Outro Artigo:
"SP: What impact did the introduction of Stingers have on Russian operations in general?
Andrei: Well, it changed right away how helicopters and planes were flying. They would for example have a predetermined approach to the airport. You have to understand that most of the direct hits were on the low flying cargo planes that were about to land or take off. And on Mi-8 and Mi-6's while they were taking off or landing or while they were maneuvering, while they were handicapped, not while they were fully flying. Rarely were there any Mi-24's shot down, but there were some Mi-24's shot down. Also 25% of all so called shot down helicopters were actually hit but were then restored and put back in service. Impact was great of course, so they changed how they took off and landed, and installed heat decoys on them.
SP: Some claim that the introduction of the Stinger in September of 1986 turned the War around for the Afghans and eventually enabled them to win. What are your thoughts on this?
Andrei: Who claims that? The Afghans lost that war from the beginning until the last Soviet soldier left that land. They did not win any friggin operations other than successful ambushes. There was no success what so ever on their part militarily to speak of. It's like this, lets say this big guy takes this little guy and starts beating the snot out of him after school. And he beats him and beats him and beats him, to a pulp. Then he finally realizes that he's not achieving anything, the satisfaction is not there, this guy is not going to submit to him or whatever. So he comes off the guy and goes home, leaves. That's is what happened in Afghanistan . They did not force us to leave. There was no military success on their part that would cause, "Oh my God, retreat, retreat, retreat." No, there was nothing. Stingers, that were barely making it through and not all of them mind you, did not defeat the 100,000 fully equipped Soviet Army. The Soviet withdrawal was planned and in strict accordance with the Geneva Peace Accord that was signed by all the parties involved and it was planned and executed as a precise military operation, our garrisons leaving the country. Every one of our units was organized and marched across the border. And, like I said, in direct accordance with plans laid out by the Geneva Conference. So although Stingers did have an effect, they did change the flying patterns, they did have to come up with countermeasures, but Stingers DID NOT sway the war to Afghans rebels by any means. I means it's as simple as that. If someone said that, they are not military, or they slept through the entire academy. There was no military success (on the rebels part). There were some (Russian) operations that did not materialize as they planned due to poor planning on our part, and they became a little success for the rebels. But they were isolated instances that were very few. And the Stingers sure as hell didn't cause that.
SP: So you think the effect of the Stinger on the outcome of the War was very minor?
Andrei: Yeah of course. How can you with a shoulder held missile go against lets say a Grad artillery battery? OK lets say that there is a wing of 6 helicopters and you shot one down. What happens to you and your detachment? Four of the helicopters are gonna come down on you and your detachment with everything they've got. Cannons, bombs, rockets, and the other one is gonna pick up the downed crew. Think about it, they shot at only single, low flying, slow moving helicopters that don't mean shit. Not very often did they shoot one full of troops. Most of the planes shot down were slow moving transport planes, not Mig's. Stingers did not do shit. You can not fight the war on the ground with a shoulder held Stinger. You gotta have tanks, APC 's, you gotta have functional weapons, your supplies routes, your logistics have to be in order, your rear echelon has to be there. Not like hide your Chinese AK under your bed, wait and whip it out at night and go shoot some Shuravi (Russians). It's not gonna work that way. The Stingers, although they had an effect, but very minor, and sure as hell did not sway the war towards the rebels. The rebels did not win that war. And talking about Russia loosing after 1986 due to the Stingers, all you have to do is go on our web site (http://www.afghanwar.ru) and see how many people were killed during those times. There was no increase in casualties. They were in-line with 1984 and 1985.
SP: Was there any impact on SPETsNAZ operations from the introduction of Stingers?
Andrei: No, everyone wanted to find one! There was an order across the ranks that anyone who captured a Stinger missile would immediately be awarded a Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union . And in fact, I think there was an ambush against a Russian column or convoy, and it was successfully defended against and beaten off. And as a result of chasing the Muj back on top of the mountains they did find a Stinger missile. However when they started talking about who deserved to win the Gold Star and started looking into the background of the officers who took part in this operation they dug up things like they were an alcoholic, or were cheating on their wife or something. None had a clean slate. And they didn't want to give it to the regular soldier who found it, it was a scout I think. So as a result some guy in the rear echelon got it, "for providing logistical support"."
A Experiencia Russa no Afeganistão 1979-1989
Moderador: Conselho de Moderação
"One time, our guys from the "Muslim batallion" had destroyed a large reinforcement caravan on the Pakistani territory. The caravan started its way in Parachinar and was supposed to reach the Afghan mujahedins in the South Eastern part of Nangrahar province.
The caravan consisted of 12 large trucks. 7 of them were filled with ammunition, and the rest consisted of Pakistani soldiers. Pakistanis wanted to help start a major offensive in Nangrahar.
One of the informants tipped us about the incoming caravan. Since the operation was very critical, the Jelalabad batallion combined forces with the Baraki batallion. The central command gave the order to engage the caravan on the Afghani territory. But Capt. Rustam Tursunkulov, the commander of the 2nd Group/1st Co. of the "Muslim Batallion", asked permission to engage the enemy inside Pakistan. Eventually he received the permission.
He received 2 Mi-8, and 4 Mi-24 helicopters. Early in the morning, two groups under his command boarded Mi-8's, while Mi-24 provided cover.
They flew very low, hiding behind the mountains. While the assault group went after the caravan, the second assault group from the Baraki batallion had set up an ambush on the caravan's destination, where they could engage the mujahedins.
Once the column was in sight, the helicopters started their attack. They destroyed one truck after another. Pakistanis were surprised shitless! Smile
Then two groups dropped in the area to clear it, destroy the wounded, and check for documents.
Later, three groups from Baraki batallion destroyed a large mujahedin unit in Khaydar Jar.
Rustam Tursunkulov had received a Medal for Courage for this operation. He's a good friend of mine, he presented me the Pakistani bayonet which he took during that Op. They've taken lots of souvenirs there.
BTW, there is a video footage of that mission. Very impressive! Wink
Regards,
16 OBr SpN"
The caravan consisted of 12 large trucks. 7 of them were filled with ammunition, and the rest consisted of Pakistani soldiers. Pakistanis wanted to help start a major offensive in Nangrahar.
One of the informants tipped us about the incoming caravan. Since the operation was very critical, the Jelalabad batallion combined forces with the Baraki batallion. The central command gave the order to engage the caravan on the Afghani territory. But Capt. Rustam Tursunkulov, the commander of the 2nd Group/1st Co. of the "Muslim Batallion", asked permission to engage the enemy inside Pakistan. Eventually he received the permission.
He received 2 Mi-8, and 4 Mi-24 helicopters. Early in the morning, two groups under his command boarded Mi-8's, while Mi-24 provided cover.
They flew very low, hiding behind the mountains. While the assault group went after the caravan, the second assault group from the Baraki batallion had set up an ambush on the caravan's destination, where they could engage the mujahedins.
Once the column was in sight, the helicopters started their attack. They destroyed one truck after another. Pakistanis were surprised shitless! Smile
Then two groups dropped in the area to clear it, destroy the wounded, and check for documents.
Later, three groups from Baraki batallion destroyed a large mujahedin unit in Khaydar Jar.
Rustam Tursunkulov had received a Medal for Courage for this operation. He's a good friend of mine, he presented me the Pakistani bayonet which he took during that Op. They've taken lots of souvenirs there.
BTW, there is a video footage of that mission. Very impressive! Wink
Regards,
16 OBr SpN"
-I guess i am asking which members of the enemy was the most consistintly effective, if any?
Well, as hist2004 already mentioned, Ahmad Shah Masood was one of the mujahedin commanders who was effective, and managed to hold out during the whole conflict. In my personaly opinion, among all of the commanders, he was the most talented one.
In fact, when I personally met him after the war had ended, as expected, I saw a very intelligent person. In fact from all of the commanders he was the one who actually wanted Afghanistan to develop. But again, he was a victim of the system, and had to play by the rules of that society.
The other force which gave us more trouble were the Pakistanis. But their troubles came not from the battlefield, but from a massive logistic that they provided to Afghans.
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
Well, as hist2004 already mentioned, Ahmad Shah Masood was one of the mujahedin commanders who was effective, and managed to hold out during the whole conflict. In my personaly opinion, among all of the commanders, he was the most talented one.
In fact, when I personally met him after the war had ended, as expected, I saw a very intelligent person. In fact from all of the commanders he was the one who actually wanted Afghanistan to develop. But again, he was a victim of the system, and had to play by the rules of that society.
The other force which gave us more trouble were the Pakistanis. But their troubles came not from the battlefield, but from a massive logistic that they provided to Afghans.
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
The 345 Regiment (Airborne) developed a very effective intelligence-gathering group
over a series of months which proved to be remarkably efficient. Often wearing local
clothes, its men infiltrated areas controlled by the rebels to collect information about
mujahidden activates using every possible means. There were eleven or twelve officers
in the group, about three praporshchiks (warrant officers) and six “soldier-interpreters”,
conscripts from the Central Asian republics who had been trained in a special platoon
in Fergana.
These soldiers were university or institute graduates who were mostly in their early-to-
mid twenties, rather older than the usual conscripts. They were mainly Uzbek or Tadzhik
with a knowledge of Pushtu, Dari and Hindu and had a much better understanding of the
culture of the Afghan people than the mainly Slav Airborne officers. Their missions were
extremely dangerous. Whenever they were working, the whole regiment would be stood
to, with aviation and artillery ready to cover them if necessary.
They collected intelligence by observing what the locals were up to, watching every kind
of activity even if it appeared peaceful, and above all by collecting and then collating every
possible scrap of information. Their main asset was the net of informants that they
built up. They had spies in mujahidden camps, which worked constantly for them. About
80% of the informants were contacted through intermediaries, and in many cases they
were just referred to by their code names. Money was a huge inducement, and despite
the wide spread believe that all Afghan mujahideen were involved in a jihad, many sold
out for the right price. Often, cooperative rebel leaders would be transported to meet
Airborne regimental commanders in an armored vehicle so that they wouldn’t see where
they were going. Agreements would often be signed with a thumbprint, if they were
illiterate.
Such documents had no legal standing, but they were psychologically important, marking
the undertaking that had taken place. These truces with rebel leaders were important since
they permitted the Soviet Army convoys to travel safely along certain stretches of
road, and freed garrisons of attack from some of the local bands.
Regards,
Hist2004
over a series of months which proved to be remarkably efficient. Often wearing local
clothes, its men infiltrated areas controlled by the rebels to collect information about
mujahidden activates using every possible means. There were eleven or twelve officers
in the group, about three praporshchiks (warrant officers) and six “soldier-interpreters”,
conscripts from the Central Asian republics who had been trained in a special platoon
in Fergana.
These soldiers were university or institute graduates who were mostly in their early-to-
mid twenties, rather older than the usual conscripts. They were mainly Uzbek or Tadzhik
with a knowledge of Pushtu, Dari and Hindu and had a much better understanding of the
culture of the Afghan people than the mainly Slav Airborne officers. Their missions were
extremely dangerous. Whenever they were working, the whole regiment would be stood
to, with aviation and artillery ready to cover them if necessary.
They collected intelligence by observing what the locals were up to, watching every kind
of activity even if it appeared peaceful, and above all by collecting and then collating every
possible scrap of information. Their main asset was the net of informants that they
built up. They had spies in mujahidden camps, which worked constantly for them. About
80% of the informants were contacted through intermediaries, and in many cases they
were just referred to by their code names. Money was a huge inducement, and despite
the wide spread believe that all Afghan mujahideen were involved in a jihad, many sold
out for the right price. Often, cooperative rebel leaders would be transported to meet
Airborne regimental commanders in an armored vehicle so that they wouldn’t see where
they were going. Agreements would often be signed with a thumbprint, if they were
illiterate.
Such documents had no legal standing, but they were psychologically important, marking
the undertaking that had taken place. These truces with rebel leaders were important since
they permitted the Soviet Army convoys to travel safely along certain stretches of
road, and freed garrisons of attack from some of the local bands.
Regards,
Hist2004
Its author described the beginning of the storm so: "a mysterious BMP with the Afghan flag [I don't remember now, perharps it was BTR] arrived in the victinity of the president's palace in Kabul. The intrigued guardsmen came closer to look at it. When they were very close to the vehicle the Afghan flag was put down and the KGB flag was risen. The vehicle's crew opened fire killing the guardsmen[...]".
I wanted to add a footnote to the take down of the Tajbeg Palace. The assault force was stopped
briefly on the way to the Palace. The situation unfolded as follows. A convoy of trucks and BMD fighting vehicles
carried the Spetsnaz troops and about three battalions of airborne troops. Altogether about 2,000 men were
heading to the Palace. As most military operations unfold, this one didn’t quite go according to plan. The assault
force ran into their first bit of trouble at an Afghan Army checkpoint on the road to Darulaman. Instead of passing
the vehicles through, the Afghan troops gathered around the Russians. They were surprised to see so many soldiers
traveling along the road without prior permission. The Afghan soldiers advanced to inspect them. Determined not to
risk any further delays or even discovery, the Soviet commandos acted. On command, they threw back the canvas
flaps of the lead truck and triggered bursts of automatic fire. The road to the Palace was now open.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
I wanted to add a footnote to the take down of the Tajbeg Palace. The assault force was stopped
briefly on the way to the Palace. The situation unfolded as follows. A convoy of trucks and BMD fighting vehicles
carried the Spetsnaz troops and about three battalions of airborne troops. Altogether about 2,000 men were
heading to the Palace. As most military operations unfold, this one didn’t quite go according to plan. The assault
force ran into their first bit of trouble at an Afghan Army checkpoint on the road to Darulaman. Instead of passing
the vehicles through, the Afghan troops gathered around the Russians. They were surprised to see so many soldiers
traveling along the road without prior permission. The Afghan soldiers advanced to inspect them. Determined not to
risk any further delays or even discovery, the Soviet commandos acted. On command, they threw back the canvas
flaps of the lead truck and triggered bursts of automatic fire. The road to the Palace was now open.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
In Afghanistan, the Alfa's orders were: investigation of structures, location, intentions of mujahideen, capture and liquidation of the leaders of mujahideen, search and destruction of warehouses of the weapon and ammunition, army headquarters and signal centers, search and rescue soldiers from captivity, help of the Afghani army in organization of subversive groups. Their first goal, however, was an assault on the palace Dar-ul-aman.
The palace of Amin had been built on an elevated area, which provided an excellent 360-degree view of the surrounding area. This three story building featured extremely well constructed walls (23mm shells from ADV-vehicles could not penetrate these walls). There was only one road into the palace, which was under constant watch by palace security personnel. The palace complex typically housed approximately 2,000 guards, with the barracks of the guards located on the third story of the palace. On the 27th of December, however, only 200 guards were present. They were reinforced by eleven tanks, two of which were dug in at the gate to the palace.
Near the palace grounds there was also a general Afghanistan Army headquarters building with its own complement of soldiers and an air defense system. Approximately 500 meters from the palace was also a building housing a regiment of gendarmeries (police).
For the assault, Alfa's soldiers were divided into two groups, "Grom" (Thunder) and "Zenith". Thunder was composed of 25 men, two ADV vehicles with the ZSU 23-4 "Shilka", six BTR-60's and six BMP-1's. Zenith was composed of 24 KGB men. The moslem batallion is other subdivision, which provided only cover of assault and consist of conscripted soldiers.
The sign for the start of the operation was the explosive destruction of a signal center in the city of Kabul. When this happened, the Shilka's opened fire on the palace. Thunder group on BMP's then moved towards the palace. Zenith also moved forward via a foot ladder towards the palace.
To prevent reinforcements from approaching from the opposite side, and to prevent any palace guards from escaping, the Muslim Battalion opened fire with two Shilkas (normally used for anti-aircraft duties) then opened up, providing devastating fire. Simultaneously, a smaller team designated "Carandoy" (made up of personnel from Thunder, Zenith, and an airborne unit) assaulted and captured the Ministry of Foreign Business in Kabul. Two soldiers from Thunder along with a platoon of paratroopers also captured the Afghanistan Air Force Staff. Four men from Thunder and Zenith then commandeered the two tanks at the front of the palace and captured the gendarmerie post.
As the BTR's and BMP's began to advance, however, they were taken under heavy automatic weapons and antitank fire. One of Zenith's BTR's was destroyed and caught fire, and one of Thunder's BMP's was so severely damaged that she had to be abandoned.
In the first two minutes after the teams left their armored vehicles, thirteen soldiers from Thunder were wounded. Despite this, massed fire overwhelmed the palace guards and Alfa made entry into the place itself. The Shilkas continued to fire at the second story, as Afghan guards tossed hand grenades and opened fire with a machine gun. As the Alfa soldiers made their way upstairs, they used their own grenades to eliminate the Afghans. Once on the second story, the soldiers lobbed grenades into each room. Amin was in his study when a grenade exploded, killing him. Some more fighting ensued, but shortly thereafter, Alfa had successfully taken the palace and set up defenses.
By the time the assault was over, nearly all of the assault personnel had been injured. One soldier lost a hand while approaching a ladder to the second story, while another took a round through the neck. Others received bullet and fragmentation wounds to the stomach, legs, and hands. At least five Alfa soldiers were killed. In the morning, the Vitebsk parachute division landed at the airport at Bagram City and the invasion of Afghanistan was underway.
The palace of Amin had been built on an elevated area, which provided an excellent 360-degree view of the surrounding area. This three story building featured extremely well constructed walls (23mm shells from ADV-vehicles could not penetrate these walls). There was only one road into the palace, which was under constant watch by palace security personnel. The palace complex typically housed approximately 2,000 guards, with the barracks of the guards located on the third story of the palace. On the 27th of December, however, only 200 guards were present. They were reinforced by eleven tanks, two of which were dug in at the gate to the palace.
Near the palace grounds there was also a general Afghanistan Army headquarters building with its own complement of soldiers and an air defense system. Approximately 500 meters from the palace was also a building housing a regiment of gendarmeries (police).
For the assault, Alfa's soldiers were divided into two groups, "Grom" (Thunder) and "Zenith". Thunder was composed of 25 men, two ADV vehicles with the ZSU 23-4 "Shilka", six BTR-60's and six BMP-1's. Zenith was composed of 24 KGB men. The moslem batallion is other subdivision, which provided only cover of assault and consist of conscripted soldiers.
The sign for the start of the operation was the explosive destruction of a signal center in the city of Kabul. When this happened, the Shilka's opened fire on the palace. Thunder group on BMP's then moved towards the palace. Zenith also moved forward via a foot ladder towards the palace.
To prevent reinforcements from approaching from the opposite side, and to prevent any palace guards from escaping, the Muslim Battalion opened fire with two Shilkas (normally used for anti-aircraft duties) then opened up, providing devastating fire. Simultaneously, a smaller team designated "Carandoy" (made up of personnel from Thunder, Zenith, and an airborne unit) assaulted and captured the Ministry of Foreign Business in Kabul. Two soldiers from Thunder along with a platoon of paratroopers also captured the Afghanistan Air Force Staff. Four men from Thunder and Zenith then commandeered the two tanks at the front of the palace and captured the gendarmerie post.
As the BTR's and BMP's began to advance, however, they were taken under heavy automatic weapons and antitank fire. One of Zenith's BTR's was destroyed and caught fire, and one of Thunder's BMP's was so severely damaged that she had to be abandoned.
In the first two minutes after the teams left their armored vehicles, thirteen soldiers from Thunder were wounded. Despite this, massed fire overwhelmed the palace guards and Alfa made entry into the place itself. The Shilkas continued to fire at the second story, as Afghan guards tossed hand grenades and opened fire with a machine gun. As the Alfa soldiers made their way upstairs, they used their own grenades to eliminate the Afghans. Once on the second story, the soldiers lobbed grenades into each room. Amin was in his study when a grenade exploded, killing him. Some more fighting ensued, but shortly thereafter, Alfa had successfully taken the palace and set up defenses.
By the time the assault was over, nearly all of the assault personnel had been injured. One soldier lost a hand while approaching a ladder to the second story, while another took a round through the neck. Others received bullet and fragmentation wounds to the stomach, legs, and hands. At least five Alfa soldiers were killed. In the morning, the Vitebsk parachute division landed at the airport at Bagram City and the invasion of Afghanistan was underway.
The following article is by a SpetsNaz veteran:
Soviet Special Forces (Spetsnaz): Experience in Afghanistan
When I read in the newspapers that U.S. Special Forces units had deployed to Afghanistan in the full-scale antiterrorist operation after the Attack on America on 11 September 2001, I could not help but experience déjà vu; I had "been there, done that."
"They are ready to go," I said to myself. "Maybe at this exact moment they are jumping into a chopper to take them on their mission. Or possibly, they are already on the ground in Afghanistan."
I had lived through the dark nights in the mountains of Afghanistan. I had heard the angry roar of helicopter engines in thin air. And, I had experienced the deafening bursts of automatic gunfire and the blasts of hand grenades as they exploded in narrow canyons or among packed mud walls of Afghan villages. I lived again the exhausting dash back toward the pick-up area. I saw the faces of my comrades, dead and alive.
Soviet Spetsnaz
The involvement of the Soviet special forces—the Spetsnaz—in Afghanistan began in 1980. The Soviet command soon realized that mechanized infantry units were not effective against Mujahideen guerrilla tactics. The Spetsnaz were called in as the only forces capable of fighting the enemy on his own terms. Even these crack units initially lacked mountain-warfare training. Their mission in the event of a full-scale European theater of war was to hunt and destroy headquarters, command and communications centers, and mobile missile launchers. In Afghanistan they had to learn a lot fast to meet new and unique challenges.
In the paragraphs below, I list some of the challenges and solutions Soviet Spetsnaz teams faced and what they learned.
Deployment Lessons Learned
Helicopter assault tactics. When deploying a Spetsnaz team into enemy territory, helicopters should make several landings, leaving the team at one location only and under cover of darkness. Doing so complicates the enemy's search and pursuit because they will have to conduct searches in several places, thus dispersing their forces.
The helicopter drop should be from two to three miles behind the target, so that instead of going deeper into enemy territory for the attack, the group would be moving back toward its own base. If the enemy launches a search operation, chances are fewer that they will be searching in the back direction.
Helicopters should use different routes for returning to base after dropping the team. To conceal the team's deployment, there should be other air force activity in the area, including limited air strikes near but not too close to the team's objective.
Destroying enemy supply convoys. During the Soviet-Afghan war, the Mujahideen developed sophisticated and effective tactics of bringing weapons and ammunitions supply convoys into Afghanistan. The tactics the Spetsnaz most often used to destroy such convoys were helicopter assaults and ambushes en route.
The general rule for intercepting and destroying weapons and ammunition convoys is that the closer to the enemy's base or main camp the convoy is intercepted, the higher the chances the convoy will be in one piece and its security will not be on full alert. After a large convoy arrives at a distribution base or area, representatives of different field commanders and tribes meet it and divide it into smaller groups, which are much harder to detect.
When a long line of camels loaded with weapons and ammunition is attacked, the most depressing thing is the maddening shriek of wounded animals. The wounded from the convoy security detachment scream too, but they are the enemy; the animals are victims. The most unpleasant thing is when a camel loaded with mines or TNT explodes into bloody pieces, killing everyone nearby.
Local conditions. Even if soldiers speak the local language and dress like the locals, they should not count too much on their ability to pass as locals. The way they walk is different, and there are many tribal dialects. Dress-specific features, even in the way of wearing a headdress, carrying weapons, and so on, can betray someone as not being a native. Depending on the mission, however, it makes sense to dress as much like locals as possible for the particular area of the country in which the mission is to occur. Doing so could fool the enemy for some time and give soldiers a small advantage. Also, soldiers should collect and hide used toilet paper. Most Afghans in rural areas use small stones and pieces of dry clay for this purpose.
Tactics Lessons Learned
Air-fuel munitions. The Soviet air force used air-fuel bombs and unguided rockets with air-fuel warheads for the first time in Afghanistan. When used in populated areas, such munitions completely destroy buildings within a distance of 25 to 30 meters from the center of the explosion and partly destroying and damaging structures at a distance of up to 80 meters. The smashing and throwing effect of an air-fuel bomb's hot explosion wave is effective at a distance of up to 200 meters, especially in canyons and narrow valleys. However, thin air in the mountains and wind at ground level can quickly disperse the concentration of aerosol needed for explosion, thereby decreasing the power of such munitions.
These munitions should be used during cold season, at night, or during the early morning, when the air is still cool and thick. If dropped in thin air or during windy conditions, it is best to use a cocktail combination of aerosol munitions and smoke bombs dropped together. The smoke will keep the aerosol from dispersing too quickly.
The number of landing zones in Afghanistan near fortified enemy bases are limited and usually mined. During air-assault missions, air-fuel munitions are effective for cleaning mines from helicopter landing zones before troops land.
Soviet attack aircraft used the following tactics:
lAttacking the target from the sun.
lPerforming "star" air strikes, which consist of aircraft attacking a target continuously from different directions, thus preventing the enemy from accurate firing in one direction.
lUsing two aircraft or two pair of aircraft on parallel courses coming from opposite directions to attack the target.
lFinishing the attack by steady climbing, then performing a sharp hook turn to either left or right.
Often a flight of aircraft would launch a distracting attack by flying on afterburners to create noise, while the main striking force attacked a strongly fortified enemy base from another direction during a large-scale operation.
Air-strike diplomacy. If a particular tribe, field commander, or village was known to have taken prisoners of war (POWs) or possessed the remains of those killed in action, from two to four aircraft would deliver an impressive air strike as close as possible to the location using heavy bombs and incineration munitions. At the same time, leaflet bombs would be dropped that declared that unless there was immediate negotiation for POWs' release or for the return of bodies to a specified location, the next air strike would target the area itself.
Air Defenses Lessons Learned
During my service in Afghanistan, the enemy used a variety of portable, shoulder-launched missiles. They included the old (usually Egyptian-made) Strela-1, Strela-2, and Strela-2M (modernized) missiles; American Red Eye and Stinger missiles; and British Blowpipe missiles.
According to information gathered from POWs, Blowpipe performance was disappointing because of its low accuracy, heavy weight, and complicated guidance system. Blowpipes were used en mass during the 1986 assault on Javara south of Khost. I personally witnessed from two to three simultaneously launched Blowpipe missiles missing a single aircraft and exploding in the air.
Twelve 7-millimeter DShK (1, 2, or 4 barrels, mostly of Chinese or Egyptian manufacture) and fourteen, 5-millimeter Zenitnaya Gornaya Ustanovka (ZGU) antiaircraft mountain units, using Krupnokaliberniy Pulemet Vlavimirova Tankoviy tank-mounted, large-caliber machine guns of Vladimirov design (originally designed for tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs)), had effective ranges of fire up to 1,500 to 1,800 meters. Even after the introduction of SA missiles, the DshKs and ZGUs caused from 50 to 70 percent of helicopter losses and damage and from 40 to 50 percent of aircraft losses and damage. Also in limited use were Swedish 20-millimeter Eurlicon antiaircraft guns and the Soviet-made mobile 4-barrel automatic gun system known as Shilka, which was used by the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.
For better protection of their fortified bases and strongholds, enemy forces established a local early warning system that consisted of a net of observation posts. Small radio stations were located as far as from 5 to 15 kilometers from each post. This distance does not seem like much when flying in a jet, but it is enough to give advanced warning of approaching helicopters. Also, such posts kept air force bases under observation, reporting every group take off. To counter such a net, striking teams should take a deceptive course, then change it to the correct one once out of the observation area.
Enemy air defense of fortified bases began from distant approaches of from four to six kilometers out from the main base area. Air defenses included heavy antiaircraft machine guns and occasional SA missiles located on high mountain ridges. The concentration of air defenses gradually increased toward the center of main bases and fortified areas. The number of heavy machine guns defending a base varied depending on its size and importance but could range from 60 to 80 pieces in a particular area. Crews are tough. Often, when a gunner was killed or wounded, another trained crew-member immediately replaced him.
Soviet pilots nicknamed antiaircraft machine guns "welding machines," because from the air the flashes that occurred when they were fired reminded the pilots of welding works in progress. Fortified areas with large numbers of antiaircraft machine guns were called welding workshops.
Special "free-hunting" missile teams usually consisted of from 10 to 20 soldiers; one to two trained missile men; and two to three soldiers to carry additional tubes. Other team members carried infantry weapons for protection and cover. Hunting teams, operating near air bases, and missile teams defending enemy bases, included 4- to 10-member groups whose mission was to kill or capture downed pilots. Pilots' messes at airbases, such as at Bagram and Kabul, were specific targets for mortar or rocket barrages. Sometimes such teams would climb to incredible heights to attack or engage transportation aircraft that the Soviets thought were flying at safe altitudes.
In 1987, after recovering from being wounded for the second time, I returned to Afghanistan where I worked at the Military Intelligence Department in Kabul. I received information that a Spetsnaz team in the Panjshire area had intercepted and destroyed an enemy convoy carrying, in addition to the usual variety of weapons and munitions, small portable oxygen bottles and masks.
To counter such measures, humanitarian packages should be dropped from higher altitudes. Transportation aircraft should alternate approach directions as often as possible, and they should avoid permanent flight routes.
Mine Warfare Lessons Learned
On many occasions, enemy forces would lay mines in a way that they could be easily detected and disarmed. Other mines in the same area would be much better concealed and laid with much more resourcefulness. For example, a mine having an easily detectable metal casing might be surrounded by mines that had plastic casings, which are much harder to detect. Enemy forces would also combine pressure-detonated mines with remote radio or wire-detonated mines and charges whose power was often increased by putting pieces of cut thick metal around them or laying stones over them.
Despite the fact that many modern weapons, including modern land mines, are used in Afghanistan, many homemade devices are also used. A pile of empty artillery and tank shell cases, as well as cases from unexploded air bombs and other munitions, clearly indicates that the place is used for manufacturing explosive devices. Also, the enemy will collect empty artillery and tank shell cases, refill them with explosives, and use them as anti-vehicle mines. Such refuse should be collected and rendered unusable by running over it with a tank or other heavy-armor vehicle.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
Soviet Special Forces (Spetsnaz): Experience in Afghanistan
When I read in the newspapers that U.S. Special Forces units had deployed to Afghanistan in the full-scale antiterrorist operation after the Attack on America on 11 September 2001, I could not help but experience déjà vu; I had "been there, done that."
"They are ready to go," I said to myself. "Maybe at this exact moment they are jumping into a chopper to take them on their mission. Or possibly, they are already on the ground in Afghanistan."
I had lived through the dark nights in the mountains of Afghanistan. I had heard the angry roar of helicopter engines in thin air. And, I had experienced the deafening bursts of automatic gunfire and the blasts of hand grenades as they exploded in narrow canyons or among packed mud walls of Afghan villages. I lived again the exhausting dash back toward the pick-up area. I saw the faces of my comrades, dead and alive.
Soviet Spetsnaz
The involvement of the Soviet special forces—the Spetsnaz—in Afghanistan began in 1980. The Soviet command soon realized that mechanized infantry units were not effective against Mujahideen guerrilla tactics. The Spetsnaz were called in as the only forces capable of fighting the enemy on his own terms. Even these crack units initially lacked mountain-warfare training. Their mission in the event of a full-scale European theater of war was to hunt and destroy headquarters, command and communications centers, and mobile missile launchers. In Afghanistan they had to learn a lot fast to meet new and unique challenges.
In the paragraphs below, I list some of the challenges and solutions Soviet Spetsnaz teams faced and what they learned.
Deployment Lessons Learned
Helicopter assault tactics. When deploying a Spetsnaz team into enemy territory, helicopters should make several landings, leaving the team at one location only and under cover of darkness. Doing so complicates the enemy's search and pursuit because they will have to conduct searches in several places, thus dispersing their forces.
The helicopter drop should be from two to three miles behind the target, so that instead of going deeper into enemy territory for the attack, the group would be moving back toward its own base. If the enemy launches a search operation, chances are fewer that they will be searching in the back direction.
Helicopters should use different routes for returning to base after dropping the team. To conceal the team's deployment, there should be other air force activity in the area, including limited air strikes near but not too close to the team's objective.
Destroying enemy supply convoys. During the Soviet-Afghan war, the Mujahideen developed sophisticated and effective tactics of bringing weapons and ammunitions supply convoys into Afghanistan. The tactics the Spetsnaz most often used to destroy such convoys were helicopter assaults and ambushes en route.
The general rule for intercepting and destroying weapons and ammunition convoys is that the closer to the enemy's base or main camp the convoy is intercepted, the higher the chances the convoy will be in one piece and its security will not be on full alert. After a large convoy arrives at a distribution base or area, representatives of different field commanders and tribes meet it and divide it into smaller groups, which are much harder to detect.
When a long line of camels loaded with weapons and ammunition is attacked, the most depressing thing is the maddening shriek of wounded animals. The wounded from the convoy security detachment scream too, but they are the enemy; the animals are victims. The most unpleasant thing is when a camel loaded with mines or TNT explodes into bloody pieces, killing everyone nearby.
Local conditions. Even if soldiers speak the local language and dress like the locals, they should not count too much on their ability to pass as locals. The way they walk is different, and there are many tribal dialects. Dress-specific features, even in the way of wearing a headdress, carrying weapons, and so on, can betray someone as not being a native. Depending on the mission, however, it makes sense to dress as much like locals as possible for the particular area of the country in which the mission is to occur. Doing so could fool the enemy for some time and give soldiers a small advantage. Also, soldiers should collect and hide used toilet paper. Most Afghans in rural areas use small stones and pieces of dry clay for this purpose.
Tactics Lessons Learned
Air-fuel munitions. The Soviet air force used air-fuel bombs and unguided rockets with air-fuel warheads for the first time in Afghanistan. When used in populated areas, such munitions completely destroy buildings within a distance of 25 to 30 meters from the center of the explosion and partly destroying and damaging structures at a distance of up to 80 meters. The smashing and throwing effect of an air-fuel bomb's hot explosion wave is effective at a distance of up to 200 meters, especially in canyons and narrow valleys. However, thin air in the mountains and wind at ground level can quickly disperse the concentration of aerosol needed for explosion, thereby decreasing the power of such munitions.
These munitions should be used during cold season, at night, or during the early morning, when the air is still cool and thick. If dropped in thin air or during windy conditions, it is best to use a cocktail combination of aerosol munitions and smoke bombs dropped together. The smoke will keep the aerosol from dispersing too quickly.
The number of landing zones in Afghanistan near fortified enemy bases are limited and usually mined. During air-assault missions, air-fuel munitions are effective for cleaning mines from helicopter landing zones before troops land.
Soviet attack aircraft used the following tactics:
lAttacking the target from the sun.
lPerforming "star" air strikes, which consist of aircraft attacking a target continuously from different directions, thus preventing the enemy from accurate firing in one direction.
lUsing two aircraft or two pair of aircraft on parallel courses coming from opposite directions to attack the target.
lFinishing the attack by steady climbing, then performing a sharp hook turn to either left or right.
Often a flight of aircraft would launch a distracting attack by flying on afterburners to create noise, while the main striking force attacked a strongly fortified enemy base from another direction during a large-scale operation.
Air-strike diplomacy. If a particular tribe, field commander, or village was known to have taken prisoners of war (POWs) or possessed the remains of those killed in action, from two to four aircraft would deliver an impressive air strike as close as possible to the location using heavy bombs and incineration munitions. At the same time, leaflet bombs would be dropped that declared that unless there was immediate negotiation for POWs' release or for the return of bodies to a specified location, the next air strike would target the area itself.
Air Defenses Lessons Learned
During my service in Afghanistan, the enemy used a variety of portable, shoulder-launched missiles. They included the old (usually Egyptian-made) Strela-1, Strela-2, and Strela-2M (modernized) missiles; American Red Eye and Stinger missiles; and British Blowpipe missiles.
According to information gathered from POWs, Blowpipe performance was disappointing because of its low accuracy, heavy weight, and complicated guidance system. Blowpipes were used en mass during the 1986 assault on Javara south of Khost. I personally witnessed from two to three simultaneously launched Blowpipe missiles missing a single aircraft and exploding in the air.
Twelve 7-millimeter DShK (1, 2, or 4 barrels, mostly of Chinese or Egyptian manufacture) and fourteen, 5-millimeter Zenitnaya Gornaya Ustanovka (ZGU) antiaircraft mountain units, using Krupnokaliberniy Pulemet Vlavimirova Tankoviy tank-mounted, large-caliber machine guns of Vladimirov design (originally designed for tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs)), had effective ranges of fire up to 1,500 to 1,800 meters. Even after the introduction of SA missiles, the DshKs and ZGUs caused from 50 to 70 percent of helicopter losses and damage and from 40 to 50 percent of aircraft losses and damage. Also in limited use were Swedish 20-millimeter Eurlicon antiaircraft guns and the Soviet-made mobile 4-barrel automatic gun system known as Shilka, which was used by the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.
For better protection of their fortified bases and strongholds, enemy forces established a local early warning system that consisted of a net of observation posts. Small radio stations were located as far as from 5 to 15 kilometers from each post. This distance does not seem like much when flying in a jet, but it is enough to give advanced warning of approaching helicopters. Also, such posts kept air force bases under observation, reporting every group take off. To counter such a net, striking teams should take a deceptive course, then change it to the correct one once out of the observation area.
Enemy air defense of fortified bases began from distant approaches of from four to six kilometers out from the main base area. Air defenses included heavy antiaircraft machine guns and occasional SA missiles located on high mountain ridges. The concentration of air defenses gradually increased toward the center of main bases and fortified areas. The number of heavy machine guns defending a base varied depending on its size and importance but could range from 60 to 80 pieces in a particular area. Crews are tough. Often, when a gunner was killed or wounded, another trained crew-member immediately replaced him.
Soviet pilots nicknamed antiaircraft machine guns "welding machines," because from the air the flashes that occurred when they were fired reminded the pilots of welding works in progress. Fortified areas with large numbers of antiaircraft machine guns were called welding workshops.
Special "free-hunting" missile teams usually consisted of from 10 to 20 soldiers; one to two trained missile men; and two to three soldiers to carry additional tubes. Other team members carried infantry weapons for protection and cover. Hunting teams, operating near air bases, and missile teams defending enemy bases, included 4- to 10-member groups whose mission was to kill or capture downed pilots. Pilots' messes at airbases, such as at Bagram and Kabul, were specific targets for mortar or rocket barrages. Sometimes such teams would climb to incredible heights to attack or engage transportation aircraft that the Soviets thought were flying at safe altitudes.
In 1987, after recovering from being wounded for the second time, I returned to Afghanistan where I worked at the Military Intelligence Department in Kabul. I received information that a Spetsnaz team in the Panjshire area had intercepted and destroyed an enemy convoy carrying, in addition to the usual variety of weapons and munitions, small portable oxygen bottles and masks.
To counter such measures, humanitarian packages should be dropped from higher altitudes. Transportation aircraft should alternate approach directions as often as possible, and they should avoid permanent flight routes.
Mine Warfare Lessons Learned
On many occasions, enemy forces would lay mines in a way that they could be easily detected and disarmed. Other mines in the same area would be much better concealed and laid with much more resourcefulness. For example, a mine having an easily detectable metal casing might be surrounded by mines that had plastic casings, which are much harder to detect. Enemy forces would also combine pressure-detonated mines with remote radio or wire-detonated mines and charges whose power was often increased by putting pieces of cut thick metal around them or laying stones over them.
Despite the fact that many modern weapons, including modern land mines, are used in Afghanistan, many homemade devices are also used. A pile of empty artillery and tank shell cases, as well as cases from unexploded air bombs and other munitions, clearly indicates that the place is used for manufacturing explosive devices. Also, the enemy will collect empty artillery and tank shell cases, refill them with explosives, and use them as anti-vehicle mines. Such refuse should be collected and rendered unusable by running over it with a tank or other heavy-armor vehicle.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
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Slip Junior
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Não sei se isso foi mencionado em algum dos artigos postado pelo Alessandro (ainda não tive tempo de ler todos), mas muitas pessoas desconhecem o fato de mesmo antes da introdução do Stinger, em meados dos anos 80, os mujahideens já estavam equipados com MANPADS. À princípio, eles utilizavam SA-7 Iglas e depois receberam alguns lotes de Blowpipes. No entanto, aparentemente foi só com o Stinger que eles começaram a obter resultados mais expressivos e mesmo assim, quase que exclusivamente, contra helicópteros; contra aeronaves, as únicas armas realmente úteis eram as centenas de metralhadoras e canhões anti-aéreos que dispunham.
Para contrapor as armas anti-aéreas de cano é que foi introduzido o Su-25 Frogfoot no campo de batalha, sendo que esse se saiu muito bem com vários exemplares voltando para base mesmo depois de serem atingidos por dezenas de projéteis.
Não consigo entender porque não foram fornecidos sistemas mais eficientes como o Hawk que podiam muito bem ser transportados para o Afeganistão através da fronteira com o Paquistão que foi durante algum tempo um bom aliado militar dos EUA. Isso dificultaria bastante o trabalho dos soviéticos uma vez que, devido a falta de tal equipamento nas mãos do mujahideens, eles podiam operar livres de qualquer ameaça à médias e altas altitudes.
Abraços
Para contrapor as armas anti-aéreas de cano é que foi introduzido o Su-25 Frogfoot no campo de batalha, sendo que esse se saiu muito bem com vários exemplares voltando para base mesmo depois de serem atingidos por dezenas de projéteis.
Não consigo entender porque não foram fornecidos sistemas mais eficientes como o Hawk que podiam muito bem ser transportados para o Afeganistão através da fronteira com o Paquistão que foi durante algum tempo um bom aliado militar dos EUA. Isso dificultaria bastante o trabalho dos soviéticos uma vez que, devido a falta de tal equipamento nas mãos do mujahideens, eles podiam operar livres de qualquer ameaça à médias e altas altitudes.
Abraços
In Afghanistan, Soviet military leadership could not apply their standard training methods, which were geared toward fighting large concentration of regular army troops in corps, division and brigade level engagements. This meant that they were hard pressed to come up with innovative ideas to counter their opposition in Afghanistan. ‘The Soviets formulated new concepts for waging war in nonlinear fashion’. The units and formations were reorganized to ‘emphasize flexibility and hence, survivability’. The most effective method was use of airborne troops along with a mechanized ground attack but Soviets could not bring adequate number of heliborne detachments. The air assault forces consisted of an airborne division, a brigade, parachute regiment and two air assault battalions. A large number of air assault forces were stationed in Bala Hisar Fort in Kabul. The airborne troops were used in coordination with ground offensive and mainly involved in blocking the retreat of resistance fighters or prevent their reinforcements. They were also used in ambushes deep in Mujahideen controlled areas, where they will spend several days in the field away from their base camp. They were used in border areas near Pakistan and Iran to disrupt Mujahideen supply lines. Overall these troops performed very well and were involved in many close battles with Mujahideen. The main disadvantage they had was that due to the nature of the terrain and very small size of the landing zones, they could not use their specialized armoured personnel carriers. These troops were generally better equipped. For better efficiency and to decrease the load carried by each air assault trooper, smaller weapons were used. The assault rifle had folding stocks with eight to ten ammunition magazines along with few grenades and a bayonet. A shortened lighter version of AK-74, 5.45 mm AKR submachine gun was also used by these troops. Good intelligence due to penetration of resistance groups by Afghan government, well coordinated small assault groups, flexibility of small units and superior air power were responsible for the success of these operations. Another new concept dictated by the nature of operations was bronegruppa (armoured group). This method used ‘the fire power of the personnel carrier in an independent reserve once the motorized rifle soldiers had dismounted’. This gave the commander significant manoeuvrability. Soviets increasingly used ambushes of Mujahideen detachments. With experience, they increasingly improvised the ambush techniques using different type of groupings in an ambush to make it more effective. In a well-executed ambush, an observation group (2-3 men for reconnaissance), firing group (machine gunners, grenadiers and gunners which will shoot in the kill zone), snatch group (5-7 men which would capture prisoners, documents and weapons) and security group (which would cover flanks and provide cover during withdrawal) would act in an organized and coordinated way to achieve results. Success of any ambush depended on military cunning, thorough practical preparation of all participants, a well-defined organization, and coordination with supporting elements’. A large amount of both personnel and equipment was invested in convoy escort and protection duties. Soviets greatly improved communication and applied new tactics in convoy protection as they learned from their earlier experience. New Material Support Battalions (about 30 such units were deployed in Afghanistan) were used along with a separate transport Brigade to keep roads open and supplies moving.
One arm, which was the critical component of the LCOSF and was used extensively beyond their capacity, was the army aviation. This was due to the fact that guerrilla nature of the fight made fixed wing aircraft less effective. Early during the operations, Soviets used MiG-21 Fishbed. This aircraft was suited for air to ground combat operations mainly in flat terrains which made it less effective in Afghan mountainous terrain. After failure of MiG-21s, Soviets introduced two fixed wings aircraft; Su-25 Frogfoot and Tu-16 Badger. These aircraft were also not very effective against guerrillas but devastated most of the countryside with carpet-bombing. Failure of fixed wings aircraft forced increasing use of helicopters. Helicopter was used in several roles including ‘transportation, mobile artillery, reconnaissance, communications relay, supply, artillery spotter, and command vehicle’. About 329 helicopters were lost in Afghanistan (127 helicopter gunship, 174 armed helicopter transports and 28 lift ships). Soviets deployed Mi-24 Hind, Mi-8 Hips, Mi-4 Hound and Mi-6 Hook in Afghanistan. Two independent Helicopter Regiments, 181st in Jalalabad and 280th in Qandahar and Shindand air base used large number of Mi-6 Hooks in various operations along border.
The opposition, which Soviets were facing was given diplomatic, intelligence, technical and enormous material support by United States and Saudi Arabia. At operational level, Pakistani army officers seconded to the Afghan Cell of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) coordinated all operations on the ground. At political level, rapid changes at the top due to senility of the Soviet leadership in contrast to previous long tenure of leadership prevented any coordinated, well-thought out plans about Afghanistan. Afghan resistance fighters mainly used AK-47 assault rifles and RGG-7 grenade launchers in their operations. Later, crew-served weapons were introduced. The resistance never presented any meaningful alternative to the Afghan government. Their whole exercise was limited to show up unexpectedly, fire, create a lot of upheaval on the field and then disappear to come back another day to repeat this exercise. This was exactly what their forefathers have been doing for centuries. The only difference was that they were using modern weapons. They fought bravely suffering enormously but all their gains were only tactical. Thousand tactical victories did not translate into a single strategic win.
Age-old concept that terrain dictates the tactics is true in all battles. ‘The Soviet equipment was designed for a different war on a different terrain. It failed to function optimally in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan’. More important than that is the fact that no amount of technological supe-
riority can be fully effective if there is a national will to fight and endure the hardships in a conflict between unequal foes. This was the decisive factor on part of the Afghan resistance. Soviet political and military leadership could not understand this fundamental fact, as ‘Marxist-Leninist dogma did not allow for a “war of national liberation” where people would fight against a Marxist regime’. Soviets would regret for not paying attention to the advice of Georgi Chicherin, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia. In 1921, he advised the first Soviet ambassador to Kabul, “You should by all means avoid the fatal mistake of trying to plant Communism in the country”. His words proved to prophetic seventy years later.
"We were no angels. But we were fighting devils". A Soviet veteran of Afghan war
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
One arm, which was the critical component of the LCOSF and was used extensively beyond their capacity, was the army aviation. This was due to the fact that guerrilla nature of the fight made fixed wing aircraft less effective. Early during the operations, Soviets used MiG-21 Fishbed. This aircraft was suited for air to ground combat operations mainly in flat terrains which made it less effective in Afghan mountainous terrain. After failure of MiG-21s, Soviets introduced two fixed wings aircraft; Su-25 Frogfoot and Tu-16 Badger. These aircraft were also not very effective against guerrillas but devastated most of the countryside with carpet-bombing. Failure of fixed wings aircraft forced increasing use of helicopters. Helicopter was used in several roles including ‘transportation, mobile artillery, reconnaissance, communications relay, supply, artillery spotter, and command vehicle’. About 329 helicopters were lost in Afghanistan (127 helicopter gunship, 174 armed helicopter transports and 28 lift ships). Soviets deployed Mi-24 Hind, Mi-8 Hips, Mi-4 Hound and Mi-6 Hook in Afghanistan. Two independent Helicopter Regiments, 181st in Jalalabad and 280th in Qandahar and Shindand air base used large number of Mi-6 Hooks in various operations along border.
The opposition, which Soviets were facing was given diplomatic, intelligence, technical and enormous material support by United States and Saudi Arabia. At operational level, Pakistani army officers seconded to the Afghan Cell of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) coordinated all operations on the ground. At political level, rapid changes at the top due to senility of the Soviet leadership in contrast to previous long tenure of leadership prevented any coordinated, well-thought out plans about Afghanistan. Afghan resistance fighters mainly used AK-47 assault rifles and RGG-7 grenade launchers in their operations. Later, crew-served weapons were introduced. The resistance never presented any meaningful alternative to the Afghan government. Their whole exercise was limited to show up unexpectedly, fire, create a lot of upheaval on the field and then disappear to come back another day to repeat this exercise. This was exactly what their forefathers have been doing for centuries. The only difference was that they were using modern weapons. They fought bravely suffering enormously but all their gains were only tactical. Thousand tactical victories did not translate into a single strategic win.
Age-old concept that terrain dictates the tactics is true in all battles. ‘The Soviet equipment was designed for a different war on a different terrain. It failed to function optimally in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan’. More important than that is the fact that no amount of technological supe-
riority can be fully effective if there is a national will to fight and endure the hardships in a conflict between unequal foes. This was the decisive factor on part of the Afghan resistance. Soviet political and military leadership could not understand this fundamental fact, as ‘Marxist-Leninist dogma did not allow for a “war of national liberation” where people would fight against a Marxist regime’. Soviets would regret for not paying attention to the advice of Georgi Chicherin, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia. In 1921, he advised the first Soviet ambassador to Kabul, “You should by all means avoid the fatal mistake of trying to plant Communism in the country”. His words proved to prophetic seventy years later.
"We were no angels. But we were fighting devils". A Soviet veteran of Afghan war
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
Slip Junior escreveu:Não sei se isso foi mencionado em algum dos artigos postado pelo Alessandro (ainda não tive tempo de ler todos), mas muitas pessoas desconhecem o fato de mesmo antes da introdução do Stinger, em meados dos anos 80, os mujahideens já estavam equipados com MANPADS. À princípio, eles utilizavam SA-7 Iglas e depois receberam alguns lotes de Blowpipes. No entanto, aparentemente foi só com o Stinger que eles começaram a obter resultados mais expressivos e mesmo assim, quase que exclusivamente, contra helicópteros; contra aeronaves, as únicas armas realmente úteis eram as centenas de metralhadoras e canhões anti-aéreos que dispunham.
Para contrapor as armas anti-aéreas de cano é que foi introduzido o Su-25 Frogfoot no campo de batalha, sendo que esse se saiu muito bem com vários exemplares voltando para base mesmo depois de serem atingidos por dezenas de projéteis.
Não consigo entender porque não foram fornecidos sistemas mais eficientes como o Hawk que podiam muito bem ser transportados para o Afeganistão através da fronteira com o Paquistão que foi durante algum tempo um bom aliado militar dos EUA. Isso dificultaria bastante o trabalho dos soviéticos uma vez que, devido a falta de tal equipamento nas mãos do mujahideens, eles podiam operar livres de qualquer ameaça à médias e altas altitudes.
Abraços
Ae Slip.. você vai ler em um dos Artigos ai que os Afegaos não sabiam usar os Stinger descentemente e em muitas vezes usavam eles como usavam os RPGs .. ou seja .. atirando sem usar o sensor IR .. os Su-25 estavam em testes lá... se eu não me engano poucos foram usados durante o conflito .... a confirmar sobre o Su-25!
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Slip Junior
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Sobre o Frogfoot, é verdade, eles foram usados em caráter experimental (sem não me engano foi empregado um único batalhão dotado de tais aeronaves) sendo que a aeronave tática mais utilizada foi o MiG-27 Flogger. No entanto, os Su-25's foram extensivamente empregados sobretudo no apoio aéreo aproximado.
Os Badgers, Backfires e, em escala bem menor, Bears e Blackjack foram utilizados em missões de saturação de área, onde voando à grandes altitudes dispejavam dezenas de bombas burras.
Mas o mais interessante sobre a invasão do Afeganistão se refere, principalmente, ao combate terrestre onde um exército que se preparava há mais de 3 décadas para um combate de larga escala em vastas planícies teve que subitamente aprender a operar contra um inimigo muito mais furtivo em um cenário dominado por montanhas.
Abraços
Os Badgers, Backfires e, em escala bem menor, Bears e Blackjack foram utilizados em missões de saturação de área, onde voando à grandes altitudes dispejavam dezenas de bombas burras.
Mas o mais interessante sobre a invasão do Afeganistão se refere, principalmente, ao combate terrestre onde um exército que se preparava há mais de 3 décadas para um combate de larga escala em vastas planícies teve que subitamente aprender a operar contra um inimigo muito mais furtivo em um cenário dominado por montanhas.
Abraços
Slip Junior escreveu:Sobre o Frogfoot, é verdade, eles foram usados em caráter experimental (sem não me engano foi empregado um único batalhão dotado de tais aeronaves) sendo que a aeronave tática mais utilizada foi o MiG-27 Flogger. No entanto, os Su-25's foram extensivamente empregados sobretudo no apoio aéreo aproximado.
Os Badgers, Backfires e, em escala bem menor, Bears e Blackjack foram utilizados em missões de saturação de área, onde voando à grandes altitudes dispejavam dezenas de bombas burras.
Mas o mais interessante sobre a invasão do Afeganistão se refere, principalmente, ao combate terrestre onde um exército que se preparava há mais de 3 décadas para um combate de larga escala em vastas planícies teve que subitamente aprender a operar contra um inimigo muito mais furtivo em um cenário dominado por montanhas.
Abraços
Eu tava falando sobre isso no MSN.. enquanto estavam as Forças Especiais estava tudo as mil maravilhas .. dai mandaram as tropas regulares para lá... dai fodeu tudo.. tropa regular NÃO serve para guerra de guerrilha .. não tem jeito .. os EUA aprenderam isso .. no Vietnã .. e com os Russos no Afeganistão ... vai ver no Afeganistão.. a tropa mais regular que tem lá e que faz operações de combate são os Rangers ... e mesmo assim eles são mais "especiais" hehe que os Regulares ...
Em relação ao Su-25 .. ele foi usado pouco mesmo.. porém provou ser extremamente efetivo e preciso!
Earlier in this thread 16 OBr Spn mentioned a journalist named Thornton who was killed
by Soviet forces. A journalist named Thornton was killed in an ambush when he was accompanying a Mujahidden unit. But he wasn’t killed by being struck by a missile.
The journalist that was killed that way was a Photojournalist named Jim Lindelof. The incident in which Lindelof’s was killed occurred around 11 Oct.1987. He had made
different trips into Afghanistan to photograph the war. On that fateful trip, word had leaked out about the caravan he was accompanying and the Soviet’s dispatched a Heliborne force to intercept the caravan. Two Hind Mi-24 Gunships and two Mi-8’s
caught the caravan Lindelof was traveling with. As the Gunships initiated their firing runs on the Resistance caravan, the Soviet’s landed their Mi-8 helicopter and around 15
Soviet commandos pressed the attack. Two westerners (one being Lindelof) and a number of mujahidden were killed. A missile had struck Lindelof in the back.
The incident involving Thornton is as follows.
On the night of 19 September 1985 a small party of Mujahidden(Resistance) was traveling near the Kajaki Dam, about fifty miles northwest of Kandahar. The Mujahidden were accompanied by Charles Thornton, a medical correspondent from the Arizona Republic and Peter
Schlueter, a photographer for the same newspaper. They suddenly came under fire from
hovering helicopters and from troops hidden in the sides of the valley they were driving
through. The battle lasted all night and just before dawn the guerrillas retreated leaving
behind the body of Thornton, who had been shot in the chest and neck. He was buried in a shallow grave at the site of the ambush and despite attempts by the mujahidden to reach the area again, I don’t believe his body was ever recovered.
This attack was a classic Spetsnaz night ambush. The attackers were well placed, supported by helicopters and, as the battle continued, reinforcements of regular troops were flown in by helicopters.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
by Soviet forces. A journalist named Thornton was killed in an ambush when he was accompanying a Mujahidden unit. But he wasn’t killed by being struck by a missile.
The journalist that was killed that way was a Photojournalist named Jim Lindelof. The incident in which Lindelof’s was killed occurred around 11 Oct.1987. He had made
different trips into Afghanistan to photograph the war. On that fateful trip, word had leaked out about the caravan he was accompanying and the Soviet’s dispatched a Heliborne force to intercept the caravan. Two Hind Mi-24 Gunships and two Mi-8’s
caught the caravan Lindelof was traveling with. As the Gunships initiated their firing runs on the Resistance caravan, the Soviet’s landed their Mi-8 helicopter and around 15
Soviet commandos pressed the attack. Two westerners (one being Lindelof) and a number of mujahidden were killed. A missile had struck Lindelof in the back.
The incident involving Thornton is as follows.
On the night of 19 September 1985 a small party of Mujahidden(Resistance) was traveling near the Kajaki Dam, about fifty miles northwest of Kandahar. The Mujahidden were accompanied by Charles Thornton, a medical correspondent from the Arizona Republic and Peter
Schlueter, a photographer for the same newspaper. They suddenly came under fire from
hovering helicopters and from troops hidden in the sides of the valley they were driving
through. The battle lasted all night and just before dawn the guerrillas retreated leaving
behind the body of Thornton, who had been shot in the chest and neck. He was buried in a shallow grave at the site of the ambush and despite attempts by the mujahidden to reach the area again, I don’t believe his body was ever recovered.
This attack was a classic Spetsnaz night ambush. The attackers were well placed, supported by helicopters and, as the battle continued, reinforcements of regular troops were flown in by helicopters.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
To 16 OBr SpN:
*How long was a typical "tour" for Airborne and Spetsnaz units?
*Did many volunteer for additional "tours"?
*Were many/any of the units deployed assembled mostly/entirely of career soldiers as opposed to several year conscripts?
*Were Afghan Army units reliable? Did the Mujahideen have the Afghan Army heavily infiltrated? If so, how well did your forces handle that counterintelligence issue?
*How would you rate the logistical support provided to forces deployed in Afghanistan?
*How quickly/effectively did the logistics support adapt to needs for new/modified equipment to deal with the Afghan battlefield?
*How are veterans of the Soviet/Russian Afghan conflict perceived by the public since it ended?
*Do you think Afghanistan has had any lasting affects on the Russian psyche like it has had in the US with the Vietnam conflict?
1) The tour depended on the type of troops we are talking about. Conscripts were present until finishing their serving time. Officers stayed there for much longer.
2) Not so many volunteered. The war wasn't popular among the troops.
3) Yes, there were some units were mostly consisting of officers (459th OR SpN; 66th and 70th Infantry Batallion; 154 OO SpN).
4) Afghan soldiers were not quite reliable. Among them there were many informants of the Mujahedin. The counter-intelligence activities were performed by HAD (Afghan KGB); GRU (through agents and informants, as well as the tips we got from the captured fighters). The counter-intelligence activities on the governmental level were performed by the KGB.
5) Logistical support was satisfactory. The most important issue was securing the transport (especially on the main highways), because they were the easy targets for mujahedin. In any military conflict securing the logistic support requires lots of resources.
6) We were perceived as some kind of "throat cutters", especially right after the end of the war. Some veterans had psychiatric issues ("Afghan syndrome"), others were going into the criminal world. The government basically forgot us, and we were left with no material support. The mafia bosses got an access to the brief list of soldiers who served in SpN, and VDV, and later approached us with tempting offers. Some could resist, while others couldn't.
One of my comrades was killed in Ufa. He was heading the local veterans organization, which had some concessions for imports of goods. He was killed by the local gangsters, for refusing to share the profit. Almost all of our unit went there. Those who killed him, later wished they were never born, because we literally created a small "Afghanistan" for them.
7) Yes it surely did. Most of all it was because of our government's treatment. We felt as if we were betrayed, and basically lost our belief in the system.
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
*How long was a typical "tour" for Airborne and Spetsnaz units?
*Did many volunteer for additional "tours"?
*Were many/any of the units deployed assembled mostly/entirely of career soldiers as opposed to several year conscripts?
*Were Afghan Army units reliable? Did the Mujahideen have the Afghan Army heavily infiltrated? If so, how well did your forces handle that counterintelligence issue?
*How would you rate the logistical support provided to forces deployed in Afghanistan?
*How quickly/effectively did the logistics support adapt to needs for new/modified equipment to deal with the Afghan battlefield?
*How are veterans of the Soviet/Russian Afghan conflict perceived by the public since it ended?
*Do you think Afghanistan has had any lasting affects on the Russian psyche like it has had in the US with the Vietnam conflict?
1) The tour depended on the type of troops we are talking about. Conscripts were present until finishing their serving time. Officers stayed there for much longer.
2) Not so many volunteered. The war wasn't popular among the troops.
3) Yes, there were some units were mostly consisting of officers (459th OR SpN; 66th and 70th Infantry Batallion; 154 OO SpN).
4) Afghan soldiers were not quite reliable. Among them there were many informants of the Mujahedin. The counter-intelligence activities were performed by HAD (Afghan KGB); GRU (through agents and informants, as well as the tips we got from the captured fighters). The counter-intelligence activities on the governmental level were performed by the KGB.
5) Logistical support was satisfactory. The most important issue was securing the transport (especially on the main highways), because they were the easy targets for mujahedin. In any military conflict securing the logistic support requires lots of resources.
6) We were perceived as some kind of "throat cutters", especially right after the end of the war. Some veterans had psychiatric issues ("Afghan syndrome"), others were going into the criminal world. The government basically forgot us, and we were left with no material support. The mafia bosses got an access to the brief list of soldiers who served in SpN, and VDV, and later approached us with tempting offers. Some could resist, while others couldn't.
One of my comrades was killed in Ufa. He was heading the local veterans organization, which had some concessions for imports of goods. He was killed by the local gangsters, for refusing to share the profit. Almost all of our unit went there. Those who killed him, later wished they were never born, because we literally created a small "Afghanistan" for them.
7) Yes it surely did. Most of all it was because of our government's treatment. We felt as if we were betrayed, and basically lost our belief in the system.
Regards,
16 OBr SpN
When the Spetsnaz was first created they were known as Guards Mine Layers. In
Afghanistan they pioneered the use of an acoustic mine that was developed to deal
with the night convoys the mujahidden were using to move supplies around the country.
Instead of one mine going off when the detonator was hit by a truck or pack animal, a
whole string of acoustically detonated mines would be planted. Only when a convoy
is well into the minefield does the acoustic level get high enough, and then they all
explode simultaneously.
At times the Resistance underestimated the capabilities of the Spetsnaz and paid dearly for it. In Nangarhar Province in March of 1986 the Resistance was manning an observation post on a site that was virtually impregnable. Behind them was
a sheer cliff that dropped hundreds of feet to a river and in front of them was a steep slope that was totally commanded by the mujahidden. But shortly before dawn the outpost was wiped out by spetsnaz commandos who had scaled what they though was an unclimbable cliff to take the mujahidden by surprise.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
Afghanistan they pioneered the use of an acoustic mine that was developed to deal
with the night convoys the mujahidden were using to move supplies around the country.
Instead of one mine going off when the detonator was hit by a truck or pack animal, a
whole string of acoustically detonated mines would be planted. Only when a convoy
is well into the minefield does the acoustic level get high enough, and then they all
explode simultaneously.
At times the Resistance underestimated the capabilities of the Spetsnaz and paid dearly for it. In Nangarhar Province in March of 1986 the Resistance was manning an observation post on a site that was virtually impregnable. Behind them was
a sheer cliff that dropped hundreds of feet to a river and in front of them was a steep slope that was totally commanded by the mujahidden. But shortly before dawn the outpost was wiped out by spetsnaz commandos who had scaled what they though was an unclimbable cliff to take the mujahidden by surprise.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004