Fórum Defesa Brasil

Taiwan condecora ex-presidente do Senado checo apesar de protestos
A chefe de Estado de Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen, condecorou hoje a título póstumo o ex-presidente do Senado checo, Jaroslav Kubera, num ato que decorre durante a visita a Taipé do atual titular do cargo, Milos Vystrcil.

14:25 - 03/09/20 por Lusa

Jaroslav Kubera tencionava visitar Taiwan no final do passado mês de janeiro, poucos dias antes de morrer de um ataque cardíaco, tendo Tsai considerado o ex-presidente do Senado da República Checa "um bom amigo".

O estreitar das relações entre Praga e Taipé está a motivar fortes protestos diplomáticos e ameaças políticas por parte de Pequim que considera aquele território uma "ilha rebelde" desde que os nacionalistas chineses foram derrotadas, em 1949.

A República Checa não tem relações diplomáticas com Taiwan tendo a visita do presidente do senado checo levado Pequim a advertir que a República Checa "pagaria um alto preço" pela visita oficial.

A reação do regime comunista de Pequim foi considerada excessiva pela diplomacia checa que convocou o embaixador de Pequim em Praga para uma reunião com o ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Tomas Petricek.

Na cerimónia que decorreu hoje em Taipé, a presidente Tsai disse que Kubera "fez muitos esforços" para melhorar as relações entre Taiwan e a República Checa e recordou a visita do antigo presidente Vaclav Havel (1936-2011) há 16 anos.

A presidente de Taiwan mostrou "esperança" de que a condecoração póstuma se transforme "num símbolo duradouro da amizade entre os dois países e na manutenção dos valores democráticos".

"Enquanto mantivermos os nossos valores, os esforços de Taiwan - na preservação da liberdade e da democracia - vão ser vistos pelo resto do mundo", acrescentou Tsai.

No decorrer da visita, os bancos de Taiwan mostraram interesse em abrir filiais na República Checa e a companhia de bandeira China Airlines admitiu iniciar uma rota direta entre Taipé e Praga assim que a epidemia global de covid-19 o venha a permitir.

A delegação checa de visita a Taiwan desde o dia 30 de agosto é formada por 89 membros, entre os quais deputados e empresários.

Na terça-feira, o presidente do Senado foi aplaudido pelos deputados de Taiwan ao proclamar em mandarim: "sou taiwanês" numa alusão direta às palavras do ex-presidente dos Estados Unidos, John F. Kennedy que em 1963 disse "sou berlinense" no famoso discurso em Berlim Ocidental e que marcava o 15º ano do bloqueio da União Soviética à cidade alemã.

https://www.noticiasaominuto.com/mundo/ ... -protestos

Penguin escreveu: Dom Set 13, 2020 1:33 pm


23o round:
Donald Trump volta atrás e Huawei poderá voltar a fazer negócios nos EUA
https://canaltech.com.br/negocios/donal ... ua-143025/

Túlio escreveu: Dom Set 13, 2020 1:39 pm

Penguin escreveu: Dom Set 13, 2020 1:33 pm


23o round:
Donald Trump volta atrás e Huawei poderá voltar a fazer negócios nos EUA
https://canaltech.com.br/negocios/donal ... ua-143025/

01 de Julho de 2019 às 10h57

Vejam a primeira demonstração de um relógio Huawei com Harmony OS
Por Joao Bonell em Set 12, 2020
https://androidgeek.pt/vejam-a-primeira ... harmony-os

Hoje temos o primeiro vídeo de um próximo dispositivo com o novo Harmony OS . De acordo com um utilizador do Weibo, a interface ainda está em fase de desenvolvimento, mas a equipa de P&D está pronta para demonstrar a IU do sistema operativo interno num smartwatch ligado a uma placa de desenvolvimento.

A Huawei anunciou Harmony OS 2.0 dia 10 e hoje já vemos o primeiro vídeo de um próximo dispositivo com o novo sistema operativo. De acordo com um utilizador do Weibo, a interface ainda está em fase de desenvolvimento, mas a equipa de P&D está pronta para demonstrar a IU do sistema operativo num smartwatch ligado a uma placa de desenvolvimento.

No vídeo, podemos ver alguns dos recursos, onde se inclui medidor de SpO2, um sensor de frequência cardíaca, rastreador de algumas atividades e alguns dos gestos de navegação á volta da IU. O autoproclamado “Digital King” afirmou na rede social chinesa Weibo que muitos recursos não puderam ser filmados devido a requisitos de confidencialidade.

Outra afirmação interessante é que a Huawei estará pronta para lançar o aparelho no mercado até ao final do ano, o que fará dele o primeiro aparelho móvel com o sistema operativo que já está disponível em alguns produtos domésticos vendido na China.

Huawei anuncia Harmony OS 2.0 para seus smartphones de 2021
Huawei anuncia hoje, durante o seu evento, a nova versão do seu próprio sistema operacional, o Harmony OS 2.0. Segundo a empresa, o SO será lançado em seus smartphones em 2021.

Vitor Valeri Por VITOR VALERI
em 10/09/2020 16:03
https://www.oficinadanet.com.br/smartph ... es-de-2021

Rurst escreveu: Seg Set 21, 2020 4:54 pm China ultrapassará os EUA como economia mundial em 2032, apesar das hostilidades de Washington, prevê o think tank estatal
O relatório é baseado em suposições prevalecentes em Pequim de que a ascensão econômica da China é imparável
Centro de Pesquisa de Desenvolvimento do Conselho de Estado sugere que rixas com os Estados Unidos continuarão a se intensificar nos próximos cinco anos

cabeça de martelo escreveu: Qui Set 24, 2020 10:47 am Campos de concentração, trabalho escravo, industria... onde é que eu já vi isto antes?!..

No Brasil, oras. Não sabes que temos milhares de campos de concentração na Amazônia, onde escravizamos pretos, GAYS e mulheres para incendiarem a rainforest sem parar? E não vamos parar até termos um deserto de matar o Saara de inveja e o Leonardo Di Caprio de tristeza.

Mas não vai parar aí: depois que virar deserto, usaremos os escravos que sobraram (mais os novos, que não vai parar de nascer preto, GAY nem muié) para extrair todas as commodities minerais que tem lá e estabelecer a maior base industrial da galáxia; e também replantar tudo de novo depois, só para queimar outra vez and so on and so on.

CHINA’S GAMBIT IN TAJIKISTAN: PARTNER OR OVERLORD?

Recently, a Chinese diplomat stated that the Pamir mountains of Tajikistan belonged to China and always have. The region borders the Uighur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang and the city of Kashgar, where up to 17 Uighur concentration camps are located. Both the treatment of Uighur Muslims by the Chinese and their increasingly outspoken historical claims to the Pamirs have alarmed those in the region, as well as the governments of Tajikistan and its close ally, Russia.

The scenario raises a number of questions. What are China’s goals in the region? Do they really believe that Tajikistan belongs to them? Is their penetration into Pamiri territory along their borders an indication of a long-term strategy in the region and an action that underpins their recent assertions about the region?

As Eurasia specialist Paul Goble recently pointed out:

This past month, official outlets of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) repeatedly republished an article by Chinese historian Cho Yao Lu, who says that the entire Pamir region belonged to China at one time and consequently, he implies, Tajikistan should now or in the future return it to Beijing.

The territorial claim is based, at least in part, on a long history of Chinese presence in the region dating back to as early as the second century B.C. This previously unspoken belief of the Chinese government feeds into what many in Central Asia fear – namely that China’s strategy in the region is anything but transactional and utilitarian. Rather, they suspect that its goals are part of a larger strategy of neocolonial and imperialist ambitions based on geographic and historical claims.

Negative comments about Chinese presence and activity in the Pamirs that started in the region over a decade ago have turned into vitriolic rumors and claims of Chinese takeover of the border area. When the Tajik government gifted a piece of land in the province of Gorno-Badakhshan in the Pamiri district of Murghab, along the Chinese border, many in the region believed their worst nightmares about Chinese intentions were coming true.

Tajikistan reportedly owes China US$1.2 billion, nearly half the country’s foreign debts of $2.9 billion. In order to pay off part of this debt, the government of Tajikistan in 2011 signed an agreement to give approximately 447 square miles (1158 square kilometers) of the Tajik Pamirs to China and in late 2019 gave China the rights to a potentially lucrative silver mine in the same region. Both are located near a new Chinese military base in Tajikistan, which, coupled with China’s land and resource grabs in Tajikistan, signals a marked uptick in Chinese military and security presence in the region.

At present, China is outpacing Russia, the United States and the European Union in development funding, economic investment, and security presence and partnerships in Tajikistan.

Russia is also watching carefully and none too happy about China’s encroachment on what it views as its traditional role of protector and security purveyor in the region. In fact, a Russian-influenced or supported social media campaign appears to be part of its strategy to highlight its disapproval of increased Chinese investment in the region, as well as debt trap lending practices, which have disproportionately affected the Pamirs.

In addition to China’s burgeoning security apparatus, Chinese trucks and trade flood the area and roads throughout the region. They have also installed traffic cameras, funded renovation and new construction of government buildings, and built numerous roads and tunnels in Tajikistan as part of their broader Belt and Road Initiative across the region. At approximately 25,000 square miles (65,000 square kilometers), the area is about the size of Sri Lanka, or six times the size of Lebanon, with a population of around 350,000 along both sides of the Tajik-Afghan border in Badakhshan, with only about 3 percent arable land. It is reputed to be rich in minerals and potential mines, however, and is already famous for its semiprecious and precious gemstones. It is reported that Tajikistan alone, according to the Chinese, has approximately 145 gold deposits.

At the same time, many in both Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan and Afghanistan’s neighboring Badakhshan province point out that Chinese support is welcome. The Chinese government provides scholarships to sons of local leaders, funds bases and development, and requires very little in return from the governments on either side of the border. Since 2015, China has developed secret bases in Tajikistan and Afghanistan (both eventually made public), conducted joint exercises along the border, engaged in intelligence sharing and joint surveillance operations, and sold or provided military and security equipment to domestic militaries and police.

The Russians are watching all of this carefully and playing both sides. On the one hand, they are engaging in active diplomacy and economic partnerships with China. At the same time, they are ramping up information campaigns in the region with local assets and spreading a message about the negative impact of Chinese presence and neocolonial ambitions, particularly in the Pamirs.

The Tajik government’s reaction to a more vocal and assertive China in the region also underpins both their unwillingness to genuflect to China as well as their alliance and deep ties with Russia. The increasing Chinese trade, development, and security agreements and partnerships with Tajikistan point to a willingness by the Tajik government to accept increased Chinese influence and control in the region through mining agreements and territorial gifts. At the same time, the Tajik government placates Russia with rhetoric on pushing back against Chinese encroachment on its territory, such as in the recent reaction by Tajik President Emomali Rahmon denouncing China’s claim to the northeastern part of Tajikistan.

It is likely Russia will pressure Rahmon to push back on China more than he is currently doing. This will put him in a bit of a pickle. The country’s many unpaid debts to the Chinese government for numerous projects in his country need to be paid somehow. At the same time, Tajikistan has a long history of placating Rahmon’s Russian security benefactor, Vladimir Putin. Rahmon has long played many sides as a means to his strategic ends, and quite successfully. This will likely be the case for the foreseeable future. In 2012, he offset his country’s debt by leasing land in Tajikistan’s agricultural heartland, in addition to giving a slice of the northeastern section of the Tajik Pamirs to the Chinese, as noted above. Shortly thereafter, he signed a security agreement for increased Russian military advisers and presence in the region. He then worked with the Chinese to allow them to build a base, engage in various other military exercises, and maintain a presence in the country.

This is all at the same time as Tajikistan partners with both the United States and European Union in various development, security, and military agreements.

At present, China is outpacing Russia, the United States and the European Union in development funding, economic investment, and security presence and partnerships in Tajikistan. What will change in the near future is the Russian-Chinese relationship and the use of tactics and messaging to discredit or undermine the influence of the other.

How this plays out and how much China and Russia either partner in the region as a means to counter the United States and European Union or begin to compete with each other will determine the course of events in the region for some time, and will go some way to answering questions of China’s intentions.