Marinha dos EUA

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Há coisas factuais nesses textos, mas a maior parte é uma mão cheia de nada.

[Suetham]

"Zumwalt" [DDG-1000 Zumwalt] deixou o Porto de Yokosuka! !

[knigh7]

Show este vídeo:

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https://news.usni.org/2022/10/11/navy-w ... -next-year
Navy Wants 100 Unmanned Ships Monitoring Middle East Waters by Next Year

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https://archive.ph/71ELI
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedi ... great-navy
Great Responsibility Demands a Great Navy

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https://www.heritage.org/military
https://www.heritage.org/military/an-as ... tary-power
https://www.heritage.org/military-stren ... er/us-navy


Aircraft Carriers (CVN). The Navy has 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers: 10 Nimitz-class and one Ford-class. The Navy has been making progress in overcoming nagging issues with several advanced systems, notably advanced weapons elevators, and the Ford’s first operational deployment is on track for the fall of 2022.
The second ship in the class, Kennedy (CVN 79), was christened on December 7, 2019, and remains on schedule for delivery in 2024, followed by Enterprise (CVN 80), which is in early construction.
The U.S. lead in this category of naval power may be waning as China completes construction of its first super carrier. As the U.S. Navy struggles to build, maintain, and crew a fleet of 11 aircraft carriers, China is rapidly catching up both in numbers and platform capability. Its newest carrier, the Type-003, like the Ford-class, will utilize electromagnetic catapults that will give its air wing greater range and sortie rates, thus greatly narrowing the capability gap.
The Type-003 is China’s second indigenously built carrier, marking a significant engineering milestone, and there has been renewed emphasis on having the ship delivered before the next Chinese Communist Party congress, which is scheduled for the fall of 2022.
China’s growing naval aviation and aircraft carrier capabilities place added stress on U.S. naval aviation and air defenses.


Large Surface Combatants. The Navy’s large surface combatants consist of the Ticonderoga-class cruiser, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, and the Arleigh Burke–class destroyer. If the President’s FY 2023 budget is executed, the Navy will decommission five aged cruisers. This will decrement the Navy’s sea-launched firepower by 316 vertical launch tubes when measured against FY 2023 delivery of new strike-capable ships and submarines. Attempts to extend the life of the aging Ticonderoga-class cruisers have yielded mixed results as deferred upgrades and past incomplete maintenance are now driving up operating costs.
In FY 2022, the Navy procured two Arleigh Burke–class DDG 51 destroyers, bringing the total on active duty in the fleet to 70. Fourteen more have been ordered. The Zumwalt class was envisioned as bringing advanced capabilities to the fleet, but the program has suffered technological problems and cost overruns, and the Navy has not indicated that it intends to acquire more than the three that have already been purchased and are being built out: the USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000), which was delivered on April 24, 2020; USS Michael Monsoor (DDG-1001), which was commissioned on January 26, 2019; and USS Lyndon B. Johnson (DDG-1002), which is completing checks before delivery to the Navy in 2024.
The Zumwalt was to achieve initial operational capability (IOC) by September 2021, which the Navy pushed back to December 2021.
As of May 2022, a revised timeline for achieving IOC had not been made public.
To reach 355 ships by 2034, the Navy plans several class-wide service life extensions, notably extension of the DDG-51-class service life from 35 to 40 years and modernization of older hulls. The FY 2020 budget included $4 billion for modernization of 19 destroyers from FY 2021 through FY 2024.
The previously noted planned decommissioning of five cruisers in FY 2023 makes this more critical.



Nuclear Attack Submarines (SSN). SSNs are multi-mission platforms whose stealth enables clandestine intelligence collection; surveillance; anti-submarine warfare (ASW); anti-surface warfare (ASuW); special operations forces insertion and extraction; land attack strikes; and offensive mine warfare. The newest class of SSN, the Block V Virginia with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) enhancement, is important to the Navy’s overall strike capacity, enabling the employment of an additional 28 Tomahawk cruise missiles over earlier SSN variants.
Construction of Block V submarines began in September 2019 with the Oklahoma (SSN 802) to be delivered May 2027 and three more boats to be delivered before the end of the decade.
The FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act included additional funds for advanced procurement that preserves a future option to buy as many as 10 Virginia-class submarines through FY 2023. As indicated previously, increasing Virginia-class production has raised concerns regarding strain on the industrial base, and the FY 2023 budget would put $1.6 billion toward expansion of the submarine industrial base “to support the Navy plan of serial production of 1 COLUMBIA plus 2 VIRGINIAs starting in FY25/26.”
Quality control of the supply chain is a key factor in submarine construction, and if it is not done well, the consequences can be catastrophic. That is why the premature replacement of critical submarine parts in 2021—parts that are intended to last the life of the boat—remains a concern.
Added vigilance will be required as the Navy finds new suppliers to meet future increased submarine production as well as the potential need to provide support to AUKUS.

Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN). The Columbia-class will relieve the aging Ohio-class SSBN fleet. Because of the implications of this change for the nation’s strategic nuclear deterrence, the Columbia-class SSBN remains the Navy’s top acquisition priority. To ensure the continuity of this leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, the first Columbia-class SSBN must be delivered on time for its first deterrent patrol in 2031.
To achieve this goal, the Navy signed a $9.47 billion contract in November 2020 with General Dynamics Electric Boat for the first in-class boat and advanced procurement for long-lead-time components of the second hull.
At a May 18, 2022, hearing, it was noted that the lead ship’s keel-laying ceremony was to be on June 6, 2022.
However, there are concerns in Congress that the Department of Defense (DOD) may not be fully utilizing special authorities granted the Navy to ensure that this critical program is adequately resourced. Specifically, in 2014, the Congress established the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, which has saved more than $1.4 billion using flexible funding but “has yet to utilize the core function of the NSBDF—namely, to provide increased flexibility to repurpose funds into it to buy down the fiscal impact of the program on our other shipbuilding priorities.”



Aviação naval:




Geral: https://defesabrasil.com/forum/viewtopi ... 7#p5620737

[Suetham]

https://www.heritage.org/military-stren ... conclusion

The Navy as “Weak.” The Navy’s overall score has dropped from “marginal” in the 2022 Index to “weak” in the 2023 Index. The technology gap between the Navy and its peer competitors is narrowing in favor of competitors, and the Navy’s ships are aging faster than they are being replaced. Its fleet is too small relative to workload, and supporting shipyards are overwhelmed by the amount of repair work that is needed to make more ships available. The Navy is projected to have a fleet of 280 ships by 2037, which is smaller than the current force of 298 and well below the 400 needed to meet operational demands. Funding to improve any of these serious deficiencies remains problematic.

Geral: https://defesabrasil.com/forum/viewtopi ... 7#p5620737

[Suetham]

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-nav ... eployment/
USS Gerald R Ford hones air operations during initial deployment

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[Suetham]

A partir do ano de 2021, todos os navios do USA, USGC, USN, Military Sealift Command e US Maritime Administration:
https://textdoc.co/qriV7Dy4lRNUE5KY
É uma lista enorme, então se você quiser apenas o resumo (deslocamento da frota e totais para cada ramo), aqui está:
EXÉRCITO: 77 navios (total de 71.473,2 toneladas métricas)
GUARDA COSTEIRA: 407 navios (total de 201.937,5 toneladas métricas)
MARINHA: 470 navios (total de 3.993.364,7 toneladas métricas)
COMANDO MILITAR SEALIFT: 125 navios (total de 4.246.562 toneladas métricas)
ADMINISTRAÇÃO MARÍTIMA DOS EUA: 69 navios (total de 2.460.125 toneladas métricas)
NA RESERVA: 8 navios (total de 244.851 toneladas métricas)
Em 2023, vou atualizar.

[LM]

AS NOVAS "LCAC 100" DA MARINHA AMERICANA
Oceano Atlântico, Norfolk, Virgínia, EUA

Um meio naval de desembarque sobre almofada de ar ("Landing Craft, Air Cushion", LCAC), vulgo "hovercraft", da nova classe LCAC 100 da Marinha dos Estados Unidos, afecta ao "Assault Craft Unit 4" (ACU 4) do USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), aproxima-se do mesmo para aceder à respectiva doca alagada, no Oceano Atlântico, ao largo da Virgínia, EUA, a 1 de Dezembro de 2022. Tratam-se do…

=> https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=186 ... 4818571541

[Suetham]

~60 em 100k significa 3,6 em 6k que é o tamanho de uma ala aérea da tripulação Nimitz incluída. O tempo médio de serviço do pessoal da ativa é de 6 anos. Isso significa que um marinheiro médio que serve em porta-aviões testemunha 21 suicídios ao longo de sua carreira. Horrendo!!! Imagina uma força de pessoal com esses problemas enfrentando uma guerra de alta intensidade contra uma superpotência, sinceramente não quero nem imaginar.

O conhecimento institucional dos EUA é sobrecarregar seus CSGs apenas por causa de algum ciclo OFRP tentando aumentar as taxas de prontidão e fazer um bando de marinheiros se suicidar porque estão infelizes e presos por meses a bordo de uma prisão. O conhecimento institucional dos EUA está apenas brincando na 5ª Frota e tendo SWOs (Surface Warfare Officers) se tornando chefes de divisão. SWOs não aprendendo a dirigir o navio, etc., apenas agindo como funcionários administrativos a bordo. A flotilha de combate no Center of International Maritime Security teve toda uma discussão sobre como o conhecimento SWO é corroído significativamente. Os EUA começaram a tentar resolver isso nas reformas de 2020-2021 (estrutura de comando, etc. reorganização). Os EUA não têm feito muito nos últimos 30 anos institucionalmente, ao contrário da China, que se prepara há décadas para uma luta com os EUA. Reclamam sobre como eles gastaram todo o seu tempo na 5ª Frota fazendo besteiras contra o terrorismo - até hoje o chefe do CENTCOM chora por um CSG, enquanto o INDOPACOM enfrenta uma China ascendente e uma Rússia ressurgente(frota do Pacífico).

É tudo sobre o treinamento que você faz, o equipamento que você usa e os sistemas que você monta. Atirar nas pessoas não gera conhecimento institucional. Uma guerra EUA-China seria uma guerra aeronaval e os EUA não tiveram experiência com esse tipo de coisa. O melhor que eles tiveram foi do Iêmen ou do norte da África, onde talvez houvesse algumas munições disparadas contra eles que tinham potencial para atingir. Ainda dá para se falar sobre os problemas na cultura NCO da USN. Os seniores NCOs forçam as pessoas a trabalhar mais de 6 dias por semana até que as pessoas se suicidem ou o navio esteja no porto para manutenção. Eles vão constantemente ameaçá-lo, negar-lhe o sono, puxá-lo para o navio quando você deveria estar de licença.

Honestamente, a cultura e os problemas da USN que estamos ouvindo soam semelhantes aos tipos de problemas que o IJN teve antes da Segunda Guerra Mundial.

[cabeça de martelo]

NASSCO Pitches ESB Drone Mothership Variant To US Navy
NASSCO has proposed major modification concepts to the U.S. Navy's Expeditionary Sea Bases, or ESB, which could see them serve as motherships for XLUUVs and UAVs, or transit F-35 airframes...

General Dynamics NASSCO has developed several major modifications for its line of Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESB) to cater to emerging U.S. Navy and Marine Corps requirements. Thanks to the ESB’s commercial origins from the Alaska-class oil tanker, the potential of the class has been described as “unlimited” by NASSCO. This “unlimited potential” has resulted in modification concepts that could turn ESBs into drone motherships or even aviation support ships.

While these potential modifications made their debut during Sea Air Space Symposium 2022, the same modifications were once again shown at this year’s Surface Navy Association National Symposium by the company.

Jim Strock, an independent consultant working with NASSCO on the ESB, explained the process NASSCO used to tailor these concepts and capabilities toward the future requirements of the force:

“We did two things. We looked at emerging operational concepts. We looked at Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, Distributed Maritime Operations, and Littoral Operations in a contested environment. We looked at future operating concepts. And then we wrote papers on how the ships could support accomplishment missions within those concepts.”

Various modifications made to support these operational concepts have been created by NASSO. Such modifications include a new aft flight deck to support unmanned aerial vehicle flight operations, the addition of repair facilities, and the capability to perform replenishment at sea with other vessels. Of these, the two most noteworthy and comprehensive modifications to the ESB are the plans to fit an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) bay and what seems to be the embarkation of Marine Aircraft, including F-35Bs, on the ESB.


UUV Mothership Concept Graphic. Note the launch and recovery system and the number of XLUUVs onboard the ESB. Photo courtesy of General Dynamics NASSCO.

Strock explained that through a specially made launch system located inside of the vessel, an ESB can support various UUVs including the Orca Extra-Large UUV.

We call it the Rotary UUV Launch And Recovery System, the RULARS. So we talked about how that can be engineered into the ship. This (referring to the document) shows just a moon pool. Then we went on to look at the counter-rotating system.”

NASSCO looked into a rotating system due to stability concerns at sea caused by a moon pool-type launch and recovery operation.

It is much better in mitigating the effects of sea state surge and water coming up. It stabilizes the vehicle and keeps it in the upright position as it rotates down into the water. So the moon pool would work, but you get a lot of wave action and surface action that could become problematic. It’s hard to see here (referring to document), but it goes in, rotates around, and goes out.”

One of the concepts involves the addition of an aft helipad that would support the operation of UAVs. Photo courtesy of General Dynamics NASSCO.

...

https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sn ... o-us-navy/

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US Navy Sets Out Capability Imperatives For DDG(X)

The US Navy (USN) has defined core capability imperatives that are driving development of its next-generation guided-missile destroyer (DDG), to be delivered under the DDG(X) programme.
Dr Lee Willett 19 Jan 2023

“The imperative for DDG(X) is the warfighting imperative,” Rear Admiral Fred Pyle, the USN’s Surface Warfare Director (OPNAV N96), told the Surface Navy Association (SNA) 2023 national symposium, in Arlington, Virginia, on 11 January.

“The ‘so what’ behind DDG(X) is that capability to deliver larger missile launchers so we can have a stick that meets that of the adversaries. That’s a key element,” said RADM Pyle.

“For DDG(X), I think we have a good picture on the top-level requirements. It’s going to bring us the opportunity to use larger missile launchers. It’s going to bring us the opportunity to use more higher-power lasers and long-range strike hypersonic weapons, as well as sensor growth, as we go into the future. That’s the ‘so what’ behind DDG(X) and the warfighting capability it brings.”

Rear Admiral Fred Pyle, the USN’s Director Surface Warfare/N96

“Shipbuilding is a long game,” RADM Pyle explained. “So, when we achieve the directed energy power we’re looking for, or high-power microwaves, or … lasers, we want to have a platform to land it on. That’s a key capability as well.” Here, he noted the need for the ship’s operational design requirement to accommodate larger sensors.

“The warfighting imperative for DDG(X) gives us the opportunity to get a larger missile launcher, increase our capacity of weapons, deliver long-range strike hypersonic weapons, and increase directed energy weapons that we have on board as well as growth sensors such as the [Raytheon] SPY-6 [active electronically scanned array 3-D radar], to pace the threat going into the next decade and beyond,” RADM Pyle told Naval News, in an exclusive interview on the SNA exposition show floor.



Provision to install a larger missile launcher to increase DDG(X) weapons capacity reflects the navy’s intent to grow conventional strike capability across its surface fleet, including through installation of large missile vertical launch systems (LMVLS) that can carry a broader range of weapons, and through increasing inventory and stock of key weapons systems including the Naval Strike Missile, Tomahawk land-attack missile, and Standard Missile (SM)-6.

RADM Pyle noted a second imperative – what he referred to as ‘SWPC’, namely space, weight, power, cooling. While underscoring the significant capability the in-service Arleigh Burke-class destroyer has delivered for nearly 40 years, the admiral said there is now an issue with space, weight, power, and cooling in US DDG design and capability. “The margin for those in that capability is no longer there,” he told Naval News. “We need DDG(X) to have a margin for that space, weight, power, and cooling.”



As regards the timeframe for delivering DDG(X), “We’re going to start moving out on that effort at the end of the decade/beginning of the next decade,” RADM Pyle told the SNA symposium.

The USN’s Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Michael Gilday reiterated the importance of DDG(X) for the navy. “We need that platform,” CNO told the SNA audience, in his keynote address on 10 January. Adm Gilday noted that transition to DDG(X) will begin in the early 2030s. He highlighted, however, various programmatic and funding commitments the USN will need to balance across the timeframe. “That transition [to DDG(X)] needs to be deconflicted a bit with the investments we’re making in NGEN [a major information technology, data, and communications infrastructure programme] and the investments we will make later in the decade in SSN(X), the next generation submarine. In the middle falls DDG(X).”

https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sn ... -for-ddgx/

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