Fórum Defesa Brasil

bcorreia escreveu:

knigh7 escreveu:

Creio que o o motivo desses cabides serem tortos seria acompanhar o formato da fuselagem naquela área.

Luís Henrique escreveu: The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
tracks closely with the F-15 Eagle, the world’s fi nest air superiority platform
before the F-22A Raptor, in its size and fuel carrying capacity. At 14,700
pounds, the F/A-18E/F has the largest internal fuel load of any of the MMRCA
competitors. Unlike the Eagle however, the Super Hornet is optimized for
transonic maneuver, load carrying performance, dominance in both BVR and
WVR combat, fl exible multi-role operations during a single sortie, and carrier
recovery, since it remains the preeminent strike-fi ghter aboard the large-deck
aircraft carriers of the U.S. Navy. In fact, on all the fi ve counts for which
it was designed—increased range, payload, bring-back weight, survivability,
and growth room—the Super Hornet outshines its predecessor without
compromising on its superb dogfi ghting qualities.
Th at it has been able to do so despite the extra weight associated with
carrier-based platforms is truly a tribute to the aircraft’s propulsion system
and its aerodynamic design. Despite its 30 percent weight gain over the C/D
version, the Super Hornet’s 25 percent larger wing and the 35 percent increase
in thrust from its current twin GE F414 engines, each generating some 22,000
pounds of thrust at sea level, have protected its original agility fundamentally
intact. As a Hornet test pilot summarized it,
In the subsonic regime, the E/F performs as good as or better
than a C/D in almost every respect. Th e challenge posed to
the contractor was not to compromise the [legacy] Hornet’s
superb capabilities as a dogfighter. “As good as, or better than
…” was the standard to meet. Th e result is that the turning
performance charts overlay one another. At high angles
of attack, the E/F’s agility truly shines, with superior roll
performance and much more carefree handling. Th e heritage
Hornet was already the stand-out, high angle-of-attack (alpha)
machine in the U.S. inventory. The E/F is “hands-down”
superior in that environment. (69)

(...)


Th e aerodynamic eff ectiveness of the Super Hornet is also remarkable,
especially given its greater weight than the other MMRCA entrants. Th e
aircraft was always reputed for its carefree handling qualities and these have
only been enhanced further in the E/F variant. When its sustained turn rate
is compared with the other aircraft at representative altitudes, the F/A-18 is
similar to the F-16 (without conformal fuel tanks) and inferior only to the
Gripen. This sustained turning performance confirms its superiority as an
excellent dogfighter, just like the F-16 is when it fl ies without its over-wing
tanks. Th e Super Hornet’s instantaneous turn rate ranks among the best in the
competition too, behind mainly the Rafale at low altitudes. Like the Rafale
and the Eurofi ghter, however, the F/A-18 has high bleed rates, which implies
that its ability to turn sharply comes at a cost of lost speed compared with, say,
the F-16 or the Gripen. Th e F/A-18 is also slower to add energy in comparison
with its peers, including the F-16 when configured for air-to-air combat, and
its constrained top-end speed makes it similar to rivals such as the Gripen and
the Rafale. This could constrain it when its pilot attempts to disengage from
higher-powered adversaries in air combat duels.


69-Commander Rob Niewoehner, “The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet: A Test Pilot Dispels
The Myths,” available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/990414-
ART-Super-Hornet.htm

Luís Henrique escreveu:
Partes grifadas no texto que vc postou:

2) manobra rápido mas perde muita velocidade nestas manobras. Primeiro o texto diz que é tão bom quanto o F-16, levando em conta os outros competidores, isto quer dizer que o SH fica no final da lista, junto com o F-16. E agora diz que é pior que o F-16 e o Gripen porque perde muita velocidade quando manobra forte.

Luís Henrique escreveu: 3) as duas últimas partes em negrito: é mais lento para adicionar energia, comparado com os seus pares..........isto o restringe de escapar de adversários mais potentes durante um combate aéreo.
Não tem nem o que explicar. Ta ai.

Luís Henrique escreveu: Repito, é um excelente caça multimissão, porém otimizado para ataque. Nos sistemas/sensores/armamentos pode vencer qualquer outro, porém no envelope de vôo é um dos piores.

Luís Henrique escreveu:Knig7,

este texto está falando bem do Super Hornet.

Se eu procurar textos falando MAL do Super Hornet, vou achar vários.
Veja, que mesmo em um texto favorável, da para perceber que o Super Hornet, apesar de ser um ótimo caça, foi desenvolvido de forma a otimizar características que prejudicam sua capacidade no envelope de vôo para combate aéreo.

Eu realmente acredito que entre os caças do MMRCA, o Super Hornet está entre os melhores.
Só não o escolheria por questões políticas e estratégicas.

Mas neste pequeno ítem, que é o envelope de vôo, não da para forçar a barra.
Ele é muito manobrável em BAIXAS velocidades. Provavelmente melhor que a maioria.
Mas em ALTAS velocidades está entre os piores.

O texto deixa isto bem evidente, mesmo sendo um texto que está elogiando o SH.
Desde o início deixa claro que DIFERENTE do Eagle, o SH prioriza manobrabilidade em velocidades transônicas.
E no final do texto completa dizendo que perde muita velocidade em manobras de alto G e que é o mais lento em ganhar velocidade (aceleração) em comparação com seus pares, o que acaba impedindo-o de se livrar de adversários em combates aéreos.

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 135
NOTES
1. Neelam Mathews, “Race is on for India MMRCA,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, September 21, 2009, available at http://www.aviationweek.com/
aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/MMRCA092109.
xml&headline=Race%20is%20on%20for%20India%20MMRCA.
2. These details about the IAF’s evaluation process are described in Shiv Aroor, “A
Big Fat MMRCA Update, Livefi st, August 12, 2010, available at http://livefi st.
blogspot.com/2010/08/big-fat-mmrca-update.html.
3. “India’s Spending On Defence to Reach about $80 Billion by 2015,” indiaserver.
com, http://www.india-server.com/news/indias ... e-toreach-
30456.html.
4. Bill Sweetman, “Fighter Competitions Could Make or Break Contractors,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 5, 2008, available at http://
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/ ... i&id=news/
DTI-Fighters.xml&headline=Fighter%20Competitions%20Could%20Make%20
or%20Break%20Contractors.
5. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” Lecture Before the Freistudentischen Bund
of the University of Munich, available at http://www2.selu.edu/Academics/
Faculty/jbell/weber.pdf.
6. For a useful summary of the contemporary challenges in this regard, see Stephen
P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2010).
7. The role of the IAF in traditional Indian grand strategy has been summarized
in Ashley J. Tellis, “The Air Balance in the Indian Subcontinent,” Defense and
Security Analysis, vol. 2, no. 4, December, 1986, 263–289.
8. The relevance of air power under conditions of limited war is masterfully
articulated in Jasjit Singh, “Dynamics of Limited War,” Strategic Analysis, vol. 24,
no. 7, 2000, 1205–1220.
9. Air Marshal (Retired) V. K. Bhatia, “Walk the Line,” SP’s Aviation, issue 1, 2009,
12–13; Air Marshal (Retired) V.K. Bhatia, “IAF Modernization—Immediate
Needs,” SP’s Aviation, issue 8, 2009, available from http://spsaviation.net/story_
issue.asp?Article=322; Tellis, op. cit.
10. “India Air Force Targets 42 Squadrons Strength by 2022,” India Defence, available
at http://www.india-defence.com/reports/4230.
11. A useful overview of PAF modernization can be found in Shalini Chawla,
“Modernization of the Pakistan Air Force,” Air Power Journal, vol. 3, no. 2,
Summer 2008. A summary of recent and upcoming PAF acquisitions can
be found in “Procurement, Pakistan,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,
November 25, 2010.
12. Robert Hewson, “Pakistan Joins AMRAAM Club in Biggest-Ever Buy,” Jane’s
Defense Weekly, vol. 44, no. 4, January 24, 2007, 14.
13. Leithen Francis, “Pakistan to get Chinese AEW&C aircraft this year,” Flight
International, August 5, 2010, available at http://www.fl ightglobal.com/
articles/2010/05/07/341584/pakistan-to-get-chinese-aewc-aircraft-this-year.html.
14. On the transformation of the PLAAF, see Philip C. Saunders and Erik R. Quam,
“China’s Air Force Modernization,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 47, Fall 2007,
28–33, and Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air
Force Enters the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1995).
15. Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United
States (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), and Mark A. Stokes,
“The Chinese Joint Aerospace Campaign: Strategy, Doctrine, and Force
Modernization,” China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the
Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Alexandria, VA: CNA,
2005).
16. B. Raman, “China Tests its Strategic Air power Capability: Implications for
India,” Sri Lanka Guardian, September 25, 2010, available at http://www.
srilankaguardian.org/2010/09/china-tests-its-strategic-air-power.html.
17. Air Marshal (Retired) V. K. Bhatia, “In Progress,” SP’s Aviation, issue 7, 2010, 17.
18. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Boosts Aircraft Buy, Widens Supplier Options,”
Defense News, November 21, 2005, 34.
19. “India Approves Purchase of 68 Boeing Jets for Eight Billion Dollars,” October
13, 2005, orange.mu, available at http://www.orange.mu/kinews/afp/
business/100877/india-approves-purchase-of-68-boeing-jets-for-eight-billiondollars.
html.
20. Air Marshal (Retired) Ajit Bhavnani, “Fortify the Force,” Force, vol. 4, no. 7, March
2007, 14–16.
21. Ray Whitford, Fundamentals of Fighter Design (Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife Publishing
Limited, 2000).
22. Carlo Kopp, “Measures of Fighter Capability,” Air Power Australia, http://www.
ausairpower.net/air-superiority-3.html. Kopp’s article is a superb survey of aircraft
qualities in the abstract and informs the analysis at various points in this report.
23. For an excellent contemporary study of the IAF, including its worldview, its
ethos, and its force structure, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, India’s Transforming
Air Posture: An Emerging 21st Century Heavyweight (Santa Monica, CA: Rand
Corporation, 2011), forthcoming.
24. Ajai Shukla, “Buy a Fighter for War, Not Air Shows,” Business Standard,
November 2, 2010, available at http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/
ajai-shukla-buyfi ghter-for-war-not-air-shows/413413.
25. For a good overview, see R. A. Mason, Air Power: An Overview of Roles (London:
Brassey’s Defense Publishers, 1987).
26. All the missions subsumed by this range are discussed at length in the Brassey’s
Air Power series, specifi cally: M. B. Elsam, Air Defense (Washington: Brassey’s
Defense Publishers, 1989); J. R. Walker, Air Superiority Operations (Washington:
Brassey’s Defense Publishers, 1989); J. R. Walker, Air to Ground Operations
(Washington: Brassey’s Defense Publishers, 1987); and Michael Knight, Strategic
Offensive Air Operations (Washington: Brassey’s Defense Publishers, 1989).
27. A good elaboration of the IAF’s vision of information dominance where air power
is concerned can be found in Air Commodore (retired) Jasjit Singh, ed., Aerospace
Power and India’s Defense (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2007).
28. Squadron Leader Ajay Singh, “The Air War With AWACS Symmetry,” Indian
Defence Review, available at http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LANCER/idr00008.
htm.
29. “IAF Canberras Phased Out,” Frontier India, May 11, 2007, available at http://
frontierindia.net/iaf-canberras-phased-out.
30. Kopp, op. cit.; Whitford, op. cit., 21.
31. An excellent overview of AESA radars can be found in the Offi ce of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Report of the Defense
Science Board Task Force on Future DOD Airborne High-Frequency Radar
Needs/Resources, Washington, D.C., April 2001; Richard S. Deakin, Battlespace
Technologies: Network-Enabled Information Dominance (Norwood, MA: Artech
House, 2010); and Flightglobal/Insight, “Fighter Radars 2010,” Special Report,
available at http://www.fl ightglobal.com/airspace/media/reports_pdf/fi ghterradars-
special-report-2010-52625.aspx.
32. Lt. Col. Jaco Steynberg, “LOOKOUT – DECIDE – ATTACK – BREAK,” SAAF
News Archive, September 29, 2009, available at http://www.af.mil.za/
news/2009/056_2009.htm.
33. Ronald G. Driggers, Paul Cox, and Timothy Edwards, Introduction to Infrared and
Electro-Optical Systems (Boston: Artech Print on Demand, 1998).
34. Scott Baldauf, “Indian Air Force, in War Games, Gives US a Run,” Christian
Science Monitor, November 28, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.
com/2005/1128/p01s04-wosc.html.
35. This history is documented with remarkable clarity in Robert Coram, Boyd: The
Fighter Pilot who Changed the Art of War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
2002).
36. Franklin C. Spinney, “Genghis John,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, vol.
123, no. 6, July 1997, 42–47.
37. For a superb and thorough overview of air combat maneuvering, see Robert L.
Shaw, Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1985).
38. For more on what energy maneuvering diagrams reveal, see Thomas R. Yechout
with Steven L. Morris, David E. Bossert, and Wayne F. Hallgren, Introduction to
Aircraft Flight Mechanics: Performance, Static Stability, Dynamic Stability and
Classical Feedback Control (Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, 2003), 79–144.
39. Ibid.
40. Steven A. Brandt, Randall J. Stiles, John J. Bertin, and Ray Whitford, Introduction
to Aeronautics: A Design Perspective (Reston, VA: American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2004), 345–378.
41. A splendid history of India’s aeronautical industry can be found in Jasjit Singh,
Indian Aircraft Industry (New Delhi: KW Publishers Private Ltd., 2011).
42. “About Us,” Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, available at http://www.hal-india.
com/aboutus.asp.
43. An excellent survey of India’s aerospace strengths and weaknesses can be found
in Confederation of Indian Industry and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Changing
Dynamics: India’s Aerospace Industry, available at http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/
aerospace-defence/pdf/india-aerospace.pdf.
44. For more on this issue, see Jan Roskam, Airplane Design, Part VIII: Airplane Cost
Estimation: Design, Development, Manufacturing, and Operating (Lawrence, KS:
DAR Corporation, 2002).
45. Shiv Aroor, op. cit.
46. “Defense Procurement Procedure, Capital Procurement, 2008,” Ministry of
Defence, Government of India, available at http://mod.nic.in/dpm/DPP2008.pdf.
47. Shiv Aroor, “MMRCA BUZZ: MiG-35 Was Never In The Running?” Livefi st,
August 19, 2010, available at http://livefi st.blogspot.com/2010/08/mmrca-buzzmig-
35-was-never-in-running.html.
48. “Don’t Call Them, They’ll Call You,” Hindustan Times, December 7, 2010,
available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/Don-t-cal ... -call-you/
Article1-635181.aspx.
49. Air Marshal (retired) B. K. Pandey, “Selection of MRCA for the IAF,” Indian
Defence Review, vol. 20, no. 1, January-March 2005, available at http://www.
bharat-rakshak.com/SRR/2005/03/38-selection-of-mrca-for-the-iaf.html.
50. “F-22 Demonstrates ‘Supercruise’ for First Time,” Air Force News, July 21, 1999,
available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/d ... 721_991378.
htm.
51. “Military Aircraft,” McGraw-Hill Yearbook of Science and Technology 1989 (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988), 215–217.
52. A useful overview of various fourth- and 4.5th-generation aircraft can be found
in Mike Spick, Brassey’s Modern Fighters (Washington: Brassey’s, 2000).
53. This discussion is based on material appearing in Yefi m Gordon, Mikoyan MiG-29
(Hinckley, UK: Midland, 2006); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Mikoyan Mig-
29 Fulcrum Pilot’s Flight Operating Manual (Los Angeles: Periscope Film, 2007),
and Sayan Mazumdar, “The Russian Gymnasts: MiG-29OVT to MiG-35,” Vayu
Aerospace and Defence Review, issue 1, 2009, 121–123.
54. The discussion here is based on material appearing in Gerard Keijsper, Saab
Gripen: Sweden’s 21st Century Multi-Role Aircraft (Hinckley, UK: Aerofax, 2004);
David Donald, “JAS 39 Gripen,” International Air Power Review, vol. 24, 2008,
54–77; and David Donald, “Advanced Gripen,” International Air Power Review,
vol. 25, 2008, 16–19.
55. Donald, 2008, op. cit., 54.
56. Ingmar A. Andersson and Leif Haglund, “SAAB IRST: The System and Flight
Trials,” Proceedings of SPIE, vol. 4820, (2003), 69–83.
57. M. K. Rasgotra, “Reach Out to the U.S. Through Obama,” Mail Today, October
12, 2010.
58. The discussion here is based on material appearing in Richard Aboulafi a,
“Dassault Aviation Rafale,” World Military & Civil Aircraft Briefi ng, The Teal
Group, September 2010; Henri-Pierre Grolleau, “Dassault Rafale: Programme
Update,” International Air Power Review, vol. 22, 2007, 26–35; and Michael
A. Taverna, “Three in One,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 19, 2010,
76–80.
59. Pierre Tran, “Thales Touts ‘Market-Leading’ AESA Radar,” Defense News,
November 10, 2008, available at http://www.defensenews.com/story.
php?i=3811949.
60. The discussion here is based on material appearing in Jon Lake, “Eurofi ghter
Typhoon,” International Air Power Review, vol. 20, 2006, 44–75; David Donald,
“Eurofi ghter Typhoon,” International Air Power Review, vol. 26, 2009, 62–73;
and Carlo Kopp, “Eurofi ghter Typhoon—Demon or Lemon?” Australian Aviation,
August, 2000, available at http://www.ausairpower.net/Analysis-Typhoon.html.
61. “Eurofi ghter Leading Race for India Deal: Report,” Economic Times, January 23,
2010, available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... cs/nation/
Eurofi ghter-leading-race-for-India-deal-Report/articleshow/5491058.cms.
62. David C. Aronstein and Albert C. Piccirillo, The Lightweight Fighter Program: A
Successful Approach to Fighter Technology Transition (Reston, VA: American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1997).
63. Ramesh Phadke, “MMRCA: A Diffi cult Choice for the IAF,” IDSA Comment,
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, May 19, 2010.
64. The discussion in this section draws on material in “The UAE’s F-16 Block 60
Desert Falcon Fleet,” Defense Industry Daily, January 26, 2010, and Orville Prins,
“Super Viper for India,” Force, vol. 7, no. 9, May 2010, 47–48.
65. “Counting on Experience,” Force, vol. 7, no.10, June 2010, 40–41.
66. Captain Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, “The F-16 Block 60: A High-Tech Aircraft
for a Volatile Region,” Aerospace Power Journal, vol. 14, no. 3, Fall 2000, 96.
67. Graham Warwick, “Lockheed: F-35 Can Compete on Cost,” Aviation Week &
Space Technology, June 18, 2010, available at http://www.aviationweek.com/
aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/asd/2010/06/18/01.
xml&headline=Lockheed:%20F-35%20Can%20Compete%20On%20Cost.
68. The discussion in this section is based on material appearing in Bill Sweetman,
“Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet,” World Air Power Journal, vol. 42, Fall 2004,
30–53; Brad Elward, “Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet,” International Air Power
Review, vol. 11, 2004, 36–73; Carlo Kopp, “F/A-18E/F Super Hornet vs. Sukhoi
Flanker,” Defense Today, January/February 2007, available at http://www.
ausairpower.net/DT-SuperBug-vs-Flanker.html; and Carlo Kopp, “Flying the F/A-
18F Super Hornet,” Australian Aviation. May/June 2001, available at http://www.
ausairpower.net/SuperBug.html.
69. Commander Rob Niewoehner, “The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet: A Test Pilot Dispels
The Myths,” available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/990414-
ART-Super-Hornet.htm.
70. Sayan Mazumdar, “The AESA Radar: Key to the M-MMRCA,” Vayu Aerospace
and Defence Review, issue 5, 2009, 84.
71. David A. Fulghum, “Attack of the Electrons,” Aviation Week & Space Technology,
June 28, 2010, 52–54.
72. Mazumdar, op. cit., 86.
73. Air Commodore (retired) Jasjit Singh, “The Fighter after Next,” Vayu Aerospace
and Defence Review, issue 5, 2010, 47. It is important to note, however, that,
despite some press reporting to the contrary, Singh has not endorsed the IAF’s
purchase of the Gripen for its MMRCA component; he has only stated its
benefi ts in terms of weight, while clearly acknowledging that the F-16IN also is
competitive by this yardstick.
74. Vipin Narang, “India’s MMRCA Deal: Muddled Rationale, Costly Adventure?”
Center of the Advanced Study of India, October 26, 2009, available at http://casi.
ssc.upenn.edu/iit/narang.
75. Bharat Karnad, “No Good Choices for the Indian Air Forces,” Center for the
Advanced Study of India, October 12, 2009, available at http://casi.ssc.upenn.
edu/iit/karnad.
76. Ajai Shukla, “Scrap the MMRCA, buy U.S. F-35s,” Business Standard, October
19, 2010, available at http://www.business-standard.com/india/ ... crapmmrca-
buy-us-f-35s/411923.
77. An excellent survey of the IAF’s evolving force structure, on which this table is
based, can be found in Air Marshal (retired) V. K. Bhatia, “Flash Forward,” SP’s
Aviation, issue 1, 2009, 20–26.
78. “Interview: Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Pradeep V. Naik,” Force, October
2010, 10.
79. “Indian Light Combat Aircraft Will Miss Some Requirements,” Aviation Week &
Space Technology, November 22, 2010, 34.
80. David A. Fulghum, Maxim Pyadushkin, and Douglas Barrie, “Stealth, Sukhoi
Style,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 8, 2010, 30–31, and Carlo
Kopp and Peter Goon, “Assessing the Sukhoi PAF-FA,” Air Power Australia
Analyses, February 15, 2010, available at http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2010-
01.html.
81. For a particularly trenchant, but on the point, critique, see Admiral (retired) Arun
Prakash, “Once More Into the Bear’s Embrace: Time to Remember Palmerston,”
December 28, 2010, available at http://www.maritimeindia.org/modules.php?na
me=Content&pa=showpage&pid=189.
82. “Taking Flight,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 29, 2010, 25.
83. Ashok Nayak, “The India Fifth Generation Fighter is Planned for Induction From
2018,” Force, vol. 8, no. 2, October 2010, 12–16.
84. Neelam Mathews, “India Develops Requirements for AMCA,” Aviation Week &
Space Technology, April 21, 2010, available at http://www.aviationweek.com/
aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?topicName=india&id=news/awx/2010/04/21/
awx_04_21_2010_p0-221350.xml.

Luís Henrique escreveu:Claro.

Espero o mesmo empenho seu quando avaliar o Rafale.

Já que os anos passaram e HOJE o Rafale está muito mais maduro do que no início do FX2.

As mesmas críticas ao Rafale. Principalmente ao seu radar já deixaram de existir.
A vantagem americana nos sistemas/sensores do Super Hornet ERA uma realidade.
HOJE talvez não existe mais diferença.

knigh7 escreveu:
Não, não. Vc pode ver eu criticando o alcance do radar do Rafale há 4 anos atrás, quando ainda era PESA.

Vc tem 2 pesos com 2 medidas. Vc citou o exemplo do radar. Pois é, até com relação a ele.

Mesmo com a revista scanneada Air&Cosmos que eu te mostrei com a declarações do general francês Alan Silvy, no qual dizia que o Rafale AESA tem o alcance 10% inferior ao APG 80 do F-16, que por sua vez tem menos módulos que o APG79, vc teima em considerar que o REB2 AESA tem o alcance semelhante ao radar do F-18E/F....

Aliás, a declaração do Gen. Silvy com a relação a diferença de alcance nem foi muita supresa: o RBE 2AA tem 838 módulos, o APG-80 tem 1000 módulos e o APG-79 tem 1.100.

Estranho seria o AESA francês ter o alcance próximo ao do SH.

E com relação a qualidade de módulos, os do caça francês são de Arseneto de Gálio. Pretendem desenvolver e trocar para a próxima década por módulos a base de Nitrito de Gálio. Os módulos da Raythen JÁ SÀO de Nitrito de Gálio e estão no APG-79.

knigh7 escreveu: Os mísseis nesses cabides acompanham a fuzelagem mas nem de longe são contíguos a ela.

Observe a imagem bem frontal da aeronave com os mísseis:





Eles ficam destacados frontalmente. Se não tivessem desse jeito, mas mais próximos, tudo bem.



Observe também o alinhamento das wingtips do caça:




Vale ressaltar novamente que a posição desse cabides não estarem alinhados (tanto do SH, quanto do Rafale, ou de outros caças) não são problemas de projetos. Nem tudo que está a 12h e sem inclinação alguma vertical é a melhor solução.

knigh7 escreveu:

Luís Henrique escreveu:Claro.

Espero o mesmo empenho seu quando avaliar o Rafale.

Já que os anos passaram e HOJE o Rafale está muito mais maduro do que no início do FX2.

As mesmas críticas ao Rafale. Principalmente ao seu radar já deixaram de existir.
A vantagem americana nos sistemas/sensores do Super Hornet ERA uma realidade.
HOJE talvez não existe mais diferença.

Não, não. Vc pode ver eu criticando o alcance do radar do Rafale há 4 anos atrás, quando ainda era PESA.

Vc tem 2 pesos com 2 medidas. Vc citou o exemplo do radar. Pois é, até com relação a ele.

Mesmo com a revista scanneada Air&Cosmos que eu te mostrei com a declarações do general francês Alan Silvy, no qual dizia que o Rafale AESA tem o alcance 10% inferior ao APG 80 do F-16, que por sua vez tem menos módulos que o APG79, vc teima em considerar que o REB2 AESA tem o alcance semelhante ao radar do F-18E/F....

Aliás, a declaração do Gen. Silvy com a relação a diferença de alcance nem foi muita supresa: o RBE 2AA tem 838 módulos, o APG-80 tem 1000 módulos e o APG-79 tem 1.100.

Estranho seria o AESA francês ter o alcance próximo ao do SH.

E com relação a qualidade de módulos, os do caça francês são de Arseneto de Gálio. Pretendem desenvolver e trocar para a próxima década por módulos a base de Nitrito de Gálio. Os módulos da Raythen JÁ SÀO de Nitrito de Gálio e estão no APG-79.

bcorreia escreveu:

knigh7 escreveu: Os mísseis nesses cabides acompanham a fuzelagem mas nem de longe são contíguos a ela.

Observe a imagem bem frontal da aeronave com os mísseis:





Eles ficam destacados frontalmente. Se não tivessem desse jeito, mas mais próximos, tudo bem.



Observe também o alinhamento das wingtips do caça:




1 Vale ressaltar novamente que a posição desse cabides não estarem alinhados (tanto do SH, quanto do Rafale, ou de outros caças) não são problemas de projetos. Nem tudo que está a 12h e sem inclinação alguma vertical é a melhor solução.

Na boa, a impressão que passa é que você está tentando achar pelo em ovo de galinha para justificar suas críticas ao projeto desse caça.
Eu nào estou criticano do Rafale. Olhe o que eu escrevi no ponto 1
Olhe de novo para as imagens, nessa área da fuselagem, aonde estão as entradas de ar para as turbinas tem uma largura maior do que onde estão as turbinas, não faria sentido os mísseis que são afixados nessa área não acompanharem o seu desenho, diferente do projeto do SH, aonde os pilones tortos estão nas asas, sem nada ao lado. ,não é diferente do Super Hornet. O fato de estar "acompanhando" da fuzelagem não livra dele estar recebendo a corrente de vento de forma assimétrica. Ele está distanciado da fuzelagem, visível de frente.

bcorreia escreveu: Realmente, nem tudo tem que estar na perpendicular ou alinhado com o projeto, cabem os estudos aerodinâmicos da solução, mas na boa, nada me tira da cabeça que esses pilones tão desalinhados tem origem em alguma gambiarra aerodinâmica, afinal, qual o motivo para estarem tão desalinhadas, além de apontarem para fora, também apontam pra baixo, o quanto de arrasto que essa solução deve criar no projeto, até porque, nos Legacy isso não existia.

bcorreia escreveu:



Agora, quanto aos mísseis da wingtip, bom, em vários aviões eles estão apontando pra baixo, isso no Rafale

no F18



No Gripen

bcorreia escreveu: knigh7, você citou que um outro colega de fórum age tendo dois pesos e duas medidas, mas a impressão que tenho, que quem age dessa forma não é ele, todos os aviões do FX tem qualidades e defeitos, todos já foram ditos e re-ditos como plenamente operacionais pros requisitos da FAB, mas a impressão que vejo é de alguns colegas por torcida inferiorizarem qualidades e defeitos de uns e maximizarem a de outros, dai pergunto, será que esses defeitos e qualidades são realmente assim, ou será que não são efeito torcida pro um ou pra outro?


Bruno

Luís Henrique escreveu:

knigh7 escreveu: Não, não. Vc pode ver eu criticando o alcance do radar do Rafale há 4 anos atrás, quando ainda era PESA.

Vc tem 2 pesos com 2 medidas. Vc citou o exemplo do radar. Pois é, até com relação a ele.

Mesmo com a revista scanneada Air&Cosmos que eu te mostrei com a declarações do general francês Alan Silvy, no qual dizia que o Rafale AESA tem o alcance 10% inferior ao APG 80 do F-16, que por sua vez tem menos módulos que o APG79, vc teima em considerar que o REB2 AESA tem o alcance semelhante ao radar do F-18E/F....

Aliás, a declaração do Gen. Silvy com a relação a diferença de alcance nem foi muita supresa: o RBE 2AA tem 838 módulos, o APG-80 tem 1000 módulos e o APG-79 tem 1.100.

Estranho seria o AESA francês ter o alcance próximo ao do SH.

E com relação a qualidade de módulos, os do caça francês são de Arseneto de Gálio. Pretendem desenvolver e trocar para a próxima década por módulos a base de Nitrito de Gálio. Os módulos da Raythen JÁ SÀO de Nitrito de Gálio e estão no APG-79.

O que eu digo é que foi noticiado que o RBE2AA tem alcance de detecção de cerca de 200 km.
E o que eu encontrei de informações sobre o Super Hornet e o APG-79 situam o alcance de detecção bem próximo.
Já li em torno de 200 km.
209 km e coisas do tipo. Nunca li que o alcance é de 300 km, por exemplo.

Nunca disse que o RBE2AA é melhor que o APG-79.
O que digo é que devemos considerar avaliações em um protótipo e que provavelmente será DIFERENTE no radar definitivo.
Com o passar dos anos, o RBE2AA foi MELHORADO.

O mesmo ocorre com qualquer outro radar ou equipamento.
Por exemplo, já foi divulgado que o radar AESA do MiG-35 deixou a desejar.
Eu pesquisei e descobri que era um protótipo e que o radar DEFINITIVO ainda estava em desenvolvimento, mas que teria MAIS módulos e a antena seria MAIOR.
Então é óbvio que o produto final será melhor que o protótipo.

O radar protótipo possuía 680 módulos, antena com 500mm, alcance de detecção de cerca de 140km.
O radar definitivo terá 1.000 a 1.100 módulos, antena com 700mm e alcance de detecção de cerca de 200 km.

Os franceses divulgaram que o ganho em alcance do RBEAA para a versão ESA foi de 50% mais.
Se considerarmos que o RBE ESA possuía alcance de detecção de 130 a 140 km, o RBEAA possui entre 195 e 210 km de alcance.

Pode ser inferior ao APG-79, mas como eu disse, levando em conta o que eu li, parece ser uma diferença mínima.
A não ser que você tenha referências que indiquem que o alcance de detecção do APG-79 é de 280km, 300 km, 350km.
Ai vou concordar com você.
Do contrário, a diferença é mínima.

Awaiting the UAE

DSI special edition , August 2010

With the general Alain SILVY
Deputy Chief Plans within the Staff of the Air Force.

The french government took the pledge with the Rafale manufacturer to ensure, whatever happens, a minimum annual rate of 11 aircrafts. A rate estimated by the manufacturer as the floor below which it would not be possible to go without calling into question the economy of the program, including the unit cost of these aircrafts. The LPM (Law of Military Planning) not providing matching funds for the purchase of these machines for the years 2013 and 2014, either export allow very opportunely to keep the commitment to the industry, or export is lacking and the french state must find the necessary budgets by reducing or eliminating other programs. Is this commitment based on obtaining export orders a dangerous bet?

Alain Silvy: Let’s be honest. This “bet”, to use your word, on short-term obtaining of export orders for the Rafale, has nevertheless allowed to complete the LPM allowing the planning of a big hole in the shipment for the Air Force and the Navy without questioning the production rate, already reduced to the minimum industrially acceptable by Dassault Aviation. Deliveries to the French armies should be reduced to only 2 or 3 machines per year for a time, the export bringing the complement to reach the threshold of 11 Rafale produced per year. In case of absence of export order, the situation would become obviously complicated.[…] We would have to find a substantial funding of several hundred million euros. […]

But how to find the hundreds of millions euros in question?

The 3 armies have all benefited from the choice made by the planners of the LPM to reduce to a very low level the Rafale deliveries. The amount saved have been reallocated to the 3 armies. I think nobody questions it. We should have to find the funds by making new balancing within the LPM […] we must now hope that will come very quickly a first export order. […] But export is not neutral. Potential customers, including UAE, have specific requirements with developments leaving the French standards – and therefore with budget not taken into account by the LPM – they want cofinanced by the French state. That could require for France to find further funding for the Rafale program […]

What would be the cost for France of these additional co-development to fund with a potential UAE customer?

One hears everything and its opposite. Everything depends on what one includes. Personally, I do not give precise figures. But this is obviously something like several hundreds of millions of euros paid by the french state.

Is the Air force interested by some of the UAE requirements ?

From my point of view, it depends where. We could be potentially interested by the M88-X with 9 tons of thrust because it would be, in the circumstances, an open field. But, on the other hand, we have not yet reached the stage of maturity – which requires about 150,000 flight hours – with the current M88 with 7.5 tonnes thrust. This means that with the M88-X, even if it should presumptively enjoy a good community with the existing M88, we would have to accumulate even more hours to reach the stage of maturity of the engine.
Very clearly, in my opinion, the M88-X is not for the Air force an immediate need. In order to sell the Rafale to the UAE, the Defense may ultimately be asked to acquire the M88-X in a quantity and on terms still to define. And we’ll maybe even happy to use it. But today we have no technical or operational reasons to make it available for us.The gain expected from the arrival of a more powerful engine is lower than the risks we would go with the technical immaturity of new modules and the management in parallel – so complicated in terms of logistics and operational employment of aircraft with different performances –of two relatively different parks of M88. All this must be thorough.

Would it be possible to see Safran manufacturing M88-X for UAE and continue to deliver “classic” M88 for the french Rafale? And this notwithstanding that the french government would have co-funded the development of the M88-X

It is not forbidden to imagine it. On condition, however, that to maintain the parallel production of two versions of M88 does not cost more than producing a single model. The support costs must not explode. Safran must tell us very quickly and very frankly what it would be. And again, nothing force us to equip the whole fleet of Rafale, Air and/or Marine.

And about the UAE demand to have a more powerful RBE2 radar, could it answer to some expectations for the Air force?

The Air Force is interested in having a RBE2 with an active antenna. It is now established with the powerful AESA antenna which will equip our tranche 4 Rafale. What the Emirians are calling for is much more complex. They want, in addition to the AESA, to have new functionalities on their Rafale, such as GMTT / GMTI (detection and tracking of moving ground target), interlacing between air/air and air/ground modes, etc.. Even if this is not for us an urgent need, the operational ‘plus’ obtained could nonetheless eventually interest us. However, the key Emirian demand is about the range of the RBE2. And, with the same antenna diameter, the only way to achieve the 10% range increase (compared with the Basic AESA F3 “roadmap”) that wish to obtain the Emirians, is a big boost to the power of the radar.

But more power to the RBE2, could it be a risk to generate serious electromagnetic interference (EMI) with the SPECTRA receptors ?

There is indeed a very real EMI risk to treat. This is the case whenever we want to change aircraft emission systems. There are solutions, obviously, but this will require to reexamine SPECTRA. But the biggest problem we have identified is about electric generation, which could be insufficient. To increase the maximum range of a few nautical miles, we would have to deeply review the electrical generation system of the aircraft.
In short, to conceive what it could be a Rafale-9, that is to say a new aircraft moving away from the similarity you want with french Rafale. The Emirati experts participating in negotiations are well aware of the problem. But they are also used to have very high quality weapons systems. They want to avoid any regression with the Rafale, at least on the radar range, compared to the F-16 Block 60, the Rafale having also many other qualities. The Emirians don’t have AWACS and therefore want – it is a fundamental requirement – that the Rafale can see very far. Beyond the radar, they are showing fairly strong requirements into SPECTRA development with, for example, the expansion of some frequency bands, an increased sensitivity, adding functionalities; in short, they want we push up the current technologies. Of course, to improve the electronic warfare of our Rafale faster than originally planned could be an additional operational advantage for the Air force. However, our current approach is to consolidate the features implemented in SPECTRA, to make them more robust and make it easier for operators and programmers before wanting to go further into addition of new capabilities. The current SPECTRA is working well and even very good. In sum, what separates us, about Spectra, is a matter of timing and calendar […]. In a more general way, we share the same wishes about capabilities, but with very different maturities calendar sometimes. Budgetary constraints remain a dimensioning factor.

The Emirians want a viewfinder-HMD …

It’s true. And ourselves, one way or another, we will. For various reasons, we agreed in the past to not use it initially, but this equipment is now an almost indispensable element for modern combat aircraft. Besides various prospects of the Rafale – the UAE, Brazil and Switzerland – also want it, confirming this analysis.

In the end, what about the eventuality of a Rafale order by the UAE?

Very sincerely, and seen from my place, I think we’re really not very far from being able to reach a common ground with our UAE friends. The only pertinent question to be asked is whether the will of similarity expressed by the Emirians will prevail over their performance requirement If performance is what counts, in fact we’ll get two quite different Rafale – as with the Mirage 2000-9 – because the french state can not or do not want to follow it. If the community is paramount, the Emirians will have to reduce their ambitions with regard to performance. The choice is now in their hands. They must see if their operational necessities allow them or not to settle for a weapon system fairly close to the F3 “roadmap” French standard. They must decide whether they consider more important to work very closely with us. I know they have already expressed the wish, in case of order, to be able to send their pilots very quickly in our Rafale units where they could train, learn the Rafale and our tactical employment. To obtain a rapid operational rise of their own Rafale squadron. in that case their Rafale configuration and ours must not be very different. But it remains to be seen … That is where we are I think
.
How long would require the additional developments required by the UAE?

It is difficult to answer precisely this question, especially since I do not have all the elements of the problematic. The first UAE aircraft would not be delivered before 2014. This period should be sufficient to finish to develop a 9 tons M-88. About the radar, we would not probably have in 2014 all the capabilities and performance expected, but they would, I think, nevertheless be already very close to the target. The problem of electric generation requires also time to be processed. This will be a heavy operation for the aircraft. In the case of an order signed this year, we would therefore have some years to develop the additional features. These years should not be wasted. In any case, I think the discussions with Emirians take place on a sound footing. Their negotiators are experts who know exactly what is fighter plane and are aware of the state of the art and of various constraints. Talking to people at this level is very pleasant for the Air Force. However, now the order must materialize.

What about the UAE Mirage 2000-9 ?

The French authorities have been very clear on this subject. Once the Rafale ordered by UAE, the Mirage 2000-9 will be taken back by France which will issue them to a defeasance agency in charge of their resale export. This means that in this hypothesis, it is not envisaged that they equip the French Army.

But would it be interesting for the Army because these are recent cells with advanced weapons systems ?

We can not say that we feel no interest in these machines, because their weapons system displays really astonishing performance. The Air Force could certainly benefit. However, the indispensable work for NATO compatibility on these weapons systems would be very heavy with a cost probably exceeding the one – 700 millions euros – planned for the renovation of our Mirage 2000D, which is a priority for us.

If the UAE buy the Rafale, could the Rafale Transformation Squadron (ETR), which will be created in Saint-Dizier, be relocated at Al-Dhafra to help UAE pilots and benefit from the excellent local weather conditions ?

Why not? but we are not there yet. […] To install the ETR – as a whole or just a part – at Al-Dhafra could be an asset. Our first participation, last autumn, to the ATLC (Advanced Tactical Leadership Course) organized by the UAE Air Warfare Center, has once again demonstrated the richness of such exchanges. If the UAE order the Rafale, we may have to quickly take charge, in a way or another, of the transformation of their pilots on our weapon system. Doing it at Al-Dhafra would be – and this is only my opinion – interesting.

Interview by Jean-Louis Prome

Justin Case escreveu:

knigh7 escreveu:
Não, não. Vc pode ver eu criticando o alcance do radar do Rafale há 4 anos atrás, quando ainda era PESA.

Vc tem 2 pesos com 2 medidas. Vc citou o exemplo do radar. Pois é, até com relação a ele.

Mesmo com a revista scanneada Air&Cosmos que eu te mostrei com a declarações do general francês Alan Silvy, no qual dizia que o Rafale AESA tem o alcance 10% inferior ao APG 80 do F-16, que por sua vez tem menos módulos que o APG79, vc teima em considerar que o REB2 AESA tem o alcance semelhante ao radar do F-18E/F....

Aliás, a declaração do Gen. Silvy com a relação a diferença de alcance nem foi muita supresa: o RBE 2AA tem 838 módulos, o APG-80 tem 1000 módulos e o APG-79 tem 1.100.

Estranho seria o AESA francês ter o alcance próximo ao do SH.

E com relação a qualidade de módulos, os do caça francês são de Arseneto de Gálio. Pretendem desenvolver e trocar para a próxima década por módulos a base de Nitrito de Gálio. Os módulos da Raythen JÁ SÀO de Nitrito de Gálio e estão no APG-79.

Boa tarde, Knigh7.

GaAn no APG-79?
Tem certeza?
Os documentos que encontrei reportam que ainda usa os tradicionais GaAs.
É um novo desenvolvimento? Já está operacional?
Abraço,

Justin

knigh7 escreveu:
"não é diferente do Super Hornet. O fato de estar "acompanhando" da fuzelagem não livra dele estar recebendo a corrente de vento de forma assimétrica. Ele está distanciado da fuzelagem, visível de frente."

"Observe que o armamento do Rafale subalar, assim como no SH, também aponta levemente para baixo:"

Luís Henrique escreveu:The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
tracks closely with the F-15 Eagle, the world’s fi nest air superiority platform
before the F-22A Raptor, in its size and fuel carrying capacity. At 14,700
pounds, the F/A-18E/F has the largest internal fuel load of any of the MMRCA
competitors. Unlike the Eagle however, the Super Hornet is optimized for
transonic maneuver, load carrying performance, dominance in both BVR and
WVR combat, fl exible multi-role operations during a single sortie, and carrier
recovery, since it remains the preeminent strike-fi ghter aboard the large-deck
aircraft carriers of the U.S. Navy. In fact, on all the fi ve counts for which
it was designed—increased range, payload, bring-back weight, survivability,
and growth room—the Super Hornet outshines its predecessor without
compromising on its superb dogfi ghting qualities.
Th at it has been able to do so despite the extra weight associated with
carrier-based platforms is truly a tribute to the aircraft’s propulsion system
and its aerodynamic design. Despite its 30 percent weight gain over the C/D
version, the Super Hornet’s 25 percent larger wing and the 35 percent increase
in thrust from its current twin GE F414 engines, each generating some 22,000
pounds of thrust at sea level, have protected its original agility fundamentally
intact. As a Hornet test pilot summarized it,
In the subsonic regime, the E/F performs as good as or better
than a C/D in almost every respect. Th e challenge posed to
the contractor was not to compromise the [legacy] Hornet’s
superb capabilities as a dogfighter. “As good as, or better than
…” was the standard to meet. Th e result is that the turning
performance charts overlay one another. At high angles
of attack, the E/F’s agility truly shines, with superior roll
performance and much more carefree handling. Th e heritage
Hornet was already the stand-out, high angle-of-attack (alpha)
machine in the U.S. inventory. The E/F is “hands-down”
superior in that environment. (69)

(...)


Th e aerodynamic eff ectiveness of the Super Hornet is also remarkable,
especially given its greater weight than the other MMRCA entrants. Th e
aircraft was always reputed for its carefree handling qualities and these have
only been enhanced further in the E/F variant. When its sustained turn rate
is compared with the other aircraft at representative altitudes, the F/A-18 is
similar to the F-16 (without conformal fuel tanks) and inferior only to the
Gripen. Th is sustained turning performance confi rms its superiority as an
excellent dogfi ghter, just like the F-16 is when it fl ies without its over-wing
tanks. Th e Super Hornet’s instantaneous turn rate ranks among the best in the
competition too, behind mainly the Rafale at low altitudes. Like the Rafale
and the Eurofi ghter, however, the F/A-18 has high bleed rates, which implies
that its ability to turn sharply comes at a cost of lost speed compared with, say,
the F-16 or the Gripen. Th e F/A-18 is also slower to add energy in comparison
with its peers, including the F-16 when confi gured for air-to-air combat, and
its constrained top-end speed makes it similar to rivals such as the Gripen and
the Rafale. This could constrain it when its pilot attempts to disengage from
higher-powered adversaries in air combat duels.


69-Commander Rob Niewoehner, “The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet: A Test Pilot Dispels
The Myths,” available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/990414-
ART-Super-Hornet.htm



Partes grifadas no texto que vc postou:

1) diferente do Eagle, o SH é otimizado para manobras em velocidades transônicas.
O que enfatiza o que todo mundo já sabe, é um caça otimizado para ataque. Todos os caças otimizados para superioridade aérea como o Raptor e o Eurofighter são otimizados para manobras em velocidades supersônicas.

2) manobra rápido mas perde muita velocidade nestas manobras. Primeiro o texto diz que é tão bom quanto o F-16, levando em conta os outros competidores, isto quer dizer que o SH fica no final da lista, junto com o F-16. E agora diz que é pior que o F-16 e o Gripen porque perde muita velocidade quando manobra forte.

3) as duas últimas partes em negrito: é mais lento para adicionar energia, comparado com os seus pares..........isto o restringe de escapar de adversários mais potentes durante um combate aéreo.
Não tem nem o que explicar. Ta ai.
Repito, é um excelente caça multimissão, porém otimizado para ataque. Nos sistemas/sensores/armamentos pode vencer qualquer outro, porém no envelope de vôo é um dos piores.

Corner velocity

Corner velocity /also called corner speed or maneuvering speed/ is an important value for each aircraft. It is determined by plotting the structural limitations /in G forces/ against airspeed. The corner velocity is the minimum speed at which an aircraft can pull its maximum rated Gs. An aircraft at corner velocity attains maximum instantaneous turn performance.

The corner velocity for the F-16A in a stock configuration is 450 knots. This means that at 450 knots the F-16 has its best turn performance. At speeds above the corner speed, turn performance drops off.

Corner speed also affects the minimum turn radius. The size of the turn radius of an aircraft depends on the speed it is traveling. A faster aircraft requires a larger circle to turn in than a slower one. However, the turn redius isn't only a function of speed. It also depends on the number of Gs a pilot pulls during the turn. An aircraft at a constant speed will make a relatively wide circle at 1 G but will turn in a very tight circle at 7 or 8 Gs. The corner velocity is the speed that gives the optimum balance between turn rate and turn radius.

Modern air combat

(November 2008)

Since World War II there has been many cases of air-to-air combat. Even in the jet age, modern air-to-air combat can develop into dog fights. A fighter can evade a missile by abrupt maximum-performance turns and employing countermeasures—such as chaff and flares—provided he can detect the missile via a radar warning receiver (RWR) or visually. If beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles can be defeated, pilots can press the attack and very quickly arrive at the within-visual-range (WVR) arena. This will typically result in a high-speed neutral pass (or merge) from which the opposing pilots must decide to turn and continue the fight with their opponent or continue straight and 'bug-out'. The turning fight that develops can be commonly called a dog fight, or air combat maneuvering (ACM).

Superiority in a dog fight can depend on a pilot's experience and skill, and the agility of his fighter when flown at minimum air speeds approaching loss of control (causing a danger of stalling); the winner typically plays to the strengths of his own aircraft while forcing his adversary to fly at a design disadvantage. Dogfights are generally contests fought at low airspeeds, while maintaining enough energy for violent acrobatic maneuvering, as pilots attempt to remain within air speeds with a maximum turn rate and minimum turn radius: the so-called "corner speed" that often lies between 300 and 400 knots, depending on the aircraft's design. Therefore a dogfight has nothing to do with supersonic speed, but much to do with the engine power that makes supersonic flight possible. The supermaneuverable F-22 Raptor can stand on its steerable nozzles at less than 100 knots airspeed, yet quickly maneuver to bring its M61 Vulcan cannon to bear on a nearby evasive target, while an F-15 Eagle is more likely to use its thrust to maintain its relatively high corner speed, working to counter the drag caused by tight turns.

The continued importance of maintaining dogfighting proficiency was demonstrated during the Vietnam War. American pilots flew aircraft such as the F-4 Phantom II, equipped with long-range AIM-7 Sparrow missiles and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles. However, air crews were required not to fire any missiles without having visually identified the target first, to make absolutely sure they were not an ally, thus losing this technological advantage. The AIM-7 missile was also not very reliable, making heavy use of delicate components such as vacuum tubes, which could not endure tropical climates, carrier takeoffs, and high-G maneuvers. Also, they had semi-active radar homing, meaning that they used the carrier plane's radar signals to home in on the target. The missiles themselves did not have a radar system, but "listened" to the pings of the attacker's radar and used the reflection of the prey aircraft to home in on it. AIM-9 missile were heat-seeking fire-and-forget missiles, meaning that once they had a lock on a heat source, they would attempt to hit it. They were only useful in short range, and in many cases failed, due to a number of factors, including delicate instruments and false heat sources (such as the sun). Additionally, early versions of the F-4 (prior to the E model) relied solely on missiles, having no guns nor lead-computing Gyro gunsight, and were therefore very vulnerable in the gun-range combat that could ensue.

Lightweight, short-endurance, point-defense fighters such as the MiG-17 and MiG-21 are typically far more agile than heavy, long-range, fighter-bombers (see the F-105 Thunderchief). Still, using superior tactics, the AIM-9 Sidewinder short-range missiles, and cannon fire, American pilots were able to gain significant victories in the air over North Vietnam, especially after the 1969 establishment of the United States Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) to restore dogfighting ability to its pilots. At this school, pilots learned to exchange airspeed for altitude, using maneuvers like the Immelman turn and the Split-S, and to master tricks that put him behind an enemy fighter, where the enemy is vulnerable to heat-seeking Sidewinder missiles.

Referring back the previous section, which focused on tactics developed during World War II, the North Vietnamese MiG-17 resorted to use of the Lufbery maneuver on occasion when cornered by faster F-4 Phantom fighters. Whereas the Thach Weave is used as aircraft move towards a point in space, the Lufbery is employed over a fixed point.

With modern air-to-air AMRAAM guided missiles greatly extending the general engagement range of jet fighters, some experts hypothesize that dogfighting may be headed toward extinction, but others cite the occurrences in Vietnam as evidence otherwise. However, it is worth noting that there have been a great number of Beyond-Visual-Range (BVR) kills occurring during and after Operation Desert Storm. This was due to the improved reliability of BVR missiles, radars, and most importantly, the integration of C3I assets such as AWACS aircraft into the realm of aerial warfare. This provided Coalition forces with a superior picture of the battlefield and in conjunction with airspace management allowed utilization of BVR weaponry.

Despite this the improvement of all-aspect IR, missiles coupled with helmet-mounted sights, has reduced the necessity of tail-chase attacks. In addition, Russian development of tail-mounted radar and rear-firing missiles has reduced Russian planes' vulnerability to tail-chase attacks.

Yet because this feature is only present on the most modern jets, and missiles are a finite resource, the US Navy (TOPGUN) and the US Air Force (Red Flag) continue to teach postgraduate-level classes in air-combat-maneuvering engagements. Russian aircraft manufacturers heavily emphasize supermaneuverability and dogfight capabilities in fighter design, with aircraft such as the Su-37 or the Su-30MKI demonstrating advanced thrust vectoring systems to achieve these goals, pushing the aircraft to its limits to give it an advantage in combat. USAF fighters, such as the F-15 and F-16, tend to favor higher speeds, because of their emphasis on high power-to-weight ratio and low wing-loading; although the F-22 has supermaneuverability with its own vectored thrust.

Possuindo superficies de comando bem dimensionadas, um FCS (Flight Control System) de ultima geracao e com motorizacao adequada, o Super Hornet capitalizou excepcionais qualidades de voo, no envelope de manobras com baixas velocidades e altos angulos de ataque. Sem restricoes de manobrabilidade e com diminuto risco de ingressar em situacoes anormais de voo, a carga de trabalho foi substancialmente diminuida, permitindo ao piloto devotar maior tempo no acompanhamento da evolucao do cenario de combate, aumentando a sua consciencia situacional.

Em arena de combate com baixas velocidades, equipado com misseis all-aspect (AIM-9X) e com o JHMCS (capacete designador de alvos), aliado a sua excepcional manobrabilidade, o F/A-18E/F sera um oponente dificil de ser batido.

Com as potencialidades anunciadas do radar AN/APG-79, a elevada capacidade de carregamento de armamento stand-off (pode ser configurado com 14 misseis, sendo 12 BVR), com a integrada e atualizada suite de equipamentos de guerra eletronica e reduzida RCS, o Super Hornet eh um vetor com surpreendente capacidade de sobrevivencia, alta letalidade e baixa vulnerabilidade.”

“(…) e tendo realizado o “G Warm-up” (curvas niveladas/ascendentes, variando a puxada, seguidas de algumas reversoes. visando a adaptacao a carga G), atingimos o FL220 e a area de exercicio, sendo que por diversas vezes fui obrigado a reduzir o motor abaixo da potencia militar, para nao entrar supersonico. ”

“(…) As curvas de máxima performance foram realizadas a 12 mil ft e 350 kt. Com razão de curva, de aproximadamente 40 graus/s, atingi 6,2 Gs, sentindo um leve Buffet, com aquela configuração (seis mísseis)”.