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Topol M

Enviado: Qui Fev 23, 2006 6:47 pm
por Carlos Mathias
Russia's SS-27 Makes Bush's
Missile Defense A Fantasy

By Charles Assisi
The Times of India
1-15-6

On November 2, a rather staid little story appeared on a ticker powered by Itar-Tass, a Russian News Agency. The tone was decidedly Russian-matter-of-fact and shorn of all hyperbole. It reported the test launch of a ballistic missile called the Topol RS 12 at 8:10 pm Moscow time. After taking off from the Kapustny Yar test range in the Astrakhan region, it hit the intended target at Balkhash in Kazakhstan at 8:34-24 minutes later.

"The target was precisely hit," said the report, quoting a top-ranking official from the Russian armed forces.

In conclusion, Itar-Tass added some jargon that sounded like regulation copy to most people tracking defence:

"The advanced Topol missile has three cruise engines and can develop hypersonic speed. The high thrust-to-weight ratio allows the warhead to manoeuvre on the trajectory and pass through a dense air defence system."

At that time, not many defence analysts thought much of the report. After all, Kapustny Yar, located on the banks of the Volga river, 75 miles east of Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad), had gone to the dogs and was infrequently used. Whenever the base was lucky to see some action, all it witnessed was small payloads.

But what the mainstream media missed was analysed in great detail on internet discussion boards. For starters, something about the time mentioned in the report sounded astounding.

For anything to travel from Kapustny to Balkash in 24 minutes, it had to fly at a speed of three miles a second. That's 180 miles a minute or 10,800 miles an hour.

If the reports were indeed true, the Topol RS 12 or the Topol SS 27, as it is known in military circles around the world, had to be the fastest thing man has ever seen. And if you will for a moment excuse the breathlessness, it also represented the pinnacle of modern missile technology. Until this test, the fastest thing known to man was the X43 A. A hypersonic, unmanned plane built by NASA. It flew at 10 times the speed of sound-almost 7,200 miles per hour.
_____

But the Topol isn't attracting attention for its speed alone. It has got more to do with the sheer viciousness it demonstrates. A conventional intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), once deployed, takes off on the back of a booster. After attaining a certain altitude, it follows a set flight path or trajectory. When it reaches the intended target, it lets loose a set of warheads that home in on the target with devastating accuracy. Given these dynamics, military establishments build defence systems that can intercept an ICBM before it strikes. Often, the defence works.

With the Topol, these dynamics simply don't come into play. To start with, the damn thing can be manoeuvred mid-flight. This makes it practically impossible for any radar system in the world to figure out what trajectory it will follow.

The other thing is the kind of evasion technology built into the missile. That makes it invulnerable to any kind of radiation and electromagnetic and physical interference.

Then there is the question of ground-based nuclear warheads traditionally deployed to stop ICBMs in their path. Until now, any ICBM can be taken down by detonating a nuclear warhead from as far as 10 kilometres. The Topol doesn't blink an eyelid until the time a nuclear warhead gets as close as 500 meters. But given the Topol's remarkable speed and manoeuvrability, getting a warhead that close is practically impossible.

That leaves defence establishments with only two options. Target the missile at its most vulnerable points - either when it is on the ground or when it is just being deployed (also known as the boost phase).

Apparently, the Russians have gotten around that problem, too. Unlike virtually every ICBM that exists on some military base or the other, the Topol doesn't have to be on a static base. All it needs is the back of a truck. And trucks can be driven anywhere, anytime. That makes it practically impossible for any country to monitor how many of these missiles have been deployed and where.

Writes Scott Ritter, a former intelligence officer and weapons inspector in the Soviet Union and Iraq in the Christian Science Monitor:

"The Bush administration's dream of a viable NMD has been rendered fantasy by the Russian test of the SS-27 Topol-M.. To counter the SS-27 threat, the US will need to start from scratch."

But when you're done marvelling at the technology, sit back for a moment and consider this. You thought the cold war was over. You thought wrong. Cold War II has just begun. And the world just became a more dangerous place.
____

To recap the SS-27 'highlights'...

The Topol SS 27 can be manoeuvred mid-flight. this makes it impossible for radar systems to figure out its flight path.

It is invulnerable to radiation and electromagnetic and physical interference.

It can be mounted on the back of a truck, which makes it difficult to monitor how many of these missiles have been deployed and where.


Comment
Neal

Let's just ignore the great figures this missile is capable off, let's look at the timing of the press release.

We have the West gathering behind The Great Satan to bomb Iran for doing what it has every right under international law to do. Then we have Russia showing off the fastest missile ever made 180 miles a minute or 10,800 miles an hour. This is no accident or misprint. What we have here is a very clear message written in the universal language of "Threat".


Assim como foi uma solução relativamente barata que anulou as caríssimas defesas anti-mísseis americanas, quem sabe um sistema anti-stealth russo aparece daqui a pouco?

http://warfare.ru/?linkid=1707&catid=265&video=true

Enviado: Qui Fev 23, 2006 6:53 pm
por Einsamkeit
Deus te ouça, TOPOL-M rulez

Enviado: Qui Fev 23, 2006 6:58 pm
por Carlos Mathias
Deve ter sido um chute no saco!!!

Enviado: Qui Fev 23, 2006 7:01 pm
por Einsamkeit
Agora pior vai ser a hora que o Bulava entrar em serviço nos Yuri Dolgoruky, é a versao naval do Topol-M

Vai ser o Melhor SSBN e o Melhos SLBM do mundo

Enviado: Qui Fev 23, 2006 7:48 pm
por Carlos Mathias
Chute no saco e dedada no olho!!! [033]

Enviado: Qui Fev 23, 2006 8:27 pm
por Bolovo
Einsamkeit escreveu:Agora pior vai ser a hora que o Bulava entrar em serviço

uia... minha mulher

Enviado: Qui Fev 23, 2006 8:29 pm
por Einsamkeit
Bolovo escreveu:
Einsamkeit escreveu:Agora pior vai ser a hora que o Bulava entrar em serviço

uia... minha mulher


que que como?

Enviado: Qui Fev 23, 2006 8:31 pm
por Bolovo
Einsamkeit escreveu:
Bolovo escreveu:
Einsamkeit escreveu:Agora pior vai ser a hora que o Bulava entrar em serviço

uia... minha mulher


que que como?

Bolovo e Bulava, uma familia feliz! \o/

Enviado: Qui Fev 23, 2006 8:32 pm
por Einsamkeit
hahaha sim!

Um dia conheces minha senhora

uma tal de Maria Joao Einsamkeit

:D :D

Enviado: Sex Fev 24, 2006 5:48 pm
por Einsamkeit
Associated Press (с) Monday, Dec. 22, 2003
Moscow — Russia has deployed a fresh batch of its top-of-the-line strategic nuclear missiles after a break caused by a funding shortage, and military officials presented ambitious plans Monday for building weapons even more potent.

Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov inaugurated the new set of Topol-M missiles at the Tatishchevo missile base in the central Saratov region Sunday, describing them as a "21st-century weapon" unrivaled in the world.

"This is the most advanced state-of-the-art missile in the world," Mr. Ivanov said in remarks broadcast by Russian television stations Monday. "Only such weapons can ensure and guarantee our sovereignty and security and make any attempts to put military pressure on Russia absolutely senseless."

Mr. Ivanov on Monday reported the deployment to President Vladimir Putin, saying the military will continue modernizing all components of the nation's nuclear forces.

The Interfax-Military News Agency said six Topol-Ms were deployed Sunday.

The first 10 such missiles entered duty in December 1998 and two more sets followed in the next two years. The military had planned to continue the deployment in regular annual installments, but got the fourth batch of Topol-Ms out only Sunday.

The Topol-M missiles, capable of hitting targets more than 10,000 kilometres away, have so far been deployed in silos. Its mobile version, mounted on a heavy off-road vehicle, is set to become operational next year, the Strategic Missile Forces chief, Col.-Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov, said in televised remarks.

The daily Izvestia said that the Topol-M lifts off faster than its predecessors and manoeuvres in a way that makes it more difficult to spot and intercept. It is also capable of blasting off even after a nuclear explosion close to its silo, the newspaper reported.

The deployed Topol-Ms have been fitted with single nuclear warheads, but there are plans to equip each missile with three individually targeted warheads, Izvestia said. The missile's mobile version will carry from four to six warheads, the Interfax-Military News Agency quoted an unidentified General Staff officer as saying.

Russia's strategic aviation chief, Lt.-Gen. Igor Khvorov, said Monday that the air force was drawing up requirements for a new strategic bomber that could become operational in 2014-2016, the Interfax-Military News Agency said.

Enviado: Sex Fev 24, 2006 6:02 pm
por Carlos Mathias
"Only such weapons can ensure and guarantee our sovereignty and security and make any attempts to put military pressure on Russia absolutely senseless."


É assim que se pensa em defesa, e não nos vizinhos farrapentos com os possíveis inimigos.

Enviado: Dom Mar 05, 2006 8:35 pm
por Penguin
Artigo publicado no Foreign Affairs sobre os EUA, a questao nuclear e o MAD (mutual assured destruction). Texto interessante, com muita informacao, porem um pouco longo.

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301f ... imacy.html

The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006


Summary: For four decades, relations among the major nuclear powers have been shaped by their common vulnerability, a condition known as mutual assured destruction. But with the U.S. arsenal growing rapidly while Russia's decays and China's stays small, the era of MAD is ending -- and the era of U.S. nuclear primacy has begun.

Keir A. Lieber, the author of War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics Over Technology, is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Daryl G. Press, the author of Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania.

Traducao do sumario:
Por quatro décadas, as relações entre as principais potencias nucleares tem sido moldadas por sua sua vulnerabilidade comum, condicao conhecida como destruição mútua assegurada (mutual assured destruction – MAD). Porem com o arsenal nuclear dos EUA crescendo rapidamente enquanto o da Rússia deteriora e o da China continua limitado, a era do MAD esta acabando – e a era da supremacia nuclear dos EUA se inicia.


Trechos:

(...) Since the Cold War's end, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has significantly improved. The United States has replaced the ballistic missiles on its submarines with the substantially more accurate Trident II D-5 missiles, many of which carry new, larger-yield warheads. The U.S. Navy has shifted a greater proportion of its SSBNs to the Pacific so that they can patrol near the Chinese coast or in the blind spot of Russia's early warning radar network. The U.S. Air Force has finished equipping its B-52 bombers with nuclear-armed cruise missiles, which are probably invisible to Russian and Chinese air-defense radar. And the air force has also enhanced the avionics on its B-2 stealth bombers to permit them to fly at extremely low altitudes in order to avoid even the most sophisticated radar. Finally, although the air force finished dismantling its highly lethal MX missiles in 2005 to comply with arms control agreements, it is significantly improving its remaining ICBMs by installing the MX's high-yield warheads and advanced reentry vehicles on Minuteman ICBMs, and it has upgraded the Minuteman's guidance systems to match the MX's accuracy.

IMBALANCE OF TERROR

Even as the United States' nuclear forces have grown stronger since the end of the Cold War, Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal has sharply deteriorated. Russia has 39 percent fewer long-range bombers, 58 percent fewer ICBMs, and 80 percent fewer SSBNs than the Soviet Union fielded during its last days. The true extent of the Russian arsenal's decay, however, is much greater than these cuts suggest. What nuclear forces Russia retains are hardly ready for use. Russia's strategic bombers, now located at only two bases and thus vulnerable to a surprise attack, rarely conduct training exercises, and their warheads are stored off-base. Over 80 percent of Russia's silo-based ICBMs have exceeded their original service lives, and plans to replace them with new missiles have been stymied by failed tests and low rates of production. Russia's mobile ICBMs rarely patrol, and although they could fire their missiles from inside their bases if given sufficient warning of an attack, it appears unlikely that they would have the time to do so.

The third leg of Russia's nuclear triad has weakened the most. Since 2000, Russia's SSBNs have conducted approximately two patrols per year, down from 60 in 1990. (By contrast, the U.S. SSBN patrol rate today is about 40 per year.) Most of the time, all nine of Russia's ballistic missile submarines are sitting in port, where they make easy targets. Moreover, submarines require well-trained crews to be effective. Operating a ballistic missile submarine -- and silently coordinating its operations with surface ships and attack submarines to evade an enemy's forces -- is not simple. Without frequent patrols, the skills of Russian submariners, like the submarines themselves, are decaying. Revealingly, a 2004 test (attended by President Vladimir Putin) of several submarine-launched ballistic missiles was a total fiasco: all either failed to launch or veered off course. The fact that there were similar failures in the summer and fall of 2005 completes this unflattering picture of Russia's nuclear forces.

Compounding these problems, Russia's early warning system is a mess. Neither Soviet nor Russian satellites have ever been capable of reliably detecting missiles launched from U.S. submarines. (In a recent public statement, a top Russian general described his country's early warning satellite constellation as "hopelessly outdated.") Russian commanders instead rely on ground-based radar systems to detect incoming warheads from submarine-launched missiles. But the radar network has a gaping hole in its coverage that lies to the east of the country, toward the Pacific Ocean. If U.S. submarines were to fire missiles from areas in the Pacific, Russian leaders probably would not know of the attack until the warheads detonated. Russia's radar coverage of some areas in the North Atlantic is also spotty, providing only a few minutes of warning before the impact of submarine-launched warheads.

Moscow could try to reduce its vulnerability by finding the money to keep its submarines and mobile missiles dispersed. But that would be only a short-term fix. Russia has already extended the service life of its aging mobile ICBMs, something that it cannot do indefinitely, and its efforts to deploy new strategic weapons continue to flounder. The Russian navy's plan to launch a new class of ballistic missile submarines has fallen far behind schedule. It is now highly likely that not a single new submarine will be operational before 2008, and it is likely that none will be deployed until later.

Even as Russia's nuclear forces deteriorate, the United States is improving its ability to track submarines and mobile missiles, further eroding Russian military leaders' confidence in Russia's nuclear deterrent. (As early as 1998, these leaders publicly expressed doubts about the ability of Russia's ballistic missile submarines to evade U.S. detection.) Moreover, Moscow has announced plans to reduce its land-based ICBM force by another 35 percent by 2010; outside experts predict that the actual cuts will slice 50 to 75 percent off the current force, possibly leaving Russia with as few as 150 ICBMs by the end of the decade, down from its 1990 level of almost 1,300 missiles. The more Russia's nuclear arsenal shrinks, the easier it will become for the United States to carry out a first strike. (...)

Enviado: Dom Mar 05, 2006 8:55 pm
por Penguin
Situacao chinesa (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301f ... imacy.html):

(...) China's nuclear arsenal is even more vulnerable to a U.S. attack. A U.S. first strike could succeed whether it was launched as a surprise or in the midst of a crisis during a Chinese alert. China has a limited strategic nuclear arsenal. The People's Liberation Army currently possesses no modern SSBNs or long-range bombers. Its naval arm used to have two ballistic missile submarines, but one sank, and the other, which had such poor capabilities that it never left Chinese waters, is no longer operational. China's medium-range bomber force is similarly unimpressive: the bombers are obsolete and vulnerable to attack. According to unclassified U.S. government assessments, China's entire intercontinental nuclear arsenal consists of 18 stationary single-warhead ICBMs. These are not ready to launch on warning: their warheads are kept in storage and the missiles themselves are unfueled. (China's ICBMs use liquid fuel, which corrodes the missiles after 24 hours. Fueling them is estimated to take two hours.) The lack of an advanced early warning system adds to the vulnerability of the ICBMs. It appears that China would have no warning at all of a U.S. submarine-launched missile attack or a strike using hundreds of stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles.

Many sources claim that China is attempting to reduce the vulnerability of its ICBMs by building decoy silos. But decoys cannot provide a firm basis for deterrence. It would take close to a thousand fake silos to make a U.S. first strike on China as difficult as an attack on Russia, and no available information on China's nuclear forces suggests the existence of massive fields of decoys. And even if China built them, its commanders would always wonder whether U.S. sensors could distinguish real silos from fake ones.

Despite much talk about China's military modernization, the odds that Beijing will acquire a survivable nuclear deterrent in the next decade are slim. China's modernization efforts have focused on conventional forces, and the country's progress on nuclear modernization has accordingly been slow. Since the mid-1980s, China has been trying to develop a new missile for its future ballistic missile submarine as well as mobile ICBMs (the DF-31 and longer-range DF-31A) to replace its current ICBM force. The U.S. Defense Department predicts that China may deploy DF-31s in a few years, although the forecast should be treated skeptically: U.S. intelligence has been announcing the missile's imminent deployment for decades.

Even when they are eventually fielded, the DF-31s are unlikely to significantly reduce China's vulnerability. The missiles' limited range, estimated to be only 8,000 kilometers (4,970 miles), greatly restricts the area in which they can be hidden, reducing the difficulty of searching for them. The DF-31s could hit the contiguous United States only if they were deployed in China's far northeastern corner, principally in Heilongjiang Province, near the Russian-North Korean border. But Heilongjiang is mountainous, and so the missiles might be deployable only along a few hundred kilometers of good road or in a small plain in the center of the province. Such restrictions increase the missiles' vulnerability and raise questions about whether they are even intended to target the U.S. homeland or whether they will be aimed at targets in Russia and Asia. (...)

Enviado: Dom Mar 05, 2006 10:13 pm
por Jet Crash®
jacquessantiago escreveu:Artigo publicado no Foreign Affairs sobre os EUA, a questao nuclear e o MAD (mutual assured destruction). Texto interessante, com muita informacao, porem um pouco longo.



Eu lí um pouco do texto seguindo o link e constato que o senhor que escreveu o texto acha que os russos são tolos.

Ele imagina bem as coisas, até fantasia um pouco.

Enviado: Dom Mar 05, 2006 10:49 pm
por Penguin
O grande problema da Russia sao os limitados recursos disponiveis comparado com a epoca da exitinta URSS e com os EUA.