GEOPOLÍTICA

[Penguin]

Domingo, 30 de Outubro de 2011 - 07:15
Brasil será sexta economia mundial até o fim do ano

O Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) brasileiro deverá ultrapassar o do Reino Unido, segundo projeções do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) e das consultorias Economist Intelligente Unit (EIU) e Business Monitor Internacional (BMI), ainda neste ano. De acordo com a Folha, a estimativa mais recente, da EIU, prevê que o PIB do Brasil alcance US$ 2,44 trilhões, à frente de US$ 2,41 trilhões do PIB britânico. Com isso, o Brasil passará a ocupar a posição de sexta maior economia do mundo. No entanto, o país deverá perder a colocação para a Índia em 2013 e retomá-la apenas em 2014, ao ultrapassar a França.

[Penguin]

30/10/2011 - 05h01
Crise na Europa eleva Brasil a sexta economia mundial

ÉRICA FRAGA
DE SÃO PAULO

Graças à crise dos países desenvolvidos, neste ano, o Produto Interno Bruto brasileiro medido em dólares deverá ultrapassar o do Reino Unido, segundo projeções do Fundo Monetário Internacional e das consultorias EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit) e BMI (Business Monitor International). A reportagem está disponível para assinantes da Folha e do UOL, empresa controlada pelo Grupo Folha, que edita a Folha.

A estimativa mais recente, da EIU, prevê que o PIB do Brasil alcance US$ 2,44 trilhões, ante US$ 2,41 trilhões do PIB britânico. Com isso, o Brasil passará a ocupar a posição de sexta maior economia do mundo. Em 2010, ao deixar a Itália para trás, o país já havia alcançado o sétimo lugar.

Como a economia brasileira cresce em ritmo menor que a de outros emergentes asiáticos, em 2013, o país deverá perder a sexta posição para a Índia. Mas voltará a recuperá-la em 2014, ano da Copa do Mundo, ao ultrapassar a França, segundo a EIU.

Até o fim da década, o PIB brasileiro se tornará maior do que o de qualquer país europeu, de acordo com projeções da EIU. Depois de passar Reino Unido e França, a economia brasileira deverá deixar a alemã para trás em 2020.

A tendência de ascensão dos emergentes já era esperada por especialistas há anos, mas tem ganhado velocidade devido à crise global.

[Boss]

Normal perder a posição para a Índia (e ainda assim vamos recuperar passando a França ), acho até incrível eles ainda estarem atrás de nós com tanta gente.

[Marino]

Oil’s new world order

By Daniel Yergin., Published: October 28 , 2011
WASHINGTON POST

For more than five decades, the world’s oil map has centered on the
Middle East. No matter what new energy resources were discovered and
developed elsewhere, virtually all forecasts indicated that U.S.
reliance on Mideast oil supplies was destined to grow. This seemingly
irreversible reality has shaped not only U.S. energy policy and
economic policy, but also geopolitics and the entire global economy.
But today, what appeared irreversible is being reversed. The outline
of a new world oil map is emerging, and it is centered not on the
Middle East but on the Western Hemisphere. The new energy axis runs
from Alberta, Canada, down through North Dakota and South Texas, past
a major new discovery off the coast of French Guyana to huge offshore
oil deposits found near Brazil.
This shift carries great significance for the supply and the politics
of world oil. And, for all the debates and speeches about energy
independence throughout the years, the transformation is happening not
as part of some grand design or major policy effort, but almost
accidentally. This shift was not planned — it is a product of a series
of unrelated initiatives and technological breakthroughs that,
together, are taking on a decidedly hemispheric cast.
The search for a “hemispheric energy policy” for the United States has
been a subject of discussion ever since the oil crises and supply
disruptions of the 1970s. Yet it was never easy to pin down exactly
what such a policy would mean. Some years ago, an economic adviser to
a presidential candidate dropped in to see me, explaining the
directive that his boss had given him: “You know that Western
hemispheric energy policy that I have been giving speeches about?
Could you talk to some people around the country and find out what I
actually mean by a Western hemispheric energy policy?”
The notion of “hemispheric energy” in the 1970s and 1980s rested on
two pillars. One was Venezuela, which had been a reliable petroleum
exporter since World War II. The other was Mexico, caught up in a
great oil boom that had transformed the United States’ southern
neighbor from an oil importer into a major exporter.
But since Hugo Chavez took power in Venezuela, its petroleum output
has fallen — about 25 percent since 2000. Moreover, Venezuela does not
seem quite the pillar to rely on when its leader denounces “the U.S.
empire” as “the biggest menace on our planet” and aligns his country
with Iran. And Mexico, which depends on oil for 35 percent of its
government revenue, is struggling with declining output. Without
reform to its oil sector and international investment, it could become
an importer of oil later this decade.
The new hemispheric outlook is based on resources that were not
seriously in play until recent years — all of them made possible by
technological breakthroughs and advances. They are “oil sands” in
Canada, “pre-salt” deposits in Brazil and “tight oil” in the United
States.
In little more than a decade, Canada’s oil sands have gone from being
a fringe resource to a major one. Oil sands (sometimes known as “tar
sands”) are composed of very heavy oil mixed with clay and sand. The
oil is so heavy and molasses-like that, for the most part, it does not
flow until it is separated from the sand and clay and treated. To do
that on a large scale and on a commercial basis has required
substantial advances in engineering over the past 15 years.
Oil sands production in Canada today is 1.5 million barrels per day —
more oil than Libya exported before its civil war. Canadian oil sands
output could double to 3 million barrels per day by the beginning of
the next decade. This increase, along with its other oil output, would
make Canada a larger oil producer than Iran — becoming the world’s
fifth largest, behind Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United States and
China.
The oil sands have become particularly controversial because of
environmental groups’ vigorous opposition to the proposed 1,700-mile
Keystone XL pipeline, which would carry oil from Alberta to the Texas
coast. The pipeline is waiting for the Obama administration to say
“yea” or “nay.” Though large, it would increase the length of the oil
pipeline network in the United States by just 1 percent.
The main reason given for the opposition is the carbon dioxide
associated with oil sands production, but the impact of this should be
considered in the context of the overall release of CO2. When measured
all the way from “well to wheels” — that is, from production to what
comes out of an auto tailpipe — oil sands average 5 to 15 percent more
carbon dioxide than the average barrel of oil used in the United
States. And this country uses other streams of oil that generate CO2
in the same range.
Even while the environmental argument rages, oil sands are proving to
be a major contributor to energy security. Although it is easy to
assume that most U.S. oil imports come from the Middle East, the
largest individual share by far — nearly a quarter of the total —
comes from Canada, part of a dense network of economic ties that makes
Canada the United States’ largest trading partner. More than half of
Canada’s oil exports to the United States come from oil sands, and
that share will rise steeply in the years ahead.
At the other end of that hemispheric oil axis is Brazil. When Brazil
began to develop ethanol from sugar in the 1970s, it did so based on
the conviction that the country had no oil. As it turns out, Brazil
has lots of oil. Just the increase in Brazilian oil production since
2000 is more than one and a half times greater than the country’s
entire ethanol output.
In the middle of the last decade, new breakthroughs in technology made
possible the identification and development of huge oil resources off
the southern coast of Brazil that until then had been hidden below a
belt of salt a mile thick. The salt had rendered unreadable the
seismic signals necessary to determine whether oil was there. “The
breakthrough was pure mathematics,” said Jose Sergio Gabrielli de
Azevedo, the president of Petrobras, Brazil’s national oil company.
“We developed the algorithms that enabled us to take out the
disturbances and look right through the salt layer.” Once discovered,
further technical advances were required to cope with the
peculiarities of the salt layer, which, sludge-like, keeps shifting.
Developing these “pre-salt” resources, as they’ve become known, is a
big technical, political and logistical challenge for Brazil, and will
require huge investments. But, if development proceeds at a reasonable
pace, Brazil could be producing 5 million barrels of oil per day by
around 2020, about twice Venezuela’s current output — and more than
half the current output of Saudi Arabia. That would make Brazil, not
Venezuela, the powerhouse of Latin American oil, and could make it a
major exporter to the United States.
The third major supply development has emerged right here in the
United States: the application of shale-gas technology — horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing, a process popularly known as
“fracking” — to the extraction of oil from dense rock. The rock is so
hard that, without those technologies, the oil would not flow. That is
why it is called “tight oil.”
Case study No. 1 is in North Dakota, where, just eight years ago, a
rock formation known as the Bakken, a couple of miles underground, was
producing a measly 10,000 barrels of oil per day. Today, it yields
almost half a million barrels per day, turning North Dakota into the
fourth-largest oil-producing state in the country, as well as the
state with the lowest unemployment rate.
Similar development is taking place in other parts of the country,
including South Texas and West Texas. Altogether, tight oil production
is growing very fast. The total output in the United States was just
200,000 barrels per day in 2000. Around 2020, it could reach 3 million
barrels per day — a third of the total U.S. oil production. (And that
is a conservative estimate; others are much higher.)
Together, these three developments will radically alter the global
flow of oil. The Western Hemisphere will still require supplies from
the rest of the world, but not to the same degree — and certainly
nowhere near the growing amounts forecast just a few years ago. The
need could fall by as much as half by 2020, which will mean declining
imports from the Middle East and West Africa.
Oil that would have gone west from those regions will instead flow in
increasing volumes to the east — to the booming emerging markets of
Asia. And those markets will be in urgent need of additional supplies.
China, which today consumes half as much oil as the United States,
could by the beginning of the next decade overtake America as the
world’s largest oil consumer. All of this points to a major
geopolitical shift, with Asian economies having an increasing stake in
the stability of Mideast oil supplies. It also raises a very
significant question over the next several years: How will
responsibility be shared among the great powers for the stability of
the Persian Gulf?
For the United States, these new sources of supply add to energy
security in ways that were not anticipated. There is only one world
oil market, so the United States — like other countries — will still
be vulnerable to disruptions, and the sheer size of the oil resources
in the Persian Gulf will continue to make the region strategically
important for the world economy. But the new sources closer to home
will make our supply system more resilient. For the Western
Hemisphere, the shift means that more oil will flow north to south and
south to north, rather than east to west. All this demonstrates how
innovation is redrawing the map of world oil — and remaking our energy
future.

Daniel Yergin is chairman of IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates
and the author of “The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of
the Modern World.”

[Carlos Mathias]

Que nos preparemos muito bem então.

[Sterrius]

o mais chato é que por mais que a gente construa refinarias se continuar nesse ritmo nunca vamos refinar tudo que produzimos ou mesmo chegar perto dos 70-80% de refino que seria uma taxa boa.

Atualmente só conseguimos manter a taxa atual/anos 2000.

[prp]

PQP ninguém segura esse país.

[Marino]

Brazil’s Quest for Superpower Status

Written by Peter Collecott, Guest Contributor
29 October 2011
DIPLOMATIC COURIER

Brazil’s quest for superpower status has a long history. Initially,
this was probably rooted in the Brazilian sense of size and uniqueness
– a continental sized country, with immense natural resources and
geographical and ethnic diversity; yet united by a common language,
Portuguese – as opposed to Spanish in the rest of Latin America - and
by a sense of a distinct history. Importantly, Brazil’s modern
history, following 300 years of colonial neglect and exploitation,
began in 1806 with the arrival of the Portuguese Court, escaping from
Napoleonic Europe. The Portuguese Empire was ruled from Rio de Janeiro
until 1821. Then in 1822 Dom Pedro famously decided not to follow his
father back to Portugal, but to declare Brazilian independence, and
himself the monarch of a Brazilian Empire! In no sense – except size -
did Brazil deserve this title at that stage; certainly not in terms of
being an economic or political power on the world stage, incorporated
as it was in practice in the 19th century British Imperial system.
However, the aspiration was there.

After 100 years of nation building – including a futile war against
Paraguay, but, more importantly, the settling of the rest of Brazil’s
many borders peacefully; the move from an Empire to a Republic; and
the sucking in of huge numbers of European and Japanese immigrants to
move from a slave economy to a wage economy – Brazil was confident
enough to exert itself on the world stage. Although not involved in
the First World War, Brazil was a founder member of the League of
Nations in 1919, and was rapidly recognised as a serious player in
multilateral discussions, even if not a central player. This is a
diplomatic tradition which Brazil has continued to burnish, leading to
influence far beyond its economic or political weight for much of the
20th century.

The year 1928 at the League of Nations saw Brazil’s first high profile
bid for something approaching superpower status. Brazil was already a
respected member of the League’s Council. The major European powers
had just signed the Locarno Treaty, a central element of which was
Germany’s admission to the League, and the provision of a new
permanent seat for her on the League’s Council. This was naturally
controversial amongst the second rank powers. However, only Spain and
Brazil refused to accept the compromise hammered out, each insisting
on permanent seats on the Council for themselves if Germany was to get
one. Initially, Brazil claimed to be doing this on behalf of Latin
America, but was rapidly disavowed by her neighbours. Brazil’s
autocratic President Bernandes refused to back down, and in 1929
withdrew Brazil from the League, never to return.

At the end of the Second World War Brazil counted herself amongst the
victorious Allies. Following vacillation early in the War, and then
successful American economic and political pressure, Brazil entered
the War on the Allied side in 1942, and became the only Latin American
country to send troops to Europe. This formed the backdrop to the
suggestion, it seems from President Roosevelt, during US discussions
on the future UN organisation, that Brazil should have a Permanent
seat on the Security Council of the embryonic body. The suggestion was
apparently quickly quashed by US staff. However, the myth persists,
not least in Brazil’s proud diplomatic tradition, that Brazil came
within a whisker of being a founding Permanent Member. For some who
like conspiracy theories, this was further evidence that Brazil was
being denied its natural status by the then hegemonic powers.

For much of the post-war period, the Brazilian quest for greater
status remained dormant. International organisations, and
international relations, were dominated by the Cold War superpower
rivalry, and Brazil was firmly on the anti-communist side. Brazil was
also looking inwards, continuing to generate rapid economic growth,
but on the basis of nationalistic and autarkic policies behind high
protectionist barriers, and plagued by periodic currency or inflation
crises. Politically the country was unstable, with various autocratic
regimes punctured by democratic experiments, until the military took
over in 1964. This was not the time for attempts to improve Brazil’s
international status.

Most of this changed in the 1980s. The end of the Cold War coincided
with the Brazilian military gradually giving up power, and a return to
democratic politics, this time in a more institutionally stable
manner. Economic stability took much longer to achieve, but was now
based on at least partial liberalisation, as Brazil began to exploit
its natural resources, agricultural productivity and industrial base
in a globalising world. Brazil’s interest in exerting influence in
multilateral negotiations – whether on trade policy or nuclear non-
proliferation – therefore increased, and it used its diplomatic
strengths to build a reputation as a moderate player, able to draw on
G77 support and broker compromise, and hence to move itself into the
inner circles of major organisations and multilateral negotiations.

This has been most obvious in trade policy. Based on highly expert
trade diplomacy, Brazil has successfully challenged developed world
protectionism; and also made herself indispensable to an ambitious
outcome of the Doha Round. The clearest manifestation of this was
Brazil’s formation in 2003 of the (trade) G20, and the subsequent
inclusion of Brazil and India, nominally as leaders of the G20, along
with the EU and the US as the informal core of the Doha negotiations.

A similar story is playing itself out in the international Climate
Change negotiations under the UNFCCC. A combination of Brazilian
activism – hosting the Rio Conference in 1992, and the Rio+20 event in
2012; diplomatic engagement, including chairing one of the main
negotiating committees in the intervening years – and its natural
endowment as an “ecological superpower”, have made Brazil a central
player, at times to the consternation of Western powers, such as in
Copenhagen with the tough stance of the BASIC countries (Brazil, South
Africa, India, China).

Such groupings of major Emerging Economies became a hallmark of
Brazilian foreign policy under Lula, starting with IBSA (India,
Brazil, South Africa), then the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China),
and BASIC. These groupings were attractive partly for economic
reasons, as Brazil went with the trends of globalisation and
successfully diversified its trade dependencies away from the US and
Europe and more towards the South – a policy which contributed to the
country being able to weather the recent Global Financial Crisis so
well. However, the link-ups with other Emerging Powers also had
political motives, as Brazil sought allies to tip multilateral
negotiations in its direction, and to challenge Western dominance of
international organisations. Such groupings had the advantage of weak
or non-existent institutions, offering Brazil maximum flexibility.
However, this was all done in a moderate and relatively quiet way.
They used to tell me, as British Ambassador, that the language of the
shifting of the tectonic plates of global power, and of the Emerging
Powers, was not their language – but they were happy for others, like
the UK, to be using it! This ambivalence came through when Goldman
Sachs coined the BRIC sobriquet in 2001. Initially the Brazilians were
not sure they liked it. However, as soon as it gained currency, they
embraced it, and agree to give it rapid institutional form with
meetings of Foreign Ministers and then Heads of State.

Their relationship with the OECD neatly demonstrates the balancing act
the Brazilians were performing through this period. Over the years
Brazil had become the non-member country with the closest engagement
with the OECD, including participation in many technical committees.
Despite this, they remained reluctant to adapt to OECD norms, for
instance on the form of Double Taxation Agreements; and to join the
OECD, except in “good company” – meaning, probably, other major
Emerging Powers. Brazil was becoming a developed economy, but still
wished to be seen as a leader of the developing countries.

With growing confidence in the sustainability of its economic
performance, the stability of its institutions, and the international
prestige of its President, Lula, Brazil resumed its quest for greater
formal recognition of its size and influence. In particular, it
resumed its overt quest for Permanent Membership of the UN Security
Council, having been reluctant to push this under Cardoso, Lula’s
predecessor. In a reflection of 1928, discussions of Security Council
reform had started off being essentially about admission of the
vanquished – this time round Germany and Japan – to the victors’
table. However, the dynamic was changed in 2005 with the formal
emergence of the G4 (these two plus Brazil and India) as a more or
less united alliance pushing for Permanent Membership for all four.
This coherence owed a lot to the professionalism of Brazilian
diplomacy. Early fruits were support for the G4 (plus a
“representative of Africa”) from France and the UK. The US and China
have proved harder nuts to crack. And regional rivalries surrounding
each of the G4 continue to bog down the process. Nevertheless, for
Brazil and others, this is the big prize - formal recognition that the
global power balance has shifted since 1945, and of the political
status of Emerging Powers in this new world. They will continue to
work for what they see as the inevitable eventual recognition of their
status. Yet even here lurks another paradox. Brazil wants the
recognition afforded by the existing institutions, and so does not
want to overturn or replace them; but does want to transform them into
something different. When challenged to demonstrate their fitness for
global leadership by standing up to threats to global peace and
security, and taking a firmer line on human rights, the Brazilians say
they want to be a “different kind” of Permanent Member – relying not
on hard but soft power; on negotiation, not coercion; firmly
multilateral, not threatening unilateral action, nor intruding on
sovereignty.

While Brazil is having to be patient on the UN Security Council front,
events have continued to give them confidence that the world is
beginning to see things their way. A first taste of this was Tony
Blair’s inclusion of the so called “+5” (Brazil, India, China, South
Africa, Mexico) in part of the 2005 G8 Summit at Gleneagles – although
the initial proposal to include only the first four was even more
attractive to Brazil, not least because it would have played well into
the Security Council debate. The subsequent G8+5 process was a first,
imperfect, recognition of the need to integrate the Emerging Powers
into the institutions of global governance. This was given a massive
boost by the Global Financial Crisis, which gave such a shove to the
tectonic plates that there was rapid recognition that the big Emerging
Powers had to be involved in measures to resolve the crisis. The
(finance) G20 was rapidly elevated to Head of Government level as the
principal forum for the discussion of global economic issues. The
central involvement of the Emerging Powers in global political
governance cannot be far behind many, including the Emerging Powers
themselves, believe.

So, after almost two hundred years, Brazil’s quest for the global
status she instinctively feels is her due, is certainly part way to
fulfilment. The country’s economic, and hence political, power is
finally catching up with the Brazilians’ conception of themselves, and
with the position that Brazil has built up in multilateral
institutions by its active diplomacy. Recognition and status - even if
not yet the final accolade of a Permanent UNSC seat - have come
Brazil’s way rapidly in the past decade. Brazil will certainly play an
increasingly influential role internationally. Not quite a superpower
perhaps, but a major influence on many global issues. This may suit
Brazil well. There are unresolved issues over Brazil’s relationship
with its region; and over the degree of change of the international
system Brazil wishes to see. The current position as an engaged
Emerging Power is much more comfortable than the earlier balancing act
between Developeds and Developings; and allows Brazil to play a role
in shaping the future global order from within, rather than perceiving
the world as constantly thwarting its legitimate aspirations.

Peter Collecott is a former career diplomat who was British Ambassador
in Brazil from 2004 to 2008. He now advises private and public sector
bodies on relations with Brazil, including as a founder member of ADRg
Ambassadors LLP, a group of former Ambassadors engaged in offering
corporate diplomacy, international mediation and training services.

[Bender]

Brazil’s Quest for Superpower Status

Written by Peter Collecott, Guest Contributor
29 October 2011
DIPLOMATIC COURIER

Um artigo compacto,com excelente resumo histórico e clara percepção política da evolução e anseios da diplomacia brasileira através dos tempos.


"O Brasil certamente irá desempenhar um papél cada vez mais influente no âmbito internacional. Talvez não seja ainda hoje uma superpotência, mas já exerce uma grande influência em muitas das questões globais,nas quais se insere de forma natural.

Há questões ainda não resolvidas na relação do Brasil com os pares da sua região, e sobre o grau de mudança do sistema atual da comunidade internacional que o Brasil deseja que se estabeleça.

Hoje parece estar mais confortável em uma posição de potência emergente ativa e influente do que na forma anterior em que se equilibrava entre os "desenvolvidos e não desenvolvidos" ,isso permite que o Brasil consiga desempenhar um papel mais efetivo,na formação de uma futura ordem mundial, a partir do seio das questões, ao invés de se achar em um mundo que constantemente frustra suas aspirações legítimas."


SDS.

[Grifon]

E o TNP...

Potências nucleares planejam renovar arsenais

As potências nucleares do planeta estão planejando gastar centenas de bilhões de libras na modernização e reforço de seus arsenais nucleares ao longo dos 10 próximos anos, de acordo com um relatório abrangente publicado na segunda-feira.

A despeito das pressões sobre os orçamentos governamentais e da retórica internacional quanto ao desarmamento, os indícios apontam para uma nova e perigosa "era de armas nucleares", de acordo com o relatório British American Security Information Council (Basic). O estudo estima que os Estados Unidos gastarão US$ 700 bilhões em despesas de armamento nuclear ao longo da próxima década, enquanto a Rússia gastará pelo menos US$ 70 bilhões em veículos de disparo Outros países, entre os quais Índia, China, Israel, França e Paquistão, devem dedicar montantes formidáveis a sistemas de mísseis táticos e estratégicos.

Em diversos países, entre os quais Rússia, Paquistão, Israel e França, as armas nucleares estão recebendo missões que vão bem além da dissuasão, alerta o estudo, e agora devem "desempenhar papéis bélicos no planejamento militar".

O relatório é o primeiro em uma série de estudos solicitados pela Trident Commission, uma iniciativa independente e pluripartidária criada pela Basic. Os principais integrantes da comissão são Sir Malcolm Rifkind, ex-ministro da Defesa pelo Partido Conservador; Sir Menzies Campbell, antigo porta-voz do Partido Liberal Democrata para questões de defesa; e lorde Browne, antigo secretário da Defesa pelo Partido Trabalhista.

Há fortes argumentos, eles alegam, em favor de uma revisão fundamental da política britânica quanto a armas nucleares. Os conservadores do governo britânico de coalizão afirmam que querem manter um sistema de armas nucleares cuja base são os mísseis Trident. Mas concordaram em que seja realizada uma auditoria sobre o "custo/benefício" de potenciais substitutos para o Trident; a aquisição de quatro novos submarinos nucleares como plataforma de lançamento para os mísseis custaria, só ela, quase 25 bilhões de libras, de acordo com as mais recentes estimativas oficiais. Os liberais democratas querem estudar outras possibilidades. O estudo, comandado pelo analista de segurança Ian Kearne, leva o título "Além do Reino Unido: as tendências dos demais países dotados de armas nucleares".

O estudo alerta que Paquistão e Índia parecem estar desenvolvendo ogivas nucleares menores e mais leves, para que possam atingir maior alcance ou ser empregadas para fins táticos ou "não estratégicos", contra alvos próximos. No caso de Israel, as dimensões de sua frota de submarinos, composta por embarcações capazes de lançar mísseis de cruzeiro, estão sendo ampliadas, e o país parece estar caminhando bem para o desenvolvimento de um míssil balístico intercontinental (ICBM), tomando por base seu programa de lançadores de satélites.

Uma justificativa comum para os novos programas de armas nucleares é a percepção de vulnerabilidade diante do desenvolvimento de forças nucleares e convencionais por outros países. Por exemplo, a Rússia expressou preocupação quanto ao programa de defesa antimísseis e o programa de ataque convencional acelerado dos Estados Unidos. A China expressou preocupações semelhantes quanto aos Estados Unidos e Índia, e os programas indianos são propelidos por medo do Paquistão e da China.

O Paquistão justifica seu programa de armas nucleares mencionando a superioridade indiana em forças militares convencionais.

Em análise país a país, o relatório afirma:

Os Estados Unidos planejam gastar US$ 700 bilhões em armas nucleares nos próximos 10 anos. US$ 92 bilhões adicionais serão gastos em novas ogivas nucleares, e os norte-americanos planejam construir 12 novos submarinos nucleares balísticos, mísseis de cruzeiro nucleares para lançamento por aviões e novas bombas atômicas.
A Rússia planeja investir US$ 70 bilhões para atualizar sua tríade estratégica (sistemas terrestres, aéreos e marítimos de disparo), até 2020. O país vai introduzir mísseis intercontinentais móveis dotados de múltiplas ogivas, e uma nova geração de submarinos nucleares dotados tanto de mísseis balísticos quanto de mísseis de cruzeiro. A Rússia também planeja reforçar 10 brigadas de seu exército com um míssil nuclear de curto alcance, ao longo dos 10 próximos anos.

A China vem reforçando rapidamente seu arsenal de mísseis móveis de médio e longo alcance, equipados com múltiplas ogivas. Há até cinco submarinos em construção com a capacidade de lançar entre 36 e 60 mísseis balísticos, o que poderia permitir que os chineses mantivessem uma dessas embarcações em operação no mar o tempo todo.

A França acaba de colocar em operação quatro novos submarinos equipados com mísseis de alcance mais longo e uma "ogiva mais robusta", e também está modernizando suas unidades de bombardeio nuclear.

O Paquistão está ampliando o alcance de seus mísseis Shaheen II, desenvolvendo mísseis de cruzeiro com ogivas nucleares, melhorando o design de suas bombas atômicas e criando ogivas menores e mais leves. Também está instalando novos reatores para a geração de plutônio.

A Índia está desenvolvendo novas versões dos mísseis terrestres Agni, com alcance suficiente para cobrir todo o território paquistanês e largas porções da China, entre as quais Pequim. Desenvolveu um míssil de cruzeiro nuclear para navios de superfície e planeja construir cinco submarinos equipados com mísseis nucleares.
Israel está ampliando o alcance de seu míssil Jericho III, e desenvolvendo capacidade de disparo submarino, para sua frota expandida de submarinos armados de mísseis de cruzeiro dotados de ogivas nucleares.

A Coreia do Norte revelou um novo míssil Musudan em 2010, com alcance de até quatro mil quilômetros e capaz de atingir alvos no Japão. Testou com sucesso o Taepong-2, com possível alcance de quase 10 mil quilômetros, o que permitiria atingir o território continental dos Estados Unidos. Mas o relatório aduz que "não se sabe ao certo se a Coreia do Norte conseguiu desenvolver a capacidade de produzir ogivas nucleares pequenas o bastante para que sejam disparadas por esses mísseis".
O estudo não trata das aspirações nucleares do Irã.

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/1000 ... nais.shtml

[FoxHound]

E o TNP...

Potências nucleares planejam renovar arsenais

As potências nucleares do planeta estão planejando gastar centenas de bilhões de libras na modernização e reforço de seus arsenais nucleares ao longo dos 10 próximos anos, de acordo com um relatório abrangente publicado na segunda-feira.

A despeito das pressões sobre os orçamentos governamentais e da retórica internacional quanto ao desarmamento, os indícios apontam para uma nova e perigosa "era de armas nucleares", de acordo com o relatório British American Security Information Council (Basic). O estudo estima que os Estados Unidos gastarão US$ 700 bilhões em despesas de armamento nuclear ao longo da próxima década, enquanto a Rússia gastará pelo menos US$ 70 bilhões em veículos de disparo Outros países, entre os quais Índia, China, Israel, França e Paquistão, devem dedicar montantes formidáveis a sistemas de mísseis táticos e estratégicos.

Em diversos países, entre os quais Rússia, Paquistão, Israel e França, as armas nucleares estão recebendo missões que vão bem além da dissuasão, alerta o estudo, e agora devem "desempenhar papéis bélicos no planejamento militar".

O relatório é o primeiro em uma série de estudos solicitados pela Trident Commission, uma iniciativa independente e pluripartidária criada pela Basic. Os principais integrantes da comissão são Sir Malcolm Rifkind, ex-ministro da Defesa pelo Partido Conservador; Sir Menzies Campbell, antigo porta-voz do Partido Liberal Democrata para questões de defesa; e lorde Browne, antigo secretário da Defesa pelo Partido Trabalhista.

Há fortes argumentos, eles alegam, em favor de uma revisão fundamental da política britânica quanto a armas nucleares. Os conservadores do governo britânico de coalizão afirmam que querem manter um sistema de armas nucleares cuja base são os mísseis Trident. Mas concordaram em que seja realizada uma auditoria sobre o "custo/benefício" de potenciais substitutos para o Trident; a aquisição de quatro novos submarinos nucleares como plataforma de lançamento para os mísseis custaria, só ela, quase 25 bilhões de libras, de acordo com as mais recentes estimativas oficiais. Os liberais democratas querem estudar outras possibilidades. O estudo, comandado pelo analista de segurança Ian Kearne, leva o título "Além do Reino Unido: as tendências dos demais países dotados de armas nucleares".

O estudo alerta que Paquistão e Índia parecem estar desenvolvendo ogivas nucleares menores e mais leves, para que possam atingir maior alcance ou ser empregadas para fins táticos ou "não estratégicos", contra alvos próximos. No caso de Israel, as dimensões de sua frota de submarinos, composta por embarcações capazes de lançar mísseis de cruzeiro, estão sendo ampliadas, e o país parece estar caminhando bem para o desenvolvimento de um míssil balístico intercontinental (ICBM), tomando por base seu programa de lançadores de satélites.

Uma justificativa comum para os novos programas de armas nucleares é a percepção de vulnerabilidade diante do desenvolvimento de forças nucleares e convencionais por outros países. Por exemplo, a Rússia expressou preocupação quanto ao programa de defesa antimísseis e o programa de ataque convencional acelerado dos Estados Unidos. A China expressou preocupações semelhantes quanto aos Estados Unidos e Índia, e os programas indianos são propelidos por medo do Paquistão e da China.

O Paquistão justifica seu programa de armas nucleares mencionando a superioridade indiana em forças militares convencionais.

Em análise país a país, o relatório afirma:

Os Estados Unidos planejam gastar US$ 700 bilhões em armas nucleares nos próximos 10 anos. US$ 92 bilhões adicionais serão gastos em novas ogivas nucleares, e os norte-americanos planejam construir 12 novos submarinos nucleares balísticos, mísseis de cruzeiro nucleares para lançamento por aviões e novas bombas atômicas.
A Rússia planeja investir US$ 70 bilhões para atualizar sua tríade estratégica (sistemas terrestres, aéreos e marítimos de disparo), até 2020. O país vai introduzir mísseis intercontinentais móveis dotados de múltiplas ogivas, e uma nova geração de submarinos nucleares dotados tanto de mísseis balísticos quanto de mísseis de cruzeiro. A Rússia também planeja reforçar 10 brigadas de seu exército com um míssil nuclear de curto alcance, ao longo dos 10 próximos anos.

A China vem reforçando rapidamente seu arsenal de mísseis móveis de médio e longo alcance, equipados com múltiplas ogivas. Há até cinco submarinos em construção com a capacidade de lançar entre 36 e 60 mísseis balísticos, o que poderia permitir que os chineses mantivessem uma dessas embarcações em operação no mar o tempo todo.

A França acaba de colocar em operação quatro novos submarinos equipados com mísseis de alcance mais longo e uma "ogiva mais robusta", e também está modernizando suas unidades de bombardeio nuclear.

O Paquistão está ampliando o alcance de seus mísseis Shaheen II, desenvolvendo mísseis de cruzeiro com ogivas nucleares, melhorando o design de suas bombas atômicas e criando ogivas menores e mais leves. Também está instalando novos reatores para a geração de plutônio.

A Índia está desenvolvendo novas versões dos mísseis terrestres Agni, com alcance suficiente para cobrir todo o território paquistanês e largas porções da China, entre as quais Pequim. Desenvolveu um míssil de cruzeiro nuclear para navios de superfície e planeja construir cinco submarinos equipados com mísseis nucleares.
Israel está ampliando o alcance de seu míssil Jericho III, e desenvolvendo capacidade de disparo submarino, para sua frota expandida de submarinos armados de mísseis de cruzeiro dotados de ogivas nucleares.

A Coreia do Norte revelou um novo míssil Musudan em 2010, com alcance de até quatro mil quilômetros e capaz de atingir alvos no Japão. Testou com sucesso o Taepong-2, com possível alcance de quase 10 mil quilômetros, o que permitiria atingir o território continental dos Estados Unidos. Mas o relatório aduz que "não se sabe ao certo se a Coreia do Norte conseguiu desenvolver a capacidade de produzir ogivas nucleares pequenas o bastante para que sejam disparadas por esses mísseis".
O estudo não trata das aspirações nucleares do Irã.

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/1000 ... nais.shtml

Os gastos militares hoje são maiores do foi na época da Guerra Fria mesmo com os EUA e a Europa em crise.

[Slotrop]

TNP só no dos outros.

[Carlos Mathias]

Toma No Prechéu.

[Boss]

Acho que só se um governo extremista tomar poder aqui para rasgarmos tal tratato lesa-pátria e quaisquer outras brechas para o pleno uso soberano de todos nossos meios.

Improvável, o mais próximo que chegamos de um governo decente em termos de defesa até agora foi o PT, que não é grande coisa.

[Marino]

Vizinhança explosiva
por Octávio Costa
O Itamaraty acompanha com preocupação os passos do Irã para obter urânio na América do Sul. Primeiro, Teerã
fez contato com a Venezuela, que descobriu reservas em Bolívar, na fronteira com o Brasil. Depois foi a vez da Bolívia,
cujo governo se disse favorável à exportação do minério radioativo. Agora, o Irã negocia com a Guiana, que também
possui reservas na região de fronteira com Roraima, onde prolifera a mineração ilegal – o que agrava o problema. A
Europa também está preocupada. Diplomatas da Alemanha, em audiência com políticos do DEM, alertaram sobre o
risco de fornecer urânio ao Irã.