Ministro da Defesa da China alerta que há limites para a autocontenção sobre a situação do Mar do Sul da China
Entregue em 02/06 (domingo) 15h19
[AFP = Current Affairs] No dia 2, o ministro da Defesa chinês, Dong Jun, fez um discurso na Conferência de Segurança Asiática (comumente conhecida como Shangri-La), realizada em Singapura, abordando a situação no Mar do Sul da China e na região Ásia-Pacífico
Ele alertou que existem “limites” para a autocontenção da China em relação à sua decisão de implantar mísseis balísticos.
Tendo em mente as Filipinas e os Estados Unidos, Dong disse: “A China exerceu contenção suficiente face às violações de direitos e às provocações, mas há um limite”.
Tanto os Estados Unidos como as Filipinas, que são aliados, estão a reforçar a cooperação no domínio da defesa em resposta ao crescente poder e influência militar da China.
Uma vez que as Filipinas estão localizadas no Mar da China Meridional e próximas de Taiwan, os Estados Unidos colocam ênfase no apoio às Filipinas no fortalecimento de alianças e parcerias na região Ásia-Pacífico. Isso está causando uma reação negativa da China.
Em abril, o Exército dos EUA anunciou que havia implantado um sistema de mísseis de alcance intermediário capaz de disparar mísseis interceptadores SM6 e mísseis de cruzeiro Tomahawk para o norte das Filipinas para exercícios conjuntos anuais.
Dong disse que a implantação de "mísseis balísticos de alcance intermediário" iria "minar gravemente a segurança e a estabilidade regionais" e criticou a medida, dizendo: "Se tomarmos tais ações, acabaremos por infligir as nossas próprias queimaduras".
Além disso, em resposta a uma série de colisões entre navios da China e das Filipinas em partes do Mar da China Meridional, onde os direitos territoriais são disputados, ele alertou que existem “limites” para a autocontenção da China no mar.
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Re: Mar da China!
US, Philippines expand exercise to territorial edges amid tension with China
By Jen Judson
BASCO, Philippines — A Philippine fishing vessel was traversing Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea when two Chinese Coast Guard ships fired water cannons at both sides of the boat.
The incident, which took place April 30 during the Balikatan exercise with American and Philippine armed forces, is just one example of what has become a commonplace occurrence — Chinese aggression in areas the Philippines considers its territory. Although, notably, the two Asian nations are among several others asserting sovereignty over local geographic features.
Still, China’s military activities in the area are bringing the U.S. ever closer to the Philippines, America’s oldest ally in the Pacific region since 1951.
The U.S. is continuing to find ways to fortify defenses across the Pacific to deter China and counter its influence. The Philippines, a nation made up of more than 7,000 islands and islets, is situated in a prime location.
A Chinese Coast Guard ship fires a water cannon at the Philippine vessel Unaizah near the Second Thomas Shoal in March 2024. (Ezra Acayan/Getty Images)
The U.S. and the Philippines have held Balikatan, a Tagalog word for “shoulder to shoulder,” almost annually for nearly 40 years. Yet the scope and size of the exercise has been relatively limited until the last few years. The exercise’s expansion is a direct reflection of the Philippines’ acknowledgment its territorial defenses are lacking.
“Exercises are like a second language that, as you are performing the exercise, you are also sending a message to both your adversaries, your likeminded partners and other stakeholders,” Col. Michael Logico, director of the joint and combined training center of the Philippines Armed Forces and the executive agent of Balikatan, told Defense News.
The exercise used to be confined to central military locations within the main island of Luzon, but now events are spread across the country from the most northern islands all the way to the southwestern island of Palawan.
The expansion of the exercise to places like Ilocos Norte, along the northwestern coast of Luzon island, “sends a message of confidence in our ability to protect as north as possible. It’s also a message of deterrence. So if any of our adversaries have any designs that involve the areas up north, we are saying that we are challenging your maritime and air presence in this area by our presence alone, or by our bilateral presence alone,” Logico said.
The exercise series, which typically focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as counterterrorism mission sets, is now centered around complex operations across domains.
While Balikatan was previously a bilateral event, the exercise now includes over a dozen more countries as observers or direct participants, and that number is expected to grow.
‘Comfortable with the discomfort’
Over the two weeks of Balikatan beginning in April and ending in May, 233 Chinese vessels were spotted in the West Philippine Sea — a term the Philippine government sometimes users in reference to its exclusive economic zone — according to a front-page story in the May 8 edition of The Manila Times.
The Philippines is “getting their teeth kicked in once a month by the Chinese in the Spratly [Islands],” Gregory Poling, an Asian maritime expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank, told Defense News.
Tension may be greatest in the Second Thomas Shoal, where there is a Philippine marine contingent aboard a World War II-era tank landing ship, the Sierra Madre. The ship has been on the reef since 1999, Poling said.
The Sierra Madre keeps Chinese forces off the strategic spot, but “in the next storm, it could be gone,” according to Mark Montgomery, an Asia-focused analyst with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank.
“If that thing blows off, the Chinese will take over the Second Thomas Shoal. [It will] never have a Philippine footprint again,” he told Defense News.
The dilapidated Sierra Madre ship of the Philippine Navy is seen anchored near Ayungin Shoal with Filipino soldiers aboard to secure the perimeter of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea in 2015. (Ritchie B. Tongo/AP)
China has been “getting wildly reckless” there in recent months, according to Poling, who said the country regularly sends at least 50 boats around the shoal every time the Philippines resupplies the Sierra Madre, harassing the crew with high-pressure water cannons, acoustic devices and military-grade lasers.
The previous president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, distanced his government from the U.S. and temporarily canceled a visiting forces agreement between the two nations. According to the Pentagon, the agreement’s activities “range from expert exchanges to ship visits to component exercises and major joint/combined training exercises.”
Duterte had also paused the Balikatan exercise in 2020 in an attempt to improve relations with China. However, the situation in the South China Sea did not improve.
The new president, Bongbong Marcos, has worked to rapidly strengthen relationships with the U.S. and some other countries in the Pacific since his election in 2022.
“The Philippine military is now focused on territorial defense operations, and that shift from counterinsurgency is in support of our allies and in support of our treaty allies. That defense matters,” Gen. Charles Flynn, the head of U.S. Army Pacific, said in May. “We help defend terrain, we help defend people, and ... we help them protect and defend their territorial integrity and national sovereignty.”
During Balikatan in 2023, the Philippine Army wanted to conduct a littoral live-fire drill in the Ilocos Norte province, but instead was instructed to move the event south to Zambales, where there is already a military installation, due to political reasons, Logico said.
“At the start of the planning conference [for 2024], I made it my personal goal to bring the exercise back to Ilocos Norte,” Logico said. Not only does it send a message that the Philippines can project military power, but “it is a way for us to be comfortable with the discomfort of the area.”
Previous instances of the exercise took place within military camps or naval training facilities, such as Fort Magsaysay located in central Luzon, Logico noted. “Some of them are a little bit restrictive,” he said. “It’s a controlled environment.”
Logico also had two more goals previously prohibited by the Duterte administration: to conduct live-fire drills and other exercises at sea beyond 12 nautical miles of the Philippines; and to train in the West Philippine Sea. (An exclusive economic zone typically extends 200 nautical miles beyond a country’s territorial sea.)
The Philippine military, along with its American and Australian partners, held a large, live-fire exercise that sank a ship off the coast of Ilocos Norte on May 8. And this year, Balikatan extended 300 nautical miles into the West Philippine Sea, Logico said.
American-style deterrence
While the Philippines is focused on its own defense, America is trying to strengthen its Pacific partnerships. It sees the archipelago nation as key to building a network of land forces that can deter those who would threaten regional stability, according to Flynn, the chief of U.S. Army Pacific.
Not only is the Philippines the United States’ oldest ally in the region, but it’s also positioned closely to Taiwan, an island China considers a rogue province and has threatened to take back by force.
Part of the U.S. Army’s strategy in the Pacific, Flynn said, is to build a strategic land power network. That network “must get in position to defend our sovereignty, to protect our people and to uphold their rights under international law,” he said in May at the Association of the U.S. Army’s LANPAC conference in Honolulu, Hawaii.
The Army does not have the same type of setup in the Pacific region as it does in Europe when it comes to pre-positioned stock, and there is no NATO member from Asia. As a result, the U.S. aims to establish relationships with individual island nations in the Pacific so it can assume a stronger regional posture.
Balikatan and the Salaknib exercise, which took place in April and May, are part of that. This year saw U.S. military presence push deeper into the Philippines’ northern islands.
For example, the U.S. Army’s 1st Multi-Domain Task Force set up a company command post in Basco, a small island in the northern island chain, to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. On a clear day, Taiwan is visible from points on the remote island.
Also on Basco, Army divers helped dredge a harbor area and construct a new pier capable of accommodating larger ships.
On Itbayat, Basco’s neighbor to the north, the service’s 8th Theater Sustainment Command was building a warehouse to support humanitarian assistance.
The Army also practiced the rapid deployment of its High Mobility Artillery Rocket System throughout the Philippines, from Palawan to La-Lo Airport on northern Luzon to Port Irene further north.
Meanwhile, the multidomain task force for the first time deployed its nascent Mid-Range Capability missile launcher. The weapon traveled to Laoag on the northwest coast of Luzon from Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state.
Three of the four sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement were used in varying forms during Balikatan. The agreement allows the U.S. to fund infrastructure improvement and construction efforts at existing Philippine military bases, among other locations, and to rotationally deploy troops. The deal was signed in 2014 and originally established six sites. In 2023, four more sites were added.
One of the largest undertakings is the U.S. Army’s deployment of an exportable version of its Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center. The Army brought the capability to Fort Magsaysay, one of the agreement’s sites, to conduct a training rotation with the Philippine military as the Pacific nation looks to establish its own high-level training capability akin to the center.
Shoulder to shoulder
In preparation for Balikatan, Maj. Gen. Leodevic Guinid, the Philippine Army’s vice commander, said he told participating forces to focus on being able to fight side by side and to consider whether “you think that we are ready, that we are interoperable.”
Indeed, this effort to ensure the nations’ forces can work together seamlessly is fresh, Guinid said, and there is room for improvement on, for example, tactics, data sharing and the distribution of certain capabilities.
But there’s been progress. For instance, during a live-fire drill as part of Salaknib, a U.S. fires team flew an unmanned aerial system that was taking full-motion video of targets on the range, while Filipino soldiers remained in a concealed position, according to Brig. Gen. David Zinn, the deputy commander of the U.S. Army’s 25th Infantry Division.
“That video was viewed from the U.S. battalion command post, and the Philippine company commander was at the U.S. command post looking at the video to see that intelligence,” Zinn told Defense News. The Filipino commander then used a U.S. radio to communicate to his fires team using Philippine radios to move forward and destroy targets.
Watching the demonstration looks simple, Zinn said, because it’s a radio call. “But having been part of working to gain technical interoperability with partners in the past, it was pretty significant what they did, and we only achieve that by working together and spending time doing it,” he noted.
Beginning during last year’s Balikatan drills in the northern part of Luzon, the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force helped develop a Combined Information and Effects Fusion Cell that would allow the U.S. and the Philippines to see the same information and coordinate actions, which previous iterations of the exercise lacked.
“One thing that we realized quickly was oftentimes we try to increase classification when we build these command-and-control nodes based off of sharing agreements,” Brig. Gen. Bernard Harrington, who commands the task force, told Defense News in an interview at LANPAC.
“We found that the best thing to do was to drive this down to an unclassified level,” Harrington said. “We have human interoperability by being in the same room together. We had technical interoperability to rebuild this network with the system, and then we have procedural interoperability.”
Harrington said they continued to improve the capability during this year’s Balikatan events and now want to provide it to other regional allies and partners.
Logico said still more can be done to benefit interoperability at future exercises, adding that they ought to focus on information warfare, the cyber domain, and low-tech solutions to high-tech problems.
“If we are slow to the learning curve, we would find ourselves being outmaneuvered, so this is something that we have to pay attention to now,” he said.
https://www.defensenews.com/training-si ... ith-china/
By Jen Judson
BASCO, Philippines — A Philippine fishing vessel was traversing Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea when two Chinese Coast Guard ships fired water cannons at both sides of the boat.
The incident, which took place April 30 during the Balikatan exercise with American and Philippine armed forces, is just one example of what has become a commonplace occurrence — Chinese aggression in areas the Philippines considers its territory. Although, notably, the two Asian nations are among several others asserting sovereignty over local geographic features.
Still, China’s military activities in the area are bringing the U.S. ever closer to the Philippines, America’s oldest ally in the Pacific region since 1951.
The U.S. is continuing to find ways to fortify defenses across the Pacific to deter China and counter its influence. The Philippines, a nation made up of more than 7,000 islands and islets, is situated in a prime location.
A Chinese Coast Guard ship fires a water cannon at the Philippine vessel Unaizah near the Second Thomas Shoal in March 2024. (Ezra Acayan/Getty Images)
The U.S. and the Philippines have held Balikatan, a Tagalog word for “shoulder to shoulder,” almost annually for nearly 40 years. Yet the scope and size of the exercise has been relatively limited until the last few years. The exercise’s expansion is a direct reflection of the Philippines’ acknowledgment its territorial defenses are lacking.
“Exercises are like a second language that, as you are performing the exercise, you are also sending a message to both your adversaries, your likeminded partners and other stakeholders,” Col. Michael Logico, director of the joint and combined training center of the Philippines Armed Forces and the executive agent of Balikatan, told Defense News.
The exercise used to be confined to central military locations within the main island of Luzon, but now events are spread across the country from the most northern islands all the way to the southwestern island of Palawan.
The expansion of the exercise to places like Ilocos Norte, along the northwestern coast of Luzon island, “sends a message of confidence in our ability to protect as north as possible. It’s also a message of deterrence. So if any of our adversaries have any designs that involve the areas up north, we are saying that we are challenging your maritime and air presence in this area by our presence alone, or by our bilateral presence alone,” Logico said.
The exercise series, which typically focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as counterterrorism mission sets, is now centered around complex operations across domains.
While Balikatan was previously a bilateral event, the exercise now includes over a dozen more countries as observers or direct participants, and that number is expected to grow.
‘Comfortable with the discomfort’
Over the two weeks of Balikatan beginning in April and ending in May, 233 Chinese vessels were spotted in the West Philippine Sea — a term the Philippine government sometimes users in reference to its exclusive economic zone — according to a front-page story in the May 8 edition of The Manila Times.
The Philippines is “getting their teeth kicked in once a month by the Chinese in the Spratly [Islands],” Gregory Poling, an Asian maritime expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank, told Defense News.
Tension may be greatest in the Second Thomas Shoal, where there is a Philippine marine contingent aboard a World War II-era tank landing ship, the Sierra Madre. The ship has been on the reef since 1999, Poling said.
The Sierra Madre keeps Chinese forces off the strategic spot, but “in the next storm, it could be gone,” according to Mark Montgomery, an Asia-focused analyst with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank.
“If that thing blows off, the Chinese will take over the Second Thomas Shoal. [It will] never have a Philippine footprint again,” he told Defense News.
The dilapidated Sierra Madre ship of the Philippine Navy is seen anchored near Ayungin Shoal with Filipino soldiers aboard to secure the perimeter of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea in 2015. (Ritchie B. Tongo/AP)
China has been “getting wildly reckless” there in recent months, according to Poling, who said the country regularly sends at least 50 boats around the shoal every time the Philippines resupplies the Sierra Madre, harassing the crew with high-pressure water cannons, acoustic devices and military-grade lasers.
The previous president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, distanced his government from the U.S. and temporarily canceled a visiting forces agreement between the two nations. According to the Pentagon, the agreement’s activities “range from expert exchanges to ship visits to component exercises and major joint/combined training exercises.”
Duterte had also paused the Balikatan exercise in 2020 in an attempt to improve relations with China. However, the situation in the South China Sea did not improve.
The new president, Bongbong Marcos, has worked to rapidly strengthen relationships with the U.S. and some other countries in the Pacific since his election in 2022.
“The Philippine military is now focused on territorial defense operations, and that shift from counterinsurgency is in support of our allies and in support of our treaty allies. That defense matters,” Gen. Charles Flynn, the head of U.S. Army Pacific, said in May. “We help defend terrain, we help defend people, and ... we help them protect and defend their territorial integrity and national sovereignty.”
During Balikatan in 2023, the Philippine Army wanted to conduct a littoral live-fire drill in the Ilocos Norte province, but instead was instructed to move the event south to Zambales, where there is already a military installation, due to political reasons, Logico said.
“At the start of the planning conference [for 2024], I made it my personal goal to bring the exercise back to Ilocos Norte,” Logico said. Not only does it send a message that the Philippines can project military power, but “it is a way for us to be comfortable with the discomfort of the area.”
Previous instances of the exercise took place within military camps or naval training facilities, such as Fort Magsaysay located in central Luzon, Logico noted. “Some of them are a little bit restrictive,” he said. “It’s a controlled environment.”
Logico also had two more goals previously prohibited by the Duterte administration: to conduct live-fire drills and other exercises at sea beyond 12 nautical miles of the Philippines; and to train in the West Philippine Sea. (An exclusive economic zone typically extends 200 nautical miles beyond a country’s territorial sea.)
The Philippine military, along with its American and Australian partners, held a large, live-fire exercise that sank a ship off the coast of Ilocos Norte on May 8. And this year, Balikatan extended 300 nautical miles into the West Philippine Sea, Logico said.
American-style deterrence
While the Philippines is focused on its own defense, America is trying to strengthen its Pacific partnerships. It sees the archipelago nation as key to building a network of land forces that can deter those who would threaten regional stability, according to Flynn, the chief of U.S. Army Pacific.
Not only is the Philippines the United States’ oldest ally in the region, but it’s also positioned closely to Taiwan, an island China considers a rogue province and has threatened to take back by force.
Part of the U.S. Army’s strategy in the Pacific, Flynn said, is to build a strategic land power network. That network “must get in position to defend our sovereignty, to protect our people and to uphold their rights under international law,” he said in May at the Association of the U.S. Army’s LANPAC conference in Honolulu, Hawaii.
The Army does not have the same type of setup in the Pacific region as it does in Europe when it comes to pre-positioned stock, and there is no NATO member from Asia. As a result, the U.S. aims to establish relationships with individual island nations in the Pacific so it can assume a stronger regional posture.
Balikatan and the Salaknib exercise, which took place in April and May, are part of that. This year saw U.S. military presence push deeper into the Philippines’ northern islands.
For example, the U.S. Army’s 1st Multi-Domain Task Force set up a company command post in Basco, a small island in the northern island chain, to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. On a clear day, Taiwan is visible from points on the remote island.
Also on Basco, Army divers helped dredge a harbor area and construct a new pier capable of accommodating larger ships.
On Itbayat, Basco’s neighbor to the north, the service’s 8th Theater Sustainment Command was building a warehouse to support humanitarian assistance.
The Army also practiced the rapid deployment of its High Mobility Artillery Rocket System throughout the Philippines, from Palawan to La-Lo Airport on northern Luzon to Port Irene further north.
Meanwhile, the multidomain task force for the first time deployed its nascent Mid-Range Capability missile launcher. The weapon traveled to Laoag on the northwest coast of Luzon from Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state.
Three of the four sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement were used in varying forms during Balikatan. The agreement allows the U.S. to fund infrastructure improvement and construction efforts at existing Philippine military bases, among other locations, and to rotationally deploy troops. The deal was signed in 2014 and originally established six sites. In 2023, four more sites were added.
One of the largest undertakings is the U.S. Army’s deployment of an exportable version of its Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center. The Army brought the capability to Fort Magsaysay, one of the agreement’s sites, to conduct a training rotation with the Philippine military as the Pacific nation looks to establish its own high-level training capability akin to the center.
Shoulder to shoulder
In preparation for Balikatan, Maj. Gen. Leodevic Guinid, the Philippine Army’s vice commander, said he told participating forces to focus on being able to fight side by side and to consider whether “you think that we are ready, that we are interoperable.”
Indeed, this effort to ensure the nations’ forces can work together seamlessly is fresh, Guinid said, and there is room for improvement on, for example, tactics, data sharing and the distribution of certain capabilities.
But there’s been progress. For instance, during a live-fire drill as part of Salaknib, a U.S. fires team flew an unmanned aerial system that was taking full-motion video of targets on the range, while Filipino soldiers remained in a concealed position, according to Brig. Gen. David Zinn, the deputy commander of the U.S. Army’s 25th Infantry Division.
“That video was viewed from the U.S. battalion command post, and the Philippine company commander was at the U.S. command post looking at the video to see that intelligence,” Zinn told Defense News. The Filipino commander then used a U.S. radio to communicate to his fires team using Philippine radios to move forward and destroy targets.
Watching the demonstration looks simple, Zinn said, because it’s a radio call. “But having been part of working to gain technical interoperability with partners in the past, it was pretty significant what they did, and we only achieve that by working together and spending time doing it,” he noted.
Beginning during last year’s Balikatan drills in the northern part of Luzon, the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force helped develop a Combined Information and Effects Fusion Cell that would allow the U.S. and the Philippines to see the same information and coordinate actions, which previous iterations of the exercise lacked.
“One thing that we realized quickly was oftentimes we try to increase classification when we build these command-and-control nodes based off of sharing agreements,” Brig. Gen. Bernard Harrington, who commands the task force, told Defense News in an interview at LANPAC.
“We found that the best thing to do was to drive this down to an unclassified level,” Harrington said. “We have human interoperability by being in the same room together. We had technical interoperability to rebuild this network with the system, and then we have procedural interoperability.”
Harrington said they continued to improve the capability during this year’s Balikatan events and now want to provide it to other regional allies and partners.
Logico said still more can be done to benefit interoperability at future exercises, adding that they ought to focus on information warfare, the cyber domain, and low-tech solutions to high-tech problems.
“If we are slow to the learning curve, we would find ourselves being outmaneuvered, so this is something that we have to pay attention to now,” he said.
https://www.defensenews.com/training-si ... ith-china/
"Lá nos confins da Península Ibérica, existe um povo que não governa nem se deixa governar ”, Caio Júlio César, líder Militar Romano".
Portugal está morto e enterrado!!!
Portugal está morto e enterrado!!!
Re: Mar da China!
Holanda critica a China enquanto avião militar chinês se aproxima perigosamente de navio no Mar da China Oriental
10 de junho de 2024 17h59 CNN.co.jp
Seul, Coreia do Sul (CNN) Um navio militar holandês foi atacado por um avião militar chinês enquanto navegava no Mar da China Oriental. O anúncio foi feito pelo Ministério da Defesa holandês. Foi o último caso a acusar as tropas chinesas de fazer abordagens potencialmente perigosas em águas internacionais.
O Ministério da Defesa holandês disse em comunicado no dia 7 que dois jatos militares chineses fizeram vários vôos circulares contra a fragata HNLMS Tromp, e um helicóptero em patrulha também foi "fechado" por duas aeronaves militares chinesas.
“Isso criou uma situação potencialmente perigosa”, disse o Ministério da Defesa.
A União Europeia disse que a fragata operava no Mar da China Oriental em apoio aos esforços multinacionais para fazer cumprir as sanções das Nações Unidas contra a Coreia do Norte.
Antes de assumir a patrulha no Mar da China Oriental, a fragata fez escala em Busan, na Coreia do Sul, onde participou de exercícios com a Marinha Sul-Coreana.
O incidente é o mais recente a acusar os militares chineses de ações potencialmente perigosas nos mares do Leste e do Sul da China.
Em maio, a Austrália acusou aviões de guerra chineses de lançar sinalizadores na direção de um helicóptero da Marinha Real Australiana em águas internacionais no Mar Amarelo. A China defendeu as ações dos seus aviões militares e negou as alegações da Austrália de que as ações eram perigosas.
https://news.livedoor.com/article/detail/26573523/
Re: Mar da China!
“Ameaça de uso da força contra o Japão” Navios chineses reforçam seu armamento em torno de Senkaku
08/06 (sábado) entrega às 16h
No dia 7, nas águas que rodeiam as ilhas Senkaku, na cidade de Ishigaki, o lado chinês deu sinais de aumentar o seu armamento, com quatro navios de guerra chineses equipados com o que pareciam ser metralhadoras invadindo simultaneamente as águas territoriais pela primeira vez. Yoshihiko Yamada, professor da Universidade Tokai, disse que a razão para isso foi a insatisfação com os esforços do Japão para se preparar para uma emergência em Taiwan, e disse: "Parece estar enviando uma espécie de mensagem ameaçadora de que" não hesitaremos usar a força.''
Até agora, têm havido dois padrões de intrusões nas águas territoriais por parte de navios chineses: um é quando quatro navios permanentemente estacionados nas proximidades realizam operações regulares de "patrulha", e o outro é quando dois navios seguem navios de pesca japoneses que operam nas águas territoriais.
No dia 7, a Guarda Costeira da China anunciou no seu site que “realizou patrulhas com base na lei para proteger a soberania”, e esta intrusão enquadra-se no padrão anterior. No entanto, no passado, era costume que apenas um dos quatro navios que entravam em águas territoriais estivesse fortemente armado com uma arma.
O Sr. Yamada destacou: “Ao contrário das invasões rotineiras anteriores em águas territoriais, existem algumas circunstâncias especiais”. A China está a aumentar as suas acções militares coercivas contra Taiwan, onde foi estabelecido um novo governo, e afirma: “Se o Japão apoiar Taiwan (no caso de uma emergência taiwanesa), esta é provavelmente uma ameaça que poderá levar ao uso da força”. .'' .
Até agora, os navios de guerra chineses tentaram interferir nas operações e pesquisas dos barcos de pesca japoneses e dos navios de pesquisa da cidade de Ishigaki ao redor das Ilhas Senkaku. No entanto, todas as abordagens são bloqueadas por barcos patrulha da Guarda Costeira do Japão.
O Sr. Yamada disse que o governo chinês, que pretende invadir as Ilhas Senkaku, está cada vez mais irritado com a situação actual, e disse: ``(Ao reforçar o armamento dos navios), pode haver uma intenção de mostrar uma forte posição contra o lado japonês e para controlá-lo. ''
No dia 7, a Guarda Costeira da China emitiu um comunicado de um porta-voz afirmando que iria “intensificar as patrulhas nas águas sob sua jurisdição”.
Quanto à situação em Taiwan, o Embaixador da China no Japão, Wu Jianghao, afirmou que se o Japão apoiasse a independência de Taiwan, “o povo japonês seria arrastado para as chamas”. Causou polêmica porque sugeria mais diretamente a intenção de atacar o Japão.
https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/03883 ... 311741ec0f
Plano de evacuação de Sakishima e Okinawa é mais urgente do que imaginamos
Pessoas como o governador Temaki e grupos de esquerda opõem-se a um plano de evacuação, apesar da ameaça de uma crise armada nas ilhas Sakishima e na província de Okinawa.
Publicado 6 dias atrás, em 5 de junho de 2024Pelo Conselho Editorial, The Sankei Shimbun
Dois barcos de patrulha da Guarda Costeira do Japão (na frente) bloqueiam um navio da Guarda Costeira chinesa (centro atrás) na costa da Ilha Uotsuri, nas Ilhas Senkaku, na manhã de 27 de abril. Na cidade de Ishigaki, província de Okinawa (©Sankei por Naoki Otake )
Estão em andamento planos para evacuar todos os residentes das Ilhas Sakishima, na província de Okinawa, no caso de uma emergência em Taiwan ou de uma invasão militar das Ilhas Senkaku. As Ilhas Sakishima são uma designação geral para as numerosas ilhas dos grupos de ilhas Miyako e Yaeyama.
No Secretariado do Gabinete, foi criado um grupo de estudo sobre "operações de evacuação de não combatentes" (NEO) para as ilhas. Tem a tarefa de elaborar um plano preliminar para a evacuação de residentes até ao final do exercício financeiro de 2024.
No final da Guerra do Pacífico, a batalha terrestre por Okinawa ceifou a vida de muitos civis. Assim, naturalmente, todos os meios diplomáticos possíveis devem ser utilizados para evitar tal emergência. O facto, porém, é que a China recusa veementemente mudar a sua posição linha-dura. Sendo assim, precisamos nos preparar para qualquer emergência que possa surgir.
Um exercício de mesa realizado no Gabinete do Governo da Província de Okinawa em 30 de janeiro confirma os procedimentos de evacuação para os residentes das Ilhas Sakishima. (©Kyodo)
Protegendo Vidas Civis
Tanto os governos nacionais como locais são responsáveis por proteger os cidadãos da nação contra tal eventualidade. Um NEO é uma atividade necessária para esse fim.
No caso de um ataque armado por parte de um país estrangeiro parecer iminente, o governo decidiu que evacuará todos os residentes (aproximadamente 110.000 pessoas), bem como cerca de 10.000 turistas de cinco municípios das Ilhas Sakishima. Estas são ilhas japonesas perto de Taiwan, incluindo Ishigaki, Miyakojima e Yonaguni. Residentes e outras pessoas seriam transportados para áreas fora da província de Okinawa, incluindo Kyushu e província de Yamaguchi em Honshu.
Aeronaves e navios civis serão usados para transportar os civis, o que a Prefeitura de Okinawa estima que levaria pelo menos seis dias para ser concluído. Os aeroportos e outras infra-estruturas devem ser preparados com antecedência.
O mau tempo também é uma preocupação. As evacuações poderão ter de ser suspensas por vários dias se houver tempestades graves. Portanto, o governo também precisa preparar abrigos subterrâneos para servirem como instalações de evacuação e abrigos antiaéreos. Estes devem ser fortes o suficiente para acomodar os residentes que ficam por até duas semanas.
Preparando-se para receber evacuados
Os governos locais nas sete províncias de Kyushu e na província de Yamaguchi aceitariam os evacuados das Ilhas Sakishima. Estas províncias também terão de preparar acomodações, armazenar alimentos, melhorar os sistemas médicos e preparar medidas de apoio aos meios de subsistência caso a evacuação se prolongue.
Precisamos também de preparar abrigos na ilha principal de Okinawa e para possíveis NEOs de Taiwan. Se uma contingência em Taiwan parecer iminente, muitos japoneses e outros estrangeiros que vivem em Taiwan provavelmente serão evacuados para o Japão. Os turistas capturados lá também seriam incluídos. Há também uma forte probabilidade de que NEO discretos das Ilhas Sakishima e de Taiwan possam ser implementados simultaneamente.
A responsabilidade de Okinawa
Uma preocupação, no entanto, é que a prefeitura de Okinawa tem demorado nos preparativos para a evacuação. O governador Denny Tamaki e as forças de esquerda que o apoiam opuseram-se aos planos de evacuação e outras medidas. Incrivelmente, afirmam que o planeamento pode, na verdade, incitar uma crise armada.
Esta é uma forma distorcida de pensar que desconsidera a vida dos moradores de Okinawa.
A invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia constitui um exemplo recente. Um grande número de residentes da parte oriental da Ucrânia foi evacuado. Isso também foi um NEO e alguns evacuados ucranianos receberam até refúgio no Japão. Serão eles e as autoridades ucranianas que os fizeram fugir as partes que incitaram o conflito? Claro, seria um total absurdo afirmar isso.
Para proteger a vida dos residentes de Okinawa, o Governador Tamaki e o governo da província devem cooperar activamente com o governo nacional para se preparar enquanto ainda há tempo.
https://japan-forward.com/editorial-sak ... e-realize/
Re: Mar da China!
Holanda critica “jatos militares chineses circulando sobre navios” China responde
11 de junho de 2024 21h17
O Ministério da Defesa holandês acusou a China de “criar uma situação potencialmente perigosa” quando jatos militares chineses sobrevoaram navios militares em serviço no Mar da China Oriental. A China opôs-se à Holanda, acusando-a de atos provocativos que violam a sua soberania.
De acordo com o Ministério da Defesa holandês, em 7 de junho, enquanto uma fragata da marinha estava em missão no Mar da China Oriental relacionada às sanções do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas contra a Coreia do Norte, dois jatos militares chineses circularam várias vezes no céu.
Além disso, o helicóptero da fragata estava em patrulha quando foi abordado por dois jatos militares chineses e um helicóptero.
Ambos os incidentes teriam ocorrido no espaço aéreo internacional, e o Ministério da Defesa holandês acusou a China de criar uma “situação potencialmente perigosa”.
Em resposta, o Ministério da Defesa chinês emitiu um comentário no dia 11, dizendo: ``Eliminamos atos provocativos que violam a soberania usando avisos sonoros e jatos de combate. Este é um ato completamente legal e razoável.'', acusou a Holanda. de demonstrar força e criar tensão sob jurisdição chinesa sob o pretexto de uma missão das Nações Unidas.
Em Maio, ocorreram incidentes semelhantes em águas perto da China, incluindo uma troca de acusações com o lado chinês depois de os militares australianos terem anunciado que um helicóptero tinha sido atacado por um caça chinês.
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/202406 ... 81000.html
Re: Mar da China!
A China enfrenta uma oposição crescente: "A Coreia do Sul não deveria criticar a questão de Taiwan...
Devíamos ser cuidadosos nas nossas palavras e acções."
05/06/2024
Jornal Hankyoreh
A embaixada chinesa na Coreia do Sul disse: "Apesar da oposição resoluta da China, o lado sul-coreano está em conluio com os Estados Unidos e o Japão para fazer queixas sobre Taiwan e a questão do Mar do Sul da China (três teorias, quatro teorias)", e instou para que eles fossem “cuidadosos em suas palavras e ações”. Eu pedi isso.
No dia 4, o porta-voz da Embaixada da China na Coreia do Sul manifestou a sua posição num comunicado publicado no SNS oficial. Na recente Reunião de Ministros dos Negócios Estrangeiros e de Ministros da Defesa, a Coreia do Sul, os Estados Unidos e o Japão repetidamente "fizeram declarações falsas e interferiram violentamente nos assuntos internos da China" relativamente a Taiwan e à questão do Mar do Sul da China, e "solicitaram negociações rigorosas com o lado sul-coreano.'' "Apresentamos um protesto diplomático."
Além disso, a declaração do lado sul-coreano "não está em conformidade com o espírito da parceria de cooperação estratégica China-Coreia do Sul e não é útil para o desenvolvimento das relações China-Coreia do Sul", acrescentando: "O lado sul-coreano precisa ser especialmente cuidadoso com suas palavras e ações em relação às questões de Taiwan e do Mar da China Meridional, exorto-os a proteger as relações China-Coreia do Sul através de ações reais." Em particular, a embaixada afirmou: “Nem a Coreia do Sul, os Estados Unidos, nem o Japão são partes na questão do Mar da China Meridional e não devem intervir em disputas marítimas entre a China e os países da região, nem devem criticar desnecessariamente a China”. .''
O documento esclareceu a posição básica da China em questões como Taiwan e o Mar da China Meridional, que a China enfatiza como seus interesses centrais, mas a embaixada estaria “criticando (desnecessariamente)” as atividades diplomáticas do país anfitrião. destacou que sua crítica pública com tais expressões emocionais é inadequada.
Antes da Reunião Ministerial de Defesa Coreia do Sul-EUA-Japão realizada no Shangri-La Hotel em Cingapura no dia 2, o Secretário de Defesa Shin Won-sik (à direita) encontra-se com o Secretário de Defesa dos EUA Lloyd Austin (centro) e o Ministro da Defesa japonês Minoru Kihara (à esquerda) no porto dos EUA Tirando uma foto comemorativa = Singapore/Yonhap News.
O porta-voz do Ministério das Relações Exteriores da China, Mao Ning, criticou a Coreia do Sul, os Estados Unidos e o Japão durante a rotação regular da imprensa no dia anterior, dizendo que eles "interferiram violentamente nos assuntos internos da China, lançaram ataques maliciosos contra a China e mancharam a China com lama".
Recentemente, com a posse do presidente de Taiwan, Lai Ching-toku, fortemente orientado para a independência, a China tem estado extremamente preocupada com a declaração conjunta dos Estados Unidos com a Coreia do Sul, o Japão, as Filipinas e outros para se opor à posição da China no Mar de Taiwan-Sul da China. questão.
Responde com sensibilidade e firmeza. No dia 31 do mês passado, a Coreia do Sul, os Estados Unidos e o Japão reafirmaram a sua posição conjunta de oposição às "tentativas da China de mudar o status quo" na questão Taiwan-Mar do Sul da China numa reunião de vice-ministros dos Negócios Estrangeiros. realizada em Washington, EUA, no dia 31. Na Reunião de Ministros da Defesa realizada em Singapura no dia 2 deste mês, foram reiteradas as posições de cada país em relação à paz e estabilidade no Estreito de Taiwan e às ações perigosas e agressivas que apoiam as reivindicações territoriais marítimas ilegais da China no Mar da China Meridional.
A posição dura da China desta vez deve-se ao facto de que, embora a Cimeira Coreia do Sul-China e a Cimeira Coreia do Sul-China-Japão tenham finalmente sido realizadas, há sinais de melhoria nas relações Coreia do Sul-China, mas as questões de Taiwan e o Mar da China Meridional estão a tornar-se cada vez mais sensíveis na relação entre os dois países. Isto indica que será um tema complicado.
Numa conferência de imprensa regular no dia 4, o porta-voz do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lim Soo-seok, respondeu a uma pergunta sobre a posição da China sobre os protestos, dizendo: “A posição básica do governo coreano sobre a questão de Taiwan permanece inalterada”. nação, esperamos que a paz e a estabilidade através do Estreito de Taiwan continuem e que as relações através do Estreito se desenvolvam pacificamente através do diálogo e da cooperação." Um funcionário do Ministério das Relações Exteriores disse: “Explicamos nossa posição básica (à China) em todas as oportunidades e a China está bem ciente da posição da Coreia do Sul”.
Repórter sênior Park Min-hee
https://japan.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/50215.html
Re: Mar da China!
Repórteres filipinos capturaram o drone de vigilância chinês Wuzhen-7 (WZ-7) sobrevoando o Mar da China Meridional, a 55 km da cidade de Subic.
Conforme anunciado anteriormente, uma aeronave de transporte militar C-17 da Força Aérea Indiana com o primeiro lote de mísseis de cruzeiro BrahMos chegou hoje à Base Aérea Filipina de Clark.
Os locais propostos para os lançadores de mísseis BrahMos são mostrados no diagrama.
A Índia está a considerar expandir ainda mais os laços de defesa com as Filipinas. Na verdade, Nova Deli beneficia de ter um actor como Manila para conter a China no Mar da China Meridional.
Capacidades dos mísseis de cruzeiro BrahMos fornecidos da Índia para as Filipinas
As instalações militares chinesas em ilhas do Mar da China Meridional estão ao alcance dos mísseis.
Também sob controle está o importante Estreito de Bashi entre Manila e Taiwan, através do qual os navios da Marinha do ELP entram no Oceano Pacífico e no Mar das Filipinas.
Rivalidade pelas ilhas do Mar da China Meridional
E comemos de novo
No dia 4 de junho, na área de Sabina Shoal (Manila chama de Escoda), no Mar da China Meridional, ocorreram confrontos entre as guardas costeiras (CCG) da China e das Filipinas.
É relatado que o lado filipino enviou a Guarda Civil, representantes da mídia e cientistas à área especificada para avaliar a condição dos corais, a fim de condenar a China por se envolver em atividades de recuperação que estão destruindo o recife.
Pequim reagiu e enviou quatro navios blindados de transporte de pessoal, barcos infláveis de alta velocidade, dois helicópteros e um hovercraft. A China exigiu duramente que os filipinos abandonassem a área, chamando-a de “Mar da China”.
China mostrou quem manda em casa
Hoje Pequim respondeu à visita do hóspede indesejado.
O ELP enviou dois caças-bombardeiros Jianhong-7A para sobrevoar a fragata HNLMS Tromp da Marinha holandesa, no Mar da China Oriental, enviando um sinal claro de que não era bem-vindo aqui.
Em seguida, os aviões, juntamente com o helicóptero de ataque chinês Zhi-19, aproximaram-se do helicóptero NH90.
O lado holandês, como esperado, começou a reclamar, dizendo que estavam em águas e espaço aéreo internacionais e que a China havia criado uma situação perigosa.
E o pretexto para a entrada da fragata Tromp no Mar da China Oriental foi supostamente patrulhar esta área de água para apoiar a coligação multinacional da ONU, que monitoriza o cumprimento das sanções marítimas contra a RPDC.
Assim, a OTAN está lentamente a penetrar na região da Ásia-Pacífico.
While the Americans have just begun training with the Japanese, in the Philippines another exercise has been underway for several days already. On June 3, the opening ceremony of the joint American-Philippine MASA-2024 exercises took place, which will last three weeks and be held in various regions of the island state.
The exercises involve the Marine Corps, Air Force, Army, as well as the naval aviation of the Philippines and the United States. These trainings are held almost every year and are not formally a response to any actions of other actors in the region.
The main goals of these exercises, as with any others involving the US and the Philippines, are to strengthen the alliance between Manila and Washington and to increase the operational compatibility of the parties.
The planned maneuvers include coastal live-fire exercises, training on ammunition replenishment and aircraft refueling, as well as ensuring the security of certain water areas.
Officials have already commented on the fact that the exercise locations are close to Taiwan. According to them, this is not related to any geopolitical challenges - the trainings in those places are due to the need to cover as much of the island state's territory as possible.
Of course, such statements should be taken critically, as the Philippines and the United States are preparing for a hypothetical conflict in the Taiwan Strait and are developing various action plans. But it is also not worth considering these exercises as another step towards escalation. Although, given the situation, any training to some extent will increase tension in the Asia-Pacific region.
The exercises involve the Marine Corps, Air Force, Army, as well as the naval aviation of the Philippines and the United States. These trainings are held almost every year and are not formally a response to any actions of other actors in the region.
Officials have already commented on the fact that the exercise locations are close to Taiwan. According to them, this is not related to any geopolitical challenges - the trainings in those places are due to the need to cover as much of the island state's territory as possible.https://amti.csis.org/hanoi-in-high-gea ... celerates/Hanoi in high gear: Vietnam’s Spratly islands expansion in the SouthChinaSea accelerates
Vietnam has significantly accelerated the expansion of its outposts in the Spratly Islands over the last six months, creating almost as much new land as it had in the previous two years combined and putting Hanoi on pace for a record year of island building in 2024.
Since AMTI’s last update in November of 2023, Vietnam has created 692 new acres of land across a total of 10 features, compared to 404 acres created in the first 11 months of 2023 and 342 acres in 2022.
This brings the total of Vietnam’s overall dredging and landfill (including both landfill and harbor/channel dredging) in disputed areas of the South China Sea to approximately 2,360 acres—roughly half of China’s 4,650 acres.
This is a major change from just three years ago, when the total amount of Vietnamese dredging and landfill was just 329 acres—less than one-tenth of China’s total.
The scale of Vietnam’s activity can also be seen in a look at the largest outposts in the Spratly Islands by land area. While China’s “big three” outposts (Mischief, Subi, and Fiery Cross reefs) remain the largest, the next four largest outposts are all newly expanded Vietnamese reefs.
Reef by Reef
Barque Canada Reef remains Vietnam’s largest outpost, nearly doubling over the last six months from 238 to 412 acres.
The feature now measures 4,318 meters in length, which makes it the only Vietnamese outpost so far with the potential to host a 3,000-meter runway like those that China has at Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi Reefs.
Currently, Vietnam’s only airstrip in the Spratly Islands is a 1,300-meter runway on the eponymous Spratly Island. While that runway is large enough for most Vietnamese military aircraft, a 3,000-meter runway would be required for larger military transport, surveillance, or bomber aircraft to take off and land.
Other features have also undergone significant landfill since November: 102 acres of new land have been created at Discovery Great Reef, 52 acres at South Reef, 41 acres at Namyit Island, and 37 acres at Pearson Reef.
Dredging activities at Pearson have expanded beyond the main outpost in the northeast to new areas on the southern end of the reef, creating new land around preexisting pillbox structures and wider channels for ships to pass through.
Vietnam has continued implementing a mix of cutter-suction and clamshell dredging to complete these expansions, with the former being used heavily at large areas of landfill such as Barque Canada Reef.
Structures
Along with the accelerated landfill, Vietnam has begun preliminary construction of some new facilities across its outposts. Notable developments include the completion of a boat ramp on Namyit Island and the construction of a new harbor at Central Reef.
Trenches and coastal defense emplacements typical of Vietnam’s Spratly outposts can be seen underway at several features.
And temporary helipads have appeared across many of the expanding features, including Discovery Great Reef, Ladd Reef, Tennent Reef, and South Reef.
O lado filipino publicou participantes da Guarda Costeira Chinesa, da Marinha do ELP e de agências de aplicação da lei marítima realizando tarefas na área de Sabine Shoal, no Mar da China Meridional, a fim de suprimir as provocações de Manila
No Mar da China Meridional, na área das Ilhas Spratly, o número total de forças navais chinesas atingiu 90 navios, incluindo a guarda costeira + polícia marítima + Marinha do PLA.
Re: Mar da China!
Desde 25 de agosto de 2022, as Forças Armadas Filipinas estão construindo instalações (oficinas de montagem, armazéns de armazenamento) na base naval Leovigildo Gantioqui, na província de Zambales, na ilha de Luzon, onde ficarão localizados os mísseis anti-navio BrahMos.
Os mísseis são fornecidos pelo lado indiano sob um contrato no valor de US$ 375 milhões.
A base está localizada a 250 km de Scarborough Shoal, onde ocorrem frequentemente confrontos entre as guardas costeiras chinesa e filipina.
A situação geral da obra executada a partir de 2 de maio de 2024 é apresentada na Figura 2.
Manila procura assim atingir os movimentos de navios chineses no Mar da China Meridional, especialmente na área de Scarborough Shoal.