described above. Then they would join the detonation cord at the midpoint between the two shafts. They would again tape the detonation cord to a standard hand grenade fuse. When the charges were set off, a wider area of over- pressure and destruction resulted. The Soviets called this "the quadraphonic effect"
After the dust had settled, the Soviets would toss a smoke pot down each shaft. The smoke is non-toxic and the ventilation in a karez system is excellent. If the smoke disappeared, that meant that some tunnels were intact and that the search team could go in without wearing respirators. Search teams consisted of three or four men. Two of these would search to the front while the remainder would guard their backs from a sneak attack from the rear. The lead man had a line tied to his leg. In case the lead man found enemy material, he would tie the line to it and come back so they could all drag it out. In case the lead man was killed or wounded, his team members could drag him back by this line.
The search group was armed with knifes, entrenching tools*, hand grenades, pistols, and assault rifles. A flashlight was taped to the forestock of the automatic rifles. The magazines of the assault rifles were loaded with tracer ammunition.
The Soviets developed a psychological weapon for underground combat using their SM signal mine. The SM is basically a Roman candle which shoots a series of red, green or white signal stars some five to 20 meters. The signal mine simultaneously emits a siren-like sound. Although designed for trip-wire release by an unwary enemy, the SM can safely be ignited while holding it in one's hand. The Soviets would tape three to six of these signal mines together and, holding them in one hand, ignite them and fire them ahead into a tunnel. For nine seconds, a brilliant shaft of light, screams of sirens, and a fountain of signal stars would fill the tunnel. The signal stars would ricochet of the tunnel walls like tracers. The Soviets would find the unsuspecting foe covering his head with his arms, even though there was no real danger unless a signal star hit someone in the eye.
Flamethrowers were also used against karez. The Soviets replaced the short-range LPO-50 backpack flamethrowers with the RPO-A flamethrower. The RPO-A is a disposable system with a maximum range of 1000 meters, a maximum effective range of 600 meters and a minimum range of 20 meters. The round is 93mm in diameter. It has three types of projectile: thermobaric (fuel-air), incendiary and smoke. The fuel-air round was most effective against karez. The problem was that flamethrower gunners drew more small-arms fire than radiomen. An incendiary round from an RPO-A could clear out any opposition on the surface around a shaft entrance, but no flame thrower gunner wanted to lean over the mouth of a karez to fire down the shaft. He might be shot before he could get off a round. The Soviets would secure the shaft entrance and then lock and cock an RPO-A with a thermobaric round. They would tie two lowering lines on the RPO-A and a string on the trigger. Then they would slowly lower the RPO-A down the shaft until it was facing a tunnel. They would then pull the trigger string to fire the thermobaric round down the tunnel. The resulting over-pressure of the fuel-air round could be devastating.
*The entrenching tool was a weapon of choice for Soviet soldiers in hand-to-hand combat. Elite forces normally kept a razor-sharp edge on their entrenching tools.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
I have a question for 16 OBrSpN about uprizing of soviet POWs in Pakistan.
I was trying to find some reliable info about the event but wasn't successful.
If you have any info, would you please share. Thank you.
I think it was 12 (maybe 14) Soviet POW's in the small prison near Peshawar. Although I would say it was more like a concentration camp.
The prison was also serving as a training base for mujahedin with a large stockpile of ammo. It was operated by Pakistani and American instructors. I think Rabbani's mujahedin were training there. Prisoners were tortured on a daily basis, with almost no food. One guy's hand was chopped off.
During Friday prayers, one of the prisoners neutralised the guard, took his weapon and within almost an hour they they fought their way, and took control of ammo warehouse. Prisoners set up machinegun posts and basically barrickaded themselves. They demanded meeting with the Red Cross, and Soviet Ambassador, otherwise they would blow up the warehouse.
Afghans, along with Pakistanis tried to storm the compound. Gunfight erupted, which lasted for almost 9 hours. Two pakistani APC's were blasted by RPG's when they tried to get closer.
After failing to take back the control, Pakistanis brought mortars and started pounding the perimeter of the prison. One of the shells hit the warehouse. There were: lots of weapons, artillery shells, mines, RPG's, grenades, Stingers. The explosion was so powerful that it could be heard dozens of kilometers away. Our guys died in there. Sad
Result: 14 prisoners; almost 60 mujahedin; 11 Pakistanis dead. Some people say 4 Americans died there too. But I don't know for sure.
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
I was trying to find some reliable info about the event but wasn't successful.
If you have any info, would you please share. Thank you.
I think it was 12 (maybe 14) Soviet POW's in the small prison near Peshawar. Although I would say it was more like a concentration camp.
The prison was also serving as a training base for mujahedin with a large stockpile of ammo. It was operated by Pakistani and American instructors. I think Rabbani's mujahedin were training there. Prisoners were tortured on a daily basis, with almost no food. One guy's hand was chopped off.
During Friday prayers, one of the prisoners neutralised the guard, took his weapon and within almost an hour they they fought their way, and took control of ammo warehouse. Prisoners set up machinegun posts and basically barrickaded themselves. They demanded meeting with the Red Cross, and Soviet Ambassador, otherwise they would blow up the warehouse.
Afghans, along with Pakistanis tried to storm the compound. Gunfight erupted, which lasted for almost 9 hours. Two pakistani APC's were blasted by RPG's when they tried to get closer.
After failing to take back the control, Pakistanis brought mortars and started pounding the perimeter of the prison. One of the shells hit the warehouse. There were: lots of weapons, artillery shells, mines, RPG's, grenades, Stingers. The explosion was so powerful that it could be heard dozens of kilometers away. Our guys died in there. Sad
Result: 14 prisoners; almost 60 mujahedin; 11 Pakistanis dead. Some people say 4 Americans died there too. But I don't know for sure.
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
From an article:
An airborne (VDV) group ambushes a bridge site by Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Gladishev:
Weapons and ammunition that were furnished to the mujahideen came into Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran, Much of this cargo came into Helmand and Kandahar provinces. Our airborne division commander decided to establish ambushes along the likely routes that these armament caravans would travel. In July 1982, my battalion commander ordered me to prepare a reconnaissance group to carry out such a mission.
I had ten days to select and prepare a twenty-man group for the mission. I selected battalion officers, sergeants and soldiers who were in exceptional physical shape, and had combat experience. My group consisted of two officers, a warrant officer, five sergeants and twelve soldiers. The soldiers included two RTOs, two sappers, a medic and an interpreter. I also received an officer from the Afghan KHAD to accompany the mission.
My group's equipment included six machine guns, fourteen AKS-74 assault rifles, and an AKMS automatic rifle with a silencer. We carried two combat loads per weapon, four hand grenades per man, four RPG- 18 antitank weapons, five mines, seven radios (two of which could link with helicopters), seven pairs of binoculars, one night vision device, and a flak jacket for every man. The group wore camouflage smocks and tennis shoes.
Our target was a bridge over which, according to Afghan counterintelligence, enemy trucks, motorcycles and tractors had crossed on previous nights. At the end of July 1982, my group boarded two Mi-8TV helicopters. We were inserted some five kilometers from the bridge one hour prior to sunset. Four Mi-24 helicopter gunships covered our insertion. The insertion was timed to allow the helicopters to return to the battalion base camp during daylight. We waited for darkness and then moved stealthily to the bridge. My patrol, which moved 200 meters in front of the group, discovered an enemy observation post, which consisted of two men, military rifles and a motorcycle. We slipped around their observation post (OP) and surreptitiously moved to the bridge. There, we split into our designated subgroups and deployed according to my plan. My ambush subgroups were a fire support group, a security group, a snatch group and a support group. By 2130 hours, my ambush was established and my troopers were ready for battle.
Every fifteen to twenty minutes, the enemy sentries would signal the nearby villages with some flashlight signals. From this, I understood that they had not discovered our presence. This continued until 0230 hours. According to our plan, I had to withdraw my ambush force and start moving to the pick-up zone at 0300 hours. However, at 0235 hours, a medium truck moved from Anova toward Mardzha and was crossing the bridge. I gave the command to detonate two MON-50 mines and to open fire. Simultaneously, two troopers from my security force threw grenades into the enemy OP.
The enemy never got a shot off and it was all over in one or two minutes. The enemy was completely destroyed. After the snatch group and the fire support group ceased fire, we gathered enemy weapons, ammunition and documents. We killed twenty-eight enemy, captured thirty-two weapons of varying types as well as their ammunition. I had no casualties. We quickly reassembled and moved out to the pick-up zone. The helicopters had us back to our base camp by 0700 hours.
From the end of July to the end of September, we conducted eighteen similar ambushes. We had positive results from fourteen of them. During this time, we had three soldiers wounded. Our ambush groups killed approximately 200 mujahideen and captured about twenty. We captured approximately 200 various weapons, a large amount of ammunition, and a large sum of money. There were about 50,000,000 Iranian rials, Pakistani rupees and Afghanistan afghans. This money was destined to pay for their Iranian and Pakistani advisers.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
An airborne (VDV) group ambushes a bridge site by Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Gladishev:
Weapons and ammunition that were furnished to the mujahideen came into Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran, Much of this cargo came into Helmand and Kandahar provinces. Our airborne division commander decided to establish ambushes along the likely routes that these armament caravans would travel. In July 1982, my battalion commander ordered me to prepare a reconnaissance group to carry out such a mission.
I had ten days to select and prepare a twenty-man group for the mission. I selected battalion officers, sergeants and soldiers who were in exceptional physical shape, and had combat experience. My group consisted of two officers, a warrant officer, five sergeants and twelve soldiers. The soldiers included two RTOs, two sappers, a medic and an interpreter. I also received an officer from the Afghan KHAD to accompany the mission.
My group's equipment included six machine guns, fourteen AKS-74 assault rifles, and an AKMS automatic rifle with a silencer. We carried two combat loads per weapon, four hand grenades per man, four RPG- 18 antitank weapons, five mines, seven radios (two of which could link with helicopters), seven pairs of binoculars, one night vision device, and a flak jacket for every man. The group wore camouflage smocks and tennis shoes.
Our target was a bridge over which, according to Afghan counterintelligence, enemy trucks, motorcycles and tractors had crossed on previous nights. At the end of July 1982, my group boarded two Mi-8TV helicopters. We were inserted some five kilometers from the bridge one hour prior to sunset. Four Mi-24 helicopter gunships covered our insertion. The insertion was timed to allow the helicopters to return to the battalion base camp during daylight. We waited for darkness and then moved stealthily to the bridge. My patrol, which moved 200 meters in front of the group, discovered an enemy observation post, which consisted of two men, military rifles and a motorcycle. We slipped around their observation post (OP) and surreptitiously moved to the bridge. There, we split into our designated subgroups and deployed according to my plan. My ambush subgroups were a fire support group, a security group, a snatch group and a support group. By 2130 hours, my ambush was established and my troopers were ready for battle.
Every fifteen to twenty minutes, the enemy sentries would signal the nearby villages with some flashlight signals. From this, I understood that they had not discovered our presence. This continued until 0230 hours. According to our plan, I had to withdraw my ambush force and start moving to the pick-up zone at 0300 hours. However, at 0235 hours, a medium truck moved from Anova toward Mardzha and was crossing the bridge. I gave the command to detonate two MON-50 mines and to open fire. Simultaneously, two troopers from my security force threw grenades into the enemy OP.
The enemy never got a shot off and it was all over in one or two minutes. The enemy was completely destroyed. After the snatch group and the fire support group ceased fire, we gathered enemy weapons, ammunition and documents. We killed twenty-eight enemy, captured thirty-two weapons of varying types as well as their ammunition. I had no casualties. We quickly reassembled and moved out to the pick-up zone. The helicopters had us back to our base camp by 0700 hours.
From the end of July to the end of September, we conducted eighteen similar ambushes. We had positive results from fourteen of them. During this time, we had three soldiers wounded. Our ambush groups killed approximately 200 mujahideen and captured about twenty. We captured approximately 200 various weapons, a large amount of ammunition, and a large sum of money. There were about 50,000,000 Iranian rials, Pakistani rupees and Afghanistan afghans. This money was destined to pay for their Iranian and Pakistani advisers.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
I noticed in another thread that someone asked about the striped blue and white shirt worn under
the uniform shirt. Elite forces have traditionally distinguished themselves from the rest of the military
by adopting distinctive uniforms or insignia. The Soviet VDV (Airborne) was no exception. Colonel
General Margelov was an enthusiastic proponent of this effort, feeling that it bolstered unit morale.
The first step was the adoption of the Soviet Navy’ striped blue and white sailor’s shirt, the telnyashka,
under the normal khaki tunic, to distinguish the paratroopers from the rest of the Soviet Army
This was an odd choice for an army unit, and was due to Margelov’s combat career in Word War II.
In the early years of the war, Margelov had served on the Leningrad Front. Many Soviet warships were
bottled up in harbors in Leningrad, so the sailors of the Baltic Fleet were brought ashore and used as
elite Infantry.
Although he was an army major, Margelov was assigned to command the 1st Naval Infantry Regiment,
which was used for raiding behind German Lines. Margelov associated the striped sailor’s shirt with
this highly effective unit. He had kept his own naval shirt as a memento of past glories, and then decided
the sailor’s shirt would serve as the basis for the new VDV paratrooper’s uniform.
In spite of its odd beginnings, the blue and white striped shirt became the predominant symbol of Soviet
and Russian elite forces, especially after Afghanistan. It is in use by the VDV and other elite formations,
including Spetsnaz and elite special police units.
I have stated in my thread that I remain non-political and non-judgmental. The Afghan people and the
Soviet personal that served there both suffered as a result of the war. When I post information it is neither
to inflame or incite, but to inform. All the information I post is based on fact and historical record. I have
stated in the past that I welcome all corrections or additions. However, I do not welcome posts that are
designed to inflame, whatever the source.
For every Afghan that suffered or whose family suffered, I can find a Soviet soldier or their family that suffered
equally as great. The loss is felt on both sides. The United States will continue to be in Afghanistan for some time.
I am documenting the record of how Soviet SOF brought the resistance to the breaking point, which is the lesson
the United States needs to follow and pursue.
Thanks & Regards,
Hist2004
the uniform shirt. Elite forces have traditionally distinguished themselves from the rest of the military
by adopting distinctive uniforms or insignia. The Soviet VDV (Airborne) was no exception. Colonel
General Margelov was an enthusiastic proponent of this effort, feeling that it bolstered unit morale.
The first step was the adoption of the Soviet Navy’ striped blue and white sailor’s shirt, the telnyashka,
under the normal khaki tunic, to distinguish the paratroopers from the rest of the Soviet Army
This was an odd choice for an army unit, and was due to Margelov’s combat career in Word War II.
In the early years of the war, Margelov had served on the Leningrad Front. Many Soviet warships were
bottled up in harbors in Leningrad, so the sailors of the Baltic Fleet were brought ashore and used as
elite Infantry.
Although he was an army major, Margelov was assigned to command the 1st Naval Infantry Regiment,
which was used for raiding behind German Lines. Margelov associated the striped sailor’s shirt with
this highly effective unit. He had kept his own naval shirt as a memento of past glories, and then decided
the sailor’s shirt would serve as the basis for the new VDV paratrooper’s uniform.
In spite of its odd beginnings, the blue and white striped shirt became the predominant symbol of Soviet
and Russian elite forces, especially after Afghanistan. It is in use by the VDV and other elite formations,
including Spetsnaz and elite special police units.
I have stated in my thread that I remain non-political and non-judgmental. The Afghan people and the
Soviet personal that served there both suffered as a result of the war. When I post information it is neither
to inflame or incite, but to inform. All the information I post is based on fact and historical record. I have
stated in the past that I welcome all corrections or additions. However, I do not welcome posts that are
designed to inflame, whatever the source.
For every Afghan that suffered or whose family suffered, I can find a Soviet soldier or their family that suffered
equally as great. The loss is felt on both sides. The United States will continue to be in Afghanistan for some time.
I am documenting the record of how Soviet SOF brought the resistance to the breaking point, which is the lesson
the United States needs to follow and pursue.
Thanks & Regards,
Hist2004