Marinha dos EUA

[manuel.liste]

http://www.revistanaval.com/noticias/2-2007-11-26-lockheed-martin-aegis-bmd

Durante unas pruebas llevadas a cabo en Hawaii, un crucero equipado con la última versión del sistema Aegis BDM interceptó y destruyó dos misiles balísticos fuera de la atmósfera utilizando el misil SM3

Se trata de la 10ª intercepción con éxito de 13 intentos llevados a cabo en los últimos meses.

[P44]

Northrop Grumman Announces Schedule Extension and Charge on Shipbuilding Program


(Source: Northrop Grumman; issued April 15, 2008)

LOS ANGELES --- Northrop Grumman announced today that it expects to record a pre-tax charge to 2008 first quarter earnings of $320 to $360 million or $0.61 to $0.69 per diluted share. The charge will primarily reflect a re-evaluation of the estimated schedule and cost to complete the LHD-8 amphibious assault ship, as well as resource impacts on other Gulf Coast ships, and an evaluation of purchased intangible assets associated with the Shipbuilding business.


Northrop Grumman will take a charge of up to $360 million on the LHD-8 amphibious assault ship, after an audit found “the need for substantial rework on the ship.” (NGC photo)

The amount of the expected charge will be finalized upon conclusion of ongoing reviews and will be recorded in the Shipbuilding segment. The amount of the charge and updated 2008 financial guidance will be disclosed when Northrop Grumman issues its first quarter results later this month. The expected charge does not impact the company's previously announced 2012 financial targets.

In recent weeks, lack of progress in LHD-8 on-board testing preparatory to sea trials prompted the company to undertake a comprehensive review of the program, including a detailed physical audit of the ship. This examination identified the need for substantial rework on the ship, primarily in electrical cable installations. The revised estimate to complete the ship results from a thorough examination of the amount of rework and the additional time needed to complete the ship.

The LHD-8 is now expected to be delivered in the second quarter of 2009. In addition, an evaluation is being performed on other ships under construction at the Gulf Coast shipyard, including the resource impact caused by the delay in the LHD-8. The cost and schedule impacts to be finalized in that evaluation are included in the above charge.

"Northrop Grumman has a strong track record of delivering the world's most sophisticated and best-performing systems. Because of the critical missions our customers perform, we at Northrop Grumman demand of ourselves that we deliver only the best to our customers," said Ronald D. Sugar, chairman and chief executive officer of Northrop Grumman.

"The LHD-8 Amphibious Assault Ship will be no exception. However, in its current state, the ship does not meet our quality standards and it will not be delivered until it does. We are deeply disappointed by the impact of this unanticipated development on our customer and our shareholders. This is not acceptable to me or anyone at this company. We are taking all necessary steps to strengthen quality processes and management oversight of our Gulf Coast shipbuilding programs."

The keel for Makin Island (LHD-8) was laid in February 2004. LHD-8 features significant enhancements compared with earlier ships of the class. The LHD-8 will incorporate major new systems, including power by gas turbine engines and electric propulsion rather than steam turbines, and will incorporate extensive electrical upgrades over previous ships of the class. Delays in construction of the ship and financial performance for the program were exacerbated by Hurricane Katrina.

The company will hold an analyst conference call at 8:30 a.m. EDT today to discuss this release. A live audio broadcast of the conference call will be available on the investor relations page of the company's Web site at http://www.northropgrumman.com.


Northrop Grumman Corporation is a global defense and technology company whose 120,000 employees provide innovative systems, products, and solutions in information and services, electronics, aerospace and shipbuilding to government and commercial customers worldwide.

-ends-

[P44]

do MP.net

New Ships are Breaking The Bank So the Navy is Fixing its Old Ones

By Grace Jean

The ballooning costs of new ships are forcing the Navy to reevaluate its plans to boost the fleet size from 280 to 313 ships in the coming decade.

Having acknowledged that buying all new ships to replace aging vessels is financially unrealistic, Navy officials are weighing the possibility of extending the service life of dozens of surface combatants that typically would have been decommissioned.

As cruisers and destroyers reach their midlife years, the Navy plans to upgrade those ships so they remain in the fleet for their full 35 years, officials say.

“The upgrades to the destroyers and cruisers are absolutely key, as far as our ability to attain 313 ships,” says Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations.

The Navy has had a checkered history of decommissioning surface ships well before the cruiser and destroyer hulls have attained their full service life expectancy of 30 years and 35 years, respectively. The first baseline Ticonderoga-class cruisers were taken out of service before they reached 20 years because the Navy could not afford to modernize them. Likewise, the entire Spruance-class destroyers were retired early. “There was a lot of service life left in those ships,” says Vice Adm. Paul Sullivan, commander of Naval Sea Systems Command.

Decommissioning ships years before their scheduled service retirement means the Navy has been throwing away the millions of dollars it invested in those hulls. Officials hope that by modernizing the current surface fleet, they can sustain the ships through their full service lives and meet the goal of a 313-ship fleet.

To modernize a surface combatant costs a fifth of what it takes to build a new ship. A new destroyer costs about $1 billion. The price to upgrade a destroyer is about $180 million and for a cruiser is about $200 million, says Cmdr. Michael Van Durick, the surface combatant division director for Naval Sea System Command’s surface warfare directorate.

Navy officials say it is possible to extend the service life of the ships by five more years.

“As long as you maintain the combat system relevance, as long as you fully fund your modernization and maintenance and keep the hulls in the right shape, there should be no reason why we can’t extend that five years,” says Rear Adm. James McManamon, deputy commander of Naval Sea Systems Command’s surface warfare directorate.

The Navy, in its 30-year shipbuilding plan, is counting on that five-year extension for its destroyers to help close the shortfall in surface combatant numbers in the 2020s, when many ships will be retiring.

In previous shipbuilding plans, the Navy had shown a long-term shortfall in the number of cruisers and destroyers in its fleet. It currently operates 22 cruisers and 55 destroyers. The current plan eliminates that shortfall and even shows a slight surplus by assuming a five-year extension of the service lives of the DDG-51s, says Ronald O’Rourke, a naval analyst at the Congressional Research Service.

“The Navy’s report on the 30-year plan acknowledges that extending the service lives of these ships will require additional maintenance work, and that the cost of this work is not included in the estimated cost of the 30-year plan,” he says.

Naval Sea Systems Command is studying options to extend by five years the service life for non-nuclear surface ships, including cruisers, destroyers, frigates and amphibious vessels. But the command will not address the budgetary implications of those upgrades.

“It’s not nirvana to go extend a ship’s service life of 35 years to 40 years,” Sullivan tells reporters. “There’s a price to pay for that. It’s going to cost a lot of money to do that extension.”

In recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, O’Rourke questioned whether the Navy actually will be able to extend the service lives of the DDG-51s and operate them in a cost-effective manner for 40 years, given the wear and tear that might accrue on the ships in coming years.

He points to the shipbuilding plan, which projects that ships may require more upgrades in the future.

“A single mid-life modernization is no longer adequate for CG-47 and DDG-51 class ships due to the evolving threat environment, mandating periodic updates to keep them effective and to sustain engineering plant capacity,” it states.

At one of the shipyards that repairs and maintains the Navy’s surface vessels, officials have observed some of the wear and tear when ships come in for service.

“We’re seeing that the ships are run very hard, but they’re very well maintained,” says Bill Clifford, president of BAE Systems Ship Repair, based in Norfolk, Va. The company is the lead integrator for the Navy’s cruiser modernization program.

The shipyard has discovered cracks in the ships’ superstructures. The yard is working with Pittsburgh-based Alcoa Inc., an aluminum producer, and metallurgists to help solve the problem on future ships, officials say.

An integrated production team consisting of shipyard, Navy and Alcoa representatives is coming up with better ways to identify where the stresses and the corrosion are in the aluminum. That way, when a ship comes in, workers are not searching for the cracks — they’re laying out a plan to fix them, says Clifford.

“We are in the hunt for better ways to weld and repair aluminum,” he adds.

In February, the USS Bunker Hill pulled into BAE’s San Diego shipyard to begin a yearlong process to upgrade its hull and its mechanical, electrical and combat systems. It’s the first Ticonderoga-class cruiser to receive the combat systems upgrade, which includes new battle management and command and control computers, air dominance and force protection packages, integrated bridge systems, electronic navigation capability and machinery control systems. Three other cruisers have had their hulls upgraded and the Navy will ramp up the process in the coming years.

The Navy also is planning upgrades to its DDG-51 destroyers to enable smaller-size crews to sail them out to their full service life of 35 years — and potentially beyond. Because the final two ships of the class have yet to be built, the Navy is in the unprecedented position of being able to upgrade its oldest ships with technologies being developed for the newest hulls. That will reduce risk for the Navy, says Dave Shikada, of Lockheed Martin Corp., which is designing a new digital machinery control system for the final two Arleigh Burkes.

The company is replacing the engineering consoles with a universal control console that has a touch screen interface to allow a single sailor to operate multiple stations, says Steve Farrow, director of maritime programs. That technology will be incorporated into the hull, mechanical and electrical upgrades on the older destroyers, which will help reduce the crew size.

“What we’re doing is reducing workload principally by automating functions that humans perform today in the DDG,” says Shikada.

Part of the mandate in the destroyer modernization program is to reduce crew size through new technologies that are coming on line for the Navy’s next-generation classes of ships, such as the DDG-1000 destroyer and the littoral combat ship.

“There’s no question that our crew sizes have to come down,” says Roughead.

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ ... wShips.htm

[soultrain]

Two ships deemed ‘unfit’ for combat

By Christopher P. Cavas - Staff writer
Posted : Monday Apr 21, 2008 13:31:35 EDT

Most of the missiles couldn’t be fired, and neither could any of the big guns. The Aegis radars key to the ships’ fighting abilities didn’t work right.

The flight decks were inoperable.

Most of the lifesaving gear failed inspection.

Corrosion was rampant, and lube oil leaked all over.

The verdict: “unfit for sustained combat operations.”

Those results turned up by an inspection by the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey — commonly known as an InSurv — would be bad enough if they came from one warship.

But they came from two. In different fleets, in different oceans. Within a week of each other. And each ship represents the Navy’s most sophisticated front-line surface combatants.

“This is worse than I remember seeing,” a recently retired surface flag officer said after reading the reports of InSurv inspections conducted in March aboard the Norfolk, Va.-based destroyer Stout and the Pearl Harbor, Hawaii-based cruiser Chosin. “I don’t remember seeing two that stood out like these.”

Copies of both reports were obtained by Navy Times.

“I don’t think I have ever seen anything so bad,” said retired Capt. Rick Hoffman, who commanded the cruiser Hue City, a sister ship of the Chosin.

“The aggregate number of discrepancies is disturbing, particularly in the Combat Systems area,” another former senior officer said.

The retired admiral went further. “There’s enough commonality between the two to make me think there’s an endemic problem in the force,” he said.

Navy Times was unable to reach the commanding officer of the Stout, and Navy officials did not make him available for comment. The CO of Chosin also could not be reached.

Naval professionals know the point of an InSurv is to list and detail all known problems with a ship’s physical condition, but these two reports are exceptional.

“InSurv is by its nature an inspection that will always reveal a fairly large number of deficiencies, hopefully most of them minor,” said retired Capt. Jan van Tol, who commanded a destroyer and an amphibious assault ship. “However, the scale and scope of the deficiencies, spread across all of the ship’s departments and including the [executive officer] and command master chief, suggests that there is a severe and long-standing problem with low standards; low initiative in finding/fixing/managing problems and following up on documented problems; poorly managed programs; and an apparent inability to train junior people in material management.”

High-ranking officers now are searching for what led to the problems revealed by the two inspections.

“There’s a discussion active inside the community about self-assessment issues and processes,” said Capt. David Lewis, the assistant chief of staff for maintenance and engineering with Naval Surface Forces in San Diego.

Lewis pointed out that a great number of the problems on the two ships were known even before the inspections. But the InSurvs turned up more problems than were expected.

“The thing that popped at me was the volume of the discrepancies. Normally, we don’t get that much on a given ship,” he said.

Stout, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer — or DDG — was particularly afflicted by corrosion, which Lewis said has become a problem on all ships of that type.

“DDGs have a corrosion trend, we are seeing that more and more,” Lewis said. “We are starting to address that in our work batches for depot-level repair. It’s in areas that are generally hard for ship’s force to get into, places they don’t go routinely. Uptakes and that kind of stuff.”

The ships’ material condition was not due to lack of funds, Lewis said.

“We are 100 percent funded to our requirement for maintenance,” he said.

Among the issues leading to the ships’ condition is that they both recently returned from deployments, said Capt. Pete Gumataotao, chief of staff for Naval Surface Forces. Overhaul periods already were planned for the ships, he said.

But under the Fleet Response Plan, ships returning from deployment remain in readiness status for some time, and often are considered “surge-ready” for several months before standing down for a shipyard period.

Lewis also noted the ships are entering mid-life.

“Stout is an earlier DDG and due for a mid-life upgrade in about four years,” he said of the 14-year-old destroyer. The Chosin, commissioned in 1991, is scheduled for an upgrade under the cruiser modernization program.

Based on calculations in the most recent 30-year fleet plan, Chosin is meant to remain in service for 35 years, or until about 2026. The Stout and its sister ships are to last for 40 years — until 2034, in the Stout’s case.

How common?
The InSurv inspectors pore over about 45 to 50 ships a year. Forty-seven ships underwent the inspections in 2007, Lewis said. Each year generally sees several ships do so poorly that they’re rated “unfit” for combat. But it is unusual for Aegis ships — considered the world’s most sophisticated and capable surface warships — to perform so badly.

Three ships were rated unfit for combat in fiscal 2007, Lewis said: a frigate, a dock landing ship and a mine countermeasures ship. Since fiscal 2008 began, there have been two more: the Stout and Chosin.

“I don’t see a trend,” Lewis said.

The last time Lewis and Gumataotao could recall when two ships did so poorly at the same time was in 2006, when two minesweepers stationed in the Persian Gulf were unable to get underway for their inspections. The situation temporarily deprived the Navy of its two best anti-mine assets in the region.

But numerous officers familiar with the InSurv reports are concerned that myriad causes are resulting in such poor material inspections.

“Where was the chain of command? Why did the parent squadron not know of the terrible material condition?” van Tol asked. The ship’s command, he said, “has a lot to answer for, either in terms of not finding and fixing the problems, or at least advising his seniors of the problems.”

The ship’s enlisted leaders also are partly responsible, van Tol said.

“One could also ask where the chief’s mess was in all this, since they are the technical experts as well as the senior enlisted leaders onboard.”

Minimal manning
Each of the ships has a crew of about 350 sailors. The Navy has been working for some years to reduce maintenance requirements on sailors in order to shrink crew sizes, and the smaller crews planned for future ships such as littoral combat ships and the Zumwalt-class DDG 1000 advanced destroyers mean maintenance issues could become more acute. Navy planners have said a key to maintaining readiness is to transfer more responsibility to land-based organizations.

But the shore establishment also should have been more aware of the conditions aboard Stout and Chosin, van Tol said.

“Many of the problems noted should have been picked up in previous inspections of various kinds,” he said. “What were the results of those inspections? Who should have followed up on deficiencies? Why did the chain of command — both within the ship and above the ship level — not monitor progress in fixing said deficiencies?”

A general air of irresponsibility seems to pervade the ships, many observers felt.

“There were a lot of things that should have been found and fixed by the crew,” the retired flag officer said. “But there doesn’t appear to be a lot of attention to detail going on.”

That many of the problems were right out in the open for inspectors to find, he said, was disturbing.

“Both ships had corrosion on the flight deck that they appeared to be ignoring. That’s fairly simple stuff. You don’t need to be outside looking at that. You need to put sailors to work doing what sailors do.”

All the officers who reviewed the inspection reports for this story said they were shocked by the lack of basic preventive maintenance.

“I see in both of these ships a basic contempt for good Navy practices,” the retired flag officer said. “Too much rust. Too many [preventive maintenance systems] checks that weren’t done properly. Too much equipment InSurv had to tell them wasn’t working.”

He pointed out that citations for items like finding foreign object debris, or FOD, shouldn’t happen during a major inspection.

“FOD on the intake engine screens,” the retired flag officer said. “ ‘My God — InSurv is coming.’ You’d think they’d clean the screens.”

The officer wondered where the command structure was in all this.

“There’s a serious lack of command involvement in what’s going on on the ship,” the flag officer said. “That’s basic.”

Asked about the problems, Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Joe Campa declined to address the specific ships’ situation, but in general terms, he agreed that his senior enlisted personnel bear some of the responsibility for keeping ships up to standards.

“The success or failure of any commandwide inspection can be placed directly at the entrance to the CPO mess,” Campa said. “There are all kinds of challenges, and reasons for failure. But it’s been proven that the experience that resides in the mess can tilt the results of any inspection toward success if the chiefs are engaged on the deck plates.”

[soultrain]

Details of the inspection reports


Posted : Sunday Apr 20, 2008 8:58:14 EDT

Here are highlights from the Board of Inspection and Survey reports on the cruiser Chosin and destroyer Stout.

Chosin
Last deployment: April-September 2007

* AN/SPS-49 and AN/SPY-1B radars severely degraded by multiple issues.

* 26 percent of the vertical launch system cells had hatch timing problems and were operationally unusable.

* Two of three fire control directors were 19 years old and beyond their 15-year depot overhaul requirement.

* Aviation facility had enough discrepancies to preclude safe flight operations. Aviation demonstration scored an UNSAT .58.

* Ship could not properly connect shore electrical power.

* Pilot’s ladder was unsafe for use and too short.

* General ship’s lighting was inadequate; “upgrade of lighting fixtures would enhance the ability of personnel to operate and maintain the ship’s systems.”

* Secondary rescue boat could not be secured for sea.

* Nine Departure From Spec listings were in excess of 180 days without being repaired; one item — shaft plastic coating — dated from April 2001.

* All 25 Mk 1 life preservers and all 29 Kapok life preservers failed visual inspection.

* 46 of 51 Kevlar lifelines failed visual inspection.

* 95 percent of the external ladders were rigged with the wrong securing pins or had missing handrail safety pins.

* Communications demonstration scored an UNSAT .57, as did the Environmental Protection demonstration.

Stout
Last deployment: July-December 2007

* Aegis AN/SPY-1D power output was reduced by about 75 percent.

* Two of three Mk 99 missile illuminators were inoperable.

* Aft vertical launch system magazine unusable due to fuel tank leakage.

* Close-In Weapon System was inoperable.

* Neither of two triple torpedo tube mounts could be quickly trained to firing position.

* The Mk 45 5-inch gun couldn’t fire due to corrosion in the gun cradle.

* Search-and-rescue swimmer gear would not permit operations in water colder than 60 degrees Fahrenheit.

* An intermittent problem with the Mk 39 Gyro Data Converter, causing unreliable data to be fed to the Aegis weapon control system and gun fire control system, had been reported in March 2006 but still not repaired.

* Food service was degraded: The ship’s walk-in freezer and nine of 13 reach-in reefers had problems; neither single tank dishwasher worked, nor did all three waste disposal units. Only one of four steam kettles was operating.

* 26 of 77 watertight closures inspected were not watertight.

* The ship scored an UNSAT .51 for the anti-air warfare demonstration.

* Only three gas turbines were in operation, precluding the ability to conduct a full-power demonstration.

* The flight deck status lighting system was inoperable due to corrosion.

* The deck demonstration received a .50 score, UNSAT.

* The aviation demonstration received a score of .59, UNSAT.

http://www.navytimes.com/news/2008/04/n ... l_042008w/

[soultrain]

Estes dois relatórios são assustadores e comprovam o que venho a dizer faz algum tempo, os EUA estão a ter uma grande falta de qualidade nos seus soldados.

Isto vai ter consequência em toda a escala de Comando da US Navy, não vejo outra forma, é grave demais.

Reparem que até a pequena manutenção foi descuidada em navios de combate de topo, em tempo de guerra. Esta manutenção deveria ser dada pelos marinheiros do próprio navio.

[[]]'s

[cabeça de martelo]

Deviamos ter-lhes vendido as JB!

Sempre estavam em melhores condições.

[P44]

Isso é tudo propaganda comuna desse bremeilhu do soultrain

material "made in US" é todo topo-de-gama, é Deus no céus e o Tio Sam na terra, todo o material americano é perfeito.

isso é contrapropaganda de algum lobby russo, o soultrain anda a soldo de terriveis lobbies

[soultrain]

P44,

É muito mais grave que problemas de material, é disciplina, moral e manutenção da linha de comando.

[[]]'s

[P44]

P44,

É muito mais grave que problemas de material, é disciplina, moral e manutenção da linha de comando.

[[]]'s

tava a reinar contigo

Mas é para ver se alguns abrem os "oios"

[soultrain]

Chosin InSurv text:


Posted : Sunday Apr 20, 2008 9:15:30 EDT

R 021629Z APR 08

FM PRESINSURV NORFOLK VA(UC)

TO CNO WASHINGTON DC(UC)

COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA

INFO ASST

SECNAV RDA WASHINGTON DC(UC)

COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

COMTHIRDFLT

COMNAVSURFOR SAN DIEGO CA(UC)

COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA(UC)

COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA

COMNAVSURFGRU MIDPAC

COMSURFWARDEVGRU LITTLE CREEK

USS CHOSIN PRESINSURV NORFOLK VA(UC)

BT

UNCLAS

SUBJ: INSURV REPORT FOR USS CHOSIN (CG 65) MATERIAL INSPECTION (MI) MSGID/GENADMIN,USMTF,2007/PRESINSURV NORFOLK VA// SUBJ/INSURV REPORT FOR USSCHOSIN (CG 65) MATERIAL INSPECTION (MI)//

GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. THE BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY CONDUCTED AN MI OF USS CHOSIN (CG 65) AT PEARL HARBOR, HI DURING THE PERIOD 24-28 MAR 08.

2. SENIOR MEMBER COMMENTS:

A. USS CHOSIN WAS FOUND UNFIT FOR SUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS. THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES CONTRIBUTE TO THIS FINDING: AN/SPS-49 AND AN/SPY-1B RADARS ARE SEVERELY DEGRADED, HATCH TIMING ON 26% OF THE VLS CELLS PRECLUDES THE USE OF THESE CELLS (SHIP REPORTED), AN/SQR 19 IS OOC (SHIP REPORTED), MT 51 AND 52 ARE OOC (SHIP REPORTED), SHIP'S COMMUNICATIONS ARE SEVERELY DEGRADED AS OUTLINED IN THIS REPORT, F/O LEAK (SHIP REPORTED) IN AFT CROSS FLOODING DUCT CREATED A FIRE HAZARD IN NR 3 GTG ROOM AND CAUSED A LOSS OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ADVERSELY AFFECTING THE ABILITY OF THE SHIP TO WITHSTAND BATTLE DAMAGE. AVIATION FACILITY HAD NUMEROUS DISCREPANCIES WHICH PRECLUDE THE SAFE CONDUCT OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS.

B. ALTHOUGH THE SHIP CERTIFIED ITS READINESS FOR SEA, THE BOARD NOTED DISCREPANCIES THAT WOULD HAVE RESTRICTED UNDERWAY OPERATIONS OR DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS DURING THE POST-UNDERWAY PORTION OF THE MI: HALON, WASTE HEAT BOILERS, GTMS, GTG INTAKES, FUEL OIL SERVICE TANK QUICK CLOSING VALVE REMOTE OPERATION, MRG SIGHT FLOW INDICATOR, HP AIR SYSTEM, ELECTRIC PLANT ALIGNMENT (ABT AND MBT), AN/SPS-49, AND READY LIFE BOAT.

C. SHIP'S OVERALL COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY, TO INCLUDE SWITCHING AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS AND ASSOCIATED SUBSYSTEMS OF HF, SHF, VHF, UHF LOS, EHF, CDLMS AND LINKS, IS UNSAT. PASSWORDS FOR KEY SYSTEMS ARE NOT READILY AVAILABLE. ANTENNA MAINTENANCE TO COMBAT CORROSION, IF NOT CONDUCTED, WILL FURTHER DEGRADE COMMUNICATIONS. SEE COMMUNICATIONS SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.

D. NR 3 GENERATOR ROOM PRIMARY HALON IN-SPACE CO2 ACTUATING BOTTLE DID NOT ACTIVATE THE HALON SYSTEM AND THE OUTSIDE CO2 ACTUATING BOTTLE LEAKED CO2 DURING RESERVE ACTUATION. MER 1 PRIMARY HALON DID NOT ACTIVATE BECAUSE OF A LEAK AT THE CO2 ACTUATING BOTTLE COUPLING HEAD.

E. THE AFT CROSS FLOODING DUCT FRAME 472 WAS HOLED AND LEAKED FUEL/COMPENSATING WATER (CASREP 07052 OF MAY 07). FUEL IS COMING FROM EITHER 6-426-1-F OR 6-426-2-F. AS STATED ABOVE, THIS IS A LOSS OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND A FIRE HAZARD. RECOMMEND RESTRICTED USE OF NR 3 GTG UNTIL REPAIRS ARE MADE.

F. 32 OF 122 VLS CELL HATCHES FAILED TIMING CHECKS AND WERE OPERATIONALLY UNUSABLE, THUS REDUCING MISSILE INVENTORY BY 26%.

G. DEGRADATION TO THE SPY-1B REDUCED RELIABLE DETECTION RANGE AND PRECLUDED 360 DEG COVERAGE. THREATS COULD ONLY BE DETECTED WITH THE FORWARD DECK HOUSE SPY AND MANEUVERING WAS REQUIRED TO ENGAGE WITH ALL WEAPON SYSTEMS. AFT DECK HOUSE PROVIDES NO RELIABLE INDICATION OF ACTUAL OPERATION. OTS TESTS FAIL TO RUN ON MANY OF THE AFT DECKHOUSE COMPONENTS AND ALIGNMENT OR TROUBLESHOOTING CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED.

H. RECOMMEND SELF SUSPENSION OF ALL FLIGHT OPERATIONS DUE TO NUMEROUS DISCREPANCIES WHICH ARE IN THE AVIATION SECTION OF THIS REPORT.

I. AN/SQS-53D SONAR DOME RUBBER WINDOW WAS CONDEMNED BECAUSE OF FAILING STEEL BELTS AND RUBBER DELAMINATION (CASREP 07139).

J. AN/SQR-19 WAS NOT DEPLOYABLE BECAUSE OF A 6-FT TEAR AROUND THE 570-FT MARK OF THE TOW CABLE. THE EXPOSED ARMORED BRAIDS SHOWED SIGNS OF CORROSION (CASREP 08031).

K. FCS DIRECTORS NR 1 AND NR 3 WERE 19 YEARS OLD AND BEYOND THEIR 15 YEAR DEPOT OVERHAUL REQUIREMENT.

L. VIDEO FROM AN/SPS-73 WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE OF INTERFERENCE FROM NON-PROGRAM OF RECORD FURUNO RADAR MOUNTED IVO SPS-73 RADAR ANTENNA.

M. VENTILATION SYSTEM IS DEGRADED AND DIRTY. A THOROUGH GROOM, INCLUDING SYSTEM BALANCING, IS NECESSARY TO RETURN EXHAUST AIR FLOWS TO DESIGN SPECS. N. SHIP COULD NOT CONDUCT SHORE POWER RIGGING AND UNRIGGING IAW EOSS SPRU (EOSS FEEDBACK REPORT REQUIRED).

O. PILOT'S LADDER WAS NOT RIGGED IAW NAVSEA DWG 804-5000900. IT WAS TOO SHORT FOR EMBARKATION AT DESIGNATED BOARDING STATIONS AND ITS OVERALL MATERIAL CONDITION MAKES IT UNSAFE FOR USE.

P. FLEXIBLE HOSE ASSEMBLIES WERE IDENTIFIED THROUGHOUT THE ENGINEERING PLANT THAT HAD IMPROPERLY INSTALLED OR MISSING BRACKETS. FAILURE TO ENSURE PROPER INSTALLATION OF FLEX HOSE SUPPORTS WILL SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE LIFE SPAN OF THE AFFECTED HOSES.

Q. PORT AND STBD ICCP SHAFT GROUNDING ASSEMBLY BRUSHES WERE CORRODED AND SEIZED IN THE ASSEMBLY, SHAFT SLIP RING CONTACT SURFACES WERE SCORED, BRUSHES WERE BELOW 50% WORN, AND 4 OF 4 BRUSHES ON THE PORT SHAFT WERE NOT MAKING CONTACT WITH SHAFT SLIP RINGS. PMS WAS NOT BEING ACCOMPLISHED ON THIS SYSTEM. DAILY ICCP LOGS WERE NOT BEING KEPT AND SUBMITTED TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER FOR REVIEW/SIGNATURE AND SUBMISSION TO NAVSEA IAW NSTM 633-6.3. DUE TO A LACK OF FUNDING, NAVSEA DOES NOT HAVE A MECHANISM IN PLACE TO INFORM SHIPS OF ICCP DISCREPANCIES NOR TRACK SUBMISSION OF LOGS BY INDIVIDUAL SHIPS.

R. THE DEGAUSSING SYSTEM WAS OOC AND A SAT RANGING CHECK HAD NOT BEEN CONDUCTED WITHIN THE REQUIRED PERIODICITY (ANNUALLY) (CASREP 08015).

S. THE FOLLOWING MBTS WERE IMPROPERLY ALIGNED TO THE ALTERNATE SOURCE: AMR 2 VITAL MBT, NR 1 AND NR 2 AC MBT, MBT 1-52-1, AND MBT 01-220-1. NR 3 GTG MODULE COOLING FAN ABT WAS IN MANUAL.

T. TASK AND GENERAL LIGHTING ONBOARD WERE INADEQUATE. AN INCREASE IN BULB WATTAGE OR UPGRADE OF LIGHTING FIXTURES WOULD ENHANCE THE ABILITY OF PERSONNEL TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THE SHIP'S SYSTEMS.

U. SECONDARY RESCUE BOAT COULD NOT BE SECURED FOR SEA. KEEL RESTS AND BOAT CHOCKS HAD NO CONTACT WITH THE BOAT IN THE STOWED POSITION, BOAT GRIPES AND BELLY BANDS FORE AND AFT WERE LOOSE AND INEFFECTIVE. THE SHIPALT TO INSTALL THIS BOAT WAS NEVER COMPLETED.

V. 1 OF 2 SEA LADDER ALUMINUM HANDRAILS WAS BROKEN AT THE DECK ATTACHMENT, RENDERING THE LADDER UNSAFE FOR VBSS OPERATIONS.

W. 4 OF 6 ARAMID MOORING LINES ARE WORN AND DETERIORATED BEYOND SAFE USE (SHIP REPORTED).

X. UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO FWD VLS COULD BE GAINED VIA VLS FAN ROOM NR 2 WTD 2-126-2. THE WTD WAS NOT INSTALLED IAW NAVSEA DRAWING 6011974.

Y. CREW MEMBERS COMMITTED A SERIOUS VIOLATION OF THE WORKING ALOFT BILL DURING THE INSPECTION WHICH COULD HAVE RESULTED IN PERSONNEL BEING EXPOSED TO HIGH FREQUENCY RADIATION.

Z. NR 2 OWS SYSTEM WAS INOP BECAUSE OF AN INOPERABLE OIL CONTENT MONITOR (CASREP 08032).

AA. THE SHIP'S SELF-ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY WAS EVALUATED AS SAT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF DECK AND AVIATION WHICH WERE UNSAT.

AB. HELMSMAN COULD NOT STEER BY DFGMC BECAUSE INDICATOR DID NOT PROVIDE DIRECTION OF TURN INDICATION IAW NSTM 420 TO ALLOW THE HELMSMAN TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN THE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS NEEDED TO JUDGE THE EFFECT OF RUDDER POSITION ON THE SWING OF THE SHIP'S HEAD.

AC. 9 OF 99 WATERTIGHT CLOSURES INSPECTED WERE NOT WATERTIGHT.

AD. 1 OF 2 IPDS WAS OPERATIONAL.

AE. 13 OF 16 VENTILATION AIRFLOW ALARMS WERE EITHER INOP OR MISADJUSTED.

AF. 12 CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES PRECLUDED OILY WATER SEPARATORS CERTIFICATION.

AG. DOSSERT CONNECTORS WERE FOUND IN NR 1, NR 2 AND NR 3 SWITCHBOARDS. THERMAL INDICATIONS REVEALED NO SIGNS OF LOOSENING OR LOCAL HEATING. CONNECTORS NEED TO BE DOCUMENTED FOR FUTURE INSPECTION.

AH. THE SHIP DID NOT HAVE PMS INSTALLED FOR THE EPIRB. 3. THE FOLLOWING CASREPS WERE ACTIVE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MI:

NUMBER NOMENCLATURE CATEGORY

07052 TANKS, STRUCTURAL 2

07114 PIPING AND VALVE GROUP 2

07115 TRIM & DRAINS SYSTEM 2

07116 TRIM & DRAINS SYSTEM 2

07139 DOME SONAR 2

07141 LAUNCHER, VERTICAL FWD 2

07142 LAUNCHER, VERTICAL AFT 2

07146 FUELING SERV, XFR & BL 2

08002 GTM INTAKE TRUNK 2

08005 LAUNCHER SYSTEM 2

08007 TRANSLATOR SIGNAL DATA 2

08008 RECORDER-R 2

08009 FILLING SYSTEM, FUEL OIL 2

08011 ELEVATOR, ELEC/MECH, CAR 2

08013 TANKS, STRUCTURAL 2

08015 DEGAUSSING SYSTEM 2

08016 5 IN GUN MT 51 3

08017 5 IN GUN MT 52 3

08018 DISTILLING PLANT, LOW PR 2

08019 SPG, TRANSMITTER 2

08020 SPY-1B, ANT 2

08021 TORPEDO TUBE, SURFACE 2

4. 33 DEPARTURES FROM SPECS (DFS) EXISTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MI.

A. THE FOLLOWING DFS WERE IN EXCESS OF 180 DAYS:

NUMBER NOMENCLATURE DATE ISSUED

CG65-0100 SHAFT PLASTIC COATING 4/24/2001

CG65-006-03 2A GTM ANTI-ICING PIPE 1/6/2003

CG65-005-07 NR 2 EVAP FEED WATER 3/16/2006

CG65-002-06 1A GTM ANTI-ICING 7/25/2006

CG65-007-06 FLEX HOSE EXTENSION 9/5/2006

CG65-1-507 FOST 6-382-3-F 9/19/2006

CG65-1-509 FEED TANK 5-300-2-W 2/16/2007

CG65-510 NR 1 WHB EXHAUST BELLOWS 4/19/2007

CG65-510 NR 1 WHB EXHAUST DOUBLER 4/19/2007

5. 8 ACTIVE TEMPORARY STANDING ORDERS (TSO) EXISTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MI.

A. THE FOLLOWING TSO WERE IN EXCESS OF 45 DAYS:

NUMBER NOMENCLATURE DATE ISSUED

11-06-03 NR 1/2 LODS 11/9/2006

07-07-01 F/O STORAGE TANKS 7/1/2007

09-07-01 NR 1 AND NR 2 MRG SUMP 9/26/2007

11-07-01 FAULTY IC ALARM 11/4/2007

6. DEMO RESULTS: SAT (0.80-1.00)/DEGRADED (0.60-0.79)/UNSAT (0.00-0.59):

* AAW DTE WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.94).

* SD DTE WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.80).

* GUNNERY LIVE FIRE DEMO WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.00) BECAUSE BOTH 5 INCH GUN MOUNTS WERE CONDEMNED. STAR GAGE TESTING REVEALED EXCESSIVE BORE EROSION AND CRACKS IN EACH BARREL (CASREPS 08016 AND 08017).

USW DTE WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.80).

* FULL POWER DEMO WAS DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.66). FULL POWER DEMO WAS CONDUCTED AT 87% FULL POWER AND WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO MEET FULL POWER HORSEPOWER REQUIREMENTS.

* QUICK REVERSAL ASTERN WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.59). QUICK REVERSAL ASTERN WAS COMMENCED AT 87% FULL POWER, BUT WAS TERMINATED BECAUSE OF LOSS OF NR 1B GTM.

* QUICK REVERSAL AHEAD WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.57). QUICK REVERSAL AHEAD WAS COMMENCED AT 100% FULL POWER ASTERN, BUT WAS TERMINATED BECAUSE OF POWER TURBINE OVERSPEED ALARMS ON NR 2A AND NR 2B GTMS.

* STEERING DEMO WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.97). STEERING DEMO WAS CONDUCTED AT 87% FULL POWER AHEAD AND 100% ASTERN.

* ANCHORING DEMO WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.87).

7. SHIPBOARD PRESERVATION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.73):

* SHIP HAD SUPERSTRUCTURE CRACKING PROBLEMS WHICH WERE IDENTIFIED BY THE NAVSEA STRUCTURAL ASSESSMENT OF DEC 07.

* 70% OF THE MAIN DECK NON-SKID HAD INEFFECTIVE PROFILE (REPLACEMENT APPROVED FOR MAY-JUL 08 SRA). TOPSIDE FLEXIBLE CONDUIT SYSTEMS/FITTINGS AND KICK TUBES HAD SIGNIFICANT CORROSION DAMAGE; THE OCT 07 ASSESSMENT REFERS. STRUCTURAL HULL DAMAGE AND CRACKS REQUIRE IMMEDIATE MAINTENANCE ACTION.

* POTABLE WATER TANK (6-366-2-W) HAD A 2-FT BY 2-FT SHEET OF PAINT PEELING OFF THE INTERIOR SURFACE OF THE TANK AND GRADE 4-S RUST THROUGHOUT THE INTERIOR SURFACE OF THE TANK.

* DRY VOID 1-180-2-V HAD PINPOINT GRADE 7P RUSTING THROUGHOUT THE TANK SURFACE.

* DRY VOID 1-340-3-V HAD A 2-FT BY 1-FT BARE SPOT FROM WELDING A TRANSFORMER TO THE OUTBOARD BULKHEAD.

* NR 3 GENERATOR LONGITUDE PORTSIDE STRINGERS HAD PULLED AWAY FROM THE FRAME. TRANSFER PUMP FOUNDATION WAS 30% DETERIORATED.

* VERTICAL STIFFENER ATTACHMENTS IN JP-5 PUMP ROOM WERE GREATER THAN 50% DETERIORATED.

* ELEVATOR TRUNK (3.5-464-0-T) RAIL BRACKETS AND FASTENERS HAVE 50% DETERIORATION.

* A 3-SQ FT AREA OF DECK AND BULKHEAD IN NR 3 GTG ROOM WAS DETERIORATED ON THE PORTSIDE 1ST LONGITUDE ABOVE THE BILGE DECK AT FRAME 422. THIS WAS CAUSED BY SACRIFICIAL ZINC ANODES BEING SUBMERGED IN OIL, INHIBITING THEIR ABILITY TO PREVENT CORROSION.

* NR 1 AND NR 2 A/C PLANT DECKS WERE SIGNIFICANTLY DETERIORATED WITH HOLES IN THE STRUCTURE (SHIP REPORTED).

* NR 1 AND NR 2 DISTILLING PLANT FOUNDATIONS HAD SEVERE CORROSION AND STRUCTURAL MEMBER WASTAGE (SHIP REPORTED).

8. SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES AND EQUIPMENT OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (EOC) INCLUDE:

A. PROPULSION: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.58):

* VALVE MAINTENANCE THROUGHOUT THE ENGINEERING PLANT WAS IN ARREARS.

* 4 OF 4 GTM CLEAN SIDE INTAKES CONTAINED DIRT/DEBRIS OR SALT DEPOSITS.

* 2 OF 4 GTM CLEAN SIDE INTAKES HAD A FREE PATH TO THE DIRTY SIDE.

* 2 OF 2 MRG GEAR CASINGS HAD POOLED OIL.

* 2 OF 2 MRG LO STRAINER INTERLOCKS WERE NOT ENGAGED (SHIP REPORTED).

* 2 OF 2 MRG LO STRAINER DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARMS WERE INOP.

* STBD SHAFT STERN TUBE SEAL INFLATABLE BOOT FAILED TO HOLD PRESSURE.

* 3 OF 4 FO SERVICE TANK QUICK CLOSING VALVES COULD NOT BE CLOSED REMOTELY (CORRECTED).

* NR 1B FUEL OIL COALESCER OUTLET LINE LEAKED (CORRECTED).

* NR 1B FUEL OIL COALESCER BIMBA VALVE LINE LEAKED (CORRECTED).

* NR 1 FUEL OIL COALESCER GAGE LINE FITTING LEAKED (CORRECTED).

* 2 OF 4 MAIN ENGINE CONTROL SYSTEMS WERE MISADJUSTED PREVENTING ACHIEVEMENT OF DESIGN SHAFT HORSEPOWER AND ENGINE TORQUE IN FULL POWER MODE.

* 3 OF 3 GTG CLEAN SIDE INTAKES CONTAINED DIRT/DEBRIS OR SALT DEPOSITS.

* 3 OF 3 GTG EMERGENCY COOLING WATER VALVES WERE INOP.

* 2 OF 3 WHB SAFETY VALVES WERE IMPROPERLY LOCKED.

* NR 2 WHB LOW-LOW WATER ALARM SOUNDED AT -8 VICE -9.5 TO -10.

* NR 2 WHB RIGHT HAND SAFETY VALVE ADJUST PLUGS WERE MISSING LOCKWIRE AND TAMPER SEALS.

* NR 3 WHB REMOTE WATER LEVEL INDICATOR ALARMS WERE INOP (HIGH-LOW AND LOW-LOW).

B. AUXILIARIES: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.72):

* STEERING GEAR PORT RUDDER ACCURACY SWING CHECKS WERE OUT OF ADJUSTMENT.

* ANCHOR WINDLASS PORT AND STBD ELECTRIC BRAKES WERE IMPROPERLY SET.

* ANCHOR WINDLASS PORT HPU STROKE WAS IMPROPERLY SET.

* ANCHOR WINDLASS STBD HPU ELECTRIC MOTOR WINDINGS WERE OPEN (SHIP REPORTED).

* NR 1 A/C PLANT LUBE OIL ACCUMULATOR WAS RUPTURED (CORRECTION).

* NR 4 CHILL WATER PUMP WAS OOC (SHIP REPORTED).

* NR 1, NR 3, AND NR 4 A/C PLANT CONDENSERS NEEDED CLEANING.

* A/C PLANT SPECIAL TOOLS AND THE LAPTOP FOR THE A/CS WERE MISSING.

* A/C PLANT FREON SUPPLY WAS INADEQUATE (200 LBS INSTEAD OF THE REQUIRED 675 LBS).

* NR 2 REEFER CAPACITY CONTROL WAS DEGRADED.

* NR 2 CHILL BOX HAD GREATER THAN 2-INCHES OF ICE BUILD-UP ON THE COILS.

* NR 1 REEFER MOTOR HAD AN UNUSUAL NOISE.

* HP AIR DEWPOINT WAS NOT TESTED BECAUSE THE SHIP DID NOT HAVE A DEW POINT INDICATOR.

* NR 2, NR 4, AND NR 6 FIRE PUMPS HAD MECHANICAL SEAL LEAKS.

* NR 1 S/W SERVICE PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE GEAR BOX WAS INSTALLED BACKWARDS.

* NR 1 AND NR 2 DISTILLING PLANT CONDENSATE PUMPS HAD MECHANICAL SEAL LEAKS.

* 3 OF 4 WATER HEATER SAFETY SWITCHES WERE NOT FUNCTIONAL.

* 4 OF 4 WATER HEATER STEAM REGULATING VALVES WERE NOT LOCKED.

* VERTICAL PACKAGE CONVEYOR GROWLERS DID NOT WORK AT ALL LEVELS.

C. ELECTRICAL: SAT (SCORE: 0.83):

* 2 4-STAR THERMAL IMAGING AND 1 3-STAR THERMAL IMAGING DISCREPANCIES EXISTED (CORRECTED).

* LIGHTING PANELS 1-411-1, 1-276-1, AND 2-139-2 WERE GROUNDED (CORRECTED).

* AUTOMATIC BUS TRANSFER 04-344-1 AND NR 5 FIRE PUMP AUTOMATIC BUS TRANSFER FAILED TO SHIFT IN AUTOMATIC WHEN TESTED.

* 46 OF 73 DISTRIBUTION CONTROLLERS INSPECTED WERE MISSING GROUNDING STRAPS BETWEEN THE ENCLOSURE AND THE DOOR WHEN ENERGIZED COMPONENTS WERE MOUNTED ON THE DOOR.

* NUMEROUS ELECTRICAL SAFETY AND CABLEWAY DEFICIENCIES INCLUDED: DEAD-ENDED CABLES, CABLES IMPROPERLY BUNDLED AND BANDED, CABLES EXCEEDING NESTING CAPACITY, INADEQUATE SUPPORT BRACKETS, AND POOR CABLE INSTALLATION PRACTICE IN TRANSITING WATERTIGHT BULKHEADS AND DECK PENETRATIONS HAS RESULTED IN COMPROMISED WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY THROUGHOUT THE SHIP.

* CONSOLE READING LIGHT IN COMP 02-138-0-C (CIC) HAD EXPOSED ENERGIZED TERMINALS.

* NR 3 GTG MODULE COOLING FAN ABT WAS NOT IN AUTOMATIC.

* FP-QP COIL JUNCTION BOX COVER WAS NOT WATERTIGHT AND HAD A TEMPORARY COVER INSTALLED.

* REHEATER CONTROLLER 1-25-1 HAD BURNT AND FRAYED ENERGIZED WIRES MAKING CONTACT WITH CONTROLLER CASING (TAGGED OOC).

* HAND-HELD CONTROLLERS FOR SLIDING PADEYE STATIONS NR 5 AND NR 6 HAD WORN AND FRAYED ELECTRICAL CABLES.

D. DAMAGE CONTROL: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.75):

* AFFF STATION NR 1 MASTER SOPV DID NOT FULLY CLOSE. S/F HAD TO MANUALLY CLOSE THE SOPV HANDLE.

* MER 1 SERVICE BILGE SPRINKLING SOPV WAS INOP (CORRECTED).

* MER 1 OVBD DISCHARGE VALVE (MD-1) LEAKED-BY.

* AMR 1 EDUCTOR FIREMAIN ACTUATING VALVE LEAKED-BY.

* AMR 2 OVBD DISCHARGE VALVE LEAKED-BY.

* 16 OF 16 FIREZONE DOORS DID NOT LATCH CLOSE AND GASKETS REQUIRED REPLACEMENT (SHIP REPORTED).

* STBD IPDS DID NOT IDENTIFY G AND H AGENTS.

* 25 OF 54 GROUP 2 COUNTERMEASURE NOZZLES WERE INOP.

* CMWD PIPING IN CIC PASSAGEWAY (02-180-0-L) RUPTURED DURING THE DEMO.

* GROUP 2 AND GROUP 4 CMWD SOPV INTERNAL ELECTRICAL WIRING HAD WORN INSULATION.

* CREW'S GALLEY REPLACEMENT APC CYLINDER WAS CONFIGURED WITH 1 PORT VICE 2 PORTS (PRESSURE SWITCH TO GAYLORD HOOD AND DEEP FAT FRYER CIRCUIT BREAKERS). SHIP HAD A SINGLE PORT GAYLORD HOOD ONLY.

E. DECK: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.60):

* 1 OF 2 SAR RESCUE LITTER SLINGS WAS MISSING WEIGHT TEST CERTIFICATION.

* 25 OF 25 MK 1 LIFE PRESERVERS FAILED VISUAL INSPECTION.

* 29 OF 29 KAPOK LIFE PRESERVERS FAILED VISUAL INSPECTION.

* 8 OF 9 J-BAR DAVIT SOCKETS WERE NOT MAINTAINED, DAVIT HEELS WERE NOT LUBRICATED, SOCKETS HAD DEBRIS IN THE BOTTOM, AND WEIGHT TEST LABEL PLATES WERE MISSING.

* 46 OF 51 01 LEVEL KEVLAR LIFELINES FAILED VISUAL INSPECTION. LIFELINES REQUIRED LUBRICATION TO THE SISTERHOOK PINS AND TURNBUCKLE THREAD FITTINGS, TOGGLE PINS WERE MISSING OR NOT SET IN THE DECK SOCKETS AND MANY WERE CRACKED AND/OR DISTORTED.

* 95% OF THE EXTERIOR LADDERS WERE RIGGED WITH THE IMPROPER SIZE SECURING PINS AT THE TOP AND BOTTOM OF THE LADDER, HAD MISSING OR NOT INSERTED HANDRAIL SAFETY PINS, AND HAD PINS MISSING KEEPER LANYARDS.

* ACCOM LADDER LOWER PLATFORM OUTBOARD HANDRAIL WAS BROKEN, TOE GUARD/SAFETY STEP WAS MISSING, BRIDLE WEIGHT TEST PLACARD WAS MISSING, AND TOGGLE PINS WERE UNDERSIZED.

* 9 OF 9 LIFERAFTS WERE MISSING DIAPHRAM TYPE HYDROSTATIC RELEASE PRESSURE TEST DOCUMENTATION AND WERE OUT OF PERIODICITY (SHIP REPORTED).

* 9 OF 18 MK 7 LIFERAFTS WERE NOT STOWED IN CRADLES PARALLEL TO THE SHIP'S BASELINE.

* 1 OF 2 ABANDON SHIP SURVIVAL BAGS WAS MISSING.

* 8 OF 16 TOPSIDE MOUNTED LIFE BOUY RINGS FAILED VISUAL INSPECTION AND WERE HOLED.

* SYNTHETIC HIGHLINE TRANSFER STATION WAS NOT RIGGED IAW NWP 4.01.

* SECONDARY RESCUE BOAT HAD A 5-INCH CRACK IN THE HULL, THE DECK NON-SKID PROFILE WAS INEFFECTIVE, 3 OF 4 OPERATING PLACARDS WERE MISSING, 2 OF 2 CO2 BOTTLES WERE MISSING, AND BILGES CONTAINED OILY WATER.

* DIP ROPE WAS MISSING (NOT IAW NAVSEA DWG 803-6397319).

* REVERSIBLE BOLTS (BAXTER BOLTS) AND SOCKETS REQUIRED INSPECTION AND LUBRICATION.

* 4 OF 4 SLIDING PADEYE BULKHEAD MOUNTED BACKSTAY STAPLES WERE CORRODED.

F. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE: SAT (SCORE: 0.82):

* STBD MK 32 SVTT BARREL NR 1 DID NOT SHOW TORPEDO INVENTORY FROM TSP OR MK 116.

* AN/WQC-2A LOW AND HIGH FREQUENCY TRANSDUCER CABLE INSULATION RESISTANCE CHECKS WERE .05 MEG OHMS VICE 10 MEG OHMS OR GREATER INDICATING A CABLE SHORT TO GROUND (SHIP REPORTED).

* AN/SQS-53D DOME PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (FM-27) FAILED TO RELEASE PRESSURE AT 33.5 PSI.

G. OPERATIONS: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.55):

* AN/SPS-49 HIGH VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY FLOW SENSOR WAS BROKEN AND DISCONNECTED, DISABLING LOW FLOW PROTECTION FOR 50K VOLT POWER SUPPLY (CORRECTED).

* AN/SPS-49 ANTENNA AZIMUTH PINION GEAR WAS FILLED WITH INCORRECT GREASE.

* AN/SPS-49 SHIP MOTION COMPENSATION, POWER OUT, AND MINIMAL DISCERNABLE SIGNAL WERE OUT-OF-SPEC.

* AN/SPY-1B ARRAY T03 INDICATED FAULTS ON 142 PHASE SHIFT DRIVERS, CREATING A RADIATION HAZARD CONDITION BECAUSE OF FAULTY POWER SUPPLIES (CORRECTED).

* AN/SPY-1B HVPS T36 INVERTERS NR 1 AND NR 2 COOLANT FLOW FAULT FAILED TO CLEAR AFTER TESTING, T35 INVERTER NR 2 WAS MISSING (INSTALLED IN HVPS T37), NR 5 AND NR 6 T31 INVERTERS DID NOT FAULT TO THE OFFLINE CONDITION WHEN COOLANT WAS REMOVED.

* AN/SPY-1B D/PD T20 CHANNEL NR 2 TWT GRID LEAD INSULATION WAS CRACKED AT THE TUBE BASE.

* AN/SPY-1B ARRAY T01 AND T02 FAILED GAIN AND SENSITIVITY TEST.

* AN/SPY-1B FPA T26 DID NOT PROVIDE RESULTS FOR ORTS TESTING.

* AN/SPY-1B AFT DECKHOUSE WAVEGUIDE SWITCH FAILED ORTS TESTING.

* AN/SPY-1B D/PD T20 CFA HIGH VOLTAGE BARRIER SAFETY INTERLOCK WAS FAULTY (CORRECTED).

* AN/SPY-1B FWD DECKHOUSE FAILED PHASE AND POWER TESTING, AFT DECKHOUSE DID NOT REPORT ANY READINGS FOR TESTING.

* IFF AS-177B ANTENNAS FAILED VSWR (SER NR 100 1.9:1 AND SER NR P16 1.58:1).

* SLQ-20 ROTATING IFF ANTENNA FAILED VSWR (3.0:1) AND HAD PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO FIBERGLASS.

* COMMAND AND DECISION COOLING SYSTEM HIGH CONDUCTIVITY ALARM SENSOR DID NOT ACTIVATE ALARM MODULE ON PANEL.

* AN/SPS-49 COOLING PUMP NR 1 DID NOT OPERATE (SHIP REPORTED).

* FWD AEGIS COOLING SYSTEM EXPANSION TANK RELIEF VALVE LIFTED AT 50 PSIG VICE 45 PSIG.

* SONAR COOLING SYSTEM PUMP NR 2 CHECK VALVE LEAKED BY (SHIP REPORTED).

* PORT AND STBD CIWS COOLING LOW FLOW SWITCHES DID NOT ACTIVATE ALARM.

* FCS, SPY, AND EHF DRY AIR INTERMEDIATE AND OUTLET PRESSURE REGULATORS DID NOT MAINTAIN PROPER PRESSURE.

* SHF AND SLQ-32 DRY AIR INTERMEDIATE PRESSURE REGULATORS DID NOT MAINTAIN PROPER PRESSURE.

* FCS AND AFT SPY DRY AIR RELIEF VALVES WOULD NOT ADJUST.

* FWD SPY AND FCS DRY AIR MOISTURE INDICATORS WERE WET.

* RD-358 FOR N+1 AND WCS WERE DEGRADED AND COULD NOT DATA RECORD BECAUSE OF DAMAGED RIBBON CABLES (SHIP REPORTED).

* MK 38 FWD CLOCK CONVERTER GYRO DATA HANDLER FAILED ORTS TESTING.

* MK 53 DECOY LAUNCHING SYSTEM NIGHT LOADING LIGHTS FOR LAUNCHER NR 2 AND NR 5 DID NOT ILLUMINATE.

* GUN WEAPON SYSTEM (GWS) UYK-43 MEMORY MODULES NR 1 AND NR 2 WERE DEFECTIVE. MODULES FROM N+1 UYK-43 WERE INSTALLED IN GWS UYK-43 FOR SYSTEM OPERATION.

H. WEAPONS: SAT (SCORE:0.84):

* CIWS MT 21 WAS INOP BECAUSE THE NR 1 AND NR 2 TRANSMITTER BEAM FILTER UNITS AND THE 3A4W21 CABLE WERE DAMAGED FROM INTERNAL ARCING.

* CIWS MT 21 SCAN DRIVE MOTOR CASING WAS SHORTING TO GROUND INDICATING BRUSH DUST BUILD-UP.

* MK 86 REMOTE OPTICAL SIGHT COULD NOT BE TRAINED BECAUSE THE AZIMUTH BRAKES WOULD NOT RELEASE.

* MK 86 WEAPON CONTROL CONSOLE NR 2 WAS INOP BECAUSE THE KEYBOARD MATRIX DIGITAL READOUT WOULD NOT RETRIEVE DATA AND THE REMOTE OPTICAL SIGHT VIDEO COULD NOT BE DISPLAYED.

* ARMORY INTRUSION ALARM DID NOT FUNCTION WHEN ACTIVATED.

I. NAVIGATION: SAT (SCORE: 0.84):

* UW LOG INDICATOR TRANSMITTER NR 2 DID NOT SEND CORRECT 60 HZ SPEED INFORMATION TO THE SHIP'S REPEATERS, ALL SYNCHRO TRANSMITTERS WERE ELECTRICALLY AND MECHANICALLY MISALIGNED.

* UW LOG INDICATOR TRANSMITTER NR 1 SYNCHRO TRANSMITTERS WERE MISALIGNED AND DID NOT SEND SPEED INFORMATION TO SHIP'S SYSTEMS.

* AFT AN/WSN-7 CDU DID NOT HAVE OPERATIONAL PROGRAM LOADED AND PRINTER CARTRIDGES WERE FAULTY.

* WAKE LIGHT COVER WAS MISSING, WITH LIGHT BULB BROKEN OFF AND WIRES EXPOSED.

* AN/UQN-4 FATHOMETER TRANSDUCER IMPEDANCE AND CABLE RESISTANCE WERE OUT-OF-SPEC (SHIP REPORTED).

J. COMMUNICATIONS: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.57):

* HF IMI TESTING FAILED BECAUSE AT LEAST 2 AN/URT-23 TRANSMITTERS COULD NOT BE ADJUSTED FOR REQUIRED POWER OUT OF 850 WATTS.

* HF LONG HAUL WAS UNSAT.

* 9 OF 10 AN/URT-23 HAD LOW POWER OUT AND HIGH VSWR. 8 OF 10 FAILED ON-AIR TEST.

* 6 OF 14 R2368 HF RECEIVERS (NR 3, NR 5, NR 7, NR 10, NR 12, AND NR 14) FAILED SENSITIVITY TEST AND 14 OF 14 FAILED ON-AIR TEST BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING: 5 OF 5 HF ANTENNAS WERE DEGRADED DUE TO CORROSION/DETERIORATION AND HIGH VSWR.

* ANZAC SPLITTER HH 108 FOR HF HAD FAULTY CHANNEL B CAUSING A 50% DECREASE IN CAPABILITY OF HF SRA-49 COUPLER BANKS.

* 1 OF 4 AN/SRA-57 TRANSMIT COUPLERS (NR 1) WAS DEGRADED AND 1 OF 4 (NR 3) WAS INOP (SHIP REPORTED).

* 1 OF 3 AN/GRC-211 VHF TRANSCEIVERS (NR 2) WAS DEGRADED AND 1 OF 3 (NR 3) WAS INOP.

* 1 OF 2 AN/WSC-3(V)11 UHF LOS HAVEQUICK WAS INOP BECAUSE OF NO TRANSMIT/RECEIVE CAPABILITY.

* 9 OF 16 AN/WSC-3(V)7 UHF LOS TRANSCEIVERS WERE DEGRADED WITH THE FOLLOWING DISCREPANCIES: NR 1, NR 2, NR 3, NR 6, NR 7, AND NR 8 HAD LOW AM WIDEBAND AUDIO OUT (CORRECTED). NR 7 HAD LOW XMIT FM NARROWBAND DEVIATION AND FAILED BITE 10 A1 TRANSMITTER CHECK. NR 8 FAILED BITE 16 A14 FM DETECTOR CHECK. NR 10 FAILED BITE 3 A23 REFERENCE OSCILLATOR CHECK. NR 12 HAD HIGH RCV AM NARROWBAND AUDIO OUT, AND NR 6, NR 7 AND NR 13 HAD LOW RCV FM NARROWBAND AUDIO OUT (CORRECTED).

* 4 OF 4 AN/WSC-3 UHF OA-9123 COUPLERS HAD FAULTY POWER LAMPS, NR 1 HAD A FAULTY A2A1A2 CCA CAUSING DRAWER 4 TO BE INOP AND NR 3 HAD COMBINER NR 3 FAULT LIT AS DETERMINED BY BIT TEST. DRAWER WORKS.

* TV-DTS WAS INOP BECAUSE OF SOFTWARE ISSUES (SHIP REPORTED).

* 9 OF 16 UHF ANTENNAS WERE DEGRADED BECAUSE OF CORROSION, DETERIORATION AND/OR HIGH VSWR.

* AN/USC-38 EHF SATCOM SYSTEM WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A FAULTY 1A6A18 POWER SUPPLY CIRCUIT CARD.

* AN/USC-38 EHF ANTENNA NR 1 AND NR 2 WERE OUT OF BALANCE (EE130-AG-0MI-260 /156-3 USC-38 BALANCE OF ANTENNAS CORRECTIVE PROCEDURES).

* AN/USC-38 EHF TIP LAPTOP COULD NOT BE ACCESSED BECAUSE NO PASSWORD WAS AVAILABLE.

* 2 OF 2 AN/WSC-6 SHF ANTENNA MAINTENANCE LIGHTS WERE INOP BECAUSE OF UNAVAILABILITY OF 115 VAC.

* 2 OF 2 AN/WSC-6 SHF ANTENNAS TEST FEED HORNS WERE INSTALLED INCORRECTLY.

* 3 OF 4 AN/WSC-6 SHF ANTENNA RADOM HATCH SECURING DOGS ON ANTENNA NR 1 AND 4 OF 4 SECURING DOGS ON ANTENNA NR 2 WERE CORRODED TO A POINT OF BEING INOPERABLE.

* 3 OF 3 EMERGENCY POSITION-INDICATING RADIO BEACON (EPIRB) REGISTRATION DATES WERE EXPIRED (EXP DATE 03/17/07). 1 OF 3 EPIRBS UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (UIN) ON THE DECAL DID NOT MATCH THE EPIRB UIN.

* 5 OF 14 TSEC/KY-58 CRYPTO UNIT (NR 6, NR 7, NR 8, NR 9, AND NR 11) AC PWR SOURCES WERE MISSING BECAUSE OF A BLOWN RACK FUSE OR COMPONENT FAILURE AND 2 OF 14 (NR 4 AND NR 7) FRONT PANEL CONTROL KNOBS WERE MISSING, RENDERING OPERATION UNRELIABLE.

* 4 OF 4 AN/USC-38 EHF ANDVT WERE ALARMING WHEN KEYED.

* 2 OF 2 KY-40 LINK-11 CRYPTO DEVICES FAILED TO ALLOW LINK-11 POFA TO BE CONDUCTED BECAUSE OF FAULTY UNITS.

* 13 OF 26 TA-970 RED PHONES WERE INOP BECAUSE OF MISSING OR BURNED OUT DETECT, CIPHER, PLAIN OR DISCONNECT BULBS AND 9 OF 26 C-10276 CHANNEL SELECTORS HAD FUSE HOLDERS, FUSES AND/OR KNOBS MISSING.

* 10 OF 15 AM-3729 AUDIO AMPLIFIERS HAD MISSING FUSES AND/OR BROKEN FUSE HOLDERS.

* AN/SYQ-7 NAVMACS SIDE ALPHA WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A MISSING TAPE DRIVE, FAULTY SYSTEM BOARD, AND MISSING 3.5 FLOPPY DRIVE. WORKSTATION NR 1 HAD A FAULTY CRT DISPLAY AND 10 OF 16 UNINTERRUPTED POWER SUPPLY SECURING SCREWS WERE MISSING.

* AN/USQ-64 OTCIXS WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A FAULTY POWER SWITCH ON THE ON-143.

* 2 OF 3 NOW TERMINALS (NR 2 AND NR 3) WERE INOP BECAUSE OF MISSING POWER SUPPLIES.

* AN/UYQ-86 COMMON DATA LINK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CDLMS) WAS INOP BECAUSE THE SYSTEM COULD NOT BE ACCESSED (CORRECTED).

* AN/USQ-125 LINK 11 WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A BROKEN INTERFACE CABLE CONNECTOR (CORRECTED) ON THE JUNCTION BOX (CASREP 08030).

* LINK 11 PASSIVE LINK TAP (PLT) FRONT CONTROL PANEL WAS LOCKED-UP, RENDERING PLT INOPERABLE. LINK 11 TACTICAL DATA COULD NOT BE SENT TO GCCS-M.

* AN/SSW-1 LINK 4A WAS INOP BECAUSE ON-AIR TEST FAILED. POFA WAS UNSAT WITH OR-176 NR 2.

* AN/USG-2 COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT CAPABILITY DIAGNOSTIC TESTING IDENTIFIED SEVERAL ERRONEOUS FAULTS (UP TO 5 CIRCUIT CARDS) AND THE SYSTEM COULD NOT BE INITIATED USING PROPER LIGHT OFF PROCEDURE. POSSIBLE SOFTWARE/ CONFIGURATION ISSUES EXIST.

K. INFORMATION SYSTEMS: SAT (SCORE: 0.85):

* 7 OF 8 AN/USQ-153 ISNS UPS FOR SIPRNET AND NIPRNET SWITCHES AND SERVER RACKS DID NOT HOLD A CHARGE.

* AN/USQ-144 ADNS UPS FAILED TO HOLD A CHARGE.

* BACK-UPS WERE NOT BEING CONDUCTED FOR SYSTEM CONFIGURATION NOR FOR RECOVERY ON MOST INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS TO INCLUDE GCCS-M, NIPRNET, SIPRNET, AND NTCSS.

L. SUPPLY: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.78):

* 2 OF 2 FREEZE BOXES DID NOT MAINTAIN 0 DEG F. TEMP RANGED FROM 8 TO 20 DEG F.

* 2 OF 2 GALLEY 10 GAL STEAM JACKET KETTLES WERE INOP.

* UNIT COMMANDER PANTRY GREASE INTERCEPTOR HOOD AND WASH DOWN SYSTEM WAS INOP.

* 4 OF 8 GIH FIRE DAMPER HOLDING SOLENOIDS MALFUNCTIONED.

* GIH REMOTE FIRE TOGGLE SWITCHES WERE NOT INSTALLED IN THE WARDROOM PANTRY, UNIT COMMANDER PANTRY OR THE COMMANDING OFFICER PANTRY.

* 1 OF 2 GALLEY DEEP FAT FRYERS WAS INOP.

* 1 OF 4 GALLEY REACH-IN REEFERS/FREEZERS WAS INOP.

* 2 OF 4 WARDROOM REACH-IN REEFERS/FREEZERS WERE INOP.

* UNIT COMMANDER CABIN PANTRY WASTE DISPOSAL WAS INOP.

* 7 OF 8 GIH VENTILATION HOODS DID NOT MEET MINIMUM AIR FLOW VELOCITY REQUIREMENT.

* UNIT COMMANDER AND COMMANDING OFFICER PANTRY FOOD SERVICE EQUIPMENT WAS NOT BEING UTILIZED. RECOMMEND REQUESTING A SHIPALT TO HAVE THE EQUIPMENT REMOVED FROM FOOD SERVICE SPACES.

M. HABITABILITY: SAT (SCORE: 0.80):

* UNAUTHORIZED SELF-SERVE LAUNDRY FACILITIES WERE INSTALLED WITHOUT PROPER EXHAUST VENTILATION CONNECTIONS PRESENTING A FIRE HAZARD IN OFFICER AND CPO SANITARY SPACES.

* OFFICER STATEROOMS, LOWER OPS, CPO ENLISTED BERTHING SPACES AND SANITARY SPACES HAD NOT BEEN UPDATED/REFURBISHED SINCE THE SHIP WAS CONSTRUCTED.

* SHIPALT CG-0047-00629 FOR SELF-SERVICE LAUNDRY WAS NOT INSTALLED.

N. NAVOSH: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.75):

* 6 OF 10 ACCESS TRUNK SAFETY NETS WERE NOT CONSTRUCTED OR INSTALLED IAW NAVSEA DWG 804-5184163 REV A. 3 ADDITIONAL NETS ARE REQUIRED.

* HAZARDOUS MATERIALS WERE FOUND IN UNLABELLED SECONDARY CONTAINERS, INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS WERE STORED IN CLOSE PROXIMITY AND EXPIRED SHELF LIFE MATERIALS WERE FOUND THROUGHOUT THE SHIP. EXCESSIVE AMOUNTS OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS WERE ONBOARD.

* LADDER CHAINS WERE MISSING/IMPROPERLY RIGGED IN NUMEROUS LOCATIONS.

* SAFETY PROGRAM WAS NOT FULLY ESTABLISHED.

O. VENTILATION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.63):

* 13 OF 24 SANITARY SPACES HAD EXHAUST AIRFLOW BELOW DESIGN SPECS, 8 HAD NO FLOW (UNIT CDR WR, CPO WR/SH, CREW BERTHING 2-138-0-L WR/SH, CREW BERTHING 3-138-0-L WR/WC/SH).

* 4 OF 11 NAVOSH SPACES HAD EXHAUST AIRFLOW BELOW DESIGN SPECS. FLAMM LQD STRM NR 1 HAD NO FLOW.

P. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.57):

* DEMONSTRATION OF THE H2S MONITORS WAS NOT CONDUCTED BECAUSE THE CALIBRATION GAS ONBOARD HAD EXPIRED.

* PLEXIGLASS SPRAY SHIELDS WERE NOT INSTALLED AROUND THE MECHANICAL SEAL OIL CAVITY FOR CHT PUMPS NR 1- 6.

* 30 OF 44 REMOTE OPERATORS WERE SEIZED OR OPERATING GEAR WAS NOT CONNECTED.

* FLANGE BOLTS FOR CHT REMOTE OPERATOR VALVE PL381 WERE MISSING/NOT TIGHTENED.

* DRIP PANS WERE NOT INSTALLED UNDER CHT VALVE PL212 AND PL214; BOTH LOCATED IN A FOOD HANDLING AREA (2-232-0-Q).

* AFT CHT TANK LOW LEVEL ALARM FAILED TO ACTIVATE.

* MIDSHIP CHT PUMP CONTROLLER DID NOT WORK IN AUTOMATIC MODE WHEN NR 4 CHT PUMP WAS THE DUTY PUMP.

* NR 4 CHT PUMP WAS MAKING NOISE INDICATING A POSSIBLE CLOGGED SUCTION/WORN PUMP.

* NR 4 CHT PUMP DISCHARGE PIPING HAD A SOFT PATCH INSTALLED AND WAS LEAKING RAW SEWAGE (DFS AUTHORIZED FOR SOFT PATCH).

* SOFT PATCH WAS INSTALLED ON THE CHT PUMP DISCHARGE PIPING IN MER NR 2 NEAR CHT VALVE PL 304 (SHIP REPORTED).

* FWD CHT PUMP CONTROLLER DID NOT OPERATE IN THE AUTOMATIC MODE. DUTY AND STANDBY PUMP DID NOT ACTIVATE (SHIP REPORTED).

* NR 1 OWS WOULD NOT OPERATE IN AUTOMATIC BECAUSE OF A MALFUNCTIONING OIL CONTENT MONITOR AND MISSING SOLENOIDS ON PUMP PRIMING SOLENOID VALVES.

* BILGE HIGH LEVEL ALARMS DID NOT OPERATE IN THE FWD PUMP ROOM, NR 1 AMR, AND NR 3 GTG.

* PLASTIC SHREDDER WOULD NOT OPERATE BECAUSE OF A MISSING VENTILATION DUCT (VENTILATION INTERLOCK).

* GLASS/METAL SHREDDER WOULD OPERATE WHEN VENTILATION INTERLOCK WAS BYPASSED.

* 2 OF 2 COMPRESSED MELT UNITS DID NOT OPERATE EFFICIENTLY BECAUSE OF A CLOGGED AND DAMAGED CLOSED LOOP COOLING UNIT STRAINER BASKET.

* PULPER WOULD NOT PULP WASTE BECAUSE OF A WORN IMPELLER AND STATIONARY BLADES IN THE SLURRY CHAMBER.

* ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PROGRAM WAS NOT ESTABLISHED.

* ODS/REFRIGERANT LOG DID NOT ACCURATELY REFLECT LOSS AND USAGE.

Q. AVIATION: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.58): RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF AIR OPERATIONS UNTIL THE FOLLOWING DISCREPANCIES ARE CORRECTED:

1) FLIGHT AND HANGAR DECK NON-SKID HAD MULTIPLE AREAS OF RUST BLEED THROUGH, REDUCED PROFILE AND WAS DELAMINATED. ALL PADEYES HAD MODERATE TO SEVERE CORROSION.

2) FLIGHT DECK DRAIN AT 01-300-1 WAS MISSING REQUIRED DOWN SPOUT AND DRAINED DIRECTLY TO THE MAIN DECK.

3) JP-5 REFUELING STATION DRAIN DOWN SPOUT WAS HOLED AND CORRODED AT THE 01 LEVEL THROUGH THE DECK FITTING AND WOULD ALLOW FUEL TO ACCUMULATE ON THE MAIN DECK. A FIREHOSE WAS INSTALLED AS A TEMPORARY REPAIR.

4) SGSI F300 UNIT WAS INOP BECAUSE OF FAILED MOTOR AND SEIZED HYDRAULIC PUMP.

5) SGSI PLATFORM HAD A LARGE AMOUNT OF FOD, NUMEROUS AREAS OF NON-SKID DELAMINATION, AND MODERATE SURFACE CORROSION.

6) 13 OF 13 OVERHEAD FLOODLIGHTS WERE IMPROPERLY SECURED AND WERE CORRODED TO THE POINT OF NEEDING TO BE REPLACED. THE MOUNTING POLES WERE EXFOLIATED AND REQUIRE REPLACEMENT/REPAIR.

* FLIGHT DECK STATUS LIGHT ENCLOSURE LENS MOUNTING COVER HAD SEPARATED FROM THE ENCLOSURE PIANO HINGE.

* JP-5 OPERATOR CONSOLE OPERATED ERRATICALLY AND THE TLIS GAVE ERRONEOUS INDICATIONS.

* HCO AND 3 OF 7 LSO STATION WINDSHIELD WIPERS WERE INOP.

* 8 OF 8 FLIGHT DECK FLOODLIGHTS HAD DETERIORATED ELECTRICAL CABLE SEALANT, DAMAGED WEATHER SEALS, INTERIOR FOD AND/OR MISADJUSTED LIGHT BULBS.

* JP-5 FLIGHT DECK FUELING STATION RISER GAGE WAS NOT CALIBRATED.

* FWD 400HZ CABLE LEAKED 38V DURING NO-LOAD TEST.

9. RDML T. ALEXANDER, COMNAVSURFGRU MIDPAC, WAS PRESENT FOR THE OUT-BRIEF. CAPT M. BRANNON WAS THE SENIOR INSPECTOR.

10. PRESIDENT, BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY, CONCURS WITH THE FINDINGS.//

BT

[soultrain]

Stout InSurv Text:


Posted : Sunday Apr 20, 2008 9:06:27 EDT

MSGID/GENADMIN,USMTF,2007/PRESINSURV NORFOLK VA//

SUBJ/INSURV REPORT FOR USS STOUT (DDG 55) MATERIAL INSPECTION (MI)//

GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. THE BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY CONDUCTED AN MI OF USS STOUT (DDG 55) AT NORFOLK, VA DURING THE PERIOD 10-14 MAR 08 AT NORFOLK, VA.

2. SENIOR MEMBER COMMENTS:

A. USS STOUT WAS FOUND UNFIT FOR SUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS.

B. ALTHOUGH THE SHIP CERTIFIED ITS READINESS FOR SEA, THE BOARD NOTED DISCREPANCIES THAT WOULD HAVE RESTRICTED UNDERWAY OPERATIONS OR DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS DURING THE POST-UNDERWAY PORTION OF THE MI: 2B GTM/1B GTM, 1 GTG, STEERING, RESCUE BOAT/MAN OVERBOARD, ANCHOR, SPY-1D, FCS ILLUMINATORS, AFT VLS, CIWS MT 21, MK 32 SVTTS AND MK 45 LWG, HALON, AND UHF LOS COMMS.

C. AAW, USW, AND SUW MISSION AREAS WERE SIGNIFICANTLY LIMITED BECAUSE: AN/SPY-1D POWER OUT WAS REDUCED BY APPROX 75 PERCENT AND THE PROCESSING ABILITY WAS REDUCED BY APPROX 13 PERCENT, 2 OF 3 MK 99 ILLUMINATORS WERE INOP (LOSS OF 360 DEG COVERAGE AND NUMBER OF MISSILES INFLIGHT), AF: VLS MAGAZINE WAS UNAVAILABLE BECAUSE OF THE FUEL TANK LEAKAGE IN THE EDUC7OR SUMP (LOSS OF 68 PERCENT OF THE MISSILE INVENTORY), CIWS MT 21 WAS INOP, PORT AND STBD MK 32 SVTT TRAIN MECHANISMS WERE BINDING AND MOUNTS COULD NOT BE QUICKLY TRAINED TO FIRING POSITION, AND MK 45 5 INCH GUN COULD NOT SUPPORT GUNNERY DEMO BECAUSE OF CORROSION IN THE GUN CRADLE. SEE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE, OPERATIONS, AND WEAPONS SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.

D. THE ANCHORING DEMO WAS NOT COMPLETED BECAUSE THE ANCHOR WINDLASS WILDCAT/CAPSTAN SHAFT COUPLING UPPER AND LOWER SLEEVES HAD EXCESSIVE CONCENTRIC MOVEMENT (UP TO 1/4 INCH) AND THE MECHANICAL BRAKE WAS MISADJUSTED.

E. MOB RECOVERY METHOD WAS DEGRADED. CORROSION ON THE DAVIT FOUNDATION, PEDESTAL, FALLS TENSIONING DEVICE, DAVIT SHEAVE, AND THE HOOK SECURING PIN WAS SEVERE ENOUGH TO WARRANT A SAFETY INSPECTION (COULD NOT DEPLOY RHIBS). THE AS-FOUND SAR SWIMMER GEAR WOULD NOT PERMIT OPS IN WATER TEMP BELOW 60 DEG F.

F. THE SHIP INITIATED SELF-SUSPENSION OF FLIGHT OPS FOR DAMAGED FLIGHT DECK NETS AND HARDWARE. AVIA&ION FACILITIES INSPECTION RESULTED IN 7 ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SELF-SUSPENSION OF FLIGHT OR AVIATION RELATED OPS. SEE AVIATION SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.

G. ENGINEERING CONTROL SYSTEMS WERE DEGRADED. 8 OF 8 CONSOLES FOUND WITH RESISTANCE READINGS BETWEEN RETURN AND GROUND TO BE BELOW THE MINIMUM OF 250K OHMS IAW PMS 2521/051 A-18. 5 OF 62 DDG'S HAVE EXPERIENCED UNCOMMANDED MAIN PROPULSION/ELECTRICAL GENERATION EVENTS DUE TO GROUNDS.

H. 11 GTM RBOS AND 7 GTG RBOS WERE IDENTIFED DURING THE INPORT INSPECTION.

I. RUDDER INSPECTION OVER THE PAST 11 MONTHS INDICATED BARE METAL SURFACE AREA HAD INCREASED BY APPROX 700 PERCENT AND 270 PERCENT FOR STBD AND PORT RUDDERS RESPECTIVELY. ADDITIONALLY, PITTING OF UP TO 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER BY 0.25 INCHES DEEP HAD DEVELOPED ON THE RUDDER SURFACE AREA. THE SHIP'S IMPRESSED CURRENT CATHODIC PROTECTION (ICCP) SYSTEM WAS NOT OPERATING PROPERLY. ICCP IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT BARE METAL DAMAGE.

J. GROUNDS IN 60 HZ DISTRIBUTION AND IC SYSTEMS WERE A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE. 3 ICSM PANELS, 5 60 HZ POWER PANELS, 4 SOUND POWERED PHONE CIRCUITS, AND 1 SHORE POWER RECEPTACLE WERE FOUND GROUNDED DURING THE INSPECTION. 2 GROUNDS DISCOVERED BY SHIP'S FORCE IN JAN 08 HAD NOT BEEN CORRECTED. INVESTIGATION AND CORRECTION OF THE GROUNDS IAW NSTM 300 PARA 300-3.2.6 WAS REQUIRED.

K. KEEL REST AND BOAT CHOCKS DID NOT HAVE 90 PERCENT MINIMUM CONTACT WITH THE BOAT IN THE STOWED POSITION.

L. ACCOM LADDER WAS NOT OBSERVED. LADDER WAS OFF THE SHIP FOR REPAIR (CASREP 07094).

M. ANCHOR CHAIN'S 1ST AND 2ND SHOT DID NOT RIDE IN THE WELP OF THE WILDCAT IAW NSTM 581-5.1.4.1.

N. MK 39 GYRO DATA CONVERTER (GDC) DATA TO SPY-1D COMPUTER INTERMITTENTLY CHANGED STATUS FROM GOOD TO FAILED, CAUSING AFT GYRO =tirORMATION TO BE UNRELIABLE BECAUSE OF FAULTY ADAPTATION DATA CIRCUIT CARDS. SYMPTOM WAS ORIGINALLY IDENTIFIED IN MAR OF 06 (CASREP 06049, USS STOUT MSG 311830Z MAR 06) WHICH ALSO IDENTIFIED UNRELIABLE DATA TO WCS, GUN FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM, AND N PLUS 1 COMPUTER.

0. AFT MK41 VLS HAD 10 DELUGE VALVES LEAKING AND FWD VLS HAD 3 VALVES LEAKING. SALINITY CHECK AFT HAD TWICE THE ALLOWABLE LIMIT (4 VICE 2 MICROMHO). SEDIMENT WAS ALSO PRESENT IN THE AFT DELUGE HOSES WHICH WILL LEAD TO VALVE FAILURES.

P. MT 51 CRADLE ROUND/POWDER POSITION SWITCHES WERE CORRODED, PREVENTING THE GUN FROM FIRING DURING THE GUNNERY DEMO. CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUIRED 4 HOURS (CORRECTED). ADDITIONALLY, SALT WATER CORROSION WAS ON THE CRADLE VALVE BLOCKS, LOADER DRUM PIPING/VALVE BLOCKS, FUZE SETTER ELECTRICAL SWITCH CONNECTORS, MAIN CABLE CONNECTOR TIE-POINT, LOWER HOIST ASSEMBLY, SHIELD ACCESS DOOR LINKAGES, AND UPPER HOIST CHAIN TRACK.

Q. SHIP'S UHF LOS COMMUNICATIONS WERE DEGRADED AND COULD NOT FULLY SUPPORT 80 PERCENT OF 5TH FLEET COMMUNICATIONS PLAN WITH AVAILABLE ASSETS. OVERALL COMMUNICATION ANTENNA MAINTENANCE AND CORROSION PREVENTIVE MEASURES, IF UNIMPROVED, WILL LEAD TO FURTHER COMMUNICATION SYSTEM DEGRADATIONS. SEE COMMUNICATIONS SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.

R. AN/USQ-153 ISNS SIPRNET AIJ~) NIPRNET WERE DEGRADED WITH THE FOLLOWING DEFICIENCIES: SERVERS HAD UNAUTHORIZED USB 500GB HARD DRIVES CONNECTED, IAVA PATCHES WERE NOT CURRENT, SERVERS REQUIRED DEFRAGMENTATION, TAPE BACK-UP DEVICES WERE INOP OR MALFUNCTIONING, AND INTEGRATED NETWORK MANAGER (INM) WOULD NOT START.

S. AN/USQ-144 ADNS SYSTEM HAS BEEN INSTALLED FOR OVER 1 YEAR WITHOUT A COMPLETED SOVT.

T. FOOD SERVICE DIVISION'S ABILITY TO SAFELY OPERATE WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE OF THE GREASE INTERCEPTOR HOOD MATERIAL CONDITION. SEE SUPPLY SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.

U. SHIP'S ABILITY TO STORE, PREPARE, AND SERVE FOOD WAS DEGRADED SPECIFICALLY: WALK-IN FREEZER DID NOT MAINTAIN 0 DEG F OR BELOW (CORRECTED), 5 OF 13 REACH-IN REEFERS WERE INOP, 4 OF 13 REACH-IN REEFERS WERE DEGRADED, REACH-IN REEFER CONDENSER COIL FILTER CLEANING MAINTENANCE WAS NOT BEING COMPLETED (CORRECTED), 2 OF 2 SINGLE TANK DISHWASHERS WERE INOP, 3 OF 3 WASTE DISPOSAL UNITS WERE INOP, 3 OF 4 STEAM KETTLES WERE INOP, 1 OF 3 CONVECTION OVENS WAS INOP, AND 1 OF 2 SANITIZING SINKS WAS INOP.

V. SEALANT IN THE SHOWERS HAD FAILED, ENABLING 7 OF 12 SANITARY SPACE SHOWER DECKS TO BECOME SEPARATED FROM THE SURFACE AND ROT.

W. BERTHING 2 HAD NUMEROUS MATERIAL AND PRESERVATION ISSUES WITH THE BERTHING TIER FOUNDATIONS CORRODED TO THE POINT OF LOST METAL DUE TO A WATER FOUNTAIN THAT HAD BEEN LEAKING FOR A YEAR (SHIP REPORTED).

BERTHING IS SCHEDULED FOR REHABILITATION IN 2011. FOUNDATIONS REQUIRE TESTING FOR QUALIFICATION TO SAFELY SUPPORT PERSONNEL FOR COMBAT STRESS/DESIGN STRESSES.

X. MAIN DRAINAGE WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE THE AUX 1 EDUCTOR OVBD DISCHARGE VALVE (MD-V 2-169-2) DID NOT SHUT REMOTELY, MER 1 EDUCTOR LOCAL AND REMOTE SUCTION GAUGES WERE INOP, THEREFORE PREVENTING SHIP'S FORCE FROM FOLLOWING EOP. AUX 1 BHD STOP VALVE (MD-V-31 4-173-6) MOV LOCAL OPEN INDICATOR LIGHT WAS OUT.

Y. HALON WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE THE PAINT LOCKER EXHAUST AND THE MER 2 SUPPLY VENTILATION DAMPENERS FAILED TO CLOSE.

Z. 22 OF 24 PORTABLE DAVIT SOCKETS HAD EXCESSIVE CORROSION AND REQUIRE LUBRICATION/CLEANING OF THE SOCKET COLLARS, DAVIT BEARINGS, DAVIT FEET, AND FOOT SOCKETS.

AA. 1 OF 2 CONREP STATIONS WAS INOP (SEE DECK SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS).

AB. SHIP'S SELF-ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY WAS EVALUATED AS MARGINAL.

AC. 26 OF 77 WATERTIGHT CLOSURES INSPECTED WERE NOT WATERTIGHT.

AD. 2 OF 2 IPDS WERE OPERATIONAL.

AE. 14 OF 20 VENTILATION AIRFLOW ALARMS WERE EITHER INOP OR MISADJUSTED.

AF. 9 CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES PRECLUDED OILY WATER SEPARATORS CERTIFICATION.

AG. DOSSERT CONNECTORS WERE FOUND IN THE NR 1 AND NR 3 SWBDS. THERMAL INDICATIONS REVEALED NO SIGNS DF LOOSENING OR LOCAL HEATING. CONNECTORS NEED TO BE DOCUMENTED FOR FUTURE INSPECTION.

AH. 2 SYSTEMS DID NOT HAVE PREVENTINTE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM ( PMS ) INSTALLED. SEE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.

3. THE FOLLOWING CASREPS WERE ACTIVE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MI:

NUMBER NOMENCLATURE CATEGORY

06026 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2

06027 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2

06028 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2

07049 AFT MK41 VLS MODULE 3 2

07051 AFT MK41 VLS MODULE 2 2

07076 ACTS 2

07092 MSS CONSOLE 2

07094 ACCOMMODATION LADDER 2

07098 CONDITIONING SYSTEMS, AIR 2

08001 FLIGHT DECK NETS 2

08002 AIR SYSTEMS, HIGH PRESSURE 2

08005 SHF 2

08007 HULL STRUCTURE 2

08009 FCS NR 1 2

08011- STEERING GEAR W/CONTROL 2

08012 BFTT 2

08013 SPY HVPS 2

08016 STEERING GEAR W/CONTROL 2

08017 NR 1 HPAC WATER PUMP 2

08018 MT22 CIWS MAGAZINE 2

08019 PURIFIER NR 2 LUBE OIL 2

4. 23 DEPARTURES FROM SPECS (DFS) EXISTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MI.

A. THE FOLLOWING DFS WERE IN EXCESS OF 180 DAYS:

NUMBER NOMENCLATURE DATE ISSUED

DDG55-003-01 MILLING MACHINE 11/13/2003

DDG55-001-02 NR 1 CRP PUMP SEAL 1/23/2006

DDG55-002-02 NR 2 CRP PUMP SEAL 1/23/2006

DDG55-004-02 NR 1 CPP SHEAR PINS 9/26/2003

DDG55-005-02 NR 2 CPP SHEAR PINS 9/26/2003

DDG55-012-01 MRG MOST REMOTE BEAR 11/26/2002

DDG55-005-03 STBD BLKHD SEAL 220 3/13/2003

DDG55-006-03 STBD BLKHD SEAL 254 3/13/2003

DDG55-007-03 STBD BLKHD SEAL 300 3/13/2003

DDG55-008-03 PORT BLKHD SEAL 300 4/25/2003

DDG55-018-03 NR 1 MRG UNLOADER VLV 1/28/2006

DDG55-019-03 NR 2 MRG UNLOADER VLV 1/28/2006

DDG55-001-04 NR 1A GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007

DDG55-002-04 NR 1B GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007

DDG55-003-04 NR 2A GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007

DDG55-004-04 NR 2B GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007

DDG55-021-04 NR 2 MRG L/O COOLER 6/3/2005

B. NO DFS WERE ISSUED TO SUPPORT COMPLETION OF THE MI.

5. 15 ACTIVE TEMPORARY STANDING ORDERS (TSO) EXISTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MI.

A. NO TSO WERE IN EXCESS OF 45 DAYS.

B. NO TSO WERE ISSUED TO SUPPORT COMPLETION OF THE MI.

6. DEMO RESULTS: SAT (0.80-1.00)/DEGRADED (0.60-0.79)/UNSAT

(0.00-0.59):

* AAW DTE DEMO WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.51) BECAUSE OF REDUCED AN/SPY-1 DETECTION RANGE AND FAILURE OF 2 OF 3 FCS ILLUMINATORS.

* SD DTE DEMO WAS DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.73) BECAUSE THE CIWS MT 21 WAS INOP AND DID NOT SUPPORT THE ENGAGEMENT.

* GUNNERY LIVE FIRE DEMO WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.30) BECAUSE MT 51 DID NOT FIRE UNTIL THE CORRODED BREECH SAFETY DEVICE WAS REPAIRED.

* USW DTE DEMO WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.91).

* FULL POWER DEMO COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED (SCORE: 0.00) BECAUSE REQUIRED EQUIPMENT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED. SHIP WAS ABLE TO ACHIEVE 80 PERCENT FULL POWER ON A 3 GTM CONFIGURATION AND A 1 HOUR HIGH POWER DEMO WAS CONDUCTED AT THAT SPEED.

* QUICK REVERSAL ASTERN WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.95). QUICK REVERSAL WAS CONDUCTED FROM 80 PERCENT FULL POWER AHEAD TO 100 PERCENT FULL POWER ASTERN.

* QUICK REVERSAL AHEAD WAS SAT (SCORE: 1.00). QUICK REVERSAL WAS CONDUCTED FROM 100 PERCENT FULL POWER ASTERN TO 80 PERCENT FULL POWER AHEAD.

* STEERING DEMO WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.95). STEERING DEMO WAS CONDUCTED AT 80 PERCENT FULL POWER.

* ANCHORING DEMO WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.00) BECAUSE OF ANCHORING DEFICIENCIES.

7. SHIPBOARD PRESERVATION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.79):

* CCIPT IN-SERVICE CORROSION CONTROL SURVEYS WERE CONDUCTED IN JUN 06 AND SEP 05. INSURV CORROSION INSPECTION VALIDATED THAT 80 PERCENT OF THE DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED DURING THE SURVEYS WERE STILL OUTSTANDING. SURFACE PREPARATION AND COATING APPLICATION HAS NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED PROPERLY OVER THE LIFE OF THE SHIP AND HAS ADDED TO THE OVERALL INCREASED WEIGHT OF 3.5 TONS IAW CCIPT SURVEY REPORT FOR USS STOUT (DDG 55), WHICH HAS DECREASED FUEL SAVINGS, SPEED, AND STABILITY.

* FLIGHT DECK STATUS LIGHTING SYSTEM WAS INOP BECAUSE OF CORROSION.

* CORROSION CONTROLS FOR BULKHEAD TO DECK INTERFACE IN BERTHING 5 AND 7 SANITARY SPACES WERE INADEQUATE (GRADE 1G).

* APPROX 210 SQ FT OF THE 05 LEVEL DECK WAS CORRODED. 65 PERCENT OF THE NON-SKID HAD RUST BLEEDING THRU, ALL DECK DRAINS WERE CORRODED WITH FLAKING METAL AND WASTAGE, THE KNIFE EDGE HAD MULTIPLE SPOTS OF FLAKING METAL, AND THE JUNCTION OF THE DOG HOUSE BULKHEAD AND DECK WAS CORRODED OVER THE ENTIRE LENGTH. ADDITIONALLY, THE FWD STBD CORNER WAS CRACKED.

* AFT ICCP MAGNETIC CONTROLLER WAS INCORRECTLY SET. HULL POTENTIAL READING WAS .900 VDC, REFERENCE AND AUX CELL CHECK READINGS WERE AT .900 VDC AND CONTROLLER OUTPUT READING WAS .150 VDC (CONTROLLER OUTPUT SHOULD BE 0 VDC WHEN HULL POTENTIAL IS ABOVE .850 VDC ).

* 1 OF 2 BRUSHES ON THE STBD SHAFT GROUNDING ASSY HAD LESS THAN 50 PERCENT CONTACT WITH THE SHAFT SLIP RINGS.

* PORT AND STBD SHAFT GROUNDING WIRE INSULATION WAS DETERIORATED.

* PORT AND STBD RUDDER GROUNDING STRAPS WERE THE WRONG MATERIAL AND INCORRECTLY BOLTED ON BOTH ENDS.

* VAPOR CONDENSATION INHIBITORS (VCIS) WERE NOT INSTALLED IN APPROX 75 PERCENT OF THE ELECTRICAL ENCLOSURES IAW MRC 3001/002-18M-4.

* ALL FCS DIRECTORS HAD EXTENSIVE CORROSION ON THE FASTENERS AND HARDWARE BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT WEATHER-PROOFED. ADDITIONALLY, THE FCS 1 TRAIN SEAL FAILED AND ALLOWED WATER INTRUSION INTO THE TRAINING GEAR FLUID WHICH WAS MILKY WHITE IN COLOR. THIS IS A CLASSWIDE ISSUE.

* HARPOON LAUNCHERS AND FOUNDATIONS WERE CORRODED. CABLE STUFFING TUBES TO THE LAUNCHERS HAD ASTM 1G CORROSION AND SHOWED 90 PERCENT METAL WASTAGE.

* TV-DTS ANTENNA 10-1 (STBD/FWD) HAD RUST GRADE 1-G (OVER 50 PERCENT RUSTED) ON THE CONDUIT SECURING PLATE.

* 0E-567/WSC-6 SHF ANTENNA 3-17 (STBD/FWD) HAD RUST GRADE 1-G (OVER 50 PERCENT RUSTED) ALONG ANTENNA BASE.

* AN/SRQ-4 HAWKLINK ANTENNA WAS SHOWING SIGNS OF WAVEGUIDE CORROSION.

8. SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES AND EQUIPMENT OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (EOC) INCLUDE:

A. PROPULSION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.69):

* 1 OF 4 GTMS WAS INOP.

* 4 OF 4 GTMS HAD LUBE OIL LEAKS.

* 2 OF 4 GTM MODULE HALON ALARM BELLS WERE INOP.

* NR 1B GTM HAD FOD ON THE INTAKE PLENUM SCREEN.

* NR 1 MRG WAS MISSING PHYSICAL SECURITY DEVICES ON VARIOUS FLANGES.

* 2 OF 2 MAIN THRUST BEARING REAR SEALS LEAKED LUBE OIL.

* 3 OF 4 LUBE OIL SERVICE PUMPS LEAKED LUBE OIL.

* NR 2 MRG LUBE OIL STRAINER DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARM WAS MISADJUSTED (CORRECTED).

* 2 OF 2 MER 1 FUEL OIL SERVICE TANK QUICK TRIP VALVES WERE INOP (CORRECTED).

* 2 OF 2 MER 1 FUEL OIL PRE-FILTER DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARMS WERE MISADJUSTED (CORRECTED).

* 2 OF 4 GTM BLEED AIR CHECK VALVES WERE INOP.

* 8 BLEED/MASKER/PRAIRIE AIR SYSTEM LOW POINT DRAINS HAD NO FLOW.

* 14 FLEXIBLE HOSE ASSEMBLIES THROUGHOUT THE BLEED/MASKER AND PRAIRIE AIR SYSTEMS HAD LAGGING PADS INSTALLED THAT APPEARED NOT TO HAVE BEEN REMOVED IOT CONDUCT THE ANNUAL PMS INSPECTION REQUIRED BY MIP 5000/009.

* 3 OF 3 GTGS HAD LUBE OIL LEAKS.

* 2 OF 3 GTG PMA LUBE OIL PUMPS LEAKED INTO THE GENERATOR.

* NR 1 GTG THERMOCOUPLE BLOCK WAS BROKEN.

* NR 1 GTG BLOW-IN DOOR CONTROLLER WAS IN MANUAL DURING OPERATION.

* NR 2 GTG HALON TIME DELAY WAS MISADJUSTED (CORRECTED).

* NR 3 GTG HAD A FUEL LEAK ON THE FUEL FILTER HOSE.

B. AUXILIARIES: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.56):

* RUDDER ACCURACY CHECKS FAILED FOR BOTH ALPHA AND BRAVO STEERING UNITS.

* ALL STEERING HYDRAULIC POWER UNITS WERE LEAKING HYDRAULIC OIL IN SEVERAL PLACES, REQUIRING CONSTANT WIPERS.

* VERTICAL PACKAGE CONVEYOR WAS INOP BECAUSE OF IN-SERVICE LIMITS. THE TORQUE COUPLING PERSONNEL SAFETY GUARD WAS NOT INSTALLED, MAIN, 2ND AND 3RD DECK LOADER/UNLOADER GRAVITY CONVEYOR CONNECTION POINTS WERE NOT INSTALLED (ECP 572-02A-C021), CONVEYOR DID NOT STOP WHEN THE JAM LIMIT SWITCHES WERE ACTUATED UP TO 1.5 INCHES IAW SAFETY ADVISORY 033-00, 01 LEVEL SECONDARY DRIVE CHAINS WERE LOOSE, AND ALL LEVEL PERSONNEL SAFETY SHIELDS WERE IMPROPERLY MADE WITH SHARP EDGES.

* NR 1 A/C WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A LEAKING MECHANICAL SEAL ON THE COMPRESSOR (CASREP 07098).

* NR 1 REFRIGERATION UNIT WAS OOC BECAUSE OF AN INOP CAPACITY CONTROL.

* NR 4 A/C CHILLER WAS LEAKING CHILLED WATER INTO THE BILGE.

* NR 1 FREEZE BOX COIL TEMP CONTROL SWITCH WAS INOP, MAINTAINING THE TEMP AT PLUS 3 DEG F.

* NR 1 AND NR 2 COILS FOR THE FREEZE BOX AND THE COILS FOR THE CHILL BOX LOUVERS WERE INOP.

* 2 OF 2 REVERSE OSMOSIS UNIT DUMP VALVES FAILED TO TRIP ON HIGH SALINITY (CORRECTED).

* 2 OF 2 HPAC AND 1 OF 3 LPAC TYPE 1 DEHYDRATORS FAILED THE DEWPOINT TEST.

* NR 1 HPAC HAD A LEAKING WATER PUMP (CASREP 08017).

* NR 4 FIREPUMP SUCTION VALVE WAS INOP REMOTELY FROM THE MAIN DECK CONTROL STATION.

* 3 OF 6 FIREPUMP SUCTION VALVE LOCAL POSITION INDICATORS WERE MISSING.

* NR 1 SWS PUMP HAD A SIGNIFICANT LEAK IN PUMP CASING VENT LINE. LEAK WAS VENTING 1 FT BELOW A POWER PANEL.

* 4 OF 5 SWS SUCTION VALVE LOCAL POSITION INDICATOR DIALS WERE MISSING.

* NR 2 AND NR 5 SWS PUMPS HAD LEAKING MECHANICAL SEALS.

* 2 OF 3 WATER HEATER HIGH TEMP SAFETY SWITCHES WERE MISADJUSTED ON HIGH TEMP.

* 3 OF 3 WATER HEATER HIGH TEMP SAFETY SWITCHES DID NOT HAVE MANUAL RESET.

* 2 OF 3 WATER HEATER OPERATING SWITCHES WERE MISADJUSTED.

C. ELECTRICAL: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.77):

* MAIN 60 HZ SWBD AND LOAD CENTER AQB-L AND AQB-LL SERIES CIRCUIT BREAKER ADJUSTABLE SHORT TIME PICK-UP AND SHORT TIME DELAY SETTINGS WERE NOT SET IAW TECHMAN (CORRECTED).

* CL Z VENT ZONE 3 PANEL NR 3 CIRCUIT BREAKER DID NOT TRIP DURING STAGE 1 LOAD SHED TESTING.

* ABTS 01-116-1 AND 02-305-2 DID NOT SHIFT IN AUTO WHEN TESTED.

* ABT 2-239-1 INTERMITTENTLY SHIFTED FROM NORMAL TO ALTERNATE POWER SOURCES WHEN IN THE AUTOMATIC MODE.

* ABT 1-127-1 EXTERIOR CABINET WAS SEVERELY CORRODED AND COULD NOT BE OPENED.

* POWER PANELS 2-50-2, 2-162-2 AND 03-173-1 HAD OVER-RATED CIRCUIT BREAKERS INSTALLED.

D. DAMAGE CONTROL: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.69):

* MER 1 BILGE SPRINKLER SOPV DID NOT OPEN FULLY WHEN ACTIVATED (CORRECTED).

* 3 GEN RE-ENTRY HOSE NOZZLE WAS INOP (CORRECTED).

* 2 OF 3 EBACS DID NOT FILL BOTTLES IAW THE PMS TIME FRAME (15-18 MINUTES). BOTH WERE IN EXCESS OF 20 MIN.

* 3 OF 3 HPFAS DID NOT FILL BOTTLES IAW THE PMS TIME FRAME (45 SEC).

* 23 OF 63 SCBAS WERE UNSAT.

* 3 BERTHING SALTWATER SPRINKLERS DID NOT ALARM DURING TESTING.

* 1 OF 2 AN/KAS WAS INOP (PORTSIDE).

* 1 OF 3 PP-4276C/PD WAS INOP.

* AUX 1, MER 1, AND 3 GEN HALON PRIMARY ACTIVATION C02 BOTTLES LEAKED.

* FIREMAIN PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE WAS INOP.

E. DECK: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.50):

* 3 OF 3 MEDICAL MK 1 LIFE VESTS WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW MIP 5832/R-1.

* 4 OF 7 RESCUE BOAT MK 1 LIFE VESTS FAILED TO PROPERLY INFLATE.

* 1 OF 2 SAR LPU-28 LIFE VESTS FAILED TO PROPERLY INFLATE (CORRECTED).

* 1 OF 2 SAR STROBE LIGHTS WITH THE BLUE LENS FAILED TO OPERATE IAW MIP 5832/U-1 (CORRECTED).

* 1 OF 2 SETS OF SAR GLOVES WAS HOLED AND REQUIRED REPLACEMENT (CORRECTED).

* 2 OF 2 SETS OF CPU-72P DRY SUIT LINERS WERE MISSING, PREVENTING SAR FROM ENTERING WATER IN TEMPS LOWER THAN 60 DEG F IAW NWP 3-50.1 FIGURE 5-59 WATER TEMPERATURE GUIDELINES.

* BOAT DECK SAR MEDIVAC LITTER WAS MISSING WEIGHT TEST DATA, 2 OF 2 ADJUSTABLE CARRYING HARNESSES AND A LUMBAR SUPPORT PAD (CORRECTED).

* 4 OF 4 RETRACTABLE BITTS/CHOCKS REQUIRED MAINTENANCE IAW MIP 5821/Q-4. BITT BUSHINGS, UPPER AND LOWER GUIDES REQUIRED INSPECTION, CLEANING, AND LUBRICATION.

* 3 OF 6 MOORING LINES HAD EXCESSIVE ABRASIONS, TWISTED STRANDS, IMPROPER SPLICES, SEVERE COCKLING, AND WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW MIP 5821/Q-11R.

* 2 OF 4 FANTAIL BITTS HAD EXCESSIVE ABRASIVE CUT CONDITIONS AND SIGNIFICANT CORROSION.

* RAS NR 5 MANUAL OPERATION CUT-OUT WAS BENT AND MISSING SECURING LANYARD.

* RAS NR 5 WAS MISSING THE ELECTRIC DISK BRAKE RELEASE LEVER. THE PADEYE COULD NOT BE DEMONSTRATED IN THE MANUAL MODE.

* 1 OF 2 LOWER LIMIT SWITCHES WAS INOP ON RAS STA NR 5.

* SLIDING PADEYE EMERGENCY PNEUMATIC DRIVE WAS MISSING.

* 1 OF 2 TILT STOWED BACKSTAY _~,OKES WAS SEIZED ON STA NR 5.

* RAS NR 5 AND NR 6 WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW 5713/Q-3R-S-1. BOTH STAS HAD SEVERELY CORRODED CARRIAGES, WORM SCREWS, FOUNDATION MEMBERS, LOWER CONNECTION BOXES, AND ELECTRIC MOTORS.

* RAS NR 6 WAS ASSEMBLED INCORRECTLY AFTER OVERHAUL. THE KING POST REQUIRED RE-WORK TO PROPERLY INSTALL THE SLIDING BLOCK SO LUBRICATION MAINTENANCE OF THE BALL DRIVE CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED (SHIP REPORTED).

* 4 OF 4 KINGPOST UNREP LIGHTS WERE DAMAGED AND INOP ON RAS STAS NR 5 AND NR 6.

* SEWING MACHINE WAS INOP BECAUSE OF MISSING POWER, SAFETY PLACARD, AND OPERATING ACCESSORIES.

* 28 OF 28 TOPSIDE LIFEJACKET LOCKERS WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW PMS MIP 6111/S-1.

* AFT LOOKOUT LIFE RING WAS DETERIORATED AND PUNCTURED. DISTRESS MARKER LIFE RING SECURING BRACKETS WERE MISSING AND STENCIL WITH SHIP'S NAME AND HULL NUMBER WAS UN-READABLE.

* SHIP'S BROW WAS MISSING 5 OF 10 LIFELINE STAPLES.

* 6 OF 6 FENDER SECURING STRAPS WERE MISSING.

* PILOT'S LADDER WAS NOT RIGGED IAW NAVSHIP DWG 804-5000900.

* PILOT'S LADDER WAS NOT PROPERLY ADJUSTED TO TERMINATE AT WATERS EDGE.

* 72 OF 187 (31 PERCENT) OF MAIN DECK KEVLAR LIFELINES WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW MIP 6121/S-5.

* 60 PERCENT OF THE BAXTER BOLTS INSPECTED WERE NOT IAW PMS 6111/A-2R.

F. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE: SAT (SCORE: 0.90):

* S/F COULD NOT POWER ON THE ALTERNATE MK 116 UYH-3 BECAUSE OF FAULTY WIRING TO THE BACK SHELL.

* 1 OF 6 TORPEDO BREECH CONTROL VALVES WAS STUCK OPEN BECAUSE OF CORROSION.

* TORPEDO BANDING TOOLS WERE MISSING.

G. OPERATIONS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.62):

* AN/SPY-1D D/PD T20, FPA T26 MOD 3 (LOSS OF 4 OF 16 CHANNELS), AND FPA T27 MOD 3 (LOSS OF 4 OF 16 CHANNELS) WERE INOP BECAUSE OF FAULTY HVPS T138 (CASREP 08013).

* 12 OF 16 CHANNELS IN FPA T26 WERE INOP (4 CORRECTED).

* 12 OF 16 CHANNELS IN FPA T27 WERE INOP (3 CORRECTED).

* AN/SPY-1D SIGNAL PROCESSOR SIDE A DROPPED OFF-LINE BECAUSE OF DIGITAL FAULTY ISOLATION FAILURES AND THE INTERMITTENT FAULT WITH RADAR TARGET DATA PROCESSOR NR 2.

* AN/SPY-1D ARRAY T01 POWER SUPPLY WAS INOP (LOSS OF REDUNDANCY).

* AN/SPS-67 SHORT PULSE MODE WP~S INOP.

* AN/SPS-67 MODULATOR CURRENT EXCEEDED 22 AMPS (CORRECTED).

* APX-118 IFF 'PRANSPONDER MODE 4 WAS INOP.

* ROTATING IFF ANTENNA (SPS-67) SUM AND DIFFERENCE VSWR WAS OUT-OF-SPEC.

* AN/URN-25 TACAN REFLECTED POWER WAS HIGH AND IPA TUBE CURRENT WAS OUT-OF-SPEC LOW.

* MK 137 MOD 4 SRBOC LAUNCHERS NR 1A AND NR 3A SAFE LAMPS WERE FAULTY (LAUNCHER NR 1A SHIP REPORTED). S/F COULD NOT DETERMINE SAFE/ARM STATUS AT AFFECTED LAUNCHERS.

* MK 137 LAUNCHER NIGHT LOADING LIGHTS WERE INOP (SHIP REPORTED).

* PCMS WAS DEGRADED (INSPECTION SCORE: 211).

* HD1140 SPY COOLING SYSTEM WAS NOT OPERATED IAW PMS 456/R08 W-1. COPPER NICKEL HEAT EXCHANGER WAS ON-LINE VICE TITANIUM HEAT EXCHANGER BECAUSE TITANIUM HEAT EXCHANGER WAS CLOGGED.

* BFTT DEMO WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE OF MULTIPLE FAULT INDICATIONS (CIU SETUP OR DMS FAULTY, 1553B STATUS ERROR-DUAL COMM FAILURE). FAULTS OCCURRED APPROX 3 TIMES PER MINUTE AND CAUSED OWN SHIP INFORMATION TO BE ERRATIC.

H. WEAPONS: SAT (SCORE: 0.88):

* MT 21 AMMO HANDLING SKIP BOX JUMPED DURING OPERATION AND WAS UNSAFE TO OPERATE.

* MT 21 WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A FAULTED ANTENNA VRU. PROBLEM COULD NOT BE REPLICATED WHEN RUNNING SOTS IN PORT.

* HARPOON LAUNCHERS AND FOUNDATIONS WERE EXTREMELY CORRODED.

CABLE STUFFING TUBES TO THE LAUNCHERS HAD ASTM 1G CORROSION AND SHOWED 90 PERCENT METAL WASTAGE. PCMS HAD MULTIPLE LAYERS OF PAINT FLAKING OFF.

* 26 OF 90 VLS LAUNCHER DELUGE GROUNDING STRAPS WERE CORRODED.

* AFT VLS LAUNCHER, MODULE 2, CELL 6 HATCH WAS BINDING AND REQUIRED REPLACEMENT.

* AFT VLS LAUNCHER, MODULE 3 FAILED SYSTEM BITE.

* AFT VLS LAUNCHER, MODULE 7 FAILED SYSTEM, LSEQ AND MCP BITE. CELLS 1-4 HAD MULTIPLE FAULT CODES.

* MT 51 AMMO ELEVATOR HOIST WAS NOT TESTED BECAUSE THE HATCH TRIPOD HOSES WERE DAMAGED AND FASTENERS WERE MISSING.

* FCS 1 TRAIN SEAL FAILED AND ALLOWED WATER INTRUSION INTO THE TRAIN FLUID WHICH WAS MILKY WHITE IN COLOR.

* FCS 1 MAN ALOFT SWITCH WAS INCORRECTLY LABELED. SAFE WAS UNSAFE AND VICE VERSA (CORRECTED).

* FCS 3 TWT PARAMETERS WERE OUT OF ALIGNMENT, PREVENTING RADIATION.

I. NAVIGATION: SAT (SCORE: 40.90):

* GYRO REPEATER IN IC GYRO ROOM NR 2 WAS FAULTY.

* EM LOG NR 2 R1 POTENTIOMETER WAS FAULTY.

J. COMMUNICATIONS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.77):

* 12 OF 14 AN/WSC-3 UHF LOS TRANSCEIVERS WERE INOP OR DEGRADED: NR 1, NR3, AND NR 12 HAD NO RF POWER OUT, AND NR 4, NR 5, NR 6, NR 7, NR 8, NR D NR 14 WERE NOT IAW PMS AND WERE OUT OF ALIGNMENT.

* 2 OF 2 AN/WSC-3 UHF HAVE-QUICK LOS TRANSCEIVERS WERE DEGRADED.

* AN/SSQ-88 QUALITY MONITORING TEST SET WAS INOP BECAUSE TEST EQUIPMENT WAS AT CAL.

* AS-3771, AS-3772, AS-3773 HF RECEIVE ANTENNAS REQUIRED PRESERVATION AND HAD LOW INSULATION RESISTANCE.

* 2 OF 2 AS-3226 VRC-46 VHF ANTENNAS HAD MISSING HARDWARE AND NR 2 FAILED VSWR TEST.

* AS-390 UHF ANTENNA NR 3-15 HAD HIGH VSWR AND THE AS-390 QMCS UHF ANTENNA PAINT WAS DETERIORATED.

* 4 OF 4 AS-2815 SSR-1 UHF SATCOM ANTENNA HARDWARE PRESERVATION WAS DETERIORATED AND 1 OF 4 HAD A LOOSE BOND STRAP.

* 1 OF 2 AN/VRC-46 VHF TRANSCEIVERS WAS INOP BECAUSE OF FAULTY AS-3226 ANTENNA.

* OA-9243 (HF ANTENNA TILTING GROUP) ANTENNA HANDCRANK TURNED VIOLENTLY WHEN USING THE ELECTRIC SWITCH TO RAISE OR LOWER THE ANTENNA, CREATING A SAFETY HAZARD.

* HF IMI FAILED.

* S/F COULD NOT DEMONSTRATE AN/USC-38 NECC BECAUSE OF NO CKT AVAILABILITY.

* AN/WSC-6 SHF WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A POOR SIGNAL TO NOISE RATIO (CASREP 08005).

* 0E-567/WSC-6 SHF ANTENNA 3-18 (PORT/AFT) BASE GASKET WAS WORN AND SPLITTING.

* 21 OF 27 TA-970/980/990 RED PHONES WERE DEGRADED OR INOP.

* LINK 4A WAS INOP BECAUSE OF AN INABILITY TO PASS TRACK DATA.

* 3 OF 3 NAVY ORDER WIRE TERMINALS WERE INOP OR DEGRADED.

K. INFORMATION SYSTEMS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.78):

* AN/USQ-185 CENTRIXS DOMAINS COULD NOT BE ACCESSED OR EVALUATED BECAUSE PASSWORDS WERE NOT AVAILABLE.

* AN/USQ-185 CENTRIXS FOUR EYES ENCLAVE COULD NOT BE TESTED BECAUSE PASSWORDS WERE NOT AVAILABLE.

* AN/UYK-163 NIAPS SERVER HAD SKED DATA TEMP FILES 500 GIG IN SIZE (CORRECTED).

* AN/UYK-163 NIAPS SERVER DID NOT BACK-UP SKED DATA NOR LIVE STATE IMAGES ONTO TAPES.

* NOMEX DECKING IN RADIO WAS SEVERELY DEGRADED BECAUSE NUMEROUS DECK PLATES HAD NO SECURING HARDWARE. THIS CREATED A TRIP AND MISSILE HAZARD. OF NOTE WAS THE FACT THAT THE DECKPLATES IN LOW OR NO TRAFFIC AREAS ALSO HAD NO SECURING HARDWARE BUT NO SIGNS OF DAMAGE.

L. SUPPLY: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.67):

* GIH WASHDOWN SYSTEM NOZZLE CLEANING AND ALIGNMENT MAINTENANCE WAS NOT BEING COMPLETED (CORRECTED).

* GIH 5 OF 6 FAIL-SAFE (DETROIT) SWITCHES WERE NOT WITHIN ANNUAL CALIBRATION PERIODICITY AND THE ONE THAT WAS WITHIN PERIODICITY DID NOT FUNCTION AS DESIGNED.

* GIH MAIN GALLEY DIVERTER DAMPER WAS INOP.

* MEAT SLICER WAS INOP.

* 1 OF 3 SELF-SERVICE ICE MACHINES WAS INOP.

* ICE CREAM MACHINE WAS INOP.

* 1 OF 3 COFFEE MACHINES WAS INOP.

* BUFFALO MACHINE WAS INOP.

* 1 OF 2 60 LB WASHERS WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A SAFETY INTERLOCK SWITCH ON THE DOOR.

* CORROSION CONTROLS FOR CPO SEABAG LOCKER DECK WERE INADEQUATE (GRADE 4G).

* CORROSION CONTROLS FOR STOREROOM NR 4 BILGES WERE INADEQUATE (GRADE 3 G).

M. HABITABILITY: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.75):

* 3 OF 7 CREW BERTHING WATER COOLERS WERE INOP AND 2 OF THE REMAINING 4 WERE DEGRADED (S/F REPORTED REPAIRING 4 PRIOR TO OUR INSPECTION).

N. NAVOSH: SAT (SCORE: 0.85):

* 3 OF 3 4-GAS ANALYZERS WERE INOP (1 CORRECTED)

* 36 BOTTLES OF CALCIUM HYPOCHLORITE WERE STORED IN THE FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS STOREROOM (CORRECTED).

* 5 OF 16 EYEWASH STAS HAD MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES.

* SAFETY NET BETWEEN GTMS 2A AND 2B WAS NOT INSTALLED.

* SAFETY GUARD CHAINS WERE MISSING ON 4 OF 6 ACCESS TRUNKS (1 CORRECTED).

* 12 OF 17 TRUNK SAFETY NETS WERE NOT IAW NAVSEA GUIDANCE (NAVSEA DRAWING

804-5184163 REV A).

* BIOLOGICAL REFRIGERATOR ALARM (HIGH/LOW TEMP AND LOSS OF POWER) WAS INOP.

* STERILIZER WAS INOP.

* EMERGENCY POTABLE WATER WAS NOT AVAILABLE IN MAIN MEDICAL.

0. VENTILATION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.77):

* 5 OF 13 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SPACES HAD EXHAUST AIRFLOW BELOW DESIGN SPEC.

* 4 OF 20 SANITARY SPACES HAD EXHAUST AIRFLOW BELOW DESIGN SPEC.

P. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.66):

* OIL CONTENT MONITOR LEAKED BY WHEN NOT ENERGIZED PREVENTING ACCURATE READINGS AND THE INLET PIPING DID NOT HAVE A RELIEF VALVE INSTALLED.

* WASTE OIL HOLDING TANK 5-220-1-F OIL/WATER TLI WAS INOP.

* 1 OF 2 COMPRESS MELT UNITS WAS INOP (CORRECTED).

* LARGE PULPER WAS MISSING THE JUNK BOX CAUSING PULPED MATERIAL TO FLOW INTO THE PIPING SYSTEM AND CLOG THE DRAIN LINES.

* PMS WAS NOT INSTALLED FOR THE LARGE PULPER OR THE TOP-LOADING PARTS WASHER.

* FWD VCHT PUMP ROOM VENTILATION AND SUMP FLOODING ALARMS WERE INOP.

* S/F COULD NOT OPERATE NR 1 VCHT EJECTOR PUMP BECAUSE OF VACUUM LEAKS IN THE NON RETURN VALVE.

Q. AVIATION: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.59):

* RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF FLIGHT OPS UNTIL THE FLIGHT DECK NETS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE ARE REPAIRED, DAMAGED PROXIMITY SUITS ARE REPLACED, AND THE DECK STATUS LIGHT IS REPAIRED.

* RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF NIGHT FLIGHT OPS UNTIL THE DROP-LINE LIGHTS ARE REPAIRED.

* RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF INSTRUMENT METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS (IMC) FLIGHT OPS UNTIL THE TACAN IS REPAIRED.

* RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF VERTREP OPS UNTIL THE STATIC WANDS ARE REPAIRED.

* RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF AIRCRAFT FUELING OPS UNTIL THE JP5 HOSES ARE HYDROSTATICALLY TESTED AND THE AIRCRAFT FUELING STA PRESSURE GAGE IS REPAIRED.

* RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF HIFR OPS UNTIL THE HIFR REFUELING NOZZLE IS REPAIRED.

* 2 OF 3 PROXIMITY SUITS WERE DAMAGED AND UNSERVICEABLE.

* DECK STATUS LIGHT WAS INOP.

* 2 OF 2 STATIC WANDS FAILED CONTINUITY CHECK.

* LINE UP LIGHTS WERE INOP (CORRECTED).

* DROP LINE LIGHTS WERE INOP.

* JP5 STORAGE TANK 4-402-0-J HAD SEDIMENT IN TANK.

* JP5 SERVICE TANK 4-390-0-J HW SEDIMENT IN TANK.

* HIFR NOZZLE GROUNDING CLAMP WAS BROKEN.

* ALL JP5 HOSES WERE OUT OF HYDROSTATIC PERIODICITY.

* AIRCRAFT FUELING STATION PRESSURE GAGE READING WAS INACCURATE.

* HIFR REFUELING NOZZLE AND 2 OF 2 D1R REFUELING NOZZLES FAILED CONTINUITY CHECK (1 OF 2 DIRS CORRECTED).

* 1 OF 2 WIND SPEED TRANSMITTERS WAS INOP.

* 1 OF 2 ELECTRICAL GLOVE SETS WAS DAMAGED (CORRECTED).

9. COMMODORE R. TINDAL III, COMDESRON 2, WAS PRESENT FOR THE INSPECTION AND OUT-BRIEF. CAPT R. BONNER WAS THE SENIOR INSPECTOR.

10. PRESIDENT, BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY, CONCURS WITH THE FINDINGS.//

[pafuncio]

Pena que o Morcego não esteja aqui para corrigí-los, seus paganos comunistas ....

[luis F. Silva]

Pois é!... Os sofisticados navios americanos são concebidos por engenheiros, mas operados por pessoal com pouca literacia. Não havendo forma de recrutar pessoal com mais qualificações, estas situações tendem a aumentar.

[P44]

mas operados por pessoal com pouca literacia.

mas tu queres que o bush maneje sozinho todas as alavancas e botões?