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Islam, Authoritarianism and Intolerance

Yesterday’s news might be seen as a confirmation of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations idea, pitting Islam against the West.

First was the headline news that Islamist militants, angered by a trailer posted on YouTube depicting Prophet Muhammed as a sexual predator, homosexual and child molester, attacked the US Consulate in Benghazi, set the Consulate ablaze, and killed ambassador Christopher J. Stevens and three members of his staff. There were violent protests elsewhere, including in Egypt.

Second was the perhaps equally disturbing news from Pakistan of an 11-year-old illiterate Christian girl (described as “slow” by the news reports) now freed from jail but still running from the mob, threatening to kill and burn her and her family, because of “blasphemy” (she’s accused of burning pages from an Islamic textbook).

Add to this the general poverty and authoritarianism of the Middle East and North Africa and other Islamic countries (especially if you leave out oil wealth), the case seems open and shut.

There are many versions of why Islam is at the root of authoritarianism, backwardness and poverty in these countries. Perhaps the most famous one argues that Islam, by failing to recognize the separation of religion and state, naturally leads to authoritarianism. In a now famous book, What Went Wrong, historian Bernard Lewis popularized a version of this idea. He wrote, for example:

The idea that any group of persons, any kind of activities, any part of human life is in any sense outside the scope of religious law and jurisdiction is alien to the Muslim thought (page 100).

He went on to compare Islam to Christianity in this regard:

From the beginning, Christians were taught, both by precept and practice, to distinguish between God and Caesar and between the different duties owed to each of the two. Muslims received no such instruction. (Page 103).

Though popular, this view doesn’t seem entirely well grounded in history or scripture.

First, as we argued in Why Nations Fail, there is another obvious explanation for extractive economic and political institutions in the Middle East and North Africa: the legacy of Ottoman rule and institutions.

Second, the close relationship between politics and religion is not confined to Islam. Rulers have used religion to cement their power or support their attempts to conquer new lands throughout the ages. For example, though colonialism was not a religious endeavor, religious rhetoric and the project of converting heathens to Christianity did play a role in motivating the Spanish and the English alike and provided a pretty good “cover story”.

Third, it is true that secularism, in any of its forms, has been all but absent in Muslim lands, but this is at least as much because politics has co-opted religion rather than the other way around.

Fourth, there is really nothing in the Koran or even the Hadith about constitutions or how the government should be organized and operated.

But the question remains: it’s unlikely to be a coincidence, nor easily explained by the Ottoman legacy, that most Muslim countries are not democratic and almost totally lack civil society, and most branches of political Islam are intolerant and often violent.

Jean-Philippe Platteau suggests that this is in part because the particular organization of Islam has led to an “obscurantist deadlock” in which various individuals, parties and social movements compete for legitimacy by arguing to be the ones that are true to the faith — and often subscribe an extremist version of the faith in doing so. He writes:

… when despots use religion to legitimize themselves in a highly contested environment they may provoke a counter-move in the form of religious backlash in which the ruler and his opponents compete to demonstrate their superior fidelity to the faith.

This equilibrium is made possible by the fact that, just like Protestantism, Islam does not have a centralized authority with which rulers can make exclusive deals (in the way that European rulers did with the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages).

This would be consistent with the patterns emphasized by Gilles Kepel in his insightful book, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Many rulers with secular backgrounds — whom we would call extractive — have tried to use Islam and co-opt a subset of the Islamic scholars, the ulema, to gain legitimacy and suppress democratic, often left of center or socialist, movements. This includes Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Pakistan, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the Assad family in Syria, Houari Boumediene in Algeria, and the military junta under the leadership of Kenan Evren that came to power after the 1980 coup in Turkey. In each case, the strategy worked for a while and ultimately backfired. Bhutto’s cynical policies in Pakistan, for example, paved the way for the religious fanaticism and repressive dictatorship of Zia ul-Haq, with disastrous consequences for Pakistan and for the region.

But why is it that we see this sort of dynamics in Islam but not in Protestantism? Though it is true that protestant radicalism emerged during certain periods, for example in the run-up to the English Civil War as documented by Christopher Hill in The World Turned Upside Down, many of these radicals such as Roger Williams fought against authority and for freedom rather than for a world order in which they would get to repress others and dictate to them what to do (see this interesting book on Roger Williams).

Here is one idea: as we argued in our previous post, Muhammed develop his teachings and Islam in the context of a state building project. This may have made Islam and Islamic scholars particularly receptive to calls by rulers or would-be rulers. The general tendency of Islamic scholars towards state authority is well captured by the famous Islamic scholar and philosopher al-Ghazali (cited in Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, page 144):

the tyranny of a sultan for a hundred years causes less damage than one year’s tyranny exercised by the subjects against one another.

This combined with the powerful role that Islamic scholars occupy in Islamic societies, particularly in view of the fact that the Koran leaves a lot unspecified and open to interpretation, may have paved the way for a subset of the scholars to make deals with any despotic ruler or any usurper to suppress dissent. This sort of intense repression, especially shutting off any legitimate political organization opposing the authority of the ruler, may have left religious rhetoric as the only channel through which people could formulate and partially voice their grievances. The decentralized organization of Islam and Islamic scholars may have then created a platform in which another subset of the scholars would support movements using this channel to oppose the ruler; and what would be more natural than claiming greater purity and devotion to Islam in the circumstances, thus leading to Platteau’s “obscurantist deadlock”?

http://whynationsfail.com/

The airspace over Benghazi was closed for several hours this morning, reportedly to enable unmanned aerial drones to patrol overhead.

The manager of Benghazi’s Benina International Airport told reporters earlier today that the airspace was closed shortly after midnight for security reasons.

“Benghazi airspace has been closed since 00:30 GMT for routine security checks” Taba Mohammed said, without elaborating further. The airspace is said to have reopened around 12:15.

There have been reports that flights were grounded as part of an operation to prevent suspects involved in Tuesday’s fatal attacks on the US consulate from using the airport as an escape route.

However, a UK-based risk and intelligence company has confirmed to the Libya Herald that it believes the primary purpose of the closure was to enable patrols by American drone aircraft.

“We believe our intelligence is accuarate”, said Cassie Blombaum, an intelligence analyst at the Inkerman Group.

“We have multiple sources, including video footage of Libyans actually spotting the drones”.

Drones were reported to have been deployed over Libya following Tuesday’s attacks, which resulted in the death of the American ambassador together with three of his staff, but Blombaum says that the surveillance aircraft have likely been operating in the country over a much longer period

“We reported back in June that the US had drones operating out of Derna”, Blombaum said.

“This followed reports by CNN, citing a senior Libyan intelligence source, that the US was orchestrating drone attacks inside Libya”.

According to the CNN report, the US was using drones inside Libya to monitor suspicious activity around Derna, and that this was being done with the full knowledge of the Libyan government.

At the time, one militant commander operating in Derna, Abdulbasit Azuz, had complained that a drone strike had targeted his training camp in the east of Libya, although this was not independently confirmed.

The US government is notoriously secretive about its drone programme, which operates in many countries, and is rarely publicly acknowledged.

http://www.libyaherald.com/?p=14380

Os egipicios ganham US$ 1,3 bi por pela bondade e consideração.

As forças armadas do Egito, sem o apadrinhamento americano, vão virar ferro velho. Nem vou falar em expurgo do oficialiato, quase todo formado na era Mubarak.

I've had a couple of very busy days here and am about to return to Cairo after a couple of months of absence. Id did write this op-ed for The National which captures some of my initial thoughts about what I'm calling, for shorthand, the embassy riots. Needless to say I find these very depressing, and as my thinking evolves about them (being quite far away from them at the moment) I am not satisfied that I know enough about the evolution of the protests — how they started, who initiated them, etc.

It appears very likely that the Benghazi attack that killed US diplomats was a pre-planned attack by a group probably trying to avenge the death of Sheikh al-Libi, an al-Qaeda leader. And it seems that the initial Egyptian protests were in good part due to a call by a small Salafi group led by Mohammed Zawahri (Ayman's brother) and a few fellow travellers, and timed for the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. That these protests expanded and got out of hand speaks volumes of the complicated, chaotic situation in Egypt. (I'll pass on the government's reaction, or lack thereof, for now.) I think it is important to see who involved in getting the ball rolling — and particularly the international network of Islamist activists who amplify and spread this manufactured outrage (I say manufactured because why now and not, say, at the time of the scandal over the desecreation of Quran by US soldiers in Afghanistan or other incidents?)

I'll write more in the next few days, but here is an excerpt from The National op-ed:

Islamist movements (even if they are not alone in this) have shown that they excel in using an insult (real or perceived) as part of their culture wars: the tactic is to portray themselves as the sole defenders of the faith. In this week's case, they chose to do so even though the film in question was released only online and no one would have heard of it or paid attention to it without their efforts.

This, perhaps, is what has changed between the 1988 Rushdie fatwa and more recent examples of Islamist outrage: thanks to the internet, a regional Danish newspaper or an amateur film have become targets just as much as a celebrated, best-selling novelist.

Not that these protests, riots and killings are entirely about insults anyway: that the protesters chose to target US embassies has as much to do with other grievances (US-led wars, support for Israel, etc) and the convenience of having a prominent address, since protests outside the filmmaker's house, say, are out of the question.

One can certainly question why protest organisers chose the embassies, as if the US government was responsible for a film made by one of its citizens. And why do organisers sometimes lie, as when Nader Bakkar - who speaks for Egypt's Salafi Nour Party, a partner with President Mohammed Morsi's party - told Al Jazeera Mubasher that the film had been broadcast on US channels?

And why, despite the risks of escalation made obvious by the attack that killed four American diplomats in Benghazi, did the Muslim Brotherhood's secretary general, Mahmoud Ghozlan, call for new protests after Friday prayers?

http://www.arabist.net/blog/2012/9/14/a ... riots.html


Mohamed al Zawahiri

I awoke this morning to the horrifying news of the death of U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other consular officials during a mob attack on the consulate in Benghazi, which followed yesterday's storming of the embassy in Cairo. The embassy riots over an absurd, obscure anti-Islam movie are more "Danish Cartoons" than "Iranian Hostage Crisis" and were following a depressingly familiar script until the deaths in Libya. But now the stakes are far higher.

It would be a tragic mistake to allow the images from Cairo and Benghazi to undermine American support for the changes in the Arab world. The protesters in Cairo and Benghazi are no more the true face of the Arab uprisings than al Qaeda was the face of Islam after 9/11. We should not allow the actions of a radical fringe to define our views of an entire group. The aspirations for democratic change of many millions of Arab citizens must not be delegitimated by the violent acts of a small group of radicals.

But the response to the eruption by empowered publics, elected leaders and influential voices across political society -- including, especially, Islamists -- really does matter. Authoritarian regimes in the past frequently allowed, or even encouraged, such violent eruptions over these issues. Islamist movements in perennial opposition leaped at the chance to score political points while taking no responsibility for what followed. Today will be a pivotal moment in the urgent debates about how such movements will respond to political power and a stake in the political system. Libya's leaders thus far look to be passing that test. Egypt's do not.

Libya was the location of the greater horror, with the death of Stevens and his consular staffers. But across the Libyan political spectrum there has been an immediate rush of condemnation of the attacks and deep empathy with the American victims. Mohammed al-Magariaf, president of Libya's National Council, quickly declared that "in the strongest possible words, in all languages, we condemn, reject, and denounce what happened in Benghazi yesterday in the assault on the US Consulate." Deputy Prime Minister Mustafa Abu Shagur said "I condemn these barbaric acts in the strongest possible terms. This is an attack on America, Libya and free people everywhere." Prime Minister Abd al-Rahim al-Keib offered similar strong condemnation. Libyan officials have promised to bring those responsible for the killings to justice. Libyans online have been similarly outraged and appalled. My Twitter timeline has filled with angry and outraged comments from Libyans denouncing the attacks and expressing sympathy and support for the dead Americans. Numerous protests have been announced for the next few days against the attackers.

In short, the response from Libya suggests a broad national rejection at both the governmental and societal level of the anti-American agitation. The leaders have said the right things and have done their part to quickly pre-empt a spiral of conflict and recrimination between Americans and Libyans. And the United States has in turn responded with a calm but firm response which unequivocally condemned the attacks but committed to continuing to cooperate with Libyans against a common challenge. And, as President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton both emphasized repeatedly in their remarks today, many Libyans came to the defense of the Americans at the consulate -- exactly the right move, isolating and marginalizing the violent attackers rather than exaggerating and empowering their claims. And they will need it, as the attacks also clearly demonstrate Libya's ongoing problems of state capacity -- lack of adequate capability to ensure security, to disarm militias, or to police such outbursts.

In Egypt, on the other hand, President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood has been notably invisible. To this point, we have heard no statements from Egyptian government officials condemning the assault on the embassy, no expressions of concern or sympathy, no suggestion of any fault on their own side. The Muslim Brotherhood had previously been planning rallies against the notorious film, and at the time of this writing has not canceled them. Even when they finally issued a statement condemning the violence in Libya, they were not forthcoming on Cairo. They seem far more concerned at the moment with their domestic political interest in protecting their right flank against Salafi outbidding than with behaving like the governing party of a state.

Morsi and the Brotherhood do not seem to understand, or perhaps they simply do not care, how important their public stance is today in defining their image. The United States has taken real risks by engaging with the Brotherhood, pushing for democratic change despite their likely victory in fair elections, and insisting that the Egyptian military allow the completion of the transition after Morsi's victory. That was necessary to have any hope of genuine democratic change in Egypt, and the right position to take. But I suspect that many in Washington will feel that they have been repaid with Morsi's silence after the breach of the embassy wall which could well have resulted in the same kind of tragedy as in Benghazi. And that will have enduring effects on the nature and extent of American support for Egypt's transition -- how much harder is it going to be to get debt relief through congress now? It is quite telling that Obama said nothing about Egypt in his remarks about the deaths in Benghazi.

The response to the attacks by Libyans and Egyptians is in many ways more important than the attacks themselves, and certainly more important than the absurd film. President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood are facing a critical test right now ... whether or not they realize its importance.

http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/20 ... _and_egypt

Analise de quem cunhou o termo primavera árabe dos eventos das embaixadas.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The 11 September killing of the U.S. ambassador and three of his colleagues is a stark reminder of Libya’s security challenges. It also should serve as a wake-up call. There is, of course, more than one way to look at the country today: as one of the more encouraging Arab uprisings, recovering faster than expected; or as a country of regions and localities pulling in different directions, beset by intercommunal strife and where well-armed groups freely roam. Evidence exists for both: successful elections on one hand, violent attacks on the other. In truth, the most and the least promising features of post-Qadhafi Libya stem from a single reality. Because the country lacks a fully functioning state, effective army or police, local actors – notables, civilian and military councils, revolutionary brigades – have stepped in to provide safety, mediate disputes and impose ceasefires. It will not be easy and will have to be done gingerly, but it is past time to reverse the tide, reform army and police and establish structures of a functioning state that can ensure implementation of ceasefire agreements and tackle root causes of conflict.

Colonel Qadhafi’s bloody end and the collapse of Libya’s police and armed forces left in its wake an armed population with 42 years worth of pent-up grievances. Qadhafi’s longstanding divide-and-rule strategy set communities against one other, each vying for a share of resources and the regime’s favour. Some towns grew wealthy thanks to connections with the ruling elite; others suffered badly. Meanwhile, the security apparatus at once fomented, manipulated and managed intra-communal conflicts. Once the lid was removed, there was every reason to fear a free-for-all, as the myriad of armed groups that proliferated during the rebellion sought material advantage, political influence or, more simply, revenge. This was all the more so given the security vacuum produced by the regime’s precipitous fall.

A measure of chaos ensued, but up to a point only. Communal clashes erupted across the nation both during and after the 2011 conflict. Tensions that had long been left simmering on the back burner came to a boil, aggravated by the diverging positions various communities took vis-à-vis Qadhafi’s regime. That most of the fighting ended relatively quickly owes in no small measure to the efforts of local leaders, revolutionary brigades and the variety of civilian and military councils that took it upon themselves to keep the country whole. The ad hoc security patchwork registered significant and even surprising success. But it is no model; even as it manages to contain conflicts, it simultaneously fuels them. Some armed groups cannot resist the temptation to target foes and settle scores; battle for political and economic influence; evade accountability; and entrench geographic and community rivalries.

Until now, central authorities have acted chiefly as bystanders, in effect subcontracting security to largely autonomous armed groups. They had a reason: the army and police were in disarray, suffering from a deficit in personnel and equipment; officers and soldiers had either defected, fled, been killed or jailed. The rebels who rose up against Qadhafi were much better armed and – both suspicious of remnants of the old regime and pleased with their newfound power – unwilling to either surrender their autonomy or come under state control. Yet, it would be wrong to see the parallel military and police forces that emerged as having done so against the central authorities’ wishes. Rather, and although they were set up by revolutionary brigades themselves, the Libyan Shield Forces and Supreme Security Committee – the former operating parallel to the army, the latter to the police – were authorised and encouraged to take action by the ruling National Transitional Council, which viewed them as auxiliary forces without which the state simply could not secure the country.

Just as armed groups physically have kept warring parties apart, so have local notables led negotiations designed to achieve longer-lasting ceasefires. Appealing to the higher ideals of Libyan identity and Islam and resorting to social pressure as well as customary law, they have proved remarkably effective mediators.

However, none of this offers a sustainable solution. Truces are fragile, local conflicts frozen rather than durably resolved. In stepping into the breach, local notables and armed groups have done what the government could not. But effective implementation of ceasefire agreements depends in large part on an impartial authority capable of providing services and enforcing decisions. The involvement of revolutionary brigades and local armed groups in efforts to end hostilities blurs the line separating neutral mediation from partisan meddling. In some instances, their attempts to simultaneously play the role of army, police, mediator, judge and jury have helped revive old communal hostilities or competition for control over smuggling routes. The hope is that the central state can set up truly national forces equipped to deal with local disputes, notably a gendarmerie and elite auxiliary corps within the army. Until then, reliance on revolutionary brigades and local armed forces will continue to be an uncertain wager.

Perhaps most serious is the fact that, in the absence of a strong state, agreements mostly have remained dead letters. Disputes are rooted in competing claims over land, property and power that pre-existed Qadhafi and were first exacerbated by his regime’s clientelism and patronage networks, next by communities’ varying positions during the uprising, and finally by acts of revenge in its aftermath. To resolve them requires clear, written understandings, government follow-up, genuine enforcement and accountability. Too, it necessitates proper policing of borders; fair determination of land ownership where the old regime resorted to confiscation; and some form of transitional justice. All are sorely lacking. Although local notables negotiate agreements, these are seldom unambiguous, committed to paper or coordinated with central authorities. Without an effective government, strong state institutions or police force, follow-through is implausible. The judicial system is overwhelmed and the establishment of a justice and reconciliation process awaits. Hard-earned reconciliation agreements founder.

There is much to celebrate in post-Qadhafi Libya but also reason to worry. The battle between central government and armed groups is not yet won, yet of late the latter have been acting as if they enjoyed the upper hand. If steps are not swiftly taken, reversing this trend is only going to get harder – and what has been a relatively good news story could turn depressingly sour.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To address immediate security needs

To the Government of Libya and the General National Congress (GNC):

1. Set up an interim Crisis Management Unit comprising the prime minister, interior minister, defence minister, and the chief of staff of the armed forces, as well as the heads of the Libyan Shield Forces and Supreme Security Committee or their successors, charged with:

a) coordinating emergency responses to communal conflicts and other armed threats;

b) overseeing governance of areas of the country that are declared “military zones”; and

c) authorising a special inter-ministerial task force answering to the prime minister to implement any decisions related to peace settlements or extraordinary governance issues arising within “military zones”.

2. Create a special inter-ministerial task force answering to the prime minister, with representatives from the interior and defence ministries, that would:

a) send representatives from the aforementioned ministries to councils of notables to observe peace negotiations and operate a direct line of communication to relevant ministers and GNC representatives during these;

b) ensure peace agreements are written and specific enough to be implemented; and

c) monitor and oversee implementation of peace settlements through the justice system or relevant ministries and ensure local notables and affected communities are aware of what is being done.

To the Government of Libya and social and tribal leaders (hukama’), notables, prominent personalities and family heads (‘a’yan and wujaha’) participating in reconciliation councils (lijan al-hukama’):

3. Ensure effective and coordinated monitoring of con­flict zones, reporting back to each other and to the inter-ministerial task force on early warning signs of possible renewed conflict.

4. Consult with all relevant parties as to the feasibility of implementation when considering demands pre­sen­ted to reconciliation councils.

5. Commit peace settlements to writing.

6. Seek the support of international technical experts in conflict resolution, where appropriate.

To the Defence Ministry, including the Chief of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces:

7. Appoint observers answering directly to the armed forces chief of staff to liaise with the Libyan Shield Forces, border guard units and military councils in conflict zones.

8. Include, for as long as their contracts with the government are active, the Libyan Shield Forces in non-com­bat-related training programs provided by the international community.

To the Libyan Shield Forces, Supreme Security Committee and regional coalitions of revolutionary brigades:

9. Support the work of the Crisis Management Unit and the inter-ministerial task force dedicated to implementing peace settlements in conflict zones.

To the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the European Union:

10. Carry out, with the government’s assent and cooperation, an assessment of the army, Libyan Shield Forces and border guard units in military zones, focusing on their performance; status and origins of their weapons stocks; recruitment from, as well as relations with local armed groups and communities; and border management activities.

11. Task observation missions to monitor the progress and implementation of ceasefire agreements in com­munal conflict areas.

To address longer-term institutional security issues

To the Defence Ministry, including the Chief of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces:

12. Create a new auxiliary corps within the army in charge of future internal deployments to military zones, com­manded by well-vetted, politically unaffiliated military officers and comprising thoroughly-trained fighters from the Libyan Shield Forces and army.

13. Provide incentives for the retirement of existing senior military staff.

To the Interior Ministry:

14. Create a new gendarmerie that will assume responsibility from the army as well as local councils for front line policing duties, including monitoring activities of armed groups, controlling narcotics flows and combating other illicit activities.

15. Form units gradually on a geographically mixed basis and assign such units with a good track record to more challenging conflict areas.

16. Close the Supreme Security Committee, phasing its recruits – subject to the satisfactory completion of training – into the new gendarmerie force.

To the Libyan Shield Forces, Supreme Security Committee and regional coalitions of revolutionary brigades:

17. Cooperate in selecting appropriate officers and fighters for inclusion in a new army corps and gendarmerie, preparing unit commanders for eventual integration.

To the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the European Union:

18. Support the creation of a gendarmerie, replacing the Supreme Security Committee, and of a new auxiliary force within the army, replacing the Libyan Shield Forces.

Tripoli/Brussels, 14 September 2012
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/m ... licts.aspx

Aqui a analise toda
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/File ... flicts.pdf

Revolta ecoa por diversos países de população majoritariamente muçulmana.

É obvio que usaram o filme que - segundo eles - difama Maomé como desculpa para inflamar as multidões, ainda mais levando-se em conta a data escolhida.

Ou seja... O filme serviu para catalizar estas manifestações, que aconteceriam com ou sem ele.

Mas ouso dizer que tal película, tão perniciosa aos olhos dos muçulmanos, lhes fez também um grande favor.

O de superar os sentimentos sectários entre sunitas e xiitas, unindo-os.

Como é perceptível que a muitos interessa o sectarismo, se dentre esses existem envolvidos com a produção do tal filme, deram um tiro no pé ao fornecerem ao mesmo tempo munição e coesão para os adversários.

Olha a imagem que eu encontrei...eles acham que é "Brasileiros fãs do clube Grêmio agitando uma bandeira com a imagem de Osama bin Laden e está escrito: Nós gostamos desse cara .. Nunca se curva"

http://4flying.com/showthread.php?t=86918&page=21

Mas isto vem de encontro ao que eu ando a dizer e espero que o ocidente TODO não baixe as calças desta vez.

Estamos a falar de um filme feito nos EUA. Ninguém obriga a população desses países a ver esse tipo de filmes. Não se pode silenciar a liberdade de expressão para atender um grupo religioso que cada vez é mais perigoso.

Não foi um tiro no pé, na minha opinião. Mostra o que ninguém quer ver. O crescimento agressivo da religião muçulmana como força intolerante. Uma nova inquisição, desta vez muçulmana que ataca quem acha que eles não tem razão. Já assassinaram cartoonistas, queimaram jornais e agora isto. Já estão a atacar embaixadas de outros países ocidentais.

Pergunto eu: E se o filme fosse feito por brasileiros?

A inquisição era assim. O povo apoiava. Não era imposto. Mas isso foi à 300 anos. Será que um cidadão de um país livre não se pode expressar contra a religião muçulmana?
Continuemos assim e os nossos netos vão ser obrigados a ser muçulmanos e mortos se não aceitarem.

tflash escreveu:Mas isto vem de encontro ao que eu ando a dizer e espero que o ocidente TODO não baixe as calças desta vez.

Estamos a falar de um filme feito nos EUA. Ninguém obriga a população desses países a ver esse tipo de filmes. Não se pode silenciar a liberdade de expressão para atender um grupo religioso que cada vez é mais perigoso.

Não foi um tiro no pé, na minha opinião. Mostra o que ninguém quer ver. O crescimento agressivo da religião muçulmana como força intolerante. Uma nova inquisição, desta vez muçulmana que ataca quem acha que eles não tem razão. Já assassinaram cartoonistas, queimaram jornais e agora isto. Já estão a atacar embaixadas de outros países ocidentais.

Pergunto eu: E se o filme fosse feito por brasileiros?

A inquisição era assim. O povo apoiava. Não era imposto. Mas isso foi à 300 anos. Será que um cidadão de um país livre não se pode expressar contra a religião muçulmana?
Continuemos assim e os nossos netos vão ser obrigados a ser muçulmanos e mortos se não aceitarem.

Eu concordo com você, tratam extremistas como se fosse crianças radioativas e que podem explodir a qualquer momento, por qualquer coisa, e a culpa da explosão será sua.

Como se fossem animais raivosos e selvagens que, se te matam, não são culpados da morte, pois são animais. Pois esses que aí estão matando são homens, se eles se comportam como cães, mordendo a tudo que lhes desagrada, que sejam então tratados como cães.

Quer viver como um animal do século III, viva, mas eu não sou obrigado a tolher o meu pensamento ou contorcer a minha vida, por você ou sua religião.

Acho ridículo que alguns países do ocidente consigam criticar a realização do tal “filme” com as declarações mais absurdas possíveis, é alimentar a cobra que vai te matar um dia.

Era um filme ridículo, feio, mal feito e que provavelmente foi feito para agredir mesmo, tendo em vista a origem, mas isso não me dá o direito de ameaçar de morte quem o fez.

Isso me preocupa muito, como ateu.

tflash escreveu:Mas isto vem de encontro ao que eu ando a dizer e espero que o ocidente TODO não baixe as calças desta vez.

Além de não "baixar as calças" outra coisa boa é que o Ocidente parasse de se intrometer onde não lhe diz respeito, como por exemplo, na Síria.

O crescimento agressivo da religião muçulmana como força intolerante. Uma nova inquisição, desta vez muçulmana que ataca quem acha que eles não tem razão.

Na Líbia não existiam Jihadistas atacando embaixadas no tempo de Khadaffi. Foram armados e apoiados por este mesmo Ocidente de "calças baixadas", que achou uma excelente idéia se intrometer nos assuntos internos de um país muçulmano para favorecer esta ou aquela corrente. Calhou que algumas destas facções que venceram a luta, acham que tem o direito de matar ocidentais por causa de um filme ou de uma caricatura. Resumindo, este "crescimento agressivo da religião muçulmana", na Líbia, foi facilitado com dólares dos contribuintes americanos, e euros dos contribuintes franceses e demais europeus, durante a intervenção para "salvar a democracia na Líbia". Talvez, até mesmo, com euros de portugueses e espanhóis...

Observe-se que a embaixada americana não foi atacada na Síria. Mas, o Ocidente, liderado pela França e pelos Estados Unidos, mantém elementos de operações especiais, descaracterizados, intervindo abertamente na guerra civil contra a ditadura Assad, do lado dos jihadistas e da al-Qaida. Quando Assad cair, também vamos ver embaixadas ocidentais queimando pela ação destes mesmos jihadistas. Quem viver, verá.

Concordo plenamente.

São os mesmos que pediram ajuda ao ocidente e se não fosse esse mesmo ocidente, não eram nada. São povos com uma cultura do sec. XV com meios modernos. Não estão preparados para viver no mundo moderno, sociedade da informação e por aí a fora.

Agora... Eles pediram ajuda ao Ocidente...

Comportam-se como crianças mimadas exactamente por essa mania de sermos politicamente correctos. Faz se muita coisa contra religiões. há bandas de música que se declaram satânicas e tem videoclips provocatórios. Não há agora um videoclip ou curta-metragem em que uma mulher se masturba com um crucifixo? Não morreu ninguém por isso.

Não se pode ser tolerante com culturas que só vêem a preto e branco e querem obrigar os outros a ver como eles.

É uma questão de sobrevivência.

tflash escreveu:Mas isto vem de encontro ao que eu ando a dizer e espero que o ocidente TODO não baixe as calças desta vez.

Estamos a falar de um filme feito nos EUA. Ninguém obriga a população desses países a ver esse tipo de filmes. Não se pode silenciar a liberdade de expressão para atender um grupo religioso que cada vez é mais perigoso.

Não foi um tiro no pé, na minha opinião. Mostra o que ninguém quer ver. O crescimento agressivo da religião muçulmana como força intolerante. Uma nova inquisição, desta vez muçulmana que ataca quem acha que eles não tem razão. Já assassinaram cartoonistas, queimaram jornais e agora isto. Já estão a atacar embaixadas de outros países ocidentais.

Pergunto eu: E se o filme fosse feito por brasileiros?

A inquisição era assim. O povo apoiava. Não era imposto. Mas isso foi à 300 anos. Será que um cidadão de um país livre não se pode expressar contra a religião muçulmana?
Continuemos assim e os nossos netos vão ser obrigados a ser muçulmanos e mortos se não aceitarem.

Pois é Tflash, os tempos da inquisição essa recebia apoio popular e bem, nao invadia embaixadas para matar pessoas, bem mais humana e justa.
O ocidente ja perdeu para o islã ao colocar a esquerda que apoia ele no poder, ja passou da hora de sanções a esse povo, de proibir imigração e restrições, nao por que sao maometanos, e sim porque se mostram cada dia mais intolerantes e violentos, cerceando a liberdade aonde passam, fazendo crimes e tudo mais.
Agora quanto a Siria, concordo com o Clermont, o ocidente tem nada que se meter la, só estão dando vitorias aos fundamentalistas maometanos...

tflash escreveu:Concordo plenamente.

São os mesmos que pediram ajuda ao ocidente e se não fosse esse mesmo ocidente, não eram nada. São povos com uma cultura do sec. XV com meios modernos. Não estão preparados para viver no mundo moderno, sociedade da informação e por aí a fora.

Agora... Eles pediram ajuda ao Ocidente...

Comportam-se como crianças mimadas exactamente por essa mania de sermos politicamente correctos. Faz se muita coisa contra religiões. há bandas de música que se declaram satânicas e tem videoclips provocatórios. Não há agora um videoclip ou curta-metragem em que uma mulher se masturba com um crucifixo? Não morreu ninguém por isso.

Não se pode ser tolerante com culturas que só vêem a preto e branco e querem obrigar os outros a ver como eles.

É uma questão de sobrevivência.

Campos e de concentração e extermínio?

Sabe que a pobreza e as intervenções no mundo muçulmano por ingleses, franceses, chineses, russos e etc tem aberto uma ferida de séculos e que o abismo agora não pode ser mais fechado. O modo de vida deles é impraticável por nós assim como o nosso parece ser por eles.