F-35 News

[AlbertoRJ]

De 3 a 6 por cento dá uma boa margem de diferença, fora que é um dado histórico, sujeito a ser revisado.

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[Penguin]

De 3 a 6 por cento dá uma boa margem de diferença, fora que é um dado histórico, sujeito a ser revisado.

[]'s

Depende da aeronave, da idade, do custo das peças, serviços, etc.

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[sapao]

Pode ser, mas historicamente os sucessores dos aviões de caça são consideravelmente mais caros de comprar e mais ainda de manter que seus antecessores.

Não acho que o preço seja caro, a aeronave realmente deverá ter equipamentos para sustentarem esse preço; o que eu acho um absurdo é dizer que vai entregar em X e demorar Y a mais do que o previsto para isso!
Se fosse por aqui já iam estar xingando todo mundo, se fosse russo ou chines então nem se fala!
Mas temos ai o F-35 e o A-400M que devem chegar depois do P-3 e um monte de desculpas. Não adianta, para mim dois projetos cagad*s e que so não cancelados porque o prejuizo ia ser maior ainda!

e o medidor de $$$$ contando...

[Penguin]

O dia chegou...antes do F-X2...

DATE:09/05/11
SOURCE:Flight International
Lockheed delivers 1st production F-35 to US Air Force
By Stephen Trimble

Lockheed Martin has delivered the first production F-35 Lightning II to the US military to reach a long-delayed milestone, but there remains no firm timetable for inducting the new aircraft into operational service.

US Air Force officials formally accepted series-production model AF-7 at Lockheed's final assembly plant in Fort Worth, Texas, on 5 May. The aircraft was then flown to Edwards AFB, California, to complete an airframe-specific flight test programme.

The hand-over marks the delivery of the first production jet nearly 10 years after Lockheed won the contract to deliver 1,763 F-35As to the US Air Force, plus a total of 640 F-35Bs and F-35Cs for the navy and Marine Corps, respectively.

"Today we begin to fulfil the vision of our government and international customers," said Larry Lawson, Lockheed's F-35 programme manager.

The milestone has been delayed several years from the original timetable set after contract award in 2001, with a costly redesign adopted in 2004 and two major schedule delays announced since last February.

Until earlier this year, the air force had planned to stand-up the first operational F-35 squadron by 2016. The latest schedule, however, delays the end of developmental testing to the end of 2016, forcing the in-service date for the F-35A into at least 2017 or 2018. But the precise date has not yet been determined by the air force as of late April.

Despite the programme's cost and schedule setbacks, the F-35's leadership team points to a new wave of progress in manufacturing and testing.

Although last of 13 flight test aircraft remains in final assembly, eight production model jets from the first two lots of low-rate initial production (LRIP) have rolled out of the assembly line.

But the earliest production jets proved more costly than the government estimated, with Lockheed's bills running as high as 15% over budget for the first three lots of LRIP.

[Penguin]

Ares
A Defense Technology Blog

First F-35A formally delivered
Posted by Guy Norris at 5/9/2011 5:59 PM CDT

The U.S. Air Force officially accepted the first F-35 Joint Strike Fighter from Lockheed Martin at its Fort Worth, Texas facility on May 5. The milestone, which occurred with the formal acceptance of F-35A AF-7, comes just under 10 years since the F-35 System Development and Demonstration contract was awarded to Lockheed, and around 14.5 years since the signing of the original JSF development contract.


AF-7, officially on the USAF books, arrives over Edwards AFB (Lockheed Martin)

Following its handover AF-7 was flown on May 6 to Edwards AFB, Calif, to join the flight test program. Lockheed Martin says overall the F-35s have completed more than 865 flights since flight-testing began in late 2006. In addition to AF-7, eight more production-model F-35s have rolled out and are being prepared for delivery. Under current planning, the Air Force is expected to acquire 1,763 F-35As.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/de ... d=blogDest

[Penguin]

Weapons roadmap...

GRAPHIC: Beyond AMRAAM, AIM-9X
By Stephen Trimble on May 10, 2011 1:49 PM
http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-d ... im-9x.html



The US Air Force has produced a handy guide for tracking the next generation of missile programmes, with a few very interesting surprises apparently tossed in to the mix. Included is a replacement for the AIM-9X Sidewinder ("small advanced capabilities missile"), which is envisioned to intercept both incoming missiles as well as other aircraft. There's also the "next generation missile", which appears to be the new term of choice for the dual-role air dominance missile -- a single weapon for internal carriage in the F-35 and F-22 to replace the AIM-120 AMRAAM and AGM-88 HARM. And, most interestingly, there's a timeline to integrate the first high-energy laser on a fighter, which is somewhere between mid to far term.

[sapao]

but there remains no firm timetable for inducting the new aircraft into operational service.

Assim,
não ENTREGOU para voar, para combater; entregou e vamos tocando...

Mas mesmo assim é um alivio, com certeza tira um pouco da pressão do projeto.

[soultrain]

Operational pilots should be thrilled with the F-35’s performance, Kelly said. The F-35 Energy-Management diagrams, which display an aircraft’s energy and maneuvering performance within its airspeed range and for different load factors, are similar to the F/A-18 but the F-35 offers better acceleration at certain points of the flight envelope.

“The E-M diagrams are very similar between the F-35B, F-35C and the F/A-18. There are some subtle differences in maximum turn rates and some slight differences in where corner airspeeds are exactly,” Kelly said.


Ahahaha, o F-35 é muito similar ao F/A-18 em performance...A boa noticia é que é bem melhor que o SH.

[Penguin]

Operational pilots should be thrilled with the F-35’s performance, Kelly said. The F-35 Energy-Management diagrams, which display an aircraft’s energy and maneuvering performance within its airspeed range and for different load factors, are similar to the F/A-18 but the F-35 offers better acceleration at certain points of the flight envelope.

“The E-M diagrams are very similar between the F-35B, F-35C and the F/A-18. There are some subtle differences in maximum turn rates and some slight differences in where corner airspeeds are exactly,” Kelly said.


Ahahaha, o F-35 é muito similar ao F/A-18 em performance...A boa noticia é que é bem melhor que o SH.

Creio que o programa de ensaios das 3 versoes, principalmente da B (STOVL, a mais compromissada e atrasada), ainda esta relativamente longe do fim e que o envelope de voo se expande nesse proccesso.

Logo, logo os F-35 invadirão os ceus europeus. Se todas as encomendas se materializarem, sera de longe o caca mais numeroso no velho continente junto com o Eurofighter

Paragrafo seguinte...

Thomas, who is also an F/A-18 pilot and a graduate of the Navy's Top Gun program and the Marines' Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course, agreed that all three variants should be lethal in the within-visual-range fight.

Link para a artigo:
F-35 Tests Proceed, Revealing F/A-18-Like Performance
Testing on STOVL Variant Said To Be 'Going Very Well'
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i= ... =AME&s=AIR

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[Junker]

F-35 fighter faces range shortfall -pentagon report
Fri May 13, 2011 5:27pm EDT

* Pentagon report says F-35 modifications being considered
* Lockheed Martin, Pentagon withhold comment
* US developing aircraft with eight other countries

By Jim Wolf

WASHINGTON, May 13 (Reuters) - U.S. Air Force's F-35 fighter, due to form the bulk of future U.S. tactical air power and to be bought by allies, may be able to fly only 85 percent as far as originally projected, a Pentagon document shows.

The radar-evading aircraft's "A" model is currently estimated to have a combat mission radius of 584 nautical miles, just short of the required 590 nautical miles, a Dec. 31-dated report to Congress said.

Program officials originally estimated that the F-35A would be able to hit targets 690 nautical miles away, unrefueled, or 15 percent more than now, the Department of Defense's "Selected Acquisition Report" showed.

The current combat radius prediction is based on estimates of the amount of compressed air diverted from the engine to run onboard systems as well on aircraft performance and fuel capacity that are not yet fully known, the report said.

"Current estimates have built-in margin that may not be realized," it said, adding that aircraft modifications were possible to add fuel capacity that would boost the range.

The F-35 family of fighters is the Pentagon's costliest arms purchase, projected to total some $382 billion over the coming two decades for 2,443 aircraft. Three models are being built for the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and allied countries by Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N).

The Pentagon report appeared first on the Dew Line, an aerospace blog.

Lockheed Martin, the Pentagon's No. 1 supplier by sales, did not respond to a request for comment, nor did the military's F-35 joint program office.

The Air Force is scheduled to buy 1,763 of the conventional takeoff and landing "A" models to replace F-16s and A-10s and to complement the F-22, the premier U.S. dogfighter.

F-35 early-production models are powered by the F135 engine built by Pratt & Whitney, a unit of United Technologies Corp (UTX.N).

As a "stealth" aircraft meant to appear as small as a bird on enemy radar, the F-35 carries no external fuel tanks and all of its weapons are carried inside a bomb bay.

Even as the F-35A's combat range may be shrinking, the costs for F-35 early-production models have been creeping up, straining a program for which affordability is meant to be a hallmark.

Range estimates have been cut for all three F-35 versions because of a growing expectation that they will need to "suck a little bit more power out of the engine" to run internal systems, including cooling, said Dave Majumdar, a pilot who is air warfare correspondent for Defense News, a trade publication. He said the "A" model had been affected the most.

Any engine-related performance questions could boost efforts by some U.S. lawmakers to revive a competitive engine program formally canceled last month by the Pentagon as unnecessary and wasteful.

"It certainly stirs the pot," said Winslow Wheeler, an F-35 critic at the private Center for Defense Information, citing what he called "more cost, less performance" of the aircraft.

The U.S. House of Representatives' Armed Services Committee voted 54-5 on Wednesday to require the Pentagon to let General Electric Co (GE.N) and Rolls-Royce Group Plc (RR.L) continue their joint development of an alternate engine for the F-35, as long as it was done at no cost to the government.

Eight countries have joined the United States to co-develop the jet -- Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark and Norway.

Competitors for foreign sales include Saab's Gripen, Dassault's Rafale, Russia's MiG-35 and Sukhoi Su-35 as well as the Eurofighter Typhoon made by a consortium of British, German, Italian and Spanish companies.

Another competitor is the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet built by Boeing Co (BA.N), which lists a combat radius of 500-plus nautical miles carrying three 480-gallon external tanks and four 1,000-pound bombs. (Reporting by Jim Wolf; Editing by Tim Dobbyn)

Thomson Reuters

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/ ... tor&rpc=43

[Penguin]

Estudo que tras detalhes sobre os requerimentos e metas de performance do programa F-35. Muita informacao ate entao classificada:

AU/ACSC/BOWMAN/AY08
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY

Scorecard
A Case study of the Joint Strike Fighter Program

by
Geoffrey P. Bowman, LCDR, USN


A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements
Advisor: Mr. Budd A. Jones
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
April 2008

Documento (pdf):

https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q ... nginespage

ou

http://alturl.com/ajfvf


Trecho:

[...]

Common Performance Parameters

There are several performance based parameters for which the services authored different thresholds and objectives. These differences were typically based on a service's unique mission requirements.

Combat radius is a Key Performance Parameter and is unique to each model of the JSF. Each service's threshold and objective combat radius parameters are listed below in Figure 1.13 The Navy's significant difference is based on its unique mission operating procedures that require not only more fuel for longer mission distances, but a larger reserve upon return to the aircraft carrier.

The USMC STOVL version's shorter range is based on its expeditionary mindset that assumes the mission will originate organically and therefore closer to the target area.

Payload requirements were similar for all three variants but differed in their demand for an internal gun. All variants called for at least four external stations capable of carrying all threshold weapons. A minimum of two stations must be capable of carrying and be plumbed for fuel tanks. The internal payload is where the difference is noted. All three required the ability to carry two AMRAAM air-air-missiles and two air-to-ground weapons in the two-thousand pound class, but there was disagreement on the need for an internal gun.

The CTOL variant demanded an internal gun, the STOVL called for a missionized gun, and the CV variant required that space be provided for either an internal or missionized gun.

The airspeed requirement also shares some similarities across all three variants. The JSF shares a requirement for its operational limit speed for each variant but differs slightly when it comes to requirements for operational speeds in level flight. The limit speed with internal weapons is 700 knots calibrated air speed (KCAS) or 1.6 MACH, whichever is less, "in order to provide adequate dash capability for a bugout maneuver." The level flight speed requirements for each variant are listed below in Figure 2.16 The configuration for the speeds listed is internal weapons only and makes no concessions for external pylons or weapons. The only notable difference is that the USAF CTOL variant requires the ability to achieve 1.0 MACH at sea level using maximum power.



Maneuverability is addressed in both general and specific terms. The requirement for all three variants is to provide a platform that will have a positive exchange ratio during air combat maneuvering (ACM) engagements against "high performance threats that employ helmet mounted cueing and high off-boresight weapons." The JSF must further possess high angle of attack (AOA) capabilities "similar in nature to (or better than) the F-18C." The fuel levels and payloads at which maneuverability is calculated differs for each variant but generally focuses on a post-weapons release payload and fuel state at 50% of the required combat radius. Figure 3 below lists the specific maneuverability requirements and shows the differences among the variants. The most notable differences are related to the USAF requirements for the CTOL JSF. The USAF includes a threshold requirement for a 9.0 G capability at 60% fuel and no air-to ground
ordnance remaining. In addition to the high-end requirement, the USAF also provides for a more realistic scenario of high altitude, large payload performance. The CTOL must have the capability of performing a 30 degree bank turn while still maintaining a 1000 foot per minute climb at 30,000 feet with a combat loadout of two external fuel tanks, two external JDAM, two internal JDAM, two internal AIM-120 missiles, and a fully loaded gun.




Air Force Mission Needs and Specific Performance Parameters

The USAF needs a strike fighter to replace the venerable A-10 attack platform and the aging F-16 multirole fighter. This replacement would be the "second tier" fighter behind the F-22 and perform the CAS role left empty by the A-10. The Air Force intends on buying large numbers and will need the costs kept reasonable. The JSF will be used to "support the USAF core competencies of Air and Space Superiority, Global Attack, Precision Engagement, and Agile Combat Support." It will complement the F-22 and bomber assets within the Command,Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture making interoperability essential to combat effectiveness.

Interoperability is seen as crucial because future operations are expected to require seamless information flow from the tactical to strategic (to include the President and Secretary of Defense) levels and back. Fulfilling these expectations under a program whose self-proclaimed cornerstone is "affordability" would be a tall order and require the USAF to pick and choose performance requirements carefully.


Navy Mission Needs and Specific Performance Parameters

The Navy needs a fifth generation stealth fighter/attack platform to replace its aging legacy F/A-18 A-C models and to complement the F/A-18 E/F. It is essential that the JSF work seamlessly with organic Carrier Strike Group assets as well as other assets within the joint and combined force structure. The Naval variant must have full interoperability within the C4ISR structure. In addition, CV variant must be capable of operating from both current CVN class carriers as well as future CVX models.

The capability to operate from a carrier is not as easy as it sounds. Additional weight comes in the form of stronger landing gear, fuselage center barrel strength, arresting hook structure, and additional electrical power requirements. The Navy has added approach speed as a service specific key performance parameter. The threshold for approach speed is 145 knots with 15 knots of wind over the deck. This must be possible at Required Carrier Landing Weight (RCLW). The RCLW is the sum of the aircraft operating weight, the minimum required bringback, and enough fuel for two instrument approaches and a 100nm BINGO profile to arrive at a divert airfield with 1000 pounds of fuel. The minimum required bringback is two 2000 pound air-to-ground weapons and two AIM-120s. The Navy further requires that the CV JSF be
capable of carrier recovery with internal and external stores; the external stations must have 1000 pound capability on the outboard stations and maximum station carriage weight on the inboard.


Marine Corps Needs and Specific Performance Parameters

The Marine Corps requires a Short Take-Off and Landing (STOVL) multi-role fighter to replace its aging AV-8B as well as its conventional F/A-18 A-C aircraft. The USMC variant must be able to operate from expeditionary airfields, Amphibious Assault Ships, and current and future Aircraft Carriers. The JSF must be able to meet or exceed legacy aircraft capability while incorporating stealth technology. It must further be fully integrated into the joint C4ISR architecture.

The Marine Corps has the added requirement of STOVL performance to address. The USMC has added STOVL performance as a service specific key performance parameter. The requirement is listed as follows:
With two 1000# JDAMs and two internal AIM-120s, full expendables, execute a 550 foot (450 UK STOVL) STO from LHA, LHD, and aircraft carriers (sea level, tropical day, 10 kts operational WOD) and with a combat radius of 450 nm (STOVL profile). Also must perform STOVL vertical landing with two 1000# JDAMs and two internal AIM-120s, full expendables, and fuel to fly the STOVL Recovery profile.

The Marine Corps has used the more limiting deck launch, rather than a simple expeditionary airfield, to frame its requirement.

[...]

[P44]

May 20, 2011
The aircraft that will destroy the US Air Supremacy (and the US Taxpayer...)
Extract:
"......Democrats and Republicans on the Senate Armed Services Committee expressed frustration with the program, the Pentagon’s largest acquisition effort. Ten years into the program, the cost has jumped from $233 billion to $385 billion. Recent estimates say the entire program could exceed $1 trillion over 50 years......"

http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/05/a ... ts-051911/

[AlbertoRJ]

Programa JSF um grande problema, mas existe alternativa?

Fonte: Defense & Professional
Tradução e Adaptação: Angelo D. Nicolaci

Ao longo de toda a história do desenvolvimento do F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), com seus altos e muitos, comentaristas e analistas têm sempre sido absolutamente unânimes em um ponto central: o programa é “um grande fracasso”, e nem a descoberta repetida de graves problemas técnicos, nem os aumentos contínuos de custos , vieram a ameaçar seriamente a sua viabilidade.

Mas então, os auditores do Lehman Brothers, também. E neste contexto, pode-se começar agora a se perguntar se a auditoria sobre o programa F-35 que iniciou dia 19 de Maio virá a representar uma espécie de divisor de águas, o momento em que tem que começar a pensar o impensável, ou seja, considerando as possíveis alternativas para o JSF.

Pessoas como o senador Carl Levin, presidente SASC; Ashton B. Carter, o subsecretário de Defesa para Aquisição, Tecnologia e Logística; H. Christine Fox, o diretor do Escritório de Custo de Avaliação do Programa (o escritório CAPE), Michael J. Gilmore , Diretor Operacional e Teste de Avaliação, o Sr. David M. Van Buren, Serviço de Aquisição e execução do programa JSF, o vice-almirante David Venlet, Executivo para o programa JSF, Michael Sullivan, diretor de aquisição e gestão de Sourcing (GAO); e o senador John McCain não abrem suas bocas em público apenas para ventilar suas amígdalas respectivos.

Afirmações como:

• “Esta Comissão tem sido um forte apoio ao programa JSF desde o início. No entanto, as pessoas não deveriam concluir que estaremos dispostos a continuar esse tipo de apoio, sem respeito ao aumento dos custos resultantes da falta de foco na acessibilidade “(Levin);

• “Os fatos sobre este programa são verdadeiramente preocupantes [...] depois de quase 10 anos no desenvolvimento e quatro anos de produção, o projeto da aeronave ainda não é estável, processos de produção ainda precisam melhorar e o sistema de armas em geral ainda não tenha sido comprovado ser confiável. Nenhum programa deve esperar para ser continuado com esse tipo de trajetória – especialmente em nosso clima fiscal atual”(McCain);

• “A acessibilidade para os EUA e os parceiros é desafiada por uma quase duplicação do preço unitário médio desde o início do programa e maiores custos estimados do ciclo de vida [...] testes de desenvolvimento mostram que ainda é cedo para demonstrar que a aeronave irá funcionar como pretendido e atender aos requisitos de combate” ( Sullivan);

• Os custos previstos para o programa são “inaceitaveis e insustentável [...] Nós queremos, mas tem que ser acessível. No momento em suas projeções, não é “(Carter, falando junto com Van Buren e Venlet);

e outras emissões para o mesmo efeito não podem ser julgadas, mas uma espécie de preleção. O programa JSF está em grandes apuros, não há como negar as coisas ou tentar varrer para debaixo do tapete.

Embora as questões relacionadas com a imaturidade técnica e os atrasos são sérios o suficiente, não há dúvida de que nas atuais circunstâncias financeiras dos EUA a explosão dos custos é de longe o elemento mais importante para ameaçar o futuro do programa. O financiamento do desenvolvimento total está estimado em 56,4 bilhões dólares para encerrar em 2018, um aumento de custos de 26% e uma alteração de cronograma de cinco anos a partir da linha de base atual do programa (que já está bem acima das previsões iniciais “). O custo médio de um F-35 aumentou para 95 milhões cada em 2002 para 133 milhões de dólares em 2011, contra uma estimativa inicial de 80 milhões. E, as novas estimativas de “ciclo de vida” do F-35 custa, incluindo o funcionamento, desenvolvimento e manutenção, agora 1 trilhão de dólares.

Como e por que o programa chegou em tal situação completamente preocupante no final, e o que poderia ser feito para tentar salvá-la?

A maioria, quando nem todos os participantes da audiência juntaram-se em apontar o dedo direto para a Lockheed Martin (LM). De acordo com o senador McCain, a empresa “tem feito um trabalho abismal em relação ao objetivo do contrato original”. Paradoxalmente, ele realmente deve ser esperado que este é realmente o caso, e que a gestão malfeita da LM e o sobreaquecimento são os únicos culpados. Se a LM é responsável, então ele pode ser razoavelmente esperado que após ter recebido tal aviso de popa, a empresa irá mudar seus caminhos e apressar os trabalhos para trazer rapidamente o programa de volta aos trilhos. A LM pode ceder à sugestão do senador McCain para o efeito que ela deva absorver pelo menos parte dos aumentos de custo, e mesmo a meta altamente preocupante dos custo do programa e do ciclo de vida em pelos “20% a 50%”, isso pode começar a soar viável.

É claro que tal previsão otimista implica necessariamente que se a Lockheed Martin pode agora salvar o programa, então eles poderiam ter feito isto de uma forma melhor e mais rentável desde o início, mas ignoraram isso enquanto Departamento de Defesa mantinha um alto investimento no programa. O Pentágono e o seu fornecedor monopolista da nova geração de aviões de combate, e à evolução futura de tais relações, mas nunca mente.

De longe o pior é a hipótese alternativa de que a LM realmente fez o melhor que podia, e todo o bafafá, na audiência, nada mais é do que a busca frenética por um bode expiatório conveniente. E se os problemas do JSF não são provenientes de uma má gestão industrial, mas sim ainda mais grave de problemas estruturais, por exemplo, tecnológicos e as necessidades operacionais a serem estabelecidas em níveis ambiciosos demais, as novas tecnologias sendo imposta sobre o programa, que são muito menos maduras do que se assumiu?

É assustadoramente claro que se este é realmente o caso, então, nenhuma quantidade de pressão a ser aplicada na Lockheed Martin poderia trazer o tão esperado resultado. A LM certamente poderia tentar definir o programa em um ritmo de desenvolvimento acelerado, mas isso inevitavelmente implica em custos mais elevados, que são por definição não aceitáveis. Se a LM não pode realmente ser culpada de ter sobrecarregado o DoD, reduções significativas de custos, só poderiam ser obtidas através de um cronograma que amplia ainda mais o tempo de desenvolvimento, ou inferiorizar as especificações, que também não é aceitável.

E depois? Carter afirmou que “não há alternativas ao JSF”, e isso é realmente muito verdadeiro em relação ao desempenho esperado da aeronave , e o previsto no total da frota de aviões de combate da Força Aérea. Mas enquanto verdade, a declaração de Carter também é totalmente irrelevante. A questão não é se os EUA e sua Força Aérea poderiam encontrar uma alternativa válida para o F-35, mas sim saber se podem pagar nas circunstâncias atuais.

A resposta não é tão simples e intuitiva como pode parecer.

Fonte: GeoPolítica Brasil
http://planobrasil.com/2011/05/25/progr ... ternativa/

[PRick]

Gente, vcs que tem mais informação sobre o Programa JFS. Como está o F-35B, morreu mesmo? Se isso ocorrer como vão ficar os NAes europeus que dependem de um caça deste tipo? Um novo Harrier? Ou vão virar Porta-Helos somente?

[]´w

[brisa]

O retorno dos Harries - A vingança