Fórum Defesa Brasil

CABEÇA, desenvestimento ou racionalidade ! , pra que servem mais de 40 ou 60 caças pra um paiz como a HOLANDA ..!sejamos sensatos.

Pra segurar um urso cafungando em suas costas, como o urso está hibernando algum "jenio" acha que não há necessidade.

O verdadeiro e giganteeeeeeeeeee urso que realmente assombra é o que mordeu a GRECIA , realmente é perigoso e todas as defesas possiveis sao necessarias, e é esse urso que deve ter assombrado os precavidos HOLANDESES.

A verdadeira guerra fria se trava na OMC , DOOHA e negociações similares.

O magnifico SU 35 , TU 160, e futuro PAK 50, sao pra defesa, nao pra ataque , o urso nao esta dormindo , ele esta na porta de casa , bem acordado apenas querendo se defender , e nao atacar....

Concurrency costs for the F-35 now exceed $1,192 million, a Senate panel said, and “a potentially serious issue…critical to its EW capability” has been discovered.(Lockheed photo)

F-35 Production Quality Worries Senate Panel (edited excerpt)


(Source: Reuters; published June 5, 2012)

WASHINGTON --- The U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday questioned the quality of production on the Lockheed Martin Corp F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, citing a "potentially serious issue" with its electronic warfare capability.

"The committee is ... concerned about production quality and whether it is sufficient to ensure the delivery of JSF aircraft to the U.S. and its allies at an affordable price," the committee said in a report accompanying its fiscal 2013 defense budget bill.

Italy has already scaled back its planned orders for the new, radar-evading warplane and several other countries are slowing their orders, citing budgetary pressures. Japan has warned it could cancel its order if the cost per plane rises from what it was offered.

…/…

Questions over the quality of production of the F-35 will compound the mounting woes of the $396 billion Pentagon program, which has already been restructured three times in recent years to extend the development phase and slow production.

The committee said it was troubled by the average rate of scrap, rework and repair at Lockheed's Fort Worth, Texas facility from 2009 through the first two months of 2012, but gave no details.

"Inattention to production quality" had led to the discovery of a potentially serious issue with an aperture on the plane that was critical to its electronic warfare capability, the report said. The full extent of the problem was not known, but it underscored the need for the Pentagon and Lockheed to "rigorously manage production quality," it said.

Lockheed has hired about 200 temporary workers to keep production of the F-35 and F-16 fighters on track at the Fort Worth plant, where 3,300 union workers are in the seventh week of a strike over pension and health care benefits.

Lockheed says the new workers are being carefully trained, but union officials have questioned whether the quality of production -- already an issue -- would be maintained by workers with less experience on the complex weapons system.

No new talks have been scheduled. (end of excerpt)


Click here for the full report on the Reuters website.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/ ... 3520120606

(ends)

Um fato me chama tristemente a atenção: enquanto parecemos ter apenas UM Hugo Napoleão no Congresso, no deles parece haver montes...

Controversy Erupts Over Simulation Test of F-35 In Fighter Jet Purchase


(Source: Yonhap news agency; published June 07, 2012)



SEOUL --- A plan to conduct performance tests of Lockheed Martin's F-35 using simulators, not an actual test flight by a South Korean pilot, has stirred up controversy here as Seoul prepares to buy an advanced fleet of stealth fighters.

Boeing's F-15 SE, Lockheed's F-35 and EADS Eurofighter are competing to win a huge deal worth upward of 10 trillion won (US$8.5 billion) to sell 60 combat fighters to South Korea, which will choose a supplier in October.

On-site performance tests will be held in June for the F-35, in August for the F-15 SE and in September for the Eurofighter, according to officials at the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), South Korea's state arms procurement agency, on Thursday.

While Boeing and EADS agreed to carry out performance tests through actual flights with a Korean pilot on board, Lockheed refused to do so, saying the radar-evading warplane is not in service and still under development.

The flight-test schedule of the single-seat F-35 has been delayed, raising concerns over rising costs and that the aircraft may not be available until 2020.

"Because the F-35 is now under development, only F-35 pilots can fly it," a DAPA official said.

Instead, the DAPA asked Lockheed to conduct performance tests with simulators and a Korean pilot on board a different fighter jet and tracking the F-35, the official said.

The plan, however, has raised questions about proper performance tests.

The U.S. government is the main customer and financial contributor for Lockheed's F-35 program, valued at more than $300 billion. Also, eight countries, including Britain, Canada and Turkey, are taking part in the largest weapons program in history by shouldering some development costs.

South Korea has purchased 60 of Boeing's F-15 fighter jets since 2002 under the first two stages of the fighter modernization program, code-named "F-X."

-ends-

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articl ... -f_35.html

Essa é uma das vantagens em não adquirir um equipamento militar sofisticadíssimo no início, adquirindo posteriormente: livra-se de vários problemas. Aliás, o F-35 é um projeto até mais ambicioso que o F-22, uma vez que se tenta convergir 3 caças de características de operações bem divergentes num único', ao contrário do F-22, que embora seja um avancadíssimo caça de superioridade área, apenas tem essa atribuiçao precípua.

Os americanos vão dar um jeito no F-35, até porque eles precisam de uma aeronave de caça tripulada e com o tempo e economia de escala, ele ficará mais barato. Mas quando...

Se economia de escala significa reduçao ou barateamento do produto , porque o F 16 ainda é tao caro com mais de 4000 unidades produzidas !

Esses lotes de encomendas atuais de F-35 são classificados pela LM de "low rate production", cujo valor unitário é maior que aqueles que seriam de plena produção.

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance Restructuring and Address Affordability Risks


(Source: Government Accountability Office; issued June 14, 2012)



Joint Strike Fighter restructuring continued throughout 2011 and into 2012, adding to cost and schedule. The new program baseline projects total acquisition costs of $395.7 billion, an increase of $117.2 billion (42 percent) from the prior 2007 baseline.

Full rate production is now planned for 2019, a delay of 6 years from the 2007 baseline.

Unit costs per aircraft have doubled since start of development in 2001.

Critical dates for delivering warfighter requirements remain unsettled because of program uncertainties.

While the total number of aircraft DOD plans to buy has not changed, it has for 3 straight years reduced near-term procurement quantities, deferring aircraft and costs to future years.

Since 2002, the total quantity through 2017 has been reduced by three-fourths, from 1,591 to 365.

Affordability is a key challenge–annual acquisition funding needs average about $12.5 billion through 2037 and life-cycle operating and support costs are estimated at $1.1 trillion.

DOD has not thoroughly analyzed program impacts should funding expectations be unmet.

Overall performance in 2011 was mixed as the program achieved 6 of 11 important objectives. Developmental flight testing gained momentum and is now about 21 percent complete with the most challenging tasks still ahead. Performance of the short takeoff and vertical landing variant improved this year and its “probation” period to fix deficiencies was ended after 1 year with several fixes temporary and untested.

Developing and integrating the more than 24 million lines of software code continues to be of concern. Late software releases and concurrent work on multiple software blocks have delayed testing and training.

Development of critical mission systems providing core combat capabilities remains behind schedule and risky.

To date, only 4 percent of the mission systems required for full capability have been verified. Deficiencies with the helmet mounted display, integral to mission systems functionality and concepts of operation, are most problematic. The autonomic logistics information system, integral technology for improving aircraft availability and lowering support costs, is not fully developed.

Most of the instability in the program has been and continues to be the result of highly concurrent development, testing, and production activities.

Cost overruns on the first four annual procurement contracts total more than $1 billion and aircraft deliveries are on average more than 1 year late. Program officials said the government’s share of the cost growth is $672 million; this adds about $11 million to the price of each of the 63 aircraft under those contracts.

Effectively managing the expanding network of global suppliers will be key to improving program outcomes, increasing manufacturing throughput, and enabling higher production rates.

In addition to contract overruns, concurrency costs of at least $373 million have been incurred on production aircraft to correct deficiencies found in testing.

The manufacturing process is still absorbing higher than expected number of engineering changes resulting from flight testing, changes which are expected to persist at elevated levels into 2019, making it difficult to achieve efficient production rates. More design and manufacturing changes are expected as testing continues, bringing risks for more contract overruns and concurrency costs.

Even with the substantial reductions in near-term production quantities, DOD still plans to procure 365 aircraft for $69 billion before developmental flight tests are completed.

Why GAO Did This Study

The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is the Department of Defense’s (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is critical to DOD’s long-term recapitalization plans to replace hundreds of legacy aircraft.

Total U.S. investment is now projected at nearly $400 billion to develop and acquire 2,457 aircraft through 2037 and will require a long-term, sustained funding commitment. The JSF has been extensively restructured over the last 2 years to address relatively poor cost, schedule, and performance outcomes.

This report, prepared in response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, addresses (1) JSF program cost and schedule changes and affordability issues; (2) performance objectives, testing results, and technical risks; and (3) contract costs, concurrency impacts, and manufacturing. GAO’s work included analyses of a wide range of program documents and interviews with defense and contractor officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that (1) DOD analyze cost and program impacts from potentially reduced future funding levels and (2) assess the capability and challenges facing the JSF’s global supply chain. DOD concurred with the second recommendation and agreed with the value of the first, but believed its annual budget efforts are sufficient. GAO maintains that more robust data is needed and could be useful to congressional deliberations.


Click here for the full report (57 pages in PDF format) on the GAO website.
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articl ... gress.html

Continuo achando que é questão de tempo (e agravamento da crise, cujas notícias têm sido sistematicamente orientadas apenas para a Europa, escondendo o que está acontecendo nos EUA, cuja dívida ronda os USD 16 TRILHÕES e que se endivida à razão de cerca de USD 2 milhões POR MINUTO) para encerrarem este programa. Cedo ou tarde vão ter que botar a casa em ordem e um dos caminhos é acabar com programas militares caríssimos e altamente problemáticos com o do F-35.

Ou a casa cai.

O problema é que acabar com o F-35 a essa altura do campeonato vai sair mais caro do que continuar com o programa.

Creio que vai acontecer o mesmo que aconteceu com o Rafale/Typhoon... a evolução da aeronave só vai demorar mais tempo para acontecer.

Meus 2 cents

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CB_Lima

Acho que não, Lima véio. Uma economia de umas centenas de USD bi viria a calhar numa hora dessas...

Mas lembre tulio, se eles quebram contrato com os parceiros, vem multas e multas...

Ou seja, a casa vai cair do mesmo jeito.
A única coisa que temos a fazer é pegar a pipoca e assistir de camarote.