Tomara mesmo que eles sejam um Canadá, tomara, será muito bom para ambos os países, Brasil e Argentina.
GEOPOLÍTICA
Moderador: Conselho de Moderação
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Carlos Mathias
Re: GEOPOLÍTICA
Cara, os argentinos finalmente se conscientizaram da situação.
Tomara mesmo que eles sejam um Canadá, tomara, será muito bom para ambos os países, Brasil e Argentina.
Tomara mesmo que eles sejam um Canadá, tomara, será muito bom para ambos os países, Brasil e Argentina.
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Tupi
- Sênior
- Mensagens: 922
- Registrado em: Sáb Abr 15, 2006 4:45 pm
- Localização: Minas Gerais - Brasil
Re: GEOPOLÍTICA
Olhando por esse lado a notícia é positiva.Depois de um incidente no Peru, onde um avião com missionários foi derrubado por engano, os EUA ameaçaram com uma série de restrições e embargos os países que adotassem leis de abate.
Interpreto a notícia como um reconhecimento da capacidade brasileira de controlar seu espaço aéreo, tendo meios com capacidade de identificação positiva aptos a diferenciar voos comuns de narco contrabando, e que não seremos retaliados por usarmos efetivamente a lei do abate.
Mas se a interpretação for esta:
Considero uma discriminação e portanto risco de aumento de crises diplomáticas.Sterrius escreveu:Que aviões vindo do Brasil com suspeita de portar drogas ou que ja portaram drogas podem ser apreendidos nos EUA.
Se na batalha de Passo do Rosário houve controvérsias. As Vitórias em Lara-Quilmes e Monte Santiago, não deixam duvidas de quem às venceu!
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Carlos Mathias
Re: GEOPOLÍTICA
Erro.
Editado pela última vez por Carlos Mathias em Sáb Out 17, 2009 7:25 pm, em um total de 1 vez.
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Hader
Re: GEOPOLÍTICA
Battling a Mineral Monopoly
As China Tightens Grip, Molycorp Ready To Step Up
By JOHN T. BENNETT
Published: 12 October 2009 Print | Email
As U.S. Defense Department officials complete a comprehensive review of the components used to build most U.S. weapon systems, analysts and industry officials say the Pentagon will discover it is almost entirely dependent on China, its chief economic and military rival, for some key minerals.
Beijing possesses a substantial amount of the Earth's rarest elements within its borders, and Chinese officials have been aggressively buying other such deposits across the globe. The Asian giant uses its monopoly position to raise market prices by cutting production and exports, in part to encourage companies to relocate manufacturing plants there.
China now controls 98 percent of the world's so-called rare earth oxides that are needed to produce sophisticated commercial and military components, such as electronics, lasers, optics, surveillance and communications systems, magnets and batteries.
The United States imports 100 percent of the rare earths it needs, according to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).
As the American military depends more and more on high-technology weapon systems, it becomes ever more dependent on rare earth minerals - and China. That is raising alarms inside the Pentagon.
Enter Molycorp Minerals, which is ready to provide a hedge against China's ever-increasing rare earth monopoly. The Greenwood Village, Colo.-based firm owns a rare earths mine in Mountain Pass, Calif., that is considered the richest deposit outside China. Owned by a private partnership, Molycorp is the lone U.S. rare earths firm.
For the Pentagon, "rare earths are simply indispensable," said Mark Smith, Molycorp CEO. "While rare earths are a small part of these weapon systems, they absolutely have to be there - and we're 100 percent reliant on China right now to get them."
"Rare earth mining is practically extinct in the West," said Jack Lifton, a minerals analyst and consultant. Though he said several firms could be ready to begin producing rare earth oxides in "five or 10 years ... Mountain Pass is basically the last hook into this."
Winning Approval
Molycorp slowed production at Mountain Pass in the early 1990s, when China increased its rare earth production and exports. Other Western and American companies exited the business altogether.
"We slowed production to … see what Chinese officials were going to do," Smith said. The company also was working to obtain a new mining permit from the California state government, a process Smith said took about 15 years.
During that time, Molycorp did not make any major facility upgrades because California regulations only allow equipment to be replaced with nearly identical systems - not the most advanced - until Sacramento approves a new permit. Its old permit expired early this decade, and mining had to stop until a new one was in hand.
Molycorp in 2004 got that new permit and a California-approved 30-year mining plan. Now, the U.S. firm is ready to upgrade Mountain Pass and significantly ramp up production there, Smith said.
The company's goal is to churn out 20,000 tons of rare earths by 2012, but without new sources of funding it could take up to 10 years, Smith said. Twenty thousand tons, he said, "would be enough to meet all U.S. needs - including defense needs - as well as much of the rest of the world's needs."
Smith said it could take up to $450 million to bring the Mountain Pass facility back to its former ability to produce 20,000 tons a year.
Lifton, who visited Mountain Pass in June, called the need for a U.S. source of rare earths crucial, but said Molycorp will be challenged to reach 20,000 tons in three years.
"They haven't been mining at Mountain Pass since 2002," Lifton said. "You don't start and stop mining like a truck."
Company officials are exploring a number of options to raise the capital needed to hit the 2012 objective, including private-sector and government sources.
Smith said he has met with officials in Washington about a number of federal funding options, including some Energy Department loan programs. And he hopes to receive funding support from private-sector firms.
In the end, Smith said he expects to raise the needed funds from a mix of public and private sources.
The company's 30-year mining plan envisions potentially doubling the annual 20,000-ton production rate, he said.
A 'Sea Change' at DoD
Company officials also have met with Pentagon officials, aiming to educate them about the rare earths market and China's dominance.
Smith said he does not seek military funding in these meetings. Rather, his message is that government officials should take steps to lock in sources of rare earths from outside Chinese control.
For years, the issue has not received high-level attention in the Defense Department because "these components are so far down the supply chain," Smith added.
But that is changing, sour-ces say.
"This is going to be an issue that's going to get a lot of scrutiny" from the Obama administration's Pentagon team, one DoD official said last month.
Pentagon officials have launched a comprehensive study to assess the origin of all raw materials and other components that go into American weapon systems, according to sources.
Lifton said he has seen a "sea change" in how Pentagon officials view rare earths in the last year.
Before, defense officials "felt like, 'We only need a small amount, and we can always get a little bit,'" Lifton said. But in recent months, he said, Pentagon brass came to understand that "it doesn't matter what the price is if China refuses to give us any."
The price of most rare earth materials has traditionally hovered around $4 or $5 per pound, but Chinese officials hiked prices to about $17 per pound last summer. Beijing has said it soon will usher in further production cuts and exports. Those moves are expected to again raise prices for most key rare elements.
"DoD needs to do something to get that [Mountain Pass] mine back into production" Lifton said, "because the military needs those metals."
E-mail: jbennett@defensenews.com.
As China Tightens Grip, Molycorp Ready To Step Up
By JOHN T. BENNETT
Published: 12 October 2009 Print | Email
As U.S. Defense Department officials complete a comprehensive review of the components used to build most U.S. weapon systems, analysts and industry officials say the Pentagon will discover it is almost entirely dependent on China, its chief economic and military rival, for some key minerals.
Beijing possesses a substantial amount of the Earth's rarest elements within its borders, and Chinese officials have been aggressively buying other such deposits across the globe. The Asian giant uses its monopoly position to raise market prices by cutting production and exports, in part to encourage companies to relocate manufacturing plants there.
China now controls 98 percent of the world's so-called rare earth oxides that are needed to produce sophisticated commercial and military components, such as electronics, lasers, optics, surveillance and communications systems, magnets and batteries.
The United States imports 100 percent of the rare earths it needs, according to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).
As the American military depends more and more on high-technology weapon systems, it becomes ever more dependent on rare earth minerals - and China. That is raising alarms inside the Pentagon.
Enter Molycorp Minerals, which is ready to provide a hedge against China's ever-increasing rare earth monopoly. The Greenwood Village, Colo.-based firm owns a rare earths mine in Mountain Pass, Calif., that is considered the richest deposit outside China. Owned by a private partnership, Molycorp is the lone U.S. rare earths firm.
For the Pentagon, "rare earths are simply indispensable," said Mark Smith, Molycorp CEO. "While rare earths are a small part of these weapon systems, they absolutely have to be there - and we're 100 percent reliant on China right now to get them."
"Rare earth mining is practically extinct in the West," said Jack Lifton, a minerals analyst and consultant. Though he said several firms could be ready to begin producing rare earth oxides in "five or 10 years ... Mountain Pass is basically the last hook into this."
Winning Approval
Molycorp slowed production at Mountain Pass in the early 1990s, when China increased its rare earth production and exports. Other Western and American companies exited the business altogether.
"We slowed production to … see what Chinese officials were going to do," Smith said. The company also was working to obtain a new mining permit from the California state government, a process Smith said took about 15 years.
During that time, Molycorp did not make any major facility upgrades because California regulations only allow equipment to be replaced with nearly identical systems - not the most advanced - until Sacramento approves a new permit. Its old permit expired early this decade, and mining had to stop until a new one was in hand.
Molycorp in 2004 got that new permit and a California-approved 30-year mining plan. Now, the U.S. firm is ready to upgrade Mountain Pass and significantly ramp up production there, Smith said.
The company's goal is to churn out 20,000 tons of rare earths by 2012, but without new sources of funding it could take up to 10 years, Smith said. Twenty thousand tons, he said, "would be enough to meet all U.S. needs - including defense needs - as well as much of the rest of the world's needs."
Smith said it could take up to $450 million to bring the Mountain Pass facility back to its former ability to produce 20,000 tons a year.
Lifton, who visited Mountain Pass in June, called the need for a U.S. source of rare earths crucial, but said Molycorp will be challenged to reach 20,000 tons in three years.
"They haven't been mining at Mountain Pass since 2002," Lifton said. "You don't start and stop mining like a truck."
Company officials are exploring a number of options to raise the capital needed to hit the 2012 objective, including private-sector and government sources.
Smith said he has met with officials in Washington about a number of federal funding options, including some Energy Department loan programs. And he hopes to receive funding support from private-sector firms.
In the end, Smith said he expects to raise the needed funds from a mix of public and private sources.
The company's 30-year mining plan envisions potentially doubling the annual 20,000-ton production rate, he said.
A 'Sea Change' at DoD
Company officials also have met with Pentagon officials, aiming to educate them about the rare earths market and China's dominance.
Smith said he does not seek military funding in these meetings. Rather, his message is that government officials should take steps to lock in sources of rare earths from outside Chinese control.
For years, the issue has not received high-level attention in the Defense Department because "these components are so far down the supply chain," Smith added.
But that is changing, sour-ces say.
"This is going to be an issue that's going to get a lot of scrutiny" from the Obama administration's Pentagon team, one DoD official said last month.
Pentagon officials have launched a comprehensive study to assess the origin of all raw materials and other components that go into American weapon systems, according to sources.
Lifton said he has seen a "sea change" in how Pentagon officials view rare earths in the last year.
Before, defense officials "felt like, 'We only need a small amount, and we can always get a little bit,'" Lifton said. But in recent months, he said, Pentagon brass came to understand that "it doesn't matter what the price is if China refuses to give us any."
The price of most rare earth materials has traditionally hovered around $4 or $5 per pound, but Chinese officials hiked prices to about $17 per pound last summer. Beijing has said it soon will usher in further production cuts and exports. Those moves are expected to again raise prices for most key rare elements.
"DoD needs to do something to get that [Mountain Pass] mine back into production" Lifton said, "because the military needs those metals."
E-mail: jbennett@defensenews.com.
Re: GEOPOLÍTICA
E o Brasil provavelmente deixando de ganhar! Ja que to pagando pra ver não ter minerais raros num país de tamanho continental como este!.
Re: GEOPOLÍTICA
South America little wars
Por Alex Sanchez
South America and Its Likelihood of a Season of Splendid Little Wars:
An Analysis of Arms Races and Regional Geopolitics
In mid-September, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton critiqued
Venezuela’s leader Hugo Chavez for his ongoing purchases of mostly
Russian military equipment, arguing that this could trigger an arms
race in South America. The statement has added fuel to the ongoing
discussions about what form South America’s rearmament is taking and
what this could come to mean for the security of the region.
The aim of this paper is to discuss the major arms purchases now going
on in South America and the likelihood of inter-state war breaking out
as the result.Ongoing reports about major purchases by Venezuela,
Brazil and Chile tend to blur the actual geo-security situation in the
region, as several countries, with Argentina as the most prominent
example, have carried out only limited military acquisitions. The
common perception is that an arms race raises the possibility of inter-
state war; however, the reality in South America (and Central America
as well) is that inter-state warfare has seldom occurred since World
War II. Additionally, regarding the arms race in South America, it is
misleading to assume that all South American countries are carrying
out their arm purchases with the same gusto as Brazil, Chile and
Venezuela.
It is generally assumed that South America is either already engaged
in an arms race or is about to enter one. This is somewhat
inconsistent because the start of an arms race is not easily defined.
It could also be argued that what is occurring is not so much a
general arms race as it is a product of certain militaries
capitalizing on weak civilian governments (an updated version of
former Uruguayan President Bordaberry in 1973) to increase their
defense budgets. Furthermore, in spite of domestic security issues in
several South American countries, most notably the insurgent movements
in Colombia and Peru as well as occasional inter-state tensions, the
reality is that inter-state wars in the region have been notably
scarce in the past few decades, which raises the question: is
interstate warfare necessarily the future of South America? The final
section of this article will discuss whether an arms race could lead
to general warfare.
An Arms Race of Levels
When discussing the current purchase of weaponry throughout South
America, there seems to be a universal, if misguided conclusion that
all purchases are occurring at the same level, and that they are all
potentially of an offensive nature. In terms of methodology, South
American countries will be separated into contrasting levels of the
intensity of weapons’ purchases in order to better portray which
countries are buying the most military equipment, and which might
arguably constitute more of a security threat for the region than
others.
Major spenders: Brazil, Chile, Venezuela
Without a doubt, the major military purchases by these three countries
are generally providing the axis around which statements concerning a
South American arms’ race are being made.
Brazil, the regional powerhouse, has embarked on an ambitious military
program in recent years. Its defense officials have announced that the
country will buy 250 Leopard 1 battle tanks, which will become the
cornerstone of its domestic protection system. In addition, as part of
its growing relations with France, Brazil recently announced that it
will purchase 36 Rafale warplanes; France will also provide Brasilia
with technological aid to build four Scorpene-type diesel-electric
submarines, as well as one nuclear-powered submarine, which will be
Brazil’s first. Issues continue to arise concerning the country’s
aviation inventory. According to reports, Brazil’s air fleet amounts
to over 720 planes, however, around 37% of them are grounded. A
September 2009 report stated that Brazil has also agreed to purchase
Eurocopters, which will become the country’s new medium-lift
helicopter (according to Defense Industry Daily, the Navy and Army
will each acquire 16, while the Air Force will be receiving 18).
Chile has made aggressive military purchases in the past decade.
Because of its geographic separation from Brazil and Venezuela, along
with its close political ties to Washington, it is not regarded as a
major security threat by the international media, though its immediate
neighbors, Argentina, Bolivia and Peru, might argue differently. The
numerous purchases made by the Chilean military include: 12 Super
Tucano planes from Brazil, dozens of F-16 planes from the U.S. and
Holland, two Scorpene-type submarines from France and 200 American
Humvee from General Motors.
Venezuela is regarded by American policymakers as the center of
development of a regional arms race. Hugo Chavez has made some of the
most public purchases of military equipment in recent months,
particularly from Russia and China. From China, Caracas has obtained
radar equipment (10 JYL-1 radars), and from Russia, Chavez has
purchased Sukhoi fighter jets, helicopters (models Mi-26, Mi-35, Mi-17
and Mi-28N) and 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles. In addition,
Russia is buying a Kalashnikov rifle factory in Venezuela, along with
an additional facility to produce ammunition. from China. Chavez’s
most recent world tour included a stop in Moscow where, during a
meeting with President Medvedev, the Venezuelan leader announced his
intention to purchase up to 92 Russian heavy battle tanks type T-72.
However, not all of this is new. Caracas’ plans for buying a Russian
S-300 air-missile system have been around for several years. In a 2008
article in the Russian news agency Ria Novosti, former Air Force
commander General Anatoly Kornukov explained that “needless to say,
should S-300s be delivered to Venezuela, they would effectively
strengthen its defense capability, and it would not be easy for its
possible adversaries to punish the country by striking at its oil
fields.”
Medium spenders with simmering armed conflicts: Colombia and Peru
Colombia has carried out a number of military acquisitions, most
notably the Black Hawk helicopters from the U.S., as well as 25 Super
Tucanos. An April 2009 press release by the Colombian army mentions
the visit of then-Colombian Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos to a
cadet school to present 5 new Black Hawks to the Army’s air force
brigade, a portion of the 15 helicopters of that model that Bogota has
acquired from Washington. According to the press release, the Army
alone possesses 50 Black Hawk helicopters and 23 Russian MI-17
helicopters. In June, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) delivered a
first batch of four upgraded Kfir fighter jets to the Colombian Air
Force. Nine others will be delivered by years’ end as part of a 2007
contract that cost $150 million. The seven bases where the U.S. will
base its forces within Colombia will add a further deterrent against
any country wishing to attack it.
Peru’s major purchases in the last several years have been four Lupo-
class Italian frigates to upgrade its navy. The country has also has
obtained a number of Sea King helicopters from the U.S. to use for
spare parts and emergency operations. The deal was part of
Washington’s surplus program and cost Peru $6 million. In addition,
Russia has repaired and upgraded 13 of the country’s Mi-17
helicopters.
Colombia and Peru are placed in a unique mid level category of the
region’s arms race, as both countries have ongoing internal armed
conflicts. Colombia’s war against the FARC and ELN continues, as well
as its far-less vigorously pursued struggles against the powerful
rightist drug cartels (now, fortunately, somewhat smaller than their
predecessors from the 1980s), and the activities of rogue rightist
paramilitary squads like the Aguilas Negras (Black Eagles). Similarly,
in Peru, the September 1st attack on a Mi-17 Peruvian Air Force
helicopter by members of the Andean terrorist movement Sendero
Luminoso (Shining Path), proved that the terrorist group’s remnant
factions in the VRAE (Valley of the Apurimac and Ene Rivers) are far
from defeated, even if their current force consists of merely around
200 combat troops. A brigade of Peruvian special forces has joined
regular troops in military operations in the VRAE region.
Peru’s purchases of the Lupo frigates can certainly be viewed as part
of the general South American arms race, especially when compared to
Chile’s aggressive purchases. The same can be said for Colombia’s Kfir
warplanes. Nevertheless, before Colombia and Peru can be regarded as
regional security threats, like Chile or arguably Venezuela, they
first need to deal with their internal security conflicts. A common
argument among militaries is that they are reluctant to be involved in
two-front wars due to the incredible drain on resources and other
complications that they bring; therefore, it is illogical to foresee
Bogota or Lima triggering external strife while fighting their own
internal battles against the FARC and ELN, and a resurgent Shining
Path, respectively. It is for these reasons that both Colombia and
Peru represent special circumstances in South America, as their
militaries and military purchases are generally aimed inwards to deal
with the insurgent movements, and not so much to guard their
respective borders.
Medium spenders: Bolivia and Ecuador
Both Bolivia and Ecuador have carried out, or are planning to carry
out, some significant military purchases. Ecuador’s major acquisitions
have been a fleet of 24 Super Tucanos from Brazil’s Embraer. In
addition, the country has acquired six unmanned Israeli surveillance
drones for patrolling purposes. From the point of view of the Peruvian
military, Quito poses a significant threat to Lima, due to its growing
relationship with Chile. In 2008, there were reports that Asmar, one
of Chile’s shipping companies, was upgrading two Ecuadorian Type
209-1300 submarines, while Ecuador had purchased two Chilean frigates.
La Paz, Bolivia, has obtained a $100 million credit from Russia that
will allow it to fulfill the military’s aspiration for modern
equipment, According to a recent MercoPress report, “the government of
President Evo Morales has come under strong criticism for having
approved the purchase of six Chinese built K-8 aircrafts with the
purpose of combating the drug trade and to control “sensitive regions”
of the country where the drug cartels prosper and have great
mobility.” The planes will cost $57.8 million. A recent report in
Bolivia’s daily La Razon verifies that the army is also planning to
purchase new standard rifles.
Low spenders: Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay
Twenty years ago, Argentina was one of Latin America’s most hegemonic
powers. Throughout its lengthy period of military ascendancy as well
as afterwards, the country flirted with the novel idea of developing a
nuclear program. The country’s military has never quite overcome the
legacy of the last epoch of military rule and its humiliating defeat
in the 1982 Falklands War. The 2001-2002 meltdown of the country’s
financial system all but eliminated the country’s military programs,
leaving them at their lowest point. Recent presidents, particularly
Nestor Kirchner, have proven particularly wary of increasing military
arms’ purchases, and are in fact, still pushing for the prosecution of
junta-era human rights abusers. From an acquisitions point of view,
Argentina has severely slashed its military purchases. Plans for
replacing its Mirage III warplane fleet have been put on hold
indefinitely, along with ambitions to acquire Russian Mi-17
helicopters. A local project to produce a light terrain military
vehicle, dubbed VLE Gaucho, has also been put on hold due to the lack
of an adequate budget.
A report in the September/October 2009 issue in Defence Helicopter
about the role of helicopters in South American armies explained that
Argentina has sought to upgrade up to 40 of its UH-1 helicopters in an
effort to extend their life by up to 20 years. An August 2009 article
by the Aerospace Daily & Defense Report found that with “at least 70
percent of defense spending [is] going toward personnel, little
remains for weapons acquisitions.” Argentina’s procurement has had to
rely on the second hand market, such was the case of its acquisition
of ex US Navy UH-3H Sea King utility helicopters to replace its
losses, and the 4 SAAB 340B regional airliners for LADE. In an
interview with COHA, Iñigo Guevara, a specialist in Latin American
defense industries and a CONACYT fellow at Georgetown University’s
Security Studies Program, said that “as far as I know, the Argentines
have only modernized seven helicopters. The military wants more but
there’s simply no money.”
Uruguay and Paraguay also have made only limited purchases. Lately,
Uruguay’s military seems to resemble that of a laid-back security
force, its use limited to use to humanitarian missions and
peacekeeping operations. In May 2008, Uruguayan blue helmets serving
in the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo received UN
medals for distinguished services. Uruguay also made headlines
recently as a result of lifting its ban on gays in the military, a law
enacted by the 1973-85 military dictatorship. In 2007, there was a
bizarre case of the Uruguayan military trying to buy 18,000 Iranian
HK2002 rifles (similar to the Kalashnikov assault rifle), with
Venezuela serving as an intermediary. Uruguayan parliamentary
investigators blocked the attempted purchase, according to an October
2007 Washington Times report. Regarding Paraguay, Guevara explains
“like Argentina, the Paraguayans don’t have the funds to modernize
their military, they’ll probably resort to Brazil for aid or cheap
deals.”
Minor spenders: Guyana, Suriname
Even though Guyana and Suriname usually deal more with the Caribbean
than with the rest of the sub-continent, they are both geographically
part of South America. As a first step in joining the South American
integration process, the two states joined UNASUR and the South
American Defense Council. Militarily speaking, both countries do not
pose a significant security threat to their immediate neighbors
(Venezuela, Brazils and French Guyana), and in any case, both
countries are primarily focused on domestic security issues,
particularly drug trafficking. Regarding Guyana, a 2008 Caribbean
Media Corporation article explains how the Bharrat Jagdeo
administration spent 100 million GUY dollars ($491,091) to purchase
forensic equipment, firearms and ammunition for the local police to
tackle local gang activity. In 2008, Brazil offered Guyana security
equipment, including Global Positioning Systems, night goggles and
helmets. Brazil plays a predominant role in regard to its influence
primarily over Guyana, but also to a significant degree over Suriname.
Meanwhile, Suriname’s military is increasingly turning to both the
U.S. and China in an effort to improve its bilateral military and
economic options. However, weakening these attempts is the former
notorious military strongman, Desire Bouterse, who has been on trial
for years for abuses, including murder committed during his
dictatorship.
Of the twelve countries in the sub-continent, at least five have
carried out a relatively low amount of military purchases in recent
years. Certainly, Argentina is a surprise member on this low-level
list. Of the three major spenders in the region, Brazil and Venezuela
receive the most media attention, which only feeds the idea of a major
regional arms race throughout the continent. This is especially the
case since Brazil has plans for constructing a nuclear submarine with
French aid (though this dream dates back to the time of the military
junta and has thus far been unsuccessful; sources say that the nuclear-
powered submarine, ideally, will be finished by 2015). Ironically, it
is Chile, perhaps the country that has received the least attention,
that should be regarded as theoretically a growing security threat, as
Santiago has border issues with all three of its neighbors.
A final issue that should be mentioned is that military officials
usually tend to describe military equipment as “offensive” or
“defensive” in nature, generally using the former to describe the
purchases meant to protect against neighboring states, while labeling
the latter for their own acquisitions for offensive tactics. Indeed,
militaries like to define themselves as peaceful in nature, describing
new weaponry as necessary to maintain a deterrent against possible
aggressions – hence security ministries are usually labeled as
“ministries of defense,” since “ministries of war” sounds too
aggressive. In an interview with COHA, an analyst at the Federation of
American Scientists explained that “labeling weapons as offensive/
defensive is very misleading.” He goes on to argue that “some weapons
can have predominant defensive roles at the tactical level but, at the
strategic level, they could be used to further an invasion or other
offensive actions (and vice versa).”
Wars since 1941 in Latin America
Discussions that question whether or not South America is headed
towards an arms race, or already is involved in one, tend to raise
fears of an eventual inter-state conflict. However, it is often
overlooked that inter-state wars in Latin America have seldom occurred
since World War II, as a brief listing of them will establish:
• 1941: A three-day war between Peru and Ecuador. Ecuadorian troops
invaded northern Peru but were successfully repelled. The Peruvian
army took the offensive and temporarily occupied the Ecuadorian
province known as El Oro.
• 1969: The “Soccer War” or “100 Hour War” between Honduras and El
Salvador.
• 1981 and 1995: Conflict broke out between Peru and Ecuador. Military
operations occurred but were short lived only lasting a few weeks and
casualties were relatively minor. The hostilities were limited to
specific areas in the border highlands in Paquisha and Cenepa.
• 1982: The Falklands War/Guerra de las Malvinas. Though one of the
belligerents was not a Latin American state, this war is still worth
mentioning. Argentina, then under military junta, decided to invade
the Malvinas (Falklands), which had been a matter of dispute for
decades with the United Kingdom. The UK forces defeated the
Argentines, speeding the dissolution of the Argentina junta and
expedited the country’s return to civilian rule.
• U.S. military operations: For the sake of argument, it is worth
mentioning that the U.S. carried out military operations in the
Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989.
• Also, it should be noted that the last “great” conflict in South
America was the Chaco War in 1932-35.
War and Peace in South America; Arms Purchases Do Not Make an Arms’
Race
As different analyses of the mounting arms race point out, there are
some ongoing disputes between different South American countries,
especially between Venezuela (at the level of heads of state) and
Colombia, and Peru and Chile. Below is a brief list of ongoing
tensions and disputes between Latin American countries:
• Peru and Chile: Historical tensions tracing back to the 19th century
War of the Pacific include an ongoing Santiago-initiated dispute over
the maritime border between the neighboring countries.
• Bolivia and Chile: La Paz presses demands that Chile should return
the coastal territories it has occupied since the War of the Pacific.
• Argentina and Chile: Both countries dispute their exact borders;
there is a disagreement about the dividing line along the Southern
Patagonian ice fields. In 1894, the countries signed a Peace and
Friendship Treaty. However, in 1978 the countries seemed to be
drifting towards war, but the Pope intervened and mediated the fracas.
It is all but certain that Pinochet provided Margaret Thatcher’s
government with intelligence that helped London defeat Argentina in
the Falklands War.
• Peru and Ecuador: Even though there has not been warfare between the
two countries since the 1995 incident in the Cenepa region and the
resulting 1998 Treaty, tensions have occasionally arisen. Peru is
preoccupied over the fact that Ecuador is a close ally of Chile,
Peru’s historical nemesis.
• Venezuela and Guyana: Caracas historically has claimed up to 1/3 of
Guyanese territory, dating back to the end of the 19th century. In
1966, after a tripartite agreement between Venezuela, Guyana and the
United Kingdom, Venezuelan soldiers and civilians entered Guyanese
territory, namely the Guyanese side of the Ankoko island. The
Venezuelans built an airstrip there, as well as a military outpost. In
February 1970, Venezuelan and Guyanese soldiers engaged in a
firefight, though no injuries were reported. Fears of a Venezuelan
buildup at the time did not translate into major military operations.
In 2007, a Venezuelan general and 36 soldiers entered Guyanese
territory apparently with the intention of blowing up an improvised
dam set up by illegal gold diggers. It was never confirmed why this
operation took place, and whether Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had
given the order to enter Guyana.
• Guatemala and Belize: These countries have a historical boarder
dispute in which Guatemala claims major amounts of Belizean territory.
Land claims have moderated however, as conciliatory discussions have
taken place over the past few decades. Belize declared independence
from its protector, the United Kingdom in 1975, but Guatemala only
recognized Belize as a sovereign entity in 1994. However, the two
countries have never lapsed into armed conflict against each other.
• Colombia and Nicaragua: Both countries claim the ownership of the
San Andres and Providencia Islands.
• Bolivia and Paraguay: While these countries have had amicable
relations for the most part, military buildups have caused some
concern due to the persisting memory of the bloody 1932-1935 Chaco
War. La Paz became concerned after Asuncion hosted a number of
military exercises with U.S. National Guard units. More recently,
Asuncion asked for more information about La Paz’s military purchases
from Russia after news began to circulate of a $100 million credit
issued by Moscow for the purpose of weapons’ acquisitions.
• For further information, consult Ivelaw Griffith’s 2003 article,
“The Caribbean Security Scenario at the Dawn of the 21st century:
Continuity, Change, Challenge,” which provides a thorough list of all
the recent disputes between the Caribbean Basin states, focusing
especially on divisive issues among the Caribbean island states.
Close Calls and the Falklands Scenario
Over the past several decades, there have been a number of instances
in which two South American countries came very close to engaging in
conflict, but never actually broke out in combat. An example is the
historically and often tumultuous Colombian-Venezuelan relationship.
Although it was difficult to imagine actual clashes between the two
governments before Uribe and Chavez held office, there has been at
least one situation that could potentially have led to an armed
conflict. In August 1987 the Colombian warship Caldas entered the oil-
rich Venezuelan Gulf, an area that both countries claimed as their
own. Venezuelan president at the time, Jaime Lusinchi, reacted by
deploying a squadron of the country’s F-16 planes to fly over the
Colombian warship. Tensions reached their peak when the Colombian
frigate Independiente and submarine Tayrona also entered the Gulf,
ready to strike at Venezuelan targets. OAS Secretary General Joao
Clemente Baena and Argentine President Raul Alfonsin managed to act as
mediators; finally convincing Colombia to pull its units back, and
allowing the situation to cool.
Peru and Chile also came close to armed engagement in the 1970s when
Peru was ruled by General Juan Velasco Alvarado and Chile by General
Augusto Pinochet. In August 1975, it was widely expected that both
countries would resort to arms, as Peru had purchased massive amounts
of Soviet military equipment, and Velasco was planning to attack Chile
to regain Peru’s lost territories. However, an outbreak of violence
failed to occur due to last minute complicating issues within the
Velasco government.
Throughout the period of military rub in Latin America from the
1960s-1980s, there failed to be inter-state wars, lest one. The
exception was the Argentine-British war over the Falklands/Malvinas
Islands. The cause of this war is generally seen as arising from the
Argentine junta’s desperation to switch national attention away from
the ongoing domestic crises taking place within Argentina, such as its
rapidly deteriorating economy and the mass protests against military
rule.
Arms Race = War ?
A major question that must be raised is whether a South America arms
race necessarily leads to war. As previously explained, even though
there exists ongoing tensions among a number of South American
countries, actual inter-state wars are few and far between, and
historically have not been long lasting. Apart from ongoing disputes
(usually as a result of two countries claiming the same piece of
land), there have been a number of “close calls” throughout the
decades, but none of them actually have evolved into open warfare
other than those cited here. The last major war in the region would
have been the Chaco War, close to 80 years ago.
Regarding Venezuela’s recent mass purchases of Russian military
equipment, as well as Chavez’s often controversial comments, there is
growing concern among his critics that Chavez may make a move a la
Argentina (Argentine style). In other words, his government may resort
to starting an armed conflict in order to divert attention from
ongoing domestic problems, thereby rallying the Venezuelan population
behind him. Venezuela dismisses such a theory as out of hand.
Various explanations have been proposed to explain the lack of inter-
state warfare. Experts point to U.S. influence, the outreach of the
inter-American system, or technical peace-keeping mechanism provided
by the OAS. Another explanation may be that countries are now
resorting to legal processes when it comes to conflict resolution, for
example Peru and Chile have sent their current maritime border dispute
to The Hague. Then there is the theory of the general movement
regarding the integration of South America. With easier modes of
communication and transportation readily available, general
populations and their officials can interact with individuals from
other nations, resulting in the possibility of long-term periods of
good will. In an interview with COHA, a retired Colombian general
explained that relations between the Colombian and Venezuelan
militaries are generally good – when differences arise, they tend to
be exclusively at the political level.
Military officials point to the complications of military diplomacy as
deterrents for the outbreak of inter-state warfare. In an interview, a
senior Peruvian army commander explained that “the nature of war has
changed as exemplified by the American military engagements in
Afghanistan and Iraq… if you want to occupy a territory you gain
through war; you have to figure out what to do with the local
population, which nowadays numbers in the millions.” In other words,
countries presently seem less interested in acting aggressively
towards each other, because issues arise even for the victors, such as
having to deal with the cost and burden of local populations in gained
territories.
Casus Belli in Latin America
The idea that an arms race could inevitably lead to inter-state
warfare is currently being put to the test in South America. It is
safe to make this claim today while the sub-continent is embarking on
an arms race, however two factors come into play with such a process.
One factor being that history has shown that since World War II (or
even since the Chaco War), inter-state war has been generally and
mercifully scarce in the region, as well as short lived (even on the
rare occasions of military governments making major arms’ purchases).
The second factor being that the current South American arms race is
one of varying levels, in that not every country is carrying out
massive military purchases like the case with Brazil, Chile and
Venezuela.
Thus, the question arises whether or not those discussing the
possibility of an outbreak of war may have some credibility to their
position. Predicting warfare is an inexact science, and, as Latin
America has proven so far, massive arms purchases have not necessarily
provoked inter-state war.
Alex Sanchez is a COHA Research Fellow. This article was originally
published by COHA on
Oct 2, 2009.
Por Alex Sanchez
South America and Its Likelihood of a Season of Splendid Little Wars:
An Analysis of Arms Races and Regional Geopolitics
In mid-September, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton critiqued
Venezuela’s leader Hugo Chavez for his ongoing purchases of mostly
Russian military equipment, arguing that this could trigger an arms
race in South America. The statement has added fuel to the ongoing
discussions about what form South America’s rearmament is taking and
what this could come to mean for the security of the region.
The aim of this paper is to discuss the major arms purchases now going
on in South America and the likelihood of inter-state war breaking out
as the result.Ongoing reports about major purchases by Venezuela,
Brazil and Chile tend to blur the actual geo-security situation in the
region, as several countries, with Argentina as the most prominent
example, have carried out only limited military acquisitions. The
common perception is that an arms race raises the possibility of inter-
state war; however, the reality in South America (and Central America
as well) is that inter-state warfare has seldom occurred since World
War II. Additionally, regarding the arms race in South America, it is
misleading to assume that all South American countries are carrying
out their arm purchases with the same gusto as Brazil, Chile and
Venezuela.
It is generally assumed that South America is either already engaged
in an arms race or is about to enter one. This is somewhat
inconsistent because the start of an arms race is not easily defined.
It could also be argued that what is occurring is not so much a
general arms race as it is a product of certain militaries
capitalizing on weak civilian governments (an updated version of
former Uruguayan President Bordaberry in 1973) to increase their
defense budgets. Furthermore, in spite of domestic security issues in
several South American countries, most notably the insurgent movements
in Colombia and Peru as well as occasional inter-state tensions, the
reality is that inter-state wars in the region have been notably
scarce in the past few decades, which raises the question: is
interstate warfare necessarily the future of South America? The final
section of this article will discuss whether an arms race could lead
to general warfare.
An Arms Race of Levels
When discussing the current purchase of weaponry throughout South
America, there seems to be a universal, if misguided conclusion that
all purchases are occurring at the same level, and that they are all
potentially of an offensive nature. In terms of methodology, South
American countries will be separated into contrasting levels of the
intensity of weapons’ purchases in order to better portray which
countries are buying the most military equipment, and which might
arguably constitute more of a security threat for the region than
others.
Major spenders: Brazil, Chile, Venezuela
Without a doubt, the major military purchases by these three countries
are generally providing the axis around which statements concerning a
South American arms’ race are being made.
Brazil, the regional powerhouse, has embarked on an ambitious military
program in recent years. Its defense officials have announced that the
country will buy 250 Leopard 1 battle tanks, which will become the
cornerstone of its domestic protection system. In addition, as part of
its growing relations with France, Brazil recently announced that it
will purchase 36 Rafale warplanes; France will also provide Brasilia
with technological aid to build four Scorpene-type diesel-electric
submarines, as well as one nuclear-powered submarine, which will be
Brazil’s first. Issues continue to arise concerning the country’s
aviation inventory. According to reports, Brazil’s air fleet amounts
to over 720 planes, however, around 37% of them are grounded. A
September 2009 report stated that Brazil has also agreed to purchase
Eurocopters, which will become the country’s new medium-lift
helicopter (according to Defense Industry Daily, the Navy and Army
will each acquire 16, while the Air Force will be receiving 18).
Chile has made aggressive military purchases in the past decade.
Because of its geographic separation from Brazil and Venezuela, along
with its close political ties to Washington, it is not regarded as a
major security threat by the international media, though its immediate
neighbors, Argentina, Bolivia and Peru, might argue differently. The
numerous purchases made by the Chilean military include: 12 Super
Tucano planes from Brazil, dozens of F-16 planes from the U.S. and
Holland, two Scorpene-type submarines from France and 200 American
Humvee from General Motors.
Venezuela is regarded by American policymakers as the center of
development of a regional arms race. Hugo Chavez has made some of the
most public purchases of military equipment in recent months,
particularly from Russia and China. From China, Caracas has obtained
radar equipment (10 JYL-1 radars), and from Russia, Chavez has
purchased Sukhoi fighter jets, helicopters (models Mi-26, Mi-35, Mi-17
and Mi-28N) and 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles. In addition,
Russia is buying a Kalashnikov rifle factory in Venezuela, along with
an additional facility to produce ammunition. from China. Chavez’s
most recent world tour included a stop in Moscow where, during a
meeting with President Medvedev, the Venezuelan leader announced his
intention to purchase up to 92 Russian heavy battle tanks type T-72.
However, not all of this is new. Caracas’ plans for buying a Russian
S-300 air-missile system have been around for several years. In a 2008
article in the Russian news agency Ria Novosti, former Air Force
commander General Anatoly Kornukov explained that “needless to say,
should S-300s be delivered to Venezuela, they would effectively
strengthen its defense capability, and it would not be easy for its
possible adversaries to punish the country by striking at its oil
fields.”
Medium spenders with simmering armed conflicts: Colombia and Peru
Colombia has carried out a number of military acquisitions, most
notably the Black Hawk helicopters from the U.S., as well as 25 Super
Tucanos. An April 2009 press release by the Colombian army mentions
the visit of then-Colombian Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos to a
cadet school to present 5 new Black Hawks to the Army’s air force
brigade, a portion of the 15 helicopters of that model that Bogota has
acquired from Washington. According to the press release, the Army
alone possesses 50 Black Hawk helicopters and 23 Russian MI-17
helicopters. In June, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) delivered a
first batch of four upgraded Kfir fighter jets to the Colombian Air
Force. Nine others will be delivered by years’ end as part of a 2007
contract that cost $150 million. The seven bases where the U.S. will
base its forces within Colombia will add a further deterrent against
any country wishing to attack it.
Peru’s major purchases in the last several years have been four Lupo-
class Italian frigates to upgrade its navy. The country has also has
obtained a number of Sea King helicopters from the U.S. to use for
spare parts and emergency operations. The deal was part of
Washington’s surplus program and cost Peru $6 million. In addition,
Russia has repaired and upgraded 13 of the country’s Mi-17
helicopters.
Colombia and Peru are placed in a unique mid level category of the
region’s arms race, as both countries have ongoing internal armed
conflicts. Colombia’s war against the FARC and ELN continues, as well
as its far-less vigorously pursued struggles against the powerful
rightist drug cartels (now, fortunately, somewhat smaller than their
predecessors from the 1980s), and the activities of rogue rightist
paramilitary squads like the Aguilas Negras (Black Eagles). Similarly,
in Peru, the September 1st attack on a Mi-17 Peruvian Air Force
helicopter by members of the Andean terrorist movement Sendero
Luminoso (Shining Path), proved that the terrorist group’s remnant
factions in the VRAE (Valley of the Apurimac and Ene Rivers) are far
from defeated, even if their current force consists of merely around
200 combat troops. A brigade of Peruvian special forces has joined
regular troops in military operations in the VRAE region.
Peru’s purchases of the Lupo frigates can certainly be viewed as part
of the general South American arms race, especially when compared to
Chile’s aggressive purchases. The same can be said for Colombia’s Kfir
warplanes. Nevertheless, before Colombia and Peru can be regarded as
regional security threats, like Chile or arguably Venezuela, they
first need to deal with their internal security conflicts. A common
argument among militaries is that they are reluctant to be involved in
two-front wars due to the incredible drain on resources and other
complications that they bring; therefore, it is illogical to foresee
Bogota or Lima triggering external strife while fighting their own
internal battles against the FARC and ELN, and a resurgent Shining
Path, respectively. It is for these reasons that both Colombia and
Peru represent special circumstances in South America, as their
militaries and military purchases are generally aimed inwards to deal
with the insurgent movements, and not so much to guard their
respective borders.
Medium spenders: Bolivia and Ecuador
Both Bolivia and Ecuador have carried out, or are planning to carry
out, some significant military purchases. Ecuador’s major acquisitions
have been a fleet of 24 Super Tucanos from Brazil’s Embraer. In
addition, the country has acquired six unmanned Israeli surveillance
drones for patrolling purposes. From the point of view of the Peruvian
military, Quito poses a significant threat to Lima, due to its growing
relationship with Chile. In 2008, there were reports that Asmar, one
of Chile’s shipping companies, was upgrading two Ecuadorian Type
209-1300 submarines, while Ecuador had purchased two Chilean frigates.
La Paz, Bolivia, has obtained a $100 million credit from Russia that
will allow it to fulfill the military’s aspiration for modern
equipment, According to a recent MercoPress report, “the government of
President Evo Morales has come under strong criticism for having
approved the purchase of six Chinese built K-8 aircrafts with the
purpose of combating the drug trade and to control “sensitive regions”
of the country where the drug cartels prosper and have great
mobility.” The planes will cost $57.8 million. A recent report in
Bolivia’s daily La Razon verifies that the army is also planning to
purchase new standard rifles.
Low spenders: Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay
Twenty years ago, Argentina was one of Latin America’s most hegemonic
powers. Throughout its lengthy period of military ascendancy as well
as afterwards, the country flirted with the novel idea of developing a
nuclear program. The country’s military has never quite overcome the
legacy of the last epoch of military rule and its humiliating defeat
in the 1982 Falklands War. The 2001-2002 meltdown of the country’s
financial system all but eliminated the country’s military programs,
leaving them at their lowest point. Recent presidents, particularly
Nestor Kirchner, have proven particularly wary of increasing military
arms’ purchases, and are in fact, still pushing for the prosecution of
junta-era human rights abusers. From an acquisitions point of view,
Argentina has severely slashed its military purchases. Plans for
replacing its Mirage III warplane fleet have been put on hold
indefinitely, along with ambitions to acquire Russian Mi-17
helicopters. A local project to produce a light terrain military
vehicle, dubbed VLE Gaucho, has also been put on hold due to the lack
of an adequate budget.
A report in the September/October 2009 issue in Defence Helicopter
about the role of helicopters in South American armies explained that
Argentina has sought to upgrade up to 40 of its UH-1 helicopters in an
effort to extend their life by up to 20 years. An August 2009 article
by the Aerospace Daily & Defense Report found that with “at least 70
percent of defense spending [is] going toward personnel, little
remains for weapons acquisitions.” Argentina’s procurement has had to
rely on the second hand market, such was the case of its acquisition
of ex US Navy UH-3H Sea King utility helicopters to replace its
losses, and the 4 SAAB 340B regional airliners for LADE. In an
interview with COHA, Iñigo Guevara, a specialist in Latin American
defense industries and a CONACYT fellow at Georgetown University’s
Security Studies Program, said that “as far as I know, the Argentines
have only modernized seven helicopters. The military wants more but
there’s simply no money.”
Uruguay and Paraguay also have made only limited purchases. Lately,
Uruguay’s military seems to resemble that of a laid-back security
force, its use limited to use to humanitarian missions and
peacekeeping operations. In May 2008, Uruguayan blue helmets serving
in the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo received UN
medals for distinguished services. Uruguay also made headlines
recently as a result of lifting its ban on gays in the military, a law
enacted by the 1973-85 military dictatorship. In 2007, there was a
bizarre case of the Uruguayan military trying to buy 18,000 Iranian
HK2002 rifles (similar to the Kalashnikov assault rifle), with
Venezuela serving as an intermediary. Uruguayan parliamentary
investigators blocked the attempted purchase, according to an October
2007 Washington Times report. Regarding Paraguay, Guevara explains
“like Argentina, the Paraguayans don’t have the funds to modernize
their military, they’ll probably resort to Brazil for aid or cheap
deals.”
Minor spenders: Guyana, Suriname
Even though Guyana and Suriname usually deal more with the Caribbean
than with the rest of the sub-continent, they are both geographically
part of South America. As a first step in joining the South American
integration process, the two states joined UNASUR and the South
American Defense Council. Militarily speaking, both countries do not
pose a significant security threat to their immediate neighbors
(Venezuela, Brazils and French Guyana), and in any case, both
countries are primarily focused on domestic security issues,
particularly drug trafficking. Regarding Guyana, a 2008 Caribbean
Media Corporation article explains how the Bharrat Jagdeo
administration spent 100 million GUY dollars ($491,091) to purchase
forensic equipment, firearms and ammunition for the local police to
tackle local gang activity. In 2008, Brazil offered Guyana security
equipment, including Global Positioning Systems, night goggles and
helmets. Brazil plays a predominant role in regard to its influence
primarily over Guyana, but also to a significant degree over Suriname.
Meanwhile, Suriname’s military is increasingly turning to both the
U.S. and China in an effort to improve its bilateral military and
economic options. However, weakening these attempts is the former
notorious military strongman, Desire Bouterse, who has been on trial
for years for abuses, including murder committed during his
dictatorship.
Of the twelve countries in the sub-continent, at least five have
carried out a relatively low amount of military purchases in recent
years. Certainly, Argentina is a surprise member on this low-level
list. Of the three major spenders in the region, Brazil and Venezuela
receive the most media attention, which only feeds the idea of a major
regional arms race throughout the continent. This is especially the
case since Brazil has plans for constructing a nuclear submarine with
French aid (though this dream dates back to the time of the military
junta and has thus far been unsuccessful; sources say that the nuclear-
powered submarine, ideally, will be finished by 2015). Ironically, it
is Chile, perhaps the country that has received the least attention,
that should be regarded as theoretically a growing security threat, as
Santiago has border issues with all three of its neighbors.
A final issue that should be mentioned is that military officials
usually tend to describe military equipment as “offensive” or
“defensive” in nature, generally using the former to describe the
purchases meant to protect against neighboring states, while labeling
the latter for their own acquisitions for offensive tactics. Indeed,
militaries like to define themselves as peaceful in nature, describing
new weaponry as necessary to maintain a deterrent against possible
aggressions – hence security ministries are usually labeled as
“ministries of defense,” since “ministries of war” sounds too
aggressive. In an interview with COHA, an analyst at the Federation of
American Scientists explained that “labeling weapons as offensive/
defensive is very misleading.” He goes on to argue that “some weapons
can have predominant defensive roles at the tactical level but, at the
strategic level, they could be used to further an invasion or other
offensive actions (and vice versa).”
Wars since 1941 in Latin America
Discussions that question whether or not South America is headed
towards an arms race, or already is involved in one, tend to raise
fears of an eventual inter-state conflict. However, it is often
overlooked that inter-state wars in Latin America have seldom occurred
since World War II, as a brief listing of them will establish:
• 1941: A three-day war between Peru and Ecuador. Ecuadorian troops
invaded northern Peru but were successfully repelled. The Peruvian
army took the offensive and temporarily occupied the Ecuadorian
province known as El Oro.
• 1969: The “Soccer War” or “100 Hour War” between Honduras and El
Salvador.
• 1981 and 1995: Conflict broke out between Peru and Ecuador. Military
operations occurred but were short lived only lasting a few weeks and
casualties were relatively minor. The hostilities were limited to
specific areas in the border highlands in Paquisha and Cenepa.
• 1982: The Falklands War/Guerra de las Malvinas. Though one of the
belligerents was not a Latin American state, this war is still worth
mentioning. Argentina, then under military junta, decided to invade
the Malvinas (Falklands), which had been a matter of dispute for
decades with the United Kingdom. The UK forces defeated the
Argentines, speeding the dissolution of the Argentina junta and
expedited the country’s return to civilian rule.
• U.S. military operations: For the sake of argument, it is worth
mentioning that the U.S. carried out military operations in the
Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989.
• Also, it should be noted that the last “great” conflict in South
America was the Chaco War in 1932-35.
War and Peace in South America; Arms Purchases Do Not Make an Arms’
Race
As different analyses of the mounting arms race point out, there are
some ongoing disputes between different South American countries,
especially between Venezuela (at the level of heads of state) and
Colombia, and Peru and Chile. Below is a brief list of ongoing
tensions and disputes between Latin American countries:
• Peru and Chile: Historical tensions tracing back to the 19th century
War of the Pacific include an ongoing Santiago-initiated dispute over
the maritime border between the neighboring countries.
• Bolivia and Chile: La Paz presses demands that Chile should return
the coastal territories it has occupied since the War of the Pacific.
• Argentina and Chile: Both countries dispute their exact borders;
there is a disagreement about the dividing line along the Southern
Patagonian ice fields. In 1894, the countries signed a Peace and
Friendship Treaty. However, in 1978 the countries seemed to be
drifting towards war, but the Pope intervened and mediated the fracas.
It is all but certain that Pinochet provided Margaret Thatcher’s
government with intelligence that helped London defeat Argentina in
the Falklands War.
• Peru and Ecuador: Even though there has not been warfare between the
two countries since the 1995 incident in the Cenepa region and the
resulting 1998 Treaty, tensions have occasionally arisen. Peru is
preoccupied over the fact that Ecuador is a close ally of Chile,
Peru’s historical nemesis.
• Venezuela and Guyana: Caracas historically has claimed up to 1/3 of
Guyanese territory, dating back to the end of the 19th century. In
1966, after a tripartite agreement between Venezuela, Guyana and the
United Kingdom, Venezuelan soldiers and civilians entered Guyanese
territory, namely the Guyanese side of the Ankoko island. The
Venezuelans built an airstrip there, as well as a military outpost. In
February 1970, Venezuelan and Guyanese soldiers engaged in a
firefight, though no injuries were reported. Fears of a Venezuelan
buildup at the time did not translate into major military operations.
In 2007, a Venezuelan general and 36 soldiers entered Guyanese
territory apparently with the intention of blowing up an improvised
dam set up by illegal gold diggers. It was never confirmed why this
operation took place, and whether Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had
given the order to enter Guyana.
• Guatemala and Belize: These countries have a historical boarder
dispute in which Guatemala claims major amounts of Belizean territory.
Land claims have moderated however, as conciliatory discussions have
taken place over the past few decades. Belize declared independence
from its protector, the United Kingdom in 1975, but Guatemala only
recognized Belize as a sovereign entity in 1994. However, the two
countries have never lapsed into armed conflict against each other.
• Colombia and Nicaragua: Both countries claim the ownership of the
San Andres and Providencia Islands.
• Bolivia and Paraguay: While these countries have had amicable
relations for the most part, military buildups have caused some
concern due to the persisting memory of the bloody 1932-1935 Chaco
War. La Paz became concerned after Asuncion hosted a number of
military exercises with U.S. National Guard units. More recently,
Asuncion asked for more information about La Paz’s military purchases
from Russia after news began to circulate of a $100 million credit
issued by Moscow for the purpose of weapons’ acquisitions.
• For further information, consult Ivelaw Griffith’s 2003 article,
“The Caribbean Security Scenario at the Dawn of the 21st century:
Continuity, Change, Challenge,” which provides a thorough list of all
the recent disputes between the Caribbean Basin states, focusing
especially on divisive issues among the Caribbean island states.
Close Calls and the Falklands Scenario
Over the past several decades, there have been a number of instances
in which two South American countries came very close to engaging in
conflict, but never actually broke out in combat. An example is the
historically and often tumultuous Colombian-Venezuelan relationship.
Although it was difficult to imagine actual clashes between the two
governments before Uribe and Chavez held office, there has been at
least one situation that could potentially have led to an armed
conflict. In August 1987 the Colombian warship Caldas entered the oil-
rich Venezuelan Gulf, an area that both countries claimed as their
own. Venezuelan president at the time, Jaime Lusinchi, reacted by
deploying a squadron of the country’s F-16 planes to fly over the
Colombian warship. Tensions reached their peak when the Colombian
frigate Independiente and submarine Tayrona also entered the Gulf,
ready to strike at Venezuelan targets. OAS Secretary General Joao
Clemente Baena and Argentine President Raul Alfonsin managed to act as
mediators; finally convincing Colombia to pull its units back, and
allowing the situation to cool.
Peru and Chile also came close to armed engagement in the 1970s when
Peru was ruled by General Juan Velasco Alvarado and Chile by General
Augusto Pinochet. In August 1975, it was widely expected that both
countries would resort to arms, as Peru had purchased massive amounts
of Soviet military equipment, and Velasco was planning to attack Chile
to regain Peru’s lost territories. However, an outbreak of violence
failed to occur due to last minute complicating issues within the
Velasco government.
Throughout the period of military rub in Latin America from the
1960s-1980s, there failed to be inter-state wars, lest one. The
exception was the Argentine-British war over the Falklands/Malvinas
Islands. The cause of this war is generally seen as arising from the
Argentine junta’s desperation to switch national attention away from
the ongoing domestic crises taking place within Argentina, such as its
rapidly deteriorating economy and the mass protests against military
rule.
Arms Race = War ?
A major question that must be raised is whether a South America arms
race necessarily leads to war. As previously explained, even though
there exists ongoing tensions among a number of South American
countries, actual inter-state wars are few and far between, and
historically have not been long lasting. Apart from ongoing disputes
(usually as a result of two countries claiming the same piece of
land), there have been a number of “close calls” throughout the
decades, but none of them actually have evolved into open warfare
other than those cited here. The last major war in the region would
have been the Chaco War, close to 80 years ago.
Regarding Venezuela’s recent mass purchases of Russian military
equipment, as well as Chavez’s often controversial comments, there is
growing concern among his critics that Chavez may make a move a la
Argentina (Argentine style). In other words, his government may resort
to starting an armed conflict in order to divert attention from
ongoing domestic problems, thereby rallying the Venezuelan population
behind him. Venezuela dismisses such a theory as out of hand.
Various explanations have been proposed to explain the lack of inter-
state warfare. Experts point to U.S. influence, the outreach of the
inter-American system, or technical peace-keeping mechanism provided
by the OAS. Another explanation may be that countries are now
resorting to legal processes when it comes to conflict resolution, for
example Peru and Chile have sent their current maritime border dispute
to The Hague. Then there is the theory of the general movement
regarding the integration of South America. With easier modes of
communication and transportation readily available, general
populations and their officials can interact with individuals from
other nations, resulting in the possibility of long-term periods of
good will. In an interview with COHA, a retired Colombian general
explained that relations between the Colombian and Venezuelan
militaries are generally good – when differences arise, they tend to
be exclusively at the political level.
Military officials point to the complications of military diplomacy as
deterrents for the outbreak of inter-state warfare. In an interview, a
senior Peruvian army commander explained that “the nature of war has
changed as exemplified by the American military engagements in
Afghanistan and Iraq… if you want to occupy a territory you gain
through war; you have to figure out what to do with the local
population, which nowadays numbers in the millions.” In other words,
countries presently seem less interested in acting aggressively
towards each other, because issues arise even for the victors, such as
having to deal with the cost and burden of local populations in gained
territories.
Casus Belli in Latin America
The idea that an arms race could inevitably lead to inter-state
warfare is currently being put to the test in South America. It is
safe to make this claim today while the sub-continent is embarking on
an arms race, however two factors come into play with such a process.
One factor being that history has shown that since World War II (or
even since the Chaco War), inter-state war has been generally and
mercifully scarce in the region, as well as short lived (even on the
rare occasions of military governments making major arms’ purchases).
The second factor being that the current South American arms race is
one of varying levels, in that not every country is carrying out
massive military purchases like the case with Brazil, Chile and
Venezuela.
Thus, the question arises whether or not those discussing the
possibility of an outbreak of war may have some credibility to their
position. Predicting warfare is an inexact science, and, as Latin
America has proven so far, massive arms purchases have not necessarily
provoked inter-state war.
Alex Sanchez is a COHA Research Fellow. This article was originally
published by COHA on
Oct 2, 2009.
"A reconquista da soberania perdida não restabelece o status quo."
Barão do Rio Branco
Barão do Rio Branco
Re: GEOPOLÍTICA
'Apenas a ponta de um iceberg'
Chávez mandou mais dinheiro aos Kirchner do que o apreendido no escândalo da mala, diz jornalista
BUENOS AIRES. Em agosto de 2007, em plena campanha eleitoral argentina, os governos dos presidentes Hugo Chávez e Néstor Kirchner (a atual presidente, Cristina Kirchner, era candidata) protagonizaram o chamado "escândalo da mala". O caso foi investigado pelo jornalista argentino Hugo Alconada Mon, ex-correspondente do jornal "La Nacion" em Washington, que acaba de lançar o livro "Os segredos da mala".
Janaína Figueiredo
Qual é sua conclusão, depois de mais de dois anos de investigação?
HUGO ALCONADA MON: A sensação que eu tive sempre foi de que o escândalo da mala era a ponta de um iceberg, que havia mais dinheiro no mesmo voo (Alconada revelou que no voo de Antonini foram transportados cerca de US$5 milhões, cerca de R$8,5 milhões, dos quais somente US$800 mil, ou R$1,4 milhão, foram retidos pela polícia da Argentina), e também mais voos.
Mais voos entre Caracas e Buenos Aires?
ALCONADA: Sim, mas o livro também revela voos realizados pelo governo chavista a outros 24 países. Um ano antes do escândalo da mala, Antonini, chamado de traidor pelos chavistas após a descoberta da mala, organizou, por ordem do Ministério de Justiça venezuelano, viagens para 24 países da Ásia e da Oceania, para promover a candidatura de Chávez no Conselho de Segurança da Organização das Nações Unidas. As viagens foram coordenadas pelo atual ministro das Relações Exteriores da Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro. O então vice-chanceler venezuelano, Vladimir Villegas, confirmou as viagens e no livro aparecem comprovantes dos voos que foram realizados.
Ou seja, Antonini trabalhava para o governo chavista há algum tempo...
ALCONADA: Exato.
No livro o senhor fala numa "petrodiplomacia de Chávez"...
ALCONADA: Eu suspeito que houve mais voos, mais dinheiro e mais países envolvidos. Organizações internacionais estimam que Chávez já destinou entre US$33 bilhões e US$38 bilhões (entre R$56,3 bilhões e R$64,9 bilhões) a seu projeto de liderança sustentada pelo dinheiro do petróleo.
O atual ministro de Energia da Venezuela, Rafael Ramírez, também aparece como uma peça-chave do escândalo...
ALCONADA: Ramírez controla a estatal Petróleos da Venezuela (PDVSA), que é quase um Estado dentro do Estado. Quando Chávez precisa fazer alguma coisa, pede para a PDVSA, porque é mais eficiente do que o resto da administração pública.
Finalmente, o que era Antonini? Um funcionário chavista nas sombras?
ALCONADA: Não, para mim Antonini é o típico empresário espertinho latino-americano, capaz de fazer um favor a um governo ou a um funcionário, na expectativa de depois cobrar esse favor.
Antonini queria participar do projeto de construção de um gasoduto na Argentina, que envolvia os dois países, por isso decide embarcar no voo no qual estava Claudio Uberti (que na época tinha um alto cargo no Ministério do Planejamento argentino e era considerado o embaixador comercial da Argentina em Caracas)...
ALCONADA: Exatamente, porque lhe prometeram que no avião teria a oportunidade de conversar com Uberti (a conversa nunca aconteceu, já que, segundo conta o jornalista no livro, o funcionário argentino esteve muito ocupado durante o voo, por exemplo, assistindo ao filme "O poderoso chefão").
Quais eram a origem e o destino do dinheiro?
ALCONADA: A origem era a PDVSA. O destino é a grande pergunta. Em minha opinião, não era para a campanha de Cristina Kirchner. Se você tem tanto poder, controla o Estado, não precisa do dinheiro de Chávez. Os venezuelanos asseguram que o dinheiro não foi pedido, e sim oferecido pelo presidente venezuelano, num gesto de solidariedade espontâneo. Mas não me convence. Outra hipótese é que esta operação foi um "clearing" aéreo de supostas propinas.
Neste segundo caso, o dinheiro era de Uberti (afastado do cargo pouco depois da descoberta da mala)?
ALCONADA: Segundo a principal dirigente da oposição argentina, Elisa Carrió, Uberti sempre foi o carregador das malas de Kirchner.
Ou seja, Antonini não era o dono do dinheiro e só carregou a mala quando o voo chegou a Buenos Aires para fazer um favor a Uberti, que depois pretendia cobrar?
ALCONADA: Essa é minha visão dos fatos. As malas foram levadas ao aeroporto de Caracas por um colaborador de Rafael Ramírez.
Qual é a situação atual de Antonini?
ALCONADA: Ele continua morando nos Estados Unidos, mas não é testemunha protegida, nunca foi. Está vigente um pedido de captura, solicitado pelos governos da Argentina e da Venezuela. Ele diz estar disposto a viajar para a Argentina e falar com a Justiça. Mas seu principal medo é que os argentinos o mandem para a Venezuela, onde diz que será um homem morto.
Por que um escândalo desta magnitude não provocou uma crise maior em ambos os países?
ALCONADA: Na Argentina existe um grande cansaço moral da população. Muitas pessoas me perguntam por que continuo falando em Antonini, depois de tanto tempo. É um caso grave porque, como em Watergate (caso na década de 1970 em que o então presidente dos EUA, Richard Nixon, tentou encobrir a invasão da sede do Partido Democrata em Washington por homens sob suas ordens), os governos da Argentina e da Venezuela estão envolvidos na operação de acobertamento. O escândalo da mala é fruto de uma relação obscura e complicada entre a Argentina e a Venezuela. Não sei se Kirchner e Chávez sabiam do dinheiro, mas, segundo informações que recolhi, pessoas de sua confiança estão envolvidas no caso.
Zelaya pede mais sanções contra governo interino
Na Bolívia, Alba discute conselho de defesa para o bloco
COCHABAMBA, Bolívia. Horas depois de estender por mais dois dias o prazo para as negociações de um acordo em Honduras, o presidente deposto Manuel Zelaya pediu ontem aos ministros da Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA) que aumentem as sanções econômicas e comercias contra o governo interino de Roberto Micheletti. O pedido foi lido por sua chanceler, Patricia Rodas, durante a sessão plenária da Aliança Bolivariana para as Américas (Alba), em Cochabamba. Patricia pediu ainda que os candidatos presidenciais e a população se manifestem contra as eleições previstas para 29 de novembro.
- Conclamamos a resistência e os candidatos que se opõem ao golpe de Estado a se pronunciarem de maneira imediata sobre o processo eleitoral, seus vícios e a fraude que está sendo preparada - leu Patricia.
Zelaya foi deposto em 28 de junho e expulso do país. Ele retornou secretamente e está refugiado na embaixada brasileira em Tegucigalpa desde 21 de setembro.
Alba aprova novas sanções econômicas
Os líderes da Alba decidiram aplicar novas sanções econômicas e comerciais ao governo de Honduras, que pertence ao bloco. De acordo com a decisão, não será permitido o ingresso ou a permanência de pessoas consideradas responsáveis pelo golpe nos territórios dos países signatários. A resolução estabelece ainda que nenhum processo eleitoral promovido pelo atual regime de Honduras será reconhecido pela Alba.
No encontro, o presidente da Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, defendeu a criação de um Conselho de Defesa das nove nações que integram a Alba "rumo a uma aliança militar".
- Como é que não nos atrevemos a criar uma aliança militar? (É preciso) uma aliança defensiva - disse Chávez. - Creio que somos obrigados a fazê-lo, pelas ameaças do império infiltrando forças militares, tentando levar-nos de volta aos anos 1960.
Chávez mandou mais dinheiro aos Kirchner do que o apreendido no escândalo da mala, diz jornalista
BUENOS AIRES. Em agosto de 2007, em plena campanha eleitoral argentina, os governos dos presidentes Hugo Chávez e Néstor Kirchner (a atual presidente, Cristina Kirchner, era candidata) protagonizaram o chamado "escândalo da mala". O caso foi investigado pelo jornalista argentino Hugo Alconada Mon, ex-correspondente do jornal "La Nacion" em Washington, que acaba de lançar o livro "Os segredos da mala".
Janaína Figueiredo
Qual é sua conclusão, depois de mais de dois anos de investigação?
HUGO ALCONADA MON: A sensação que eu tive sempre foi de que o escândalo da mala era a ponta de um iceberg, que havia mais dinheiro no mesmo voo (Alconada revelou que no voo de Antonini foram transportados cerca de US$5 milhões, cerca de R$8,5 milhões, dos quais somente US$800 mil, ou R$1,4 milhão, foram retidos pela polícia da Argentina), e também mais voos.
Mais voos entre Caracas e Buenos Aires?
ALCONADA: Sim, mas o livro também revela voos realizados pelo governo chavista a outros 24 países. Um ano antes do escândalo da mala, Antonini, chamado de traidor pelos chavistas após a descoberta da mala, organizou, por ordem do Ministério de Justiça venezuelano, viagens para 24 países da Ásia e da Oceania, para promover a candidatura de Chávez no Conselho de Segurança da Organização das Nações Unidas. As viagens foram coordenadas pelo atual ministro das Relações Exteriores da Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro. O então vice-chanceler venezuelano, Vladimir Villegas, confirmou as viagens e no livro aparecem comprovantes dos voos que foram realizados.
Ou seja, Antonini trabalhava para o governo chavista há algum tempo...
ALCONADA: Exato.
No livro o senhor fala numa "petrodiplomacia de Chávez"...
ALCONADA: Eu suspeito que houve mais voos, mais dinheiro e mais países envolvidos. Organizações internacionais estimam que Chávez já destinou entre US$33 bilhões e US$38 bilhões (entre R$56,3 bilhões e R$64,9 bilhões) a seu projeto de liderança sustentada pelo dinheiro do petróleo.
O atual ministro de Energia da Venezuela, Rafael Ramírez, também aparece como uma peça-chave do escândalo...
ALCONADA: Ramírez controla a estatal Petróleos da Venezuela (PDVSA), que é quase um Estado dentro do Estado. Quando Chávez precisa fazer alguma coisa, pede para a PDVSA, porque é mais eficiente do que o resto da administração pública.
Finalmente, o que era Antonini? Um funcionário chavista nas sombras?
ALCONADA: Não, para mim Antonini é o típico empresário espertinho latino-americano, capaz de fazer um favor a um governo ou a um funcionário, na expectativa de depois cobrar esse favor.
Antonini queria participar do projeto de construção de um gasoduto na Argentina, que envolvia os dois países, por isso decide embarcar no voo no qual estava Claudio Uberti (que na época tinha um alto cargo no Ministério do Planejamento argentino e era considerado o embaixador comercial da Argentina em Caracas)...
ALCONADA: Exatamente, porque lhe prometeram que no avião teria a oportunidade de conversar com Uberti (a conversa nunca aconteceu, já que, segundo conta o jornalista no livro, o funcionário argentino esteve muito ocupado durante o voo, por exemplo, assistindo ao filme "O poderoso chefão").
Quais eram a origem e o destino do dinheiro?
ALCONADA: A origem era a PDVSA. O destino é a grande pergunta. Em minha opinião, não era para a campanha de Cristina Kirchner. Se você tem tanto poder, controla o Estado, não precisa do dinheiro de Chávez. Os venezuelanos asseguram que o dinheiro não foi pedido, e sim oferecido pelo presidente venezuelano, num gesto de solidariedade espontâneo. Mas não me convence. Outra hipótese é que esta operação foi um "clearing" aéreo de supostas propinas.
Neste segundo caso, o dinheiro era de Uberti (afastado do cargo pouco depois da descoberta da mala)?
ALCONADA: Segundo a principal dirigente da oposição argentina, Elisa Carrió, Uberti sempre foi o carregador das malas de Kirchner.
Ou seja, Antonini não era o dono do dinheiro e só carregou a mala quando o voo chegou a Buenos Aires para fazer um favor a Uberti, que depois pretendia cobrar?
ALCONADA: Essa é minha visão dos fatos. As malas foram levadas ao aeroporto de Caracas por um colaborador de Rafael Ramírez.
Qual é a situação atual de Antonini?
ALCONADA: Ele continua morando nos Estados Unidos, mas não é testemunha protegida, nunca foi. Está vigente um pedido de captura, solicitado pelos governos da Argentina e da Venezuela. Ele diz estar disposto a viajar para a Argentina e falar com a Justiça. Mas seu principal medo é que os argentinos o mandem para a Venezuela, onde diz que será um homem morto.
Por que um escândalo desta magnitude não provocou uma crise maior em ambos os países?
ALCONADA: Na Argentina existe um grande cansaço moral da população. Muitas pessoas me perguntam por que continuo falando em Antonini, depois de tanto tempo. É um caso grave porque, como em Watergate (caso na década de 1970 em que o então presidente dos EUA, Richard Nixon, tentou encobrir a invasão da sede do Partido Democrata em Washington por homens sob suas ordens), os governos da Argentina e da Venezuela estão envolvidos na operação de acobertamento. O escândalo da mala é fruto de uma relação obscura e complicada entre a Argentina e a Venezuela. Não sei se Kirchner e Chávez sabiam do dinheiro, mas, segundo informações que recolhi, pessoas de sua confiança estão envolvidas no caso.
Zelaya pede mais sanções contra governo interino
Na Bolívia, Alba discute conselho de defesa para o bloco
COCHABAMBA, Bolívia. Horas depois de estender por mais dois dias o prazo para as negociações de um acordo em Honduras, o presidente deposto Manuel Zelaya pediu ontem aos ministros da Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA) que aumentem as sanções econômicas e comercias contra o governo interino de Roberto Micheletti. O pedido foi lido por sua chanceler, Patricia Rodas, durante a sessão plenária da Aliança Bolivariana para as Américas (Alba), em Cochabamba. Patricia pediu ainda que os candidatos presidenciais e a população se manifestem contra as eleições previstas para 29 de novembro.
- Conclamamos a resistência e os candidatos que se opõem ao golpe de Estado a se pronunciarem de maneira imediata sobre o processo eleitoral, seus vícios e a fraude que está sendo preparada - leu Patricia.
Zelaya foi deposto em 28 de junho e expulso do país. Ele retornou secretamente e está refugiado na embaixada brasileira em Tegucigalpa desde 21 de setembro.
Alba aprova novas sanções econômicas
Os líderes da Alba decidiram aplicar novas sanções econômicas e comerciais ao governo de Honduras, que pertence ao bloco. De acordo com a decisão, não será permitido o ingresso ou a permanência de pessoas consideradas responsáveis pelo golpe nos territórios dos países signatários. A resolução estabelece ainda que nenhum processo eleitoral promovido pelo atual regime de Honduras será reconhecido pela Alba.
No encontro, o presidente da Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, defendeu a criação de um Conselho de Defesa das nove nações que integram a Alba "rumo a uma aliança militar".
- Como é que não nos atrevemos a criar uma aliança militar? (É preciso) uma aliança defensiva - disse Chávez. - Creio que somos obrigados a fazê-lo, pelas ameaças do império infiltrando forças militares, tentando levar-nos de volta aos anos 1960.
"A reconquista da soberania perdida não restabelece o status quo."
Barão do Rio Branco
Barão do Rio Branco
-
1maluquinho
- Júnior
- Mensagens: 33
- Registrado em: Ter Set 29, 2009 6:30 pm
- Localização: Rio de Janeiro
Re: GEOPOLÍTICA
Apos a crise economica asiatica ventilou-se que a bola da vez seria o Brasil e toda a o Europa e os Estados Unidos nos ofereceram dinheiro.Porque?Porque eles tem muita grama empreendida aqui e se quebrar-mos eles quebram tambem.Todos os que aqui chegam recebemos como iguais,naturais,não fazemos distinções.Mas ilude-se aquele que pensa que temos vizinhos irmãos,porque na verdade morrem de inveja de nós e ainda os ajudamos.Ate vamos doar Helicopteros pra Bolivia que nos tomou refinaria.O Anti-Cristo não é o Islã e sim a China.Democracia plena jamais existiu nem mesmo na Grecia antiga.Aqui temos muito mais liberdade que nos Estados Unidos pois la ou és democrata ou republicano,senão é terrorista.O Brasil de hoje com seus contrastes não é mais coadjuvante e os gringos ja sabem disso.Precisam muito mais que nós do que nós deles.Chavinho tem seus dias contados porque creio que a madame não se elege e quem entrar vai mudar a postura em relação a ele.Ele sabe disso.Creio que feçaremos pacto militar e extrategico com Tio San e isso nos interessa mas garoto de recados não seremos mais.Jamais foi e sera de nenhum Brasileiro a intenção de ser satelite Russo ou Chines...Chapolin Canarinho pra riba do Chavinho.
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1maluquinho
- Júnior
- Mensagens: 33
- Registrado em: Ter Set 29, 2009 6:30 pm
- Localização: Rio de Janeiro
Re: GEOPOLÍTICA
Todo mundo sabe que o Chavinho repassava armas e dinheiro a Argentina,Paraguai,Equador,Bolivia e os fomentava contra nós
Re: GEOPOLÍTICA
Informe Otálvora
*** Receta de Chávez para sus aliados incluye la compra de material de guerra
*** Evo Morales encarga aviones de guerra y pide más ayuda económica de Venezuela para su campaña electoral
*** Chávez confirma sospechas hondureñas: el ALBA es un proyecto militar
*** Brasil procura contrato por mil millones de dólares con EEUU para ventas bélicas.
Integra em: http://www.defesanet.com.br/04_09/eco_18out09.htm
==============================================================================
[]'s a todos.
*** Receta de Chávez para sus aliados incluye la compra de material de guerra
*** Evo Morales encarga aviones de guerra y pide más ayuda económica de Venezuela para su campaña electoral
*** Chávez confirma sospechas hondureñas: el ALBA es un proyecto militar
*** Brasil procura contrato por mil millones de dólares con EEUU para ventas bélicas.
Integra em: http://www.defesanet.com.br/04_09/eco_18out09.htm
==============================================================================
[]'s a todos.
"Apenas o mais sábio e o menos sábio nunca mudam de opinião."
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1maluquinho
- Júnior
- Mensagens: 33
- Registrado em: Ter Set 29, 2009 6:30 pm
- Localização: Rio de Janeiro
Re: GEOPOLÍTICA
Pra riba deles minha Cobrada....Escraaaaaaaachaaaaaaa....Nos dias de hoje para se poder realmente mudar o quadro de nossos problemas sociais (Saude,Educação e destribuição de riquesa) é necessario primeiro se ter segurança.So nos falta duas partes:Dominio de codigos fonte de processadores especificos e uma turbina de ponta Nacional.O resto aprimoraremos pois ja dominamos.Ter uma politica mais voltada ao desenvolvimento interno para depois de crescer expandir.Todos precisam alimentar-se e somos o maior produtor de carnes e gráos.Todos precisam de agua potavel e temos a maior reserva.Muito em breve seremos um dos maiores produtores de petroleo,sem falar das demais riquesas minerais.O mundo hoje precisa muito mais de nós do que nós deles.Tivemos a felicidade de ver um operario grevista transformar-se no maior estadista que ja tivemos mas seu ciclo se encerra e quem sabe depois retorna.Quem vira depois dele é que me preocupa.O nosso momento é agora e não sera 88 aviõeszinhos que fara nosso futuro e sim a auto-suficiencia e o aprimoramento.Parabems a todos aqueles que estão nos centros de pesquisas,selva,mar e céu de nosso Brasil,formando o futuro da mais democratica e livre de todas as nações.
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jumentodonordeste
- Sênior
- Mensagens: 3212
- Registrado em: Sex Mai 01, 2009 9:01 pm
- Localização: SP
- Agradeceram: 215 vezes
Re: GEOPOLÍTICA
Eu adoraria ver uma guerra, Chávez ligando para a ALBA e seus amigos fingindo que a ligação está ruim...Marino escreveu: No encontro, o presidente da Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, defendeu a criação de um Conselho de Defesa das nove nações que integram a Alba "rumo a uma aliança militar".
- Como é que não nos atrevemos a criar uma aliança militar? (É preciso) uma aliança defensiva - disse Chávez. - Creio que somos obrigados a fazê-lo, pelas ameaças do império infiltrando forças militares, tentando levar-nos de volta aos anos 1960.
Bolívia- ataque de folhas de coca... Soldados Americanos começam a ver vários Osamas com roupa de índio.
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1maluquinho
- Júnior
- Mensagens: 33
- Registrado em: Ter Set 29, 2009 6:30 pm
- Localização: Rio de Janeiro
Re: GEOPOLÍTICA
E alicinogenamente chamando-o de Obama Bin Laden k k k...em meados dos amos 80 a ditadura Argentina buscando desviar as atenções populares intentava contra nós mas acharam mais prudente as Malvinas e se fuuuu...Esse mal clonado Bolivar ta indo no mesmo erro porque primeiro intentava contra nós e agora se vira para os EUA...Adivinhem o ultimo capitulo...Nossa geopolitica propria de avanço tecnologico com a França e extreitamento militar com os EUA...Hummm isso é bom...Pelo menos os vermelhinhos de Brasilia tão muito mais pra rosa-choque do que a cor purpura.So o fato de preservarem o pais de tornar-se satelite Sovietico ou Chines,agradecemos.Por mais que busquemos a independencia tecnologica e a emancipação é direito de todo um povo livre mas na hora que o pau cantar fechamos com Tio Sam porque a liberdade esta acima de tudo.
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Francoorp
- Sênior
- Mensagens: 3429
- Registrado em: Seg Ago 24, 2009 9:06 am
- Localização: Goiania-GO-Brasil, Voltei!!
- Contato:
Re: GEOPOLÍTICA
1maluquinho escreveu:Pra riba deles minha Cobrada....Escraaaaaaaachaaaaaaa....Nos dias de hoje para se poder realmente mudar o quadro de nossos problemas sociais (Saude,Educação e destribuição de riquesa) é necessario primeiro se ter segurança.So nos falta duas partes:Dominio de codigos fonte de processadores especificos e uma turbina de ponta Nacional.O resto aprimoraremos pois ja dominamos.Ter uma politica mais voltada ao desenvolvimento interno para depois de crescer expandir.Todos precisam alimentar-se e somos o maior produtor de carnes e gráos.Todos precisam de agua potavel e temos a maior reserva.Muito em breve seremos um dos maiores produtores de petroleo,sem falar das demais riquesas minerais.O mundo hoje precisa muito mais de nós do que nós deles.Tivemos a felicidade de ver um operario grevista transformar-se no maior estadista que ja tivemos mas seu ciclo se encerra e quem sabe depois retorna.Quem vira depois dele é que me preocupa.O nosso momento é agora e não sera 88 aviõeszinhos que fara nosso futuro e sim a auto-suficiencia e o aprimoramento.Parabems a todos aqueles que estão nos centros de pesquisas,selva,mar e céu de nosso Brasil,formando o futuro da mais democratica e livre de todas as nações.
Pra mim falta mais coisa para o Brasil ser auto suficiente, quanto a Chavez... não tem nem indústria al di là da fronteira, eles, em caso de guerra ativa conosco, não resistiriam uns 12 meses, ou no máximo uns 24 meses, depois de uma nossa invasão do território.
Mas poderia-se ter um guerra de guerrilha, neste caso, anos passam a ser décadas.
Quanto aos minerais alimentos e agua, teríamos que controlar melhor estas resorças, ou poderíamos perder muitos partes de produção, simplesmente por falta de organização.
Duvido que enfrentaremos guerra no futuro próximo. Ao menos que começamos nós!!!
![[004]](./images/smilies/004.gif "Fogo!"){kind=small}
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1maluquinho
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- Mensagens: 33
- Registrado em: Ter Set 29, 2009 6:30 pm
- Localização: Rio de Janeiro
Re: GEOPOLÍTICA
Eita lasqueira e não ouvi isso..não...não ouvi mesmo...Que guerra amigo??? Somos um pais conhecido como neutral e pacificador...Guerra pra nós so em caso de sermos agredidos...Apenas o fortalecimento belico nosso para dissuadir...o que realmente queremos e buscamos e desenvolver-nos e capacitar-mo-nos mas se vierem,,,vamos fumar pra cima deles minha cobrada...Em outro site estão guerriando sobre quem pode mais no ar,o f5 ou o su35...Andam torcendo demais pro Rubinho Barriccello que infelizmente nasceu pra ser coadjuvante...Um embate aereo não se da em velocidade supersonica.Destresa,mobilidade e impetuosidade,sim,fazem a diferença e isso nossas Jararacas voadoras esbanjam,então não se assuste se 1 AMX vier abater 1 SU-35.....se formos enumerar sobre o que falta e o que precisamos vamos continuar como estavamos,sem sair do lugar e vivendo de suposições....A HORA É ESSA...DESPERTA GIGANTE ADORMECIDO...